The stock example I’ve always read is, the answer to ‘why is the kettle boiling?’ can be either ‘to make tea’ or ‘because it’s been heated to the appropriate temperature.’ Both answers are of course correct, — Wayfarer

Yes. As far as I'm concerned, as a philosopher, that's a datum.
A neat resolution is to see it as a question of lenses rather than about the world. Wittgenstein's "seeing aspects" is one attempt, and the puzzle picture analogy is, I think, very helpful. Two problems. First, there is a description of the picture as marks on paper - lines or patches of shading. That description "loses" both ways of interpreting it - it couldn't be neutral between them if it didn't.
If, for example, we were to interpret our debate about animals as about two different ways of understanding (representing) them, we would have neat explanation of why we find it so hard to agree. It's a false choice. But then, we would expect there to be a description of them that is neutral between the mechanical, physical explanation and the rational explanation of what they do.

We just have to figure out what the commonality is. Something explains the different modes operating in the same being. — Patterner

Yes. However, traditional metaphysical explanations like dualism resolve the problem by positing two different substances (and then there's the "three worlds" idea, which seems to me to be in the same boat with dualism), which rejects your description of different modes in the same being. Materialism and idealism make a choice within that framework by rejecting one substance or the other and "reducing" one horn of the dilemma to the other. We won't get anywhere down that road.

Generally speaking science since Galileo has attempted to avoid teleological explanations, preferring explanations in terms of preceding causes. — Wayfarer

Yes. "Preferring" is a bit weak - unless you mean it in the traditional sense of "pushing forward" or "promoting". They had a methodological issue as well as all the theology - mathematics. Mental objects appeared not to be capable of being incorporated into that new way of doing science. But, as we are now seeing, that was actually just kicking the can down the road. We can't do that any more, though some people (Nagel, Searle) seem to think that's an option.

The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong, — Janus

You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs.
You can say that the thermostat causes the boiler to switch on and off, because, at that level of description, they are recognizable to two different entities. But if you talk about the heating system, the thermostat controls the system and so is part of it. It doesn't cause the system to switch on and off - the system doesn't switch on and off.

But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two. — Patterner

Well, there is - Aristotle's four "causes". Actually the word that we translate as "cause" also means "reason", so it would be better to talk about Aristotle's four explanations. But that is lodged deeply in his hylomorphic metaphysics, so that all four explanations apply to everything, which won't do for us - unless we fancy accepting the Supreme Good and the Great Chain.
The problem now is that we do not want to (cannot) apply both explanations to everything. We would be happy to say that some things require causal explanations only and some things require both. Many cases are clear, but others or not - both at the line between living and non-living things/beings and between sentient and non-sentient beings and again at the line between rational and not rational beings. What's worse is that it appears to be an empirical question which things belong in which categories.
Our problem is not helped by the fact that ever since evolutionary theory developed we have had a scientific theory hovers between (combines?) the two - there is a rational explanation for what evolves as well as a mechanistic one. But there is no question that the purposes of evolution are not the purposes of the animals that evolution applies to.

Not at all, a priori/a posteriori was Kant’s summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction, later called into question by Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. But I still think it’s a valid distinction, in fact I recall it being one of the first things I was taught as an undergraduate, in the class on Hume. — Wayfarer

Oh, yes, it was one of the early bedrocks that I was taught as well. What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work. I also know about Quine, but then he wanders off into what he calls naturalism. Wittgenstein didn't exactly abandon it. But he did argue that it was more a matter of how certain propositions were used - a question, if you like, of statements rather than propositions.

When Frege says that 'thought contents' are real 'in the same way' as a pencil, he means, well, real. ...... So he's granting reality to abstract objects, which nowadays is controversial. As regards the empiricist rejection of Platonic realism, it's sadly typical, I'm afraid. — Wayfarer

Now you have opened the door to the world of pain that is reality in philosophy. The meaning of "real" depends heavily on the context of its use.
The essence of the problem is this. When Frege (philosopher) says that all numbers are real, everyone will agree. Mathematicians include all the rational numbers, such as the integer −5 and the fraction 4 / 3 and the irrational numbers (and 0) as real. For Frege, as a philosopher, an unreal number is a number that does not exist. But for mathematicians, there are three kinds of number that are not real - imaginary numbers, infinite numbers and complex numbers. All these most certainly exist. I could multiply examples. Strictly speaking, the philosophical use of real is a figment of the philosophical fantasy that there is a use of real such that it is not context-dependent; I think it is absurd but I think it is now so common that it has to be accepted. But it does not correlate with the use of real in other departments of our language.
I do accept that numbers exist and that they are abstract, which is a category of existents, which means they have a different kind or mode of existence from physical objects. So I'm not with Frege, either. Meinong? Maybe. I haven't thought about that. I think the best short story about this is Quine's slogan "To be is to be the value of a variable". My long story would be about language-games and the different kinds or modes or senses of existence they define.

The simple reason is - and it is simple - that if number is real but not material, then it's a defeater for materialism - and we can't allow that. — Wayfarer

That's their problem. Certainly not mine, and I'm guessing not yours either.

The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate. — SEP

That's fascinating. It's as if the last 50 years of philosophy never happened. Oh, well, that's how the cycle works. One day people will look again and find it was not so awful after all.

Traditionally, this was regarded as a distinction between a posteriori (learned through observation) and a priori (established through deduction), although this distinction has become far less clear-cut than it was in Kant's day. — Wayfarer

Quite so. Looking back, the original clarity looks like an inheritance from Plato. But perhaps that's just me.

I know that 'ready to hand' would suggest Heidegger but it wasn't really meant as an allusion to him — Wayfarer

OK. I just wondered.

Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

That "in the same way" is the problem. Even if we grant him the reality of abstract objects, which is true in a sense, it would be hard to grasp what that phrase means.

Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets. — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

That's an interesting quote. I would think it was the ancestor of Wittgenstein's idea in the Tractatus that all possible combinations of atomic propositions are given in advance - which I'm pretty sure he later abandoned.

. It is because of this, that they authority for our thought if it would attain to truth — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

Yes. It looks to me as if something has gone wrong with this sentence. But the general sense is clear. This is the same metaphor that Nagel is appealing to. (What else does one submit to but authority?) But it seems to me that the assimilation of the place of reason in our lives to the place of the law or a tyranny (depending on your point of view) is a distortion - a failure to pay attention in pursuit of a grand universal statement. (Notice how much post-modernist rhetoric turns on attacking this.) Mind you, if one has a creator-God, the metaphor becomes less metaphorical.

— What is Math? Smithsonian Institute

Yes. It's curious that they chose to give such a feeble, illogical argument here. Perhaps they reflected they are addressing a lay audience, which might not appreciate harder-edged arguments.

Well, being is a verb. — Wayfarer

Excellent. If only it was possible to get our software to remind anyone who types the word "existence" or "being" of it.

Yes, much better. Thanks.
(Self dope-slaps. Shoulda got there by myself)
You, too. Nice rendition of the essay. Thanks.
But I reserve self dope-slappin’ here, cuz I might not have got there by myself at all. — Mww

I'm glad you liked it. You deserve a pat on the back for self-criticism.

We have to explain our behavior to others and we do so mostly in terms of reasons, although sometimes in terms of causes. — Janus

In this context, perhaps there is room for a question I mostly shelve, about whether the difference between reasons and causes is also discovered or created. Mostly, philosophers treat it as a given, though explaining it to people learning philosophy or reluctant to recognize it can be difficult. (It's not intuitive). I don't have a crisp answer. It could be either or some combination.

In regard to the last (sc. mechanism, forces and causes) in ancient times some explanations of the natural were also in terms of reasons. — Janus

Yes. Indeed, with some reservations, it would not be wrong to say that for them, teleological explanations were dominant. Which suggests that explanation by causes was developed later, by distinguishing it from the teleological. (Though it would be more accurate to say that it was developed from Aristotle's account of explanation, which gives one model for everything.) It's curious that the non-teleological explanation has taken over and nearly ejected teleological explanations altogether - like a cuckoo.

We have to explain the behavior of animals and we do this sometimes in terms of (imagined and projected) reasons . — Janus

I like the concept of a rational reconstruction for this. (I found it recently in Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds".)

Note that Burge writes "number" not 'numbers'. I find it to be an important distinction because the quality of number is of course present wherever there is diversity whereas numbers as entities are not. To put it another way, say there are four objects—it seems to me to make sense that the quality or pattern of four, that is fourness, is present, but not the number four as a separate entity. — Janus

I like this. It helps to bridge the gap between counting (as the ground in our practices) and arithmetic.

I think of number as an act rather than an entity. — Wayfarer

That's very helpful.

"Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?'
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.”
― Kurt Vonnegut, Cat’s Cradle — wonderer1

I like that a lot. Vonnegut used to be a great favourite of mine. I don't know why I stopped reading him. It just happened somehow.

What, on your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it? — Mww

One can make a start by getting a better idea what Nagel meant by the order of reasons. You can get a clue by going back to the beginning of the essay and re-reading the quotation from Pierce at the top of p.2.

I'm assuming that you have a copy. I'm too lazy to type it out. My copy doesn't like me using copy and paste. You can get an idea of what "submit" means by reflecting that I have to submit to the order of the software. Which means that I want something different from what the software provides. Then ask yourself why you would want something different from what reason provides.

Reading Pierce, I'm driven to ask myself what he is trying to do with that stuff about Nature being "great and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real". For me, Nature is as real and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real as a wet Sunday afternoon or washing my socks.

It's that inherent incompatibility that leads me to believe that the so-called "Hard Problem" is a pseudo-problem that comes with failing to recognize this fundamental incommensurability. — Janus

You may have a point. I think the two are different articulations of the same problem. Which I agree is a pseudo-problem, except that I can't spot how the illusion is created - yet.

I thought that as well, but isn’t a syllogism a logical construct in propositional form, which we create? — Mww

As for the ground of reason, obviously a deep question, but I will generally argue that the ‘furniture of reason’, the basic laws of thought, are discovered and not invented. — Wayfarer

We need to get past this opposition between discovery and invention - or construe it in radically different ways.
1.We should recognize (and I do mean recognize) that discovering Neptune is different from Pythagoras' discovery of his theorem or the discovery of the irrationality of pi or sqrt2.
2. Perhaps also a distinction between a theory/hypothesis (invented by Copernicus) and recognizing/proving that it is true (submitting to the facts or evidence). The second phase cannot happen until the first phase has happened. But what made Copernicus invent his theory? Recognising that Ptolemy's theory was problematic because the facts didn't fit.
3. Nagel supposes that our first order of business in life to ask ourselves what to believe and how to live. He was wrong. Our first order of business to learn how to ask questions, and that takes years, by which time we have already begun to live our lives and acquired many beliefs. The questions arrive too late to be fundamental.

Construct, I think, rather than 'create', out of materials ready to hand, so to speak. — Wayfarer

That looks like a false opposition to me. Doesn't all creation use materials ready to hand, but perhaps in new ways. Doesn't construction always result in something new? (BTW Have you been reading or reading about Heidegger?) Did he construct his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand or create it? I don't think either construct or create is quite right for that case.

:chin: — Wayfarer

I'm really sorry. I can't decode that.

I didn't mean to be dismissive. I have to acknowledge that a new paradigm of explanation is possible, I guess I just don't see it as a likelihood. — Janus

I don't think that what I'm proposing is a new paradigm. It's just a different way of looking at an old paradigm, which better reflects the questions that we ask and dissolves some of the puzzles that the old paradigm seems to generate.

Also, I think it's fairly easy to see the adaptive and survival advantage that reason possesses. ..... Will is also needed. — Janus

Too right. We oscillate between seeing reason as our crowning glory and seeing it as merely the slave of the passions. It all depends how you define it - particularly the place of our values in what we do.

So throughout this passage, he's presenting Nozick's proposal as an example of a naturalised epistemology based on evolutionary biology. — Wayfarer

Yes, that makes sense of it. I might have written a rather different response if I had realized that. I have a feeling that he thinks that refuting that kind of naturalised epistemology in some way supports his view of reason. The vision of reason that he seems to present does not attract me in the slightest. But that's another issue.

Well, that I take to be his point. Basically I read the argument as saying, to rely on scientific or evolutionary justifications for reason, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. And why? Because it points to factors outside reason itself to ground reason: — Wayfarer

This is where the fundamental obscurity in foundationalism creates unnecessary (in my book) confusion. It's very simple. Question - are the foundations of a house part of the house or not? Well, builders dig trenches and fill them with concrete and they call that putting in the foundations. So the foundations are part of the house. From this perspective, the foundations of mathematics require more mathematics. But the soil and rock into/onto which they build those foundations are the foundations of the foundations and they are not part of the house. So more mathematics just pushes back the question of the foundations. Sooner or later, there must be something analogous to the soil or rock which is not built, but on which a house is built.

Things are a bit different when you come to consider something like a ship or a car. These are self-supporting structures and so, strictly speaking do not need and cannot have foundations. However, the keel of the ship or the chassis of the car plays a role analogous to the foundations of the house. The keel of the ship and the chassis of the car are part of the car. But you can build a car without a chassis - the functions of the chassis are fulfilled by the entire bodywork, which is a true self-supporting structure, without a foundation. (The same applies to ships, but they still need a keel, to give the ship a grip on the water.) But ships and cars do still have a medium, an environment, in which they exist.

I think that what Wittgenstein says about ways of life and practices trades on the first kind of foundation, but the idea is applicable to the second as well. I think a case could be made for counting it as a form of naturalism, but that's only a label, so I do not care much.

Plenty of animals get along just fine without mathematics and science. So appealing to evolutionary principles in support of reason actually has rather the contrary effect of undermining it, rather than strengthening it. — Wayfarer

You must mean "without articulating mathematics and science". The hawk that can catch a rabbit is, in one sense, solving a complex mathematical problem even though it can't solve it in the way(s) that we can; it can also distinguish quite reliably between what it can, with benefit, eat without any (articulate) knowledge of chemistry.
Well, plenty of living things, including some animals, manage pretty well, without or with only very poor vision. Which does not invalidate the idea that vision gives an evolutionary advantage to those animals that have it. It depends on your way of life and whether you can work out some other survival strategy. (Living underground, or developing an effective ultra-sound system) However, an advantage in surviving does not negate the possibility of side-effects which may or may not play into survival.
I don't see how you can argue that evolution does not and cannot validate reason, even if it contributes to survival and argue that evolution undermines reason. If you advance the latter claim, you are accepting that reason might contribute to survival.

The 'something more' is a reason that carries its own authority, which need not and should not be grounded in something else. — Wayfarer

Well, that's an outline. It needs a good deal of unpacking.

I won't go further with it here, other than to note that this is the background to much of this debate, in which 'reason' is now mainly understood in terms of evolutionary adaptation, rather than as an instrument which is able to discern truth. — Wayfarer

I wasn't aware that this evolution business is so mainstream. There's no need to treat it as a dilemma or competition. I think it is quite plausible to say that reason can contribute to survival because it is able to discern truth.

One lurking factor that I've been thinking over is the change in the conception of the nature of reason over history. — Wayfarer

Yes. And that's not merely marginal to understanding what people mean by "reason".

This demonstrates that rationality is not contingent on being correct or knowing the truth. — night912

That's certainly true. But the reasoning you outline starts from "If someone has fired a gun, I might get shot, so I should hide", and then considers a range of possibilities around that. That's the starting-point. Factoring in my beliefs and knowledge amounts to factoring those possibilities in. It's still about the facts.

The fact that we have developed the capacity for reason evolutionarily does not "justify" reason. Reason needs no justification. No justification of reason that doesn't use reason is possible, and this circularity ensures that justifying reason is an incoherent, an impossible, fantasy.. — Janus

No argument here.

All our explanations are in terms of either causes or reasons. It might be imagined that some completely new paradigm of explanation will be found, but I see no reason to think so. — Janus

Well, I thought you might find my suggestion interesting.

Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to — Wayfarer

Thanks for sending me the link to this. I realize that everything has moved on in the last three days. But I hope my comments may nevertheless be of interest.

The heart of his argument is the re-evaluation of evolutionary theory. There have been various statements of it in this thread, but I shall quote from this article.

The evolutionary explanation itself is something we arrive at, in part, by the use of reason to support evolutionary theory in general and also this particular application of it. Hence it does not supply a reason-independent justification of reason, and, although it grounds reason in facts independent of reason, this grounding is not accepted by us independently of our reason. — p. 5, apparently quoted from Nozick's 'The Nature of Rationality'.

Nagel goes on to say that

..our finding something self-evident is no guarantee that it is necessarily true, or true at all -- since the disposition to find it self-evident could have been an evolutionary adaptation to its being only approximately, and contingently true.
The proposal is supposed to be an explanation of reason but not a justification of it. Those facts are not supposed to provide us with grounds for accepting the validity or reliability of reason — p. 5

So far, so good.

Now comes his mis-step, in which, so far as I can see, he contradicts what he has just said - continuing from the last quotation:-

... what is it It supposed to provide? It seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason "objectively" true.... — p. 5

There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. But he moves gradually from the relatively harmless point that evolution would settle for pragmatic heuristics as opposed to valid arguments, that is, he ends up equating reason with any old natural process, and that's a mistake.

Reason is whatever we find we have to use in order to understand anything. And if we try to understand it merely as a natural (biological or psychological) phenomenon, the result will be an account incompatible with our use of it and with the understanding of it that we have in using it. For I cannot trust a natural (sc. evolved) process unless I can see why it is reliable, any more than I can trust a mechanical algorithm unless I can see why it is reliable. — p. 10

A natural process is specified irrespective of its trustworthiness and so the question whether it is reliable can be formulated. But an algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions or rules that will help to calculate an answer to a problem: One can ask of a set of mathematical instructions whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem. But one cannot ask of an algorithm whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem; the question whether that particular set of instructions is reliable has already been asked and answered. That's why one cannot ask of reason whether it will deliver the truth; that question has already been asked of potential arguments and answered.

If one supposes that human beings have a "rational faculty" - i.e. an ability to reason, - the question of evolution is what contribution such a faculty might make to survival - the question whether we are able to garner information about the world has already been asked and answered. This question does require a justification of reason, not as such, but as something that needs to be explained in the context of evolution. The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he is right.

I think that Nagel's critique does not distinguish clearly enough between the two issues. The possibility of evolution settling for something that is "only approximately, and contingently, true" (p. 5), which is a perfectly rational pragmatic practice, is meant to undermine the idea "that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection". But this misses the point. The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account.

The only recourse I have to understand this is wildly speculative. Nagel doesn't even mention Wittgenstein. Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are.

But if one accepts Wittgenstein's "This is what I do" as the bedrock of justification, evolution is not required to provide any further justification for rationality. It is asking and answering a different question. On the other hand, if one rejects Wittgenstein's "groundless grounds", evolution may seem to provide another layer to the infinite regress of justification. For myself, I don't see that another layer is required, and would probably argue that evolution doesn't provide it anyway, but that's another matter.

For the record, I don't think that the "refutation" of evolutionary theory is his real business here. He is using that question in pursuit of bigger game, and makes that clear in his final paragraph.

Once we enter the world for our temporary stay in it, there is no alternative but to try to decide what to believe and how to live, and the only way to do that is to try to decide what is the case and what is right. Even if we distance ourselves from some of our thoughts and impulses, and regard them from outside, the process of trying to place ourselves in the world leads to thoughts that we cannot think of as merely "ours". If we think at all, we must think of ourselves, individually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it. — p. 10

This is a substantial and even important idea, irrespective of any bickering about evolution. It is helpful to read this passage in the light of his remarks about Pierce at the beginning of the essay.
I would like to comment, however, that our first business when we enter the world is not to ask that, or any other, question but to undergo the years of training required before we are capable of asking questions. By which time, we will have learnt a good deal about what is the case and what is right.

Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood. — Wayfarer

In some ways, it was. It gave people a focus, just as Nagel's bat did. I never doubted that he is a clever cookie. Doesn't mean he's right. I'm not bothered about what he did before philosophy. It is a bit ambivalent, though. I try to listen carefully to physicists when they are talking about physics and mathematicians when they are talking about mathematics. But not necessarily when they are talking about Dualism.

The interview needs some reading. But I will put it on my list. Thank you. BTW, I'm still getting my head round Nagel. An off-the-cuff response based on a skim-read seemed inappropriate.

I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the theme has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers. — Wayfarer

Quite so. All part of the process. Although putting Chalmers in charge makes me nervous. But then, no-one's impartial here.

There is. It’s called ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer

That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.

As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general. — wonderer1

Well, it's commonest among philosophers in the 20th century English-speaking tradition, which at first set out to abolish philosophy (or at least metaphysics) in favour of science. Phenomenonlogy specifically sets itself up to exclude science from philosophy (bracketing, epoche). Then there's the Indian and Chinese traditions.

Many technologists - not philosophers - think that climate change will be "solved" by more technology - as if more of what got you into trouble is likely to get you out of it. But they still want to build nuclear power stations (to help with climate change) even though their only solution to the problem of nuclear waste is to bury it - for 100,000 years! That's a prime example.

Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above. — Janus

Don't you think that recognizing the problem is the first step? What we need to do next is to map it - understand it. Then we'll have to wait and see. I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.

the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. — Janus

One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". It leads to dualist hankerings, which won't help at all. I'm thinking of some locution like "is" as in "Rainbows are effect of sunlight on raindrops" or "Thunder and lightening are an electrical discharge". So brain processes join rationally explicable behaviour as symptoms or criteria for consciousness - following Wittgenstein's analysis of "pain". (D.M. Armstrong used this as a basis for a materialism, but I don't think that follows.)
Or we could look carefully at how psychologists address the problem - mainly by ignoring it, which is like a fingernail on a blackboard to philosophers like me, but nonetheless produces some interesting "phenomena"

The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes. — Janus

God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say.

From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse. — Janus

... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.

I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in ..... In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do. — Vera Mont

I don't disagree with you. There's a lot to think about here - questions that arise once one has established that dogs are rational. Does one draw a line further along the scale. Birds, yes. Snails and slugs, no. Insects, no. Fish? Maybe some. (Whales &c. yes, of course). Plants, no. The distinction between instinctive "actions" and rational one? Between autonomous actions - heart beating, digestion, sweating and voluntary actions, i.e. actions proper. These will be tricky, because there will be good reason for them even though those can't be the animal's reason. Likely it will only be serious nerds like me who will want to pursue those.
Philosophy of action is incredibly complicated.

I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought. — Wayfarer

There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.

I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity. — Janus

In one way "two perspectives" is a very encouraging metaphor. So it could be like looking at the front and back of a coin. My problem is that those two perspectives are within the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Thoughts, sounds, smells are not in the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. I'm very fond of the explanation in physics for a rainbow, which seems to cross our categories. Electrical discharge to lightening is another example. The last case suggests we should not say that an electrical discharge causes the lightening, but that the electrical discharge is the lightening. (This goes back to D.M. Armstrong. He suggested this as a materialist theory of the mind, which is a bit of a problem for me.) Then neural activity will not cause thoughts, but will be the thoughts - comparison with events inside the computer and calculating an equation. That's about as far as I've got with this.

I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer

My objection to Aristotle is that the form/matter dualism works well enough in some contexts, such as the context in which we have designed a computer to carry out a calculation. But it doesn't follow that it will work in all contexts e.g. where there is no purpose or designer apparent. (Because I'm quite sure that not everything has a purpose, much less that everything fits into a single hierarchy of purposes.
Having said that, I must immediately disclaim any idea that this is actually an objection to Aristotle, because I haven't engaged with his texts anywhere near sufficiently to be confident that it really applies to him specifically (or anyone else).

All true. So the question is, why would anyone say they don't have a concept of time? What's more, why don't we insist that human beings have the same concept of time? The hours and days are additional articulations of the sense of time we have from our biological clocks.
What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality.

I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer

Yes, I suppose it could be. I've always thought there is a good deal to be said for it - better than substance dualism and materialism, anyway.
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial.

If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another. — Janus

That's true. But neither can you seriously articulate the idea that mental states are determined by physical processes. The conceptual equipment used to describe physical process does not include any way to describe beliefs; equally the conceptual equipment (evidence, logic) does not include any way to describe purely physical processes. Incommensurability means no bridges, no translations. And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.

What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it. — Vera Mont

Oh dear me! It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, and of an ancient TV programme for very small children that tried to teach children to tell the time. They displayed a clock face and then announced to time displayed. It's not important, but I get irritated by people who say "but the dog has no concept of" and work to concede the lowest possible level of rationality to console themselves for admitting that an animal could have any concept at all. Not important.

I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so. — Athena

Yes. At best partly and with training.

They (sc. ants) are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen. — Athena

Yes. I thought about them and decided that they weren't. They just had a large collection of instincts, triggered, if I remember right, by what they are fed as larvae. An illustration of how irrational components can produce rational results. Not what the thread is about.

Rational decisions are those grounded on solid statistics and objective facts, resulting in the same choices as would be computed by a logical robot.

If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?

The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. — Wayfarer

There is a lot going on here, but the above is one strand which I think I can deal with without grappling with any special reading (evolutionary naturalism).
The author (Plantinga?) has grasped one relationship between the physical and another category, but has not noticed that there are other relationships available. I offer two examples.
First, each piece in a chess set is a physical object which consists of one substance or another in a specific shape. We even say that the king is this piece - holding up or pointing to the physical object in question. But what makes it the king has no representation in the conceptual structures of physics. It is the king because the rules and conventions of chess make it so - it is the king in the context of a chess game. Physically speaking, it is just an object like any other.
Second, - and perhaps closer to home - each number in a calculation has a physical - what shall I call it? - correlate. 1, 2, 3, Again, qua physical mark each number has a representation in the conceptual structure of physics. However, qua number, it does not. What makes it a number is the rules that we apply to it (better, that we follow in manipulating it) - in the context of a mathematical calculation or in the context of counting or measuring physical objects.
When we use a machine to do a calculation, we have assigned various physical phenomena to a mathematical role, and arranged causal sequences to correspond to the mathematical operations we are interested in. What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them.

Knowing what time the human is expected is knowledge about one's own expectations. Dogs do not have that. — creativesoul

I wonder how you know this. Or what difference it makes to rational thinking. — Vera Mont

I know how you and I know what we expect. By introspection, whatever that may be. How do other people know what you and I expect? By our behaviour. So I'm happy to say that the dog knows what they expect - and want and so on. So what might ground the claim that dogs don't have introspection? Well, they can't do anything that could differentiate between expecting X and knowing that one expects X, because they don't have the language skills to articulate it. It's just one of the knotty problems that come up when you are extending the use of people-concepts to creatures that lack human-type languages.

The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive. — creativesoul

When but not what time. Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay. — Vera Mont

But the train arrives at 5 pm. If we're happy to say that the dog knows when the human is about to arrive, why are we not happy to say that the dog knows the 5 pm train is about to arrive? Suppose the dog has learnt to read the station clock or at least to get up and start some preparatory tail-wagging when the clock says 5 - are you sure that they are incapable of that? If they can learn to associate a bell with the arrival of food, I think there's no way to be sure.

My point is this. If one focuses on a specific case - which is a good thing to do, and much, much better than hasty generalizations - there will always be many possible representations of exactly what the dog knows/believes/expects. But if one sees that one case in the range of the dog's life, it will normally be possible to narrow down the possibilities. And one can get a bit further by indulging in thought-experiments, which will at least allow one to understand under what circumstances one might distinguish cases that seem utterly indistinguishable so long as one focuses on just the one event. But unless something important hangs on the issue, it will be tedious work, and one will be disinclined to pursue it unless it matters.

Why should one explanation preclude the other? Another point is that most of our reasoning is inductive or abductive, where there is no logical necessity in play at all. — Janus

Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either.

I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal. — Athena

I would say that is an example of what tacit knowledge is all about. It means that the ability to verbalize one's reasoning is distinct from the ability to reason - the two are not the same process. Which does not mean that the ability to verbalize one's reasons does not enable more complex thinking.

My favourite example of tacit knowledge is Socrates/Plato's insistence that if one cannot define, e.g., courage, piety in words, one does not know what courage/piety may be. But it is clear that that is not the case. In fact, when we speak, we are following a set of complex set of rules that we cannot verbalize. This is a dramatic illustration of how important tacit knowledge can be.

BTW If you post image-thinking as an alternative, that is fair enough. But there is not reason to suppose that it explains tacit knowledge, because if one can sensible manipulate the images such that the product is what you imagined, then you are following rules that you cannot articulate. Image-thinking is an alternative (better, in some circumstances) to verbal thinking.

Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge? — Athena

Yes, I think so.

I'm glad following up tacit thinking was so productive for you. I think it is an important phenomenon. It is a shame that philosophers have seen fit to ignore it.

All notions of ‘rational’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “rationality” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such. — Mww

"All notions of ‘physical’ at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept “physical” is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such."
The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. There may be distortions due to our particular perspective. But that does not mean that everything we understand is false. After all, we cannot change our perspective, so we might as well make the most of what we've got.

Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, — Mww

What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time.

thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter. — Mww

That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. But it is clear that we do make such assessments, from which it follows that thought/belief is not an entirely internal cognitive machination.

Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. — Mww

Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided.

Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. — Mww

That would be one possibility, but it is not the argument that I would put.

Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us. — Mww

Two conclusions follow. First that animals are capable of rational action. Second, the internal cognitive machinations are accessible to us, so they are not purely internal.

It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it. — wonderer1

Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind.

Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here? — Patterner

If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats.

As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
— Wayfarer
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.
— Wayfarer — Ludwig V

I'm never sure how much weight to put on explanations at this level. Bu there is another issue, not yet mentioned, playing in to this. I think it may be hard for philosophers in the traditions of english-speaking philosophy to accept as philosophical at all - but then, neither Christianity nor Darwin is a philosophical theory. This has its roots in European philosophy and is often deployed in sociology. My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested.

Why do I say that the roots are in our way of life? Because so much of our effort over generations to make ourselves more secure, better fed, better sheltered, more prosperous, we have mostly been centred on distinguishing ourselves from animals.

Because they are natural, they are a puzzle and a threat. They live in what, for a human, would be a state of abject poverty and show no evidence of trying to escape from it. These we can exploit for food and labour ("living tools"). Others show a marked inclination to destroy ourselves and all that we have struggled to build up. Of course "we" are different from "them". However, we need to change that attitude and develop a better sense of the ecosystem that we live in, not because it is moral or right, but because we are just as dependent on it as they are. Even if some of us escape to other planets, we cannot all ship out elsewhere - the first time in history that has been true.

Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the information and the link. I've secured everything but will need some time to read and think about it.
I'm not particularly offended by calling scientific materialism into question. That has been done ever since science began 1,500 years ago. Mostly, I admit, in the name of religious ideas.

As for chutzpah, don't you think your photograph is a splendid example?

Thomas Nagel is a scientific ignoramus, and doesn't have a perspective based on having a scientifically well informed perspective. Your attempts to smear scientifically informed people with Nagel's emotional issues amount to pushing propaganda on your part. — wonderer1

I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption.
There are people, you know, who find some pronouncements from people who have nothing but a scientifically well-informed perspective extremely ill-informed and annoying.
If you think that Nagel's questioning of scientific materialism is just an emotional issue, perhaps one might look for some actual arguments on the point? (But probably not right now, since they are not really relevant.)
Incidentally, I also find at least some of his arguments extremely annoying as well, but not on those grounds.

But, to be honest, I get bored in repeatedly presenting the same facts regarding lesser animal's observed behaviors -- to only find these same factual presentations repeatedly overlooked for the sake of the given counter argument. — javra

Yes. It's not restricted to this issue. People (including me, sometimes) get over-focused and can't see what they don't want to see.

It's very tempting to think that engagement with specific cases is crucial to making this argument and it's not wrong. But perhaps even more important is engagement with animals. But it's not so simple as that. What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.

It's not the same as the engagement of a farmer with his stock, which is transactional and does not require the kind of empathy that is needed to understand them. (Not that farmers are necessarily incapable of empathetic engagement alongside the transactional aspects of their business.) Short story - living with animals as companions or colleagues makes a huge difference. (Aristotle makes a huge mistake when he describes animals (and slaves) as "living tools".

That's very vague, but I'm trying to gesture at the idea that this is not just a matter for abstract reason. It's about how to live with beings recognizably like us. After all, that's how we come to treat people as people and not "just" animals".

Yes, animals can act intelligently, especially higher animals like cetaceans, primates, birds, canines, etc. But they lack reason in the human sense (which, as you say above that you're 'a pedant' might be, I would have thought, a distinction a pedant would recognise ;-) ) — Wayfarer

Very neat. But I would have thought that a pedant might refuse to recognize a distinction on pedantic grounds? In any case, I'm only a pedant when I want to be - I don't claim to be any different from other pedants in that respect.

But since you grant intelligence to "higher" animals, I take you to be granting rationality in some sense to them, but then maintaining there is a different sense that is available to human beings. I don't have a clear grasp of these two different senses, much less of why the difference is important. It may be merely pedantic.

As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and like all popular wisdom, tends to be a bit broad-brush.

The Christian doctrine has been interpreted in certain ways that are objectionable, as justifying tyranny and cruelty. But there's another interpretation that interprets sovereignty as requiring stewardship and care (recognizing, for example, that animals are also God's creation and deserve respect for that reason, if no other). This still may (or may not) be patronizing and demeaning. Even if it is, it is better than the alternative. If it is not, then I don't see how the Christian doctrine would necessarily be objectionable.

"Politically incorrect" seems to me to mean "at variance with the consensus view". But a view is not necessarily incorrect (or correct) just because it is a consensus view. So there's something missing here.

There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism. — Wayfarer

Yes. I sense a criticism there, but I don't quite see what it is. There is a further difficulty that I'm not clear just what philosophical naturalism is.

The idea that we are "just monkeys" was a major issue at the time. But I gather than many Christians are now at peace with evolution, so they must have found some resolution of the issue. For myself, I notice that we did still carry many of the basic animal behaviour patterns and that we find predecessor or proto- versions of many of our patterns of behaviour in animals (and even insects). So the idea of a radical discontinuity seems a bit implausible.

This is where I think a philosophical critique of naturalism fits in, but I won't advance it again, as it's clearly not registering. — Wayfarer

Well, if you could favour me with a link to where you have advanced your critique, I could look at it more carefully.

Anthropomorphism looms large. — creativesoul

On the one hand, anthropomorphism, on the other mechanism. No escape. Steer a careful course between the two, and be prepared to change direction as necessary.

I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. ... On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves. — creativesoul

Yes, it is more nuanced a matter than I allowed. Interpretation is not a free for all. It has limits.
There are many examples of ambiguity in pictures and that shows that what a picture shows is not straightforwardly given. But not every picture is ambiguous and not any "interpretation" is possible for a given picture. The puzzle picture is a picture of a duck and a picture of a rabbit. This is confusing just because most pictures aren't ambiguous. It wouldn't be difficult to provide a bit of additional context that would disambiguate the picture as presented. It is certainly not a picture of a horse or a frog. If someone tried to suggest that interpretation, we would correct them.
But it is wrong to say that the picture has no meaning. It is not just a meaningless scribble. The supposedly neutral description in terms of lines on paper suggests a misleading comparison. The only truth is that the picture can be described in all three interpretations. It has multiple meanings, not none. And additional context, in a particular case, can disambiguate the picture.

In one way, actions can be interpreted in a rational or in a mechanistic framework. We are used to using language to disambiguate, but sometimes this fails us. Nevertheless, there is a question of context which often allows us to juggle the two.

But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances. The agent may be lying or misrepresenting the action for various purposes. Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us. It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves.

It doesn't reflect the human's accurately, either, but that doesn't matter, because a common language gives us a thumbnail picture of what is in the other's mind. We don't need every detail to understand the gist of their meaning. — Vera Mont

That's true. What I'm after is that truth is not the only criterion in play. There's also the desire to understand and to be understood. That may require slightly different ways of putting things to cater for differences in perspective. We only need enough accuracy for our actual purposes. Accurate for all purposes is not available. We can always refine things if and when the occasion arises. Philosophers are trained to ignore all that, and trip themselves up quite often.

Of course not. The feral children - and there have not been many - cannot communicate how they think, because they're inept in our language, even if they can learn it, and we have no access to theirs. — Vera Mont

Yes. I did wonder how it was possible, and lived in a wild hope.

That’s what I thought you would say, although I still say there’s a fundamental distinction you’re not recognising. — Wayfarer

Well, either I'm not recognizing the distinction, or I'm not recognizing how fundamental it is. Perhaps if you were specific, it would be possible to discern which.

Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.

In my book, as you know, it's correlations.

Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter. — creativesoul

I think I mostly agree with you.

Why would they need to think exactly the same way we do in order to be considered rational? — Vera Mont

As our discussion of week-ends below shows, they don't.

And only to communicate with other people. — Vera Mont

That's true. But one feels that the version for other people is not the truth, because it doesn't represent the dog's point of view accurately. The difference may never make any difference. But it might possible, so pedants like me like to have both versions at hand to use as and when appropriate.

And they've developed a non-verbal set of symbols and patterns that work for them. — Vera Mont

I had heard of the language problem. Do you have a reference that would tell me more about the symbols and patterns that they use?

Perhaps "rational" is being equated with "the way I think"? (If only subconsciously.) — wonderer1

If you check out my comments to Vera Mont, you'll see that if you want to communicate what the dog is doing to other humans, you may have to distort how the dog is actually thinking. It's an obscure feature of the intentionality of concepts of believe and know which most people miss because they don't think things through from the point of view of speaker and audience.

Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? Do humans think critically? What percent of humans? — wonderer1

Those question need a good deal of teasing out with specific cases before I would venture on anwers. But they are quite capable of mistrusting people.

Is rationality the result of having culturally acquired skills that improve the reliability of one's thinking? — wonderer1

There are some skills one can acquire from the culture. But real life experience is also a great teacher. Either way, I'm sure it is learned. Though children learn to pretend and even to deceive quite early.

To think critically one first has to have abstract reasoning skills, which I don’t believe is possessed by animals, for the reasons stated. — Wayfarer

Yes. It depends whether by "critical thinking" you mean the skills in informal logic sometimes taught in schools. Many people never acquire those skills , but they're still capable of detecting falsehoods and deceptions.

If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, why would we assume it's something - anything! anything! - other than a duck? — Vera Mont

Perhaps so. But it depend whether the dog is going to generalize in the same way that we do. Most of the time, they get it right, because they understand context. But that's not a given. Actually, your next comment illustrates the point perfectly.

Not because it's the weekend; he can't think in the same terms as working and school-attending humans; he doesn't have that experience.* What he's anticipating are the events that take place at five-day intervals: family all present and relaxed, more playtime, activity, maybe the excitement of visitors or outings something of interest going on. — Vera Mont

It's not whether it is Saturday, it's whether it's been five days since the last time. Perfect. But we are not wrong to explain to our in-laws that the dog is excited because it's the week-end.

We choose our words to balance the understanding of the dog and the understanding of the people that we are speaking to. Your in-laws would likely be a bit puzzled if you told them that the dog is excited because it's been five days since the last time everyone was at home, don't you think? I realize that's not very philosophically correct, but it's a tough world if one can't be a bit incorrect occasionally.

Hum, this is the definition that Wikipedia gives-
Being a Athenian means a little more than just living in the city. — Athena

Thanks for this - and for the oath, which I have not seen before. Aristotle puts a huge emphasis on "public affairs" (which I think is closer to what he intends) as part of the good life, and says it is one of the higher good things that constitute the good life, along with friends.

You/Wikipedia are quite right. I don't necessarily trust my memory of these things, so I have double-checked. "politikos" does include what we call politics, but has a wider range and includes "public" or "municipal" and "community". The standard translation of the relevant sentence in Aristotle is "Man lives in a community".

[Oops!. I can't let this mistake go, so I'm adding an edit. That sentence should have read "Man is an animal that lives in a community/city.]

That surely involves a degree of thinking. But what is thinking without words? — Athena

Some people say they think in images. (Planning how to pack a suitcase, for example). I don't, but how could I contradict them?
Sometimes, when we are improvising, we are thinking by doing.
Then there's all the thinking that goes on that we are not aware of. This is more controversial, philosophically speaking. My favourite example is our echo-location. Phenomenologically, we just know where a sound is. But the scientists tell us that we work out where sounds are by the difference in the sound between one ear and the other - it arrives later on the side furthest from the source.
This is sometimes called "tacit knowledge". There's a lot of it about, but philosophy regards it as secondary to conscious thinking. Short story. It's a bit of a mystery.
And @Vera Mont is quite right to cite feral human children. When found, they are often completely without language, yet can clearly respond appropriately to what's going on. (They also, I understand, find it very difficult to learn language at all.) But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language. So it is important for this thread.

So, your argument is that all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species. The ability to speak, think rationally, plan, create science and technology, and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so we're really no different to to other species.
Do I have that right? — Wayfarer

Sort of. To save a lot of words that may or may not be unnecessary, here's my edited version, and then you can ask about any changes that you like.

My argument is that 1) all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species and that 2) all species are similar - after all, they are all living beings. The ability to create science and technology, art and social institutions and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so being unique is not unique to any species.

The unstated but critical question is whether the things that human are unique for are developments of abilities that other species have or are a radical break from all other species. My answer is the former alternative. I do not deny that radical breaks have occurred during evolution but I do not see anything that makes me think that we are such a break. (Radical breaks - eukaryotid cells, multicellular organisms, fish, plants, reptiles, mammals - off the top of my head. There could be others.)

Perhaps the point is that uniqueness is not a particularly good basis for jumping to anaturalistic conclusions? — wonderer1

I've been trying to re-direct people from what I think is a pretty fruitless debate to the question, why does it matter? It's not the distinction, it's why it matters.

I'm not sure what anaturalistic conclusions are. But there is an interesting point here. In our discussion, I think we would happily say that everything that we do is natural to us. Yet, we spend much of our time "artificially" separating ourselves from nature. That distinction - between the natural and the artificial - was popular in 18th century philosophy, and served to draw a line. But that wouldn't hold water for us now, would it?

I intended to post this after I had made some comments. So now I am adding them.

I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done. — creativesoul

That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it? But one could argue that although it is rational qua response, it is not the animal's response and so not an action in the sense that we are talking about. (Think about that first gasp for air when you have been underwater for too long.) That is a possible view.

Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again. — creativesoul

That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality.

What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends. — Vera Mont

There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.

In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this.

Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc. — creativesoul

From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation.
Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary.

That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals.

It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none. — creativesoul

Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.

The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action.

you have been participating on a philosophy forum to the tune of 1.5K posts. Surely, you've been in one or two discussions where you did not expect the other person to change their mind. — Patterner

I never expect to change anyone's mind - except possibly at the margins. Major changes of mind take a lot of time.

But I don't know why subjective judgement puts something beyond discussion. Opinions change. Tastes change. Someone can present an opposing opinion in just the right way to sway the other person. — Patterner

Oh, I was working to the usual idea that a subjective judgement is not open to objective argument. That may have been a bit of a cop-out. But I couldn't make enough sense of what your judgement was to be able to work out how to reply to it.

A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions.
— Mww

I can't make sense of this.
— Ludwig V

That part attributed to me, isn’t mine. Or isn’t mine in conjunction with what came before it. I’d like to deny I ever said it, but….crap, I forget stuff so easy these days. If you would be so kind, refresh me? Or, retract the attribution? — Mww

Yes, you are right. I screwed up the formatting. I apologize. I think your original comment was this.

Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional. — Mww

I intended to add my comment, which was "A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions." I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation.

I like that the Greeks thought we are political creatures and it is fitting for this thread to question if any other life form is political. — Athena

That is a very popular quote - I'm fond of it myself. But Aristotle didn't mean by "political" what we mean by it; we took the Greek word and distorted its meaning. He meant that human beings live in cities - that's all. It's still a surprising thought for its time.

Also, I don't think we all have an agreement about what language is. I think we have agreement that animals are capable of communication but does that equal language? Even if it did equal language is that language limited to a few words and what concepts does that serve? — Athena

No, we don't. It makes this discussion much more difficult than it need be.

They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
— Wayfarer
Then what, precisely, are they doing? If a human stood on that same bank, assessing the distance and scanning the far shore for safe landing spots, would you doubt that he's thinking?
ETA Moreover, exactly like the man, if the leap is deemed not worth risking, a cat will walk some way up and down along the bank, looking for a place where the water narrows or there is a stepping-stone. — Vera Mont

I agree with you and Wayfarer that they are weighing up the leap before acting. I agree with you that weighing up before acting is thinking - and thinking rationally to boot.

Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine. — Patterner

Yes. I was a bit flummoxed when I wrote it - that last sentence is a mess. My problem is that you announce that your judgement is entirely subjective, which puts it beyond discussion and at the same appear to expect me to discuss it with you. I don't think that judgement is a simply objective one, but I don't think it is wholly subjective either.

Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional.
A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions. — Mww

All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the “meaning is use” nonsense, — Mww

I can't make sense of this.

insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize….think rationally….without ever expressing even a part of it via “verbal behavior”. — Mww

So we are in agreement, after all.

Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows. — Mww

I even agree that humans sometimes think in images. I can testify from my own experience that not all humans do that, but it is quite sufficient for me that they sometimes do.

Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And there’s evolution for ya, writ large. — Mww

Oh, I think there's more to language than making good the deficiencies of images. Some people think that an image is worth a thousand words, so there are deficiencies in words, as well. Perhaps its a question of horses for courses.

……and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product. — Mww

H'm. What precedes method? Or do we construct methods and then discover what they produce?

All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Makes sense. — creativesoul

I'm so glad you think so. I'm afraid it is a rather boring conclusion and so seems to be of little interest here.

What about human behaviour cannot be described in behaviourist terms? (Fortunately, that fad has faded) — Vera Mont

Nothing. That's why it was so frustrating to argue with. Strict behaviourism left out everything that made actions what they are and represented them as a series of meaningless twitches.

I'm talking about behaving according to reason. Do animals use reason to inform their actions before they act? People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons. — Fire Ologist

Granted that sometimes we use reason to inform our actions before we act, we do not always do so. Sometimes, we must act without working out reasons beforehand. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress of preparation to act.

That's what we are doing when we insert rationality in animal agents. We can't explain their behavior without saying it is like our behavior, so we just say they must be doing what we are doing. But like intelligent design, saying a dog is using reason and thinking things, is not the only explanation, nor the simplest or demonstrative of the most evidence. — Fire Ologist

To describe what's going as "insert" rationality begs the question. The rationality is not an add-on or an insertion into the act. It is inherent in the act, or it is nothing.
You describe the animal as an agent, which makes their case quite different from the inference of a designer from the design. Nice argument. But the two cases are not parallel, so they don't work.
You are right that there are difficult issues about reading too much, or too little into an action. But that problem applies just as strongly to our reading of human actions, so you can't conclude from the difficulties that the way of looking at dogs, or human as agents - and therefore rational agents - is a mistake. When we recognize that animals are conscious, perceptive, creatures who have wants and desires, the only question is how far you can apply our paradigm of personhood, not whether you can apply it at all. If you question whether animals are conscious perceptive agents, then you are implictly question whether human are conscious, perceptive agents, and that makes no sense.

Philosophy of Mind. Saying my dog is communicating with me when he begs for food is placing a mind of his own in the dog. — Fire Ologist

I wouldn't say "placing", but recognizing. I think when we imagine that trees or storms have minds, we are "placing" a mind in them - otherwise known as personifying them. But that's just a way of speaking, not a metaphor. Few people nowadays that there really is a mind behind in them - though people used to.

like I place a mind in a dog to help build a rational explanation for how good he is at obtaining bowls to lick. — Fire Ologist

No, it is his skills at obtaining bowls to lick that justify recognizing that there is a mind at work there. It's like swallows and summer. There's a complex interplay between the symptoms of summer and the recognition that it is summer.

The chemical is not a living thing. The plant is not an animal. The animal is not a reasoning mind. These are all different. All with their own complexities and goods and beauties, and simplicities, bads, and uglinesses. — Fire Ologist

Oh, I can get behind that. For all my defence of animal rationality, I recognize that dogs are not people. They are like people, but that's different. Or, perhaps better, they are people, but differently. And some animals, but not all. But that position doesn't have the excitement or simplicity of the dogmatic, all-or-nothing approach.

Lastly, none of the above speaks to what reason really is. Reason happens in a mind. Minds happen in a consciousness. Animals have a consciousness. So, just like my dog, I am a conscious, sensing, perceiving being. Somewhere in the evolutionary process, animal consciousness, along with sense perception, came to include concepts and thoughts. Like the chemical became the protein, and the protein became the cell, and the cell became the animal, the human animal became "self" conscious or a thinking, reflecting thing. — Fire Ologist

Yes, self-consciousness is tempting as a distinction between animals and humans. So people have done experiments with mirrors and concluded that some animals are self-conscious because they can recognize themselves in a mirror. I think there's more to it than that. Existing as a conscious being requires a recognition of the difference between self and other. So some level of self-consciousness is inherent in consciousness. Even that may not be the end of it.

If the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are not necessarily simple. — Patterner

Oops! Typo. Will correct. Thanks.

The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) — Wayfarer

Yes. Note that Chomsky and I part ways at this point. The definition begs the question whether animal communication systems count as languages. I'll let that pass for the sake of the argument.
Let's suppose that language learning is a case of human exceptionalism. I've already admitted that humans, as a distinct species, will be exceptional in some respects. One would have to show that this is an exception of more significance that the ability of Monarch butterfly to migrate back to the summer home of its ancestors without ever having been there.

For perspective, try this article from Scientific American.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/evidence-rebuts-chomsky-s-theory-of-language-learning/

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't discount that possibility. But it seems normal now to allow for that situation and to posit that selections other than survival, for example sexual selection, would kick in at that point. The story of the Irish elk is of interest. (It was first identified in Ireland from the large number of remains found there, but its has been found across Western Europe to Lake Baikal in Siberia. This variety of elk grew huge antlers, far bigger than could be of use in a fight. That first though to be an example for Wallace, but now the favoured explanation is that sexual selection enabled this. But, the story goes, they grew so big that they became a hindrance in normal life. The result was the species became extinct about 7,700 years ago.

The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. — Wayfarer

Are you suggesting that my dog does not know the difference between humans (and between men and women and children) and dogs, not to mention many other things? That one won't fly. I grant you that she probably lacks a concept of energy. But that doesn't affect the question whether she's rational or not.

Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: ) — Wayfarer

Yes. Skipping whether intentional is the quite the right word for it, the argument is plausible, so far as it goes. Some of the models of autonomous systems that Thompson discusses are very persuasive. People often suggest that feedback loops are also not reducible to conventional causality (what that is, these days). But "reducible" has become a complex concept nowadays, so I reserve my position and watch with interest. It's all a long way from what we're discussing, though.

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her. — Wayfarer

I hope you are not suggesting that because I don't understand even calculus, I'm not rational. It's not altogether irrelevant (given that we're also discussion the "g" factor) to point out that my school streamed me as sub-calculus in mathematics at the same time as it streamed me in the advanced classes for Ancient Greek and Latin.

It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too. — Wayfarer

It was a bit harsh, given that it was your first essay and nobody warned you about inter-disciplinary boundaries. That's how Kuhnian paradigms are enforced. You don't get to qualify unless you conform - at least until you've qualified in orthodoxy. Nowadays, that's a perfectly respectable issue. I suppose other people swallowed their doubts until they got an academic post and tenure.

Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g". — wonderer1

That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change.

I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are. — Wayfarer

That explains a good deal that was puzzling me. I suppose that's an example of how one tends to get over-focused in these discussions. On the other hand, it may be that people felt that neither was equivalent to rationality and so left it on one side.

One of the problems about discussing intelligence is that it is not easy to grasp a definition of it that is amenable to philosophical discussion. However, I found the the following in an article on intelligence in "Psychology Today" that might provide a starting-point. "IQ" and "Giftedness" were proffered as one-word summaries. Then I found

Reading a road map upside-down, excelling at chess, and generating synonyms for "brilliant" may seem like three different skills. But each is thought to be a measurable indicator of general intelligence or "g," a construct that includes problem-solving ability, spatial manipulation, and language acquisition that is relatively stable across a person's lifetime.

For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? My question is, then, what is the relationship between intelligence and rationality? It seems to me that all the skills cited involve rationality - intelligence is about the difference between being good (better than average) at these skills or not. So my next question is why you think that someone can be intelligent but not rational?

Sensitivity. I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? That she doesn't speak English? I don't think so.

I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said.

Sentimentality, you mean ;-) — Wayfarer

No, I mean sensitivity, which can be excessive, just as insensitivity can be excessive.

There was a major fuss at one point in the seventies, when people realized that unsentimental scientists were testing the toxicity of certain products by dropping them into the eyes of rabbits. Their criterion for a dangerously toxic dose was that 50% of the rabbits died. Hence the test was known as "LD50". In the process, the rabbits often suffered extreme pain (or at least the scientists knew that a human would have suffered extreme pain, which was why they were testing the products on rabbits). So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened.

You may also like to consider:-

I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. — Wayfarer

However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify - Wittgenstein says somewhere that "the concept of pain does not get a foothold in the case of a wriggling fly. Yet I also think that tearing the wings off a fly is cruel torture. Fish in general are also too alien to impact much on me, though I'm pretty sure that lobsters feel pain (partly because they have the same kind of nerve cells as the ones that register pain in human beings) and so think that the practice of boiling them alive is cruel. There are lines to be drawn here, and it's not easy.

Especially as opposed to through emotion. — Patterner

I'm afraid that opposition is under severe pressure. There's a lot of research these days into the relationship (intertwining) of them. For example:-
Cognition and Emotion Journal

Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine. — Patterner

"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity.

The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention. — Wayfarer

I am indeed saying that conceptual thought is not solely dependent on language. The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use. — Ludwig V

A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. — Mww

Not particularly. As I said above:- The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are not necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex.

And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects. — Mww

To be sure, animals do not indulge in our logic games and, likely, do not engage in our theoretical practices. Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do - but that's another argument). I also believe (though I can't claim any authority from Wittgenstein) that, since we are animals, it seems most reasonable to suppose that our way of life is a one variety of the many varieties of animal ways of life.

Differences in degree do indeed produce differences in kind. — javra

Homo Sapiens is a species of an utterly different kind than that of any other species on Earth with which we co-inhabit (most especially with all the other hominids that once existed now being extinct). — javra

There's a dissonance between those two statements - not exactly a contradiction, but close. How do you get from one to the other?

I'll hasten to add that our species is nevertheless yet tied into the tree of life via an utmost obtainment, else utmost extreme, within a current spectrum of degrees - this as, for example, concerns qualitative magnitudes of awareness, of forethought, and the like. But this in no way then contradicts that we humans are of an utterly different kind than all other living species on Earth. — javra

That looks very like trying to have your cake and eat it.

I know of more than a few anecdotes of lesser animals giving all appearances of having a sixth-sense, as it's often termed. — javra

Yes. Whether there is anything substantial behind it is an interesting question. But if they do, they are superior to us in that respect. Just as homing pigeons and other migratory species have superior navigational abilities to us (in that they don't require elaborate technologies to find their way about the globe). So why do you insist that they are lesser?