But my point is that physical determinism—the deterministic laws governing physical processes like brain states—doesn’t explain why Bob1 or Bob2 are acting in the way that they are. It doesn't provide the right causal story and so it leaves something important out of the picture. — Pierre-Normand

Which is why I can't stress enough that "physical" isn't particularly important here. Afaik you brought up physical determinism. It isn't mentioned in the article and I didn't bring it up. Sure, maybe there are non physical things that go into deciding future states, future choices, future actions. That's not in question. Nobody is denying that. Whether you believe all that explains how the world evolves is physical or not doesn't seem to be to have anything to do with the argument at hand.

Libertarians hold that free will is only possible in indeterminism. And given that indeterminism in regards to human choice literally means "Bob's choices are indeterministic if and only if, for some choices Bob makes, Bob2 might make a different choice from Bob1 even though everything is perfectly the same about them and their circumstances", then Libertarians by extention must necessarily believe that "Bob has free will if and only if, for some choices Bob makes, Bob2 might make a different choice from Bob1 even though everything is perfectly the same about them and their circumstances"

So you say the thought experiment is defined to make it arbitrary, but the thought experiment is quite literally *the only thing that distinguishes deterministic choice from libertarian choice*. So as far as I'm concerned, if one wants to take libertarianism serious, one MUST engage in a thought experiment like that. That's what libertarianism means. It means that the exact conditions Bob is in do not gurantee his choice, ie that Bob really, geniunely could do something entirely different even if literally nothing changed.

So the writer of the article isn't just defining some silly impossible thought experiment for shits and giggles, he's taking the central claim of libertarianism seriously and looking through the implications of it.

that wasn't very clear from your phrasing that you were talking about the experiment being impossible

"So under libertarianism, the decision to do one action over the other ends up being arbitrary after all." But only under a condition defined to make it arbitrary, and that moreover is conceded to be impossible

I thought you meant the decision to do one action or the other is impossible.

is "it is?" a non sequitur? I don't see where in the article he concedes that's impossible.

But only under a condition defined to make it arbitrary, — tim wood

Only under a condition that is by design the sort of condition that distinguishes determinism from indeterminism. Which is relevant, because libertarians are of course generally saying that determinism is lethal to free will, and indeterminism aka for it.

and that moreover is conceded to be impossible. — tim wood

It is?

none of what you're saying looks to me to even be an attempt at engaging with the actual logic of the article in the op. None of it relies on instruments or measuring or anything.

I'm not sure about that tbh. I know that quantum mechanics maintains certain conservations, like momentum and angular velocity things like that. But I'm not sure about the first law, Google seems to think they there are quantum situations where it can be broken or at least fudged.

People generally assume that the dependency of actions on past law-governed neurophysiological events (for instance) entails some form of determinism. It does. But it merely entails physical determinism—the existence of regular laws that govern material processes in the brain, for instance. But this low-level determinism doesn't extend to high-level processes such as the exercise of skills of practical deliberation that manifest an agent's sensitivity to norms of rationality. — Pierre-Normand

You say that, but then you confirm that Bob2 would always do the same thing as Bob1, which is what determinism means. Even when those actions involve high level processes, skills, deliberations, you seem to think Bob2 would do the same as Bob1 given everything is the same.

So you say determinism doesn't extend there, but then you confirm the very thing determinism says.

It seems like there's a semantic reason why you don't want to call it "determinism" - and it looks like that semantic reason revolves all around the word "physical", even though determinism as a concept isn't limited to the physical - and so that's why you're confirming that Bob2 would always do the same as Bob1, but not calling that "determinism".

need not arise if one deems physical determinism not to entail unqualified determinism. — Pierre-Normand

I don't understand why you keep bringing up physical determinism at all. Even if there isn't a single physical thing in existence, and agents are all purely non physical things, the argument still makes perfect sense. Even if we're all floating spirit orbs, as long as we make choices over time, the argument holds as far as I can tell. It had nothing to do with physical anything, other than for the coincidence that we happen to live in an apparently physical world. That fact is entirely irrelevant to the conversation as far as I can tell.

I know. And there is not evidence that (unqualified) determinism is true. — Pierre-Normand

This conversation doesn't rely on it being true. It relies only on understanding what it means. What does it mean for something to be deterministic? What does it mean for something to be indeterministic? That's it. (and the meaning has literally nothing to do with any assumptions of physicality)

The article in the OP isn't an argument for determinism. The conclusion of the article isn't "and therefore determinism is true". I think multiple people are getting mixed up on that.

That's only physical determinism. Physical determinism is a thesis about the causal closure of the physical and the deterministic evolution of physical systems considered as such — Pierre-Normand

That's not what I'm talking about at all. I'm taking about determinism. Any determinism. Physical or otherwise

In my view, it is indeed quite trivial that if Bob1 and Bob2 are identical, atom for atom, and likewise for their environments, and assuming microphysical determinism holds, then their behaviors will be the same — Pierre-Normand

If that's true for every decision in bobs life - that Bob1 and Bob2 and bob3 and... Bob∞ will always do the same given identical everything, then... well, that's what determinism means. There doesn't look to be anything indeterministic about any of bobs decisions. That's the very thing that distinguishes determinism from indeterminism.

What distinguishes my account from compatibilist accounts is that it shares with most libertarian accounts a commitment to rational causation (as distinguished with Humean event causation), which is not merely indeterministic — Pierre-Normand

So, rational causation is indeterministic you say. I'm not really sure why you think that, or why appealing to "norms" would make it indeterministic (as far as I can see there's nothing in the definition of what a norm is that has really anything to do with determinism or indeterminism), but regardless....

If it's indeterministic, that means you think it's possible that Bob2 will do something different from Bob1 at T2, despite being perfectly identical in every way at T1, every way meaning including physically, mentally, spiritually, rationally - every aspect of them is the same at T1. So to engage with the argument in the article fully, I'd like to see what you posit as the explanation for the difference in behaviour between Bob2 and Bob1. They're the same, remember, so why did they behave differently in the exact same circumstance?

I read what you wrote. It still sounds like you're saying "it's incoherent because I don't know what (in)determinism means".

We talked about it already though. You say there's not even a tentative definition. I gave you one about functions - at least I think that was you. Do you recall how I distinguished deterministic functions from indeterministic ones?

You're acting like you're really trying and I'm responding in bad faith, that's not my experience of this conversation. My experience is, we've actually pretty explicitly gone through what these words mean at least in some context, and then pages later you just conveniently forget and get hostile about it because you're confused again. But we can go through it again.

Here's where I defined the difference between a deterministic and indeterministic function.

Do you want some hands on examples?

interesting, would you say you can square genuine alternative possibilities with determinism? How would you describe a situation where there's genuine alternative possibilities, and yet determinism holds true?

so step 1 confirmed or not?

OK. So, first let me say, I'm not interested in convincing you of compatibilism. I can't do that. I don't want to do that, it's beside the point. I'm not even interested in convincing you compatibilism is *coherent*. All I'm interested in is if you're able, after this, to translate someone saying "I'm a compatibilist" into a more broken-down paraphrasing of what they're probably saying.

Luckily that's really simple.

If someone says "I'm a compatibilist", they're saying "I believe we have free will, and the type of free will I believe in wouldn't be undermined by determinism".

That's why it's compatible with determinism - because it wouldn't be undermined if, somehow, we found ourselves in a world where determinism were unambigously confirmed to be the case.

So are we past step one? Step one: understand what it means for someone to understand "free will" from a compatibilist perspective.

what on earth kind of free will can your description of an "indeterminst compatibilism compatibilist" possibly entail? — javra

A compatibilist one. Do you know what a compatibilist kind of free will is?

Let's break this down into two steps for you.

Step one: understand what it means for someone to understand "free will"from a compatibilist perspective.

Step two: understand why it's possible for an indeterminist to understand free will from a compatibilist perspective.

Shall we start with step 1?

Which cries out for defining all these terms. I have pointed out above that the article's mention of non-D was at least incomplete/inadequate and either thereby incoherent or itself already incoherent. — tim wood

Why? Why is mentioning a term that tim wood doesn't know the definition of incoherent? Is it incoherent any time anybody says a word you don't know? Determinism is defined on wikipedia, or Stanford philosophy encyclopedia. It's not a complicated definition either - well, maybe it is to some I guess, it seems pretty straight forward to me. You not knowing the definition of a word doesn't mean anybody who uses that word is being incoherent.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

your description of an indeterminist compatibilism — javra

I didn't describe an indeterminist compatibilism. I described an indeterminist compatibilist - a person who is a compatibilist, who happens to be an indeterminist.

The two positions aren't related. It's just a person who holds both positions at once..

The universe being indeterministic doesn't seem to give any more room for free will than if it were deterministic.

what I believe about free will is way more difficult to express than the ideas in this article. And they don't matter in regards to a thread about the argument in this article, so I would prefer not to do that here.

I'll just briefly say that my belief in free will can be summarised by "emergent compatibilism". If you want to read about that sort of idea from someone much more intelligent then I, check this out. If you want to talk more with me about it, I'd request you start a new thread.

Without some rigorous definitions, even if just tentative, nothing coherent can be stated or established — tim wood

You don't even have a tentative definition of indeterminism?

the entire scenario with the 2 bobs is laid out assuming INDETERMINISM is the case. Not determinism. So that's why I didn't really understand why you're saying they have to do the same thing. If indeterminism is the case (and we're assuming it is, at that point in the article), then that enables Bob2 to do something different from Bob1.

Without going further into what I think of the rest of the argument, can you understand that at least? That the article takes indeterminism as an assumption, not determinism, and that therefore it's not the case that Bob2 has to do the same thing as Bob1.

There's a point in the article where he says this: "But the libertarian denies that Bob’s will is causally determined by anything". From that point on, for at least the next couple of paragraphs, and certainly while talking about the two bobs in the two worlds, he's talking about indeterminism.

would you briefly paraphrase what you think the argument is in that article, and what the conclusion is? I'm really curious where you're at.

the article isn't about determinism

Anyway, to complete the argument of the OP, an impossible thought experiment is set up, which itself is self-contradictory. In it, B1 and B2 have to perform the same action, but it is acknowledged that they do not. And that blows up that imaginary world. — tim wood

They HAVE TO perform the same action? I'm not sure we're reading the same article. Why do you say they have to? The author didn't say that.

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will — javra

My description of an indeterminist compatibilist didn't involve an indeterminist concept of free will.

every single word there has a clear prior context of meaning in this conversation, so I don't know why you think it's a jumble of words with no definition.

We know what it means for someone to be an indeterminist.

We know what it means for someone to be a compatibilist.

An indeterminist compatibilist is quite simply someone who is an indeterminist, and a compatibilist. Of course it is, why would it not be? A black horse is a creature that is a horse and is black. A rapping Asian is a person who is Asian and is rapping. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist who is a compatibilist.

I don't see which part you think is a jumble of words.

uh huh. And I stand by that. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist whose concept of free will is compatible with determinism.

How do you figure that — javra

Because that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism in this context literally means, my concept of free will is compatible with determinism.

someone who believes in libertarian free will believes the following 3 things

1. We have free will
2. Indeterminism is true
3. Indeterminism MUST be true for us to have free will

It's that third belief that's crucial there. You can be an indeterminist without believing 3. You could even be an indeterminist without believing 1.

Compatibilism, on the other hand, is more or less these 3 things

1. We have free will
2. Maybe we live in a deterministic universe, maybe there's some indeterminism (some compatibilists are unambiguous determinists, some are agnostic, and some are unambiguous indeterminists)
3. It doesn't matter if indeterminism is true or not for our free will

So an indeterminist compatibilism is just someone who believes we have free will, that we live in an indeterministic universe, but that if they happened to find out that we didn't live in an indeterministic universe, their understanding of free will would remain in tact.

Mispost

it can only be, yes, but that doesn't mean they mean the same thing. A square can only be a rectangle, but you can't just call things "squares" whenever you should be calling them a rectangle, and vice versa. The words still mean different things.

I thought you were arguing for libertarian compatibilism.

did you know you don't have to be a determinist to be a compatibilist?

I think you've given the definition of determinism and called it "compatibilism".

Working definitions:

Libertarianism: it is metaphysically possible that one could have chosen otherwise than what one chooses at any juncture of choice making.

Compatibilism: it is metaphysically impossible that any event, including that of choice making, can occur in fully undetermined manners; i.e. all events, including that of choice making, must be in some way determined by necessary determinants. — javra

Are those your definitions?

then we still don't know anything about them. — tim wood

Other than the definition of what they are, which I wouldn't call "nothing".

Now that you know what distinguishes determinism from indeterminism, do you care to reread the scenario in the linked article in op about Bob1 and Bob2?

But beyond that simple fact, this tells us nothing about indeterministic systems and certainly nothing about will, free or not. — tim wood

What do you mean by "this"? What tells us nothing?