It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And don’t overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited. — Wayfarer
Memories passed down in our genes? Not exactly. But biologists have observed examples of learned behaviors and acquired responses being transmitted through several generations, contrary to the traditional rules of genetic inheritance. https://www.quantamagazine.org/inherited-learning-it-happens-but-how-is-uncertain-20191016/#:~:text=Memories%20passed%20down%20in%20our,traditional%20rules%20of%20genetic%20inheritance.
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We do know that dogs that became used to humans became domesticated and that a gene controls if a dog can or can not be domesticated. The dogs that interacted with humans developed and spread this gene. This is not just about DNA but also RNA.
.RNA, is another macromolecule essential for all known forms of life. Like DNA, RNA is made up of nucleotides. Once thought to play ancillary roles, RNAs are now understood to be among a cell’s key regulatory players where they catalyze biological reactions, control and modulate gene expression, sensing and communicating responses to cellular signals, etc. https://cm.jefferson.edu/learn/dna-and-rna/#:~:text=There%20are%20two%20differences%20that,uracil%20while%20DNA%20contains%20thymine.
Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
Aptitude and talent in various fields, such as intelligence, creativity, and athleticism, are attributed to genetic factors. For example, drawing, playing an instrument, or dancing may come more naturally to some people than to others. Similarly, genetic factors can influence traits like analytical and critical thinking, communication, and research skills. Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
https://seniorslifestylemag.com/featured/5-skills-and-talents-that-are-influenced-by-your-genes/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20drawing%2C%20playing%20an,%2C%20communication%2C%20and%20research%20skills.
Yet another criterion. The more requirements you add, the fewer entities may exercise a faculty that was once available to everything in possession of a cerebellum.Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time. — Athena
Oh dear me! It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, and of an ancient TV programme for very small children that tried to teach children to tell the time. They displayed a clock face and then announced to time displayed. It's not important, but I get irritated by people who say "but the dog has no concept of" and work to concede the lowest possible level of rationality to console themselves for admitting that an animal could have any concept at all. Not important.What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it. — Vera Mont
Yes. At best partly and with training.I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so. — Athena
Yes. I thought about them and decided that they weren't. They just had a large collection of instincts, triggered, if I remember right, by what they are fed as larvae. An illustration of how irrational components can produce rational results. Not what the thread is about.They (sc. ants) are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen. — Athena
If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?Rational decisions are those grounded on solid statistics and objective facts, resulting in the same choices as would be computed by a logical robot.
Usually decisions that turn out to be wrong. "An alien machine you don't know what it does? Beam it aboard!"Several Star Trek shows are about human judgment that is not based on rational thinking — Athena
Don't be so sure. Anyhow, it wouldn't rule - that's an ape thing. It would simply administer our resources and enforce our laws - both of which tasks humans have botched repeatedly and abominably.and I don't think Star Trek fans are in favor of AI ruling over us.
All dogs know their feeding time, without any bells. Every living thing has time sense and arranges its feeding, resting and moving routines according to the time of day, and to time elapsed and to correspondence with some other event - like this is the time their preferred prey is most vulnerable; this is the time salmon come to spawn; this is the time to bury nuts for winter; this is the time lions don't come to the water.It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, — Ludwig V
Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either. — Ludwig V
What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them. — Ludwig V
You seem confused — wonderer1
Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism. — wonderer1
"With me," Darwin said, "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
The same thought is put more explicitly by Patricia Churchland. She insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival — Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated
That there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity
Yes, I suppose it could be. I've always thought there is a good deal to be said for it - better than substance dualism and materialism, anyway.I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer
That's true. But neither can you seriously articulate the idea that mental states are determined by physical processes. The conceptual equipment used to describe physical process does not include any way to describe beliefs; equally the conceptual equipment (evidence, logic) does not include any way to describe purely physical processes. Incommensurability means no bridges, no translations. And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another. — Janus
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial. — Ludwig V
I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in : level 1. association of a time of day or year with some event or activity (like: crocodiles are sluggish before sunrise, winter's coming soon) 2. taking certain specific time-dependent action (drink at the river while it's safe; start migration exercises) and 3. anticipation of time-related events (getting to the river before the elephants churn it up; making sure one's own fledglings are flight-capable) 4. arranging other necessary tasks not to conflict with time-related ones. (this is a little more complicated, depending on each species, but it still doesn't need a lot of intelligence.What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality. — Ludwig V
And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship. — Ludwig V
I don't disagree with you. There's a lot to think about here - questions that arise once one has established that dogs are rational. Does one draw a line further along the scale. Birds, yes. Snails and slugs, no. Insects, no. Fish? Maybe some. (Whales &c. yes, of course). Plants, no. The distinction between instinctive "actions" and rational one? Between autonomous actions - heart beating, digestion, sweating and voluntary actions, i.e. actions proper. These will be tricky, because there will be good reason for them even though those can't be the animal's reason. Likely it will only be serious nerds like me who will want to pursue those.I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in ..... In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do. — Vera Mont
There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought. — Wayfarer
In one way "two perspectives" is a very encouraging metaphor. So it could be like looking at the front and back of a coin. My problem is that those two perspectives are within the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Thoughts, sounds, smells are not in the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. I'm very fond of the explanation in physics for a rainbow, which seems to cross our categories. Electrical discharge to lightening is another example. The last case suggests we should not say that an electrical discharge causes the lightening, but that the electrical discharge is the lightening. (This goes back to D.M. Armstrong. He suggested this as a materialist theory of the mind, which is a bit of a problem for me.) Then neural activity will not cause thoughts, but will be the thoughts - comparison with events inside the computer and calculating an equation. That's about as far as I've got with this.I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity. — Janus
My objection to Aristotle is that the form/matter dualism works well enough in some contexts, such as the context in which we have designed a computer to carry out a calculation. But it doesn't follow that it will work in all contexts e.g. where there is no purpose or designer apparent. (Because I'm quite sure that not everything has a purpose, much less that everything fits into a single hierarchy of purposes.I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer
Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. — Ludwig V
God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes. — Janus
... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse. — Janus
By some process yet to be understood….. — Wayfarer
God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say. — Ludwig V
... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out. — Ludwig V
I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question. — Janus
No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is ‘fairly well understood.’ — Wayfarer
That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.There is. It’s called ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer
Well, it's commonest among philosophers in the 20th century English-speaking tradition, which at first set out to abolish philosophy (or at least metaphysics) in favour of science. Phenomenonlogy specifically sets itself up to exclude science from philosophy (bracketing, epoche). Then there's the Indian and Chinese traditions.As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general. — wonderer1
Don't you think that recognizing the problem is the first step? What we need to do next is to map it - understand it. Then we'll have to wait and see. I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above. — Janus
One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". It leads to dualist hankerings, which won't help at all. I'm thinking of some locution like "is" as in "Rainbows are effect of sunlight on raindrops" or "Thunder and lightening are an electrical discharge". So brain processes join rationally explicable behaviour as symptoms or criteria for consciousness - following Wittgenstein's analysis of "pain". (D.M. Armstrong used this as a basis for a materialism, but I don't think that follows.)the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. — Janus
That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion. — Ludwig V
I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm. — Ludwig V
Quite so. All part of the process. Although putting Chalmers in charge makes me nervous. But then, no-one's impartial here.I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the theme has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers. — Wayfarer
In some ways, it was. It gave people a focus, just as Nagel's bat did. I never doubted that he is a clever cookie. Doesn't mean he's right. I'm not bothered about what he did before philosophy. It is a bit ambivalent, though. I try to listen carefully to physicists when they are talking about physics and mathematicians when they are talking about mathematics. But not necessarily when they are talking about Dualism.Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood. — Wayfarer
Thanks for sending me the link to this. I realize that everything has moved on in the last three days. But I hope my comments may nevertheless be of interest.Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to — Wayfarer
Nagel goes on to say thatThe evolutionary explanation itself is something we arrive at, in part, by the use of reason to support evolutionary theory in general and also this particular application of it. Hence it does not supply a reason-independent justification of reason, and, although it grounds reason in facts independent of reason, this grounding is not accepted by us independently of our reason. — p. 5, apparently quoted from Nozick's 'The Nature of Rationality'.
So far, so good...our finding something self-evident is no guarantee that it is necessarily true, or true at all -- since the disposition to find it self-evident could have been an evolutionary adaptation to its being only approximately, and contingently true.
The proposal is supposed to be an explanation of reason but not a justification of it. Those facts are not supposed to provide us with grounds for accepting the validity or reliability of reason — p. 5
There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. But he moves gradually from the relatively harmless point that evolution would settle for pragmatic heuristics as opposed to valid arguments, that is, he ends up equating reason with any old natural process, and that's a mistake.... what is it It supposed to provide? It seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason "objectively" true.... — p. 5
A natural process is specified irrespective of its trustworthiness and so the question whether it is reliable can be formulated. But an algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions or rules that will help to calculate an answer to a problem: One can ask of a set of mathematical instructions whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem. But one cannot ask of an algorithm whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem; the question whether that particular set of instructions is reliable has already been asked and answered. That's why one cannot ask of reason whether it will deliver the truth; that question has already been asked of potential arguments and answered.Reason is whatever we find we have to use in order to understand anything. And if we try to understand it merely as a natural (biological or psychological) phenomenon, the result will be an account incompatible with our use of it and with the understanding of it that we have in using it. For I cannot trust a natural (sc. evolved) process unless I can see why it is reliable, any more than I can trust a mechanical algorithm unless I can see why it is reliable. — p. 10
This is a substantial and even important idea, irrespective of any bickering about evolution. It is helpful to read this passage in the light of his remarks about Pierce at the beginning of the essay.Once we enter the world for our temporary stay in it, there is no alternative but to try to decide what to believe and how to live, and the only way to do that is to try to decide what is the case and what is right. Even if we distance ourselves from some of our thoughts and impulses, and regard them from outside, the process of trying to place ourselves in the world leads to thoughts that we cannot think of as merely "ours". If we think at all, we must think of ourselves, individually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it. — p. 10
There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. — Ludwig V
It (i.e. Nozick's book) seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason “objectively” reasonable--that is, a reliable way of getting at the truth.
But is the (evolutionary) hypothesis really compatible with continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the non-apparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an evolutionary story tells against such confidence. Without something more, the idea that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection would render reasoning far less trustworthy than Nozick suggests, beyond its original “coping” functions. There would be no reason to trust its results in mathematics and science, for example. — Nagel, p5
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival — Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated
The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he (Nagel) is right. — Ludwig V
The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. — p6
The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account. — Ludwig V
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