I keep seeing the title as "dermatological ontology".
Getting some skin in the game? — Banno
For Husserl there is a subject pole and an object pole for every act. These are inseparable aspects of experience. For Heidegger there is the in-between, neither subject nor object. — Joshs
Exemplary daily exorcisms of foolery (re: meta-ignorance (i.e. agnotologies (e.g. pseudo-discourses, sophistries)); expectations misaligned with reality (i.e. self-immiseration, alienation, dukkha); maladaptive habits of mind (e.g. mis/ab-uses of communication, judgment, knowledge), etc) aka "spiritual exercises". — 180 Proof
The teaching of the sciences embodies the appropriate philosophical ideas for those subjects. — jgill
But being philosophical might help smooth out the bumps in life. — jgill
I think we both agree that they have simply assumed a flawed ontology. It's crucial that science looks around any particular human subject. It's absurd to radicalize or misunderstand the first genuine necessity and (pretend one can) look around human subjectivity altogether.you sometimes see ‘scientists puzzled over why consciousness exists’, — Quixodian
wouldn't it be the case that many people think philosophers have annihilated human values, unleashing relativism, hopelessness and nihilism? — Tom Storm
some professional philosophers have been known to pontificate : to speak from authority, — Gnomon
complex abstruse esoteric language — Gnomon
:up:Yesterday, upon the stair,
A hurried man who wasn't there
He wasn't there again today
I wish, I wish he'd go away... — jgill
Some people think football is a matter of life and death. I assure you, it's much more serious than that.
— Bill Shankly
Philosophy is football with the universe as the ball, and everyman the referee. — unenlightened
What criteria have to be already in place in order for scientific criticism to be intelligible within any given community of researchers? And what sort of discipline is best suited to question and replace these criteria within which normative questions of truth and falsity, and correctness of method, gain purchase? — Joshs
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).
To whose transcendental ego have you favored as your own? — Mww
Do these not contradict each other? Or, how do these not contradict each other? Can a thing be both for and through, and independent of that for which it is for and through? — Mww
So no subject/object dualism? — Mww
Of course cultural immortality is a common way to speak of a writer's or artist's mind, as incarnated in objective forms, continuing to "live-on" in the minds of other embodied souls. — Gnomon
But such an unexperienced "life" may be cold comfort to the dead or disembodied soul, with no sensory organs plugged into the non-self system. — Gnomon
Really? That's not obvious to me, you'll have to elaborate. — goremand
Kant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to distinctive kinds of normative assessment. Judgments and actions are things we are in a distinctive sense responsible for. They are a kind of commitment we undertake. Kant understands judging and acting as applying rules, concepts, that determine what the subject becomes committed to and responsible for by applying them. Applying concepts theoretically in judgment and practically in action binds the concept user, commits her, makes her responsible, by opening her up to normative assessment according to the rules she has made herself subject to.
The responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something. On the theoretical side, what one is committed to doing, what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception. It is a systematic, rational unity, dynamically created and sustained by drawing inferential consequences from and finding reasons for one’s judgments, and rejecting commitments incompatible with those one has undertaken.
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. — Sellars
Human bodies are real;
Experience is a condition of an intelligent subject;
The body is not an intelligent subject;
Bodies do not experience. — Mww
Yes, precisely that meaning of free. Regarding our 'eerie temporality', I have lately been speculating on the forum whether consciousness might not actually exist - ie. have a "size" - in the temporal dimension, versus just traversing time. — Pantagruel
I haven't heard of Brandom. I have a rather love-hate relationship with linguistics. — Pantagruel
https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/Texts/From_German_Idealism_to_American_Pragmat.pdfAs I understand his work, Kant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to distinctive kinds of normative assessment. Judgments and actions are things we are in a distinctive sense responsible for. They are a kind of commitment we undertake. Kant understands judging and acting as applying rules, concepts, that determine what the subject becomes committed to and responsible for by applying them. Applying concepts theoretically in judgment and practically in action binds the concept user, commits her, makes her responsible, by opening her up to normative assessment according to the rules she has made herself subject to.
The responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something. On the theoretical side, what one is committed to doing, what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception. It is a systematic, rational unity, dynamically created and sustained by drawing inferential consequences from and finding reasons for one’s judgments, and rejecting commitments incompatible with those one has undertaken. Apperceiving, the characteristically sapient sort of awareness, is discursive (that is, conceptual) awareness.
For it consists in integrating judgments into a unity structured by relations of what judgments provide reasons for and against what others. And those rational relations among judgments are determined by the rules, that is the concepts, one binds oneself by in making the judgments. Each new episode of experience, paradigmatically the making of a perceptual judgment, requires integration into, and hence transformation of the antecedent constellation of commitments. New incompatibilities can arise, which must be dealt with critically by rejecting or modifying prior commitments. New joint consequences can ensue, which must be acknowledged or rejected. The process by which the whole evolves and develops systematically is a paradigmatically rational one, structured by the rhythm of inhalation or amplification by acknowledging new commitments and extracting new consequences, and exhalation or criticism by rejecting or adjusting old commitments in the light of their rational relations to the new ones.
....
But the minimal unit of responsibility is the judgment. It is judgments, not concepts, that one can invest one’s authority in, commit oneself to, by integrating them into an evolving constellation that exhibits the rational synthetic unity of apperception. Accordingly, in a radical break with his predecessors, Kant takes judgments to be the minimal units of awareness and experience.
Sure, and then I'd probably pull the hand back and start screaming, as that is the usual functional response. The functionalist account is in no way lacking in terms of explaining human behavior. — goremand
Nicely put. I'd say the species itself is similarly entangled with the biosphere, etc. ie. That there is tiered entanglement from most to least animate (correlating with the conditions of being law-governed versus free). — Pantagruel
Brain storming/imagineering/musing/rumination! which is unrestricted by any notion of 'can't go there because.....'
Such, can cause thoughts in scientists that that they would otherwise, never have thought of. — universeness
But if man is the end of creation, he is also the true cause of creation, for the end is the principle of action. The distinction between man as the end of creation, and man as its cause, is only that the cause is the latent, inner man, the essential man, whereas the end is the self-evident, empirical, individual man, – that man recognizes himself as the end of creation, but not as the cause, because he distinguishes the cause, the essence from himself as another personal being.
But this other being, this creative principle, is in fact nothing else than his subjective nature separated from the limits of individuality and materiality, i.e., of objectivity, unlimited will, personality posited out of all connection with the world, – which by creation, i.e., the positing of the world, of objectivity, of another, as a dependent, finite, non-essential existence, gives itself the certainty of its exclusive reality. The point in question in the Creation is not the truth and reality of the world, but the truth and reality of personality, of subjectivity in distinction from the world. The point in question is the personality of God; but the personality of God is the personality of man freed from all the conditions and limitations of Nature. Hence the fervent interest in the Creation, the horror of all pantheistic cosmogonies. The Creation, like the idea of a personal God in general, is not a scientific, but a personal matter; not an object of the free intelligence, but of the feelings; for the point on which it hinges is only the Guarantee, the last conceivable proof and demonstration of personality or subjectivity as an essence quite apart, having nothing in common with Nature, a supra- and extra-mundane entity.
Man distinguishes himself from Nature. This distinction of his is his God: the distinguishing of God from Nature is nothing else than the distinguishing of man from Nature.
Agreed, semantic robustness is valued in science. — PhilosophyRunner
However if you set up a questionnaire that you asked a selected representative sample in the mall, where in addition to verbose answers they also rated parts of their experience on a numerical scale, you are likely to find it easier to get that published in a scientific journal. It would also help if you performed a statistical analysis of the responses. — PhilosophyRunner
Where I see a divide between phenomenology and science is in the method. Science (I would say all sciences) requires a level of methodological robustness that is not required by phenomenology. — PhilosophyRunner
You can talk to people in a mall about experience and write a book about it in free form, and this book may be well received in phenomenology circles. — PhilosophyRunner
Ok but well, that intuition is bound to vary from one person to another. If we want meaningful discussion and not just sit around in a room and think (though I guess Husserl loved that) we can't insist only on our preferred way of conceptualizing. I someone has a problem with how you conceptualize experience you can't get around this by saying "it's irreducible". — goremand
In the past, I've argued pretty reductively against a focus on subjectivity, and it's true that rational norms and concepts are primarily public and ego-transcending, or philosophy would be impossible.In essence, basic statements are for Popper logical constructs which embrace and include ‘observation statements’, but for methodological reasons he seeks to avoid that terminology, as it suggests that they are derived directly from, and known by, experience (2002: 12, footnote 2), which would conflate them with the “protocol” statements of logical positivism and reintroduce the empiricist idea that certain kinds of experiential reports are incorrigible. The “objectivity” requirement in Popper’s account of basic statements, by contrast, amounts to a rejection of the view that the truth of scientific statements can ever be reduced to individual or collective human experience. (2002: 25).
Popper therefore argues that there are no statements in science which cannot be interrogated: basic statements, which are used to test the universal theories of science, must themselves be inter-subjectively testable and are therefore open to the possibility of refutation. He acknowledges that this seems to present a practical difficulty, in that it appears to suggest that testability must occur ad infinitum, which he acknowledges is an operational absurdity: sooner or later all testing must come to an end. Where testing ends, he argues, is in a convention-based decision to accept a basic statement or statements; it is at that point that convention and intersubjective human agreement play an indispensable role in science:
Every test of a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must stop at some basic statement or other which we decide to accept. If we do not come to any decision, and do not accept some basic statement or other, then the test will have led nowhere. (2002: 86)
It says that intelligent agents such as ourselves can be explained and understood solely in those terms, and that the qualitative domain - the felt quality of existence - has no intrinsic reality apart from that. — Quixodian
Hence the requirement for the vertical dimension, the qualitative domain. — Quixodian
The deepest principle in human nature is the craving to be appreciated.
...
Mankind’s common instinct for reality has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism. In heroism, we feel, life’s supreme mystery is hidden. — William James
Discursive practice is made of the fundamental particles of the universe which is the intra-action. She talks about discursive practice rather than the atomic 'speech act'. Our discussion and her book are defining each other in a mutual process, a thread is an experiment that might work or not. — unenlightened
Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? — charles ferraro
In the sciences we see emergent hierarchies, and the lower do provide the foundations for the higher, but it certainly doesn't follow that the higher can be exhaustively explained or adequately described in terms of the lower. — Janus