- I think I opened the page in a new tab early, before looking at it.

You will certainly find a lot of "emptiness" in theistic traditions, and also some (but less) "unification/fulfillment" in non-theistic traditions.

In any case my view is that experience and interpretation/framework are mutually influencing, such that anyone who draws a one-way arrow is mistaken.

f(a, (b,c)) is of course malformed — Banno

According to what authority? The gods of Analytic Philosophy, who do not allow a 2-tuple within a 2-tuple? :wink:

Your whole presupposition is that one of the two relata is complex, and is therefore subject to substitution, for you are substituting a subject/part of a proposition, not one of the two relata that frank outlined. If the proposition-relata cannot be complex then your objection has no force.

- Bananas indeed. :up:

I think this is a good answer to Leontiskos question about whether an emphasis on properties and one on mathematics contradict each other. — T Clark

Let me highlight a few things from that quote:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36

This is much to my point. To systematically exclude sound and smell is to abandon a motive of "common sensibles." If one were motivated by common sensibles there would be no reason to systematically exclude two of the senses. For Galileo and Descartes the point is not epistemic; it instead pertains to quantitative description and the fact that quantitative analysis is eminently rationally manipulable and transparent. It is that some qualities are deemed objective and others subjective, and the senses that pertain to the "subjective" pertain to secondary qualities.

We can see this in Galileo, Locke, etc. with the demotion of color to a "less real" (merely mental) "secondary quality," while shape and motion, etc. remain fully real "primary quantities." — Count Timothy von Icarus

...so it is more than just color that is less real. It is also sound and smell, which are directly correlated to two of the senses.

Just to note a basic division in testimony, theistic religions tend to report experiences of emptiness and such, while no-theistic religions tend to report experiences like the unification with God or whatever. Perhaps a general conclusion is not possible. — praxis

Did you mean to reverse the two?

I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. It seems to be about thought. — frank

The problem is that a name is arguably an extrinsic quality. To know some object is not the same as knowing what name certain other people use to refer to that object.

Maybe you have a nickname, and only two of your friends use that nickname. To fail to know your nickname is not necessarily to fail to know you. Banno's, "Tully = Cicero," actually means something like, "What some name as 'Tully' others name as 'Cicero'." This isn't a particularly substantial point. It pertains to names, not to things. It pertains to predication, not to relationship. Banno says:

if it were a relation, then substitution should be allowed - if f(a,b) and c=b then f(a,c) — Banno

What he requires is something more like f(a, (b,c)), such as Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)). The quibble is actually over the propositional predication (b,c), not the relation between knower and known. After all, Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)) is arguably different than Knowledge(Frank, (Cicero, De Officiis)), if names are to be constitutive parts of knowledge.

I'll go out on a limb here based on my limited reading of the history of science in the 1600s. Looking at reality as made of of things with physical properties was a new idea in that period. Physical properties are only observable by our senses. Mathematics depends on measurable properties. Otherwise it wouldn't have anything to operate on. — T Clark

But is mathematics observable by our senses?

Count Timothy pointed to those who think that mathematics is what is ultimately real, and where the senses and mathematics conflict, we should trust mathematics. At that point there is certainly an opposition between sense knowledge and mathematics, but perhaps that extreme point is merely an aberration?

By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is. — tim wood

What does "it is" mean? Does it mean "it is T"? Or "it is true"? Either way your definition is circular:

• Former: "By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is T."
• Latter: "By true I mean a property, call it T of P, such that for proposition P, P is T, if in fact it is true."

This is an indication that defining truth is more difficult than one might first expect. Truth is something which is characteristically resistant to univocal sequestering within the object language or meta language (which is why philosophers like Buridan explicitly rejected the notion that the two "languages" are separable).

- I would say that "relationship" simply does not have that baggage except in the context of Analytic Philosophy.

The reason I would not want to use "relationship" is because it reifies propositions. It is something a Platonist might like.

If we don't check every member of a set it's always possible to find a black swan. — Moliere

When you talk about "Aristotle's view of induction," what texts are you referring to? Or are you just thinking of Hume and conflating him with Aristotle?

Aristotle was not wrong in his time.

But neither he nor we can make induction a valid move that secures knowledge.

I say he wasn't wrong because I can see how his inferences are good given his circumstances, influences, and concerns not just from the rest of his writing but also from others' writings at the time, as well as writings about those writings.

But I don't think we can travel by induction up to knowledge of God, for instance. I'd say there is a limit of some kind on our ability to judge on some questions we might want to answer or try to answer, but don't seem like we can reliably answer. — Moliere

Well either he was not wrong or he was wrong. You seem to switch back and forth at least four times in these few sentences. Do you think Aristotle thought "induction" could secure knowledge? If so, and if it cannot, then you should hold that he was wrong.

I'm not sure that the process is sound. — Moliere

The process I outlined or some other one you are substituting? Here it is again:

Let's suppose that Aristotle thinks one should have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should consult popular theories (or even all theories) to the best of their ability. Okay. I think that's right. Do you have some objection to it?

Because the idea that such a process is defeated... — Leontiskos

Because your argument looks to be invalid again. "There might be a black swan, therefore one should not have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should not consult popular theories to the best of their ability." Non sequitur.

But if someone had something in mind other than Aristotle -- some modification which dealt with the notion that a single mind dealing with eternal categories does not bring one closer to being, but rather collective effort and distributing tasks and building trust such that we can work together, which tends to function better in an atmosphere where doubt is encouraged does. — Moliere

I am fairly certain that your familiarity with Aristotle is slim to none, but what you say here does not help your Humean notion of induction. Collective effort does not overcome the problems of Humean induction.

Are you able to say what each is? — Leontiskos

Not exactly, but by way of example I've hoped to show a difference -- Aristotle is the philosopher-scientist, Lavoisier is the scientist, and Kripke is the philosopher.

Not that I've been explicit or clear on this, really, but this is what the examples are meant to furnish -- as good examples of how to use the terms differently. The interpretation of each I'm meaning to use as why I might want to distinguish between the terms: look at what they mean and how they make inferences in these details and you'll hopefully catch onto the difference.

There won't be necessary and sufficient conditions -- I don't think we can solve the problem of the criterion, though I think falsification is still an important subject unto itself -- but there will be stark differences between two family resemblances when we compare them. — Moliere

This looks like another non-answer. If you want to say that science and philosophy are different, then you must be able to say what each is, and why the two are different. If you can't say what the two are and why they are different, then I have no idea why you would assert that the two are different.

Aristotle, Lavoisier, and Kripke? How many pages have you read of any of them? If they are to serve as exemplars of the putative categories you attach to them, then apparently both of us must have strong exposure to all three. That seems doubtful. I have read lots of Aristotle, a small bit of Kripke (less than 70 pages), and nothing from Lavoisier. Have you read enough of each to take them as exemplars of categories such as "philosopher-scientist"? If not, they are not going to function as exemplars of anything substantial. In that case they will just end up being empty vessels for post hoc rationalization.

This is why learning to make real arguments is important. "Philosophy and science are different, I can't say why, but I can point to Aristotle, Lavoisier, and Kripke as prime examples of the relevant differences, despite the fact that I have read very little Aristotle or Lavoisier." That's not a good argument, and what this means is that you have not provided any good reason for your conclusion. A good argument provides a good reason to believe the conclusion.

- :up:

- :up:

- :up:

Not that the future couldn't be different, but now there are just that many options that this method is not feasible to do metaphysics with. — Moliere

Okay, but do you have an argument for your conclusion? Are we no longer capable of induction in the 21st century? Was Aristotle wrong that we should have wide experience before drawing conclusions?

So, for instance, I wouldn't say induction requires, but I'd say that the manner in which Aristotle's induction does. The way I see him move is securing his claim by an exhaustive survey of the extent arguments, a review of their merits and demerits followed by the conclusion of Aristotle's.

So, yeah, you'd have to figure out some other way to be an Aristotelian, at least, if you wanted to progress to metaphysical truth in the manner of induction as Aristotle practiced it. — Moliere

Let's suppose that Aristotle thinks one should have wide experience before drawing a conclusion, and one should consult popular theories (or even all theories) to the best of their ability. Okay. I think that's right. Do you have some objection to it?

Because the idea that such a process is defeated if we do not consider every single scientific claim that exists or is available in our linguistic context looks like a strawman. Even if we don't look at every single scientific claim, the process is still perfectly sound. And the person who looks at more evidence will be more suited to draw conclusions. There is no magic number or percentage of evidence that one must consult, nor does moving from 99% to 100% make the induction somehow qualitatively different. It's not like Aristotle made sure his pupils never made any "inductive" or "metaphysical" claims before considering "all" evidence. :grin: Have you ever engaged in teaching or tutoring?

Basically I think philosophy and science are separate activities. — Moliere

Are you able to say what each is?

- I think J asked a good question. Here it is again:

Would it follow, then, that if most people had mystical experiences, we'd consider them also to be "quasi-empirical" and possible evidence for general conclusions? How many would we need? What would be the threshold beyond which the experiences gained evidentiary status? — J

If phenomenology is "quasi-empirical" and the study of mystical experiences is not, would this change if most people had mystical experiences?

My thoughts were that they are ultimately connected. Mathematics is, at least initially, based on abstracting the common sensibles from any underlying matter and other qualities, including from time. So you get a timeless, changeless "platonic," intelligible subject that is nonetheless based on what is common to the senses (i.e. the experience of magnitude and multitude through shape, number, extension, etc.).

So, I'd argue that mathematization is sort of a blending of the two. It is materialism pulled back up into the intelligible realm, or the intelligible truncated down to just what is abstracted from the common sensibles.

It's obviously also intuitive in much the same way, which is why it is almost as old (e.g., Pythaogreanism). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That seems right to me. I am just trying to think of the wider picture within which to situate the OP. Mathematization could derive from an emphasis on the common sensibles, sure, but what else could it derive from? Mechanistic philosophy and the Baconian desire for control over nature, for one. Quantifiability and univocal, tidy reasoning schemes, for another. Along with this quantifiability is the neatness with which mathematics represents reasoning, which is apparently why many philosophers—from Plato to Descartes—were so fond of mathematics.

Also, your other point could be extrapolated out. It is the idea that where overdetermination exists, "testimony" is subject to confirmability. This happens with common senses, and it also happens with intersubjective consensus, repeated scientific testability, large sample sizes for the sake of induction, and probably many others. That desire for confirmability is surely present in many ways in our own age.

But, aside from the objection that this cuts out far too much, I think there is also a good argument to be made that a recognition of both magnitude and multitude is reliant on a measure (e.g. "one duck" must be known as such to know three ducks, or half a duck, etc.) and measure itself requires going beyond mathematics, to a recognition of unity and wholes (virtual, as opposed to dimension/bulk quantity, i.e. intensity of participation in form). That puts some recognition of whole, and so intelligible form, prior to dimensive quantity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes and this relates to the transcendental of "unum." Cf. <This post> and others within that thread.

Second , mathematization struggles with existence. Even if one accepts that "what everything is" can be described by mathematics, this does not seem to explain "that it is." Hence, mathematization still tends to either tend back towards materialism (e.g. "these particular mathematical objects really exist just because, for no reason—which essentially puts potency before act or potency as actualizing itself) or towards extremely crowded and inflated multiverse ontologies. For instance, Tegmark cannot fathom how mathematics can explain existence (fair enough) so he had to suppose that every mathematical object exists (and that some just happen to have experiences). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good points.

I suppose empiricism leans towards the materialist side, rationalism towards the platonist side. Either way though, they have to somehow reduce the fullness of experience to a part of experience (quantity). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and Lloyd Gerson would also juxtapose nominalism, mechanism, relativism, and skepticism with materialism. I am wondering if that constellation of materialist notions is bound up with the primacy of the pragmatic over the speculative. To prefer the pragmatic to the speculative is perhaps to inevitably reduce the fulness of experience to a part of experience. It may be that speculative reason is the only thing that can truly resist that reductionism. In his book on Illiberalism Peter Simpson seems to think that a society which honors truth will resist such problems.

Well, atheists I know would not say, as you write, “there isn’t any personal god.” They would say instead that there are no compelling grounds for belief in a personal god, though they remain open in principle to revising that view should persuasive evidence arise. — Tom Storm

Regarding the meaning of the word 'atheism', see <this post>.

Wittgenstein's Hinges and Gödel's Unprovable Statements — Moliere

This is a very relevant topic on TPF, so I think the submission is appropriate.

If one’s notion of epistemic justification is dependent on other epistemically justified beliefs, then the infinite regress looms. Or as I've said , it "is a bit like a novice bricklayer’s idea that every brick needs to rest on two other bricks. But this leads to an infinite regress, for there must be a foundation which itself supports the lowest bricks."

The basic way to avoid this infinite regress is by positing more than one kind of justification. For example, the justification that attaches to foundational beliefs versus the justification that attaches to non-foundational beliefs, where the justification that attaches to foundational beliefs is not dependent on other epistemically justified beliefs.

Wittgenstein’s solution is apparently to make a distinction between different kinds of beliefs (or “propositions”) but to dismiss the idea that foundational beliefs require justification. So there are different kinds of beliefs but not different kinds of justification.

In other words, given the following argument, Wittgenstein would apparently accept 1, 2, and 3, but reject 4 and 5.

1. Either every belief is justified in virtue of other beliefs, or else some beliefs are not justified in virtue of other beliefs.
2. If every belief is justified in virtue of other beliefs, then an infinite regress results.
3. Therefore, some beliefs are not justified in virtue of other beliefs.
4. Every belief requires justification.
5. Therefore, even beliefs that are not justified in virtue of other beliefs still require justification.

The rejection of 4 is a significant problem for Wittgenstein, but there is another problem. The justification/warrant of an argument's conclusion flows from the justification/warrant of the argument's premises, in much the same way that electricity travels from one end of a conductive surface to another. Yet Wittgenstein believes that he can begin with premises which possess no justification/warrant, and from them infer conclusions that possess justification/warrant. This is not coherent, and the same issue rears its head in reverse when we consider the fact that a modus tollens critique moves from conclusion to premises (or more precisely, from consequent to antecedent). It is irrational to try to divorce premises from conclusion qua justification.

As Wittgenstein observes, "There is no why. I simply do not. This is how I act" (OC 148). — Moliere

How should we respond to Wittgenstein here? Apparently by pointing out to him that there is a why, and that other people act differently than he does. As soon as two people who act in foundationally different ways come into contact with one another the "why" will become a question of interest.

But what about Gödel?

Just as Gödel showed that mathematical systems rely on axioms that cannot be proven within those systems, Wittgenstein's hinges reveal that epistemic systems rest on certainties that cannot be justified internally. — Moliere

This is simply a misunderstanding of Gödel. Mathematicians since Euclid knew that axioms could not be proved. This is nothing new. Gödel's contribution has to do with the completeness of formal systems, not the self-justification of formal systems. In fact most thinkers already believed that formal systems lacked completeness, but Gödel proved it and in the process destroyed the hopes of Wittgenstein's friends in the Vienna Circle.

I don't suspect that Gödel shared Wittgenstein's confusion in this matter, but perhaps someone who is familiar with Gödel's wider work could comment. I don't suspect that Gödel confused formal reasoning with natural reasoning. Formal logic has a very strong dichotomy between axioms and consequences, to the extent that there is a schizophrenic gulf between the two with regard to justification. Natural reasoning does not work that way.

(Note that Wittgenstein tends to shift haphazardly back and forth between psychological description and logical normativity, and this complicates but does not invalidate the picture I have drawn. Gödel does not do this. He is not arguing for the idea of unjustifiable premises.)

- Okay, well I agree that falsifiability pertains to modus tollens. I don't think our notions of falsification differ on that score.

I infer that because of his method of induction -- in order for him to be able to consider being, as such, he would have to start with the lower categories and move his way up. As I read the move from the physics to the metaphysics that's pretty much how we gets to his claims to have philosophical, metaphysical knowledge. — Moliere

So your argument is that <Induction requires exhaustive knowledge; in order to have exhaustive knowledge we would have to survey every scientific claim; therefore induction is no longer possible in an age with such a large multitude of scientific claims>?

Because it's small and could die and remains uncertain from its inception. It only grows in certitude with growth, or gets thrown out -- but its beginning is not its end, unlike a building -- an architectonic -- which builds from a solid beginning. — Moliere

Okay.

They don't have to unless they're following in the footsteps of Aristotle. — Moliere

Where does Aristotle say that one needs to consider every scientific claim?

Do you have an argument that connects your premise to your conclusion, or am I right that your inference was invalid?

Possibly, though there's a difference in kind here where "X" is some measurement and "Y" is some theory.

So the theory that follows is just another guess that sounds good, but doesn't have any observable measurements which falsify it. — Moliere

Again, I don't see any substantial claims being made here. "Possibly" is not saying anything. "Another guess that sounds good" doesn't tell us much of anything.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Scientific_Discovery — Moliere

Your article says nothing at all about modus ponens, and so fails to answer my question.

Yes, I think a lot of the questions we're running across are somewhat siderails -- but I don't think it's some fundamental error as much as a difference in approach to philosophy. — Moliere

In order to do philosophy I would say that one has to make claims and support those claims with arguments.

"What is real? How do we know what is real?"

This is one of those questions that can’t be answered in the way most people expect. It’s not that there’s no answer, but rather that the question itself rests on a misunderstanding; it assumes we need a justification or proof for what we already take for granted in our actions.

We don’t know reality in the same way we know facts; instead, we act with a certain conviction that things are real. This acting isn’t based on reasoning or evidence; it’s the foundation upon which reasoning and evidence even make sense. Doubt and knowledge only function because we already move through the world with an unquestioned trust in its reality. In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all.

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

It seems to me that the problem with the Wittgenstenian approach is that it casts one half as certain and another half as justifiable, and never the twain shall meet. Except that's not really how certainty and knowledge work. The "reality" and the "facts" influence one another. There is no strict separation.

In this sense, the question "How do we know what is real?" is like asking, "How do we know that the ground holds us up?"—it’s not something we know in the usual sense; it’s the condition that allows knowing to exist at all. — Sam26

Continuing, there are not "conditions" in one part of reality and "knowing" in another part of reality. It would be more accurate to see "conditions" and "knowing" as the trough and crest of a wave, where everything is in continual motion, and "trough" and "crest" do not point to determinations that are primary (since the trough/crest is a secondary form of continuously moving matter).

(This presumably has also to do with @Moliere's misunderstandings of Aristotle. For Aristotle the movement from the more certain to the less certain is primarily individual, not "objective.")

There's a great deal in these posts that is helpful and to the point.

But I don't think they can get round the fundamental problem, which is nicely exemplified by Husserl. Somebody earlier posted a quotation from him about his intent to start his project from scratch, in poverty, etc. It's a classic idea. Such a project might have a special status, above the fray of all the competing schools. But it's not possible, as the history of phenomenology demonstrates. — Ludwig V

Okay, so what is the fundamental problem that you see, in your own words?

Interesting and thoughtful OP. :up:

Hence, the common sensibles of size, shape, quantity, etc. get considered "most real." We can see this in Galileo, Locke, etc. with the demotion of color to a "less real" (merely mental) "secondary quality," while shape and motion, etc. remain fully real "primary quantities." — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can also see how some people strive to remove the echo of the senses from this way of thinking, to make mathematics more abstract and thus, presumably, "more objective." For instance, LeGrange's 18th century mechanics textbook proudly announces that it uses no diagrams or drawings, only formulae. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Apparently there are two modern emphases you are bringing out. One is an emphasis on common sensibles, and the other is an emphasis on mathematics and mathematicization. What's curious is that they seem opposed. The first tends towards materialism and the second tends towards Platonism, and yet both flow in a special way out of the modern period.

I am not sure how to reconcile those two strands. If they are left unreconciled then the modern period appears schizophrenic, torn between an emphasis on common sensibles and an incompatible emphasis on mathematicization. Is there a ready way to reconcile the two? To reconcile thesis 1 and thesis 2? Or am I incorrect in thinking that they are opposed?

- Crap, I was hoping you would be preoccupied with your essay contest. :razz:

Further, we don't begin with a solid foundation and build outwards. Rather I'd use the plant metaphor that we begin with a seed which, when nurtured in the proper environment, slowly takes roots to the soil and becomes something solid. — Moliere

But how is a seed not a solid foundation? That seems to be precisely what a seed is. From an edit:

It's as if Aristotle gives a theory of seed germination and growth, and in response you say, "I think you just have to throw seeds and see what happens." — Leontiskos

So rather than beginning with the certain I'd say we make random guesses and hope to be able to make it cohere in the long run. — Moliere

Aristotle is well aware that most people have no method, and just throw seeds randomly, hoping to stumble upon something or another. He just doesn't think such a person will produce reliable fruit.

I'd say it's on par with "From the more certain to the less certain" — Moliere

It's just a part of Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics. I use it because it is so uncontroversial.

I don't think that follows at all. I think that what this says is that Leontiskos can't understand how someone could think that sensibility and intelligibility are important unless they are not skeptics, rather than that one doesn't begin with skepticism. — Moliere

It follows as long as you understand what skepticism is. If one holds and presupposes that reality is intelligible, then they are not skeptical of that proposition. If they say, "Oh, well I am skeptical of X even though I believe and presuppose it entirely," then they are equivocating on the word 'skepticism'. This is but one example of moving from the more certain to the less certain. The "more certain" is that reality is intelligible. You are again captive to Aristotle's knowledge even without realizing it.

At the time one could reasonably, though falsely, believe they had reviewed "all the sciences" such that they could reasonably make inferences about "all of reality at its most fundamental". — Moliere

Not sure why you think someone has to review every scientific paper, for example. Seems an odd idea.

Aristotle, though he did not have access to all science, could feel confident that he'd responded to all the worthwhile arguments so that he could link science to metaphysics.

The sheer volume of knowledge today makes it so that Aristotle's procedure can't be carried out. So one's metaphysical realism can't be on the basis of science insofar that we are taking on a neo-Aristotelian framework -- it's simply impossible to do what Aristotle did today with how much there is to know. — Moliere

Okay, so this is the new argument, <If we do not read and survey every scientific claim, then we cannot be metaphysical realists (or else we can't connect science to metaphysics)>. Again, pretty clearly invalid. Or else, I am still in no way sure how you are getting from the premise to the conclusion. Why must a metaphysical realist read and review every scientific claim?

I'd start with Popper, at least, so falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it means to say that falsification follows the form of a modus ponens. Does Popper say this somewhere?

But then I'd say that in order to falsify something you have to demonstrate that it is false to such a degree that someone else will agree with you. — Moliere

Anyone at all?

Furthermore I don't think that for falsification to take place that the next theory which takes its place will be true or even needs to be demonstrated as true. — Moliere

So X can falsify Y even when X is not true?

I would say that there is truth and falsity, and then there are also beliefs about propositions, namely that they are true or false. Falsification can be viewed from either angle, but both are interconnected.

I think TPF probably needs a thread addressing the deep problems with an intersubjective approach to truth, given how many people here are captive to it. We can falsify an individual's belief, but only if the content of that belief itself has a truth value (apart from any particular individual).

The purpose of using names isn't to demonstrate what I've read and understood, but to refer to a shared body of knowledge between speakers. So when I say "Aristotle", I presume you understand Aristotle well enough and modern science well enough to be able to put together the dots that teleology and modern science, especially of the enlightenment era, are in conflict.

I switched to divisibility because the example is as good as the teleological one -- namely, I don't know if Lavosier, on a personal level, might have believed there was some kind of teleology behind water, but the whole enlightenment project basically rejects teleology in favor of efficient causation for its mode of explanation -- this is one of the primary reasons people reject Enlightenment era materialism and go in various ways. — Moliere

So again, Aristotle's teleology does not contradict Lavoisier's chemical claim, whereas the idea that water is indivisible does contradict that chemical claim. So one argument is valid and the other is not. It is helpful that you switched over to a valid argument and left the invalid argument behind.

There is nothing about Lavoisier's claim that commits him to an anti-teleological view. The idea that Lavoisier lived in an age that often rejected teleology is not a real argument in favor of the idea that Lavoisier's chemical formula contradicts Aristotle's teleology, much less that the current state of affairs accepts the idea that one entails the other.

I think all it takes to grow in knowledge is to plant seeds and see what happens. — Moliere

I think that is so vague as to be saying nothing at all, and in this it causes many problems. I don't think you are even presenting a theory of knowledge growth here. It's as if Aristotle gives a theory of seed germination and growth, and in response you say, "I think you just have to throw seeds and see what happens."

But noting here: even our notions of "falsification" are at odds. So perhaps we cannot appeal to falsification in our back-and-forth, because even this is being equivocated in our dialogue. — Moliere

Well I know exactly what I mean by falsification. Do you know what you mean? Or is it a vague term that allows one to affirm all sorts of things, depending on what they prefer?

To say what's at stake: I don't think science delineates what is real. I also think that the project towards finding essences using the sciences is doomed to fail -- the big difference between Aristotle's and our day is the sheer amount of knowledge that there is. In Aristotle's day it probably seemed like a reasonable project to begin with the sciences and slowly climb up to a great metaphysical picture of the whole.

But any one scientist today simply can't have that perspective. Looking at https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ their tagline on the front page states "PubMed® comprises more than 38 million citations for biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science journals, and online books."

Aristotle could review all the literature that was in his day and respond to all his critics and lay out a potential whole. But he didn't have so many millions of papers or forebears to deal with. And I'd be more apt to look to the Gutenberg Press to explain this difference.

But this is only if we treat metaphysics as exactly the same as science, too. That was Aristotle's goal, but it need not be metaphysics goal. I'm more inclined to think that these metaphysical ways of thinking are ways of dealing with the sheer amount, the multiplicity, that one must consider to make a universal generalization. The generalizations, rather than capturing a higher truth, is a way of organizing the chaos for ourselves. — Moliere

Well, is there an argument here? And is it valid? The basis of any such argument is something like <There are more scientists and scientific papers today; therefore metaphysical realism cannot be true>. But as with many of your posts, I have no idea how you got from your premise to your conclusion. It seems pretty clear to me that scientists today are trying to understand the world, just as Aristotle was trying to understand the world. Both reject the idea that truths about reality could contradict one another, and therefore both seem to have a unified idea of science. I'm not sure how more scientists and more scientific papers in any way invalidates these propositions.

It is odd to say that it is false. If it is "good enough" to begin understanding, then it simply cannot be wholly false. If it is wholly false then it is not good enough to begin understanding. — Leontiskos

Another terminological difference. I tend to think attributions of "not wholly false" or "not wholly true" can be reduced to a set of sentences in which the name is sometimes the predicate and sometimes not the predicate, — Moliere

That's fine. My point still holds.

So what I see is that skepticism, rather than security, is the basis of knowledge. Jumping out into the unknown and making guesses and trying to make sense of what we do not know is how new knowledge gets generated — Moliere

As above, I don't think this is a theory. Note too that if one thinks "guess and try to make sense" is a viable approach, then they already hold to the idea that reality is intelligible and sensible. They are not starting from skepticism.

I think your construal of AW and LW is such that they look like they agree more than they do not agree. — Moliere

Sure, and we could add in your new thesis about indivisibility to complicate the picture, but my general point will still hold.

Aristotle's concern is philosophical and scientific, and he lives in an era where his project is feasibly both philosophical and scientific. He has a much wider theory of water that conflicts with the enlightenment, mechanistic picture of H2O which Lavoisier is credited with determining. I think of hisLavoisier's work primarily as a scientist because his work as a scientist was in improving analytic methods, and it was due to his care towards precision that he was able to demonstrate to the wider scientific community the ratio of Hydrogen to Oxygen you get with electrolysis. So maybe there's some philosophical work of his I do not know, but I'd say this work fits squarely within the scientific column, even if we don't have strict definitions to delineate when is what. — Moliere

I'm not sure why Lavoisier's claim that water is composed of H2O should not be considered philosophical. In this Lavoisier is involved in a truth claim of metaphysical realism. Similarly, the modern rejection of teleology is a metaphysical truth claim. It's not like there is some clear separation between philosophy and science.

And, likewise, Kripke is making a point about whether essences can be made viable in the 20th century after they had been largely abandoned by contemporary philosophy (even if there are other traditions which keep them). So he's a philosopher, but if science turns out to be wrong about the whole H2O thing his points will still stand(EDIT:or fall) regardless. — Moliere

I don't think your last sentence is true, namely the inference. Kripke's work depends on scientific claims. He could adapt his claims to something like, "If water is H2O then water is necessarily H2O," but he apparently wants to say more than "if". More, he is presupposing that some such "scientific" relations are demonstrable and existent, even if the relation between water and H2O turns out to be false. If all such "scientific" relations turn out to be false then Kripke's points will not stand.

Yep. :up:

And note here that the whole crux is the coherence of intersubjective approaches to truth. Is something made true because lots of people believe it? Or do lots of people believe it because it is true? Or is truth something else entirely, such that something can be true even if lots of people do not believe it?

The intersubjective analysis is of course highly dependent on the sample. When and where the sample is taken will largely determine whether some proposition is intersubjectively held.

When these assumptions lead to paradox, we get "skeptical solutions" that learn to live with paradox, but I'd be more inclined to challenge the premises that lead to paradox. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would say that with @J the problem is much deeper than that. Note that when he spoke of “true sentences” J was just borrowing a word out of Banno’s mouth. Banno would probably be willing to argue for the thesis that truth is the property of sentences, but J would not.

Pared down, J’s philosophical vice is that he won’t argue for any thesis at all. He will only stand on the sidelines and watch others philosophize as he comments from afar. For example, the closest he will get to arguing for “Stance Voluntarism” is to cite a paper by Chakravartty and a paper by Pincock and then critique Pincock (who argues against stance voluntarism). The idea that J himself believes in stance voluntarism and therefore should offer arguments in its favor would not occur to him.

The skepticism about truth and falsity is part of it, and that has been duly noted, but perhaps deeper is the methodological approach where one is unwilling to take upon themselves the burden of an argument for some real and substantial conclusion. Strange as it may seem, you will not find anything in any of J’s threads or posts akin to, “I believe X is true and here are my arguments for it.” And it is extremely odd to constantly cast doubt and contradict others without ever offering a stance of your own.

There are many facets to this. One is that people who believe only in intersubjective agreement don’t know how real arguments work, given that “truth” is in that case only about persuasion and then a majority vote. Thus rhetoric and the casting of doubt become the highest intellectual feats. But for most people these various facets and symptoms can be remedied by a desire to offer arguments for their beliefs and to be transparent about those arguments.

If one has the desire to provide arguments for their beliefs then they will in time move beyond mere doubt-casting and rhetoric, and begin to learn the art of reason. They will try to give arguments for their beliefs, they will stumble, they will revise their approach and/or their beliefs, and they will improve. But the person who is not even trying to give arguments for their beliefs is in quite the pickle, in that they deprive themselves of not only success, but also failure and improvement. Perhaps they even come to convince themselves that they have no beliefs at all, and neither should anyone else. Misology is the danger here, and in a surprisingly developed form. The remedy is to look at the discussion, recognize the beliefs one holds which are at stake in that discussion, and then to be willing to offer reasons and arguments in favor of those beliefs. To engage in discussions without possessing that willingness is deeply problematic.

This flows back to whether or not you require every mental action to be a judgement. — AmadeusD

I require every judgment to be a judgment, and I gave my definition of judgment <here> by following the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Nowhere in that definition is the claim that every mental act counts as a judgment. I noted that you are free to offer a different definition of judgment.

I do not - so, on my view this is a recognition only. I have simply taken what I've been told "We're here!" and run with it. I've not assessed it in any way (other than to pick up which words were aimed at me... is that hte judgement you mean? That's what Im calling recognition, to be clear). — AmadeusD

I think we're circling back to this and the conversation that followed:

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

You can say, "Oh, I only recognized that the first pipe was 10 feet long and the second was not," but in no way does this fail to count as a judgment given the definition I have laid out. The same holds with, "Recognizing that I have arrived at my destination." How did you recognize that if not by judging that the Google Maps voice told you that you arrived?

If you think recognizing that X is true involves no judgment, then you are denying the Oxford definition I have provided. Do you have an alternative definition?

This is analogous: I judged my condition, the surgeon and medical advice, and the prognosis to go under the knife (or, anaethesia as you note). In the former, I could literally be unconscious, and be schluffed out of the car, and I'd still be wherever I actually was, regardless of whether it was 'correct'. Is it just that I am conscious you're wanting to hang something on, in that example? — AmadeusD

I raised the example because I believe it to be disanalogous. In the Google Maps scenario you must judge that you have arrived. In the anesthesia scenario you need not judge that you should wake up. In that case you are literally woken up by someone else. In that case no volitional act is required, judgment or otherwise.

I agree that there are differences between recognizing that you have arrived at your destination, and deciding to take a taxi cab. But both are judgments given the definition I have provided. I don't think it makes sense to say, "I knew that I arrived but I did not judge that I arrived." When philosophers talk about judgment this is what they are talking about.

I don't quite think this is available to us, so I'm happy with that. — AmadeusD

Okay, but it seems that many of your complaints have to do with a lack of watertight reasoning due to vague definitions (e.g. "moral," "right," "judgment," etc.).

Correct. But I've designed a scenario where I am not engaged in the prior activity, in terms of judgement. I can judge that hte crash fucking sucked, but I made no attempts to divert, or incur a crash. — AmadeusD

It seems like you are saying that you might get in a crash and regret the crash, and then when someone asks you why you got in a crash, you could reasonably answer, "Oh, I didn't know I wasn't supposed to crash when driving. I make no attempts to avoiding crashing." That seems patently unreasonable, no? This all goes back to my claim:

To decide when to turn your steering wheel with your eyes closed in relation to the instructions you are hearing is a judgment — Leontiskos

The process here is something like, "I hear the instruction telling me to turn left, and then I turn left." For some reason you want to remove all judgment from that action, as if Google Maps turns the steering wheel for you and you do nothing at all. Or as if you put yourself on autopilot and cease to be an intermediating agent between Google Maps and the car. None of that seems reasonable. It seems pretty straightforward that when carrying out instructions one is engaged in judgments, even if they are subordinated to a proximate end and infused with an intention of trust.

It seems to me that the "ultimate concern" of any life governed by self-reflection is the basic ethical question "how should I Iive?" Could there be strictly empirical evidence available to guide me in answering that question? — Janus

Why would one suppose that either Tillich's "ultimate concern" or else the question "how should I live" are not guided by empirical evidence?

Here is your syllogism:

1. All science is X
2. No religion is X
3. Therefore no religion is scientific

In this case your X is "empirical." Elsewhere you have tried different X's. None of them seem to be sound.

- It's pretty interesting to ask about the relation between Positivism and Pragmatism. They seem to be cousins, and at least some pragmatists are positivists who jumped ship when it began to sink.

- :lol:

- I think folks who see AI as conscious and believe we owe it moral obligations are confused. Nevertheless, one might be "polite" to inanimate things for other reasons, for example, in the same way that they are respectful with a hammer.

My position is that Pooper's (!) revision allows Positivism to be sustained until falsified, meaning it will survive contingent upon there being no facts falsifying it. — Hanover

So Popper talks about what "can be falsified," which is a possibility claim. It is a claim about falsifiability. Given that anything at all can be "sustained until falsified," it would follow that anything at all fulfills Popper's claim, construed in that way, which in turn would make that claim vacuous. Popper is asking whether it is able to be falsified, not whether it has been falsified. I think @Janus was struggling with this same distinction recently.

Note too that if something is not falsifiable then it obviously won't ever be falsified and this is another reason why the "has been falsified" consideration is not helpful. In that sense checking whether something has been falsified is precisely beside the point for Popper. If it has been falsified, then for Popper it is a scientific theory. In that case it passes his test of falsifiability. Popper's targets are those theories which have not been falsified and can never be falsified (because they are unfalsifiable).

(It is interesting to ask whether Popper's work remains within or moves beyond Positivism. I suspect that @Wayfarer might say that Popper's response is a kind of extension of Positivism.)

What makes it fail, as I alluded to, might be the lack of predictive value in such things as economic and psychological theories. That is the blow to Positivism I'd think meaningful, less so internal inconsistencies in its logic. That is, the proof is in the pudding of how it works. — Hanover

That looks like a pragmatic consideration, which is rather different than Popper's consideration. Popper's notion of falsifiability is separate from a notion of whether "it works." Non-empirical theories might work very well, depending on one's aim. The Logical Positivists would do well to reflect on how well their non-empirical theory succeeded in achieving their aims, and what those aims really were.

(Revised to clean up the argument.)

I'd suggest, from what you've written, that positivism does not fail under the Popper revision of falsifiability you've described. — Hanover

So you are claiming that under Popper's thesis "that a scientific theory is one that can be falsified by empirical evidence," Logical Positivism and its Verification Principle meet the criteria required to be counted as a scientific theory? How so? How is the Verification Principle able to be falsified by empirical evidence?

-

An interesting and useful thread, . :up:

I don't believe that Aristotle was falsified by Lavoisier.

Falsification is a much more complicated maneuver than disagreement on fundamentals. Disagreement on fundamentals -- such as whether water is an element or not, or whether water is composed of atoms or not -- don't so much falsify each other as much as they both make claims that cannot both be true at the same time. This is because they mean different things, but are referring to the same object. — Moliere

If you believe that Lavoisier said something true, and that it contradicts Aristotle, then you are committed to the idea that Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. You can't claim that and then simultaneously say that Lavoisier has not falsified Aristotle. So your reasoning throughout the thread to the effect that Lavoisier caused Aristotle's assertions to be false is sensible, given those conditions.

I would say with respect to reasoning about reality -- deciding "What is real?" -- the PNC is not violated, of course, but they can't both be true either. Water is either a fundamental element which does not divide further into more fundamental atoms, or it is a composition of other more fundamental elements and so does divide further, or something else entirely — Moliere

Okay, sure. Water cannot be divisible and indivisible. This is a true contradiction. Yet this is the first time I've seen you presenting Aristotle as a proponent of indivisibility. Earlier you were talking about teleology.

Again, if Lavoisier proved that water is divisible and Aristotle held that it is indivisible, then Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. But this is different from what we were discussing earlier:

I think you've presented a canard of "teleology," but let's accept it for the sake of argument. Does "water is H2O" contradict "Water wants to sit atop Earth"? It looks like Lavoisier did not contradict Aristotle even on that reading. — Leontiskos

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The thinkers are very far apart from one another in terms of time, who they are talking to, the problems they're trying to address, and so forth, and yet are talking about the same thing -- at least I think so. So the variance between the two can only be accounted for by looking to the meanings of the terms, which in turn is how we can come to understand how people have made inferences about fundamental matter in the past, and thereby can serve as a kind of model for our own inferences. — Moliere

Good, I agree. :up:

What water is seems to me more of scientific than philosophical question, but then I know that barrier is another bit where we're likely not in agreement, since for Aristotle the question of science and philosophy isn't as separate. His whole philosophy has large parts dedicated to ancient science and he's making use of philosophical arguments. — Moliere

There is no strict division between philosophy and science. Aristotle is generally referred to as a scientist, perhaps the first, and yet this does not disqualify him as a philosopher. Srap just deleted a great post on this in J's new thread, focusing on psychology and phenomenology ...lol.

is my most recent post to you, by the way.

Yes, there are true sentences. — J

And do people who contradict those sentences hold to falsehoods? Do false assertions exist? Or have we managed a world where there are truths but no falsehoods? You seem to dance around these simple questions continually.

And if you are to say, "No, they probably just have a different context, and are not really contradicting anything at all," then do you have an actual method for determining when someone has contradicted a sentence and when they "hold to a different context/stance"? Because if you don't have such a method then I'm not sure how it is substantive to claim that they probably have a different context.

It's hard, perhaps, to take on board the idea that context is what allows a sentence to be true at all. If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is uttered without a context, I don't know what that would be. — J

Psychologizing ad hominem is pretty easy. "It's hard, perhaps, to take on board the idea that some people are right and some people are wrong. If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is immune to contradiction, I don't know what that would be. Given that people purport to disagree all the time, it would be pretty amazing if no one were actually disagreeing."

- You deleted the best post in the thread. :razz:

and thus undermine a stance's construal as "upstream" from facts and matters of ontology. — fdrake

Good post. The vagueness of a "stance" strikes me as a big problem, and this point about cordoning stances off from their downstream "effects" is a good example of that.

I would prefer Aristotle's Rhetoric or Newman's Grammar of Assent. In the Rhetoric Aristotle talks about "enthymeme," by which he means a "shooting from the hip" sort of argument (as one would be likely to hear when a politician tries to make a point given a very short bit of time). That sort of argument can hit or miss depending on the background conditions of one's hearers. Even Pincock's abductive reasoning would be a form of "enthymeme" for Aristotle.

The trouble with "enthymeme" is that it is a kind of per accidens argument. It is like tossing a hand grenade into the fray and hoping you hit someone. For this reason the phenomena surrounding that sort of argument isn't scientifically precise or predictable. Chakravartty can only pretend that a study of that sort of argumentation is scientific by talking about "stances" and pretending that he has some relatively precise notion of what he means by a "stance." He almost certainly does not. This tends to make his thesis vacuous, like the certitude that neither Alice nor Bob are irrational in their preferred sample size.

This is sort of an interesting thread. I can see how it intersects with your interests, @J. Note that I am arriving from the citation in .

But I’ll cut to the chase and say that I think the argument as a whole can be defeated simply by denying the characterization of what a stance voluntarist does. Pincock’s language includes phrases such as “no reason that obliges them,” “not adopt[ing] their realist stance on the basis of any reasons that reflect the truth,” “no connection to the truth,” and “not appropriately connected to the truth.” These all-or-nothing characterizations can only hold water if we accept Pincock’s idea that a theoretical reason must result in rational obligation. (I should point out that the first phrase, “no reason that obliges them,” would be conceded by Chakravartty. But he would not concede that there are no theoretical reasons that could have a bearing, or influence the decision – merely that they don’t result in rational obligation, and that others could have different reasons for their stances, or weight them differently.)

As we know, Pincock maintains that the stance voluntarist has no theoretical reasons of any sort for their adoption of a stance. For Pincock, only “desires and values” can form the basis for (voluntarily) adopting a stance. Once again, if we look back at Chakravartty’s description of how he understands an epistemic stance, this seems to be a misreading: — J

Let's construe Pincock's argument as saying that, "Chakravartty has no reason to adopt one stance rather than another, when choosing among the subset of stances which are rational." This looks to be the most charitable interpretation, and it precludes the response that, "Choosing one stance involves 'rational choice' because one can produce reasons in favor of that stance."

Suppose all possible stances are represented by the set {A, B, C, ..., X, Y, Z}. And suppose that Chakravartty's set of "rationally permissible" stances is {A, B, C, D} (and therefore 4/26 stances are rationally permissible). Given this, my construal of Pincock's argument pertains to "choosing among the subset of stances which are rational," i.e. {A, B, C, D}. Chakravartty can say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than F, and that he has a reason to adopt C simpliciter, but he apparently cannot say that he has a reason to adopt C rather than D (which is what he needs to say if he is to properly answer Pincock).

This way of construing Pincock's argument has much to recommend it, given that it is in line with what is traditionally understood as "voluntarism." Namely, voluntarism posits that the choice in question is traced to the will rather than the intellect, such that one might explain their choice by saying, "I did it because I wanted to, not because I was rationally guided to do so." *

I think Chakravartty tries and fails to address this difficulty in section 3. We can boil it down with the dichotomy, "Either you have a reason for your choice or you don't" (where the voluntaristic answer that "I wanted to" does not count as a reason). Does Chakravartty have a principled (all-things-considered) reason to choose C and reject D? Apparently he can't have a principled reason, because if he did then D would not be "rationally permissible" (for him). The whole rationale for voluntarism—including stance voluntarism—is that the subset of rationally permissible stances ({A, B, C, D}) are equally rational, and are therefore immune to rational predilection. Voluntarism entails that a decision between C and D is not rationally adjudicable.

This constitutes an internal problem for Chakravartty, because at the end of his paper he assumes he is still entitled to the general idea that we should "encourage others... to see things our way":

To add to this dialogue the assurance that “I, not you, possess a uniquely rational epistemic stance” adds nothing of rhetorical or persuasive power. In contrast, to endeavor to elaborate, to explain, to scrutinize, and to understand the nature of opposing stances (to engage in what I call “collaborative epistemology”)—and to encourage others, when our own stances appear to pass the tests of consistency and coherence, to see things our way, upon reflection—is to do our best. There is no insight into epistemic rationality to be gained by demanding more than this. — Chakravartty, 1314

This is a nice moral sentiment, but it isn't rationally coherent. If the voluntarist claims that the subset of rationally permissible stances are not rationally adjudicable, then he is not rationally permitted to "encourage others" to drop their D and adopt his C, given that there are, by definition, no compelling reasons to choose C over D. He must restrict his stance-disagreements to those interlocutors who hold to one of the 22 stances which are not rationally permissible.

If Chakravartty wants to coherently "encourage others to see things his way," then he must reject his own voluntarism. He doesn't need to be an ass about it, but he must hold that, "My epistemic stance is more rational than yours." If he doesn't hold that then he has no grounds to try to convince his interlocutor to reject D and adopt C. If he is a true voluntarist then he would not argue against the stance of someone who holds to one of the four rationally permissible stances.


* Note that voluntarism signifies choice or will, but if the "values" that Pincock characterizes are inherited rather than chosen then everything I say here still follows. Any non-rational predilection for C will result in the same problem, whether that predilection is based on will, inheritance, or anything else. As long as Chakravartty cannot hold to A, B, C, and D all at the same time, he will be forced to possess one rationally permissible stance rather than another, yet without having a reason that counts as a worthy reason to choose among that subset of stances. Thus Pincock's point about the realist will also apply to Chakravartty himself, who sees himself to hold C rather than A, B, or D, for no good reason at all. This creates a deep incoherence between the non-rational stance and the "rational" effects that flow out of it. @fdrake is correct to note that the stance cannot be cordoned off in this way. In real life when someone notices that they have no good reasons to hold C, they simply stop holding it and end up trying to hold to the four rationally permissible stances equally.


(For the record, I find both authors to be rather confused, especially Pincock. So I'm not throwing in with Pincock. Pincock is using "rational obligation" in a softer sense than Chakravartty recognizes, but given that Pincock is clear about his usage the misunderstanding is on Chakravartty (unless the draft Chakravartty read was substantially different than the published paper). If Chakravartty thinks he possesses some coherent distinction between 'rational choice' and 'rational obligation', then the onus is certainly on him to make that distinction clear. It seems to me that he relies heavily on ambiguous and undefined terms, including "rational obligation.")

The straightforward denial of truth, e.g. moral anti-realism, actually seems less pernicious to me here. Reason simply doesn't apply to some wide domain (e.g. ethics), as opposed to applying sometimes, but unclearly and vaguely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree. The straightforward denial of truth is certainly more transparent and coherent than the equivocal re-definition of truth.

As reason becomes a matter of something akin to "taste" it arguably becomes easier to dismiss opposing positions out of hand. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. This happened right in this thread, when @Moliere claimed that because Aristotle views water "teleologically" and Lavoisier views it as H2O, therefore Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. Moliere—who it seems to me does not have a great grasp of the PNC—imputed contradiction where none exists. Often it is the case that if people had a better understanding of the PNC they would see that there is less disagreement than they suppose. The PNC is a remarkably mild principle. It allows an enormous amount of space for reason to play.

Percy emphasises that though Keller had felt water before, she lacked the symbolic framework—the naming of water via language—until that pivotal moment. — Banno

Yes, hence my whole point that the water goes before the 'water'.* Without some contact with water the sign 'water' has nothing to signify.

We'll have to disagree here. — Banno

If you want to say that dogs "understand" water and you want to take issue with the Aristotelian approach, then the first thing to do is to get clear on the difference between canine "understanding" and human understanding.


* At the very least, causally

The performative contradiction is in performing a democratic act by someone who perforce rejects democracy. — SophistiCat

But why assume they reject democracy? Maybe they say, "I think democracy is the wrong system for our nation; I will vote against it; I hope the vote succeeds and the nation is no longer democratic; if the vote does not succeed I will abide by the decision."

To say that it is a performative contradiction for a society to vote itself out of democracy is to reify a democracy into a being of its own. The reification is fictional; the democracy does not destroy itself; rather, citizens are opting for a different form of government.

Given that democracies can legally disband themselves via amendments to the legal charter, do you think that provision means that the charter is itself self-contradictory? Surely there is a difference between, say, legally disbanding a contract and illegally disbanding a contract. One can honor the terms of a contract while simultaneously seeking that it be dissolved.

Ah, I think I see the misunderstanding. You're using "pluralism" and "relativism" interchangeably and synonymously, where I'm drawing a distinction. Do you think I shouldn't do so? Pluralism, as I understand it, allows different epistemological perspectives, with different conceptions of what is true within those perspectives. It also encourages discussion between perspectives, including how conceptions of truth may or may not converge. Relativism (about truth) would deny even this perspectival account as incoherent. (A very broad-brush picture of a hugely complicated subject, of course.) — J

Classically, if X is true then everything which contradicts X is false. Since both pluralism and relativism reject this notion, the person who wants to avoid truth claims is aligned with pluralism and relativism (at least so far as this consideration goes).

Similarly, if one wants to oppose pluralism or relativism, the most straightforward way is to say, "There are truths and the principle of non-contradiction holds." We could adapt @Count Timothy von Icarus' challenge to you as follows: If this standard way of opposing pluralism and/or relativism is unavailable to you, then on what grounds do you disagree with pluralism and/or relativism?

(We could ask whether pluralism entails relativism, but the simpler approach is to focus on relativism itself and leave pluralism on the back burner.)

As Spinoza said, "Omnis determinatio est negatio."