'there are plums in the ice box.' — Pie

What about the fish?

Hegel's concept of truth is not to be found in truth values: — Fooloso4

So now you seem to be saying he is an antirealist...

Well, if antirealism means not attributing a truth value to unknowns, then he is an antirealist. But he does not attribute truth value to knows either. It is the system as a whole not particulars that is true.

I am reminded of Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy:

The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.

Yes, that seems to be so.

P is true is just fancy talk for P. This is the 'redundancy' theory. — Pie

But truth, like most things, is not binary. Sentences have degrees of truth. Absolute truth is an edge case.

Therefore, P cannot be the same thing as P is true. P in itself cannot express the range of degrees the truth property of P can take.

Truth is just one property of P. It's semantic contents, its aesthetic appeal, the number of words, the language and dialect, are other properties of P.

P is the proposition, 'P is true' is a comment on P's property of truth.

I think a large part of the problem is that we have different ideas of what philosophy is about. I hold to the ancient idea of philosophy as a way of life. This does not mean making, defending, and attacking arguments, although that is a part of it. — Fooloso4

I want to live a wise life like just about anyone who survives their youth perhaps. All of us, philosophers or not, are under pressure to figure out which claims to trust. I also count rationality as a social virtue. I connect this to the desire to achieve consensus fairly. I see us as self-transcending beings, discarding narrow, one-sided views for something larger, something we can share. Wittgenstein demonstrates one aspect (the semantic) in what might be called the primacy of the social.

It is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another. — Kant

That applies to people in general, who don't seem to need us fussy philosophers. In strictly practical terms, mastering basic statistics, including the necessary math, is probably more valuable than reading Wittgenstein.

But truth, like most things, is not binary. — hypericin

As opposed to a few things that are ?

Sentences have degrees of truth. Absolute truth is an edge case. — hypericin

I think that they sometimes to, due to ambiguity primarily. But let us differentiate carefully here between imperfectly true statements (fuzzy logic, etc.) and the confidence we have in our beliefs.

Truth is just one property of P. It's semantic contents, its aesthetic appeal, the number of words, the language and dialect, are other properties of P.

P is the proposition, 'P is true' is a comment on P's property of truth. — hypericin

The issue though is whether truth is a property in the first place.

I use P as a symbol for the semantic payload of 'P'.

What distinction do you make between truth and values and do you consider it preferable (or even possible) for one's values to be mostly determined by true things? By values I mean things like democracy, secularism, scientific evidence (e.g., medical treatment versus prayer), feminism, etc.

I think that they sometimes to, due to ambiguity primarily. But let us differentiate carefully here between imperfectly true statements (fuzzy logic, etc.) and the confidence we have in our beliefs. — Pie

What's special about our confident beliefs?

Language is nothing if not ambiguous. Statements may be true, within a temporal window. They may be true, only within certain spatial coordninates. They may be true from some physical or mental perspectives, but not others. They may be true within the framework of some cultures and ideologies, but not others. They may be true in some perfectly legitimate interpretations, and false in other perfectly legitimate interpretations.

Even trivial toy examples, "The sky is blue", admit to this ambiguity. In one sense it is true. Yet is the sky itself a blue object in the way other blue objects are? No, the blue is a result of light scattering in the atmosphere, in a manner totally unlike blue objects in our everyday experience.

The issue though is whether truth is a property in the first place. — Pie

If truth can admit to degrees, which it does, then it must be a property.

I use P as a symbol for the semantic payload of 'P'. — Pie

There is not one definite semantic payload corresponding to a given sentence.

Fair enough. But what's a truthmaker for 'there are plums in the icebox'? Are you tempted to say something like...there being plums in the icebox? — Pie

Of course. It could be false.

But truth, like most things, is not binary. — hypericin

So... that's partially true?

If truth can admit to degrees, which it does, then it must be a property. — hypericin

Are you certain of this? To what degree?

Your argument, of course, applies to your own remarks, and so if it undermines everything, it undermines itself.

That language can be ambiguous is obvious. At issue is, what should we do about it?

What distinction do you make between truth and values and do you consider it preferable (or even possible) for one's values to be mostly determined by true things? — Tom Storm

Deep question ! I think we articulate values, make them explicit, as beliefs. 'No kid should go hungry in this country.' To me there's nothing wrong with this 'should.' It's just a value manifested as a belief about norms. I personally don't think rainbow or promises or marriages or square roots are less real than electrons or tables. They all figure in the same causal/explanatory nexus, which is (roughly) the structure of the world as we know it.

Because warranted beliefs can be false and unwarranted beliefs can be true, I think the best thing we can do is take care of warrant, presumably because we expect to end up with more true or at least less false beliefs this way. To me irrationality is a primary form of anti-sociality, but I don't deny that people like Ayn Rand can make cults around the word in violation of the referent. I'm still haunted by Orwell's 1984. 'Ministry of Truth.'

, I never could see much of use in the notion of truthmakers. Can either of you explain what they are for?

If truth can admit to degrees, which it does, then it must be a property. — hypericin

Or the world itself is vague in places.

.

So... that's partially true? — Banno

:up:

That language can be ambiguous is obvious. At issue is, what should we do about it? — Banno

:up:

A thread on Davidson would be as absurd as a single thread on Wittgenstein. But it might be interesting to start a thread on one of his essays - say Truth and Meaning, since it sets out his early views. — Banno

Well, I wasn't suggesting that the thread would cover all of Davidson's ideas.

We will disagree as to whether Davidson's ideas flow parallel with Wittgenstein, if you mean by parallel, there is agreement. Just from the little I read in the SEP, I don't get that idea. There are other philosophers who do a much better job of extending Wittgenstein's ideas.

And, of course, there is more to philosophy than Wittgenstein, who would think otherwise, certainly not me.

So... that's partially true? — Banno

Sure, in some contexts, propositional logic for instance, truth is binary.

Your argument, of course, applies to your own remarks, and so if it undermines everything, it undermines itself. — Banno

So it cannot be the state of affairs that truth has degrees, because if it did, it would be impossible to state that truth had degrees? Sophomoric argument.

In the real world we get by just fine without running around proclaiming absolute truths and falsities. My post is no different. To attempt to pigeonhole all propositions into T and F is to miss almost all the nuance of actual communication.

Of course. It could be false. — Luke

This is where the CorrTheory and the redundancy theory are very close. If plums being in the ice box are the 'truthmaker' for 'there are plums in the ice box,' then 'truthmaker' seems like too much of complement here.

For isn't this just a complicated way of saying that P is the truthmaker of 'P' ? But nothing is actually being added. No truth is being made. P is just (taken as) true.

.

I think the issue is truthmakers.

This much is agreed: “x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn’t generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold. Indeed sometimes there’s barely enough agreement amongst the parties to the truth-maker dispute for them to be disagreeing about a common subject matter.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

I think that @Banno and I both don't trust the notion much. It seems superfluous if not just confused.

This is weird and funny to me.

It seems obvious that for every true contingent proposition there must be something in the world (in the largest sense of “something”) which makes the proposition true. For consider any true contingent proposition and imagine that it is false. We must automatically imagine some difference in the world. (Armstrong 1973: 11)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/#Def

What in god's name is supposed to happen when we imagine that a proposition is false ? That just is imagining some difference in the world.

To attempt to pigeonhole all propositions into T and F is to miss almost all the nuance of actual communication. — hypericin

Is that T or F ? Or (T + F)/2 ?

There's something in there about the separation of facts and true propositions that chimes with my discussion with @Sam26. As if in the T-sentence, 'p' (on the left) is a truth-bearer, and p (on the right) a truth-maker. What would that tell us?

For any truth, there must be something in the world whose existence entails that truth. — Truthmaker Slogan

Tautologies look to be an obvious counterexample. What is the something in the world whose existence entails that truth (p v ~p)?

Truthbearers look like an attempt to resuscitate substantive theories of truth by reintroducing some sort of ontological implication for true statements. It looks wrong.

By values I mean things like democracy, secularism, scientific evidence (e.g., medical treatment versus prayer), feminism, etc. — Tom Storm

I could have answered this better. FWIW, I think it's hard to divorce rationality from anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-classism. It goes with free speech, democracy, and science. I'd argue that it also goes with a minimum standard of living to prevent the collapse of that which makes a rational society possible in the first place, such as education, safety, and leisure.

As if in the T-sentence, 'p' (on the left) is a truth-bearer, and p (on the right) a truth-maker. What would that tell us? — Banno

That would explain why CT feels so close and so far away to the redundancy theory.

I'm afraid that folks might want to interpret 'P' as a string of letters. I tend to interpret it that way, reserving P for the meaning of 'P.' (This may be nonstandard of me.)

I get the sense that CT wants to interpret the P as the truthbearer, letting 'atoms and the void' or something be the truthmaker.

So it cannot be the state of affairs that truth has degrees, because if it did, it would be impossible to state that truth had degrees? Sophomoric argument. — hypericin

Of course. A sophomoric reply for a sophomoric issue. Truth only ever admits of degrees... of truth. If what is suggested is an attempt to escape truth, then it fails.

Truthbearers look like an attempt to resuscitate substantive theories of truth by reintroducing some sort of ontological implication for true statements. It looks wrong. — Banno

Yeah. Still seems like unnecessary machinery to me.

It's as if assertion is brutally irreducible, which I'd connect to the primacy of the social and the publicity of meaning.

CC — Pie

CC?