The lobbyists that forced this issue in the UK courts were principally concerned with not allowing rapists in vulnerable women's spaces. — fdrake

Are you concerned that trans men are going to rape women? Do you think someone without a natural penis can rape a woman? Unaided penetrative intercourse doesn't work so well with a phalloplasty, and I'm not sure why erectile prosthetics would be allowed in a women's prison.

Imagine you're in a woman's prison and Buck Angel walks into the showers. A musclebound, steroid using, bodybuilder with a sixpack and thick bodyfur walks into womens' collective showers... — fdrake

You're equivocating between rape and abuse. If we are concerned about rape, then the ruling is quite logical. If we are concerned about abuse (i.e. strength differentials), then the ruling is beneficial but imperfect (as all law is, by the way).

Logically, the abuse matter is tricky because a trans man or trans woman who has received hormone treatment will possess a strength somewhere between that of the average man and woman, and therefore they introduce a new (and varied) strength differential. For example, the trans man will be stronger than women but weaker than men, and therefore there is a potential for abuse in both women's and men's prisons.

On balance, though, the ruling is great. That you've found an exception to the rule in no way proves that the ruling is flawed. All rules and law have exceptions.

(And if we are concerned with neither rape nor abuse, but merely "perceptions," then we have created a world with infinite potential complaints where realism and pragmatism do not even exist.)

- I don't know that you've provided me with many arguments, but I think you are short on time and I am glad to see you offering Count Timothy arguments and reasons in this post. So, fair enough.

To be clear, the reason I wanted you to consider and answer (3) is as follows:

1. We all make moral judgments (in the sense of non-hypothetical ought-judgments)
2. Our moral judgments are able to be evaluated, both by ourselves in retrospect, and by others
3. We respect these evaluations, or at least some of them
4. Therefore, ought-claims have force
5. Therefore, the "rhymes and reasons" are not arbitrary

It's a definition of 'ought' which relies on value. I just do not accept there are any objective values to be found. Therefore, no 'ought' which is not beholden to it's speaker's values specifically can be found either. — AmadeusD

So suppose your wife tells you, "You shouldn't have done that," or, "You should do this," and suppose you respect her evaluation (i.e. 3). What follows is (4): ought-claims have force for you.
(I think what you are more truly opposed to are categorical/exceptionless norms.)

That's a fairly big step. You, Michael, and others claim that you don't think people are being coherent when they make ought-claims. I would point out that something which is incoherent or non-existent cannot have force, and yet ought-claims do have force; therefore they cannot be incoherent or non-existent.

Now you might say, "Sure, my wife's ought-claims have force for me, but that doesn't make them objective or even universal. Either she knows my own values well enough to counsel me, or else we self-consciously share a set of values upon which we reason together. Either way the objectivity needn't extend beyond the two of us." That's a fair answer, but I would contend that you and your wife are also potentially open to the suggestions and advice of every other person on Earth, and that this would be odd if there were not some sort of value-continuity between the two of you and other people. That is, ought-claims of others who do not know you at all and who therefore do not know your idiosyncrasies and "arbitrary" values nevertheless have force for you (even if that force is quite small or is merely potential and defeasible). Hence the point about food: there are all sorts of values that everyone holds in common, and the general "oughts" which flow from these common values will also be common.

To give a concrete example, suppose you travel to a foreign city and begin to drink water from a drinking fountain. Someone warns you not to drink the water. Whether or not you accede to their suggestion, you give it due consideration. Now I don't know why you would give a perfect stranger's ought-claim due consideration if all values are arbitrary. Instead I would say that, like the food example, the stranger knows and shares one of your own values even though he does not know you, and this is why his ought-claim is worthy of consideration.

and, naturally, the layman atheist latches onto this disposition and becomes the counter-disposition, equally flawed and vague, that ‘faith’ is a useless concept which only refers to blind belief that only makes sense within the context of religion. — Bob Ross

But it doesn't even make sense there. For example, Janus implies that <People have faith in authorities who they have no reason to believe are credible>. That whole idea is incoherent, and it underlies these New Atheist-type arguments.

The paradox of these fringe debates is that the atheist who is infallibly certain that religious faith is irrational cannot be engaged rationally (and that level of certitude almost always results in them refusing to give arguments for their thesis in the first place). On the other hand, the 99% of people who can be engaged rationally do not hold that religious faith is foundationally or definitionally irrational. Therefore you can't ever argue about whether religious faith is irrational, because the tiny percentage of militant atheists are dogmatic and unwilling to offer arguments, whereas the rest of humankind doesn't hold to the thesis in question at all. So it's pointless with either group.

Were they able to unfold their reasoning, we would see that the rational error that such atheists or quasi-atheists generally make is to conflate subjective grounds/evidence with objective grounds/evidence. They effectively mean to say, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons." Thus the argument is little more than <If I don't think his reasons are good reasons, then he is irrational or he is believing without evidence>. But if the atheist were honest he would admit that the believer does have evidence; he would just say that it isn't good evidence. Yet this merely begs the question since the whole issue is about whether the evidence/reasons are good or bad.

I have limited access to internet at the moment, but there is a famous miracle (of Fatima?) where the sun stood still, or moved backwards for a time, or was blotted out for a time, or something like that. The idea is something like this, "The prophet predicted abnormal activity of the sun to occur at such-and-such a time. That activity occurred. Therefore the prophet is truly in contact with a higher power." (This is an example of how we vet someone's abilities, and the logic is much broader than prophecy or foretelling.)

The atheist will say something like, "Yes, they believed they saw the sun behave abnormally, and therefore they had 'evidence' that the prophet was a true prophet, but it was not good evidence, because they should have [reasoned the way I reason about such phenomena]." Or in other words, "Well I admit he has reasons to believe, but they aren't good reasons."

The philosophical and scientific problem with the atheist's approach is that there is nothing principled or rigorous about his method. Legitimate epistemological theories have identifiable criteria. "If I think it's a poor reason then it's a poor reason," is not a legitimate epistemological theory. An atheist can certainly hold the belief that, "All religious beliefs are based on insufficient evidence," but there is nothing philosophical, scientific, or rigorous about this assertion/dogma.

More simply, the militant atheist is too vain to admit that there are rational beliefs which he would nevertheless disagree with, and it is literally impossible to argue with someone who can never admit that something he disbelieves believe might be rational. Incidentally, this is why there is a strong correlation between militant atheists and unintelligence, and this in turn is why their professional colleagues ask them to pipe down lest onlookers begin to perceive the whole field as being possessed of such unintelligence.

You [...] keep repeating the same demands for explanation of something I haven't claimed. — Janus

"Leontiskos has demanded an explanation for X, but I have not claimed X."

What is X? What is this thing you speak about? Please tell me. :roll:

I'm actually getting pretty tired of your dishonesty of late. Why don't you either tell me what X is or else just admit how silly your last page of posts has been.

That’s fair. What I should have said is that the major and minor premise of a syllogism are both assertions. — Bob Ross

Sure, but the key point is that if you give a controversial premise then you must defend it. P2 is part of what we are differing over, and therefore it cannot be assumed (without begging the question).

In principle, a sin is a concept which extends the concept of immorality; such that the former is an offense, at least in part, to God. We could also word this as the immoral act is simultaneously a non-sin and sin act: the offended party which is not God being the non-sin immoral act, and the offended party as God as the sin immoral act. I prefer to just say sin is any immoral act which, at least in part, offends God to keep things simpler. — Bob Ross

But that doesn't answer the question I asked. If there are no immoral acts which are not sins, then your defense doesn't work (because in that case there is no immoral act that does not offend a party with infinite dignity).

True, but I think this burden is sufficed given that humans have finite dignity, a human cannot repeat a sin infinitely since they live for a finite duration, and the consequences of the sins cannot be infinite if the universe is not eternal. I think all three of those statements are widely accepted as true. — Bob Ross

If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist. If humans are eternal then it is possible for an act to cause infinite "spillage."

The "order" is charity, or friendship with God, and Hell is basically the absence of that friendship. To destroy a friendship is like breaking a pipe, on my analogy.

But yes, humans are eternal beings on Christianity. — Leontiskos

I said science is predominately evidence based and religion is purely faith-based. — Janus

No, you said, "This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and that's what I asked about. The question is and has always been about the difference between faith in science and faith in religion. You keep evading it.

I don't see that we are talking about linguistics, but rather about the logics of different kinds of faith. — Janus

I'm afraid I have to agree with you. ↪Leontiskos has mounted no argument to support the contention that religious beliefs are evidence-based or logic-based, and has, I now believe willfully, distorted the arguments of those who are posing the hard questions, apparently because he has no answer for them. — Janus

Did I start a thread on the defense of faith against New Atheist types? Nope. This is a thread about the meaning of faith, and when folks like Tom or yourself offer definitions without any arguments or reasons, you are not doing philosophy. The fact that the petitio principii includes psychologically incoherent assumptions makes it even worse. "Leontiskos has the burden of proof to show that faith is not irrational," is not a real argument. It is similar to your unfalsifiability sophistry. Arguing against such is pointless. Accepting their question-begging burden of proof would be insane.

Besides, you know full well that what you are engaged in <here> is bullshit. I'm sad to see you engage in that sort of thing, given that you are capable of more.

(I'm sure Banno is doing his standard troll gig. I have him on ignore as I've said.)

The reason the anti-religious folks are struggling so much is this. They want to define faith as some form of irrationality or some form of belief sans evidence, and yet there is no reputable source which corroborates such a pejorative definition of 'faith'. They want to win their anti-religious argument with a mere definition, and yet there is no good reason to accept their definition. In fact if we want to know what some word means, we set about doing things that the anti-religious folks here refuse to do. The reputable lexical sources are abhorrent to them because those sources don't toe the line of their agenda.

- That's fucking shameful, man. :down:

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be."

I'm not following that. — Leontiskos

-

• Janus: This is the basic difference between apples and bananas.
• Leontiskos: What is the basic difference?
• Janus: The basic difference is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green.
• Leontiskos: So you are saying, "The basic difference between apples and bananas is that carrots are orange whereas peas are green." I'm not following that.
• Janus: *Implodes into multiple posts of complete nonsense*

(This is a pretty standard conversation with an anti-religious person, or in Janus' case, a person who holds an anti-religious position. Even answering for their own claims becomes far too burdensome.)

I pointed you to this question:

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

What was I asking you? What claim of yours elicited that question of mine? Go back and have a look. :roll:

Lol - You're changing the subject again, just like you did <here>. You made a claim about "the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion," and now you're playing dumb, pretending that no such claim was made. You are equivocating, talking about differences between other things than the original topic (i.e. different kinds of faith).

That last sentence does not even make sense. — Janus

No shit. Why don't you remedy that incoherence?

Or it you are deliberately trying to distort what I've been saying then cut out the sophistic bullshit and try doing some cogent reasoning. — Janus

The sophistic bullshit is all yours, darling. My post shows it all. Ante up and do some real philosophy. :roll:

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

The basic difference is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be. — Janus

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be." — Leontiskos

So you are saying, "The basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion is that evidence is observation-based or reason-based whereas faith need not be."

I'm not following that. I would encourage you to take your time in setting this out. The reason I brought up Pieper was to encourage people to take more time and effort with this topic.

We all know what the words evidence and faith mean. — Janus

Lol - I take it that you haven't been following this thread very closely.

I made all sorts of unaddressed points in my last two posts to you. Feel free to go back and address some of them. Here is the most pointed:

What is the basic difference? — Leontiskos

I don't see that we are talking about linguistics, but rather about logic. — Janus

The meaning of a word is a matter of linguistics, not logic.

If we have good reason to think that the authority we are trusting is presenting facts which are based on actual observation and evidence, not mere opinion, then our trusting of such an authority is not merely faith-based but is also a matter of rational inference. — Janus

No one believes authorities who they do not believe are credible. Once you recognize this you begin to see why acts of faith are not without evidence (i.e. you begin to consider motives of credibility).

If we have no good reason to think the authority we are trusting is presenting facts which are based on actual observation and evidence then our trusting of that authority would not be merely faith-based. — Janus

Typo?

If we have no good reason to think someone is credible then we do not believe them, and we do not take them to be an authority.

This is the basic difference between faith in science and faith in religion. — Janus

What is the basic difference?

See, you're doing it again. If it is mixed up with trust in authority it may be somewhat faith-based., whereas a belief which is entirely following an authority with no evidence to support such following is simply faith-based. — Janus

This is real argument, which is great. This is what this thread needs much more of.

Much of what we call our knowledge consists in beliefs which are culturally accepted as facts so there is an element of faith of course. The assumption is that if had the time we could check the sources of such facts ourselves, that we have good reason to accept the findings and observations of experts, of scientists and scholars, and thus have good reason to believe in their truth. So there is also reasoning to the most plausible conclusion in play and such knowledge is not merely faith-based.

In matters where there is no possibility of seeing for oneself the beliefs are entirely faith-based. — Janus

I don't think this is linguistically correct, though.

You give two separate conditions:

1. The belief that "if we had the time we could [directly verify the claim]."
2. The possibility of seeing for oneself.

You are basically claiming that if (1) or (2) are present then less faith or belief is involved. There is no real problem with any of this, philosophically or logically. But there is also nothing necessary about it, philosophically or logically. Linguistically an act of faith or belief does not exclude (1) or (2), nor does either condition "water down" the faith-component of some assent.

Suppose you stop at a gas station to ask for directions to the beach. The cashier gives you directions, you believe her, and you get back into your car to drive to the beach.

But now consider two possibilities, both premised on the fact that there were local maps available for sale in the gas station:

A. You do not notice the maps for sale
B. You do notice the maps for sale.

According to your thesis, even if you do not buy or consult a map, your assent to the cashier's directions is still less faith-based on (B) than on (A). This is because on (B) conditions (1) and (2) are true.

But I don't think that's actually correct. When you get back into the car and use the cashier's directions to drive to the beach, your act is faith-based whether (A) or (B) is true, and I don't see that (A) would make it more faith-based. Someone could equally argue the opposite, namely that (B) would make it more faith-based (because there is a more explicit decision in favor of trust). So again, philosophically we can argue these fine points, but linguistically the faith-based nature of the act isn't affected or altered by (B).

(The atheist will want to make a lot of hay out of (2), but that focus is extra-linguistic. It is a philosophically investigable issue, but it is not an outcome of the natural language analysis.)

I see what you mean. As I said, however, it's difficult to harmonize what the Bible seems to say in various places. — boundless

I think we have to establish a proper methodology if we are to avoid begging the question in these matters.

The first way to do that is to speak and listen at a single pace. I think Matthew 26:24 is incompatible with universalism, and presumably I don't need to explain why. You seem to, "See what I mean." So then, speaking and listening at a single pace, you might go on to present something in Scripture that you see as supporting universalism:

For instance, 1 Tim 2:3-4 seems to say that God's will is that all people shall be saved. St Augustine... — boundless

I'm not very concerned with what Augustine says (and he may well be stretching the text). I'm more interested in your argument that 1 Tim 2:3-4 supports universalism.

Verse 4 does seem to support universalism in a prima facie way, but I think that if we simply bring in the immediate context of v. 1 that thesis loses a lot of its steam. "God wills all men to be saved, and therefore it is good and acceptable in his sight that we pray and intercede for all men." The rationale here does not seem to imply universalism, given that praying for a man does not guarantee his salvation. The rationale is that God has a goal and that we contribute to that goal with prayers and intercessions. The fact that the prayers and intercessions are fallible is—in this context—actually evidence that the goal is fallible. If Paul had omitted vv. 1-2 then vv. 3-4 would have had a more universalistic ring.

Further, I think the fallibility of God's (antecedent) will was the most plausible exegetical interpretation in the first place. "God wills to save all men," does not mean, "God will save all men," and this is particularly true in the Hebrew context. Finally, I don't see how this cuts against non-universalism, for I don't know of any non-universalists who deny the universal salvific will of God. Note too that in the verses preceding verse 1 Paul is talking about those who have made shipwreck of their faith, which is certainly in tension with the interpretation that all will be saved. Similarly, verse 15 gives an explicit condition for salvation, thus implying that the condition (and the salvation) may not occur. So I think the initial interpretation is incorrect, and that there are also three contextual cues that the interpretation is incorrect.

Now let's look at your objection to my verse:

I also believe that St John Paul II said that despite what that verse you cite about Judas, the Church never made any definite pronouncements on people who are forever in Hell and this includes even Judas. — boundless

I don't find this to be a strong argument at all. A pope's comments are worth very little in comparison with Scripture, especially when he is not teaching formally. I also think that the claim that the Church has never pronounced on anyone who is lost is demonstrably incorrect, and involves a remarkable whitewashing of ecclesial history (but we don't need to get lost in that debate). In fact, if someone thinks the Church has never made such a pronouncement, apparently they haven't read Matthew 26:24, where the Head of the Church seems to do exactly that. Of course, someone could argue that Judas is saved and nevertheless it is better that he had never been born, but that seems like an impossible argument. I think those who try to engage in those sorts of mental gymnastics must be pre-biased (literally pre-judiced) in favor of a particular outcome.

That was our first step. I pointed to Matthew 26:24 and you pointed to 1 Timothy 2:3-4. At this point in the theological discussion, both of us having presented one pericope, I think the universalist interpretation is less plausible. I think the Matthew text has more anti-universalist weight than the Timothy text has pro-universalist weight.

Another example is St John Chrysostom's — boundless

So it is odd to look for someone who you think made a bad argument (e.g. Augustine or Chrysostom), isolate their bad argument, and then infer that the oppose conclusion must be true. This is a form of invalid reasoning. I could also find people who made (putatively) bad arguments for universalism, but this would not disprove universalism. Better to actually try to make an argument for universalism from Scripture.

(I actually pointed out the problems with two scriptural arguments presented in this thread, in <this post > and <this post>.)

Now let's take another step in the theological discussion. A second verse that I find quite convincing is Luke 13:23-28. I don't know how one could read that without bias and come to the conclusion of universalism. Granted, if there were verses that support universalism as strongly as these sorts of verses oppose universalism, then the "harmonization" question would become pertinent.

Ok, but anyway as I see it, if you allow the logical possibility that one can repent, then the logical conclusion is simply that no one will be beyond hope of repentance (assuming that they will exist forever). — boundless

Yep, again:

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

-

So either the damned - or some of them - will lose the ability to repent or even if they do, they will not be given mercy from God. If we assume that they will lose the ability to repent, it seems to me that, based on what we have said so far, the damned will either not given the possibility to do so or they will not be allowed to do so. So, in other words, it is either an active punishment of God or a complete 'abandomnemnt/desertion'.
But it it is so, then, we have to think eternal damnation as an extrinsic punishment again. — boundless

I don't follow much of this, grammatically or logically. You may have to restate it in a different way.

Note that if Matthew 26:24 is true then Judas will not be saved. I'm not too concerned about whether his lack of salvation has a logical cause, or a psychological cause, or some other cause. Either way the outcome is the same. And again, at some point we have to wonder whether your term "logical possibility" has a specific meaning at all. It looks a lot like a tautology, "If everyone can repent forever, then everyone can repent forever."

I doubt that a Christian universalist would say that evangelization or repentance is unnecessary. — boundless

I spoke about evangelization, not repentance, and I think an intellectually rigorous universalist would have to admit that evangelization is not necessary. Even on your own analogy the only reason to evangelize is to lessen pain, and the lessening of pain is in no way necessary.

But anyway, do you think that the main reason that one should have to evangelize, do good etc is to avoid unending torment? — boundless

I think that if our ultimate goal does not require evangelization, then evangelization is not ultimately necessary. The goal is salvation, not avoiding unending torment. Nevertheless, try to make sure that your arguments rise above a mere emotional appeal.

Maybe at a certain point, the patient will be convinced by his painful experience to take the serious medication — boundless

And maybe he won't. We have no empirical or Scriptural reason to believe that every patient eventually takes medicine. Just the opposite.

So, maybe... — boundless

As has so often been the case in this conversation, you keep saying "maybe" when your conclusion requires that you say "necessarily." "Maybe" won't cut it for universalism, and we have already put hopeful universalism to bed (by agreeing that it is philosophically possible on the supposition of the 'maybe').

Or maybe the illness is not fatal but leads 'only' to agonizing pain but the patient refuses to take the medicine. If the pain could go along forever, will the patient simply forever say 'no' to the medication if he or she will suffer agonizing pain? — boundless

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in.

Assuming that the medicines are necessary for the patient's well-being, compassionate doctors will try to convince the patient to accept them as long as is possible for them to do so. — boundless

Sure, and that's why the Church keeps at it.

The 'hard' universalists would say that at a certain point the 'patient' (sinner) will be convinced to take the 'medication' ('salvation') possibly by the painful experience (where the pain might be regret, a painful experience of loneliness and so on). The 'hopeful' universalists would say that there will be always hope that the 'patient' will be convinced. — boundless

Yes, correct.

The traditionalist would say that the 'patient' at a certain point is beyond hope or is actively condemned to not take the 'medication' or even to not desire it. — boundless

If the "hard" universalist says that at a certain point the patient will be convinced to take the medication, then the traditionalist says that some patients will never take the medication.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to respond in the following days. I hope to come back by mid or the end of next week. — boundless

No problem at all!

- That's actually a much more serious appraisal than anything Tom Storm has attempted in this thread, and so it is at least a step in the right direction.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein is a lousy linguist, usually pulling things out of thin air. Pieper is an example of someone who is much more attentive to natural language.

If someone suffers from weakness of will and cheats on their spouse we normally consider them blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Likewise for ignorance. Negligence can be blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, thanks for the correction. Usually when someone speaks about things like ignorance they aren't speaking about things like negligence, but I see that you meant to include the latter in the former.

Nevertheless, the more central reason I interpreted you that way is as follows. First, an edit I added that you may have missed:

Else, you are basically trying to justify a position where moral evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time, which is a rather difficult task. — Leontiskos

Your argument:

1. No one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint.
2. Therefore, no one chooses anything other than God for x+y amount of time.

My counterargument asks why (3) does not follow:

3. Therefore, no one chooses anything other than God for x amount of time.

Or to Flannery's point: why does anyone choose anything other than God at all?

If man's natural desire for Goodness and Truth cannot find rest in evil and falsity, in the absence of what is desired, then the rational soul stays in motion and hungry until it has attained its ends. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I pointed out to boundless, there are basic empirical problems here. If humans rest in things other than God in this life, then why couldn't they rest in things other than God in the afterlife? I don't think you are appreciating the acuity of Flannery's point.

As I said:

I do not find plausible the idea that our earthly lives are too short for moral or spiritual formation, or that we have some good reason to think that our earthly lives are accidental, such that our destiny-orientation will be fundamentally changed by temporal experiences outside our earthly course. — Leontiskos

My view is that this life and our choices in this life really matter. Your view seems to entail that this life and our choices in this life don't really matter. That someone can choose ends other than God for their entire earthly life, and then everything will just be reversed after they die. That the nature and shape of this life is entirely incommensurate and unconnected to our eternal destiny.

"We already have such evil in the world: sinners who separate themselves from God and live—even humanly-speaking—frustrated, resentful lives" (Flannery). If we can do that for 80 years, why can't we do it for eternity? You are required to say that the bigger picture is just entirely different and incommensurable with the earthly picture. On your theory of will unrepentant evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time. I'm not sure what basis there is for such a theory. Nevertheless, I grant that if there were no evil then the Platonic theory of will would be a really excellent theory; and that if Socrates were right in claiming that evil merely flows from ignorance then it would also be an excellent theory.

Anyhow, on your view, if man chooses evil as evil, and finds his rest in evil... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are probably aware that Thomists do not think man chooses evil as evil. The damned have chosen a lesser good.

B. Have lost its rational nature and rational appetites, which is in some sense to have become a different substance and so to have been annihilated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's the argument:

1. Humans by definition desire God
2. Therefore something which does not desire God is no longer human (and has therefore been "annihilated")

Note first that I strengthened the argument by avoiding "rational nature." I don't think we just automatically seek God because of our rational nature, as if Pantheism were true or as if salvific faith were the result of a logical syllogism. This goes back to the tension between Hart's position and classical notions of Pelagianism and grace.

In any case, are you right that a substantial change must occur for someone to be damned? We can talk that way metaphorically, but I have no good reason to take such a claim literally. I don't find the underlying Platonic theory of the will overly certain, and I think there are better sources which contradict it, such as the empirical data we have from earthly life and Scripture.

Presumably their identity perdures, and therefore there is no actual annihilation. We could ask various questions here, such as, "Do the damned desire God?" I would say that unfulfilled desire is part of Hell, but that the desire is not accompanied by repentance. So Hell in the afterlife is presumably a lot like the Hell we occasionally see in this life, and that's probably why Jesus connected the two.

But if someone wants to elevate that Platonic theory of the will to an extremely high place, then I can understand why they would hold to universalism. I just wouldn't understand what grounds we could have for that manner of elevation.

Being arbitrary, it is random. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Let's save your trope about libertarian free will until we have finished this topic of the Platonic view of the will.

Deface, yes, but not utterly destroy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right: can the imago dei be destroyed? I think it can. Scripture certainly depicts individuals who are beyond help or return, and I would venture to say that this is because they have destroyed their imago dei. I am convinced that Orthodox scholars like Fr. Stephen De Young are correct in saying that deification (as becoming an icon/idol of God) vs. "demonification" (as becoming an icon/idol of a demon) is a central theme in Scripture. Indeed, Scripture presents a kind of parity between angels/demons and humans, where the same possibilities of eternal life and eternal death are available to both angels/demons and humans. This is why Augustine's anti-universalist argument about the demons is so strong, and it is also strong because the Platonic theory of the will should apply to demons too.

-

I think a basic critique you are making is something like, "Your view of evil is problematic." I would say that every view of the mysterium iniquitatis is problematic, and that trying to explain it perfectly is a fool's errand. What I want to do is stick to the most credible sources in forming a judgment. I don't find much credibility in a Platonic theory of the ineluctable good, at least when compared with the empirical nature of this earthly life and Scripture.

It seems you are perhaps bigoted against atheists, perceiving them all as monstrous amalgamations of the worst traits of Dawkins and Hitchens. — Tom Storm

Have I claimed that the central act of atheism is a form of irrationality? Of course not. You are reaching.

I would say that many religious believers hold irrational beliefs, but so do many political adherents. — Tom Storm

What does that have to do with anything? It has no logical bearing on the point I made.

I’m not seeking authority figures to follow; I leave that to zealots and fundamentalists. — Tom Storm

You have avoided objective arguments for the meaning of "faith" like the plague. That's not intellectually honest.

That would be a bad argument. — Tom Storm

That's how definitions work. If you define faith as belief without evidence then instances of belief without evidence are faith. I'm not sure how to make this any easier for you.

- :up:

The entirety of a syllogism is a mere series of assertions — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. "Bears are furry; water is wet; and Bob's last name is Ross." On your reckoning that would be a syllogism, given that it is a series of assertions.

An immoral act is evaluated relative to... — Bob Ross

Okay, this is an interesting and thoughtful theory. :up:
I am not going to enter into prolonged interaction with the theory given that it feels a bit like a new OP.

For the former, no object of the act can have infinite dignity because it is a contingent being and none of them have been of infinite repetition (historically); — Bob Ross

The first question to ask is whether there are, using your definitions, immoral acts which are not sins. You seem to be presupposing that there are immoral acts which are not sins, and that these immoral acts are (likely) not proportionate to infinite punishment. Are you claiming that there are immoral acts which are not sins?

If there’s nothing infinite about the act or its consequences, then it cannot be proportionate to punish the person responsible for the act with something infinite because something infinite is disproportionate to something finite. — Bob Ross

I agree with that. What we are asking is whether you have the burden of proof to show that there is nothing infinite about human acts (or at least immoral acts that are not sins); or whether I have the burden of proof to show that there is something infinite about human acts. The reason I think you have the burden of proof is because you are the one who started the thread. But let's consider Aquinas' argument:

however, to your point, it is in principle possible that the universe continues for infinite time and that some sins which are not rectified would “spill out” infinitely — Bob Ross

And if this is right then the act which causes the infinite "spillage" would itself be infinite insofar as it is the true cause of an infinite effect. The question seems to ask whether humans are capable of acts which incur eternal consequences:

<Only a very substantial act is able to incur an eternal consequence; humans are not capable of such substantial acts; therefore humans cannot incur eternal consequences> — Leontiskos

I don't think 2.4 billion people are believing things without evidence. And we'd need to include other religions like 1.9 billion Muslims and 1.2 billion Hindus too. — Tom Storm

This is another example of your unseriousness. On the pejorative definition of faith_ath, anyone who believes something without evidence must be engaged in faith. This is silly, lexically speaking. On this view, for example, someone who has been hypnotized to believe something is engaged in faith; someone who appeals to their instincts is engaged in faith; and the victims of "inception" are also engaged in faith. This is all linguistic nonsense, of course. More generally, "faith" becomes a synonym for "stupidity," and the word loses all unique lexical value. It's a fancy form of name-calling which also bastardizes natural language.

---

My ethics professor had his doctorate in linguistics, not philosophy. At the time I found that odd, but I no longer do. Those who are careful with language are good philosophers, and those who are careless with language are bad philosophers. This is why those who study linguistics or philology are so often better philosophers than those who study philosophy. Those who do not respect language, and bend it to their whims, also tend towards sophistry and a kind of intellectual unseriousness and/or dishonesty.

Anti-religious bigots are a dime a dozen. I am happy to oppose them on occasion. Your whole approach here is, "Religious faith is irrational. Prove me wrong." I almost never agree to those sorts of terms, given the question-begging nature of the challenge. That's why I pointed out the unseriousness of your a priori stance. So I guess you can just get back to me when you find a more objective source than Bertrand Russell, or when you at least have the intellectual seriousness to look for some objective sources.

Imagine if we treated anti-religious bigotry the same way we treat anti-homosexual bigotry? Banno would have been banned years ago.

But you're not being very philosophical, are you? It's just insults and ad hominems, presumably because you hate atheism and see everyone in the image of Dawkins or Hitchens. — Tom Storm

Well, no. For example, pointing out that your bigotry flies in the face of human psychology is both an insult and an argument. It shows that you are not taking this topic seriously and it is an argument for why faith_ath is a facile concept.

You haven’t attempted to respond to this — Tom Storm

It's nothing more than another fallacious appeal to faith_ath. In a technical sense bigotry is basically just a whole lot of question-begging assertions.

Well, you're the only one doing the insulting. I wonder why you feel this is necessary? — Tom Storm

I just told you why: because your whole approach to this topic is absurd and bigoted. That's why you're being insulted.

Good that's better - I got this off the Revised Standard Version. But no doubt there are arguments about which translations are correct, ect. — Tom Storm

I gave you a link to a Greek lexicon. We don't have to limit ourselves to Biblical translations.

(I have Banno on ignore, but he is apparently still engaged in his habit of appealing to ChatGPT. Not sure why that sub-par approach is necessary when we have dictionaries and lexical studies to hand.)

That’s the problem with an appeal to faith – there is nothing that can't be justified using an appeal to faith, since it is not about evidence. As per Hebrews 11: 'Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.' — Tom Storm

This is ironic, Tom. "Conviction" is here translating elenchos, which in many translations is rendered as 'evidence.'

For example, the King James Version, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This is a standard text for Christian treatments of faith.

But why stop at your precious 2.4 billion folks? — Tom Storm

To do you a favor. :lol:

I think faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. — Tom Storm

Faith_ath is a bad pathway to truth. The point is that if you can't stop appealing faith_ath then you're just begging the question. You are committing fallacies, over and over. Pointing to the 2.4 billion was an attempt to help someone who isn't great at spotting their own logical fallacies. If you want to rise up to intellectual seriousness you will have to consider the idea that religious faith isn't faith_ath.

I think the dogmatism -- though that may be too strong -- lies in your insistence that only "providing a definition" will further the discussion, which in turn implies that the entire subject is capable of such definitions. — J

The fact of the matter is that when you pretend to use a word, but you have no idea what you mean by that word, you are engaged in a form of sophistry. When you say something and someone asks, "What do you mean by that?," and you answer, "I don't know what I mean," then the onus is on you to backpedal and rework your argument. You can't just pretend to say things; you can't just use words that have no meaning, even to you. That's the point about (nominal) definitions.

Beyond that and as I've noted before:

When people on TPF and elsewhere contradict others for pages on end without giving any alternative account of their own, they are engaged in a dubious practice. — Leontiskos

If you really want to further the conversation you should set out your own account of morality, or your so-called "moral realism." Merely contradicting and opposing things that Count says isn't yet philosophy in any meaningful way. It's the Monty Python argument skit.

- I am just appalled at your bigotry; at your unwillingness to openly consider the idea that 2.4 billion people might not be foundationally irrational. That sort of nonsense is appalling, after all. Maybe consider the idea that your whole approach to this topic is absurd, and that this is why you are being insulted.

Thank you! — boundless

Sure.

But one should have the sufficient awareness that is making is wrong, right? Maybe not an explicit 'oath to evil' but still a deliberate decision to be 'faithful' to a lesser good. — boundless

Yes, that's basically right. But the key is that what is chosen is in fact a good, albeit a lesser good. It is not evil simpliciter.

The problem that I see with how the notion of 'mortal sin' is formulated is that it is legalistic. The view you presented here isn't. — boundless

There are various reasons why Roman Catholic praxis tends towards legalism, but the theological undergirding is not really legalistic.

Anyway, I still am not convinced that 'universalism' proper is rejected if the necessity of repentance is affirmed. — boundless

I said that Hart's position is not secured, not that it is rejected. Indeed, if Balthasar's position is secured then Hart's conclusion can't be rejected. The securing of Balthasar's position entails that Hart's conclusion is possible, for we cannot hope for the impossible.

BTW, I do find weird that among Christians the 'hopeful' position is quite rare. — boundless

I don't find it odd. I don't think hopeful universalism is compatible with Christian revelation. Let me quote the crucial line, with the originally emphasized 'if':

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

I don't think Christians can uphold that 'if'. I said why here:

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible. — Leontiskos

-

Ok! The more one is addicted, the more is difficult to heal from the addiction. I also believe that addiction is a very good analogy for evil/sin. — boundless

Right, but it is broader than addiction. It is 'habit' or even 'phronema'. Humans mold themselves into definite shapes, and as far as we can tell, those shapes are not reversible (after a point). Minor moldings can be reversed, but even that can be quite hard. I think these discussions tend to overlook the empirical data that molded patterns or phronemata have a telos of stability or fixedness. Once this is seen universalism looks more and more like a deus ex machina.

But what traditionalists do not seem to allow is the possibility that experiencing the painful consequence of having remained in sin might not lead to repentance. — boundless

I think you probably included more negatives in this phrase than you intended.

Empirically, reversals do happen, and they often happen in the way that you illustrate. Also empirically, reversals do not always happen.

Well, here you seem to assume that the 'ultimate reason' is necessary for evangelize. But as I said before, a universalist has many other reason to share his or her views. — boundless

As I've said, the universalist has non-necessary reasons to evangelize, but no necessary reasons. That's a big difference from the traditionalist. It also contradicts the urgency with which the Gospel is presented in revelation.

Also, your example of the travel to Brazil is misleading IMHO. A better analogy would be that if I don't buy the ticket, I can't take the plane and I have to go there without a plane. — boundless

Well your idea that "I have to go there" contradicts the premise that "you and your spouse will be taken to Brazil." You are presumably thinking of universalists who believe in purgatory, but this broader issue is another problem with universalism: how exactly are the unbelievers to be forced "to go there"?

I would suggest facing the analogy more squarely. If I will inevitably end up in Brazil no matter what I do, then why do I have to do anything? Your contention that I have to do something is part and parcel of the logical error I have been trying to point out. If I will end up in Brazil no matter what I do, then I don't have to do anything at all (in order to arrive in Brazil). If arriving in Brazil is the ultimate and most important goal, then that's all that needs to be said.

Now maybe someone wants to go to Brazil early. Or maybe someone wants to sit in first-class rather than coach. For these lesser goals, one might have to do something. But in the end it won't matter at all, especially given the way the universalists in this thread have been talking about things that "could be seen as a punishment" (e.g. "A sub-equal condo in Brazil could be seen as a punishment").

A better analogy is one of an illness where you are presented two choices. If you take a painless drug now, you are healed without much suffering. But if you wait, you have to undergo a very painful treatment, where both the pain from the illness and the treatment is hard to bear. So, even if the final result is the same (being healed), the process might be very, very different. In this case, the doctors would have a very good reason to try to convince the patients to take the first medication. — boundless

So on your analogy the most significant universalist motivation is avoidance of pain, whereas the most significant traditionalist motivation is avoidance of death. What's worse? Pain or death? I don't think there is a real comparison here. And the urgency with which revelation presents the Gospel is apparently not compatible with a mere lessening of pain. The analogy is apt given the way that revelation speaks about the ultimate stakes as death, not pain.

Again, the difference is between expedience of means and arrival at the end. Arriving at the end is by definition enormously more important than doing so via an expedient means. Universalism dissolves any possibility of not arriving at the end, and is left only with admonitions about the expedience of the means to that end.

When you define religious faith as belief without evidence, you are saying that it is a form of irrationality. When you say that religious faith is a form of irrationality, you are committing yourself to the claim that the billions of religious believers are foundationally irrational in a central part of their life. And now combine this with a remarkable ignorance of religious traditions and theology.

That's a mind-boggling level of bigotry. Off the charts. I recognize that there are some unfortunate areas of the world where this level of anti-religious bigotry is not only socially acceptable, but is actively fostered. In those locales anti-religious bigots can pass themselves off as polite, respectable, reasonable, etc. Nevertheless, the level of bigotry which glibly states that billions of people are foundationally irrational is not polite, respectable, or reasonable. It is problematic; it is insulting to religious people; and it is insulting to all rational human beings who are opposed to bigotry. I am not impressed.

I don’t recall saying religious people aren’t human beings. I thought you disliked rhetorical stunts like this. — Tom Storm

When your first move is to just to assume that 2.4 billion people are irrational, you've obviously implied that 2.4 billion people are not rational human beings.

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god.

Faith in airplanes is not irrational because we can demonstrate that they exist and that people fly safely every second of the day.
Therefore, faith in airplanes is not unwarranted. — Tom Storm

"I think religion is irrational therefore everyone who is religious is irrational; and I think faith in airplanes is rational therefore everyone who is afraid of flying is irrational."

Talk about thinking the world revolves around you! What about the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores? Just because you think something is irrational doesn't make it irrational. Heck, you couldn't even make it through a popular level treatise on the lexical nature of the word 'faith'. Maybe you need to dial down the faith you have in yourself?

I was simply asking that we consider evidence in regard to the difference between faith and belief. — Tom Storm

Again, to think that the billions of people who disagree with you on both scores are uninterested in evidence is wildly naive and bigoted. I'm not sure how else to put it.

I was saying that atheists find 'faith' used to justify a belief in god as irrational — the concept we are discussing. I did not make the argument that, beyond this, all Christians are emotional and irrational. — Tom Storm

Why are you giving the atheist view if you don't agree with it? It's pretty clear that you yourself agree with that view. Your earlier definition of faith was similarly pejorative and irrational. (And in any case, I have no idea what atheism has to do with flying.)

If you are going to define faith as believing things without reason/evidence, then you've implicitly called all those who engage in faith irrational.

This may be true, but we weren’t talking about human psychology, nor have I argued what you’ve written here, so it’s a bit of a red herring. — Tom Storm

So you want to imply that 2.4 billion people are foundationally irrational while prescinding from the facts of human psychology, because "we weren't talking about human psychology"? :roll: :zip:

I wanted to have the conversation and not be shut down with "I know better". — Tom Storm

But that's all you've been doing the whole time, saying, "I know better." I've asked you to be serious, objective, look at dictionaries, philosophy of religion, history, and I even provided an essay that delves into all of these aspects.

I'd be interested to know what a good secular philosopher would say about this discussion.

Are there any atheists you respect, or do you think the position is irredeemably unjustifiable? — Tom Storm

Faith in atheists is a rather odd approach. What sources do you trust? Are there encyclopedias that you trust? Publishing houses? Dictionaries? That's how you should proceed. For example, if you trust SEP then you should consult it. If you trust Oxford University Press then you should consult it.

As far as self-proclaimed atheists qua atheists, Austin Dacey is the only one I have read in this vein. Dacey is not irrational enough to believe that 2.4 billion people are just believing things without evidence, but the same is true of any atheist with half a brain.

But consulting atheists about religious faith is like telling your wife that she believes X and X is irrational, and then when she objects, instead of consulting her about her beliefs you go consult someone who fundamentally dislikes her. There are probably people who fundamentally dislike her and yet remain objective, but that would still be a weird-ass approach to assessing your wife's beliefs. She would probably slap you, and you would probably deserve it.

Yeah, but I think it’s a fine line between censorship and self-defense. To me, I don’t think it’s censorship qua censorship to fight back against a censorial mob who only wish to stop you from speaking. I think that counts as opposing violence rather than censoring them. — NOS4A2

I don't think that engaging in self-defense or opposing violence is incompatible with censorship. I mean, if there is a violent group and you impede their activities by squelching their speech, it seems that you are opposing violence via censorship, no? I just don't know of a reasonable definition of censorship where this sort of thing would not be censorship. At the very least, if we want to say that speech-restriction only counts as censorship when it is done for certain reasons, then we would be required to outline those reasons.

And again, 's petitio principii is not a correct interpretation of Popper. For Popper "intolerant philosophies" are forms of anti-Rationalism, not forms of violence. Popper would no doubt counsel violence or legal coercion to oppose intolerant philosophies, at least where those intolerant philosophies cannot be adequately met with rational argument. Presumably a form of anti-Rationalism which is not overtly violent and nevertheless cannot be adequately met with rational argument (e.g. many forms of cancel culture) would not be tolerated by Popper, such that the community ought to take legal action against that kind of anti-Rationalism.

That you think "ought" must imply "obligation" is perhaps indictive of the problem I mentioned about an ethical tradition that ultimately grows out of voluntarism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. From earlier:

"Ought to be chosen" != "Obligatory" — Leontiskos

-

I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It happens too often on TPF.

And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This road has been traveled in the past and @J doesn't seem to have an answer.

It's perhaps indictive of the voluntarism underpinning the ethics (and metaphysics) of command (law) and obedience (duty). I think this is why anti-realists so often claim that divine command theory is a good theory of ethics, and what any "real ethics" would look like, if only God existed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Michael certainly resonates with this Anscombian genealogy, but I think J may be better characterized by Simpson's genealogy. I think Kant is really the antecedent to J's skepticism. The ice of Kantian morality is not thick enough to support those living in the 21st century. But it's certainly possible that J's views are more theologically informed.

Duty and natural law aren't situated in anything broader here — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

In general the moral anti-realists of TPF don't know what to do with the modern subjective/objective distinction, but I think you are also right that there is something one-dimensional and brittle about the way they conceive of the possibility of morality. Morality in the modern period is like a tree which lost all its antifragility as its roots dried up. Morality became this autonomous being, sequestered from everyday life and incompatible with mundane decisions. It atrophied and died in quarantine.

With that said, there are more productive ways to approach such difficulties. First we define morality as that which pertains to rational action, at which point we can try to relate various subdivisions: categorical/exceptionless moral norms, non-hypothetical ought-judgments, weighted moral values or "ceteris paribus rules," and hypothetical imperatives. The tendency among our moral anti-realists is to reduce moral norms to the first subdivision: categorical/exceptionless norms, probably because this is the most potent kind of moral norm. Its potency also makes it the hardest to justify, and therefore it is understandable that someone who reduces all of morality to the most potent variety of morality also comes to the conclusion that morality itself is impossible to justify, and that morality is therefore little more than a pipe dream.

But there may be a second reason we tend to focus on that first subdivision. Presumably liberalism and individualism make us very sensitive to impositions, and this is why we have become even more sensitive to categorical/exceptionless norms. Modern man is like the prey whose only predator is the categorical/exceptionless norm, and therefore he has a tendency to be overattentive to it, over-scrutinizing it (and then, unsurprisingly, depriving it of existence). Morality thus becomes a defensive game rather than a comprehensive approach "permeating all aspects of life." The question J is always ultimately asking is, "What right have you to impose your rationality/morality on others?" If he were to yield to realism and real definitions he would have to forfeit that schtick, and of course if tigers are real then they might eat you.

Perhaps the pedagogical approach in these dialogues is to abandon the categorical/exceptionless subdivision for a time and develop the natural roots of morality. (I think this is the direction you are taking things.) Absent divine commands, that subdivision cannot be sustained without deeper roots of the more natural and pragmatic forms of morality.

(This is to say that the definition which eludes J and AmadeusD is bound up with categorical/exceptionless moral norms. The idea is that morality is really about rules which admit of no exceptions (and this flows simultaneously from both Kant and divine command theory). The exceptionless character of the rules makes them autonomous, sovereign, untethered to any ulterior considerations, particularly prudential ones. To give a reason for an exceptionless rule is almost inevitably to undermine the exceptionlessness of the rule itself. It's not an unworthy puzzle, and I think it comes down to the same issue of ratiocination vs intellection. ...And nevermind the fact that J's pluralism will balk at the idea of intellection, even though his mystical "metanoia" is quite similar to it.)

You might be right - although I don't recall appealing to an echo chamber. — Tom Storm

I think of Bertrand Russell as an anti-Christian polemicist who would not be considered an objective source in these discussions.

What seems missing from your summary of this discussion is exploration of evidence. Doesn't that leave out the key element? — Tom Storm

Only the key element of your definition of faith. See:

All of the work I did in <this post> is based on Pieper's definition, which is empirically derived via actual usage. Pejorative definitions preclude true philosophical work like that. — Leontiskos

If we have no common point of departure, then we will just talk past each other by using different definitions of 'faith'. That's why I proposed Pieper as a common point of departure which is rigorous and academic (and perhaps too academic for your palette).

So we could try to oversimplify a complex word with appeal to a dictionary. The definition that Bob Ross gave can be related to an entry in the Cambridge Dictionary, "a high degree of trust or confidence in something or someone."

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god. — Tom Storm

But this is little more than prejudice. I have read Aquinas on faith, Avery Dulles' historical survey of faith, Pieper's essay on faith, Martin Laird's dissertation-derived book on faith, Ratzinger's treatment, and various academic encyclopedias on the topic. It's a very well-developed topic. Bertrand Russell strikes the informed like a drunk 3rd grader stumbling into a post-graduate seminar. It's a remarkable combination of ignorance, arrogance, and irrationality.

Why irrationality? Because suppose you ask the question, "There are 2.4 billion people in the world who are Christians. Why are they Christians?" The answer, "Because they are emotional and irrational," is just plain stupid. It's not an intellectually serious answer. Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists would get a good laugh out of that sort of intellectual unseriousness. It is evidence of ignorance of human psychology, basic sociological dynamics, and even the principle of sufficient reason as applied to beliefs. People who think 2.4 billion humans basically form beliefs in the absence of evidence or contrary to evidence simply don't understand the first thing about human psychology. They are so biased against religion that they adopt psychologically absurd theories. They are conspiracy theorists.

There are a few different ways to approach the topic of faith. Here are some:

1. Try to objectively understand what the word means
2. Try to understand what people are actually doing when they engage in acts of faith
3. Assume that faith is irrational and proceed to subtly or not-so-subtly call religious people stupid, arguments be damned

If your starting point for comparing religious faith to airplane faith is to blandly assert that "there is no good reason to believe in god," then it's pretty clear that your protestations against being grouped with the New Atheists are entirely without merit, and you're engaged in nothing more than (3). If that is your starting point then you're not taking the topic seriously. What you need to do is recognize that religious people are human beings, that human beings are not merely irrational, and then you need to generate a sincere interest in understanding why they believe the things they do. Until that happens dialogue is a non-starter.

- Sure, but the point is that "intolerant philosophies" = anti-Rationalism. I should have included more context to the quote, but I am trying to illustrate precisely what Popper sees as the potential object of legitimate intolerance.

I see you edited your post, but part of the point is that Popper is not primarily concerned about ideological positions or disinformation.

My point was that when Popper says that, "we should [not] always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies," by "intolerant philosophies" what he means is anti-Rationalistic philosophies. The point is that both Popper and his opponents are proposing intolerance, and therefore there must be a distinction between proper and improper intolerance. Popper's solution to that problem seems to be favoring "Rationalism," which I read as free speech and inquiry. If someone is not opposing "Rationalism" then for Popper they are not being intolerant.

The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.

Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet. — NOS4A2

Sorry, I forgot about this reply.

For my part, I am not convinced that speech is an inconsequential act. This is why free speech always becomes a difficult issue. If speech were inconsequential then no one would worry about free speech and we would need no civil right to free speech.

To give a very blasé example, suppose the captain orders his troops to kill the women and children. That is a consequential speech act, albeit a command. Its causal power is manifest. Other acts of speech, such as persuasive speech, can also be consequential. If someone traveled back in time to kill Hitler, they may very well aim to off him before he starts giving his big speeches, given what a powerful orator he was.

As a theist, you would of course see it as pejorative. — Tom Storm

It is, factually, a pejorative. It is the usage of the word in a negative or disapproving way.

But you and other theists also use polemics and pejorative language when talking about atheists, so as far as that goes, it seems to be open season. Both camps often convinced that the other is obtuse, irrational and wrongheaded. — Tom Storm

Pejoratives are useful in echo chambers, but to use them in arguments against the opposition is the logical fallacy of begging the question.

I started it but struggled with it. It's prolix, and I would need some hours to step out the argument with notes, which I don’t have time for. But I appreciate the piece being included and may get around to it. — Tom Storm

Fair enough. Thanks for giving it a shot.

We've ended up in a debate about whose usage is correct, and, unsurprisingly, we've landed where the theist thinks their usage is correct, and the freethinker thinks theirs is. — Tom Storm

No, not really. I've pointed to dictionaries, philosophy of religion, historical usage, etc. You've appealed to members of your echo chamber. That's a rather big difference.

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors. — NOS4A2

Yeah, I think that's in alignment with what Popper is saying.

The paradox sometimes rears its head in discussions of free speech as a justification for censorship, “de-platforming”, and “cancel culture”. This shocked me when I first heard it used this way because I always understood Popper as suggesting that the censors fall into the class of “those who are intolerant”, that the censors needed to be suppressed and met with violence if necessary. But on another reading, I can understand how Popper’s solution might be confusing, especially for the bigot. — NOS4A2

Involved in the paradox is the idea that we should use censorship to censor censors, so to speak. Thus any act of intolerance, such as cancel culture, could be opposed or defended on the basis of Popper's reasoning.

The way out is to find a value, something which distinguishes proper intolerance from improper intolerance. Popper provides that value in the second quote you give, and it is something like free speech and inquiry. That is why things like cancel culture would be abhorrent to Popper: because they are opposed to his "Rationalism."

It may be that Popper's goal was to embolden those who felt that all forms of intolerance were impermissible, and who were therefore unable to properly defend the Western, "Rationalist" way of life. Things like cancel culture obviously threaten that way of life.