Beliefs are stated as an association between an agent and a proposition. This superficial structure serves to show that a belief is always both about a proposition and about some agent. It might be misleading as the proposition is not the object of the belief but constitutes the belief. — Banno

The last sentence, in particular, nicely reconciles the issue about the object of the belief. There might be more to be said, but it is a good starting-point.

This association is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water. — Banno

Quite so. "Association" is vague enough to enable it to stand up even when he cannot pour a glass from the tap (because the water has been turned off).

Some folk hereabouts think something like that there are beliefs which are not propositional. It remains unclear to me how that could work. It's supposed that there are hinge beliefs that are in some way not propositional, but that is quite problematic, since hinge beliefs are also supposed to ground other beliefs by implication, and implication relies on propositions. — Banno

That's at least partly about different uses of propositional forms. If I point to something red and announce "That's red.", I may be making an empirical observation, or teaching someone what "red" means, which case the object is a sample and to be used in a different way. That's only an example. There would be other cases to consider.

Unless your point is that Lois might have inconsistent beliefs? — Banno

Isn't that a problem, though? Any proposition will have a cloud of implications around it. There's no guarantee that I can see that Lois will have drawn all those implication or that she would instantly agree to all of them if they were presented to her, or that she will not draw any false conclusions from what she does believe.

It seems worth making the point that parsing natural languages into formal languages is not a game of finding the one, correct, interpretation. Rather one chooses a formalisation that suits one's purpose. — Banno

Your analysis of Lois' beliefs illustrates how useful formalization can be.

Or is it better thought of as a sensation, a feeling, an impression, an intuition? — Banno

I would rather say that sensations and feelings (when expressed in the grammatical form of a proposition) and impressions (ditto) can give rise to beliefs, rather than being beliefs. Not sure about intuitions. One can intuit that...

If my belief is directed at the world independent of any proposition, then how could I ever be wrong about what I believe? — Leontiskos

The standard way is to post an "intentional object" (in this case a proposition). But then, what's a proposition? The standard "meaning of a sentence" doesn't help much. I believe that Frege thinks it is something like thinking of a state of affairs without affirming or denying it. Are there no other proposals around.

The other way might be to push your metaphor a little harder and say that if a is directed at b, it can still miss.

We are supported in understanding the "use of the word in the wild" by formal analysis. — Banno

Mutual support? Interdependence? But perhaps not on topic here.

actions are related in an explanatory or causal manner. — Leontiskos

Well, if you are happy for me to say that beliefs explain actions, I'm content to do so and to leave the notion of explanation undefined because it is off-topic.

It has had an effect on what I said, so if you count that as an action, I guess you could say it did.
But I think that is a different definition of action than the one I had in mind. — Janus

So long as we agree, I won't quarrel about the words and I won't fuss about saying something to oneself silently or about that multifarious word "think".

The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief.(Searle). — Sam26

That seems to me to be exactly right. I was never happy with propositional attitudes, though on different grounds.

It is not inconsistent to say that Lois Lane believes Clark Kent wears glasses, a sentence that can be parsed more formally. — Banno

I wouldn't quarrel with the representation B(X,p), if that's what you mean. But I don't see that it helps any. I would suggest that before settling on a formal representation we need a good understanding of the use of the word in the wild.

I think most particularly that we need to better understand why beliefs explain actions even when the belief is false.

I'm saying that if we're to say that Mary has a belief, then for us to know that Mary believes X it must be expressed in some action (linguistic or nonlinguistic). — Sam26

I wouldn't object to saying that a given belief may never be expressed in action, only that it would be if circumstances were right. Though I would look for an episode of acquiring the belief. Just what that might amount to, I'm not sure about.

It is legitimate to describe what belief does as a way of understanding what belief is. — Leontiskos

That's enough for me.

one belief can cause multiple effects, and therefore a belief and its effect are not the same thing (even when it comes to thinking). — Leontiskos

I agree that a cause is distinct from its effect, though how far that's an accurate description of science is another question. Since Hume, we establish a cause/effect relationship by observing correlation and contiguity between them. There is no more than that to it. We cannot observe beliefs independently of their effects, (any more than we can observe electrons and their effects independently - or the wind and its effects), so we cannot establish a cause/effect relationship between a belief and its effects.

Unless you are using "cause" (or possibly "belief") in a way different from the way it is understood in orthodox philosophy.

I'm sorry to be difficult. But the idea that belief causes appropriate actions seems perfectly commonsensical. I wouldn't deny that there must be something right about it. All I'm saying is that on the orthodox philosophical view of causation, it doesn't make sense. Maybe it makes sense in some other way.

the examples of beliefs which do not show themselves in actions seem to be countless. — Janus

That's true. But is it absurd to go counter-factual and say that a belief would show in action (where thinking counts as an action) if appropriate circumstances arise? Or are you saying that there is no necessary relation between belief and action?

Your examples don't include bedrock beliefs, and I'm inclined to think that my belief that I have a hand or two shows every time I pick something up, so they couldn't occur on this list. Is that right?

The examples on your list all seem to be things that I have learnt or at least thought about, at some point. Would that be a necessary condition?

Methinks that the Anglo bias towards empiricism is rearing its head and conflating beliefs themselves with the ways in which we empirically detect beliefs in others, even to the point that a belief is re-defined to be the detection of a belief — Leontiskos

You are, I think, picking up on the lingering traces of logical positivism in that philosophical tradition. But isn't it legitimate to describe what belief does, as a way of describing what belief is? I have in mind the role of belief in our language, which is not reducing it to the question how we know what people believe. Perhaps I'm just fooling myself.

In my view, the conception/meaning of wavelengths is entangled with everyday experience. — plaque flag

That's a very good way of putting it.

In short, indirect realism that takes the scientific image as the hidden real seems to miss that this image is very much on the side of appearance and only his its meaning in context. — plaque flag

I think I agree with you, only I'm not sure what you mean by "this image" (which image exactly?).

It is certainly odd that people so often forget that the scientific version of colour is also the product of experience - that's what "empirical" means.

If I may comment on some of these issues....

There seems to be some disagreement and confusion about beliefs and actions. Surely we can confidently say that if X believes that p, X will normally act, on occasions when p is relevant, on p. In other words, and in perhaps old-fashioned language, if X believes p, X can be expected to act on p, when X believes that p is relevant, and conversely. Note, speaking includes speaking to oneself and both are actions, so X can be expected to assert that p when X believes that it is appropriate to do so.

This give a context in which the use of "believes" might be helpfully explained. When we explain actions, we do so by explaining the reasons for them. But one very quickly finds that there are difficulties about this. First, It is not enough for p to be true for it to be correctly posited as a reason for X's action. If p is to count as a reason for what X does, it must be known by X. Second, there are occasions when X carries out an action which is best explained by p, but p is not true. The way to express this, is to say that X believes that p.

Whether it is appropriate to call such an explanation of the use of a word as a definition, I do not presume to say.

The question of the object of belief has always bothered me. I'm no fan of propositions. The idea that the object of knowledge is the world, the facts, the way things are makes sense to me. But it doesn't work for belief, because belief can be false. I always thought that was the reason for the invention of the concept of "intentional" objects. Perhaps it can be said that belief aims to have a relation to the world, etc. but may fail. Is that intolerably mysterious, or, rather, is that any more mysterious that the concepts of a proposition or an intentional object?

I see two more posts have arrived while I was writing this, so I had better stop at that.

I don’t understand the difference between “you have the experience of falling freely” and “you can experience falling freely.” — Patterner

There is no difference of meaning, except that "you have the experience of falling freely" suggests that there is some kind of entity/thing that you in some sense have, whereas "you experience falling freely" does not suggest that.

No I'm sorry, this got misunderstood. — goremand

OK. But you made me think about how I express myself so there's no harm done.

I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind. — goremand

Do you mean that I'm using tricks of the mind to express my doubts? I believe that I'm exposing the tricks that make plausible the idea that we have an immersive experience playing in mind and especially the suggestion that everything we experience is an illusion. But I do not intend to malign anyone, so my argument would not claim to prove that the tricks are known or believed to be tricks; proponents of this idea are as taken in by these deceptive arguments as much as anyone else. They are tricks of language or perhaps I should call them misleading features of the grammar of language.

I'm comfortable for myself, but some people think that they have to refuse to acknowledge that there is a difficult philosophical problem here. That seems most unhelpful, to me.

It seems to me the text is liked because many people shared with him that assumption but struggled with putting it into words, — goremand

You may well be right. Don't get me wrong. It is a brilliant piece of philosophy, demonstrating that it is perfectly all right to be wrong, so long as you are wrong in interesting ways. I suppose it's just a marginal note to say that the article might well lead to some people who have never worried about the issue getting worried about it, or that, since philosophy thrives on puzzles, some people might buy in because they love a puzzle.

The defence is that resolving the puzzle can clarify what might be called knots in our thinking.

However, I think I should temper and depersonalize my language about this.

I can doubt "plainly" without invoking any tricks of the mind. — goremand

I seem to remember that you doubt that phenomenal properties are real. Is that what you are referring to?

Which conclusion do you mean? I try to read him, but can’t usually get far. — Patterner

I realized after I wrote that sentence that I was going too far. It is true that Nagel aims to raise a question, not present a conclusion. But Nagel does propound his example as suggesting a problem and I think that problem is an illusion.

Are you saying a machine that was given consciousness would no longer be a machine? — Patterner

Yes and no. Perception is something that distinguishes consciousness beings from non-conscious (and unconscious) beings. If you say that a machine can perceive something, it is important to be clear in your own mind whether you are using "perceive" in a metaphorical way or whether you intend to attribute consciousness to it. When the EPOS machine says "Thank you", you don't believe that it is thanking you, do you?

At the moment, the only solid stance I’ll take about subjective experiences is that they exist. — Patterner

I wouldn't want to quarrel with that, so long as you don't get misled into clouds of philosophical problems by false analogies.

Let me try another example.

The word "appearance" gets used in two different ways. When I am waiting for a procession, (funeral, VIP, celebration) to pass by, we can say that eventually the parade appeared at the end of the street. Or that the parade made its appearance at the end of the street. These two ways of putting it mean the same thing, that the actual parade appeared, not something that looks like it or sounds like it. The appearance is an event, not an object in the sense that the cars and motor-cycles and people that make it up are objects. Right?

There's another sense of appearance which marks a distinction or contrast between appearance and reality. If we pay attention to the grammatical feature of language that an appearance is always an appearance of something, or perhaps more accurately, there is always an object that exists independently of any appearance of itself. Appearances may or may not coincide with the their objects. The stick appears to be bent or looks bent (or looks as if it is bent) is the best way to say this. This is the sense that gives trouble, especially when, as in the case of illusionism, there is no reality to distinguish appearance from - that's the philosophical move.

Experience is similar. By making a bungee jump, you have the experience of falling freely in perfect safety. But if you say it that way, you are heading for philosophical perplexity. However, if you say, by making a bungee jump, you can experience falling freely, there is less temptation to wonder what kind of object an experience is.

What do you think the things dualists invented the term for actually are? I mean, you see blue, and taste sugar, and feel pain. What category of existence do you attribute to them? — Patterner

Well, you've identified/described three experiences quite clearly. You used a sentence, which consists of a subject, a verb and an object. So it looks as if an experience is a relationship, or (especially in the case of seeing, an activity). There are three different kinds of object, a colour, a substance and a sensation. What more do you want me to say?

Totally color blind people surely believe those of us who see in color have subjective experience. — Patterner

I'm not sure about total colour blindness, or about what colour-blind people believe. If they don't know that colour-blindness exists, they likely believe that everybody sees the same way they do. But I'm not denying that there's such a thing as subjective experience - that's true by definition. The question is whether a subjective experience is an object in its own right. That's why I prefer to stick to the verb "experience" rather than its associated grammatical form, the noun "experience".

I don’t know that argument, or how it deflates the debate. Actually, not sure exactly what debate you mean. — Patterner

The best way to explain is to give you a link - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/ section 2.3.3.

If you think that our knowledge of our own minds is just like our knowledge of tables and chairs, you will think that subjective experiences are a premiss for an argument, that they are true or false. If our "knowledge" of our own minds isn't like our knowledge of tables and chairs, then the problem disappears. I should confess that this is not a simple either/or.

I think something we don’t understand is going on....Something is added by experience. — Patterner

I agree with that. But I don't think it is helpful to jump to conclusions, which Nagel does. The issue is what is added by experience, or, to put it in a more neutral way, what the difference is between knowing and experiencing.

A first step is to observe that knowing that p adopts a third-person (hopefully objective) point of view; experiencing is a first-person point of view. There's a big difference between knowing that someone is in pain and being that someone.

(Don't forget that what you know actually affects how you experience things. If you know that the earth goes round the sun and not the other way round, you see the sunrise differently. When you do a bungee jump, your knowledge that you are securely fastened make a big difference to how you experience the fall.)

We’ve created machines that do the same. — Patterner

If a machine did do the same, it would be conscious and consequently not a machine. But they don't, so they're not. That's a bit unfair, but condenses another complicate topic about what the difference is and how one might create a conscious.

Mine too. That's why I object to it so much.

Wittgenstein says somewhere that the philosophical solution he is looking for is the one that enables him to stop doing philosophy when he wants to.

I’m asking your opinion. Do you think qualia are non-physical things? — Patterner

I can't give a straight answer to that, because the question presupposes that qualia exist, which I'm not sure about, especially since I'm not clear what category of existence is attributed to them. It seems to me very unlikely, if and insofar as they exist, that they can possibly be physical objects. But the term was invented in order to justify the philosophical theory known as dualism, which I do not accept.

I don’t see anything wrong with anyone writing about topics on which there is not universal agreement, even controversial topics, from their pov. — Patterner

You misunderstand me. I wasn't objecting to Nagel writing about his ideas. I was just disagreeing with them.

But there’s an obvious difference between that action and a car’s or brain’s. — Patterner

Certainly. I was suggsting that if we can't expect to give a complete description of something as simple as a computer (or a rock) on a desk, we can't expect to give a complete description of an autonomous system like a car or a brain.

"In Nagel’s words, there is something that it is like to be a bat. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Philosophy is a strange business. I'm about to complain that an ordinary expression that I understand as well as anyone else is incomprehensible. But seriously, what, exactly does "something it is like to be a bat" mean? Nagel makes another empty gesture when he says he means the subjective experience of a bat, which he believes cannot be described. So he knows that there is no answer to the question what it is like to be a bat. He provokes you to try to answer and prevents you from answering at the same time. That's the point of the question. The only sensible option is to refuse his trap and refuse to answer the question.

"these (sc. qualia) are taken to be intrinsic features of visual experiences that ... are accessible to introspection, ...." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

Introspection is a very strange concept. It is supposed to be readily available to anybody, because it is an essential feature of human consciousness and yet there is endless disagreement about what it amounts to. Yet here, it is presented as if it were completely unproblematic. There is one argument, for example, that introspection is not knowledge, which I think is not exactly right, but is an important part of the concept. If that's right, the entire debate is deflated.

"It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/

That doesn't mean that there is some magical thing that the subject of an experience knows that no-one else can know. It just means that knowing is not the same as experiencing.

There is a thesis that I think has at least an important part of the truth here. It is sometimes called the transparency thesis. "According to this thesis, experience is ... transparent in the sense that we “see” right through it to the object of that experience, analogously to the way that we see through a pane of glass to whatever is on the other side of it. Gilbert Harman introduced such considerations into the contemporary debate about qualia in a now-famous passage: “When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences.” (Harman 1990, 667) As Harman went on to argue, the same is true for all of us: When we look at a tree and then introspect our visual experience, all we can find to attend to are features of the presented tree. Our experience is thus transparent; when we attend to it, we can do so only by attending to what the experience represents. " https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/

That makes sense to me and doesn't need any reference to qualia. It may not be quite complete, but it settles a wide range of cases.

It's really hard to know how to proceed with this. I'll do my best.

Do you think the definition is correct? — Patterner

It depends what you mean by correct. It's not as if there is an existing definition, or even an existing (mutually agreed) phenomenon that we are trying to "capture". We can agree what a rainbow is, both in the dictionary and in the world. So there can be an argument about the correct definition - and there isn't one, because there are criteria.

In my book, Nagel is trying to persuade us that there is a phenomenon to be captured, one that everybody can recognize. But he also knows that there isn't universal agreement about that. It's a pity he doesn't actually engage with the issue.

That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all. — Patterner

It's not that simple. If you try to list every event, both the ones that are relevant to what the car does and the ones that are incidental, like comfortable seats or a sun roof and the ones that are irrelevant - side issues - like (in years gone by - the pollution it creates, you would, I suggest never come to the end.

Make a complete list of all the events going on in the desk that is supporting your computer.

If we did the same for a brain, a much more gargantuan task, — Patterner

The brain is important, but not the whole story. It is probably true that the brain has a dominant role in the processing of information. But our minds do much more than that. The brain depends on the entire nervous system, all the sense organs (supplying information) and all the muscles (enabling action) to function. Our hormones regulate all sorts of things, including our emotions. I don't think we will come even close to explaining the mind unless we include our entire body in our explanations.

If one considers how we can answer similar questions about what a computer does and compare that to the questions we are asking about the brain, it becomes clear that we are barely in the foot-hills of the project, and in no position to blandly assume that we know what will happen. We don't even know which events in the brain are relevant and which are not. We don't even know what all the chemistry of the brain is never mind what parts of it are relevant and which incidental.

We haven't yet mentioned emergent properties. One of the essential functions of the car is that it moves itself. What part of the car is the one that moves it? The wheels? The engine? The body? None of them, on their own. All of them, in their systematic relations. And here's the paradox of analysis, that what you are trying to analyze, in a sense, inevitably disappears when you take it to pieces.

Consider the rainbow. Or ask how a clock tells the time. These are systems. One can analyze them, but one will not find one-to-one correspondence between one level of analysis and the next.

If one considers the conceptual revolution that we required for us to understand the simplest physical object works, it seems to me arrogant to assume that this project will not also involve conceptual revolutions that we cannot imagine. When one considers how much our idea of matter has had to change in the process of understanding that, why would one think that understanding the mind will not involve similarly radical new concepts?

Philosophy often gets ahead of itself and tries to answer questions that it does not have the conceptual equipment to answer. Qualia is an example.

I'm sorry if this is too much, but it seems right to show what is involved in this issue.

The fact that consciousness is not physically reducible is the reason some people say it doesn’t exist. — Patterner

Consciousness may not be physically reducible now. But that doesn't mean it always will be. One day, I'm sure, there will be a physical account.

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see. — Patterner

If you are asking for an explanation how we see the table, it doesn't help to say that a copy or imitation or model of a table appears in our heads. Even if we found a little model of a table, how would that explain anything?

There is no hint of qualia. — Patterner

Of course, a list of physical events won't include any qualia. They are defined as non-physical things.

We need a different list to capture the experience. — Patterner

What do you mean by "capture"?

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible. — Patterner

Lists aren't necessarily helpful. But it is certain that a list of all the parts of a car isn't a description of a car, nor an explanation of how it works, and a car is not the same thing as a list of its parts, or a description of it, or an explanation of how it works.

Physical processes lead to my brain being able to perceive, and discriminate between, frequencies of visible light. But distinguishing between frequencies of light is a different thing than what it is like to see blue and red. Understanding those processes in perfect detail does not describe experiencing colors, and does not help a person who sees in great detail, but is color-blind, understand what blue is. — Patterner

Yes, a distinguishing between frequencies of light is different from distinguishing between colours. Neither is an attempt to describe experiencing colours. But a description is never the same as the real thing. A description of a table isn't a table. A description of a chess move isn't a chess move. A description of an smile isn't a smile. And so on. Why would a description of an experience (though I'm not really sure what that might be) be an experience?

Someone who is colour-blind is unable to experience see colours. Why would a description of a colour (whatever that might be) substitute for that? It's like trying to substitute money for food. Money can be exchanged for food, but it can't substitute for it.

There's an interesting question whether understanding something includes experiencing it. It's comparable to the question whether understanding something in theory, without practical experience of it is complete or not. That's complicated. In some cases, the answer seems to be Yes and in others it seems to be No.

Certainly not. I don’t know why you are asking me that. I never intended to suggest such a thing. Maybe I worded something badly? Rainbows do exist. And we understand the physical reductionist explanation for them. — Patterner

I asked the question because I wanted to check that you agreed with me and to make the point that we don't need any more explanation. But I hesitate to call it reductionist because it is called reductionist to suggest that it somehow implies that because there is a physical explanation, rainbows somehow don't exist.

We should not posit such a thing. I dare say that explanation is impossible. — Patterner

Don't give up too easily. We don't have an explanation yet. But the future is a long time and we can't rule anything out.

No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical. — Patterner

Fine. But you don't want to say that rainbows don't exist just because they are fully explained by physical processes, do you?

Now, we don't know what is going on when Macbeth sees the dagger. Why can't we leave it at that rather than positing some dagger-like phenomenon in his head?

Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops. — Patterner

I'm not sure what you have in mind in that sentence. Can you give an example or two?

For evidence, I think the realist would say "Phenomelogical properties appear to exist, so they probably do exist", and the Illusionist would say "Phenomelogical properties result in unsolvable philosophical problems, so they probably do not exist". — goremand

That's admirably concise. But "exist" is complicated, so we can't understand exactly what this means without looking at it a bit more closely. Dragons, rainbows, numbers, colours, crimes all exist. But their existence is different in each case, and none of them is the same as the existence of tables and trees. The insoluble problems arise when we try to say that their existence is like the existence of tables and trees - we end up chasing ghosts and wondering why we can never catch them. The illusion of the bent stick is not an object like the stick, only in my mind. That is a metaphor, because my mind isn't a place (where "place" is a location specified in three-plus-one dimensions - time and space).

So we need to understand the manner of existence of appearances - in other words, its category.

Do you know about the idea of a category mistake? There's a helpful entry in Wikipedia, if you don't.

I'm not pretending that's a magic wand, though Ryle seems to have thought it was. But it at least allows us to formulate the problem differently and escape the endless merry-go-round (or should that be sadly-go-round?) of the traditional debate.

I think in the case of Illusionism, the counterpart would not be physics but phenomenological realism. The Illusionist says "phenomelogical properties appear to exist, but do not", the realist says "phenomelogical properties appear to exist, and do". — goremand

H'm. We're talking about slightly different things. "Phenomenological properties exist" and "Phenomenological properties do not exist" are indeed contradictories. Whichever is true must be a contingent, empirical statement. Right? So where does the evidence that they exist, or not, come from?

We’ve built machines that can perceive, discriminate, react, and learn, but don’t have the subjective or awareness. — Patterner

Careful! There's a strict use of these words in which anything that perceives, etc. is by definition, conscious, aware, has subjective experience. In that use, that statement counts as personification - a metaphorical use of the words. So that isn't quite the hard problem.

explaining why/how the physical is accompanied by subjective experience, — Patterner

... once you have defined "physical" and "subjective experience", and said that one accompanies the other, you have defined them as distinct, not just as chalk and cheese are distinct, but categorially distinct. So the problem no solution in virtue of the terms you use to pose it. "Team spirit" - to use Ryle's example - is something distinct from the team members, yet it is not something distinct from the team.

A rainbow is distinct from the raindrops and light that create it. Yet it is an effect of the sunlight refracting through the raindrops, not an elusive something. There is no hard problem there, is there?

Can you direct me to this thought experiment? — Patterner

I'll have to hunt it down. I'll get back to you.

What do you mean by “ something dagger-like in his head or mind”? — Patterner

Something like a picture or a model.

But the very fact of having an inner experience is evidence in favor of the hard problem. — Marchesk

It certainly is, if such things as inner experiences exist. The issue is whether they exist. I read the Nagel's original account and carried out the thought experiment he proposed. Nothing. Am I deficient? A zombie? Hard to bamboozle?



Perhaps it's time to go nuclear. I think illusionism is circular. An illusion can only be defined by its difference from reality. If the deliverances of consciousness are illusions, what is the reality? Oh, yes, physics. How do we know that physics is an account of reality and that common sense is the illusion? By empirical evidence, of course. Where do we get empirical evidence? Naturally, the deliverances of consciousness.

The formulation of the hard problem is misleading. One day, perhaps, we will recognize that and develop less misleading ways of thinking about these things. But I'm not holding my breath.

Speak and write accurately in whatever language is important. Yet, I think this issue is not part of politics but philosophy of language and linguistics. — javi2541997

I didn't know about Spain.


This is indeed a dilemma. But the real point is not quite what it seems.

One side will say that what matters is successful communication. So if an utterance serves its purpose, it's OK. So that, for example,

"You must all stop making bang bang noises and away from here you need to go. I cannot hear the babies ticking in the mummy belly" — Sir2u

worked perfectly well. No problem.

But if you want to communicate effectively across

nearly 2 billion English speakers in the world — Sir2u

, it's a different story. That was what underlaid the emergence of RP (Received Pronunciation) in the BBC when it started. RP was never more than a dialect, but it was quite effective for its purpose. Nowadays RP is out, for social reasons. But the BBC and its various audiences seem to be managing with quite wide dialect variations. No doubt it is easier in this world of instant communication, which presumably has some effect in preventing, or slowing down, the variation of dialects.

An anecdote - long ago, I was visiting Sweden and, miraculously, bumped into someone who was also seriously learning Latin. (I spoke about six words of Swedish and he had no English.) We tried swopping quotations, and I realized, to my (naive) astonishment that Swedish people pronounce(d) Latin quite differently from English people. We could probably have sorted things out if we had had more time and writing things down, though limited, provided an alternative channel.

Wittgenstein has a quotation (which I'm too lazy to look up - sorry) about language being like a huge city, with the well-regulated but still individual suburbs and the confused maze of the inner, ancient, city. I think that works quite well.

Our collective knowledge has put together an impressive (I don't suppose it is exhaustive) array of explanations. It reveals that language is just as messy as life. Who knew? Certainly not philosophers. It should be compulsory reading on all introductory courses.

A partisan remark. This illustrates why I prefer to talk about specific bits of language, rather than language as such. Language games, with many structures, not Language, with a single structure.

I hope I didn't give the impression that I was dismissive of or unsympathetic to the problems of people learning a second (third...) language. I learnt Latin, Greek and (modern) French and have since picked up some German and Swedish. What I admire most is those rare people who seem able to acquire at least a basic knowledge of a language very quickly. People who are fluent in five languages, or who learn Hungarian for fun. (Now, that's a really difficult language, or so I'm told.)

There is a history of attempts to reform and regularize language. France and Sweden have had government regulation for more than 100 years. When Greece acquired independence from the Ottoman Empire, there was an move to revert to pure Greek, divested of all those pesky bits of Turkisn that had crept in. The result was two dialects, "purified" for use on formal, official occasions and "popular" for everyday life.

There's also a developing story of the break-up of English, which I confess I don't know much about. It will probably be rather like what happened to Latin in Western Europe.

As for "banning irregular verbs to crush the human spirit," that's just silly — Dawnstorm

On reflection, you're right. Sadly, they have plenty of other ways.

One thing that grates on my ears is the common misuse of the past participles in the past perfect, as in, "I have come home" versus the incorrect "I have came home." I used to hear that only among the uneducated, but it's everywhere now. A point could be made that these identifiers are irrelevant. — Hanover

I haven't come across that one.

There are things that bother me, also. Misuse of the apostrophe is one of current ones; it the apostrophe seems to be disappearing from the vernacular. I think that people get confused about it and so leave it out.

What it shows is how deeply the rules are ingrained and how disorienting it can be when they are broken. It's like walking down stairs and hitting the ground instead of another step (or conversely).

An observation. It seems that it is the most everyday, and most ancient parts, of language that acquire the most irregularities. New forms seem to conform much better to the rules.

Pinker says that there are 180 of these exceptions from regular forms, — javi2541997

Only 180? You surprise me.

Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means? — Patterner

It depends what you mean by "of the same nature". They are clearly radically different, since there's no dagger. But they are clearly similar because Macbeth is behaving as if there is a dagger in front of him. The question is whether the similarity can only be explained by positing something dagger-like in his head or mind. I know it seems mysterious. But if you approach the question in a different way, it will seem (as it has seemed to many philosophers) the best and only explanation possible. This is why philosophy is hard.

How I would put it is, the straight and the bent stick *share* the same appearance. If X looks like Y, then Y looks like X, it goes both ways. — goremand

Yes, of course it goes both ways. So I could easily see a bent stick in water as straight. The issue is that the phrase in italics and the phrase in bold seem to be equivalent, but actually suggest different models of what's going on. The italics phrase suggests that the illlusion must involve some thing called an appearance, and that's where the fault is. The bold phrase suggests something more like your way of putting it, that the illusion does not involve any thing except the stick.

hallucinations are blamed on the "faulty" perceptual or cognitive apparatus of the subject. — goremand

I doubt anyone would question that. The issue is what kind of fault it is. Perhaps the quick way of explaining it is that it is a question whether it is like an error in interpreting the data or like a faulty copy of a picture. I thought you were proposing the first alternative and rejecting the second.

I have to stop now, but since we started this exchange I've been thinking about it. Later on, I'll post a suggestion that might take us a bit further.

An observation - standard grammar was originally developed as a teaching aid in Alexandria at some point in the last few centuries BCE because lots of people were learning Greek as adults. It was designed (in accordance with a popular idea of education) as a collection of rules because rules could be taught and enforced in a fairly simple-minded way. (Language-learning nowadays is much more sophisticated.) It was, and remains, a codification of the habits of first-language speakers, who learn in completely different way. There are exceptions - Chomsky's transformation grammar was developed for the very different purpose of explaining why language is how it is. Logic and the philosophical sense of grammar are completely different enterprises.

The consequence is that what are rules for language learners are habits for first-language speakers, and that use and practice determine what the rules are. (The same applies, nowadays, to dictionaries, as I'm sure you are aware.)

Grammatical irregularities (which don't occur only in verbs) are a serious nuisance to learners. Sadly, use and practice pay little attention to their problems.

My first stab at an explanation of grammatical irregular verbs would suggest that where a general rule (like adding -ed to form a past tense) is applied, the verbs in most common use are likely to develop specific variants, whether from difficulties in pronunciation (of which your iced cream is an excellent example) or local and dialect variation or from the history of the word (adopted from another language - criterion and criteria and bacterium and bacteria are examples that I have noticed.)

Good examples are always hard to find on the spot, but the contraction of I will (and I shall) to I'll (and you'll, etc.) is one that comes to mind. The difference between it's (it is) and its (of it) is another annoying example. That one comes from the traditional genitive form which consisted of adding -es to a noun, which duly contracted to -s, but the standard contraction ('s) (the leg of the table or the table's leg), itself developed an irregularity for "it". Irregularity upon irregularity. The same rule and contraction produces his for he-es. There'll be a whole variety of explanations.

I don't think that Orwell was wrong to celebrate grammatical irregularities as the result of the resistance of human beings to regimentation. There have been many attempts to regularize language with different motivations and, let us say, mixed results.

I don’t understand what you mean by “we actually see internal images” or “ it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong.” — Patterner

Quite right. I shouldn't have allowed habitual forms of speech to take me over. But it illustrates how difficult it is to avoid misleading ways of putting things - especially when you're trying to demonstrate that certain ways of putting things are misleading. I'm sorry.

It follows that you are not on the wrong thread.

It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions.

I extended the discussion to hallucinations, dreams, etc. to register that there are other cases of getting things wrong that are less amenable to this kind of explanation. It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. (Dreams are even more difficult, because we are asleep (i.e. unconscious) while we are dreaming.) The psychological explanation that Shakespeare expects us to adopt is that Macbeth is secretly guilty, but that doesn't help philosophically. I don't have a pat answer to that, so to avoid misleading you any further, I'll stop there, at least for the time being.

Does that help?

Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different. — Patterner

I think it has, in the second paragraph. My point there is that the idea of an internal image makes better sense in the context of an illusion or hallucination. The argument then is that if we actually see internal images when we see an illusion or hallucination, it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong.

Certainly, no part of my brain turns yellow and shapes itself like a rubber ducky if I see one floating in the water. — Patterner

Curiously enough, Aristotle has a theory quite close to that. But no-one takes it seriously any more.

But how was it achieved? — Patterner

It's a trick of language. Some people have a name for it - nominalization. This is the term used in grammar for the process of inventing a noun that corresponds to a verb. You'll remember that in grammar a noun is defined as the name of a person, place or thing. This true, but can be very misleading.

If I say a) "I'm going out for a walk", that may be grammatically like b) "I'm going out for a cucumber". So if you just look at the grammar, you will likely think that a walk must be an entity somewhat like a cucumber. But b) means I am going out to get a cucumber and bring it back but a) means I am going out to walk. A cucumber is an object, but a walk is something I do.

This is where talk of categories kicks in. A walk and a cucumber are both nouns, but in different categories. There is an entity that is named or picked out by "cucumber". There is no entity that is named or picked out by "walk".

Similarly, "bent stick" picks out an entity, but "illusion of a bent stick" doesn't. It is a nominalized version of "thought the stick was bent".

The main reason for insisting that this is the right way to look at it is this. If we suppose that some kind of picture is conjured up in my brain when I see a stick bent in water, we have to explain what the process of seeing it (the internal picture) is like. Then you will find yourself wanting to suggest that there's a picture of the picture in my head. You'll realize you are on the brink of an infinite regress, and so that there is something wrong. Positing the picture in my head doesn't explain seeing, much less my mistaken seeing. The story of the light getting bent as it passes through the water is all the explanation we need.

I hope that's helpful.

Excellent!

The next step is a standard move in philosophy. When we see something, there is something that we see - a table, a goal, etc. We can draw a diagram. (I wish I was more fluent with computers and could actually draw it, but you'll have to imagine it, or sit down and draw one.) There's a head on the left side of the page, facing towards the right side, and a table on the right side of the page; an arrow connects the eyes in the head with the table. In other words, seeing has an object and the person seeing the object is in a relationship to it; the two are entirely separate entities.

Now, the question is, when I see an illusion, what is the object that I see? The obvious answer is some kind of picture of a bent stick in my head. (The same argument applies to hallucinations, which is why I was going on about Macbeth, and it seems inescapable that the same model must apply to anything that I see.)

I maintain (and so do a lot of other philosophers) that this is a conjuring trick. But I don't want to go too fast, so I'll stop there for now to make sure you are not lost.

I'm sorry. I made an assumption and I was wrong. You're doing well.

Illusions exist, all right. They are perfectly objective. The tricky bit comes when we try to explain what they are. And this matters because of the grand question what the phenomena that we experience through our sense are, and how they relate to physics.

Useful background for this is this idea of a category mistake. See Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake

You need to go carefully here, because even though we say that illusions exist only in our consciousness, it's a metaphor. There's nothing wrong with that, until you try to make too much of it. Our consciousness isn't a place and doesn't have an inside or an outside. So the existence of illusions in our consciousness isn't like the existence of my lap-top in my house. Explaining the literal truth of the existence of illusions and other experiences complicated and difficult.

[

I am skeptical of phenomenal properties and argue that there is no "appearance of the phenomenal" (as opposed to the appearance being an illusion). — goremand

I agree with your point of view. But I'm inclined to be a bit more than sceptical of phenomenal properties, understood as a kind of screen or veil between us and reality. I think the idea is based on a naive realist view of language.

We sometimes think we see something that doesn't exist (as in Macbeth and his dagger). We say that Macbeth is hallucinating a dagger, which is correct. Anyone who isn't paying attention will be tempted to say that Macbeth is seeing a hallucinatory dagger. One can be forgiven, I suppose, for concluding that a hallucinatory dagger is an object like a dagger. But it isn't. It is a non-existent dagger and Macbeth is not seeing it. He is thinking that he is seeing it. If we insist that there must be something (some entity) that he is seeing, endless problems follow.

Illusions are a bit different. But there is the same temptation to think that we are seeing an illusion is an entity that we are seeing. But, as you say, an illusion is not an entity; it is a misunderstanding. There is a perfectly good explanation for making the mistake of thinking that the stick in water is bent and it is clear that there is no bent object of any kind involved (except possibly some light waves, which, strictly speaking are not bent, but refracted). The catch comes when we generalize. Physics explains to us what sound waves (or light waves or heat) are and how they explain our ability to see or hear feel what's going on around us. But then that old chestnut (!) about the tree falling in the forest arises and we feel we need to make a choice. Either the sound is there whether we hear it or not, or there is only a sound when we hear it. The choice is inappropriate, since we hear the sound when we interact with the sound waves. We can resolve the dilemma either way. It doesn't matter - unless one then wants to treat sounds as some mysterious entity between us and the tree.

Dennett's problem is that an illusion is only an illusion in the light of a description of reality and analysis of how things appear in terms of that description. He takes physics &co as not merely a description of reality, but as the description of reality. I call that a naive realist view of physics.

The idea that we perceive reality is often characterized as direct or naive realism. (I've never seen a view that one could characterize as indirect or sophisticated realism, which may be significant.) I'm sure you've noticed that I think there are naive views of some other things in circulation. I don't mean to be sarcastic, but characterizing a view from the outset as naive is hardly dispassionate.

It would be a mistake to cover all the ground in one go. I think that's enough for now.

To be able to flush out the deceiver as presenting a false identity, or the ignorant identity, we need to be able to look at something beyond the self-describing narrative as the true indicator of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

H'm. I'm not sure that there is, or has to be, a "true" identity. Certainly, if you consider the multiple roles played by most people during their lives, it wouldn't be appropriate to insist that just one of them was the truth and the rest, in some sense, ancillary.

It's different with a sequence of narratives, and there is a temptation to treat what X accepts as X's life as primary or more important than other narratives. But consider Hitler's version of his own life and death with that of history. (He never accepted that he did anything wrong and blamed others for all the disasters.) Which is the truth?

Not all songs fade out, the best reach a harmonic resolution that completes and satisfies. Not all lives peter out incomplete; not all stories end in dots of unfinished business and regrets. — unenlightened

True. I didn't mean to imply that they all did, and most of them end with a harmonic resolution - completing and satisfying is not, I think, automatic. But my point was that the resolution doesn't just happen (although it may appear to). It is designed, constructed, not automatic.

A life that reaches a completion of some sort followed swiftly by death may well occur from time to time, but it certainly isn't automatic. I'm not sure that an incomplete life is necessarily ending in regret. I suspect that most lives end with unfinished business; life goes on until the end, and while life is on-going, business is on-going. There's bound to be unfinished business. Though, of course, opinions might differ about whether certain business is unfinished or not.

To stop and then start again, and to stop and never start again are two very different things. But when something just stops, how do we know which is which? — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't, not until the end of the story. Stopping is like dots at the end of the sentence, or the fading out of the music as the end of the song. You can't be sure that the story has ended - yet. And "yet" can be postponed indefinitely. There's a nice complication. Arguably, the end of a narrative is always, in a sense, arbitrary. Part of the art of the novelist/story-teller is providing an ending that is, somehow, satisfactory. (The same, of course, applies to beginnings) That's what makes a narrative artificial, in a sense. Is there, perhaps, an awkwardness about idea that narrative is identity. Not that it's wrong, exactly, but that our narratives and consequently our selves are constructed or adopted (like a role).

If identity was all in the narrative, then how would I distinguish one subject from another when you write in this thread, or another thread? Instead, I assign identity to the author, and look at any narrative as an activity of the author. This allows me to see unenlightened, with one identity, as the author of many narratives, instead of concluding that unenlightened has many identities, according to the many narratives. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's another complication here, (which I was about to trip over at the end of my last paragraph. unenlightened's link between narrative and identity focuses on the stories we tell ourselves. But other people tell their own stories, not only about themselves, but also about us. If our identity was entirely up to us, those stories would be irrelevant. But we are social (even if we are hermits). Worse than that, our very first identity is landed on us (or, as some would have it) we are "thrown" into our world, and we learn that identity and so learn what identity is. We adopt it for lack of choice; sometimes we rebel and seek to end that narrative and create our own. Others may go along with that, or may not.

I don't know how to articulate the next point properly, so I shall ask questions instead. What ensures that there is a single narrative throughout a biological life? What makes it impossible to live more than one narrative at a time? If the answer to those questions is Nothing, and a narrative defines a self, doesn't it follow that multiple narratives and multiple selves are possible? Apart from our legislation, what makes that conclusion paradoxical?

turn out to be mostly due to the need to fund research or push a certain theory. — I like sushi

Well, that's a point of view and it may be valid in some cases. But I think it is a bit unfair as a generalization. Presumably you accept that the science that can only be done in a community and a culture. The community may ignore ideas that turn out to be worth pursuing and may be mistaken, but there's no help for that.

In our culture, if you want to do serious work (as opposed to armchair speculation), you need to be recognized by the community and funded by someone. What's the point in having a brilliant idea if the community doesn't recognize it and no-one will fund the research that would prove it? You can sit on the side-lines and complain - perhaps rightly - or find some work that you can do. It's not ideal, but it is the way things are.

In short, compromise is not necessarily selling out. It is the price you pay for the support of your community - and you can't do serious work without that.

Philosophers can be much more independent than scientists. But it has to develop in the culture that the philosopher lives in and that will set the starting-point and although in theory philosophers can work in total isolation, I can't really imagine such reflection amounting to more than musings. To do serious philosophy (even for fun) without resources (books, etc.) and a community is not possible.

Philosophy only works with a delicate balance between disagreement (about issues) and agreement (about how to discuss them). With people who don't understand that, the only solution may be to walk away, unless one decides to take on a difficult (and often quite boring) negotiation.

It's not ideal, but it's the only game in town - unless you are very lucky or able to compromise.

I wrestle with this as well.

Everyone is on the spectrum, hence ‘spectrum’. — I like sushi

That's true, although the pedant in me hesitates over "everyone". But it seems that recognition of spectra of mental illness is quite widespread and accepted. Indeed, there seem to be fashions in this. ADHD, personality disorder, autism and Asperger's are all examples.

I'm inclined to generalize (which is always dangerous) and say that it is often useful to see mental illnesses (insofar as they can be defined) as over-development of one or another personality trait which is not abnormal.

I have two "buts".

1. That applies to certain "physical" conditions as well. For example, it is perfectly normal to carry some fat store. But obesity is a clinical condition. Yet it is not more than an over-development of something that is normal. Addictions are similar. Cancers are different, but not dissimilar. Apparently, all of us develop cancerous cells; they are usually dealt with by our immune system. The ones that become dangerous have escaped that process. And so on.

2. It is easy to forget that there are examples of conditions that used to be thought of as mental illness (or even moral turpitude) have turned out to be the result of physical issues. Indeed, don't we think that, in the end, there will be a physical basis for most mental illness?

The amount of misuses of quantum physics is already too many. — Darkneos

Yes, but as someone who has not been trained in any scientific subject, I have to be a bit more complicated about that. Scientists also have a tendency to lecture the rest of us on topics that they have no special knowledge of; it's very difficult to challenge them in the security of their specialisms. Yet, scientific knowledge has consequences and surely the rest of us need to have a say about that.

I'm not saying that you are wrong. (My own bugbear is the misuse of relativity theory.) But it seems to me that there is bound to be a contested area when it comes to the significance (and even, in some sense, the interpretation) of scientific theory. (It's a special case of the problem of specializations as silos. Specialization is very powerful, but has its problems.)

I can't deny something is really off about some of the users there. — Darkneos

I get that feeling from time to time and if it's known, that's different. But the attribution isn't just coming from a post.

It is possible that I'm a bit sensitive about mental illness. But I do mind that it gets thrown about in a casual way that bothers me. People don't talk about cancer in the same way, do they? I worry that there's a lack of recognition that mental illness is really illness.

You see how quickly his own logic falls apart which is why I think he's mentally ill. — Darkneos

Yes, I can see that. But I wouldn't move to a diagnosis of mental illness. Until they have been through some training, people are really not very good at logic. I have observed people who are clearly mentally ill whose logic is impeccable.

Specialisation is useless if such ‘specialisation’ lives in its own terminological frame wholly separate - or rather seemingly so - from more mundane matters. — I like sushi

Yes. That observation underpins the popularity of multi-disciplinary teams to pursue a project - particulatly a practical project. But the decision is a pragmatic one.

If we both see a dog in the street and one of us says ‘look at that dog’ we know what is meant. Objectivity in this sense in an object of understanding.

If you ask ‘what are you doing tomorrow?’ No one will fail to understand. What they can fail to understand are subtle inferences and reasons for asking/stating certain things. — I like sushi

I take it that you are identifying various reasons for communication failure, but not saying that there's always some hindrance to communication. That makes sense. Now all we have to do is to spot the hindrances when they apply and find a way round them. I would only add that it takes two to do that.

In a more general sense the primary question of philosophy (posed millennia ago) is ‘How should I live my life?’ — I like sushi

That's true and it is true also that it is still a live question for us. Whether the difference in context makes a difference is an interesting question. Also, does it follow from the primacy of that question millennia ago that it must be the primary question still? Or perhaps it may be primary for some people and not for others. Come to think of it, what makes it the primary question?

I am more or less for doing away with distinctions when they inhibit exploration. — I like sushi

I like the pragmatism about this. But does it follow that when distinctions encourage or even enable exploration, you are in favour? For example, I can distinguish between questions that I know the answer to and those that I don't know the answer to. Arguable, that distinction enables me to explore. Really, quite useful.

Which again sounds like Buddhism but that’s getting stuck at the “ultimate reality” and ignoring the “conventional” truth of reality. Or rather committing the mistake that thinking that something being conditional means it’s not real or doesn’t exist. — Darkneos

You're right. One might say that there is more than one reality, or that there is more than one level of reality, or that what is real depends on context, or that reality is subjective. I always want to insist that "real" is an adjective that distinguishes from "unreal" in all its many varieties. Either alternate is meaningless with a noun - what is it that is real or unreal? To put it another way "reality" is not an object or entity, but a property of objects and entities. I'll stop now, because it is very hard to capture the everyday use of the concept.

The idea that everything "just is" and nothing is very important is very helpful if you are anxious or confused and unhappy about it. I've taken refuge there myself from time to time. But if meaning is subjective, no-one else has to pay any attention.

I followed the link and read some of the posts. I picked out:- "In modern science ultimate reality is thought of as a place of no things, in other words, unmanifested energy, while apparent reality is a place of things/objects. Objects, however, are manifest energies, but I suspect they are dependent on the effects of energy on the biological subject's body. Seeing as we cannot escape our subjective consciousness, however, to date it is impossible to know."

I understand now much better what you were talking about. I should have done that in the first place.

It's surprisingly difficult to draw a line that would put serious or valuable philosophy on one side and BS on the other. Which is interesting. Our little demarcation problem. — Srap Tasmaner

That's the trouble with philosophy. It tips over quite easily and one can go over the edge and down a rabbit hole without realizing what's happened. Philosophy requires self-criticism, which is a difficult art at the best of times.

Unfortunately I'm not well versed enough in philosophy to call them on the BS. — Darkneos

I don't know how well versed you are in philosophy, but I think the problem is in the Dao De Jing. It is very appealing, but it is not really philosophy as we understand it - nor is it meant to be. It is better to think of it as poetry or rhetoric designed to promote a state of mind or attitude. And there's all the cross-cultural issues as well.

One might as well try to apply conceptual analysis to the "Jabberwocky" - though actually, there's an interesting point about nonsense and meaninglessness to be drawn from it. (It kind of escapes the distinction - never forget that Dodgson was a logician and so must have known what he was doing. (Nonsense was a thing at the time - compare Lear. I think that people wanted to escape from the age in which they lived.))

You ( ) got sucked into the trap. The ability to spot the trap and resist being sucked in is what I meant by "insulated". I claim some ability to do that, from bitter experience. That's why I restrained myself. You asked

And if you weren't restrained? — Darkneos

. The answer is, I've forgotten, and would rather not know.

If you don't want to listen to someone who just wants an audience, the best response is to walk away (or disappear in this medium). If enough people do that, they'll either go elsewhere or try something different.

Philosophy should be hospitable, but if it is a philosophical environment, philosophy's rules apply.

Perhaps we should be thinking about the time before definitions are in place. Except, how can we say anything at all - even articulate a definition - without some definitions, or at least mutual understanding, in place. Perhaps all we can say is that dialogue has to start with a mutual willingness to engage.

Oh! My mistake. Apologies.

Yes. I think it's important to be able to recognize the end of a chat. Then one can look forward to the next one.

This site is much saner and safer than the rest of the internet. — Srap Tasmaner

Quite so.

unfortunately the forum itself is not moderated, — Darkneos

This site is moderated. I wouldn't join anything that wasn't. There's a code of conduct (somewhere - I'm afraid I can't remember where). You can find out who the moderators are if you go to the members page (button in the banner at the top. and look for the "staff" button). If you get into trouble, you can send them a private message. There's a thread called "Bannings" where you can see something of what's going on.

Forgive me if you know all this already. But it seems possible that you don't.

It is true that this site has a very hospitable policy. The thing is, there's a dilemma here. It's about what philosophy is or should be. In one sense, philosophy is for everyone; everyone is involved with philosophy even if they aren't aware of it. If one restricts philosophy (for example, to what's academically respectable) one limits it and neglects much of its influence. That seems a bad idea to me.

By its nature, philosophy (in some sense) cannot exclude crazy ideas - for example, the brain in a vat, the evil demon and so on. It is better to at least try to confront them (gently, because it is easy to provoke a row, which is almost always counter-productive or frightens people away). There are no quick wins, though, because one of the tests is whether people are capable of admitting they are wrong, or at least taking a new idea seriously.

One learns who will actually discuss ideas and who simply wants to sound off and gather "followers".

I'm just a little worried that the damage might be done. — Darkneos

Yes, damage can be done. That can't be helped; it's in the nature of the enterprise. Philosophy seems like a safe space and in many ways it is - specially behind an avatar (I call it a pen-name). But, like a virus, it has its dangers. There's a kind of insulation needed, so that one doesn't end up obsessed with the evil demon or the absurdity or meaninglessness of life. I hesitate to say, not taking things too seriously, but it's like that.