Popper seems to have violent, anti-tolerant (not merely intolerant) rhetoric and behavior in mind, not refusing to screen Woody Allen movies. — J

Not at all. Cancel culture fits Popper's description of, "incitement to intolerance and persecution." What he is saying is that we should claim the right not to tolerate the intolerant, but that where the intolerant can be adequately met with rational argument they can be tolerated.

Can cancel culture be met with rational argument? No, not really, and therefore it is well within what Popper sees as beyond the pale. It is a form of mob violence, where reputational harm or vocational harm is intended alongside the physical harm. An attempt to force someone to lose their livelihood is obviously persecution.

but it really lowers the bar on what it means to be intolerant — J

"If you try to give your speech you will suffer the consequences," is not intolerance? You need to invest in a dictionary, J.

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm

Do you see that this is also pejorative?

I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's. — Tom Storm

Russell strikes me as an anti-Christian polemicist, not in the sense that that was his sole gig, but in the sense that he regularly engaged in anti-Christian polemicism.

I'm trying to rethink mine based on feedback from theists. — Tom Storm

Have you looked at Pieper's essay? If you want to know what a group means by faith, you have to look at sources from that group. In this case the way that group (Christians) use the word is entirely consonant with historical and lexical usage.

The closest thing you will find in an actual dictionary to, "Belief without evidence," is, "Belief without proof," but it should go without saying that proof and evidence are rather different beasts. The first question you need to ask yourself is, "How do I figure out what a word means?"

...whereas my argument establishes that all three forms of infinitude (relevant to judging sins) are absent in practical sins which entails that infinite punishment would be disproportionate. — Bob Ross

I don't see that you have. P2 is merely an assertion. There has been no argument to "establish" it. In fact we've already seen Aquinas rebut the idea that the duration of the punishment must be proportionate to the duration of the offense.

I suppose it is possible that most or all human sins, thus far, are “open cases” like a continuous water spillage; but I would find that implausible. How is someone who steals and does their time in jail akin to this continuous water spillage? Likewise, wouldn’t this argument require that the universe is eternal (for the sin would have to causally affect for eternity)? — Bob Ross

Well remember how the analogy began:

I missed this. To use an analogy, imagine that a pipe breaks and the water that was flowing through it is now flowing out onto the ground. This is an order being disturbed, and as long as the pipe remains broken, the water will continue flowing out onto the ground. It will flow out onto the ground for all eternity if the cause/pipe is never repaired. Put crudely, Aquinas is saying that we are able to break our own pipes in ways that we cannot repair, and that Hell flows out of this. — Leontiskos

The "order" is charity, or friendship with God, and Hell is basically the absence of that friendship. To destroy a friendship is like breaking a pipe, on my analogy.

But yes, humans are eternal beings on Christianity.

Duly noted: perhaps I am thinking of the wrong person. I will re-read Aquinas on that part. — Bob Ross

Sounds good. :up:

- Yep. :up:

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. — J

But you are doubtless unable to answer the question, "What is an absurd definition?" You keep making claims that you are unable to explain, and using words that you are unable to define.

Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing. — J

That one person has stronger metaphysical superglue? :wink:

I think I arrived at this view through Bertrand Russell, who said: "...We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence." — Tom Storm

That's a pretty standard pejorative (and unserious) usage. You won't find anything about emotion over evidence in dictionaries.

In one sense, this quite true. Evil doesn't have an essence; it is a privation. I think this understanding is pretty mainstream in the West (e.g. St. Augustine), and it certainly is in the East. It is absolutely true that evil ought not exist, and thus Hell ought not exist either. The Fall is the result of irrational rebellion. Both man and the demons' rebellion is something blameworthy, something that ought not have occured.

Evil exists in the world though, and in the hearts of men. We need not deny this. Evil exists as privation and imperfection, the tendency of creatures towards multiplicity and non-being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, agreed.

Hence, I don't think considerations I mentioned erase moral blame. Freedom, self-determination, self-governance, knowledge, etc. have contrary opposites (e.g. unity/plurality, true/false). We can be more or less free, more or less aware of what is truly best, and so more or less culpable for "missing the mark" in our thoughts and deeds. Spiritual sickness is not blameless, since people enable their own sickness and freely partake in their own degradation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well then let me explain why I think your contention undermines moral culpability and the possibility of moral evil. You give a threefold dichotomy, ignorance, weakness of will, and external constraint:

Here would be my contention: no one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of ignorance? It seems not. Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of weakness of will? It seems not. Is one evil or morally culpable on the basis of external constraint? It seems not. If moral culpability and moral evil are not possible on any of the three exhaustive options you have provided, then they are not possible at all.

Indeed, your whole argument here is that universalism is inevitable because humans could not but choose otherwise. Given your understanding of human choice, humans could never choose evil, and therefore they could never fail to choose God. You apparently view humans as something like Roomba vacuum cleaners, which may make a few wrong turns but will never ultimately fail. This is why Flannery's analysis is so relevant. Evil itself would not exist if this theory of choice were correct, and the Problem of Evil goes hand in hand with the problem of Hell.

Spiritual sickness is not blameless, since people enable their own sickness and freely partake in their own degradation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If they do it continually throughout life, why cannot they do it continually throughout eternity? Can one take a mulligan on their entire life?

This is the maximum extent of the curvatus in se, and I suppose that one argument for a Hell of infinite temporal duration might be that this curving inwards approaches something like a black hole at the limit, a point at which no light can escape. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right.

People know evil as such and still embrace it; they have a right to be punished. The reduction of justice solely to remediation (rather than the restoration of right) degrades justice into something like breaking a horse. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, agreed.

The question is not whether punishment is deserved, but whether punishment of infinite temporal duration is deserved. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This "maximum extent of the cuvatus in se" is already its own punishment, and need have no temporal limit if humans and angels/demons are indeed eternal beings who do not cease to exist.

At any rate, I don't think voluntarism actually helps here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't seen anyone propose it, so no biggie.

I'm not even sure what position this is supposed to be responding to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Precisely the position that you've set out, namely the one that logically entails the impossibility of moral evil. Else, you are basically trying to justify a position where moral evil is possible for x amount of time but not x+y amount of time, which is a rather difficult task.

The latter could be considered an intrinsic punishment that one does to oneself, but would also imply a capacity to deface (and lose) the Imago Dei absolutely, beyond any capacity to repent, which is at odds with a lot of theology (closer to Plato than Aristotle in some ways too). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea that one can deface the imago dei is written up and down throughout Scripture. In that there is some similarity with Aristotle, but universalism is basically just a form of Platonism, of the ineluctable Good. I don't think you get to universalism from Scripture or from empirical data (Aristotle). You basically need to be ultimately committed to Platonism, and thus allow Platonic theories to override these other considerations. It's no coincidence that your theory where evil is basically derived from ignorance is so closely bound up with Socrates' approach.

Thanks for the response and the link, I'll read. — boundless

You're welcome. If you are referring to the thread on a different forum, beware that it may be a bit hard to follow. I was tailoring it to individuals rather than to a general audience. In any case I think a thread like that would shed more light on justice than a discussion of Hell. Hell is a hard case, and it is better to begin with easy cases ("Hard cases make bad law").

As a short premise, I didn't change my mind. I just see more subtlety in the 'free will' defence of semi-traditional hell view. Although I don't consider them convincing, you did make good points. — boundless

That's fair, and I appreciate that you are taking care with this conversation.

Anyway, let's say that the sinner does, indeed, have the ability to make a 'oath to evil' (or 'mortal sin') and the ability to commit to it perpetually. — boundless

Sticking with Aquinas, to fix one's end in sin is not to form an intention towards evil (or in an extreme case, an oath towards evil). For example, adultery is a sin, but when a man commits adultery he is not doing it for the sake of evil. He is doing is because he desires the romance and sex, and chooses to pursue it. He values the romance and sex more than he cares about not-committing adultery.

As I see it this question of understanding how an evil act could ever be performed is much closer to the heart of the issue, and it bears on my last post to Count Timothy.

So, here at least from a logical standpoint, it seems to me that if some are beyond any hope for salvation,... — boundless

Let me repeat and elaborate:

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. — Leontiskos

Universalism is the belief that all will be saved, and this is largely what you and I have been discussing in this thread. But now you are switching to a different topic, namely the topic of "Hopeful universalism": the belief that one can or should hope that all will be saved. These are two different things.

Hope positions are always easier to defend than assent positions, and the same holds here. Hans Urs von Balthasar wrote a book in 1979, Was dürfen wir hoffen? ("What may we hope?"). As you know, David Bentley Hart wrote a book in 2019, That All Shall Be Saved. Hart was one-upping Balthasar by switching from the topic of hope to the topic of assent or assertion.* What you are now doing in the thread is shifting back into Balthasar's more modest position.

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible.

So my contention here is that the hopeless state of (some of?) the damned cannot be explained solely on terms of their ability to make oaths. — boundless

Sure - I think you are technically correct. But I don't find the psychology and anthropology convincing. To make the point quickly, we could say that a man who has been addicted to opium for 70 years is logically permitted to stop using opium, but this is undue "logicalism." Although it is logically possible, that's just not how reality works. Human acts form the habits and the soul towards an end. There may be creatures who do not move towards fixity in an end, but they are certainly not humans. I take it that these claims are much more empirically sound than the idea that reversal of one's fundamental orientation is always possible, no matter what has come before.

(We might even begin to ask what it means to say that the opium addict is "logically capable" of abandoning opium.)

BTW, I didn't know that Balthasar allowed the possibility of post-mortem salvation. Interesting. — boundless

You may have misunderstood me, because I don't think he did. He tended toward what I said here:

(It may be worth pointing out that universalists don't need to deny the fixity of the will at death. The fixity of the will at death has much to be said for it, and many universalists don't find it reasonable to question. Instead they claim that we don't have inside knowledge on what happens in someone's soul before they die. I.e. Everyone may secretly repent before they die.) — Leontiskos

-

Regarding your points about evangelization, I think we are talking past each other at this point. I am not really sure why you think that believing in the traditional view of hell is so fundamental for evangelization, if you also agree that universalists would still have their valid reason to evangelize. But it is a tangential discussion. — boundless

I think it is a central point of the discussion. Let me elaborate on the logical error that I see:

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent. — Leontiskos

This is basically your position:

Suppose that next week you and your spouse will be taken to Brazil, and there is nothing you can do about it. You know with perfect certainty that you will end up in Brazil. Your spouse says to you, "Let's buy plane tickets and fly to Brazil next week." You respond, "There is no need. We will be in Brazil next week no matter what we do. It would be a waste of money to buy plane tickets." Your spouse will only desire to buy tickets insofar as they don't realize that there is no need to buy tickets (and this explains the secretive universalists you referred to).

The universalist has no more ultimate reason to evangelize than the man has a reason to buy a ticket to Brazil. Buying the ticket is irrational. I think this argument actually destroys the notion of universalism in the Christian context, hook, line, and sinker. Folks who accede to universalism literally act this way, and that's perfectly logical. They become uninterested in pursuing the inevitable end. The Unitarian Universalists are a great historical example of this.


* He was even playing on the English title of Balthasar's book, "Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved?"

I tend to avoid people whose views or behaviours limit conversation and commonality and I avoid people with views I find ugly or unpleasant. Betrayers, trolls and liars would seem to be fairly good to avoid as there's a good chance we (or others close to us) would become victim of their behaviours. I've generally avoided people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. Things I don't like I avoid. — Tom Storm

Okay, but it looks like you have two different categories. The first category has to do with commonalities and excludes people who are into sport, fashion and pop music. The second category has to do with behaviors that you do not want to fall victim to.

What would you say is the rational justification for excluding, dismissing, or avoiding victimizers? What precisely is it about the victimizer that makes you oppose them? A specific example may be helpful here, and it could even be one of the three you mentioned (betrayers, trolls, or liars).

Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Someone like @J or Michael will distinguish the moral ought from the non-moral ought, and when you press them on what is meant by "the moral ought" they will be reduced to the exact same problems that plagued them in the first place.

This goes back to your ethical/deliberative definition of good as "choice-worthy," or the definition of good as that which all things seek (i.e. a kind of desirability). "Ought" is no less conceptually complex and multivalent, and if we do not recognize the analogical nature of such terms we fall into univocal fallacies. For example, the univocal move where one distinguishes the moral ought from the non-moral ought and yet has no idea what they claim to mean by "the moral ought."

This all goes back to my reference to Simpson's paper.

Acknowledged. I had associated the word with general discussion of the problem of evil not realising that it was usually intended as a apologetic in the religious context. So it is misleading, and I have changed the thread title to reflect that. — Wayfarer

Thanks. I think that's helpful, even though I realize there isn't a great rhetorical substitute for the word "theodicy." Nevertheless, "Indictment" is a good one.

That is not the argument at all. The argument is, if the existence of suffering is supposed to be an indictment against God, then where do you draw the line between what you would deem a reasonable and an unnacceptabe degree of suffering? That colds and influenza would be 'allowed' by a merciful God, but not cancer? That earthquakes would be reasonable, but mass casualties would not be? — Wayfarer

That's basically the argument I gave. I'm not sure if you're familiar with reductio ad absurdum arguments? The implication is that either (4) or (5) must be false.

That colds and influenza would be 'allowed' by a merciful God, but not cancer? — Wayfarer

Again:

So there is a possible danger of over-emphasizing the critique contained in the OP, namely by overemphasizing the question, "Where exactly should the line be drawn?" — Leontiskos

So for example, does your "Where exactly should the line be drawn" argument imply that not only colds, and not only cancer, but also genocide is permissible? The danger here is the idea that there is no line and nothing is off limits. Even if (7) is absurd, there still seems to be a line somewhere.

The more general argument is that a world without suffering is inconceivable, (although I might add that this is actually what Heaven is supposed to mean.) — Wayfarer

Right, but if heaven exists then it's not clear that, "facing and rising above evil is an essential aspect of existence." Specifically, I think Buddhism takes evil/suffering as a brute fact in a way that Christianity does not. For Christianity evil possesses a contingency at a level which is not true for Buddhism. The difference is that Christians believe in a God who allows evil that he was at least somehow capable of preventing—even in the extreme case where he decides not to create at all. That's presumably why Dawkins does not levy the Problem of Evil against Buddhism.

Again, the essay 'is not an attempt to justify suffering, nor to offer spiritual guidance. It aims only to point out the mistake of that common assumption in modern discourse — the idea that if God exists, He must operate like a benevolent manager of human well-being. It’s a superficial way of seeing it. Recovering some understanding of the metaphysical and theological contexts against which the problem of evil has traditionally been resolved, allows us to reframe the question in a larger context — one in which suffering still has to be reckoned with, but not on account of a malicious God.'

And I stand by that argument. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I think it is a salient point. :up:
Contemporary atheists definitely take the argument too far and make God into a Hotel Manager.

If further context is needed, I can find some Gospel passages, I suppose, but I doubt whether you really need them. — J

I think you definitely need them, given that people use "love" to justify anything and everything. For example, I know Christian consequentialists who say that in the Trolley scenario, or in a scenario where a tyrant applies consequentialist pressure so that you might murder someone, the loving thing to do is to go ahead and murder for the greater good. You might even be one of these consequentialists who would say that if you can murder someone so that ten other people do not die, the loving thing to do is to murder them.

Without some context, "Love" is an incredibly ambiguous and increasingly meaningless term.

Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms. — Janus

To his great credit, @Bob Ross attempted exactly that, and he is right that a substantial rebuttal of his explanation is lacking. In fact I don't know that I have seen anyone else on TPF attempt to give a precise definition of what they mean by "faith." Usually it goes <more like this>.

God as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent — J

@J is not altogether wrong here, @Wayfarer. First, it's very confusing that the word "theodicy" is being used in this thread to mean "anti-theodicy" or "anti-theism." For that reason I will avoid the word altogether.

Here is a standard argument against theism which utilizes the problem of evil:

1. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent, then there would be no evil
2. But there is evil
3. Therefore, there is no existing God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent {modus tollens}

Part of your argument is something like this:

4. If God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent, then there would be no head colds
5. But there are head colds
6. Therefore, there is no existing God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent {modus tollens}
7. Therefore, head colds disprove the existence of God {reductio ad absurdum}

(Note how similar this is to <my argument against anti-natalism>.)

(7) represents Hotel Manager Anti-theism, and the response is to say that (4) is rather dubious.

For me, the point is that there is a real and live problem with Hotel Manager Anti-theism, and yet at the same time it is true that at some point Hotel Manager Anti-theism ends and more legitimate reasons for Anti-theism begin. So there is a possible danger of over-emphasizing the critique contained in the OP, namely by overemphasizing the question, "Where exactly should the line be drawn?"

(See also my response to Tom Storm. The trick here is that not all anti-theistic arguments are created equal.)

Sure, we can use other reasons to try to convince the non-believer. We could even appeal to his moral system, assuming he has one. — BitconnectCarlos

The word "even" makes me think that such an appeal is not necessary, which makes me think that there are suitable reasons which do not specifically leverage the non-believer's moral system. If that is so, then the issue must be amenable to reason and not merely to divine commands. If it is not amenable to reason then we couldn't use other reasons, and there could be no .

If that's not right, then I think you need to replace, "We could even," with, "We could only."

Sorry for the belated response! — Bob Ross

No worries.

My answer was that there are three kinds of things that can be quantified over for the sake of this discussion as it relates to infinitude: (1) dignity, (2) duration, and (3) repetition. My point was that you can pick any of them or all of them for our discussion and my argument will apply. — Bob Ross

And my point is that if you don't pick one of them then you simply don't have an argument at all.

It's like if I said, "If one wanted to argue against factory farming they could do so on the basis of animal welfare, environmental issues, or sustainability." The natural response would be, "Are you going to produce an argument against factory farming? If so, you'll need to pick one of the three and put together an actual argument. Until you do that there is no argument being proposed."

I agree with your assessment here; and I would point out that no matter how many gallons of spillage happen due to this person it would not warrant infinite demerit unless the water that spilled was infinite in volume, was spilling for infinite duration, or was itself or a casually derived offended party was of infinite dignity. None of these three are the case in every human example of sin. — Bob Ross

Aquinas' point is precisely that the water spills out for a potentially infinite duration. "So long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also."

This was my complaint with Acquinas, because he attempts to tie the infinite demerit of a sin to God’s infinite dignity since God is an offended party; — Bob Ross

You've already been told by multiple people that Aquinas doesn't do that at all, and that you have Anselm in mind. If you want to characterize Aquinas, I would suggest quoting him, or at the very least quoting a secondary source.

And even on its own terms, the logic quickly becomes untenable. If suffering were to be eliminated, where exactly should the line be drawn? Is it enough that we only suffer head colds, not cancer? That no child is ever harmed, but adults might still endure misfortune? That natural disasters occur, but without casualties? — Wayfarer

The "hotel manager framing" speaks as if God's only purpose is to prevent suffering, and as you say, this sole-purpose-god can be invoked to remove any level of suffering, no matter how small. That's the oddity: the Copernican Revolution led to a cramped, anthropocentric worldview, where the removal of human suffering is the most important thing. The "god" of this worldview has but one job: remove suffering. The whole picture is self-directed rather than transcendent of self—curved in on oneself. Like going to the doctor day after day and demanding more painkillers. A diminished anthropology.

'The Hotel Manager Theodicy' is a misnomer. — Janus

True enough.

This seems like a central argument to your post:

Here would be my contention: no one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But isn't this tantamount to the denial of (moral) evil? Flannery rightly points out that arguments against Hell are very similar to arguments against evil, or for the claim that evil ought not exist.

If what you say is true then sin and (moral) evil do not exist at all, and of course Hell cannot then exist either. You could actually read my thread, "Beyond the Pale," as an inquiry into the rational grounds for moral blame, which is in turn related to the question of whether moral evil is possible. It's a difficult question that our culture struggles with in a special way, but nevertheless I don't see how such a thesis is compatible with Christianity. For Christianity moral evil does exist.

Let me quote Flannery given that this is such a ubiquitous issue:

Before dealing with this issue directly, we need to establish one preliminary point: that there is no intrinsic reason to regard the sayings of Jesus found at Matthew 25 as mere threats or warnings. The only reason we might have for so regarding them would be if Balthasar (and others) were right: that it is incompatible with God’s nature to allow to happen what Christ says will happen to those who are not merciful. But there is no reason to make this assumption. Is such evil incompatible with the notion of a loving and all-merciful God? We already have such evil in the world: sinners who separate themselves from God and live—even humanly-speaking—frustrated, resentful lives. If such suffering is incompatible with the notion of the Christian God, he is either not as powerful as Christians claim (and therefore not the Christian God) or he does not exist. Given that the Christian God does exist, if such suffering is in itself not incompatible with his nature, why must its duration be incompatible with that same nature? As Newman remarked ‘the great mystery is, not that evil has no end, but that it had a beginning.’ Ultimately, the problem of hell can be reduced to the problem of evil—and no one thinks of solving the problem of evil by denying its existence. If we have no reason to regard Christ’s remarks at Matthew 25 as mere threats or warnings, it is legitimate to represent them as conditional statements of the form ‘if p then q’: if we are not merciful we will find ourselves in hell. The question facing us is how to understand such statements. — Kevin Flannery, How to Think About Hell, 476

(To look at the mysterium iniquitatis and conclude that evil does not exist, or to look at the mystery of goodness and conclude that goodness does not exist, strike me as concrete instances of the low anthropology referenced earlier. The idea—so tied up with our own culture—is that responsibility does not exist, whether deserving praise or blame. The dual potency goes hand in hand with that responsibility. This is also related to a transgression of Przywara's Analogia Entis, where one consideration is allowed to trump all others.)

It's common knowledge that it is. — Janus

Argumentum ad populum?

Here we go:

4. "There are many parallel, non-interacting worlds."

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

"4. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that there are not many parallel, non-interacting words could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?"

So on your approach the many-worlds interpretation is falsifiable. As I said, on such a facile approach every proposition must be falsifiable. This approach says nothing more than, "It would be falsified if it were falsified, therefore it is falsifiable." The fact that you've been running with this facile approach for so many posts is rather crazy, and it's very hard to believe that you are being intellectually serious here.

You ask me to show you an unfalsifiable claim. — Janus

Yes, and I am still waiting for you to do that.

Two well-used examples of what are often characterized as unfalsifiable claims are the Multiple Worlds Interpretation in QM, and the Multiple Worlds hypothesis in cosmogony. — Janus

So what is the claim that you purport to be unfalsifiable? Give me an actual assertion/claim. I am trying not to put words in your mouth given that you keep accusing me of incorrect interpretations, but you need to provide some clarity. Here is Wikipedia:

The many-worlds interpretation implies that there are many parallel, non-interacting worlds. — Many-world Interpretation | Wikipedia

Is that the claim you hold to be unfalsifiable? If not, what is the claim?

From the point of view of moral realists like you and me... — J

Here's the sober truth: You are not a moral realist. Here is SEP:

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism... — Moral Realism | SEP

Wake up, dude. Time to stop asserting things you know to be false. The reason you are constantly arguing against moral realism is because you don't believe it. You don't believe that there are factually true moral claims. Why pretend otherwise? Why deceptively play both sides and pretend to be what you are not? You will do yourself and everyone else a huge favor if you simply admit that you are not a moral realist. Until that happens the whole conversation is built on a pretense/lie, and that lie will continue to color all of the strange edifice built atop it.

The quote you exchange shows exactly the opposite of what you are claiming. — AmadeusD

You are wrong and I've just shown that clearly. — AmadeusD

I find it silly and clearly wrong. — AmadeusD

This is the sort of thing you do, and it has nothing to do with argumentation or philosophy. These are not arguments. You need to learn to give arguments for your claims. Obviously I am not the first to tell you this, nor will I be the last.

Honestly, I would suggest that you study the question of what an argument is, and then begin discerning whether your posts contain any (or how many they contain, and of what quality). There are a very large number of people on TPF who don't know what an argument is, so this is not specific to you. Understood aright, that question is not elementary; it is vastly interesting.

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

A good approach. :up:

Either way, is this a fair demand? "For an ethics to be compelling and to be real ethics, it must match my definition of a sui generis moral good which I cannot define, nor give examples of, and which I have no clear notion of, given that I think my concept is itself wholly unintelligible." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ergo:

The reason the "morality" of "non-naturalism" cannot affect choices is because this "morality" is by definition undefined. For Michael a "non-naturalist" is just someone who has no idea what the word "moral" is supposed to mean. Anyone who has a definition of the word "moral" thereby fails to be a "non-naturalist." It's basically, "If you have an answer to my question, then you don't have an answer to my question. I'm only accepting answers from those who don't have answers."

So this is one of those cases where someone who doesn't know what a word means can't do things with that word. There is nothing strange about this. — Leontiskos

(Michael consistently does this same thing. He argues against morality, but when you ask him what he means by "morality" he admits that he has no definition. And yet when you offer a definition he says, "That's not the definition of morality." @J is in much the same boat, but he doesn't even have a grasp of logical argumentation in the first place and therefore his plight is a bit more pronounced.)

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified and is therefore falsifiable. — Leontiskos

No the logical conclusion is that a claim would be at least possibly if not actually falsifiable if we can imagine how it could be falsified, if we can say what falsification would look like, which is what I have done. — Janus

Do you think there is such a thing as an unfalsifiable claim? If so, try to show me one, and I will show you why my quote holds. I think you have used a clever trick to write the concept of unfalsifiability out of existence, in order to make your unfalsifiable claim falsifiable. I already explained the problems with that tactic earlier in the thread.

Let us call this the Hotel Manager Theodicy. It holds God to account for the conditions of the world in the same way one might complain about bad service. — Wayfarer

Good OP. I agree. We see this sort of thing constantly.

Besides, nowhere in the sacred texts of East or West is there a promise that the world will be free of suffering. Quite the contrary. Christianity, for example, is founded upon the image of a crucified Saviour, who bore suffering for the benefit of all mankind². Buddhism begins with the recognition that life is inevitably marked by suffering (dukkha). These traditions are not surprised by suffering; they take it as the starting point of spiritual inquiry. — Wayfarer

Exactly right. Such critiques seem to be wholly ignorant of actual religious beliefs and traditions. They strike me as a kind of naive escapism which is not able to deal with or confront the fact of suffering. It is not a surprise that those who do not confront that fact know nothing about religion.

The irony with this OP is that the "Hotel Manager" analogy presented is not a theodicy, but a critique. A theodicy is an apologetic. — Janus

Yes, but like most trolls, Banno doesn't read posts, so it isn't a surprise that his response has nothing to do with the OP. Wayfarer is talking about the sort of critique of theism which presupposes that God is a hotel manager, and such a critique is not a theodicy. A theodicy is supposed to vindicate God in the face of such a critique.

It doesn't require a moral judgment. I am at pains to understand how this question arose. — AmadeusD

with the way I described a moral judgment, namely:

Nevertheless, let's save the term "moral dismissal" for the situation where you dismiss someone based on a moral judgment of their own actions or behavior. Ergo: "I am dismissing you because of such-and-such an action of yours, or such-and-such a behavior of yours, and I would do so even if I had ample time to engage you." — Leontiskos

I elaborated on this idea <here>.

So let me quote the whole context of what you responded to when you merely asserted that it doesn't require a moral judgment:

But why isn't it moral? Why is it not a moral judgment to judge someone's ability to read the room and reflexively adapt their comedy routine? I am thinking specifically of the definition of "moral judgment" that we earlier agreed to. — Leontiskos

We are judging an action or behavior, and we agreed that such a judgment is a moral judgment, so it seems that the judgment of the comedian is a moral judgment. Do you have any argument to the contrary?

Feel free. I don't consider that judgment. If i'm marking a student's exam against a rubric of which out of A, B, C or D is 'correct' for each question, i'm doing no judgement at all. I feel the same applies here. — AmadeusD

Then give your definition of 'judgment.' It seems to me that looking at the rubric and determining which answer is correct will require a judgment, namely judging which answer is correct. Why is that not a judgment? It seems ad hoc to exclude that sort of act from being a judgment, just as it seems ad hoc to exclude the judgment of the comedian from being a moral judgment. What principled definitions are supposed to exclude such things?

More simply:

I think assessing against a rubric requires judgment. If you need a 10-foot pipe and you examine two possible candidates, you are inevitably involved in judgments, no? — Leontiskos

Thanks for the clarification, I think that I understand better now. — boundless

Okay, great.

Good points here! To me this raises an interesting question, though. I believe that most (?) Christians assume that one can't be righteous in an inerrant way without God's help. — boundless

I don't think that really matters. Let's suppose that when one enters into a marriage one believes that one will not be able to be faithful to the marriage vow unless the spouse is helping them. It makes no difference. That condition is already wrapped up in the ability to fulfill the vow. There is no need to think that someone who undertakes a vow must believe that they can fulfill it without outside help. They only need believe that they can fulfill it.

For example, if you join a monastery and take a religious vow, it is both true that you cannot fulfill the vow without God's help, and that you can fulfill the vow. This is because you can fulfill the vow with God's help, and when you take the vow you are presupposing that God will be there to help you. "With God's help," may even be part of the explicit formula of the vow.

Regarding the couples, I also believe that the couple can ask God's help to be able to commit the vow. So, they might believe that with God's help, they are able to respect the vow even if they themselves are not. — boundless

Right.

I see what you mean but even if we assume that we can make definite decisions, the traditional thesis that there is no possibility of repentance after death raises the inevitable question of why it should be so. — boundless

My point is that if the traditional position on the fixity of the will after death is such a hangup for you, then just ignore it. It changes nothing so long as we agree that humans can make definitive decisions (in which they in fact persist).

(It may be worth pointing out that universalists don't need to deny the fixity of the will at death. The fixity of the will at death has much to be said for it, and many universalists don't find it reasonable to question. Instead they claim that we don't have inside knowledge on what happens in someone's soul before they die. I.e. Everyone may secretly repent before they die.)

If, even in principle, the damned could repent, then why we can be sure that some will never repent? — boundless

If you want to hold that we can't be sure that some will never repent, go ahead and hold that. It doesn't logically imply universalism.

Both eternal (self-)damnation of some and repentance of all are possible scenario and we can hope for everyone. This would mean that we can legitimately hope for everyone. So, to me, the view you are expressing here is not logically inconsistent with a hope of universal repentance. — boundless

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible.

On the other hand, if the damned can't repent, this would imply an infinite retributive punishment of sorts. And in this case, the main question of the thread would arise (how a human being can merit a punishment of unending suffering...) — boundless

And question (1) <here> becomes more and more pertinent as we move along. There is a way in which you and @Count Timothy von Icarus are not paying much attention to what kind of thesis you are supposed to be arguing for. It begins to look like a, "Ready, shoot, aim," approach to the topic.

What I said is that a universalist that believes that 'being evangelized' is a necessary condition to avoid post-mortem purification then the universalist has of course a very rational motive to evangelize. — boundless

The same question arises: why is avoiding post-mortem purification so important? It's not important at all compared to the avoidance of Hell. It seems to merely be a motive of expedience.

But even this is not necessary to have a rational motive. An universalist might simply think that 'evangelizing' is a good thing to do, that it can help to avoid the temporary punishment both for him/herself and for others. There are plenty of rational motives that I can see. — boundless

But again, I never said there are no possible rational motives. I said . The evangelization doesn't need to be done. Of course, it can be done. We are capable of doing all sorts of things that we don't need to do. But it does not need to be done.

See, for example, this clip from N. T. Wright at 13:38. That's a pretty basic Biblical anthropology, where, "human choices in this life really matter."

Note that even if the argument were true, this would not exclude the possibility of the redemption of all, if the damned can still repent. — boundless

I was explaining why the universalist has no ultimate motive, not why the damned don't repent.

It depends about what you mean by 'philosophically demonstrable'. — boundless

What I mean is, Do you think you can demonstrate it on purely philosophical grounds?

I believe that here we are discussing if the traditional view of Hell is consistent with a proportional retributive model of justice. — boundless

We could ask whether Prometheus' punishment could be retributively just under any circumstances. I would say 'no', but that whole framing strikes me as a strawman. I don't personally know of theists who propose such a thing or who worship Zeus.

Considering that Christianity isn't the only theistic religion, I also believe that the discussion we are having here has a wider scope than being a discussion about a specific doctrinal aspect of Christianity. — boundless

A purely philosophical case is in no way a specifically Christian case.

-

BTW, I believe that the discussion we are having is also a very interesting way to explore what some concepts of 'justice', 'punishment' etc might imply, a reflection of what abilities we human beings really have and so on.

So, even if we are discussing under these kinds of things in the particular context of a religious doctrine, our reflections can give us interesting food for thought that can be applied in other contexts. — boundless

That's true, but I don't want to spend my free time endlessly discussing Hell. If we want to have a discussion of justice, I would rather do that in a less fraught context. For example, my thread from a different forum, "Is Justice based on Equality?"

What I am saying, is that what people are doing is saying that "X is good for..." — AmadeusD

So even though people call food good without any explicit qualification, you are reinterpreting everyone to be saying something else, namely that "food is good for such-and-such"?

one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive — Leontiskos

This is literally all i had said. — AmadeusD

It's literally not all you had said. In fact you contradicted that claim. Here is the exchange:

You did not respond to the claim that food is (deemed) good by all. — Leontiskos

It was an unreasonable claim in teh discussion. That is simply not how food is characterized. It is necessary to survive. Colloquially referring to this as 'good' is a psychological trick and not an ethical claim. Come on now. — AmadeusD

...you literally said that, "Food is good," is an unreasonable claim, that this is not how food is characterized, and that what we should say is that it is necessary to survive. It seems like you've done a 180 degree turn on most of these previous claims.

I can only repeat my previous reply. It's not a reasonable question, because I didn't intimate it was in question. You're not getting an answer. The question is ridiculous. What people? What acts? What reasons? Probably I eat for hte same reasons as other people, but there's very little chance I do some of my more personal things for the same reasons as others. The answer you want is a fugazi imo. "yes" tells you nothing whatsoever except that I think I know why everyone does everything they do, and "No" tells you nothing but "I am special". These are not part of our discussion and I am telling you, point blank period, the question is not helpful for what you want to know. Given that I am the source of what you want to know, I'm happy to just not respond if you re-ask this one. Take that as you wish. — AmadeusD

If you can't give truthful answers to questions posed to you, I'm not sure why you're on a philosophy forum. Your desire to understand where a question is going before answering it is a form of post hoc rationalization, where instead of simply giving a truthful answer you tailor your answer in a defensive manner in order to try to achieve some ulterior goal within the conversation. Consider your response:

I would want to know your motivation from 2 to 3 there - or perhaps, what you would expect one to say and what you think that might mean. — AmadeusD

...That's a bit like playing chess and then saying, "I'm not going to move until you tell me your strategy, so that I know where I should move." That's not how chess or philosophy works, and avoiding giving truthful answers for fear of being wrong is a great way to never be wrong, and to never learn anything. If you think someone will draw a false inference from an answer then you give the answer, see if a false inference is drawn, and then address the false inference. You don't refuse to answer.

These are not part of our discussion — AmadeusD

. Besides, who made you the arbiter of what is and is not part of the discussion? The reason you won't answer the question is because it shows your claim about the arbitrariness of the good to be false. If we all call food good for the same reason then your claim that predications of goodness are arbitrary is clearly seen to be false. One only refuses to move when they are at a loss. :razz:

Then you think "true" and "false" are synonymous with "good" and "bad".
I both disagree and find it silly. — AmadeusD

This is a good example of a false inference. It simply does not follow from what I've said that true/false must be synonymous with good/bad, and "I find it silly" is in no way an argument for that odd claim.

something must indicate that whatever proposition is, in fact, true or false, if we are to take those views — AmadeusD

But you are unduly stretching the meaning of the word "arbiter." The claim here that whatever it is that indicates that 2+2=4 is true is an arbiter is simply a misuse of the word "arbiter." I take it that we both know, if we are using words accurately, that it is not an arbiter that makes 2+2=4 true.

Perhaps you've missed, but I addressed this. He fails (on my view). YOu pointed me to an article. I read it. — AmadeusD

You've given no indication whatsoever that you read beyond the first page of the article. You haven't addressed or presented any of the arguments or points in the article.

In general, your fiat declarations of victory are not convincing, to say the least. If you are short on time, then delay the post. Don't make unsubstantial posts lacking argumentation and then declare victory.

1. would be falsified if sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another were found. Do you disagree with that? If so, on what grounds?

2. would be falsified if definitive proof or evidence that one race is inferior to another could be found. Do you disagree? If so, why?

3. would be falsified if you could imagine what sound evidence could look like. Do you disagree? If so, on what grounds. — Janus

Yes, the same old disingenuous answer, "It would be falsified if it were falsified."* Your intellectual honesty dried up many posts ago. I guess we're done here, Janus. Good luck with these unfalsifiable, "metaphysical" claims of yours. :roll:

* The logical conclusion of this form of sophistry is that there are no unfalsifiable claims, for every single claim without exception would be falsified if it were falsified, and is therefore falsifiable.

Perhaps it wasn't expressed in the clearest of ways. — Janus

Isn't it just false?

Why bring it up again? — Janus

Because it seems to me to be the last point in the conversation when you were clearly on topic, namely the topic of falsifiability.

My claim really just consists in the observation that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims — Janus

Well let's look at some of your claims:

1. "There simply are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, inferior to another." ()
2. "No race is, tout court, inferior to another." (my paraphrase)
3. "there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims" ()

Since we are talking about falsifiability, what is your opinion? Is (1) falsifiable? Is (2) falsifiable? Is (3) falsifiable? The claims are all laid out in front of us; this should be a simple matter.

I think we agree that if some proposition is falsifiable then there must be a concrete possibility which would falsify it, such as the concrete possibility provided in <this post> by the flat Earther. So if you think any of these claims are falsifiable, then I would ask you to provide that "imaginative" possibility.

I think (2) is much clearer and easier to assess, but if you really want to look at (1) then I would say that (1) implies that there are no sound criteria for considering one race to be, tout court, equal to another. It precludes rational opposition to racism just as much as it precludes rational support of racism. It functions as a kind of nuclear option, and I don't see how that nuclear option could possibly help repel racism if it places the racist claim and the anti-racist claim on a par, as both being irrational (and ultimately unfalsifiable).

If you agree that there is no imaginable evidence for racist claims then why are you continuing to argue with me? — Janus

Because I want to see if you are, "giving air to assertions which are not rationally justifiable."

I don't think the whole racist debate is just a sinkhole of unfalsifiable claims on both sides, akin to an astrological debate.* I agree with (2), but I don't think (2) or its mirror contradiction are unfalsifiable. In particular, I would not use a term like "tout court inferior" if I did not know what I meant by it.

* Feel free to substitute some other pseudoscientific candidate for 'astrology' if you like

Sure. Something I think is misguided. But I understand that this doesn't sit perfectly. — AmadeusD

Okay.

You've done nothing to support this. — AmadeusD

So you are claiming that things which enable us to survive, such as food, are not generally considered to be good? When I say that people call food good in part because it allows them to survive, and you disagree, I don't see that I am the one making the controversial claim. It seems obvious that one of the reasons we call food good is because it enables us to survive. I'm wondering if you sincerely disagree with that claim.

No. I'm telling you it was non sequitur. Feel how you want to about that. But it was loaded and I wanted clarification as to what you had loaded into it. If you don't want to give it, that's fine. I wont engage. — AmadeusD

No, I asked a simple question and you've avoided answering it twice now. The question is, "If so, are those rhymes and reasons altogether different than those which guide other people's acts?" If you need clarification on any of the words in the question, feel free to ask. I need an answer to that question.

I don't even know quite what you were getting at mate. — AmadeusD

It's not necessary to know what someone is getting at before answering their question. If that were the case then no one would have answered any of Socrates' questions whatsoever.

Not in the strict sense of those words. — AmadeusD

Right, and given that we can talk about true and false without an arbiter, I see no reason why we can't talk about good and bad without an arbiter.

Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4? — Leontiskos

I'm sorry, are you trying to suggest that Ethics is a mathematical function? If so we have no basis for discussion. Otherwise, I can't tell what you're getting at in this reply. — AmadeusD

I'm sorry, but this is another avoided question. Do we need an arbiter before we can see that 2+2=4?

-

why would [and arbiter] be needed in ethics? — Leontiskos

It isn't. But if you want 'good' and 'bad' to mean much of anything, you need one. I don't claim they do, so I don't need one. — AmadeusD

So does it then follow that we also need an arbiter of the terms in "2+2=4" if they are to mean anything? Again, if we don't need an arbiter to interpret or know the claim that 2+2=4, then it's not clear why we need an arbiter to know that food is good. The whole "arbiter" argument requires some explanation.

In the first section, he outlines almost exactly what I've suggested Ethics functions 'as'.

"The prudential ‘ought’ rests for its force on the facts about the contingent desires and interests people have, and just tells one what one ought to do if one is to satisfy them."

I find nothing further on which would counter this position. It's arbitrary. Obviously. If you'd like to point me somewhere in the article, more than happy to review and adjust. — AmadeusD

Right, that's why I pointed you to the article. He captures your position very clearly before arguing against it. You've recognized how accurately he captures your position, and that's a good start.

"Scientific theories can be falsified insofar" means "scientific theories are falsifiable insofar" so I am talking about falsification. We won't get far if you keep presenting distorted readings of my posts. — Janus

Why did you switch to talking about falsification rather than falsifiability? Here is what you said earlier, when you were still on topic:

Scientific theories are falsifiable only insofar as their predictions fail to account for observed facts. — Janus

(Again, this claim is simply false. Accurate theories can still be falsifiable even when they have not been falsified.)

Remember that the topic has always been falsifiability:

Specifically I want to explore the question of whether this claim is empirically or logically falsifiable. — Leontiskos

The attempt to discuss falsification apart from falsifiability is a kind of red herring, one which helps your case but which is in fact beside the point. (Note that one can discuss falsifiability via notions of falsification, or they can discuss falsification as a way of avoiding the question of falsifiability. You seem to be engaged in the latter.)

The further point is that no such evidence or proof is even imaginable, and I think that's why you keep saying my claim is unfalsifiable. — Janus

Well yes, if there is no imaginable evidence for your claim or the racist's claim, then both claims are unfalsifiable, are they not? It seems like you are on the verge of simply admitting that your claim is unfalsifiable, and such an admission would not imply that the racist does not have the same problem. If I just look at the two claims it seems obvious that both claims are unfalsifiable.*

* At least on your conception of reason

@Count Timothy von Icarus, @boundless

As far as I am concerned, there are two basic questions here:

1. Is it philosophically demonstrable that the doctrine of Hell is false?
2. Given Christian Scripture and tradition, is the denial of Hell reasonable?

I think the answers are both 'no'.

I'd say we are most concerned with the first question, and I am not yet convinced that either of you would be willing to answer that question in the affirmative. If we agree that the answer to (1) is 'no', then it's not at all clear what we are arguing about.

Explain how "unending torment with no possibility of improvement," could ever be in "someone's best interest?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I give my kid a choice between broccoli and a candy bar, and I accept his choice of the candy bar, does it follow that I don't care about his best interest? Respecting freedom is a pretty sound motive. To spin this and claim that I don't care about my son because I allowed him to choose would be a pretty tendentious interpretation.

Is God is capable of showing mercy on everyone? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is mercy just a magic wand that God waves which solves every problem? Traditionally mercy is not seen that way. At the very least it requires a kind of repentance, and repentance is a free act.

I have noted in the past that universalists and Calvinists are extremely close, in that both tend to be quasi-determinists who deny human freedom in one way or another. In either case the outcome is predetermined and freedom is not a real variable. I even suspect that we will see more and more Calvinists follow Barth in that universalist direction.

Of course I'm supposing injustice here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And to do so is to beg the question. Suppose you said, "What if someone does absolutely everything in their power to cooperate with grace and God damns them anyway?" I would give you the exact same answer, "Then God would be unjust. Why would you presuppose that traditional Christians think God would do that?" It is a strawman. No one thinks the guy who commits a few minor sins will be disproportionately punished for all eternity.

I am focusing on extrinsic punishment because human beings, while alive, are capable of repentance. If human beings utterly lose this capacity at death, it would seem to require some sort of extrinsic limitation that is placed upon them at death. A capacity they once had is now limited. If man has this "dual potency," it is apparently being constricted at the moment of death. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I said earlier:

I think there are good arguments for the fixity of the will at death even though it’s not a hill I would die on. But I don’t find it plausible, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, to say that the will can never be fixed in anything other than God. — Leontiskos

So let's pretend, for the sake of argument, that death has no substantial effect on us or on our ability to repent. What then? Does it suddenly follow that humans are unable to make definitive decisions (in which they persist)? Does it follow that in the Judeo-Christian tradition the will of intellectual beings can never be fixed in anything other than God?

To be fair, no. But I think that your example of the wedding made it clear. It is like making a oath. Am I wrong? — boundless

An oath is an example, yes. It is the language of "means" and "ends." So you might say, "I am going to go to the grocery store today." That would be an example of setting an end. Then you might say, "I will use my car to get to the grocery store." That would be an example of a means to your end. We could say that you have fixed an end regarding going to the grocery store. For further explanation, see ST I-II.1.

When Aquinas talks about someone who "fixes his end," what he presumably means is that someone fixes an end for himself qua person. Marriage is a good example of this because the couple is fixing their joint end in a way that is more substantial than merely going to the grocery store. In this way there is a sense in which one can define their own life vis-a-vis some desired end, or decide that some end is supremely desirable (and one could here think about Paul Tillich's talk of "ultimate concerns").

To fix an end of any kind does not entail that one will never change their mind, but it does entail that one can pursue the end without changing their mind. Hence my point about "can" rather than "must."

I see. But can philosophy and scripture/theology contradict each other? — boundless

Well, as I said, "if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition." Truth does not contradict truth, but not all philosophy and theology is true.

But there is a problem, here, I believe. You still have to explain why there is absolutely no hope of break the fixation of the will in sin. — boundless

Why do I have to explain that? Why don't you have to explain why there is no ability to fix one's end? That's my point about Aquinas: fixing one's end is uncontroversial.

But here in this life, it is assumed that we can repent. — boundless

On what basis? Theologically, it is assumed that we can repent in this life. It is also theologically assumed that we cannot repent beyond this life. So I don't see the argument.

Or we could just reify C. S. Lewis' imagery and say that repentance is always logically possible, but some will never repent. That is an orthodox position. It may or may not be a tenable position within Catholicism, but I don't really want to research that minute question.

The broad stroke simply says that humans are eventually capable of definitive decisions. I don't find that claim problematic.

Of course, he might not and we can imagine that the more time he remains faithful to this commitment, the more difficult is for him to renounce it. But he can still change his mind (i.e. repent) at any time and hopefully he does. — boundless

And if you want to think that way then I would just say that what is psychologically impossible can be logically possible. Someone who is confirmed in a certain decision or way of life will not change their mind, even though it is logically possible. These logical debates are ultimately debates of post-mortem anthropology, which strike me as unfruitful.

In the case of marriage, I don't see how 'making a sincere oath' necessary implies the ability to remain always faithful to the oath (in fact one can ask God's help to remain faithful precisely because of this). It certainly expresses the sincere intention to respect the oath, but failing to mantiain is also a possibility. — boundless

I think you are committing logical errors here, primarily modal errors. If one can promise lifelong fidelity then one must be capable of lifelong fidelity. If one is clearly incapable of lifelong fidelity then one cannot promise lifelong fidelity. You actually agreed to this earlier when you agreed that the person who does not think couples can fulfill the marriage vow do not in fact believe in marriage. It doesn't make any sense to say that the marriage vow is impossible to fulfill and nevertheless promote marriage.

In general, I don't think that an ability to make a oath implies an ability to remain faithful of it. — boundless

Suppose you make a promise that you know you can't keep. Are you promising or lying? I'd say it is merely lying.

Let's assume that 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation. — boundless

Here's what I said:

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. — Leontiskos

Strong exclusivism has problems, but they are not the problems of the doctrine of Hell. Tying the two together is no good.

-

I said:

If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. — Leontiskos

Your reply was that a universalist might hold that evangelization is, "a necessary condition to be saved in this life."

I don't understand your argument. Are you saying that if the universalist doesn't evangelize someone then that person won't be saved in this life? Hasn't your whole point been that there is no reason to limit our actions to this life? If nothing changes at death then who cares whether they are saved in this life?

If one still believes that repentance is necessary, them 'it's not something that requires no labor'. — boundless

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent.

Liberalism as I understand it stops with the first statement: From the state's point of view, your individual judgment is just that, and we will not interfere or tell you you are right or wrong. — J

But that's just nonsense. I don't understand the naivete which claims that the liberal state does not interfere with value judgments. Do you actually believe yourself when you say things like that?

A state which makes no value judgments cannot govern at all. Politics is no less bound up with values than morality. The fact that liberalism has brainwashed us to think otherwise is remarkable, and even impressive. :lol:

Doesn't this point back to the controversy surrounding the Pelagian heresy though? Man, on the orthodox view, cannot know and strive towards the Good on his own. His nous (intellect and will) are diseased and malfunctioning. Even in writers accused of being Pelagians like St. Jonn Cassian have a large role for grace and the sacraments in the very possibility of the healing of the nous, which is itself a precondition of knowing and choosing the Good as good (i.e. known and willed as good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Apart from Calvinists and some Lutherans, no Christians really believe in total depravity. Calvinists don't accept a bidirectional potency, and it is true that for the hardcore Calvinist everyone else is a Pelagian, but I'm not sure Calvinists deserve much credit.

More generally, I don't think the anti-Pelagian tradition precludes a bidirectional potency.

The eternal consequences man can effect as man aren't bidirectional. For man to have this capacity in the upwards direction would mean something like Pelagius' conception of the righteous man who attains merit warranting beatitude on his own.

The other issue is that movement upwards, towards God, is classically conceived of as making us "more free." St. Paul used the language of "slavery in sin." So movement in either direction is not the same. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are conflating a bidirectional potency with the idea that the two directions must be exactly parallel. Just because movement in either direction is not the same does not mean that there is no bidirectional potency. Indeed, I have never claimed that movement in both directions is the same.

There are mysteries in grace and mysteries in evil, and therefore the nature and relation of the two potencies is quite mysterious, but I don't see any of that supporting universalism (or the other extreme, which is a kind of extreme pessimism).

TBH, I find the dialectical of nature and grace to generally be unhelpful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you don't distinguish between nature and grace I don't see how you could talk about Pelagianism at all.

At any rate, I think the larger issue would tend to center around God (and us as Christians) wanting "what is truly best for every creature." It is hard to see how eternal torment could ever be "truly best" for someone, nor how, if we are called to forgive everyone, we should ever want eternal torment for anyone. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you think the doctrine of Hell requires that God or Christians must not want what is truly best for everyone? If so, why?

Consider a man born out by the Indus, who never had a chance to hear of Christ and dies as a young adult. He grows up in a violent culture, perhaps part of a low caste. And he does wicked things. Perhaps not abhorrent things, but "lower level mortal sins." And he cannot repent and turn to Christ, for he has never heard the name of Christ. Thus he dies in his sins. Might he benefit from purgation, or even the retributive punishment of justice? Sure. But after the first 9,999 billion years of suffering, does justice still require additional torment to be met out for his 20 miserable years on Earth? More to the point, is continued torment "what is truly best" for him? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are presupposing injustice here and then finding it in your conclusion. It could be simplified, "Suppose someone does something that does not merit Hell, and God gives him Hell. That's unjust." Yep, but no one thinks that God gives undeserving souls Hell.

Even if one has a strong place for retributive justice, there is a point at which, at least on human scales, it becomes sadistic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's what you yourself said:

Theologically, the focus on "extrinsic punishment" and "extrinsic reward," seems less helpful... — Count Timothy von Icarus

...and yet you are focusing on extrinsic punishment objections. Even Dante avoids those. I actually don't know of any theologians whatsoever who think in terms of extrinsic punishment. The passage I gave from Aquinas addresses this directly, with his points about the "disturbing of an order."

This is a thorny issue. If beatitude in union with God is the natural end of all rational creatures, then it would seem that the denial of this end could be seen as a punishment by itself. Yet, we normally don't think of withholding rewards—i.e., of withholding aid towards a dessert we cannot attain to on our own—as punishment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's pretty basic logic. Something cannot be gratuitous and due at the same time.

Honestly, I don't find Hart to be a very good philosopher or theologian.* Above all he is a rhetorician, and a caustic, uncharitable one. Reading Hart and reading Christopher Hitchens is more or less the same thing, with a different topic and a slightly different style. If I want puffed up abuse with a small side of argument, those are the sort of people I read. If I want serious engagement, I look elsewhere.

I say this because people who lean on Hart tend to eventually draw on that same sort of rhetoric, and the arguments then become thin. The reason Hart appeals to that abusive rhetoric is apparently because he can't "get the job done" without it. Here on The Philosophy Forum I think we need to keep the arguments front and center and not become lost in rhetorical polemics. Beyond that, I want to preempt the idea that Hart counts as an authority, especially for "infernalists"—one of Hart's characteristically rhetorical labels. If someone wants to use one of Hart's arguments then they will have to present them in their own words, and try to find logic in the midst of all that bluster.

When this topic was popular a few years back I tried reading Hart, but it was impossible. The book is not written to convince or persuade. So I turned to Balthasar's first volume on the topic and read that instead. The arguments were fairly bad, but at least the conclusions were more modest.

As I said earlier, I think some forms of universalism are philosophically defensible, but I think they fail when confronted with Scripture and tradition.

What exactly is the nature of the punishment in Hell though? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Lewis' images in The Great Divorce or The Four Loves are quite good. Dante, Aquinas, or even Milton also offer good images. The basic Orthodox approach where the damned are burned by the face of God or love of God is another. More simply, here on Earth it is not hard to find cases of unrepentance, hardness of heart, hopeless fixation on evil, extreme hatred, etc. I need look no further than my own heart to see the basis and possibility for Hell.

Beyond all that, I don't see a need to put God in the dock, especially given that the philosophical attempts at demonstrating injustice don't seem to hold up. There are lots of revealed truths that I don't perfectly understand. That's not a problem unless I want to reject everything that I can't understand well.

I think this is an important issue because it is perhaps not "universalist" to deny that any soul is subjected to sensuous torments of infinite duration (the "cosmic torture chamber"), although it could also be seen that way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have never found this objection very interesting. It's as if folks are super concerned about physical fire or sensuous torments—and this might be a materialist hangup. I could tell them that there will be no physical fire but there will be estrangement from God, and they would be relieved. That relief is a kind of irony all its own, as if estrangement from God is small change compared to the prospect of physical fire. :grin:

And this "differential cup size" might also be taken as a punishment — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't really buy all the claims in this thread of, "Might be taken as a punishment." I want more rigorous argumentation than that. I mean, democrats might take an unequal gift as a punishment, but so what? What does it matter that an irrational person might take something as a punishment? I would rather talk about things that are real punishments.

If everyone is "beatified to the extent they have made themselves able," this still might allow for a gradation (e.g. the metaphor of all cups filled to the brim, but some cups being smaller than others). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is standard orthodoxy to say that there are different levels and experiences in both Heaven and Hell. Once this and the possibility of Limbo are recognized I think many of the injustice arguments dissolve.

The idea that sin is its own penalty tends to get washed out by the scale of retributive justice. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This sort of thing looks like a false dichotomy. It's a pretty old idea that Hell is sin as its own punishment, and that retributive punishment need not be extrinsic.

It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What are you reading, here? Romans 14? Philippians 2? Again, if we give someone with no horse in the race these verses, will they think they have anything at all to do with universalism? Apart from the fact that such an interpretation contradicts all sorts of other things that Paul himself says, the literal meaning of such phrases has to do with military conquest. For instance, the metaphor applies in a special way to Satan, whose knee will bow, and yet there is nothing implied about Satan being saved or rejoicing in this submission.

With universalism there is a very real danger of wishful thinking - of seeing things that are not there, stretching interpretations beyond their proper bounds, or (in a case like Hart's) using rhetoric as a compensatory strategy. Hart's interpretation of aion in Mt 25:46 is a spectacular example of this. In general I would be cautious of Hart's claims when he is high on his rhetoric horse (e.g. his claims about Biblical scholarship and aion). His ability to mislead is quite unparalleled. N. T. Wright's review of Hart's New Testament translation highlights what happens when a rigorous scholar comes up against Hart's polemically-motivated decisions.


* Granted, he often has his finger on the most pressing and popular theological controversies, even before they emerge as such, but the way he addresses such controversies strikes me as rushed and superficial. The slapdash precedent may be bad for the theological guild altogether - as if we must pronounce strong conclusions on the most difficult and upcoming theological issues even before they are allowed to properly emerge.

That is, I believe that one can fix his end in sin/evil (and have the, at least implicit, intention to remain 'fixed' in that end) — boundless

What do you think it means to "fix one's end"? Or even to fix an end? Are you familiar with this language?

Why not, say, annihilation — boundless

One could argue for annihilation from philosophy, but not, I think, from Scripture/theology.

If you believe that because you have trust in the traditional view of hell, that's ok, I guess. But here we are discussing the matter philosophically. In my opinion, the traditional view has difficulties to be justified even in a retributive proportional understanding of 'justice' for the reason I explained in my previous posts and even in this one, where I argued that even if one's fixation in evil/sin is irrevocable, then, the traditional view of hell doesn't necessarily follow. — boundless

Again, if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition. That's why universalists like Hart try to prove such a thing.

I think I can agree with that. But I believe that, unfortunately, even if one has sincerely that will at the moment of marriage, one's will might not irrevocably set. A 'change of mind' (in this case for the worse) is indeed possible. One might seek help from faith in God's help that this bad change of mind won't occur.

So, I guess that I can say that in the case of 'fixing one's end in sin', my point is similar. While one can will to remain in sin forever, such a will is not necessarily irrevocable. If one's will isn't irrevocable, then there is still hope in repentance, in turning away from sin. — boundless

Again:

No one is saying "must." What is being said is, "Can."... — Leontiskos

• Leontiskos: One can have the will to sin everlastingly
• boundless: Yes, but one might not have the will to sin everlastingly

What you say is of course true, and there is no incompatibility here. The doctrine of Hell does not entail that everyone goes to Hell. You require a much stronger thesis, namely, "One cannot have the will to sin everlastingly."

But for the better or the worse at least in this earthly life I don't think that we have the power to be irrevocably faithful to the oaths. — boundless

If you don't think we have the power to be faithful to oaths then you presumably don't believe we have the power to make oaths, just as the person who does not believe that a couple has the power to be faithful to their marriage vows does not believe in marriage. This goes back to my point that some don't think humans are capable of much (e.g. oaths, vows, eternal consequences, etc.).

So yeah maybe you are right here, ultimately the result will be the same, but evangelization would be still important. — boundless

Okay, good.

BTW, even for an anti-universalist the question of evangelization (or spreading one's theistic religion to make the argument more general) is IMHO no less mysterious. If people need to be evangelized in order to be saved and end up not being evangelized because some believers refuse to evangelize (or live wickedly), these people end up outside salvation which would be a problem if God wants the salvation of every human being. That is, the salvation of a person would then depend also on the choices of others.* — boundless

I don't see a problem with any of this. I think what you are saying is, "Salvation couldn't possibly depend on human choices," and the Judeo-Christian tradition just disagrees with you on that.

So the question of the role of evangelization in the salvation is IMHO a mysterious topic even in the anti-universalist case, at least if one assumes that God wants the salvation of every human being. — boundless

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. What we are asking about is the motive towards salvation. On universalism there is no ultimate motive towards salvation. If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. Subsidiary goals can of course be sought, but they won't have any effect on that essential goal.

I think the best argument against 'universalism' is what I believe is called the 'pastoral argument', that is at least some people would not bother to strive for salvation if they hear that, eventually, all will be saved (incidentally, I believe that ancient universalists tended to not spread that doctrine exactly for this reason...). — boundless

Yes, I believe that is precisely what we are discussing.

I don't think we properly recognize how illogical it is to keep a doctrine secret "exactly for this reason." In fact it seems downright sinful to mislead someone in that manner, namely to try to persuade them—via an omission—to labor for something that requires no labor.

If we are charitable then the universalist is relying on paradox, but to formalize a paradox doctrinally in favor of one side of the paradox is surely inadmissible.