it can only be, yes, but that doesn't mean they mean the same thing. A square can only be a rectangle, but you can't just call things "squares" whenever you should be calling them a rectangle, and vice versa. The words still mean different things.

Yes, sure. But I didn't intend to say they are the same thing. To restate more explicitly: a (type of) indeterminist compatibilism.

But then again, given that compatibilism signifies a compatibility between free will and the necessity of determinants, what do you have in mind as a non-libertarian form of indeterminist compatibilism?

Mispost

someone who believes in libertarian free will believes the following 3 things

1. We have free will
2. Indeterminism is true
3. Indeterminism MUST be true for us to have free will

It's that third belief that's crucial there. You can be an indeterminist without believing 3. You could even be an indeterminist without believing 1.

Compatibilism, on the other hand, is more or less these 3 things

1. We have free will
2. Maybe we live in a deterministic universe, maybe there's some indeterminism (some compatibilists are unambiguous determinists, some are agnostic, and some are unambiguous indeterminists)
3. It doesn't matter if indeterminism is true or not for our free will

So an indeterminist compatibilism is just someone who believes we have free will, that we live in an indeterministic universe, but that if they happened to find out that we didn't live in an indeterministic universe, their understanding of free will would remain in tact.

So an indeterminist compatibilism is just someone who believes we have free will, that we live in an indeterministic universe, but that if they happened to find out that we didn't live in an indeterministic universe, their understanding of free will would remain in tact. — flannel jesus

How do you figure that when a non-indeterminstic universe can only equate to a deterministic universe, which in today's parlance can only equate to "everything is causally inevitable". What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable?

How do you figure that — javra

Because that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism in this context literally means, my concept of free will is compatible with determinism.

Because that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism in this context literally means, my concept of free will is compatible with determinism. — flannel jesus

Yes, but you specifically specified - or attempted to - the definition of an indeterminsit compatibilist.

uh huh. And I stand by that. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist whose concept of free will is compatible with determinism.

This is a jumble of words without definition and can potentially be as meaningless as would be "the black rainbow is both white and purple"

So it would really help out if you could answer this question as pertains to what you're attempting to argue:

What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable? — javra

every single word there has a clear prior context of meaning in this conversation, so I don't know why you think it's a jumble of words with no definition.

We know what it means for someone to be an indeterminist.

We know what it means for someone to be a compatibilist.

An indeterminist compatibilist is quite simply someone who is an indeterminist, and a compatibilist. Of course it is, why would it not be? A black horse is a creature that is a horse and is black. A rapping Asian is a person who is Asian and is rapping. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist who is a compatibilist.

I don't see which part you think is a jumble of words.

An indeterminist compatibilist is quite simply someone who is an indeterminist, and a compatibilist. Of course it is, why would it not be? A black horse is a creature that is a horse and is black. A rapping Asian is a person who is Asian and is rapping. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist who is a compatibilist.

I don't see which part you think is a jumble of words. — flannel jesus

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will - even when either will claim their own versions of compatibilism. Given the span of this discussion on this topic, don't know what more to say then.

Maybe that is why you don't address this question via reasoning or examples. Again:

What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable? — javra

I'll reply if you do address this question with some sort of explanation. Otherwise I won't. No biggie.

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will — javra

My description of an indeterminist compatibilist didn't involve an indeterminist concept of free will.

Now that you know what distinguishes determinism from indeterminism, do you care to reread the scenario in the linked article in op about Bob1 and Bob2? — flannel jesus

Have read. I find it incoherent. Here goes:

In this post I will argue that libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another. I will do this by arguing that though libertarianism seems to be able to explain why an agent acts the way she does at some given moment in time, even though the action is not causally determined, libertarianism cannot explain why the agent does that action instead of some other action. I find this troubling, since I believe humans have free will and I believe that compatibilism is not a tenable position on free will because it collapses into hard determinism.

Apparently an agent chooses an action, yes? The claim is that libertarianism cannot give an account for that choice of action, at least in the case of an action not causally determined. It seems clear to me that with every action may be associated that which can be called a cause. Can you provide an example of an action that cannot be so associated with a cause? Yes? No? Nor can libertarianism account for having and making choices. All of which suggests that libertarianism, whatever else it may be good for, is useless for these purposes. Pending any rehabilitation of libertarianism, let us hear no more about it.

A person’s will is causally undetermined. According to libertarianism, if the clock were rolled back, then radically different things could happen than what happened the first time. This is because humans could choose differently the next time around even though all antecedent conditions including beliefs and desires remained the same.

What exactly is an "antecedent condition"? Is it not fair to understand it as the condition that exists ante? But now(!) we introduce knowledge and thinking. These are certainly conditions, and they are not ante. It would appear that whatever the deficiencies of libertarianism are, the criticism here is not of sufficient quality to touch it or them, being themselves, by omission, fatally flawed.

One objection that libertarianism faces is that if our wills are causally undetermined, then how can we make sense of the choices that a person makes?

Not even if they (our wills) are made of marzapan, or bamboo, One confusion here seems to be the failure to distinguish between acting and choosing, and their respective distinctive aspects. And perhaps this confusion arising due to a failure to understand, or define, what "causally determined" means.

Anyway, to complete the argument of the OP, an impossible thought experiment is set up, which itself is self-contradictory. In it, B1 and B2 have to perform the same action, but it is acknowledged that they do not. And that blows up that imaginary world.

All of which means that the argument as presented is useless, meaningless. Which is the case with all (so far as I know) absolute critiques of anything. And the simplest account for that being that there ain't nothing nowhere that Is absolute.

Anyway, to complete the argument of the OP, an impossible thought experiment is set up, which itself is self-contradictory. In it, B1 and B2 have to perform the same action, but it is acknowledged that they do not. And that blows up that imaginary world. — tim wood

They HAVE TO perform the same action? I'm not sure we're reading the same article. Why do you say they have to? The author didn't say that.

They HAVE TO perform the same action? I'm not sure we're reading the same article — flannel jesus

They have to or determinism is a waste of time, yes?

the article isn't about determinism

the article isn't about determinism — flannel jesus

It appears to be not really about anything.

would you briefly paraphrase what you think the argument is in that article, and what the conclusion is? I'm really curious where you're at.

Where I am at, as stated, is that I think the article is an exercise in incoherence. As such, no argument, no "about." But I was about to ask you, as I have before, to say what you think - not about the article - but on what you think the article is about.

the entire scenario with the 2 bobs is laid out assuming INDETERMINISM is the case. Not determinism. So that's why I didn't really understand why you're saying they have to do the same thing. If indeterminism is the case (and we're assuming it is, at that point in the article), then that enables Bob2 to do something different from Bob1.

Without going further into what I think of the rest of the argument, can you understand that at least? That the article takes indeterminism as an assumption, not determinism, and that therefore it's not the case that Bob2 has to do the same thing as Bob1.

There's a point in the article where he says this: "But the libertarian denies that Bob’s will is causally determined by anything". From that point on, for at least the next couple of paragraphs, and certainly while talking about the two bobs in the two worlds, he's talking about indeterminism.

And all we know about in-D or non-D is that it is not D.

"But the libertarian denies that Bob’s will is causally determined by anything" — flannel jesus

And here we need to know what "causally determined" means - I don't recall reading that in the article.

But with either D or non-D or L, is the claim that it is one or another of these "all the way down"? Without some rigorous definitions, even if just tentative, nothing coherent can be stated or established. For example, is free will ultimately free? How can it be "free" once a decision is made? And so forth, until and unless some guard rails are first set in place. Without them, one can argue that of course and obviously free will is a feature of life. But - just for fun - does a perfect God have free will? And at the same time can be argued that ultimately, there is no "free" will. Our author of the article manifests ignorance of these points, and moreover, ignorance of their possibility or significance. So what is he about?

Without some rigorous definitions, even if just tentative, nothing coherent can be stated or established — tim wood

You don't even have a tentative definition of indeterminism?

You don't even have a tentative definition of indeterminism? — flannel jesus

Yes, as non-D. Let's give up this discussion of a problematic article. I am persuaded that whatever meaning you find in it comes from you. Let us then continue on the basis of what you think, you being the OP. I see you believe in free will. What do you say - if you can - that is? I qualify it because I do not think it will be easy to define. Btw, by ":define" I only mean establishing a waypoint for discussion and navigation therein.

what I believe about free will is way more difficult to express than the ideas in this article. And they don't matter in regards to a thread about the argument in this article, so I would prefer not to do that here.

I'll just briefly say that my belief in free will can be summarised by "emergent compatibilism". If you want to read about that sort of idea from someone much more intelligent then I, check this out. If you want to talk more with me about it, I'd request you start a new thread.

about the argument in this article, — flannel jesus

Which is what, exactly?

The universe being indeterministic doesn't seem to give any more room for free will than if it were deterministic.

The universe being indeterministic doesn't seem to give any more room for free will than if it were deterministic. — flannel jesus

Especially in light of statements such as this, for the life of me i don't understand your reasoning. I'm presuming the best here, and am earnestly trying to understand. In then going back to this:

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will — javra


My description of an indeterminist compatibilist didn't involve an indeterminist concept of free will. — flannel jesus

If your description of an indeterminist compatibilism does not involve an indeterminst concept of free will, what on earth kind of free will can your description of an "indeterminst compatibilism" possibly entail?

(I can so far only assume it then mandates a determinist concept of free will. But then how does one get a determinist concept of free will - i.e., a free will whose doings are causally inevitable in all conceivable cases - to in any way cohere with an indeterminist compatibilism???)

your description of an indeterminist compatibilism — javra

I didn't describe an indeterminist compatibilism. I described an indeterminist compatibilist - a person who is a compatibilist, who happens to be an indeterminist.

The two positions aren't related. It's just a person who holds both positions at once..

The universe being indeterministic doesn't seem to give any more room for free will than if it were deterministic. — flannel jesus

Which cries out for defining all these terms. I have pointed out above that the article's mention of non-D was at least incomplete/inadequate and either thereby incoherent or itself already incoherent.

I'll argue this way: free will exists; free will does not exist. I can prove either. What's your pleasure? YUou in turn will tell us what you think.

And can you make clear why the preoccupation with undefined and ambiguous/vague terminology?

Which cries out for defining all these terms. I have pointed out above that the article's mention of non-D was at least incomplete/inadequate and either thereby incoherent or itself already incoherent. — tim wood

Why? Why is mentioning a term that tim wood doesn't know the definition of incoherent? Is it incoherent any time anybody says a word you don't know? Determinism is defined on wikipedia, or Stanford philosophy encyclopedia. It's not a complicated definition either - well, maybe it is to some I guess, it seems pretty straight forward to me. You not knowing the definition of a word doesn't mean anybody who uses that word is being incoherent.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/