Yes, precisely that meaning of free. Regarding our 'eerie temporality', I have lately been speculating on the forum whether consciousness might not actually exist - ie. have a "size" - in the temporal dimension, versus just traversing time. — Pantagruel

Have you looked into Husserl's notion of the smeared moment ? Like T. S. Eliot, he thinks about what it means to listen to music. In short, there's no 'pure' (punctual, pointish) now but always anticipation and drag. So even the now is smeared, if we ignore the useful calculus fiction and just direct our attention to how life is given to us.

I haven't heard of Brandom. I have a rather love-hate relationship with linguistics. — Pantagruel

Some of his work gets too deep in the linguistic weeds for my taste. But his creative reinterpretation of Kant's unity of apperception is great.

As I understand his work, Kant’s most basic idea, the axis around which all his thought turns, is that what distinguishes exercises of judgment and intentional agency from the performances of merely natural creatures is that judgments and actions are subject to distinctive kinds of normative assessment. Judgments and actions are things we are in a distinctive sense responsible for. They are a kind of commitment we undertake. Kant understands judging and acting as applying rules, concepts, that determine what the subject becomes committed to and responsible for by applying them. Applying concepts theoretically in judgment and practically in action binds the concept user, commits her, makes her responsible, by opening her up to normative assessment according to the rules she has made herself subject to.

The responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something. On the theoretical side, what one is committed to doing, what one becomes liable to assessment as to one’s success at doing, is integrating one’s judgments into a whole that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: the synthetic unity of apperception. It is a systematic, rational unity, dynamically created and sustained by drawing inferential consequences from and finding reasons for one’s judgments, and rejecting commitments incompatible with those one has undertaken. Apperceiving, the characteristically sapient sort of awareness, is discursive (that is, conceptual) awareness.

For it consists in integrating judgments into a unity structured by relations of what judgments provide reasons for and against what others. And those rational relations among judgments are determined by the rules, that is the concepts, one binds oneself by in making the judgments. Each new episode of experience, paradigmatically the making of a perceptual judgment, requires integration into, and hence transformation of the antecedent constellation of commitments. New incompatibilities can arise, which must be dealt with critically by rejecting or modifying prior commitments. New joint consequences can ensue, which must be acknowledged or rejected. The process by which the whole evolves and develops systematically is a paradigmatically rational one, structured by the rhythm of inhalation or amplification by acknowledging new commitments and extracting new consequences, and exhalation or criticism by rejecting or adjusting old commitments in the light of their rational relations to the new ones.
....
But the minimal unit of responsibility is the judgment. It is judgments, not concepts, that one can invest one’s authority in, commit oneself to, by integrating them into an evolving constellation that exhibits the rational synthetic unity of apperception. Accordingly, in a radical break with his predecessors, Kant takes judgments to be the minimal units of awareness and experience.

https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/Texts/From_German_Idealism_to_American_Pragmat.pdf

The discursive self is then essentially normative and (Brandom doesn't stress this in this passage) deeply temporal. For I am bound to previous commitments as I contemplate new ones, though I can of course rebuild myself slowly like Neurath's boat.

More generally, Brandom at his best makes the essence of rationality dazzlingly explicit to itself. His website is full of great free texts if you happen to want more.

The responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task responsibility: a commitment to do something.

You could say that when we act, we realize the law or principle which guides our actions. Indeed, the scientific method is essentially that, the instantiation (formal codification and social adoption) of some law that coincides with a certain type of human action (experimentalism). If scientific laws can be socially instantiated with tangible physical elements that are enhancements of fundamental human abilities (instruments, tools, symbols), why should not other types of laws (logical, moral) be similarly encapsulable?

I'm not exactly sure what you are asking. I'd just say that rationality is a kind of virtuous responsibleness. It's like paying one's debts, keeping one's promises. Notice that these are also essentially temporal. A self is a self-referential pattern in the dimension of time. A rational person keeps their story straight.

Are you looking to reduce normativity into something simpler ? If so, it seems to me that one has to argue for such a reduction, a performative contradiction. As far as I can tell, human existence [ I excluse the comatose, infants, etc.] is fundamentally and irreducibly normative.

I was generalizing the sense in which applying a concept is a commitment to a type of task. Similarly, scientific laws are instantiated by and through human instrumental actions. Hearkening back to the OP theme of the scientific method.

Ok. The focus on the instruments threw me off. There are norms governing the driving of cars on public roads. Is that significantly different ? I like Popper on this. Science is a secondorder mythmaking tradition. One ought to modify claims in response to effective criticism, the results of experiments, etc. We let our theories do our dying for us, identified more with the critical-synthetic process than with our current pet thesis.

Ok. The focus on the instruments threw me off. There are norms governing the driving of cars on public roads. — plaque flag

I guess those can be in some sense be formulated in terms of heuristic rules governing systems flow. So while it seems arbitrary and artificial that traffic flow is conventionalized, it can have symbolic meaning relative to something that is actually happening, some kind of functioning circulatory feature. I think that the scientific method only makes sense in terms of experimentalism. I think the most accurate general description of existence is that it is experimental in nature.

I really don't personally mind if you are sold on the wonders of phenomenology, but such a statement suggests that you haven't much looked into it. Correct me if I am wrong, and I don't intend to be rude. — plaque flag

I certainly wouldn't classify myself as an expert on phenomenology, I have a shallower understanding than that. Quite possibly you have a better understanding than I do, so I welcome your views.

Phenomenology is methodological, but from my shallower understanding the method is different to that of science.

Take my quote from Einstein in my earlier post. Using a phenomenological method, having interviewed many people who have that same experience, one may come to the conclusion that time is indeed slower when you put your hand on a hot stove and quicker when you are spending time talking to someone you find attractive. This is saying something about time.

While a scientist would reject that notion and conclude that it says nothing about time. Instead you should put a clock in both scenarios and measure time that way, regardless of the experience.

Now a phenomenologist may ask "what is it the clock is doing?" and that is a valid question where the phenomenologist and scientist may share a good discussion.

So science and phenomenology share much (the last paragraph above), while also having methodological differences (the previous two paragraphs).

Am I along the correct track?

Just to be clear, I'm not pissing on science. I love science.

But I've got some experience with math and physics (went to school for that kind of thing, also computer science), and to me it seemed that people all too readily settled for a very 'local' semantics. It's presumably because of the specialization of knowledge. Everyone is afraid perhaps to speak outside their little yard. The positivist boogey man will get them ? — plaque flag

Absolutely, I'm not suggesting you are pissing on science.

As a first point of call, what I hope to get to myself, is a place where an understanding of science is self consistent.

Imagine a guy called Luke. It is fair enough if Luke takes after Feyeraband and it is fair enough if he takes after Popper. However I hope that whichever he takes after, he stays true to the assumptions underlying it. If Luke adopts Feyeraband but also believes strongly that many theories are pseudo-science, then I find that self contradictory. The same is true if Luke adopts Popper and believes there is no such thing as pseudo-science. And so on.

So I actually have less qualms if someone is scared of the positivist boogeyman, as long as they are consistent with such a position. I also have less qualms if someone isn't, as long as they don't invoke the positivist boogeyman when it suits them.

None of this is towards you or any particular poster here, but rather an overall theme I have seen as someone with a science background who is interested in philosophy.

In other words, if a theoretical model can not be efficiently simulated via quantum computer then it cannot be efficiently realized in the real world. — Pantagruel

But the point of the critiques of speculative physics and cosmology is that they might never be testable at all. As Ellis and Silk put it:

Faced with difficulties in applying fundamental theories to the observed Universe, some researchers called for a change in how theoretical physics is done. They began to argue — explicitly — that if a theory is sufficiently elegant and explanatory, it need not be tested experimentally, breaking with centuries of philosophical tradition of defining scientific knowledge as empirical. We disagree. As the philosopher of science Karl Popper argued: a theory must be falsifiable to be scientific.

Chief among the 'elegance will suffice' advocates are some string theorists. Because string theory is supposedly the 'only game in town' capable of unifying the four fundamental forces, they believe that it must contain a grain of truth even though it relies on extra dimensions that we can never observe. Some cosmologists, too, are seeking to abandon experimental verification of grand hypotheses that invoke imperceptible domains such as the kaleidoscopic multiverse (comprising myriad universes), the 'many worlds' version of quantum reality (in which observations spawn parallel branches of reality) and pre-Big Bang concepts.

These unprovable hypotheses are quite different from those that relate directly to the real world and that are testable through observations — such as the standard model of particle physics and the existence of dark matter and dark energy. As we see it, theoretical physics risks becoming a no-man's-land between mathematics, physics and philosophy that does not truly meet the requirements of any. — Scientific Method - Defend the Integrity of Physics

I've often noticed how easily multi-verse and many-worlds speculations (granted that these are different but often conflated) provide metaphorical elbow-room for speculative rationalisation of scientific-sounding claims.

For instance, In the Copenhagen interpretation of physics, the wave-function collapse is considered a fundamental and irreducible aspect of quantum reality, where the act of measurement causes the system to "choose" one of its possible states, leading to the observed outcome. The Everett interpretation of quantum physics offers an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which wave-function collapse doesn't occur. It dissolves this conundrum by saying that what appears as wave-function collapse in the Copenhagen interpretation is actually the result of the quantum system branching into multiple parallel universes, each corresponding to a different outcome. But then, the many-worlds interpretation itself may not be amenable to empirical falsification, and the requirement of multiple universes seems at the least highly unparsimonious. The idea may fairly be regarded as a metaphysical rather than a scientific theory (Philip Ball's critique is often cited.)

There are many of these interpretive problems thrown up by current science.

As a first point of call, what I hope to get to myself, is a place where an understanding of science is self consistent. — PhilosophyRunner

:up: :up: :up:

Imagine a guy called Luke. It is fair enough if Luke takes after Feyeraband and it is fair enough if he takes after Popper. However I hope that whichever he takes after, he stays true to the assumptions underlying it. If Luke adopts Feyeraband but also believes strongly that many theories are pseudo-science, then I find that self contradictory. The same is true if Luke adopts Popper and believes there is no such thing as pseudo-science. And so on. — PhilosophyRunner

:up:

Nice ! You are very close in this to my understanding of a minimal foundation for inquiry. Thou shalt not engage in performative contradiction. Also, Brandom writes about the discursive self as responsible for the coherence of its claims. A discursive self 'is' this time-smeared quest for coherence.

This is basically a genuine limit on skepticism and relativism. What can't be rationally doubted is the conditions for the possibility of rationality. Now people can be crazy, but that's a different issue.

But the point of the critiques of speculative physics and cosmology is that they might never be testable at all. — Quixodian

In which case what are they? If they don't have any kind of practical application their value is purely aesthetic.

What if they solve problems of cognitive dissonance? You know, are used to keep challenged paradigms immune from criticism? Multiverse arguments and ‘hidden variables’ and the like give you a lot of metaphysical elbow-room.

What if they solve problems of cognitive dissonance? You know, are used to keep challenged paradigms immune from criticism? — Quixodian

If you mean the theories function in some holistic sense by deepening the coherence of an overall theoretical framework then that would be an application, but it seems a stretch.

No. I mean they’re used to smooth over annoying inconsistencies in current models. Like I said, Everett devised many worlds to avoid the spooky implication that the measurement problem was mind-dependent. Hidden variables theories to make spooky action-at-a-distance go away. The multiverse is routinely invoked to explain away the anthropic cosmological principle. And so on. Examples could be multiplied.

As a scientist, I do not know of anyone who uses a 'scientific method'. Imagine a private investigator trying to solve a case. They can build on the experience of themselves and others, but ultimately they will use whatever currently legitimate tools are available. The thing that makes science science are the activities of a community of self-identified members who are recognised as such by other members of the community who share a particular set of approaches, values and standards, that shifts as their perspectives change. Primary values of this community are a belief in the provisional nature of our knowledge and, as Whitehead puts it, 'a vehement and passionate interest in the relationship of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts'. These values also currently include quantification, objectivity and replicability, but these are only included as they are seen as furthering this relationship between principles and facts.

Hi Richard, and welcome to the Forum. Excellent first post - but tell me this. Once upon a time, I considered, but never enrolled in, a Project Management training course. I didn’t go ahead, but I did learn there is a document or collection called the Project Management BoK - meaning ‘book of knowledge’. I never went on to study it, but you would think science has, at least, something corresponding - a kind of core set of methods, techniques, attitudes, and, yes, even ‘how-to’ knowledge, that was to some extent passed on, like guild knowledge. No?

No. I mean they’re used to smooth over annoying inconsistencies in current models. Like I said, Everett devised many worlds to avoid the spooky implication that the measurement problem was mind-dependent. Hidden variables theories to make spooky action-at-a-distance go away. The multiverse is routinely invoked to explain away the anthropic cosmological principle. And so on. Examples could be multiplied. — Quixodian

Then they are elements of whatever theories happen to have practical application. Life is on a voyage of discovery wherein it inter-evolves with an environment. At an abstract level, organisms adapt to different types of information in their environments, producing forms that are specialized in various ways to interact with that information. For me, this is what differentiates science from pseudo-science. Science is definitively involved in this process.

Given that all observation (perception) is theory-laden, in essence, learning new knowledge can be like opening a door that lets you peer into a completely new dimension of reality. Since organisms adapt to their environments, expanding its environment through the integration of new knowledge creates the possibility of entirely novel types of adaptations. And as the type of information to which we adapt grows more abstract, the brain becomes more and more the organ of adaption. This is the import I see in the scientific method, cum experimentalism.

At an abstract level, organisms adapt to different types of information in their environments, producing forms that are specialized in various ways to interact with that information. — Pantagruel

Yeah but that’s biology. The parameters of what we’re discussing are no longer determined by that, and I think rationalising science, or any other human activities, in those terms is inherently reductionist. And there are better things than simply being well-adapted.

I think this is a good perspective - there is a set of procedures, methods and attitudes that are recognised as fitting the standards of the community, such as objectivity and requiring p-values to be less than 0.05. In addition to journal articles and textbooks, these standards are passed down and enforced by teachers, advisors, colleagues, reviewers and editors. People who do not adhere to these standards will (generally) be limited in their ability to publish and obtain funding.

Excellent! Glad we agree. I see that as being a more expansive definition of scientific method than it’s cookie-cutter image.

Yeah but that’s biology. The parameters of what we’re discussing are no longer determined by that, and I think rationalising science, or any other human activities, in those terms is inherently reductionist. And there are better things than simply being well-adapted. — Quixodian

That's a non sequitur. The human enterprise is and always will be a human enterprise. As I pointed out, the nature of the environment to which we are adapting evolves based on our understanding. The only thing reductionistic is your characterization. Evolution can be as open-ended as it apparently is.

But you appeal explicitly to biological criteria:

At an abstract level, organisms adapt to different types of information in their environments, producing forms that are specialized in various ways to interact with that information. — Pantagruel

Whereas we’re discussing the metaphysical implications of science. Do you see any difference between the biological adaptations of animals and intellectual interpretation, or do you see the latter as on a continuum with the former? Are such conjectures a form of or in service of adaptation?

Whereas we’re discussing the metaphysical implications of science. Do you see any difference between biological adaptation and intellectual interpretation, or do you see the latter on a continuum with the former? — Quixodian

Am I biologizing intellect, or intellectualizing biology? Yes, absolutely I'd say we are on a continuum which stretches from the poles of pure objectivity (which is an abstraction) and pure subjectivity (which is also an abstraction). It is in the nature of these antinomies that they are dyadic. There is no subject without object, no object without subject. The Copenhagen interpretation supports this.

Are we pieces of matter that learned to think? Or has thought learned to cloak itself in matter? Is one of those options inherently less improbable than the other?

As a scientist, I do not know of anyone who uses a 'scientific method'. Imagine a private investigator trying to solve a case. They can build on the experience of themselves and others, but ultimately they will use whatever currently legitimate tools are available. — Richard Goldstein

This is similar to what Susan Haack argues.

There is, in short, a constantly evolving array of scientific methods, tools, and techniques of inquiry—methods, tools, etc., often local to specific scientific fields, though sometimes proving useful elsewhere, too. Insofar as these methods, tools, and techniques stretch scientists’ imaginative powers, extend their unaided evidential reach, refine their appraisal of where evidence points, and help sustain honesty, provide incentives to the patience and persistence required by scientific work, and facilitate the communication of results, they enable progress: better measurements, better theories, more sensitive instruments, subtler techniques, finer-grained experimental design, more informative terminology, and so on.

- Scientism and its Discontents Susan Haack

Are we pieces of matter that learned to think? Or ideas that learned to enrobe themselves in matter? Is one of those options inherently less improbable than the other? — Pantagruel

Nice way of summarising it. I vote (2).

:ok:

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Using a phenomenological method, having interviewed many people who have that same experience, one may come to the conclusion that time is indeed slower when you put your hand on a hot stove and quicker when you are spending time talking to someone you find attractive. This is saying something about time. — PhilosophyRunner

That's not phenomenology. Not if we mean Husserl & company. I recommend Zahavi's Husserl’s Phenomenology (Cultural Memory in the Present) if you are interested. Obviously primary texts are great, but Zahavi's book is map through the maze of a long career. Heidegger's The Concept of Time is also great. I mean the 100 page first-draft of Being and Time (there are several texts with that name, confusingly.) It's packed with the hits and less overwhelming than the final published draft.

There is no subject without object, no object without subject. — Pantagruel

:up:

Given that all observation (perception) is theory-laden, in essence, learning new knowledge can be like opening a door that lets you peer into a completely new dimension of reality. — Pantagruel

:up: