Aristotle never defines good in his ethics — Bob Ross

The very first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics: (or the second, depending on your translation)

...and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything aims. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, First sentence

Indeed. No "principle" led to choosing this trough and not the other. — Banno

And thus you falsely conclude that we require no principles to make decisions, because you think a coin-toss is a decision.

Which trough the beast heads towards is arbitrary, and a decision that must be made. — Banno

For Aristotle you would be misusing the word "decision." Here is what Aquinas says:

Objection 3. Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.

Reply to Objection 3. If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other. — Aquinas, ST I-II.13 - Article 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

Presumably then we could opt for one side on the basis of chance or a mental coin flip, seeing that we are hungry and both sides are equally capable of satisfying our hunger. There is no proper decision because our opting is not the consequence of deliberation.

"Why did you choose the left side?" "Because I was hungry and wanted to eat." "But why did you pick the left side rather than the right side?" "For no particular reason—only because the coin showed 'tails'."

Having been introduced to Ur-Platonism on this forum, I started reading Gerson's scholarly papers. That is when I started objecting to his interpretations of texts, for example, here and here as well as the example given upthread. As it concerns this thread, the clear preference for Plotinus shown in those commentaries is not represented as such in the Ur-Platonist stuff. This gives a bit of three card monte flavor to the scene. Is there a bait and switch play between the two enterprises? — Paine

I would simply wonder if Gerson is doing two different things simultaneously.

I am glad to have had to discuss Schleiermacher's resistance to Systems because I am willing to acknowledge that is the lineage I come from. The most important element is the individual participating in the dialogue being witnessed. That theme is also echoed in the Dialogues in many ways that are not shy and retiring. So, I freely admit to an aversion to Gerson's efforts to assemble a system to fight modern foes on the basis of that point of view. — Paine

In a similar way, I wonder if Plato could be doing two different things at once. Plato is obviously crucially interested in individual participation, but he seems to also be interested in repelling sophistry. The dialogues themselves don't seem to present all players as being situated within the same boundaries on the field of philosophy. While granting that Gerson's anti-sophistry—in his case anti-naturalism—is a great deal more clumsy, I would still affirm a similarity between the two.

For Plato I don't see the two things as wholly separate. Anyone who loves something will also fight to protect it, and the philosophy that Plato loves—including the individual participation—requires certain nurturing conditions in order to thrive. It is a temptation for any thinker to blur the line between what is legitimate and what is their own doctrine, and obviously Gerson blurs this more than Plato, but I would recognize the same broad dynamic operating in Plato and I would again affirm this dynamic as laudable.

Burnyeat was claiming he was on to Strauss' magic trick. That is a valid way to characterize persuasion and I don't fault Burnyeat for trying it. He took his chance with it. I don't know what Gerson's trick is. But he proposes to close what I think should not be. — Paine

But is a proposal to close already an error on your view? I think that both Plato and Gerson seek to bring about a recognition of what is beyond the pale and what is not vis-a-vis philosophy, and I think the only legitimate objections to either of them will be objections to where they draw a line, and not that they draw a line.

Buridan's Ass will die unless it makes an arbitrary decision. So sometimes it is rational to make arbitrary choices. — Banno

But is eating arbitrary? When we decide to finally stop deliberating and make a decision our decision is not arbitrary, even if certain aspects of it are underdetermined. The way you and other's assess Buridan's Ass involves a rather odd way of specifying the act, as if the act lay in choosing this rather than that, instead of simply choosing to eat. Technically speaking we should say that the choice lies in eating, and that it is an open question whether choosing this side rather than that side is even a choice or a deliberation at all.

Why not instead think about morality in terms of values? — Banno

In that case one must still provide principles for the interaction of those values.

I think it is a valid question, but Aristotle is on to something. The reason humans want to be happy is because it is the most intrinsically (positively) valuable "thing"...Aristotle just never quite mentions this and starts instead with his idea that what is good is a thing fulfilling its nature. — Bob Ross

Does he, though? In the very first sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines good in terms of what is aimed at.

There are cases in which one does not have the answer before one encounters the problem. — Banno

And the formulation of the PDE was occasioned by encountering new problems. The PDE is a result of that encounter.

Making decisions is not always algorithmic. — Banno

Do you mean algorithmic, or rational? Presumably when we encounter a novel problem we may need to formulate new principles, because if we make unprincipled decisions then we are not being rational. It is not so easy to roll one's eyes at principles without also rolling one's eyes at rationality. One can think about morality too algorithmically, but one cannot think about morality without principles.

- I was just trying to explain why I am not interested in donning her hermeneutic given the circumstances. Setting the taxonomic terms of a discussion is not an innocuous or insignificant move. I can understand assessing a claim in terms of a well-known Kantian taxonomy or a commonly accepted taxonomy such as SEP charts, but it seems to me that when you claim that we have run afoul of Sally Haslanger's taxonomy the correct response is, "Who? :chin:"

That approach in general strikes me as a faux pas, but it becomes tricky when you assume that your taxonomic move is innocuous or unobjectionable and launch into a long post on the basis of that presupposition. I did begin responding to the individual arguments of your post, but after tripping over Haslanger's taxonomy enough times I began wondering why I should labor under a strange taxonomy that had been forced upon me. Ergo: I don't accept that taxonomy. You assumed I would, but you know what they say about what happens when we "assume."

No, how can you do better than paying attention, driving within the speed limit and so on, which I outlined? Explain to me how you could do better than that, what doing better than that would consist in in that context. — Janus

You are equivocating on effort and outcome. Doing or trying one's best is a direct measure of effort, not a direct measure of outcome. Supposing two people drive under the speed limit, it does not follow that each of them are applying equal effort to obeying the law. It does not follow that each of them are doing/trying their best to obey the law. Some are more conscientious and effort-applying than others in this regard. Your false argument is, <They both achieved the same outcome, therefore they both applied the same proportion of effort>.

You believe that it follows from the fact we are punished for neglect that volition must be involved? I don't see that, and in any case, you are changing the terms—I spoke in terms of failure of attention (a failure which is not deliberate) and failure of understanding the situation (which obviously also would not be deliberate). You could try to explain to me just what you mean by volition—is volition always deliberate according to you, for example, and then lay out your argument as to why volition would be entailed on the grounds that we are punished for neglect? — Janus

I Googled a paper that might be helpful to you in this regard: "The Moral Neglect of Negligence." Again, an introduction to moral philosophy would probably be even better.

Instead of trying to respond to the different arguments you give, I am going to opt for instead pointing out that I do not take Haslanger to be an authority. She may be an authority for you, but she is not for me, and I don’t find her approach promising. For example, I don’t know why we should accept her dichotomy of how terms are used, why we should take it to be exhaustive, why we should frame the whole question in terms of her taxonomy, etc. At first glance it would seem that she is trying to create a taxonomy of term use in order to answer a contentious societal question about the terms ‘race’ and ‘gender,’ and as I have said recently, I think that trying to set out out general principles on the basis of a controversy is a fundamental philosophical mistake (see <penultimate paragraph>). Haslanger's taxonomy might be more useful in that limited context.

I would opine that when someone wants to leverage a non-mutual authority on a philosophy forum what they need to do is argue that authority’s arguments rather than appeal to their authority. If you can find a way to give in your own words a “Haslangerian” critique then that would be an appropriate way to bring her into the conversation, but at the moment you are imposing her as an authority. Note too how crucially important her taxonomy is. A metaphysical taxonomy of all the mutually exclusive ways of using terms would be more or less on par with divine revelation, and to put forward such a taxonomy on the basis of authority would require a very powerful authority indeed. My favorite philosophers never even attempted such a feat (i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas...).

The thread is about Aristotle and I think it is much better to begin with Aristotle. I think he touches on the same sorts of questions in a more natural way. Let me quote the larger context of what I already quoted in EN I.4, although it is also important to read the first three chapters:

Since—to resume—all knowledge and all purpose aims at some good, what is this which we say is the aim of Politics; or, in other words, what is the highest of all realizable goods?

As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.”

But they differ as to what this happiness is, and the masses do not give the same account of it as the philosophers.

The former take it to be something palpable and plain, as pleasure or wealth or fame; one man holds it to be this, and another that, and often the same man is of different minds at different times,—after sickness it is health, and in poverty it is wealth; while when they are impressed with the consciousness of their ignorance, they admire most those who say grand things that are above their comprehension.

Some philosophers, on the other hand, have thought that, beside these several good things, there is an “absolute” good which is the cause of their goodness.

As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held, we will confine ourselves to those which are most popular, or which seem to have some foundation in reason. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4

EN I.5 directly follows by raising epistemic considerations, not entirely unlike those that you raise via Haslanger. Chapter 6 then begins considering the concrete views of what happiness is.

Indeed, one recommendation is to abandon entirely its common usages in philosophy and substitute eudaemonia. The reason for this recommendation is important: It’s because “happiness” in English is found philosophically wanting. It doesn’t seem up to the job that we’ve asked it to do. — J

I think you are overstating this case. “Eudaimonia” is usually translated into English as “happiness,” and there is a reason for that. Let me quote Jonathan Barnes’ introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics (Penguin) for some similarities and differences:

This natural feeling of dissatisfaction with the chief thesis of the Ethics may be mitigated by a nicer attention to the Greek word eudaimonia. The standard translation, 'happiness', is by no means wholly absurd: it makes sense in most contexts of its occurrence, and it receives some degree of support on general semantic grounds. Yet it is far from adequate as a precise rendering of Aristotle's term. That is quickly shown in an abstract way: happiness, as the term is used in ordinary English, is a sort of mental or emotional state or condition; to call a man happy is (to put it very vaguely indeed) to say something about his general state of mind. Eudaimonia, on the other hand, is not simply a mental state: after setting out his analysis of eudamonia, Aristotle remarks: 'Our definition is also supported by the belief that the happy man lives and fares well; because what we have described [i.e. eudamonia is virtually a kind of good life or prosperity' (1098b21-2). To call a man eudaimon is to say something about how he lives and what he does. The notion of eudaimonia is closely tied, in a way in which the notion of happiness is not, to success: the eudaimon is someone who makes a success of his life and actions, who realizes his aims and ambitions as a man, who fulfils himself. — Jonathan Barnes, Introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics, xxxi-xxxii

I would say that Haslanger’s strongly analytic approach is inappropriate because there is a complex relation here between analysis and synthesis. Happiness is “living well or doing well,” but there is an epistemic quest built into the term insofar as “often the same person actually changes his opinion [about happiness].” Happiness simultaneously represents a unity and a multiplicity. Everyone aims for happiness, and yet they disagree as to what happiness is, or how happiness is achieved, and they at times change their minds.

What is at stake is not Haslanger’s terminological dispute, but rather that, “But when it comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions differ, and the account given by the generality of mankind is not at all like that of the wise.” It is an argument over man's final end, not an argument over words. The idea is that everyone wants happiness and yet they disagree as to what happiness consists in. It is important to handle the subtle distinction between happiness per se and what happiness consists in, and not to mistake disagreements over the latter for disagreements over the former. Aristotle is already talking about happiness per se long before he introduces the actual word, namely by talking about man’s last end (and this is why it is crucial to read the chapters that precede I.4). Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in his own treatment (link).

Well, so far as the name goes, there is pretty general agreement. ‘It is happiness,’ say both ordinary and cultured people; and they identify happiness with living well or doing well. — Nicomachean Ethics, I.4 (tr. Thomson)

Now is Aristotle saying, < ∀x(Human(x) → DesiresHappiness(x)) >? He probably does believe this, but he doesn’t commit himself to the claim. Why not? Presumably because trying to place the inductive conclusion beyond dispute is beside the point. If someone wants to dispute the universality of the claim then Aristotle would presumably say, “My book is not for you. Have a nice day.” There is really no point in arguing with them. (I think Aristotle would be much more interested in observing people who do not seek happiness in their actions. I don’t think there are such people, and I suppose one could argue that this is because they destroyed themselves in their quest to live and do poorly, but that strikes me as farfetched.)

But we could still ask whether such a person is saying something true. Do they want to live well and do well, or not? Probably they do and they are just confused or contrarian. The question is whether they want to be happy; it is not a semantic quibble about whether they are willing to adopt this or that word.

Speakers aren’t (usually) making mistakes. My character Pat doesn’t want to be happy, on either a descriptive or a conceptual understanding of the term. — J

It seems to me that the first problem here is a conflation between real people and fictitious characters, and we’ve been over that before. Fictitious characters are not infallible about their desires. And even if your fictional characters are based on real people, they remain somewhat fictitious insofar as they are not present and available for dialogue. It becomes a kind of argument from authority by proxy, where you speak for someone who is not present and who I am not allowed to contradict.

The second problem is that your claims about your fictitious characters seem incorrect, and that is what I argued in my reply. For example, your fictitious Pat said, “I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces.” I said:

It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness. — Leontiskos

Pat has obviously interpreted your question about happiness as a question about “a fool’s paradise of Smiley Faces.” He says he doesn’t want that fool’s paradise. Does it follow that he doesn’t want to live well or do well? Surely not. Like Aristotle, he doesn’t think that happiness consists in what others say it consists in.

Now I think there are people who despair of happiness and no longer really seek it, but it does not follow that they do not desire it, and even then they still seek out some small measure of it. I think the more central objection is really the objection that the idea of happiness (or also goodness) is equivocal to the point of uselessness, or as Aristotle says:

However, in the case of human beings at any rate, they show no little divergence. The same things delight one set of people and annoy another; what is painful and detestable to some is pleasurable and likeable to others. — Nicomachean Ethics, 1176a10, tr. Thompson

-

Let me comment on just one part of your Haslanger section:

“in our culture” the word is used to pick out certain psychological states — J

Are they saying that they don’t believe psychological ease is enumerated among happy states by language users in our culture? — J

A large part of the problem is that you are preferring a secondary definition of happiness. Merriam-Webster gives:

• 1a. A state of well-being and contentment: joy
• 1b. A pleasurable or satisfying experience

Contrary to your claim, eudamonia is not eclipsed in English. In fact something close is still the primary definition of happiness, where wellbeing is involved (1a). There is a more transient and superficial sense (1b) but it is not primary. Long-term, sustainable happiness is still part of the English lexicon. If you wish to talk about happiness as something in the same genus as, “a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces,” then you are preferring an English sense that is both contrary to Aristotle’s term and also is not the primary English sense. This seems to be a quibble over words rather than a substantial objection. In any case, the Aristotelian context of the OP suffices for determining something like 1a rather than something like 1b. It should not be hard to understand what Aristotle means by ‘happiness,’ and his usage is not at all foreign to English speakers.

and yet folk can dream up convolute circumstances too difficult for any given principle — Banno

The problem with "dreaming up convolute circumstances" is that the contrivance that has been dreamed up is superficial. Moral principles pertain to human life, and those who are playing games by dreaming up artificial scenarios are not involved in human life.

In real life we are made to go beyond daydreaming. If, say, conjoined twins are sharing an organ that cannot support them both, then you're bound to think about the principle of double effect whether you want to or not, and no moral platitude or genetic fallacy regarding Catholicism will help you in that case.

There is no reason to strive to do better in a task when the circumstances don't require it. — Janus

And there is no reason to strive to do our best when the circumstances don't require it. If we can do better then we are not doing our best, and we both know that on your definition of "best" we can do better. Therefore your definition fails.

How are you going to do better than attending as best you can in the moment to a degree sufficient to avoid speeding... — Janus

In order to do a better job than what is sufficient or adequate you simply go beyond what is necessary. One can apply more or less effort to the act or rule of not-speeding.

In moral philosophy neglect is a failure of being able to care or a failure of understanding the situation. — Janus

No, that is ignorance.

No one deliberately fails to care or attend to what they understand should be attended to, but no one is perfect and may be distracted or fail to understand what is required or simply not be capable of good judgement. — Janus

We are punished for neglect similar to the way we are punished for direct intention, and therefore neglect involves volition. I would suggest that you work on a theory which incorporates these facts, and really any introduction to moral philosophy will help you with that.

You (and Joshs) could try to make an argument for ethics on determinism, and you could try to say that every time someone gets a speeding ticket it is not because they have neglected a (positive) duty but only because we want to deter or condition them. This is ultimately futile and logically incoherent, but you could try it. Nevertheless, I would not try such a thing before you understand the perennial understanding of justice, including what words like "negligence" actually mean. Better to understand the received and coherent approach before trying your hand at the newfangled determinism-morality.

Within my formulation, I think it would be obligatory; because, as you noted, my version compares the bad side effects of each foreseeable means (towards the end) and not just the good effect (of that end) and the bad side effect being considered (of an action). — Bob Ross

That's fine, but what you're describing is not the principle of double effect. The principle of double effect never obliges, because it determines whether an act with a bad effect is permissible. You are giving a principle which tells us what to do given two or more legitimate choices, and this is not the principle of double effect.

In both cases, they are intending something good but both have bad side effects; so the less severe one should be chosen. — Bob Ross

I will continue to call this the second principle (as opposed to the principle of double effect). This second principle of yours is more straightforwardly consequentialist than the principle of double effect, and @I like sushi's comments make more sense in light of this.

Yes, I agree. I just see that as a weakness in the classical formulation: it is completely silent on if one should pick the means with the least severe bad effects, and instead only comments on whether the bad effect does not outweight the good effect. Both are arguably important. — Bob Ross

They are two different questions. Suppose you are going golfing and you take a club to the golf pro, and ask him if the club is fit for use. This is the first question. Then you go on to show him a second club, and you ask him which of the two clubs should be preferred. This is the second question. Answering the first question does not answer the second question, and an answer to the second question is not the same as an answer to the first question. It is not the job of PDE to compare acts one to another, or to determine whether something is obligatory. To call this a "weakness" of the PDE would be like calling it a weakness that a rake cannot cut down trees. It was never meant to cut down trees. A rake is not an axe.

-

Edit:

The frame of your definition is correct:

The version of PDE that I accept is that it is permitted to bring about a bad effect in the case that [all six conditions hold]. — Bob Ross

I.e. "It is permissible to bring about a bad effect if..." Note that, by your own words, the matter is not one of positive obligations or of choosing between acts. If your version of PDE tells us what is permissible then it does not tell us what is positively obligatory, for what we are permitted to do is not the same as what we are obliged to do.

- Right, although even the foreseen effects that are not part of the principal intention have some indirect relation to the intention of the agent, insofar as the agent accepts their occurrence and acts despite foreseeing them. Thus, if the foreseen effect is particularly undesirable then the agent will refuse to engage in the act which causes it.

Although you have said we don’t always know whether we were trying our best, at least some of the time we know it, and in those cases maybe the simplest way to measure our effort is to use a verbal scoring system: On a scale of one to ten, how hard were we trying? — Joshs

Okay.

I would put it this way. We are always putting our effort into some game or other... — Joshs

Except when we do things like sleep, but putting effort in and putting maximal effort in are two different things. I do not do my best when I drive in ideal conditions, but I do apply effort.

I’ll know how successful I was at my game of touring by how satisfying the trip was for me, not by how fast I was going. — Joshs

Sure, I don't dispute any of this. It doesn't affect our topic. I don't expect you to have a very robust theory of the specification of human acts, but I think even bad theories arrive at the obvious conclusion that we don't always do our best.

I would put it this way. We are always putting our effort into some game or other , but the criterion of success changes with changes in the game. — Joshs

So what? Attempting to achieve success is not the same as applying maximal effort. I can beat my three year-old nephew in a wrestling match with one hand tied behind my back. This has nothing to do with whether I am trying my best. The reason we shouldn't always try our best is because some things are easy, and do not demand our best.

We could speak about acting in an optimal manner rather than applying maximal effort, and this indeed seems to be what you are interested in. Are human beings always acting in as optimal a way as they are able? This relates to the "broader question" I spoke to in my last post.

There are a nearly infinite variety of games we can opt to play, and we switch among them all the time. When we naively assume another is continuing the play the game we believe they are playing, we may not notice this shift in games. So we only notice their failure to perform within the rules we assume they are abiding by, and we fail to notice that they are already involved with a different game. The are still doing their best, but their effort is applied in a completely different direction, with different criteria of success. — Joshs

We don't always misidentify another's "game," and even if we did, it remains true that we do not always apply maximal effort to the "games" we are self-consciously "playing." (I dislike speaking in Wittgenstenian metaphor. Our activities are not games.)

I grant that there is a somewhat interesting way in which the contemporary mind sees effort as flat and unchangeable. To see the fault in this one might consider the case of an extreme rock climber who climbs free (with no safety rope) and compare him with the fellow who is walking to the coffee shop before work. The rock climber is exerting more effort in an absolute sense than the man walking to the coffee shop, and he is likely exerting maximal effort. Now compare the free climber with an identical climber who has a safety harness, and there will be a different level of effort vis-a-vis the same activity, ceteris paribus.

The obvious conclusion once again arises unperturbed: human beings do not invariably do their best.

How do you define "doing your best"? I would define it as doing what the situation or task at hand requires so as to avoid negative outcomes. If you are paying adequate attention to the conditions—the road. traffic signals, other drivers and so on, such as to avoid an accident, or getting booked, then I would count that as "doing your best". — Janus

If you could do better are you doing your best? Is someone who is doing an adequate job doing the best job? See:

Someone who is not doing their best is by definition not putting all of their effort into something. The reason we seldom do our best is because it is very difficult to put all of our effort into something. — Leontiskos

You might say that if you failed to do your best then you might, for example, have an accident or be booked for speeding, but could that failure ever be counted as intentional? If you drive too fast, is it not on account of a failure of attention... — Janus

In moral philosophy neglect is a failure involving intention or volition. "Attention" comes under our intention and volition, after all, and that is why it is not unjust to ticket speeders.

It's much more complex than that. If anything, it's Catholic...

Not a strong recommendation in my opinion. — Banno

It was nurtured in a Catholic context, but that is true of more philosophical concepts than you would care to know. The principle is common parlance in bioethics and has arguably always been part of medical ethics. The seeds of the principle are traced back to Aquinas, but he doesn't take himself to be stating anything novel:

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention... — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Regarding the common use in medicine, see for example:

To this effect, Dr. Mary S. Calderone tells of a group of eminent doctors who implicitly affirmed the validity of this aspect of the principle when they refused to classify hysterectomy for uterine fibroids as a therapeutic abortion, even though therapy had lead to the destruction of the fetus.

At the Symposium on Aspects of Female Sexuality, heId in New York in 1958, Dr. S.A. Cosgrove made a similar though somewhat marginal statement. He stated in this respect that he would not perform a therapeutic abortion since he did not consider it "good medicine", but that he would treat a definite life-threatening disease even if fetal death might result from the treatment. — Paul Micallef, A Critique of Bernard Häring’s Application of the Double Effect Principle

So ... a mass-murdering and torturing rapist's intent to torture, rape and murder as many as possible cannot be ethically incorrect. He cannot thereby want what he shouldn't. — javra

A central claim in that previous thread was that a serial killer need not be acting immorally:

For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether." — Leontiskos

Because to me this kind'a speaks to that whole bemoaning of modern-day ethical standards as being in a state of decadence, demise, or however one ought best term this. — javra

Yep. :up:

My objection to Aristotle’s concept of happiness as eudaemonia, and this whose ethical theories are influenced by it, is that it conflates the hedonic and the cognitive aspects of experiencing. As a result, it fetishizes intent over sense-making. One can allegedly ‘want’ suffering , pain or misery instead of pleasure and happiness. We make decision all the time between short term reward and long term benefit, between the thrill of the moment and an ‘eventual good.’ But in doing so, we are not dealing with different forms of the hedonic, but different ways of making sense of the situations that will produce happiness. In other words, it is the cognitive aspect of goal-seeking that is involved when we choose none route to happiness over another. Choosing the longer term benefit over the immediate reward requires construing this far off reward within the immediate situation. — Joshs

The more you talk about Aristotle the more convinced I am that you have never read him. Perhaps you should try to produce texts which you believe support your claims. Aristotle's account of pleasure is rather complicated, and his theory of practical reason is not "hedonic." It would be almost as odd to say that Plato is "hedonic."

The Principle of Double Effect is utilitarian. What is there is agree or disagree about other than the overall balance of outcome (which is precisely what the PoDE is describing)? — I like sushi

gave six different conditions and only one of them is consequence-based. For the consequentialist good consequences are sufficient to justify an act. For the PDE good consequences are necessary but not sufficient for the justification of an act.

- Yes, this seems right to me. :up:

If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." — J

It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness.

Of course, in our culture "happiness" has become much more psychological than eudamonia. For example, lots of people will skip the "happiness pills," but it's not because they don't want to be happy, it's because they don't think the pills produce happiness. They don't think psychological ease is happiness. Pat seems to fall easily within this group.

Robbie replies by explaining in great detail why none of those suggestions are options that would work for them — J

Robbie, by your own admission, does not believe that your advice will make him happy (because it is not achievable for him). This doesn't mean he doesn't want to be happy; it only means he doesn't think you are giving good advice.

But perhaps the more important point is this: Aristotle doesn't mean "everybody" when he talks about the human desire for happiness — J

I think he surely does.

If we could bring him into this conversation, I think Aristotle might say: "Yes, sadly, there are those whom you have to actually convince to desire their own good, but that doesn't put the idea of 'the good' up for grabs in any important way." But wait a minute, Ari, we reply; we're talking about happiness, not the good. Aristotle smiles serenely . . . "Oh, are you?" he asks. — J

In the very first pages of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle connects happiness with the good. You could say that for Aristotle not everyone wants to be virtuous, but not that not everyone wants to be happy. Everyone does want to be happy, and they try to do so within their unique circumstances.

As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4

-

Edit:

What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite? — J

If "exact opposite" means virtue then we are speaking about the akrates. On the other hand, someone who desires vice is the akolastos that you read about in Kevin Flannery’s paper, “Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds.”

Robbie hates the condition they are in, and has no desire to keep pursuing it . . . or so they say. Do we need to say that Robbie "secretly" or "deeply" enjoys being stuck in misery, in order to explain their condition? I'm not sure that's right. But in any case, I would hesitate to judge Robbie by the same yardstick I'd use to judge the typical, "standard" person in a state of vice. — J

Robbie is the akrates. Generally we say about Robbie that he is conflicted. See my post <here>:

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction. — Leontiskos

I’m not blaming or reproaching you. — Joshs

The absurdly emotional tale that you told indicates otherwise.

But I will insist that claiming someone is not doing their best is an accusation, regardless of how you sugarcoat it. All forms of blame (including concepts like narcissism and laziness) are based in hostility, and as such are accusations, even if they masquerade as affectively neutral rational judgements. — Joshs

I’d say you’re about 300 miles off course. Underlying your thinking is the argument <Everyone should do their best, therefore everyone does do their best>. Not only is this argument invalid, but it also has a false premise.

The question of whether someone is doing their best is a matter of fact which must be determined on a case by case basis, a posteriori. It is not an a priori necessity, as you have made it.

“The Corvette is going 100 mph.” This is also a matter of fact that must be determined on a case by case basis. When a police officer uses his radar gun to determine how fast the Corvette is traveling, he is probing this matter of fact. The normative question arises second: how fast should the Corvette be traveling? With regard to this second question, the police officer will ticket the driver if the Corvette is traveling too fast (or too slow).

“The Corvette is going 100 mph,” is a statement about the speed of the car, and cars can travel at different speeds. “Johnny is doing his best,” is a statement about the effort that Johnny is applying to some activity, and humans can apply different levels of effort. Step 1 is assessing the level of effort, which is a matter of fact. This step is like using the radar gun to determine the car’s speed. Contrary to your moralizing worldview, the assessment of effort is not yet a normative or moral matter. Step 2, the normative step, only arises when we want to judge how much effort Johnny should be applying to the activity. The answer to this question is not, “Johnny should always be applying maximal effort.” That is a stupid idea inherited from the Puritans, on a par with other stupid ideas like, “If a job isn’t done well then it’s not worth doing.”

Again, when I am driving a car I am usually not trying my best. In ideal driving conditions it would be stupid to try my best, as this would be a needless waste of energy. In that case your moralizing would be perfectly backwards, and, “He is trying his best,” would be the accusation, as opposed to, “He is not trying his best.” It is not uncommon to ridicule someone in that manner, by noting that they are trying their best when they shouldn’t be.

So if someone says to you, “Joshs, you aren’t trying your best,” and they mean it as a corrective, then you should 1) Ask yourself whether you are trying your best, 2) Ask yourself whether you should be trying your best. If the answer is no/yes, then you should thank them for correcting you, tell them you will try harder, and possibly ask their advice about how to improve. If the answer is not no/yes, then you should tell them why you disagree. Whatever you do, do not say, “I am a human being, and human beings always try their best, therefore I am trying my best.” They will probably just reply that they thought you were smarter than that.

The broader question you are after is the question of whether it is ever prudent or legitimate to make a normative judgment.* Your proximate rejoinder would be something like, “Well, we should never presume to tell anyone that they should be applying a different level of effort than they are in fact applying.” I think this is completely wrong, but it is not worth addressing here. I would point you to my thread, “The Breadth of the Moral Sphere.”

* A normative judgment about others, but perhaps also about ourselves.

I am glad to see that you have revised your position on this. Truth be told, PDE is an unwieldy principle. There are cases (such as the hysterectomy) where it seems to obviously apply, but it has often been noted that in other cases the principle can be easily abused. Our topsy-turvy discussion in the other thread got at some of the nuance involved.

Two simple points regarding that nuance:

it is morally permissible and obligatory to pull the lever — Bob Ross

In the other thread I ended up in the end saying that it is not permissible to pull the lever, but I think it is uncontroversial the PDE does not make it obligatory to pull the lever. Thus:

because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either the deaths of five or the killing of one) and the bad side effect of pulling the lever is consequentially less severe than the bad side effect of not pulling it.

...

The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer. — Bob Ross

The key here is that the PDE does not apply to omissions, and this is because omissions (non-acts) do not have proper effects. So I would say that you have two principles operating: the PDE which renders the act permissible, and another principle regarding omissions which renders the act obligatory.

In the other thread you were quite adamant to distinguish commissions from omissions, and you got a lot of pushback. I never actually opposed that distinction, but I put it off as a separate topic. What I would say is that there is a morally relevant difference between a commission and an omission, but this does not mean that we are never responsible for omissions, or that omissions are always permissible.

Classically speaking, you misstate the proportionalist/consequentialist condition of PDE:

6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially). — Bob Ross

The proportionalist condition classically compares the good effect(s) to the bad effect(s) of the single action, not the effects of different actions. For example, in the case of the tactical bombing the circumstances will determine the proportion of good effects to bad effects, and if the bad effects are significantly greater than the good effects then the bombing should not be done, even if the other conditions are met.

This second principle you are utilizing is distinct from double effect, and involves a comparison between multiple acts or between positive acts and omissions. Double effect is more restricted, and has nothing in particular to say about that. It is only about the moral permissibility of an act which has more than one effect, some of which are undesirable.

- :roll:

Presumably Godel is making the same sort of error, equivocating on "possibility." — Leontiskos

I'm addressing modal ontological arguments. These arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God. — Michael

You literally said:

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God." — Michael

You asked what an English sentence means, and then you tried (and failed) to translate it into modal logic.

◊∃xG(x) is false given the fact that it denies what is true of God by definition. "God possibly exists" is not false, and it is not false precisely because it is an epistemic claim. Therefore your translation into modal logic fails. Modal logic is not capable of distinguishing the notion of necessity from the actuality of necessity, and that is precisely what is required in order to translate, "God possibly exists." Modal logic is not sophisticated enough to represent the claim, "A necessary being possibly exists." I explained why above ().

Modal ontological arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God... — Michael

You asked:

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? — Michael

You responded:

In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God." — Michael

And I pointed out, among other things, that:

Then the modal logic fails to translate, because <it is possible that there exists a necessary being> does not mean <it is possibly necessary that there is a being>. — Leontiskos

The implications of the natural English propositions and the implications of the modal logic propositions diverge drastically, and it would be silly to prefer the modal logic to the natural English. That would be to let the tail wag the dog, as I argued (). Presumably Godel is making the same sort of error, equivocating on "possibility."

a. It is possibly necessary that there exists some X such that X created the universe — Michael

No one thinks creation was necessary. It seems that you have gotten your theology from Richard Dawkins.

- It seems that @Banno understands better than you what the word "God" means.

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God."

Using the definition above, this means:

It is possible that there exists an X such that X necessarily exists, is all powerful, is all knowing, etc.

But what does this mean? In modal logic we would say ◊□∃x(P(x) ∧ K(x) ∧ ...) which translates to "it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X is all powerful, is all knowing, etc."

Notice how "it is possible that there exists an X such that X necessarily exists ..." becomes "it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X ...".

...

All we are left with is the claim that it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X is all powerful, is all knowing, etc. This is a claim that needs to be justified; it isn't true by definition. — Michael

Then the modal logic fails to translate, because <it is possible that there exists a necessary being> does not mean <it is possibly necessary that there is a being>. The former is an epistemic claim, and in my opinion the ◊ operator of modal logic does not capture this (others might argue that it is not epistemic, but I would still say that it is not represented by ◊). Logical possibility and epistemic possibility do not seem to me to be the same thing. When most people say, "It is possible that there exists a necessary being," what they mean is that there may exist a necessary being that they do not have knowledge of, for the necessity of some being does not guarantee knowledge of it (i.e. necessity does not preclude epistemic possibility).

Necessity opposes possibility on any given plane (logical, epistemic, theoretical, actual...). But epistemic possibility does not oppose logical necessity, or actual necessity, etc. Thus, supposing God exists, He is actually necessary (i.e. he is a necessary being), but it does not follow that he is epistemically necessary (i.e. that everyone knows He exists and is a necessary being). Thus someone who does not know that God exists is perfectly coherent in saying, "It is possible that God exists."

's point is well put but I would phrase it somewhat differently. Suppose there were a modal argument that proved God's existence. What would the hardened atheist say? "Why put so much faith in modal logic?" This is not wrong. Modal logic is derivative on natural language, and therefore to assent to an argument in modal logic that cannot be persuasively translated into natural language is to let the tail wag the dog. What I find is that most who dabble in modal logic really have no precise idea what the operators are supposed to mean ('◊' and '□'), and as soon as they try to nail them down other logicians will disagree. Is the nuance and flexibility of natural language a bug, or is it a feature?

So the English language claim that "God is defined as necessarily existing" is a deception. — Michael

You are letting the tail wag the dog. The problem isn't the English, it's the modal logic. Everyone who speaks English knows that things cannot be defined into existence. @Banno both understands the definition of God as necessarily existing and nevertheless denies his existence, and this does not make Banno incoherent.

-

Here is Aquinas:

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 53:2). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (I:3:4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. — Aquinas, ST I.2.1 - Is the proposition that God exists self-evident? (NB: objection 1 and its reply omitted)

Note in particular, "it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally."

However, I do think this has to be weighed against other factors like the surge in suicides and "deaths of despair," as well as plummeting self-reported well being. Then there is declining membership in pretty much all sorts of social institutions, marriage, etc. Hell, even the age old past time of having sex or being in romantic relationships is plummeting, especially for the young. And then you have the political climate, which at least here in the US is arguably as bad as it has been since the Depression, even if it hasn't been particularly violent (yet...). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. Political nominees in the last 8 years would also be worth noting.

As to music, this is sort of comical. I don't think it's possible to get any more sexually explicit than 2 Live Crew's hits like "Pop that Pussy," or something like Notorious BIG's "Unbelievable." White Zombie's 1995 hit single "More Human Than a Human," literally opens with a clip from a porno, and Nine Inch Nails 1994 hit "Closer" was all over the radio when I was growing up. At the very least, MTV's "The Jersey Shore," maxed us out on hedonistic degeneracy many years ago, lol. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think these assessments of changes from 1995 to 2024 are really on point. Presumably the OP is thinking far beyond a 30-year period.

But I think the thread has mostly been a distraction. The OP is about Aristotle and the claim that his moral ideas are better than those that prevail in our own time.

Anybody who doesn't know what Bob means by moral decay is simply playing dumb. — Lionino

I agree.

Good post, I agree in large part. :up:

"Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch.6, p. 35) — Bob Ross

People tend, nowadays, to think that happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains; but this couldn’t be further from the truth: living a well-regulated life—i.e., a morally virtuous life—is going to give one a deep and persistent sense of happiness. — Bob Ross

I think Aristotle's mean is very important. People think happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains, but they also fail to observe the mean in explicitly moral thinking. For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether" (Joshs takes the culturally popular route of saying that everyone is always doing their very best, and therefore it is illogical to blame anyone for anything).

For Aristotle it is never that simple. We can't just run to the extreme and call it a day. Things like blame and anger will involve a mean, and because of this there will be appropriate and inappropriate forms of blame and anger. The key is learning to blame and become angry when we ought to blame and become angry, and learning not to blame and become angry when we ought not blame and become angry.

The is-ought gap objection would go something like this: “it seems as though that one should fulfill their nature does not follow immediately from the fact that one needs to fulfill their nature to achieve happiness; and so it seems as though Aristotle is just appealing to ‘obviousness’ to justify what is good being a thing fulfilling its nature”. — Bob Ross

More simply, the objection asks why one ought to want to be happy. For Aristotle this is sophistry. Humans do want to be happy, just as fish do want to be in the water. It's just the way we are. "We don't necessarily want to be happy," is nothing more than a debater's argument.

What's nonsense is having barely read the SCOTUS opinion is you having such strong opinions about it. The decision is fine and fully in line with what I would expect coming from a Dutch legal background. Tobias maybe you want to have a look as well but I find the media reporting on this ridiculous and dissenting opinion confused. — Benkei

I agree, but some have argued that Barrett has the better argument in her concurrence. See, for example, Jonathan Adler's piece over at The Volokh Conspiracy.

Are you saying that Susie might not be consciously aware that she is not doing her best? — Joshs

Yes, of course. Do you have a real argument against this or are you just going to appeal to the weird emotional stories you tell? Your theory is literally premised on fictional anecdotes you made up in your head.

The irony is that these stories are dripping with blame and reproach, attempting to guilt-trip me into buying into your irrational system. "How dare you tell poor little Susie that she wasn't doing her best! You monster!" I do think that guilt-tripping on the basis of fictional shame-porn is a problem. :roll: I would imagine you could do better, especially given the fact that your strange accusation-based strawman followed my distinction between an assessment and an accusation ("The person in question need not even be told").

I thought the morally responsible agent must be acting from free will? — Joshs

Perhaps you should try reading Aristotle on volition. I drove into town yesterday. Was I doing my best when I was driving? Of course not. Was I attempting to not-do my best? Of course not. Nor was I self-consciously aware that I was not doing my best. If I can drive well enough without doing my best then I will do that, because it requires enormously less effort. The habits that I have created around driving have to do with a balance between effort and conservation of energy, and that balance is not met by constantly expending the maximal amount of effort possible at each moment driving.

When someone regrets something and says, "I shouldn't have done that," they are very often acknowledging that they were not doing their best. Indeed, it is hard to see how we could regret any decision at all if we are constantly doing our best. Those who think that they are at fault for everything and those who think they are at fault for nothing both have deep psychological issues. The world you are proposing is one full of narcissists who believe they are not at fault for anything and are beyond criticism.

But my position is a priori — Joshs

Of course it is, and it is highly irrational to have an a priori belief that everyone is constantly doing their best at each moment of their life. It's as if you don't even understand what the clause, "doing their best," means. Or you don't understand that effort is not always maximal.

1b) You agreed with the point of this example (or so you said), that someone's positive project, even if it leads to their welfare, cannot be an excuse to cause harm to another. — schopenhauer1

The argument you have been making has two parts: 1) If I am not allowed to do something then I am not allowed to do it even if it would be helpful or useful to me, 2) I am not allowed to cause suffering. Clearly you are arguing for antinatalism.

What I have said from the very start is that the problem with your argument is (2). (1) is trivial, but you keep arguing it even though no one has opposed you.

3) You then said that "one doesn't have a right to no suffering". — schopenhauer1

No I did not. The accurate quote is, "we have no negative right not to be caused suffering*" (). Strawmen aside, I was saying that we have no negative right not to be caused suffering [by other people]. Obviously we also have no right not to be caused suffering by nature.

3b) You seemed to agree, but then shifted the focus to the non-identity problem — schopenhauer1

No I did not, and in fact I already told you that I did not. You are persisting in an error that has already been clarified.

3c) You disagreed and said it's because "If they don't exist they have no rights". — schopenhauer1

You failed to read what I wrote. Go back and try reading it again.

If we continue this we should move it into the antinatalism thread.

OOOHH so instead of the argument at hand, it's moving the target to a different one (non-identity). Lame. — schopenhauer1

I never said that the reason the preexistent person has no such right is because they do not exist, although that is also a perfectly good objection. There is a cornucopia of problems with antinatalism. A piñata with candy for everyone who takes a whack. :wink:

...I've just realized why you utilize the strange term "negative ethics." It's ultimately because you want to have duties which are not correlated to any rights. Rights-based ethics is very difficult for antinatalism.

First off, you didn't address my example. I take this that you don't have a good response? — schopenhauer1

It's not a point of disagreement. I already said that, "I am among those who hold that a good end does not justify an evil means." If you have a right to life and I need an organ transplant then I cannot kill you in order to obtain an organ, because the end does not justify the means. The real question has to do with what our negative rights are.

I don't have the right to CAUSE you to suffer because I want something out of it... — schopenhauer1

No one thinks you have that right. The question is whether your victim has a right that prevents you. You are incorrectly multiplying rights.

Thus, "I want this to happen, therefore I get to make you suffer" is the more-or-less what is being discussed. You subtly changed it from "no right to not be caused suffering" in the impersonal. — schopenhauer1

The antinatalist seems to think that the right of a preexistent person is being infringed when they are conceived. The right that is said to be infringed is the right to not be brought into a world which contains suffering (absent consent). My point is that the preexistent person has no such right, and therefore procreation does not infringe this right.

Here is an extreme microcosm of what I mean about YOUR projects versus MY rights... — schopenhauer1

I understand, and again, my point is that the rights you are invoking do not exist. For example, we have no right to not be caused suffering. Again, the crux of the question is what counts as a negative right.

- Thanks, I plan to get to this, but I also want to <link> to my last post in our discussion of Gerson.

When she practices for her lesson, is she doing her best? — Joshs

On my account the answer to that question is contingent, and rides on how she has actually practiced. Hence my point about contingent vs. necessary truths.

You could just poll piano teachers or school teachers. 100% of them will tell you that it is false that each child is doing their best at each moment.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but wouldn’t you argue that ‘not doing one’s best’ generally requires that the person who is the target of such an accusation be aware of the fact that they are not doing their best, that they deliberately desired and chose to underperform relative to what they knew they were capable of? — Joshs

No. That someone has not done their best only means that they have not done their best, not that they must have known it. Note too that an assessment that someone is not doing their best need not be an accusation. The person in question need not even be told. If you stop using words like "accusation" you will draw some of the emotion out of this debate, and we might actually come to a considered answer.

Bringing this back to little Susie, dont we need to surmise that she simply didn’t feel like putting all her effort into practicing? — Joshs

Someone who is not doing their best is by definition not putting all of their effort into something. The reason we seldom do our best is because it is very difficult to put all of our effort into something.

It wouldn’t be a question of aiming a radar gun at her speed of playing, since this wouldn’t tell us anything about her performance relative to her potential unless we compared the results over time and discovered that she was moving in the wrong direction. — Joshs

Here is what I have already said to that:

By my knowledge of their capacity as a cause. Ergo: I am best situated to praise or blame myself given my uniquely informed knowledge about myself, and I blame myself precisely when I fail in relation to my capacity and my ability. — Leontiskos

As you can see, I’ve moved the terrain of the issue of ‘doing one’s best’ away from that of a variability in performance given an unchanging ground of positive motivation (intrinsic reinforcement) to push the limits of one’s ability and understanding, and toward connecting variation in performance directly to shifts in intent and motivation. Now things become complicated. Let’s say the teacher calls Susie lazy. What does laziness mean? Does it mean that Susie has decided not to push her creative potential to its limit, and that my claim that such a directedness toward expansive knowing is not intrinsically motivating? Or does it mean that Susie continues to actively expand her curiosity and inventiveness, but not in the direction her teacher wants her to direct it? There are all kinds of reasons we hold back in performance situations. We may be entering a crisis of commitment, where we discover that our time is better spent elsewhere. Perhaps our daydreaming which gets in the way of a current task lead us to our true calling. The question , then, is whether laziness reflects a failure on the part of the accused or a failure on the part of the accuser to recognize that the lazy person is in fact doing their best, but not in a way that conforms to the accuser’s expectations. Perhaps your perception that the other is not doing their best indicates an inability to see past the normative expectations through which you judge their motives. You see what they’re not doing, but not what they are doing. — Joshs

You're making this a great deal more difficult than it is. Susie has had 100 piano lessons with Mrs. Scott. Has Susie tried her absolute best at each and every piano lesson? Of course not, and Mrs. Scott will attest to this. We can give explanations of why Susie did not do her best, and we could even use a great deal of mental gymnastics to claim that every single aspect of Susie's playing which seems to indicate she is not doing her best is merely a matter of circumstances outside of her control. But why fool ourselves in such a way? We all know that we and others do not constantly put 100% of our effort into things. I think this is beyond obvious.

The idea that there are no lazy pupils is simply false. There may be bad teachers, and some teachers may falsely claim that their pupil is lazy, but it remains the case that there are also lazy pupils. It should also be noted that our actions compound, and because of this our responsibility extends into the future. We are not only responsible for our acts; we are also responsible for our habits. When we perform a bad act it may have more to do with a habit than with our current level of effort, but it remains an open question whether we are responsible for the bad habit that produced the bad act.

The central question still looms: is your position a priori or a posteriori? Is the proposition you assert necessary or contingent?

Seems to me that the default is "requires consent" and so we have to justify why it is we are ignoring consent in some circumstance. — Moliere

In adult surgeries, sure, but apart from that not really. There are lots of things that require consent and lots of things that don't. For example, I honk my horn at someone on the road without getting their consent.

No one when it comes to hard in fast rules. I clarified the kinds of persons I'd point to in a circumstance parenthetically, but I value autonomy in that process of selecting who the professional is. — Moliere

But then you aren't talking about ceding professionals coercive tools at all, which is what we were discussing.

"Against their will" would have to incur a pretty strong justification for me, given my respect for autonomy. But serial killing is pretty extreme. We've been dealing in some extreme examples where the question is when to use coercion. — Moliere

Okay, but you still require a principle which explains why things change in the extreme case. Many of us have brought up the extreme case precisely because it disproves the OP. The extreme case disproves the claim that one can never transgress another's will.

I'm admitting in this question that I don't see the appeal of punishment, yes.

What's the appeal? — Moliere

What do you think punishment is? That's where I would say we need to start if you think it makes sense to talk about consensual punishment.

Hrrmm, I think it's just a disagreement about what is entailed by socialization -- is it a process of moral admonition, or a process of learning to think for yourself, or a process of collective deliberation, or a process — Moliere

As far as I can see each one of those processes requires the sort of admonition and criticism that is being opposed in this thread, which leads me back to the original point that socialization involves moral admonition, criticism, etc.

I don't see legislators or policemen as moral tools. — Moliere

What I said is that the professionals who wield moral tools are more likely legislators and policemen than doctors.

But hierarchy and coercion are generally things I don't think of as ethical, but rather expedient: they are political, not moral tools. They are useful to this or that end, but that doesn't mean they're good, per se. — Moliere

The question is whether they are bad per se; whether they are ethically permissible. To say that they are expedient doesn't answer that question.

The serial killer might be acting rightly to his intrinsic nature. But that's also a pretty extreme case for thinking ethically -- it's not on my radar as a thing I have to consider very often. I tend to believe that ethical thinking occurs between persons who respect one another, at least, so these are just difficult circumstances rather than cases against some approach. — Moliere

The idea that morality has to do with acting according to one's intrinsic nature is diametrically opposed to the idea that "ethical thinking occurs between persons who respect one another." This is what the serial killer example shows.

Philosophically I don't think there is such a thing, really, as an intrinsic nature. For myself I'm coming at it more from the existential side. The "intrinsic nature" is created along the way, and changed with circumstances. — Moliere

Okay.

...I'm somewhat overloaded so I will probably need to start drawing myself out of some of these conversations. I suppose the main idea here is that extreme individualism which prizes autonomy and consent ends up being opposed to social living. The members of a society necessarily bump into one another and in doing so change one another's trajectory. A position which rejects this fact of life is simply unrealistic. It doesn't matter whether that position is premised on morality, or autonomy, or consent, or "Taoism," etc. A morality is an idea about how that bumping ought to operate. Ideas which claim that the bumping should not exist are unrealistic and pointless, and in fact they are not moralities. Like antinatalism, such an idea is more a metaphysical critique of reality than a morality.

(NB: The "bumping" necessarily involves the non-consensual ways that we effect one another. An example of an unrealistic idea would be one which tries to make every bump consensual. In reality even defining a 'bump' is probably impossible given the complexity of human and social agency.)