But when they see the possibility of error they just jump to the conclusion that we must not be able to “know” the way they want and then they project the skeptical/metaphysical picture from there. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I understand that. My point is only that if one remembers the roots of philosophy in ordinary language, it might seem less of an extraordinary aberration to those who don't see the point.

Cavell, in Problems in Modern Aesthetics, points out that Kant (in his critique of judgment) says that we make aesthetic claims, like OLP’s descriptions of its examples, in a universal voice — Antony Nickles

Yes, I can see the point. So long as that voice is hopeful rather than dogmatic.

Wittgenstein is always leaving things unfinished, asking questions you have to change your perspective in order to answer. — Antony Nickles

Yes. I read somewhere that he was brought up with a practice, not of having heart to heart chats with people when he was going off the rails, but leaving a book by his bedside. I don't know if it's true, but it fits with his practice. It's risky, though.

The accusation of arrogance, in both cases, is the response of those who don't recognize the voice or don't find the expected lesson in the book.

to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility. — RussellA

What the dictionary says is not (to coin a phrase) definitive. In other words, the definitions in dictionaries have been developed by human beings are not exempt from criticism and revision. They are intended to capture the use of the word by ordinary speaker

You quoted two of the meanings in Merriam Webster. The full list has 9 main meanings with two or three variants for most of them. The two most important ones, in my book are "to perceive by the eye: to perceive the meaning or importance of". I think the latter is metaphorical. The use of "see" to cover "suppose" and "visualize" cited in Merriam Webster is, in my view, marginal and metaphorical. The Cambridge Dictionary has 9 meanings. Dictionary.com has 21 meanings.

Ayer maintains that "see" has two meanings, both of which are covered by "perceive by the eye". So he and Austin disagree about what the ordinary use is. Many people have agreed with Austin. I don't know that any philosopher has directly argued with Austin about his conclusion. Whether you are convinced by Austin's examples that Ayer is wrong is up to you.

I followed your link. That will take some digesting. But I will read it.

it’s almost like you have to read the whole thing, — Antony Nickles

I assume you mean the whole of the book. I'm afraid I have indeed read lecture XI and couldn't wait to share what I think is a jewel.

But it isn’t about language — Antony Nickles

I had taken a rather different direction, thinking about the "ordinary" in philosophy. Descartes starts his meditation from ordinary life. Perhaps that's just a pedagogical device, starting from where his audience is. Berkeley makes great play of his respect for "vulgar opinion" and "what is agreed on all hands", yet rejects "universal assent". Hume's view of the divide between ordinary life and philosophy is well enough known. And Ayer, as Austin points out, starts from the "ordinary" man (who, admittedly turns out to be a stalking-horse, to be slaughtered before the philosophical work can begin) and insists that both his senses of "perception" are ordinary (see p. 93)

It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject, it’s essence, is reflected in how we judge it, which is captured in the kinds of things we say about it in particular cases. — Antony Nickles

I would like to add, however, that it is at its best when it actually analyses the uses. His discussion of "real" is really illuminating, because, I suggest, it goes beyond "looking" and gives me what Wittgenstein might have called an "oversight" (in a non-standard sense) of the use of the word. In contrast, his dissection of "vague" and "precise" is effective enough, but doesn't take that step. Maybe I'm not being reasonable, but I think that extra step is important.

As the sense-data theory cannot show that OLP is invalid, OLP cannot show that the sense-data theory is invalid. — RussellA

Quite so. Perhaps this is where philosophy should begin. But it never does.

Until whilst walking through a town someone driving in a car runs over my foot. — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "understand".

So when I say "I directly see Mars", as there is no information within these photons that their source was Mars, I am using the word "directly" in a figurative rather than literal sense. — RussellA

So far as I know, no-one suggests that photons are the sense-data for the eyes. That would be an entirely different matter. For example, it would be very strange to say that what we see is photons.

c) without an intervening agency - buy direct from the manufacturer — RussellA

Yes. Now we need to work out what it means to buy something indirectly. If one buys from a shop, does one buy indirectly from the manufacturer? If so, I'm not sure that one can buy directly from anyone else. A nice puzzle.

So how does this work in the case of "directly see the car that ran over my foot"?

I don't deny that there's an issue about understanding modern research into vision. If one models the brain as a computer, one would have to classify something as data and something else as output. Both are tricky, but "experiences", "sense-data", "ideas", "impressions", "qualia" are not helpful concepts; they are simply waving one's arms about and worrying (or purporting to worry) about the "hard problem"; but this is simply defining the problem as insoluble, which may be a satisfactory outcome, depending on the point of view you started from. (See my first comment in this post.)

I'm sorry to have missed this fascinating discussion. There's this thing called ordinary life. Very intrusive, not to say annoying.

The symmetry is broken; and with it the two language theory. — Banno

Yes. But there's an additional step, which I think is the killer move. It occurs in the discussion of Warnock - XI pp. 141,142. "Warnock's picture of the situation gets it upside-down as well as distorted. His statements of 'immediate perception', so far from being that from which we advance to more ordinary statements, are actually arrived at, and are so arrived at in his own account, by retreating from more ordinary statements, by progressive hedging. (There's a tiger-there seems to be a tiger-it seems to me that there's a tiger-it seems to me now that there's a tiger-it seems to me now as if there were a tiger.) It seems extraordinarily perverse to represent as that on which ordinary statements are based a form of words which, starting from and moreover incorporating an ordinary statement, qualifies and hedges it in various ways. You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around. It is not, as Warnock's language suggests, that we can stop hedging if there is a good case for coming right out with it; the fact is that we don't begin to hedge unless there is some special reason for doing so, something a bit strange and off-colour about the particular situation."

The two "languages" are not equal. One is "derived" from the other, as Ayer supposes. But object-language is not derived from sense-data language. It's the other way round. (I'm hedging about "entailment", of course.)

There is also a puzzle about exactly what Ayer means by saying that objects are constructions. What are they constructed out of? Experiences? Patches of colour? Actually, I'm pretty sure he means "logical constructions", but that needs a good deal of explaining, and certainly doesn't include any non-verbal reality.

They are interested in the specific and particular case "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object". — RussellA

... and the point about that particular case is that no clear meaning has been assigned to "direct". One might well reply that I see both directly, or that directly has different meanings in the application to objects and to sense-data. If I see sense-data directly, I see objects indirectly. If I see objects directly, I don't see sense-data at all. So the question can only be answered if I have already made up my mind about the answer.

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

I'm beginning to think that "ordinary language philosophy" is a misnomer. It's a lot closer to philosophy than it seems to be if one reads the programmatic description. Perhaps the project would be better understood if one talked about "natural language". Logicians seem to have a generally accepted concept, which seems at least close to ordinary language.

True. The concept of "reality" is manufactured within language. — RussellA

Quite so. That's why careful attention to language is so important. But there is a very tricky problem attached to that. Language - at least ordinary language - clearly "points to" a non-verbal reality, and Austin himself uses the phrase at least once in these lectures. But if we try to understand that non-verbal reality we find ourselves unable to do so. Hence much philosophy and many doctrines. None of which succeed. I don't have a solution, but wouldn't it be reasonable to explore ordinary language carefully to understand what this "pointing to" amounts to? It doesn't seem reasonable to attach a label ("metaphysics") to this phenomenon of ordinary language and then use it as if we understood the phenomenon, thought that's exactly what happens all too often.

The particular method used to obtain an object will pre-determine any object discovered — RussellA

Quite so. So Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover. Stalemate. What next?

You could urge us to accept both Austin and Ayer, but that's a position that needs some explanation. Few people think that they do not disagree, and most think that both cannot be right including the two participants.

Actually, I think you over-state the case. It would be more accurate to say that the particular method applied will pre-determine what kind of object can be discovered. A microscope will discover many things, but never a star. For that, of course, you need a telescope, which will never discover a bacterium. And you need a different kind of instrument to measure volts and amps.

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position. — RussellA

So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA

That's true. But it depends on the argument. If my argument is that democracy is bound to fail (as Plato argues), that argument may be absurd, but that doesn't show that democracy is absurd. But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No?

He acknowledges that the craftsmen, physicians, ship captains, and others have knowledge. — Fooloso4

We would have to get into the texts to settle that. But I pretty clear that he does not think that such people have philosophical knowledge, which is knowledge of the true and the real. They have something lesser; his word is sometimes translated "Knack".

The cave has been discussed in other threads and, of course, a new thread can be started. — Fooloso4

So I think we should leave the topic there.

There may be advocates of sense data who do believe that, but Ayers agrees with the view that what we see is real, whether it's sense data that we see, or material objects. — frank

Well, his position is more complicated than my remark allowed. That is true. If you prefer, he says that it is only sense-data that we see directly, and that "material objects" are "constructions" out of sense-data. So material objects, according to Ayer are not what we think they are.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument. — RussellA

OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data.

The images whose shadows we see are not sense-data, they are: — Fooloso4

Yes, but we see the shadows, never the statues, which are also not what they seem to be, i.e. not men and other animals. So you're right. There are two levels of unreality involved. But Plato is claiming that we never see reality, and that's the central issue in sense-datum theory.

I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. — RussellA

That's one of the questions. The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. No?

True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God. — RussellA

I don't know. I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem?

And it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. — Antony Nickles

I think this is a much better way of putting what's going on. Perhaps it is helpful to reflect that lawyers arguing a point in case law are in a similar position. The practice of the courts, rather than legislation needs to be examined in order to arrive at justice. It strikes me that Austin's examples can be treated as simply (counter-) examples. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point

But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage.

It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t). — Antony Nickles

Exactly. The ordinariness of the language is beside the point.

And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

.. and it may well be helpful in such situations to articulate and formalize our habits in order to be better able to focus arguments and settle those difficult cases.

But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone). — Antony Nickles

I'm probably unusual in that I'm rather suspect that there is really no such a thing as a or the scientific method. Blame Feyerabend. (I know he's persona non grate for two good reasons, but if he's right, he's right. I can accept that without approving or excusing some of the things he's probably done). I prefer the idea that science is simply organized common sense.

Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. — Antony Nickles

.. and you elaborated further and I agree with all of that.

This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance. — Antony Nickles

Quite so. That's a consequence of the private language argument. But then, there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved.

Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the sceptic's generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). — Antony Nickles

Yes. Austin thinks that sense-datum theory can be disposed of or dissolved. Cavell, writing some time later, is taking seriously 1) the survival of scepticism (and sense-data) post Wittgenstein, and 2) Wittgensteins remark about "our real needs" being at the heart of the issues. But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. On the other hand, I'm not sure where else to go. However, our discussion of the pursuit of certainty is helpful.

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno

I'm afraid that I'm partly responsible for that. I was curious about his take on Plato (which seemed to be based on some serious reading and thought). But it was also because Plato seems to me to be an early progenitor of the mistakes we are talking about, because he believes that ordinary perceptions are all false and develops something that is close to sense-datum theory in the "cave" metaphor. But he takes the central point (that ordinary perceptions are deceptive) and runs off in an entirely different direction with it, because he has an alternative concept of what is really real. But that's of interest itself. My understanding of Kant is that he also takes the central idea to show that there is a "reality" "behind" the phenomena), rather than believing that the phenomena are the only reality (cf. Berkeley).

True, that's partly based on the accident of my biography, that I've always been involved with Plato, though not at a serious (research) level. The later dialogues were simply beyond me. I couldn't take them seriously enough to get my head round them.

There is an interesting and, so far as I know, unusual, idea there.

The Forms are philosophical poiesis, images of the truth and knowledge that those who desire wisdom strive for. — Fooloso4

This lecture is about why this is a misguided approach. — Banno

I'm going to venture into uncertain territory here. His dismantling of Ayer's approach is convincing, as always. I'm convinced, but not satisfied and I think this raises difficult questions.

On p.121 he says "We learn the word 'pig', as we learn the vast majority of words for ordinary things, ostensively-by being told, in the presence of the animal, 'That is a pig'; and thus, though certainly we
learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied, we don't go through any kind of intermediate stage of relating the word 'pig' to a lot of statements about the way things look, or sound, or smell. The word is just not introduced into our vocabulary in this way."

This is all very well, and relevant. But formal definition and various kinds of entailment do have a place, whether inside or outside ordinary language. So, though it may be unfair, I'm inclined to think that Austin has over-generalized here.

In the footnote on that page he says "Another way of showing that 'entailment' is out of place in such contexts: Suppose that tits, all the tits we've ever come across, are bearded, so that we are happy to say 'Tits are bearded.' Does this entail that what isn't bearded isn't a tit? Not really. For if beardless specimens are discovered in some newly explored territory, well, of course we weren't talking about them when we said that tits were bearded; we now have to think again, and recognize perhaps this new species of glabrous tits. Similarly, what we say nowadays about tits just doesn't refer at all to the prehistoric eo-tit, or to remote future tits, defeathered perhaps through some change of atmosphere."

Rather than try to find a place of impregnable safety, adapt to the unforeseen when it occurs. Very helpful when dealing with philosophical certainty.

But there's another concern. If we were to take Newtonian mechanics and argue that the terms of that theory were nonsense from the point of view of ordinary language - (and even from the point of view of some non-ordinary language, since the law of gravity violates the prohibition of action at a distance) - we would meet a battery or arguments that our criterion was in appropriate and that the theory had did make sense and had various other virtues. Of course, that isn't a philosophical theory. But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question?

I think where I'm going with this is something like - ordinary language is not a distinct philosophical method, it is embedded at least as a starting-point in all philosophy and in all theory. A clean sheet of paper is simply not available.

that I am informing you so that you might help me, — Antony Nickles

More tweaking. I think Wittgenstein's point is that "I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response ("Ouch!"). Actually one could use "I am in pain" in the same way as one might use "he is in pain" - to give information. Which use I'm making of it will depend on circumstances.

that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. — Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on?

This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. — Antony Nickles

That is a really important point.

From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility". — RussellA

The first sense and I mean that I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form - except when I am looking at a two-dimensional picture.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA

I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. That is not mentioned in the Merriam Webster definition.

However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — RussellA

As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, — RussellA

Yes, it is common to dismiss the arguments of people who believe in God because they arrive at the conclusion they started from. But actually, that's a lazy mistake. It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. Some of them do beg the question. But that's not the same thing. For example, if you say “I got the most votes because I won the election”, your premise (I won the election) relies on the conclusion (I got the most votes) rather than providing evidence for it. Nothing to do with what you or I believe.

Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. — RussellA

That's not the same thing as begging the question. Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. It would be up to a supporter of Ayer to show that the mistakes and confusions that Austin has identified are not mistakes and not confused. This argument would invalidate any criticism or evaluation of any argument - it would, as they say, - prove too much.

From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — RussellA

I think there's a typo in the sentence, isn't there? You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. I would agree with that.

This is why he states that the person might gaze at those words trying to find out a common factor. — javi2541997

Yes. I think that's right.

It is similar to a metaphorical use. — javi2541997

I agree with that. But what you say implies also that this use is also different from the paradigm cases that are usually offered to explain what they word means. "Metaphor" is a slippery word, so I don't think there is any future in arguing about whether it is correct or not to classify this use as a metaphor or not. We seem to have a pretty much common understanding of what it going on here.

my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, — Antony Nickles

The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. One would have to how this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.)

Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. In other words, I'm not sure that this idea is distinctively Austinian. I believe that Wittgenstein relies on a similar point in his argument about "I am in pain". It is not only first person statements that are incorrigible.

Much discussion of this seems to rely on a clear distinction between statements that are true or false and statements that are neither. I doubt if either Austin or Wittgenstein would really want to defend the usual binary (simplistic, context-independent) position. Certainly, it seems to me that "I am in pain" has similarities to both. On the one hand, it is like "Ouch" (an expression) and on the other, it is like "He is in pain" (true/false). Wouldn't a similar point apply to "I see a turquoise patch"? There are differences, of course. For example, I don't know what the equivalent of "Ouch" would be for "I see a turquoise patch". Not sure where this goes.

The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face — Antony Nickles

That is certainly the outcome of philosophical practice at least since Descartes. But I'm not sure it is fair to put it in that way. I would rather say that philosophers have become so focussed on avoiding error and so fascinated with a particular truth-game, that they have lost perspective and tried to deny the truths that they cannot pack into their box.

his approach just didn't seem to me to get off the ground; — Banno

I was inclined to think that Carnap is not actually particularly interested in Ayer's problem, but focused on the practices that we call science. What he says makes sense in that context, but it is true that in Ayer's (and Austin's) context, it falls apart.

Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he is cautious about it presentation of it. He's no fool. But that caution is eerily reminiscent of Austin's remark "There's the bit where you say it and the bit where you take it away". Only Plato gets the bit where you take it away in before he says it.

Perhaps it is a symbolic representation. If so, it is a representation like the Escher staircases.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference?

And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled.

Sentences can be used in "utterances", somewhat of a term of art for philosophers, — Banno

Forgive my pedantry, but "utter" in this sense seems to me to be a revival of the classic and original use of "utter", which survives in the law. When one uses a forged £5 note, in law, one "utters" it. When one presents a forged passport, one "utters" it. And so on. Creating the forgery is distinct from using it and the creator does not necessarily use it. So the distinction matters.

When one utters "I name this ship" in the right circumstances, one uses the words. We're not used to it, but it isn't a philosophical invention.

This reminds me of Austin's arguments on chapter VII, — javi2541997

There's a intricate issue here. There's no doubt that the meaning of "cricket" is being extended but I don't think it is being transformed in quite the way that a metaphorical use would extend it. "Cricket" is defined as a noun and we understand how it is constituted. But "cricket" in Austin's example is being used as an adjective, in a different category. This change, or stretching, is different from a metaphorical use.

The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether ordinary language misleads us is precisely the question. Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows.

What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I don't agree that the brain produces an image. If it did, there would be a question how we perceive the image that the brain produces.

Clearly, the first is meant literally and the second metaphorically. — RussellA

I can only see the front of it. — RussellA

If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. Seeing in two dimensions occurs when you see a picture of an apple. You do not confuse the image of the apple with an apple; you do not confuse the back of the picture with the back of the apple, (except when you are deceived and do not know which you are seeing). Hence seeing in two dimensions is the metaphor, not the reality.

I'm not here to help you understand Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, — RussellA

I'm sorry if I misunderstood. I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread.

Therefore, both the following statements are true: "I can only see in two dimensions" and "I can also see in three dimensions", dependent on whether the word "see" is being used literally or metaphorically. — RussellA

Which use is literal and which is metaphorical?

Metaphors are a legitimate part of language. — RussellA

I don't think there's any doubt of that, though "metaphor" is a somewhat slippery term. I'll put the book on my wish-list.

But how does this help us understand this topic?

And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable.

Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

An interesting line of argument. But I can't engage with it without reading or re-reading the texts and I'm afraid I simply don't have the time to do that. Sorry.

Yep, but it is perhaps a minimum achievement for an interpretation or translation of a statement in one language into another. — Banno

It applies well enough to the kicked wood/door. But it might be more complicated to apply to the duck-rabbit. It is satisfied in an objective sense, but not everyone always sees both interpretations straight off, so you would have to phrase it carefully.

There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - ↪Gregory, ↪Corvus and ↪RussellA apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it. — Banno

Perhaps they are not aware that our ears deliver spatial information about the source of the sound "directly"; however, the information is deduced from the difference between the information from one ear and the other. That's why the sound from earphones often sounds as if it were located in your own head. Binocular vision delivers spatial information in the same way as an old-fashioned range-finder; however,, that method only works at limited distance. Further away, we use internal clues.

However, I'm sure that we learn about space and that action in space is critical to understanding it. But ideas about what is perceived are also important, so I wouldn't be surprised if someone who was convinced by the arguments "saw" in two dimensions; but it is an interpretation, just as seeing in three dimensions is an interpretation.

That's not a coherent view, I know.

But the reason I drove her home was that I promised - an ought from an is, in a manner of speaking, that at least superficially contradicts your "Reason cannot get an ought from an is...". There's more here. — Banno

That sounds like an interesting discussion.

Which raises the question, who is actually doing the reading? — Banno

We'll never know.

Distribution lists are tricky. I usually leave someone off and get rebuked.

If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. I accept that the addict who pursues their addiction believes that it is a good thing. But for the rest of us, before and after the action(s), it isn't. This is the problem of akrasia. I don't see why you insist that alcohol is a good thing for an alcoholic, just because the alcoholic believes that it is - though that could be said if one had a thoroughly subjectivist view of what good is. But that would be incompatible with any Platonic view, so I don't suppose it will appeal to you.

I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not.

I can see that you are trying to develop a solution to a key problem with the theory of Forms. But your concept of cause is very different from modern usage, though it may fit with the Greek concept of aitia. However, there are other problems with the theory of Forms that make it hard for me to see much benefit in "solving" this one.

I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises.

On the two languages issue, Austin reports Ayer as saying that "..they find it 'convenient' to extend this usage (sc. that what is experienced in delusive cases is a sense-datum) to all cases', on the old, familiar ground that 'delusive and veridical perceptions' don't differ in 'quality' and that he is disposed to accept the recommendation with the comment "'it does not in itself add to our knowledge of empirical facts, or even make it possible for us to express anything that we could not have expressed without it. At the best it enables us only to refer to familiar facts in a clearer and more convenient way.' (P 87 Sense and Sensibilia. This is hardly a ringing endorsement. One wonders why he is so cautious.

Translating "I see a table" into sense-datum language (a patch of colour of this shape here and a patch of another colour of that shape there) would be extremely cumbersome and the only advantage that I can see would be to maybe remove the possibility of being wrong. I don't rule out the possibility that such a representation might be useful in some circumstances. But clarity and convenience are hard to discern.

"You kicked the door" IFF "You kicked the painted piece of wood" — Banno

Yes, of course. I'm only saying that having the same truth value isn't the end of the story and so isn't the same as equivalence for all purposes. A Plea for Excuses does indeed take the point further.

And so, “…there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen…”, not a “surface” or a sense-data. Or, as Ludvig puts it: “it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral” perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen. — Antony Nickles

Yes, I agree with both points.

May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something.

It's just how often the term appears in Google Books, — Banno

Thanks. That makes sense.

It is odd, though, that "J. L. Austin" is apparently mentioned in 1900, when he was born in 1911. I know - it's someone else with the same name. But since, so far as I can see, the same is happening for both the others, it seems that even full names are much more common that one might have thought.

Comparative Ngrams — Banno

These are quite fun and I'm guessing they show something about their work through the decades. But I don't know (and don't understand the Wikipedia article) about Ngrams. Is there a layperson's explanation anywhere? One axis is years, so that's clear. The other is a percentage, but percentage of what?

However, no thanks. — Antony Nickles

Is the offer you are declining the project

we could investigate the mechanics and criteria of those practices in various contexts. — Antony Nickles

. I confess I don't feel tremendously enthused at the prospect in the abstract.

Having removed ourselves from the “empirical propositional” and only relying on different methods of “descriptions”, “we cannot properly claim that it is either true or false.” — Antony Nickles

what I take Ayer to be doing is abstracting the discussion from a factual one so we are always correct, despite it only being about our description, with the actual goal that we are never wrong about what we see (sense-data). — Antony Nickles

Do you mean that Ayer represents the question as which "language" to use so that he can choose between the options on the grounds that sense-datum language cannot be wrong and for that reason is more "clear and convenient" for the special purposes of philosophy? That makes sense. But I think the two languages are not equivalent precisely because one is true or false and the other is incorrigible.

Now "I kicked the wooden door" might well be logically equivalent to "I kicked the painted piece of wood". — Banno

In some sense of "logically equivalent" that's probably true. But the different descriptions might make a serious difference. "I shot the target" and "I shot the heir to the crown" are not by any means criminally equivalent. But it would be odd, wouldn't it, to say that "the wooden door" and "the painted piece of wood" are interpretations of anything.

But it is harder to say "I see a rabbit" is equivalent to "I see a duck". — Banno

The point here is that the two descriptions are logically not equivalent and yet both duck and rabbit are valid interpretations, so both "I see a rabbit" and "I see a duck" can be said when what I see is a single picture. Rorschach images are a different kind of case with some of the same features.

So in the end, I think that Austin hasn't thought these examples through. I can see the general relevance to perception, but the exact points are not clear.

Austin shows how logical positivism grossly oversimplifies the things we do with words, — Banno

Yes, he certainly does that. The pity of it is that no-one seems to follow his example. Philosophy still loves its classifications and its doctrines.

Proper understanding reveals that "the real good" is the good apprehended by the individual, as one's goal or objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what makes this understanding "proper". It is defensible as a view. But people often do things that they think are in their interests, but actually bring them harm. Moreover, it clearly wasn't Plato's view. (Only philosophers can understand what the real good is)

The passage you quoted from me

My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a fully explanation of the causes that produce it. — Ludwig V

has a typo. It should have read "My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a FULLER explanation of the causes that produce it". So I'm not arguing that the kind of explanation I'm citing explains potential away.

Hume seems to be in the position that inductive reason (because it is based on habit and custom") can only offer us probable knowledge of the world, hence it cannot be a good ground for believing in the world. — Corvus

I didn't realize that your question to me was in the context of Hume. You did drop a hint, but I didn't pick it up. My fault. That does change things. However, your sketch above is an abbreviation of his argument, which does not reflect what he thought he was doing.

Hume was happy to employ sceptical arguments against the idea of "hidden causes" or "hidden powers", as he refers to them. But he was scathing about what he calls "pyrrhonist" (radical sceptical) arguments. Not that he thought that they could be refuted; he just thought they should be ignored. His argument about association of ideas, habit and custom was intended to provide, not a refutation, but a basis for ignoring such arguments. He relies on past experience, for example, as a "full and complete proof" when he argues that a naturalistic explanation of a supposed miracle will always be more plausible than the supernatural one. As Austin says in Sense and Sensibilia "There's the bit where you say it, and the bit where you take it back".

So I agree that there's no deductive argument for positing that things you don't perceive continue to exist (A). But there is a considerable weight of (reasonable) evidence against it. In my opinion, it is at least enough to put the burden of proof on the your idea that things cease to exist when not perceived - the contradictory of A. Curiously enough, there's no deductive argument for that, either. Stalemate. In another discussion, we could ask each other what's next, but perhaps that will do for now.

it's not true of Russell and Moore, nor of the Oxford Realists or Popper's intellectual children, and Quine naturalised metaphysics but would not call it that. — Banno

Yes. I'm afraid I over-generalized.

So what is it all about? It's about certainty. All this frippery hides Ayer's actual interest, which is to find (or invent) firm grounds for our statements about the way things are. — Banno

I found it very hard to get to grips with IX, but I think I've finally got my head more or less round it. I was not entirely happy with the discussion of " see as", especially in the context of "The speck is a star" (and is the star a speck - I suppose so.) Austin cites Wittgenstein here, but W is not as comprehensive here (at least in the PI as he so often is. This links to the point that Austin also makes, that the "same" object can be described in more than one way (as in the example of kicking the door and kicking some painted wood.) I was also reminded of Kripke's discussion of Hesperus, Phosphorus and Venus.

There's a lot more to be said here and I'm not sure that Austin totally excludes the possibility that the idea of sense-data, or something quite like them may not have a place.

Calling seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck (or a rabbit) an interpretation is not quite right, but captures the point that the same object can be seen in two ways. We know it is the same object because we have the third description as a mediator - actually, there are two mediating descriptions. One is the duck-rabbit. The other is the description of the marks on the paper. But these, I think, are yet more interpretations. In fact, it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral. In the "ordinary" practice of interpretation, there is something that counts as the original, which is what is to be interpreted.

In most ordinary life, we can sort out how to proceed. But when our access is so limited as it is in astronomy, I'm not sure that things are so easy. It's very tempting to interpret the specks we see, from which we deduce the reality that lies behind the appearances, as data. I suppose we can classify these cases as exceptional, but still, we've given Ayer his first move. However, there is, so to speak, a real speck that we see, so this is not the incorrigible data that Ayer was looking for.

Still - on to X and incorrigibility. It was interesting to see a solid argument that the philosophical use of the term is technical, or specialized.

I know too much to want to get into color and shape here (I take it back, can we call them qualities and be done with it?) — Antony Nickles

I also know too much to want to argue with you. I had in mind only the cautious idea that "abstract" might have its uses. As so often, we ought always to consider the meaning of "abstract" in a particular context and in the light of what counts as "concrete" in that context.

As Austin might say:- "This discussion of appearance and reality is too abstract. We need to consider some concrete examples".

The use of "quality" as a classification of "colour", "shape", etc. is arguably a philosophical invention (Aristotle?), which survives only by it's contrast with whatever "part" of an "object" is not a quality. "Relation" is a similar term. "Object" here could mean "substance" or "essence" or, in more recent times, as whatever is named when a name is bestowed or referred to when a referring expression is used. (The point is, of course that "quality" in this use, as in all the other uses you identify, is part of a language-game, only not a natural or ordinary language game - context again.)

Of course, I see the cup when I turn and look at the cup. — Corvus

You still don't answer the question. So you still believe that you would have to accept the counterfactual if you did and that you would then have to admit that it is a ground for believing it exists when you don't perceive it.

The next question is whether you accept that you exist when you are perceiving an object and whether you perceive yourself when you are perceiving an object.

But here I am talking about generalization from a single case or two (in the sense of without objects). Abstraction is a harder practice to justify. — Antony Nickles

Oh, I never intended to imply that generalization from a single case or two was not extremely rash (to put it mildly).

As to abstraction, I intended an "ordinary language" sense of the word, not a view of the debate about nominalism. The Cambridge Dictionary definition is "existing as an idea, feeling, or quality, not as a material object". This, to me, fits with, for example, Austin's insistence that not everything is a material object. Numbers would be an prime example. The Cambridge Dictionary gives, truth, beauty, happiness, faith and confidence as examples of abstractions. I have always understood properties like colour and shape to be abstractions, but perhaps I'm wrong. I noticed that you said that it was a "harder practice to justify" rather than

Not taking into consideration multiple examples (the practice in multiple situations, contexts), as it were, of how things "are" (as Dewey might say I believe), is to intellectually theorize separate from actual cases (an event with attendant circumstances). — Antony Nickles

Yes, quite so. And theory without application to cases is empty. But theory with application is not. So it's not an issue about theory in itself.

After all, saying it is "meaningless" to even talk of certain things is, in an important way, to make a metaphysical claim about them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite so. That's the essence of what the "analytic" philosophers believed, and explains why they spent their time talking about language.

A rather famous quote on this problem: "....Therefore it is possible that I walk around the ostensible apple and discover that there is no apple...." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does Sebastian Rödl consider the possibility that I might walk round the apple and discover that there is an apple?


You repeat your claim three times but don't answer my questions.

Do you accept that if you were to turn and look at the cup that is holding your coffee, you would see it? Is that not a reason for believing that it still exists? — Ludwig V

. I take that as meaning that you think there is something wrong with the question. Could you explain?

These arguments both, can only remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance, by replacing it with something actual. This is the actuality of God. The problem though, is that the reality of potential cannot simply be replaced by the actuality of God, because this produces determinism, which is inconsistent with our experience. Therefore to maintain the reality of free will we must maintain the reality of potential. However, since the concept of free will in human beings cannot account for the agent involved in the selection from the possibilities which underly the natural dispositions you refer to, such as molecular structures, we do not avoid the need for the Will of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would I want to remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance? All I want to do is to explain it, by giving a fuller account of what happens when one billiard ball strikes another. My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a fully explanation of the causes that produce it.

There's nothing wrong with determinism. It is the idea that free will is inconsistent with it that is problematic.

I don't see any need for the Will of God. What, exactly, do we need it for?

The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesn’t change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance. — Antony Nickles

Yes. But I think that abstraction and generalization (which, despite Berkeley, I do not think are the same thing) are also sources of truth. So let's not over-generalize about it. Pragmatism is probably the best policy here.

We are talking about the basis for scepticism regarding the external world. — Corvus

I agree that scepticism is a fundamental starting-point for this debate. But there's a question of the burden of proof. Your challenge to me is to provide a reason for believing that the cup that holds your coffee exists when you don't perceive it. Do you accept that if you were to turn and look at it, you would see it? Is that not a reason for believing that it still exists?

You either don't accept the counterfactual or don't accept that the counterfactual implies that the cup exists when you don't perceive it.

Remember the part about how words don't affect the world? If you think that the cup exists when you perceive it and doesn't exist when you don't, you believe that your perceiving affects the world. Most people, I think, believe that it does not - at least in paradigm cases like your cup of coffee.

I think the counter-factual is a reason for believing that your cup of coffee exists whether you perceive it or not. So I think that the burden of proof is on you. So I ask you what reason you have for not believing that the cup exists whether you perceive it or not?

You might also like to look up Berkeley's argument for believing that he does not perceive himself when he perceives the cup and yet believes in his own existence, and then for believing that his perceptions must have a cause, that he is not the cause and hence that God exists even though he does not perceive God. (You don't have to be a theist here. You could just believe in external objects as the cause of your perceptions instead of God.)

For Ayer, statements about objects just are statements about sense data. — Banno

Exactly. But it depends on the linguistic version of the issue. The question is, whether the two versions are equivalent. However, sense-datum language implies a general scepticism about external objects. Ordinary language does not. So can we not conclude that the two versions are not equivalent and hence not inter-translatable?

This is the case even when I pick up a cup with my hand and look into it. — Corvus

You have put you finger on what gets left out of the debate. I think that even Austin accepts the dissection of perception out of our lives and to a large extent overlooks the huge contribution that our actions in the world modify how we perceive it. Our perceptions are not like images on a screen. There is a feed-back between perception and action. Ayer nearly gets there when he says that prediction is crucial, but misses the point that predictions are not only based on sense-data but on the results of actions.

I think that what needs to be said about the tree is 1) you can't cut down a tree (in one sense of "cut down") with 1) words, 2) a fishing net, 3) a screwdriver ... More generally, there are things we cannot do with words, and there are things we can do with words. The problem then arises with the philosophical division between words and things. That's the bit that creates unnecessary problems. But words are also part of the world and words are also things in the world. The distinction between the two may have uses for certain purposes, but if misapplied, just generates false puzzles.

Oh good. — frank

Careful, now. I also think that the idea that I'm living in a Matrix situation is an implausible fantasy. In particular, I know that the truth of the matter is far stranger than Matrix proposes
.

As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false? — Antony Nickles

Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue.

You've been watching too much Amy Schumer. — Antony Nickles

I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher?