III continued...

Ayer's supposition is that in each case what we see is not a "real" material thing; there is no bent stick, no body of water, no person standing in the mirror, and hence we "must" conclude that in each case what we see is something else - what philosophers call a "sense datum".

Some might now replace "sense datum" with "qualia". Not quite the same.

Austin points out that although we are supposedly looking at the Argument from Illusion, that there is a distinction between an illusion and a delusion, terms interchanged by Ayer, and that the examples given are not examples of illusions. "The argument trades on confusions at just this point" (p.22)

Here's the familiar Müller-Lyer Illusion:

The two lines appear different lengths, but are the same.

Amusingly, the page from which I borrowed the image has this to say:

Here’s the thing: Even after we have measured the lines and found them to be equal and have had the neurological basis of the illusion explained to us, our conscious awareness still perceives one line to be shorter than the other. One can know that the two lines are the same length whilst at the same time experience them as different lengths.This has a serious effect on our conception of the nature of experience.

The world around you is not the way you think it is. — Zach Olsen

Olsen's conclusion is not quite right, but not quite wrong, either. We are, after all, aware of the Müller-Lyer Illusion, and after a point no longer surprised by it - one might say it becomes a part of the way we think. The Müller-Lyer Illusion is part of the world around you and part of what you think. Olsen's conclusion, "the world around you is not the way you think it is", is imprecise, as are similar views expressed already in this thread.

Delusions differ from illusions mainly in their being something amiss with the person who is deluded - they have delusions of grandeur, of persecution. We suffer from delusions, not so much from illusions... (p.23) In an illusion, nothing need be "conjured up"; we see the lines before us quite clearly. In a delusion, the grandeur or paranoia are the product of the sufferer. Something is wrong with the person who has delusions. But there is nothing wrong with you when you look at the Müller-Lyer Illusion; indeed, now you are aware of the illusion, you can take steps to prevent yourself being deceived, and even use your understanding to create novel illusions.

Sometimes there is reason to doubt what you're experiencing... — frank

Yep. I supose that what is salient here is that sometimes folk doubt what they are experiencing without good reason. Austin is slowly and carefully showing why this is problematic.

We sometimes see things incorrectly; therefore, we never see them correctly. — javi2541997

The invalidity of this is apparently not obvious to many. Stove's gem, the worst argument in the world, and so on.

If everything you perceive is real... — Corvus

Austin is certainly not making any such claim. Sometimes we see things that are real. It does not follow that everything we see is real. Sometimes we see things that are not real. It does not follow that everything we see is not real. So your "For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair" is a mischaracterisation. Nor is memory a simple process of storage. I suggest the brush you are using here is too broad. If for you "the realist's account on perception sounds too simple", you might consider that you have not represented their view accurately.

, , "hallucination" is closer to "delusion" than to "illusion", in that something is conjured up in both an hallucination and a delusion, but not so much in an illusion. Should Ayer have called his the "Argument from Hallucination"? That doesn't carry the same rhetorical strength.

“seeing” a table is to identify something as a table — Antony Nickles

:up: Slowly...

I’ll leave him out of it; — Antony Nickles

To be clear, there's no need to leave Wittgenstein out, indeed there is much to be gained in keeping him in, but we need to take care, given the considerable overlap, as to who is claiming what.

:up:

It would be reasonable to introduce a term like sense-data as a place-holder for whatever it is we decide we perceive directly. — Ludwig V

The danger here is the presumption that what we perceive is all of one sort, in such a way that we can apply the label "sense data" in all cases. Austin is showing that this is not a good idea.

III continue...

So is a mirage an illusion or a delusion? Ayer would have us suppose that we have conjured into existence a thing, a "sense data", and hence that we are deluded, seeing the sense data where there is nothing. But it is clear from the explanations given above that what we see is a part of the sky, or a ship, appearing in an unexpected place. The problem, if there is one, is not within us, but in the way light is bent by layers of air at different temperatures. We don't need the delusion of sense data to explain mirages.

When you look at yourself in the mirror, are you looking at an illusion? That is an odd use of words. Those are your eyes, that zit is on your nose; they are not illusory, and certainly not delusions. The coin, seen edge on, looks elliptical - that's not an illusion, but just how a coin seen edge-on is supposed to look. The straight stick in water looks just how a straight stick in water should look - slightly bent. Just as in the Müller-Lyer Illusion we understand what is going on, our expectations are met.

Importantly, there are common cases where we miss-perceive, yet are neither illusions nor delusions. Austin gives the example of a proofreader who sees "casual" as "causal"; not a delusion or illusion, but a simple misreading.

Austin uses Price to show a common feature of Arguments from Illusion; that they suppose there is something extra that is what is seen in each of these cases, in addition to the mirage, reflection, stick and so on; the argument is taken as proving that this additional aspect of perception is needed. I hope it is plain from the explanations given hereabouts that this need not be so. The explanations of each do not require sense data. In such situations we are not deluded.

Oh no need to apologize. It’s just I can’t do two things at once.

Some might now replace "sense datum" with "qualia". Not quite the same. — Banno

Agreed, though I think qualia are problematic for Austin in one important respect: In the passage you just discussed, Austin sounds as if he believes there’s only one correct way to see something. “The straight stick in water looks just how a straight stick in water should look - slightly bent.” But this is a sophisticated result, one which a child would probably not reach without some coaching. How something “should look” has to be grounded in, and educed from, what it does look like, at any given moment of perception, and this is arguably what “quale” refers to.

Later, Austin seems much more aware of this. Not to jump ahead, and I won’t elaborate the point till we get there, but see pp. 100 – 102. For instance, this: “When something is seen, there may not only be different ways of saying what is seen; it may also be seen in different ways, seen differently.” (Austin’s itals.)

@Banno

I think it needs to be reiterated that Austin is peeling away the logic of assuming mistakes about seeing things are evidence of a generalized problem with the faculty of our senses or something “after” that, as in “when something is amiss (that his 'senses are deceiving him' and he is not 'perceiving material things')” p 9

One of the problems he sees is that philosophy takes it that perceiving always works the same way as perceiving objects rather than all the ways we see, and thus the different ways we have trouble (other than just with our senses) seeing “people, people's voices, rivers, mountains, flames, rain-bows, shadows, pictures on the screen at the cinema, pictures in books or hung on walls, vapours, gases-all of which people say that they see or (in some cases) hear or smell, i.e. 'perceive'. Are these all 'material things'?” P. 8

Again, just because we have problems simply means in each case there is a separate logic of ordinary error. But the philosopher wants to group all the different errors into one problem (with perception) with one answer: flawed “Perception” compared to say “reality”. As Austin says, "...there is no neat and simple dichotomy between things going right and things going wrong; things may go wrong, as we really all know quite well, in lots of different ways-which don't have to be, and must not be assumed to be, classifiable in any general fashion." Such as something wrong with our ability to perceive anything at all (which we should also keep in mind is only one example of philosophies desire to create a problem as one kind of thing, as with: appearances, beliefs, subjective, morality, etc.)

Austin sounds as if he believes there’s only one correct way to see something.. — J

Is that what he addresses in a somewhat racist fashion on p.26? I don't think he's saying that there is only one correct way, but that there is at least one correct way, that does not involve sense data. And that's all he need show in order to undermine Ayer's contention that we are obligated to invoke sense data. Ayer's argument is based on there being no alternative. Austin simply need show one alternative.

Yes, Austin is displaying the varieties of perceptual experience, and drawing conclusions therefrom. Contra , I supose.

@Banno @“J” @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997
I forgot to tag people in my above post, but I also wanted to bring attention to Sec. 3 on page 9 where Austin comments that philosophers like to point out that they are noticing something that ordinary people do not; that philosophy is more aware, smarter, etc. And, yes, philosophy's job is to reflect and reveal what we don’t normally consider everyday. And Austin seems to breeze by this, at least for now. But I want to point out that, yes, there are problems, and mistakes, and falsehood, and ignorance, etc. and that philosophy is trying to record that fact. The only problem is that philosophy starts with simplifying the problem (to perception, appearance, etc.) and forcing a single answer (something "real", "objective"), rather than what Austin is doing here which is to examine how our failings are varied and thus have various ordinary ways in which we account for them.

But my biggest puzzle is what would count as direct perception. — Ludwig V

Austin’s point of showing how “indirect” perception actually works is to show that in no instance is it the opposite of what we imagine direct perception would be the perfect case of. So if we set aside the problem of direct or indirect, we can look and identify the actual mistakes we make in seeing something, identifying something, or whatever else is supposed to fall under the imagined process of “perceiving” something (more than just simply vision). “…it seems that what we are to be said to perceive indirectly is never—is not the kind of thing which ever could be—perceived directly. P. 19.

III concluding.
The sting, when it comes, is pithy and simple.

So the argument goes that the stick is straight, but appears bent.

What is wrong, what is even faintly surprising, in the idea of a stick's being straight but looking bent sometimes? Does anyone suppose that if something is straight, then it jolly well has to look straight at all times and in all circumstances? — p.29

And the answer here is simply that there is no problem with a straight stick that looks bent when partially immersed in water, not illusion, no delusion, nothing that needs explaining beyond the physics of optics mentioned earlier. And there certainly is no need to infer the existence of a novel entity to take on the part of being what we see when we look at a straight stick that appears bent when partially submerged, appart form and distinct from the stick.

And when you see yourself in a mirror, there is no need to invent a simulacrum to stand in for you. There is no illusion, no hallucination and no error. What you see is yourself, reflected in the mirror. Again, this is what mirrors do, and no further explanation is needed that replaces your reflection with anything immaterial.

And when you see a mirage, you need not infer the presence of a new thing, but understand instead that the light from things already there has been bent in odd ways. Of all the examples, this is the one Ayer deals with most poorly.

for though, as Ayer says above, 'it is convenient to give a name, to what he is experiencing, the fact is that it already has a name-a mirage. — p.32

So there is no reason, let alone a necessity, to conclude that in these cases we need invoke sense data to explain what is going one.

Even less, then, to take the next step, and conclude with Ayer that in normal cases, what we see is sense data.

The invalidity of this is apparently not obvious to many. Stove's gem, the worst argument in the world, and so on. — Banno

I personally think that it is invalid because it is simplistic, and it doesn't prove too much. But I don't want to get deeper in this specific premise because I agree with you.

And when you see yourself in a mirror, there is no need to invent a simulacrum to stand in for you. There is no illusion, no hallucination and no error. What you see is yourself, reflected in the mirror. Again, this is what mirrors do, and no further explanation is needed that replaces your reflection with anything immaterial. — Banno

Interesting. But do we see ourselves in the mirrors because this is what they do - reflecting - or because do we actually exist? OK, we can conclude that 'real' objects are phenomenal, as we ordinarily treat them; and the things - or ourselves - that appear are, most of the time, real. That is just the point. And, this point comes from a 'general coherence' of our experience. What the argument from the possibility of hallucinations gets us is a brief possibility to doubt on this coherence. Note please, that my aim is not to doubt everything and always, as I said previously, things must exist objectively, but they are 'interfered' by our senses. I understand that taken delusion with sufficient seriousness, it is an argument against the possibility of knowledge in general.

So, if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to the mirror itself and not me.

Agree? Or am I lost?

Such as something wrong with our ability to perceive anything at all (which we should also keep in mind is only one example of philosophies desire to create a problem as one kind of thing, as with: appearances, beliefs, subjective, morality, etc.) — Antony Nickles

rather than what Austin is doing here which is to examine how our failings are varied and thus have various ordinary ways in which we account for them. — Antony Nickles

Yes. :up:

@Banno @“J” @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997

Having finished Lecture III, I noticed that Austin continues to bring up normal cases. This is part of his method, but he only hints at it. At p. 31 though, he says that “we must remember what sort of situation we are dealing with.” (Emphasis added) Wittgenstein will insist on the importance to philosophy of “command[ing] a clear view” PI #122 and of the need for a “particular” p.188, “wider” #539 “great variety of” p. 181, or even “imagined” context and will remind us to “Remember that…” #33, 88, 161, 167, 217, 269, p. 191, p. 207, or to “remember actual cases…”; #147 and #591, as “In what sort of context does it occur?” P. 188.

The situation we are to put these claims into, and what we are remembering about the context of those situations, are the “public” “standard procedures” p. 24 and “normal occurrences” or “normal find[ings]” with which we are “familiar” p. 26. I think he gets at why when he says we see “exactly what we expect” (emphasis added) because our common expectations are what we see, only to have them disappointed. It is philosophy that makes it a disappointment with (our) “perception”. (Do we bring the disappointment inside of us to have control? As then we might be able to make sure we don’t fail again?).

As he showed in the case of deception, we only recognize the odd case against normal ones. P. 11. You are only able to be surprised by an illusion because you were normally expecting something else. Thus why it is important to put these claims into a situation and context to see what the normal procedures, standards, expectations, implications, and findings are for that kind of thing (delusion, mis-identification, deception, etc.). Wittgenstein will call these ordinary criteria.

One question could be: what about this method is important? (other than having someone set out an example and I actual say.. “oh yeah, he’s right”), but the more interesting question is why philosophy wants to abstract from any context and our ordinary means of judgment? but that is not under discussion here.

I personally think that it is invalid because it is simplistic — javi2541997

Yes, it is simplistic. But what makes it invalid is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise.

We sometimes see things incorrectly... — javi2541997

What is not ruled out here is the possibility that we sometimes see things incorrectly and at other times we see them correct. That is, the premise does not ruled out that we sometimes see things correctly.

...therefore, we never see them correctly — javi2541997

This just does not follow.

But do we see ourselves in the mirrors because this is what they do - reflecting - or because do we actually exist? — javi2541997

That's a good question, with a long, but not so difficult, answer. I don't know your philosophical background. So I will go back a few steps. What follows is a potted history, and as such it is roughly correct in broad outline, but definitely wrong on the detail.

The approach to philosophical questions being used here is ordinary language philosophy, a part of analytic philosophy. It doesn't begin with doubting everything, or trying to find certainty, or looking for indubitable sources of knowledge, Instead it starts pretty well where we are, here and now. And it proceeds by looking with great care at the philosopher's main tools, their words.

So it doesn't here begin with what exists and what doesn't, or what "self" is, what it is to be this thing and not that thing, questions of individuation and essence, or other profound questions. But it could.

Some folk presume that because it doesn't start with such things, it doesn't address them That'd be quite wrong.

Here it has begun with an argument that in its day was quite influential, a cornerstone of what was called Logical Positivism. Logical positivism was a branch of analytic philosophy that tried to build certainty from observations. The argument presented by Austin is a large part of the demolition of that project.

So on one view, all Austin is doing is critiquing another analytic philosopher. However, in the process he is developing and using a range of philosophical tools, with much broader application than just the question at hand; and also providing at least in outline a coherent account of how we deal with perceptions by setting out in fine detail the many nuanced ways we use language in this area.

He is developing and showing us a different way to deal with philosophical issues.

So you asked, roughly, how our existence fits in to the account given here. The answer, roughly, is that it is taken as granted; not because it is assumed to be certain, but because it is not central to our concerns here. To be sure, if it became an issue, then we could consider it, again using the method of examining the way we use words around notions of existence and so on. There are such considerations elsewhere, mainly in areas relating to logic, quantification and equivalence. And the answer, roughly, might be not "...if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to the mirror itself and not me" so much as "... if I am capable of seeing myself in the mirror, it is thanks to there being both a mirror and me".

Thanks for your substantive and instructional response. I was lost, but now I think I am getting closer to the basic concepts which are the object of this thread. My philosophical background is very basic, so I appreciate the effort of users like you who explain philosophy to me.

Cheers. :up:

what we imagine direct perception would be the perfect case of. So if we set aside the problem of direct or indirect, — Antony Nickles

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect".

But I agree that setting this issue aside enables us to understand what is going on here better, even though I'm not entirely sure that the last word has been said here. (I have in mind Cavell's idea that the idea of a last word on scepticism is a mistake.)

The danger here is the presumption that what we perceive is all of one sort, in such a way that we can apply the label "sense data" in all cases. Austin is showing that this is not a good idea. — Banno

I certainly agree with that. If there is anything more to be said about or with sense-data, it would be off-topic here, so I shall leave it alone.

Instead it starts pretty well where we are, here and now. And it proceeds by looking with great care at the philosopher's main tools, their words. — Banno

I agree with this, whole-heartedly. But you referred earlier to some of the "critiques" of ordinary language philosophy here

Some mirth has been found in Austin's use of "the ordinary man" - as if such as he would have any idea.. — Banno

and there's a mention of Gellner's book here:-

Ernest Gellner. In his book, Word and Things, — Richard B

So I'm tempted to articulate more of a defence. But, again, that would perhaps be more appropriate elsewhere.

I'm afraid I'm a bit confused about whether we are working through the sections systematically or just reading the book at our own pace?

I'm afraid I'm a bit confused about whether we are working through the sections systematically or just reading the book at our own pace? — Ludwig V

For my part my intent is to continue in the way I have been, reading a lecture or two ahead and then going back to re-read in more detail to make notes mostly for myself. Lecture IV will probably be very brief, then a bit more detail, or less, as we move into the later lectures, if I loose interest. If you want to move at a faster pace, go ahead, but I've found in the past that this leads to folk getting lost and needing to go over arguments again.

In a PM to @Richard B I said

I would prefer the thread stay on the topic and not become another diatribe against linguistic philosophy. It's probably inevitable that it become so mired, but I'll not help out. Much.

As for your specific question, I don't see Gellner's "four pillars" at all in Austin; indeed, Austin's method is antagonistic to all four. — Banno

Well put. The problem, then, is not whether there’s only one way vs. at least one way, but whether the (one or many) ways can be constructed without sense data.

I hope I’m not just conflict-averse, but I really believe there’s less here to dispute than might first appear. Do we agree that “qualia” refer to actual phenomenological experience, and that the word can be used in meaningful sentences that describe those experiences? If so, let’s try out the idea that this is what Ayer, Austin, & Co. are arguing about – whether there is a separate layer, or filter, or “raw” experience, that is not identical with the eventual object that we say, perhaps too breezily, that we “see.” Even for ordinary perception, a great deal of “how to see” has to be learned. I think the “indirect perception” advocates (and that’s a terrible term, very misleading, but we’re stuck with it) are saying that there’s a meaningful distinction to be made between the sensory information I receive at time T, and the identification of what I’m seeing at time T+1.

Does such a position involve believing in sense-data? Perhaps, but what it doesn’t entail is believing we see sense-data as opposed to the object in question. The sense-data are what permit the seeing, at least in almost all ordinary cases where we’ve learned to pick out relevant objects from the blooming, buzzing confusion of “pure sensation” (James).

Austin is certainly not making any such claim. Sometimes we see things that are real. It does not follow that everything we see is real. Sometimes we see things that are not real. It does not follow that everything we see is not real. So your "For the realists, there is no room to say anything more on the perception than a chair is chair" is a mischaracterisation. Nor is memory a simple process of storage. I suggest the brush you are using here is too broad. If for you "the realist's account on perception sounds too simple", you might consider that you have not represented their view accurately. — Banno

Wasn't Austin a direct realist? His argument was against sense-data theory in perception, claiming that when you perceive an external world object, you are perceiving it directly without any medium in between the perceiver and the object.

I was trying to point out some problems with the direct realist's account that you can perceive external world objects directly, and sense-datum is not involved.

The contents you perceive definitely get stored in your mind, if not in memory where else could it be?

Another problem I used to think that naive realists and direct realists (not sure they are the same people, but sounds similar to me) have with their claims, is that what they perceive is the true account of the real world, which is problematic (from the argument of illusion). You cannot ground certainty of the external world solely on the basis of what you perceive due to the imperfect human sense organs, and possibility of illusion with perception due to the way the objects' nature and property are, or the fluxing environmental condition of the perception etc.

I agree with Russell's Representative Realism, because it says what we perceive is sense-data not the objects direct. In the case of sense-data, the whole process of perception process gets coherently explained and understood. Because it is sense-data, the data which could be accurate or inaccurate, can be stored and retrieved, it coheres with the whole human cognitive process and paradigms.

And still he wasn't denying the external world as illusion. The world out there exists even when we don't perceive it. But due to nature of the world, and our perceptual sense organs, what we perceive is sense-data, not the objects themselves.

Anyhow, this thread is a good opportunity to take out the old classics "Sense and Sensibilia" and "Foundations of Empirical Knowledge", read, think, refute (if need be), and learn. cheers.

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect".

The “directness” describes the relationship between perceiver and perceived. By “direct” one means there is no causal intermediary between the perceiver and the rest of the world, that we aren’t viewing sense-data, neurons, shadows on a cave wall, but the things themselves.

The “directness” describes the relationship between perceiver and perceived. By “direct” one means there is no causal intermediary between the perceiver and the rest of the world, that we aren’t viewing sense-data, neurons, shadows on a cave wall, but the things themselves. — NOS4A2

Yes, I would go with that.

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect". — Ludwig V

But I agree that setting this issue aside enables us to understand what is going on here better, even though I'm not entirely sure that the last word has been said here. (I have in mind Cavell's idea that the idea of a last word on scepticism is a mistake.) — Ludwig V

He’s not done yet, for sure. But the argument is that discussions about indirect perception make sense, but not as thought of in contrast to direct perception. Which means we don’t need the idea of sense data at all. It would just be “perceiving” but I believe the next move is that we don’t even understand what “perception” is (if we talk about sense perception, what is direct touch? direct smell? etc.)

Does such a position [with qualia] involve believing in sense-data? — J

The argument for sense perceptions, or data, and qualia (and appearances, and particulars) have in common that we are problematizing sensing in a particular way—by abstraction from any setting—and creating one answer because we believe there is always a problem (and that we want to buffer ourselves from the possibility of any). However, Austin has just shown that the problems we have with sensing are ordinary and resolvable at the ground level, so both the abstraction from any case, and the generalization to all cases is unnecessary. There is more.

To be fair, as Austin intimates somewhere, all perception is direct. It’s just a question of what it is we are perceiving. In my opinion there are only two likely candidates: ourselves or the world. So in my mind it also becomes a question of identity and selfhood.

I used to think every perception is indirect i.e. via sense-datum.  But Banno says that Austin claims there are perceptions which are not indirect.  So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are.  I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not.

But take for instance, I am looking at an object on the grass in my back garden.  I am on the 2nd floor of my study room, and looking down at the grass through the window.  It is not that far away, about 30 ft distance.  The object looks grey and round in shape, and is unidentified at first. I was wondering what it could be, but cannot make out.

I was suspecting it would be either a leaf from the trees, or an empty plastic carton blown by the wind from the outside road, or it could even be the next door neighbour's cat droppings. I am not sure due to the fuzziness of the object and the distance.

I take out my old Pentax binoculars, and point to the object through the window, and focus for the object.  It is blurry and fuzzy at first, but soon it gets clearer, and appears as a super sharp image.  I can see the object now very well, and can tell it is a leaf possibly dropped from the trees in the garden.

The visual perception in this case was only possible via the aid of the binoculars.  For that, I would claim that the binocular was part of my sense organ.  The image was transferred to me via the lenses in the binoculars into my eyes and then into my brain somewhere in which was able to identify the image as a leaf, not an empty carton or the dreaded cat droppings.

In this case, if I say the whole perception was direct from the leaf on the grass to my cognition, I think I am not being fair or reasonable.  Even my eyes are not the recognitive judgemental place for the perception.  They were just a medium, which transferred the image in the binocular to my brain somewhere. 

I am sure the final place where the perceptual judgement took place where I identified the object as a leaf was somewhere in my brain, and the categorical concepts which activated my judgement of the identification of the leaf as a leaf from the trees. My perception in this case was indirect in many folds for sure.

I still don't know what kind of leaf it is, or from which trees (birch, poplar or acer) in the garden. For that, I will need to go out to the garden and walk into the grass, and stand right above the object and have a close peek.

Hence, my perception was incomplete, although having identified what the object was ( a leaf), I am still not sure what it might be, therefore I have no complete access to the object in the world in epistemic sense even after having a concentrated perceptual operation with high quality visual aid. Of course I am not denying the existence of the object on the grass, or saying that it might be a figment of my imagination. What I am saying is that, I have perceived the object on the grass, and with the visual aid which assisted in clearing the blurriness of the image of the object, initial identification seems successful, however, the full knowledge of the nature of the object is still vague at this stage of perception.

Consequently perceptions cannot be direct, but must be resolutely indirect, because all perceputal activities take place via sense organs minimally, sense-datum mostly and many other peripheral factors. (I still keep open-minded admitting for the non-indirect perception case offered by Austin.)

So we don't seem to agree on the topic, but not all do, and that is pretty normal in all discussions.

Austin, of course, has been the butt of many jokes, the quintessential irrelevant Oxford Don, putting the anal back into analytic, and so on. — Banno

It doesn't matter. Think of the loonies and colossi of affectation he savaged, so politely. Well, fairly politely.

Reading Sense and Sensibility resulted in a kind of epiphany, for me. The revelation of the profoundly errant views of the proponents of sense-data and such artifices was stunning. I felt as if I was Paul, but on the road to some kind of metaphysical Damascus, struck in the face by a cream pie and knocked off the high horse of philosophy as it became after Descartes.

[I've been wanting to do something with Paul being hit by a pie in the face for some time now. Best I can do for now].

It’s not only the leaf, but also the binoculars, the window, the garden, the chemicals and particulates in the air that you are seeing. To the question “what is it that is perceived”, all of it must be included. The mistake, I think, is to consider the “perceived” as an isolated object, like a leaf or table. Moreover, everything witnessed in the entire sensual periphery must be considered as “the perceived”, including smells, sounds, and so on. If all of it included, as I think it must be, it is impossible to say perception is indirect because there is no intermediary there.

If the law of identity holds, I cannot consider “the final place where the perceptual judgement took place” as perceived, because the brain is a component of the perceiver. Does X perceive Y, or does X perceive X? At any rate, neither precludes any intermediary.

Austin intimates somewhere, all perception is direct. — NOS4A2

Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. As he says:

"It is essential, here as elsewhere, to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies. I am not, then-and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning-going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects)." p.3

So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are. I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not. — Corvus

It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here.

Well we are not here for changing your views, but fair enough for your points. I have given out my views for your points.

He quibbles throughout, but then says that, according to the argument from illusion, sense-data is perceived directly.

As I mentioned earlier, the argument from illusion is intended primarily to persuade us that, in certain exceptional, abnormal situations, what we perceive—directly anyway—is a sense-datum; but then there comes a second stage, in which we are to be brought to agree that what we (directly) perceive is always a sense-datum, even in the normal, unexceptional cases.

P.44

So whether we are perceiving a table or sense-datum, both are perceived directly.