How do you approach this without visualizing? I will picture in my mind my exact movements, to whatever degree I'm able to remember, like trying to watch a movie of the events. — Patterner

Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures.

Would this not also be true of observed human behaviours? — Vera Mont

Sorry I wasn't clear. I think that's implicit in what I said - indeed it is the justification for what I said. I should have said so upfront.

Ground for rational thinking is, when you are faced with question to justify why your beliefs or thoughts were rational. — Corvus

Do you mean something like?
How did you know the train was coming at 12:00?
Because the company's web-site said so.
Why do you believe what the company's web-site says?
Because it is almost always accurate.
Why do you believe it is almost always accurate?
Because I and many others have used it in the past.
Why do you believe that its accuracy in the past means that it is accurate now?.
Because I am rational.
Why are you rational?
Because it is the best way to get to the truth.
Why is it the best way to get to the truth?
?
All justifications end in "groundless grounds".

You should be able to give explanation on your thoughts or beliefs in logical and objective way. — Corvus

But I'm guessing that your actual agenda was that animals can't be rational. It would have saved a lot of bother if you had just said so.

I have an impression that you are in confusion between skills, capabilities in problem solving with rational thinking. — Corvus

Why do you not believe that solving a problem can be an exercise in rational thinking?

Ground for rational thinking is, when you are faced with question to justify why your beliefs or thoughts were rational. — Corvus

Doesn't giving a justification count as solving a problem?

Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further? — Corvus

I was taught to drive a car. Hence, I can drive a car.
I was taught to think rationally. Hence, I can think rationally.
I would be grateful if you would explain to me what you mean by "ground".

I am looking forward to see what you might have to say in reply to @Patterner's question.

We maybe talking about different things. This sentence makes it sound as though you are physically checking the pockets. I'm talking about sometime later, possibly several days. (So, it might not be a wallet, since I would probably notice that was missing much sooner.) I can't physically check every possible place where something might have been left between the last time I know I had it and now. So I think back to that last time I had it, and start visualizing everything that I can from that point forward. — Patterner

That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize.

I think what's going on is different approaches to the problem. Neither of us can remember where we put our wallet. You try to prompt your memory. I don't. When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all. That's not so clever when I'm at home, so I will recover my last memory of having it and then retrace my steps (which I also have to remember) until I find it.

My understanding of formal logic is probably more limited than yours. When you say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain I'm not sure exactly what that means. Would it be the same as saying that a generalization is a name of a category? — Janus

Well, generalizations are a class of statements with a specific logical form. The line between categories and classes is pretty blurred. I could work with either.
The logical form of generalizations is "For all natural numbers n, 2xn = n+n". This contrasts with "For some (i.e. at least one) natural number(s) n, n×n = 25". This is called existential quantification because it presupposes that numbers exist. (If there are no numbers, universal quantification is true - paradoxical, but the point is that if no numbers existed, then there is no counter-example.)
So generalizations and statements about abstract objects have different logical forms and hence different meanings.

If so would generalizations not exist as names (or quantifications)? And do they not assert the existence of similarities that constrain the ways we categorize? — Janus

Generalizations are universal quantifications but not existential quantifications. They do not refer to specific individual things, so they do not name anything. It is the difference between "Human beings are moral" and "Socrates is mortal". Think of it as the difference between talking about a class/category and talking about a member of a class/category. Similarities and differences are involved in both, but they are similarities and differences at different levels.
Does that help?

I think we can observe animals avoiding danger—things they presumably feel to be threatening. I am not suggesting that animals think precisely in terms of 'avoidance' or 'threat' or 'danger' as those are linguistically generated concepts. — Janus

As I said animals can feel threatened. My point was simply that they don't think in terms of the word 'danger'. Of course I don't deny that there is a pre-linguistic sense or affect that such words as 'danger' or 'threat' refer to. How would we know what the words mean if we had no experience of such affects? — Janus

"Danger" and "threat" are words. Animals that don't speak human languages don't use words. Danger and threat are concepts, and as such involve more than uttering words. They also involve actions in the world. There are are certain behaviour patterns that are built in to these concepts. When we see animals displaying those behaviour patterns, there should be no problem whatever in applying those concepts to them.
When we come to the question which exact concepts apply in specific cases, it is not an at all unusual to find that there is a range of possibilities. In the case of the llamas, their behaviour is compatible with danger, threat, bad, evil. It may well be that with more information, more examples, we might be able to find behaviour patterns that enable us to distinguish between them. We also might not. But the mere fact that there are a range of possibilities in a single case which we cannot conclusively distinguish between is not particularly surprising or important.
I don't see that what is going on in the llamas' heads is particularly important. It is this behaviour pattern in the context of their overall lives that we are trying to explain.

I follow the same routine, more or less. But I'm just working down a list. Check all my pockets. Then the shopping bags. And so on.

Somehow it doesn't give impression you were thinking rationally for that act. — Corvus

I did say explicitly

on the company web-site (which I have chosen because there is good reason to trust it) — Ludwig V

You still haven't provided the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs, if you had one. — Corvus

The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.

By "primordial" I mean generalization in the non-linguistic, non-abstractive sense. Think of painting as an analogy. A representational paining is not abstract because it is an image which shares the patterns of its subject such that they are recognizable. A representational paining is however a kind of generalization on account of its resemblance to its subject. An abstract painting is non-representational in the sense that it doesn't represent anything and if it evokes anything then it is a generalization in a symbolic sense.
So, I would say words are abstract in this sense because they do not resemble the generalities they stand for. Ditto for numbers. — Janus

Broad agreement. It occurs to me that it might be helpful to say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain, while an abstraction can be referred to hence hence be a member of a domain. (My understanding of logic is limited, so my language may not be accurate.) I'm thinking of "to be is to be the value of a variable". Another way of putting it might be to say that it makes (some) sense to say that abstractions exist, whereas generalizations do not necessarily assert the existence of anything.

Animals avoid what might injure them, just as we do. I don't imagine that they think in terms of "threat" or "bad" or "evil". I think to think they do would be us projecting our own abstractive concepts onto them. — Janus

This is puzzling. "Animal avoid what might injure them, just as we do" is applying/projecting our concepts to/onto them. When we describe anything, we apply our concepts to it. That is the same as projecting our concepts on to it, except that "project" implies disapproval.

If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words. — Patterner

I do the same thing, but in words, not images.

I was thinking there are people who claim they never think in words. If there are such people, I would like to know how they have conversations. — Patterner

Perhaps they are thinking of thinking as a "private" activity in the head. There's a lot of mystery about this.

I don't think a wolf bringing down prey is more evil than an avalanche burying the same victim. I think there needs to be malicious internet for evil to be present. And that means humans. — Patterner

Well, the intentions of the wolves are clear enough. Whether their intentions count as malicious is debateable and I rather suspect that the wolves and the llamas have different views on that.

I believe we think on several levels and several ways at the same time. The multi-chambered mind allows us to process input, store it in short-term memory, translate it into numbers, words, musical notation, symbols and picto- or videograms and cross-reference it, for storage in various compartments of long-term memory archive, whence it can be retrieved using any of several reference keys (voluntary) or automatic flags (involuntary). — Vera Mont

Yes, thinking is very complicated and polymorphous. I would hate to have to try to define it. But people often do think of it as primarily internal speech. The catch is that what I say to myself silently in my head, can be said in the usual way.

We also mix memory, emotion, prejudice and involuntary associations in with our conscious thinking.
It's never simple and pure; and it's - I hesitate to say never, so will settle for seldom - wholly rational. — Vera Mont

Yes. We have all ignored the difference between theoretical reason and practical reason. The difference is that values are integral to practical reason. So, in one sense, reason requires a non-rational starting-point. Insofar as theoretical reason is also an activity, even that requires some values as a starting-point.

I very much wish I knew one of these people, so I could talk with them and ask many questions. — Patterner

I encountered someone once who told me that he thought in images. Specifically, when he was packing a suitcase, he would lay out everything he was taking and visualize how they could be placed in the suitcase. When he had a satisfactory visualization, he would pack the suitcase. He said it worked. I was sceptical, but had no ground for arguing with him. I think it is possible. There's been some empirical work on this in psychology, and it seems that some people say they never think in images, but many say they do, at least sometimes.

but generalizing in the primordial sense I would say consists in recognition of concrete pattern recurrence and animals can certainly do that. — Janus

I've never heard of a "primordial" sense of "generalization". Could you explain, please? I'm particularly interested in understanding the difference between pattern recognition and generalization.

You seem to think that "threat", "bad" and "evil" are all on the same scale, rather like "good", "better", "best". It's more complicated than that. I do think that any threat to me or people that I approve of is a bad thing. Don't you? The difference is that there are other things that are bad, but no threat can be a good thing, when it is a threat to bad person. Evil is a superlative for bad, with moral and perhaps religious overtones.

All our abstract thoughts are about generalities — Janus

I'm not sure about that. If I am calculating 23 x 254, I am thinking about specific numbers, not generalizing about them. If I am thinking about the Olympic ideal of sport, I am not thinking about Olympics or sport in general. The perfect circle is abstract and quite different from not circles in general.

But if every such threat is evil, then the world is filled with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene. — Patterner

That seems to imply that some threats are good - or maybe neutral. But surely such threats would be a promise, if good, and neither here not there if neutral.

Why should they? They already have concepts and strategies that work for them. — Vera Mont

I didn't mean to imply that they should. Sorry I wasn't clear.

The lost point there was that the sophistication of language, narrative and high level of abstraction which sometimes work for us are also what backfire on us - not the animal drives. — Vera Mont

OK.

Every entity with a brain understands threat. In between the dumbest and smartest are intelligences that assess the threat level as degrees of bad, and categorize the sources of threat accordingly. — Vera Mont

Yes, I understand that. But @Patterner seems to be suggesting that we can't attribute the concept "evil" to them because we created it. I wondered what difference he was getting at between "threat" on one hand and "bad" and "evil" on the other. What led him to suppose that we can attribute the concept "threat" to them but not the other two.

That was just my facile example of a generalization, of conceptual thinking. I loosely translated the llama's aggressive approach to any random wolf as analogous to a human categorizing his perceived enemies as evil. If I'd known so much would be made of it, I'd have been more circumspect in my choice of words. — Vera Mont

Well, it was good enough to make your point, in my view. But @Patterner's objection pushes us to go deeper into the way the process of explaining animal behaviour works.

I'm not sure about that. Have you tried getting clarity from a religious or political fanatic? If you listen to interviews with MAGA supporters or jihadists, you'll hear them use the most extreme language and yet they seem not to have any idea what they believe or why. — Vera Mont

Good point. Possession of language doesn't guarantee the application of rational standards to what one says/believes.

And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point. — Patterner

So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?

We show that we have understood a concept by the way we behave. Our linguistic behaviour is the quickest and most accurate (but not absolutely accurate) way of showing what understanding we have, but our non-linguistic behaviour does also show that understanding. There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
Whether "threat" or "bad" or "evil" is the best way of describing the llamas' behaviour is simply not clear from the information we have. Any of them would be a reasonable explanation for what we know. We would need a good deal more information to clarify that.
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas. We don't need to get inside the head of anyone, animal or not. That's just as well, because it's not possible to get inside anyone's head.

I don't understand what you mean by "we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures." What would be an example? — Patterner

That was not well put. I should have said what I meant. I was thinking of the question of animal languages, human morality, and even rationality.

But it's interesting to think of someone who had no language thinking abstract thoughts. — Patterner

It seems to me that we need to distinguish clearly between thinking as a conscious action, a phenomenological event or process and the tacit thinking when our thoughts are enacted without prior, separate, thinking. Think of it as thinking in action.
It depends on what you classify as an abstract thought. Generalizations from experience do not seem to me to be problematic. It seems to me that maths, morality and articulate self-consciousness are.
However, there is an interesting possibility. Some people say that they think in images. That would be independent of language.

A couple of other people have just recently told me that llamas can't generalize something that threatens them as being evil or even bad. — Vera Mont

Some relatives of mine acquired a dog. Three maiden aunts sharing an apartment/flat. When I first met this dog, it backed off, bared its teeth and growled at me. I was bemused. I had always lived with dogs, so thought I understood them. I was expecting the cautious, tentative approach and delicate sniffing, but not immediate hostility. It was explained to me that this dog had had some bad experiences in the past and hated/feared all human males. That seems a perfectly good explanation to me and it relies on attributing to the dog on an (inductive) generalization. I don't know what else to say.
I don't think isolated events like that one, or your case of the llamas, are capable of determining, on their own, whether "threat" or "evil" or "bad" is the "right" concept to apply. One would need a much deeper understanding of the animals - much bigger and more varied data-set, if you like - to differentiate between the three possibilities.
There's a cloud of philosophy sitting behind this - and philosophy is not well-equipped to deal with our topic. Our topic is about how far we can attribute belief/knowledge (and rationality) to animals. The difficulty is that a) our paradigm is what we do when we are talking to and about humans and b) that we will inevitably conduct our discussion in human language.

I didn't say you blamed animals for anything. It's not even you, specifically, that I should have aimed that remark at. It's the double-think we humans do so well. — Vera Mont

Well, the truth is that I'm pretty confused here. I suddenly found myself holding humans responsible for climate change etc. and not holding animals responsible for it. So I was faced with human exceptionalism.

We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts. — Vera Mont

I would rather describe them as hyper-developed, rather than extra, capabilities, but that may be nit-picking. In general terms, one feels that it must be something to do with our animal instincts not being evolved to cope with the cultural world that we have developed. I don't quite see what you mean by "the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts".

I'm saying neither the animal instincts nor yet our helplessness to control them, are responsible for our messes. — Vera Mont

That is very plausible. Do you have a diagnosis of what is responsible? (Probably in a causal, not moral sense.)

We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls. — Vera Mont

Yes, that's true. (Anorexia and suicide are indeed examples of control of instincts, but control that has gone wrong. Control is a bit of a two-edged sword.) Though the scope of those controls seems to be too limited to deal with the threats that we are facing. It does seem to me that the arguments about the planetary threats are not really moral arguments, although they are often framed as such. They are arguments about our real, long-term self-interest. We're not very good at the long term. However, that framing might convince at least some of the people who are so resistant.

Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil. — Vera Mont

Yes, I do accept that narratives are crucial to the way that things work for us. That does seem to be a product of language. It's hard to imagine what might convince us that creatures without human-style languages could develop them.

Oh, sure, don't give our ancestors credit for acting with common sense, but then blame them for the evil narratives that intelligence and imagination - all that vaunted unique cogitation - have wrought. — Vera Mont

I'm sorry. I wasn't clear enough. I don't blame animal instincts for the super-damage that we have done. There's nothing wrong with them. I thought that was obvious. I was blaming the super-rationality which enabled us to develop super-powers but has not enabled us to develop some super-self-control to go with them. Quite similar to what you are saying, I think.

When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words? — Vera Mont

No. The verbal description is quite distinct from the experience. Though the people who seem to think that the photograph is more important than enjoying the scene may be missing out - substituting the fuss with the camera for the event itself.

I don't have problem. You seem to have. I am just pointing out your example is not reflecting what rational thinking is. When you are asked, "Why can't S tell red from green?", if you explained the reason is S is colour blind, then your answer is based on your guessing, or just parroting what you read or heard from other sources, not from your rational thinking. — Corvus

Sorry. I wasn't clear enough. My explanation is "S is colour-blind", but I thought that

I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct. — Ludwig V

...excluded guessing and parroting.

You explanation must be based on either from deductive or inductive reasoning for it to be qualified as a rational thinking. Not just because you explained something based on your guessing or parroting what you have heard or read from other sources. — Corvus

If I look up the time of the next train on the company web-site (which I have chosen because there is good reason to trust it) and tell everyone that the next train is at 12:00 and the next train is at 12:00, I would claim that I knew the next train was at 12:00 and deny that I'm just parroting. Guessing, I agree, is not rational basis for claiming knowledge, though trial and error as a way of discovering truth is a good basis.

we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though. — Janus

Well, I certainly agree that there is no need for a distinct phenomenological experience as a basis for telling ourselves that we are aware of a distinction as opposed to simply reporting or noting it. "Illusion" suggests that I am not aware of the distinction I am aware of, so it seems the wrong classification to me.

I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No? — Patterner

Very good. But then the brains of bats and dolphins must be wired differently from ours, because they have specialized abilities that we do not - and just as their specialized abilities have evolved from ancestors that did not have those abilities, so our specialized skills must have evolved from ancestors that did not speak human languages. But again, in both cases, we would expect to find precursors or simple beginnings in those ancestors and we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures.

It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without language. — Janus

Well, Pavlov's dogs were capable of generalizing from the bell ringing yesterday before food to the bell is ringing to-day, so there will be food. "Abstract thought", to me, means something different. Mathematics is abstract thought, because it is about abstract objects.

Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought? — Patterner

I'm more inclined to argue that abstract thought couldn't exist if we were not capable of language. The truth most likely is that the two developed together.

Yes. all that. So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell. — Janus

Yes. The bit about "post hoc" is important. That underlies many (possibly all) our explanations of what language-less creatures do and even of a lot of what we do. "Rational post hoc construction" is a good description. We model those on the pattern of the conscious reasoning that we sometimes engage in before and sometimes during executing an action.

(I imagine the dog's record of his internal life as a reel of virtual reality - like a 6D movie. Is it story-telling? Without grammar and syntax, it's hard to tell - in fact, at the time, it's impossible to communicate - but that's the way children with limited verbal skills view their own life.) — Vera Mont

The phenomenology of language-less creatures is extraordinarily difficult. I don't think it is reasonable to expect the level of accuracy and detail we can get from creatures that can talk to us.

Human history does not indicate - at least to this observer - that all that science and culture have contributed significantly to our collective ability to make rational decisions. — Vera Mont

The trouble is that human capacities have not eliminated the things we share with animals. They still motivate us in exactly the same ways - the will to survive, to reproduce, to eat, drink, seek shelter and company.

No, certainly not 'evil.' But I think even 'bad' is a stretch. I wouldn't think we are safe with anything more than 'threat' and 'not threat.' — Patterner

We can never eliminate the possibility of being wrong - even safe conclusions can be wrong. So long as we can recognize when we are wrong and do better next time, it's not a catastrophic problem.

The second of those two books recounts how Frank Brown was essentially ostracized by the scientific mainstream for the claim that the oysters somehow responded to changes in lunar gravitation. Nevertheless his findings still stand as far as I know. — Wayfarer

That's a good story. However, I recently happened to hear a BBC radio science programme that answers questions sent in by listeners (often children). There was a question about the effects of the moon's gravity on the earth. The answer was incredibly detailed, but mentioned, unless I misheard, that the moon's gravity had a (presumably measurable) effect on the earth's rocks; it suggested a kind of (mini-) tidal effect on land as well as water. Which doesn't seem fantastic to me, so I believe that. It would entirely explain those results. I wonder who we could ask? (I wouldn't rate that as particularly super, but the way. It's just one of those things that is so obvious one wonders why one didn't think of it before.)

I think so, In line with my response to Wayfarer above I tend to think that whereas other animals distinguish themselves from everything else in having a sense of self but are not conscious of doing that distinguishing we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though. — Janus

It seems to me that they most likely have self-awareness, because otherwise they couldn't navigate the world or tell the difference between the things around them moving and themselves moving. I have often seen them exercising self-control - just ask them to sit and stay while you walk away. Other animals I don't know well enough to opine. Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go.

I'm not sure being aware of awareness makes sense. Perhaps it's just that we can tell ourselves that we are aware on account of possessing symbolic language. — Janus

The whole business is infected with the fact that the grammar of language allows one to apply recursion, so when S believes/knows/is aware that p, it is not ungrammatical to suggest that S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p, and S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p that S believes/knows/is aware that p and so on. There's also I know that p, and so now you know that p, and so I know that you know that p, and you know that I know that you know that p. The fact that grammar permits it is no reason to suppose that each step is meaningful.

A major one has been to bolster theologies and thereby, the lifting of Man half-way to Heaven. — Vera Mont

Yes. It is striking though how theologies need to convince us first that we are less than worms (no disrespect to worms, though) in order to be able to lift us up, but only half-way to heaven, with dire threats about what will happen if we break their rules.

Representational theories of consciousness reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural states.

The question that bothers me about representational theories is that they never explain what it is that is being represented. I know how a picture is a representation, but not how those mental whatsits are. What does a smell/taste represent? or a touch? Or a pain? Representations of sounds seem to be more like mimicries or recreations that representations. It's all completely unclear, and yet people hang on to it. I don't get it.

conceptual thought depends on concepts, which are formed from sensory input. — Vera Mont

I hope you'll forgive me nit-picking at something that is broadly true. But I think it is important, in order to ensure we avoid various well-known philosophical traps, that we never forget, that actions (interactions) with the world are critically important, not only in learning how to interpret our sensory input, but also in understanding what concepts are - knowing what "gate" means means knowing how to use (and abuse) the gate.

I believe you are correct. It seems to me interaction with others plays a huge roll in the development of our consciousness. — Patterner

I've little doubt that is true. Which gives me one more reason for not understanding what it would mean for the universe to be conscious. There isn't anything else for it to distinguish itself from.

So

I am not sure if deciding what physical explanation is applying rationality. — Corvus

I don't see what your problem is. If my question is "Why can't S tell red from green?", I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct.

Reasoning can be ground for the actions, speakings, beliefs, knowledge and explanations. — Corvus

"ground" is a bit vague. I hope you mean "justification". I notice you include explanations in your list. I'm especially happy with that.

And the part of the universe that is you is aware. Aware of yoursrlf individually, aware of a billion other things, and aware of the universe as a whole. A part of the universe is aware of itself. — Patterner

I don't disagree with that. I must have misunderstood you.

I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time. — Vera Mont

I agree with you. It seems to me that there are two concepts of time in play. There is the idea of time as a rhythm or repetition, and our biological clock maintain what is called a circadian rhythm, making us more inclined to sleep and night and wake up during the day. (The human biological clock is located in the hypothalamus in the brain.) Then there is our clock time - which actual is a more sophisticated system that does the same thing. It's not unreasonable to suppose that dogs and other animals do not comprehend that system. But it is unreasonable not to recognize that they also have biological clocks that do give them an effective sense of time - it's a well established fact.

Circadian rhythms have been widely observed in animals, plants, fungi and cyanobacteria

Wikipedia - Circadian rhythm

It is perfectly clear to me. I am a part of the universe. We all are. Parts of the universe are aware of themselves, and of the universe as a whole. Maybe our planet is the only place in the universe where this is happening. But it is happening. The universe is waking up to its own existence, and coming to comprehend itself. — Patterner

I don't dispute that parts of the universe are aware of themselves and of the universe as a whole. But I can't see that it follows that the universe is aware of itself or its parts. I don't think that my car is aware of anything just because I'm driving it, though I can see some sense in such an idea. But the idea that my car is aware of itself just because someone is sitting in it makes no sense to me.
But I do think that there is something important about insisting that we are a product of the universe, not some alien imposition.

In case of mysterious or abnormal visual perception case, you would try to resort to the biological or psychological probes and explanation in clarifying the problems, rather than rationalisation. — Corvus

I agree with that. I was thinking, however, that deciding what the physical explanation is would be applying rationality.

Only if you have some external source of information that contradicts your defective senses. without that contradiction, you would ask no questions. — Vera Mont

That's right. But that external source has to be, or be based on, perception.

I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard. — Corvus

Ah, yes. You are quite right. That means that there is something foundational about our perceptions. But I would want to say that it is not necessarily straightforward. Normally, we do indeed believe what we see, etc and that is unproblematic. But sometimes we find ourselves with incompatible beliefs, or simply confused. Then we start asking questions, making diagnoses; very often, but not always we can resolve the situation and then we turn on the perceiver and conclude that there is something wrong or at least different going on - colour-blindness, astigmatism, etc. I realize that's very vague, but I'm gesturing towards all that, rather than trying to describe it. I think we probably don't want to pursue the details here and now.

I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me. — AmadeusD

I've never thought about emotin in relation to belief, or rather I've always assumed that any emotion was superfluous and basically undesirable. The usual assumption is that emotion is always just irrational prejudice, but now that it seems to be generally accepted that emotions have a cognitive element and that does indeed change the game. I need to think about this.

It's not a logical position but an emotional one. — AmadeusD

I have trouble with this. Sincerity, to me, means not affected (pretended), genuine. Emotions can be affected or genuine, sincere or not. So, like honesty, sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions. (Though emotion can be an explanation for people believing things, though usually of them believing things irrationally.)

Tell that to the Jain monks who conscientiously sweep the path they're walking along to avoid stepping on insects. Or the world's many vegetarians and vegans who decline animal products as sustenance (which doesn't include me). I think this is rather a stale caricature of Christian imperialism, even if historically accurate in some respects. — Wayfarer

Yes, I know about the Jains - and respect them. So it is without disrespect that I point out that they sweep the insects from their path, rather than, for example, not walking where they are, or walking round them. Which falls under the prioritization that we were talking about.
Yes. I was using that cliche as a way of making the point that exceptionalism does not necessarily imply exploitation and destruction. Even "stewardship" is open to criticism. We don't own the world just because we can wreck it. So the care we ought to take is more like the care we should take of something that belongs to, or is shared with, someone else.

The exceptionalism I'm proposing is due to our existential condition: that we are endowed with the ability to sense meaning in a way that no other animal is able to do. There are, as a consequence, horizons of being open to us, that are not open to other animals. — Wayfarer

So now I'm puzzled again. The conversation started with the point that a lion prioritized itself and perhaps (I don't know the habits of lions) its mate and cubs over other species, in that it regards its own life as more important than the lives of its prey.
Because I have trouble with "horizons of being", I don't know what you mean by "in a way that no other animal is able to do".

It's both a blessing and a curse, as consequently we have a sense of ourselves, and so also a sense of our own limitedness and finitude and the ability to lose what we cherish and also to act in ways which we ourselves know are sub-optimal — Wayfarer

I think the issue here is about morality. Which is a rather different kettle of fish from rationality. Nevertheless, I'm pretty sure that some animals to have a simple sense of morality.

But then, it also suits a consumer society to have us believe that the pursuit and satiation of desires is an aim. Many before me have observed that the popular interpretation of the 'survival of the fittest' serve the industrial capitalist mindset very well. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's true. Yet, if they had eyes to see, they would understand that evolution itself demonstrates that we are better together.

That they are demonstrably lacking the rational faculties of h.sapiens is not an expression of prejudice or bias, but a simple statement of fact, which seems inordinately difficult to accept for a lot of people. — Wayfarer

Yet, from my point of view, it is a simple fact that we are animals. I'm sure you don't intend to deny that, just as I don't mean that animals don't do many things that humans do.

Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, famously claimed that “The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless.” But to examine the universe objectively and conclude that it is pointless misses the point. — David Loy

I'm sorry. It seems odd that Weinberg should bemoan the pointlessness of the world when he studies the world from a point of view that has been carefully constructed to eliminate any question about what the point of the world is. It doesn't miss the point. It by-passes it. (Not that I'm a fan of the question what is the point of the world).

If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself. — David Loy

Doesn't the same apply to scientists and historians etc.? But anyway, from the fact that cosmologists are part of the universe that they study, it does not follow that the universe is comprehending itself. I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself.

Its not difficult for me to accept that humans possess symbolic language and thus are capable of collective learning in ways that other animals are apparently not. What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals. — Janus

I agree. Humans are different from animals, animals from fish, fish from insects. Humans are like animals, which are like fish, which are like insects. Each species is like others and unlike them. That's all boring. What makes the issue contentious? It has to be what significance is attributed to them.

The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know. — AmadeusD

If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment.

I meant, and I thought the notion was of self-importance. — creativesoul

OK. My misunderstanding.

Yes, rationality includes more than differentiating between accurate/inaccurate information. I was making that case. — creativesoul

Yes. But it does include differentiating between accurate and inaccurate information, doesn't it?

it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? — AmadeusD

I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality. But does that mean we are only rational if we critically assess everything? Is it actually irrational to believe that the sun is shining because you can see that it is?

I still look out at the cedar tree every morning: though I don't rationally expect to see Sammy there, some superstitious* part of me keeps hoping. The same way the families of soldiers missing in action keep hoping for years or decades that their loved one will come home some day.
*I suppose it's the same part in many humans that insists on believing in a soul and afterlife. Hope, even the most improbable hope, is hard to give up. — Vera Mont

Yes. I think of it like this. Losing someone you know is a gap in your world. In most cases, the gap fills in as life goes on, though the loss is still marked. Like a scar, it can be forgotten, but still there's a reminder. In other cases, the gap does not fill in - perhaps never fills in - like a tooth you have lost, you can always feel the loss as an empty space.
The thing about long-term hope is that it will fasten on the remotest possibility. The thing about remote possibilities is that sometime they actually happen. (Hiroo Onoda was the last Japanese soldier to surrender after 1945. He emerged from the jungle in Lubang in the Phillipines in 1974.) That doesn't make hope against the odds rational, exactly. But it does distinguish it from a fantasy. You could ask the same question about Hiroo Onoda's faithfulness to his mission. If you read the story, you might decide that he was perhaps not rational but at least not irrational either.
Observations:-
1. It would seem that there is a kind of understanding that is not exactly a rational explanation, but does help to understand why people might remember those they have lost when it would not be irrational to forget.
2. But with Hachiko, I don't see how we can ever determine which of the suggested explanations is right or wrong.

All meaningful experience begins with connections being drawn between different things. The world becomes more meaningful as a direct result. That's early rational thought. — creativesoul

That sounds about right.

There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs. — creativesoul

I agree with both sentences. The ill-understood (at least by me) is the difference and relationship between formulating one's beliefs and having them. Between articulate reasoning and "tacit" reasoning.

I'm sorry. That post was not reviewed prior to posting. There were half edits going on. As it stood, on my view it was nonsense. :blush: From my own poorly attended post nonetheless. — creativesoul

Oh, I do understand. I've often regretted some bit of nonsense within seconds of posting - and it's surprising how often someone spots it before I've had time to remove it. But it's hard to remove everything when a typo can mean the difference between sense and nonsense - and spell checkers only catch the mistakes that are obviously mistakes and perhaps some grammatical errors.

That has nothing to do with rationalising. That is just a perception. Perception and recalling what they saw when asked, is not reasoning.
Reasoning takes place when thinking takes place on why and how, and being able to logically and objectively summarising the grounds for the perception, beliefs, actions or propositions. — Corvus

OK. So believing what they saw and reporting that when asked doesn't involve reasoning. But reasoning can come into it when they are asked to justify (give reasons for believing) their belief that what they say did happen. Is it only after the justification has been provided that it is rational for them to believe what they saw?

The agents with no or little linguistic ability is not the point of the topic. They are not the subject of reasoning. They are objects of reasoning. We have been talking about whether your thoughts and comments on them are rational. Not them. — Corvus

I don't really see the difference between discussing whether animals are rational and discussing whether my belief that animals are rational is rational. Of course, there is a third possibility that my belief that animals are rational may be the result of a valid argument based on false premisses. Is that what you are suggesting?

I wasn't suggesting that it was a prejudice that could be changes, merely that it is a kind of natural prejudice shared by all social animals in favoring their own over other species. — Janus

OK. It's just that it seems to me to be a requirement for a species to be social at all. A "society" in which every member felt free to cannibalize the other members wouldn't survive for long, just as an individual that didn't regard itself as a priority (prioritizing its own life over that of an aggressor) wouldn't survive for long. If that's a prejudice, it would be hard to criticize a society or an individual that had it.

I cannot agree with that interpretation. Humans are responsible for climate change simply insofar as they are causing it. — Janus

It's significant, though, that you (rightly) hold human beings responsible. What's more, we can't expect any other species to step up and control the situation. All I'm suggesting is that, although exceptionalism has been all too often used by humans to justify maltreating everything else, it is also the basis for expecting better of them.
The exceptionalism that I'm opposed to is the exceptionalism that seeks to disown or set aside our animal nature, pretending that we are not animals. In a phrase, it is the idea that we have "dominion" over everything else. It has too often been interpreted as a licence for tyranny, when stewardship is called for.

Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular? — Corvus

Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale?
If so, I agree.
It seems to follow that when we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational. Do you agree?
I did ask a further question. Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying.

Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational? — Corvus

I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons.

A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice. — Janus

That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore.
I think it's not far wrong to say that all life except the life of some organisms like lichens, lives off other life; it's part of the deal. To be sure, humans do have some choice in the matter; they can manage without meat and without killing plants, but they are a long, long way off being able to live without taking life at all.

There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks. — Janus

Well, it often does. Often through carelessness and ignorance, it must be said. But human exceptionalism can be a basis for pinning responsibility on them. That's the key point of much of the argument about climate change.

I was trying to give you a simple example of even a simplest most basic daily life knowledge has a ground to be rational when examined. — Corvus

I'm afraid I may have forgotten the context of this. But if you are saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale, then I agree. Sometimes, we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational.
What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding.

Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back. — Corvus

I don't disagree. However, when we are dealing with human beings, we can cross-question them and elicit rationales from them. When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational.

Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity? — Patterner

What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter.

Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational. — Patterner

I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness.

The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations. — creativesoul

They can indeed make an important difference.

Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. — creativesoul

Yes. One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).

Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. — creativesoul

While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.

We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. — creativesoul

Yes, of course. But I don't see why that conclusion requires the premiss about metacognition.

There would be no sense of importance. — creativesoul

That is puzzling. Animals have wants and desires, and I would have thought that implies a sense of importance.

A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. — creativesoul

Yes. That's the standard way of putting it and my knowledge of what I believe is not to be evaluated in the same way as my knowledge of what others believe. There are a number of qualifications, which may well apply in real life. Nevertheless the believer's words are very helpful in getting a more accurate idea of what, exactly, it is that the believer believes.
But I get worried about how to establish that a candidate is insincere. If one thinks about it from the perspective that you don't know whether a candidate is sincere or not, my remark

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important. — Ludwig V

may seem less absurd, though it still seems bad-tempered and unhelpful.

What's at issue is how we need to adapt what we can do when we do not have access to the believer's own words. This does turn up in human life, but seems marginal, in some sense. But it is no longer marginal when we come to creatures that do not, and seem incapable of, human language.

I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights. — creativesoul

Fair enough. Point taken.

This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors. — creativesoul

Absolutely

Words don't play games. — creativesoul

Not sure what you are getting at here. If you think I'm just playing games here, better tell me.

I'll do better to depersonalize my replies. — creativesoul

So will I.

But I'm afraid I can't reply to you just now. It's late and I need to be up early. I'll be back tomorrow.

After no-Ueno outnumbers Ueno by two, three, four, five times, how rationally is the dog thinking? — Patterner

I agree. People admired the dog's loyalty, but I'm not sure that loyalty is entirely rational. There has to be some doubt about what motivated him.

...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew. — creativesoul

Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down.

The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship. — creativesoul

That's very plausible.

it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). — creativesoul

But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense?
I'll tell you what - in my view, cats have absolutely no moral sense at all. There are certain behaviours, which I have observed in dogs, which I have never observed in cats, that lead me to differentiate.

The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him. — creativesoul

That's just dogmatic.

It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows. — creativesoul

As do we all.

You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action. — creativesoul

Well, suppose I said that belief is a term we use to explain behaviour/action by giving reasons.
One difference is that reasons justify what they are reasons for, while causes do not.
Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not.

Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence? — creativesoul

Of course not. If I were to say that "infinity" or "49" or "love" is not an object, would you think I was saying that infinity or 49 or love are not real and do not effect/affect/influence?

The child named the balloon. — creativesoul

Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his.

Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock? — creativesoul

Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?

Let's see...

The dog is on the platform at 4:55, looking down the track, just like he is there every week-day when Ueno goes off to work in the morning, and just like most of the humans who have gathered there in the last ten minutes. Agreed?
We will say of the humans that they are expecting a train. We know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that they are expecting the 5.00 train (whether they know that it is due at 5.00 or not - they might be unclear and only know that it is some time soon.).
Why will we not say of the dog that he is expecting a train? If we do, we know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that he is expecting the 5.00 train. "The 5.00 train" is our description, not his. So I'll give you this. The dog is not expecting a train at 5.00; he is not expecting anything at 5.00, because he doesn't have a concept of 5.00.

We know that when the train appears down the track, dog and humans will all come to attention - humans gathering their bits and pieces or moving towards the edge of the platform, dog standing with tail waving slowly back and to. When the train stops, the humans will climb into, and more humans will climb out of, the carriages. The humans still standing on the platform will meet and greet the people they have come to meet, the dog will meet and greet the human he has come to meet. Perhaps some humans will not meet anyone, but will pause till the train has gone and the platform cleared and then walk quietly away. Perhaps they will come back to meet another train. Eventually, the same will happen to the dog and the dog also will come back to meet another train.
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? Again, "Ueno" is our description (name), not his.

What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things? — Athena

I don't know. I would suggest that one thing that would change would be our ability to co-ordinate with each other.

They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'. — Janus

Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill.

I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience. — Janus

When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities.

Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer. — creativesoul

One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours.
It is very plausible that it is going too far to attribute to the dog a concept of belief; I cannot imagine dog behaviour that would lead me to do that. But saying that the dog believes that the train arrives at 5 p.m. is not for the dog's benefit, but for yours.
However, what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich.

That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate. — creativesoul

I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief.

That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect. — creativesoul

Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers).

The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes. — creativesoul

You are doing phenomenology, then - first person view. Not possible with a dog. But the phenomena that are relevant in this context are not the thinking processes.

They are the benchmark. They are the standard. — creativesoul

If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.

That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog. — creativesoul

I'm sorry I wasn't clear. I was admitting that it seems right not to attribute hope to the dog, and then, with a "But..", introducing a case that makes that conclusion doubtful.

The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. .... Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result. — creativesoul

Yes, and the cat's grasp of that meaning is what justifies us in using "mouse" to describe what the cat is doing. To be sure, the cat's concept of a mouse is different from, and more limited than, our concept of a mouse. But cat and human are both thinking about the same furry animal, hiding away behind the wainscot.

My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. — creativesoul

Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below.

If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them. — creativesoul

Clearly, beliefs are not propositional attitudes, except in the sense that a proposition is grammatically necessary to describe them. (There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)

I'm not sure that the question what they consist in is applicable, but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. So what the believer says is often given a specially authoritative status. But the believer's own description of their belief is not conclusive. We often overturn it when other evidence convinces us that they are lying or pretending or deceiving themselves.

When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.

If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images.

Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. — creativesoul

That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.

I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train. — creativesoul

The story doesn't tell. But surely, if the dog turned up at random times when the human is not coming, there would not have been anything like the same fuss.

Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way. — creativesoul

Yes, you do need to look more widely and/or have a decent background knowledge of the dog's habits. But if going to the station itself was a pleasurable experience for the dog, would they not turn up at random times as well as at 5 p.m.?

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations. — Mww

Surely, we would not even try to apply explanations of actions that work for humans unless we found that animal behaviour was sufficiently like human behaviour for that to make sense. It's not an arbitrary choice.

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had. — Mww

It's the result of the peculiar condition of the philosopher. But it is perfectly true that there are many experiences that we have that seem more or less completely arbitrary. But one can sometimes explain dizziness, for example, by the spinning dancing you've been indulging in, or by an ear infection. So perhaps one day...

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate. — Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. Their thoughts and feelings are on display to us in just the same way(s) that our thoughts and feelings are on display to them. I don't think speculation is particularly harmful in itself. It's when it gets mistaken for established truth that it can do damage.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.) — Mww

In fact, you know perfectly well how to play the game. The fact that we sometimes get it wrong is not important. We can spot mistakes and put them right.
Although in this case, I would propose that he did go out to welcome you home, but got distracted by the squirrel when he got out there. However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one.

My point was that being rational must be able to be verified, justified and approved to be so. — Corvus

You didn't quite say that.

Not always. I know it is autumn by looking at the falling leaves from the trees outside. My knowledge of autumn arrived to me purely from the visual perception. Why do I need to justify the knowledge? If someone asked me to justify it, I could then do it. But before that unlikely event, I just know it is autumn.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle. — Corvus

On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that.

You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal. — Corvus

I agree, a single case on its own doesn't cut much ice. One needs a framework of background knowledge, including a decision about whether rational explanation applies to at least some things that the subject does. However, given that you are a homo sapiens, if you walk down the street, stop at the shop door, open it and go in, I am justified in saying that you walked to the shop. I might be wrong, but that possibility applies to everything that I say. It would be unreasonable to deny that you walked to the shop in those circumstances. Ditto the dog and the hawk.

Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself. — creativesoul

I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book.

What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog. — creativesoul

I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other.

If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. — creativesoul

I was responding to a specific issue. It may be possible to generalize, but it's certainly very complicated.
If you include our sayings as well as our doings as actions, then beliefs do show up in actions. What sense could we make of a belief or thought (rational or irrational) that didn't (couldn't) affect what we say or do at all? But perhaps there is a different sense of belief in which we can make sense of such beliefs. What do you suggest?

I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all. — Patterner

It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.

The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachikō would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachikō died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)

That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands.

We could also debate how far the dog was rational. I would say that persisting for a while after Ueno died is rational. But continuing for that long... I'm not sure. Other dogs, I think, would have given up much, much, sooner. One factor in his persistence may have been that his new home (with Ueno's former gardener) did not distract him from his habit. Habits, I would say, can be rational, but can also be irrational, especially when they do not change when changed circumstances imply a change in habits.

But then, people saw his persistence as loyalty, which is not necessarily rational, but is something that we value, on the whole. So this question of how far we apply the "people" framework to animals extends beyond rationality or not. It incudes values.