- Thanks. Wonderful passage. I tend to think this idea of "tolerance" is what underlies many of @J's meanderings. He worries about how he could ever be justified in claiming that something is true when he knows that others disagree.

It is also interesting to think about faux agreement, such as virtue signaling, as the other side of the coin of "bourgeois metaphysics." I see this a lot with philosophers who feel pressure to assent to a set of ideas based on appearing fashionable or "in." This informal chat with Dr. Michael Gorman about his introduction to philosophy and metaphysics gets at some of these ideas in a rather simple way, especially the student who worries that their question might be stupid.

- Yep. See also @Count Timothy von Icarus's thread, "The Unity of Dogmatism and Relativism."

- I would certainly think he followed kosher, etc.

- Thank you. Good post. :up:

I want to return to this loose end. Am I right that we can avoid the conclusion in (8) by denying (4), the symmetry of relevance? — J

@fdrake's argument is both invalid and self-contradictory, among other things. Odd that no one understands it well enough to see this, even though it has been pointed out:

From (1) and (5) we get <X is relevant to X, and X is a philosophical claim, therefore something relevant to X is relevant to a philosophical claim>, and this contradicts (7). — Leontiskos

One isn't inferring Not A in such cases — sime

So you would say that a reductio ad absurdum is not an inference in the proper sense?

It's hard to say in generality. Did you have a specific verse or issue in mind? I certainly don't think Jesus strays far from the Law. The Sermon on the Mount is key here, for this is the New Moses going up the Mountain to give the New Law. This sermon begins in Matthew 5, and I am especially thinking of v. 17 as beginning the teaching on the Law. The verses before that look like a sort of prelude.

It looks to me like Jesus took the seed or sapling of the Law and nourished it into a life-giving tree. He is developing it.

This seems to be the best answer; you do not resort to a redefinition of Christianity in any sense. — BT

:up:

I'm glad you're taking due care when it comes to redefinitions of Christianity.

Many would like to redefine Christianity away from Paul. But Paul's theology of the resurrection naturally matches that of the gospels. To take two examples at random regarding Jesus' power and victory over sin & death:

For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again; this charge I have received from my Father. — John 10:17-18

But if it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you. Or how can one enter a strong man’s house and plunder his goods, unless he first binds the strong man? Then indeed he may plunder his house. — Matthew 12:28-29

-

The very word "gospel" (evangelion/εὐαγγέλιον) signified a military victory. Indeed, the "good news of Jesus Christ" was the good news (gospel) of his victory over sin and death. This is the core of Peter's sermons in Acts, "You crucified and killed [him,] But God raised him up, having loosed the pangs of death, because it was not possible for him to be held by it" (Acts 2:23-24). This "good news" is precisely what got the Apostles in so much trouble after Jesus' resurrection (e.g. Acts 5:27-32). It is also what changed them from fearful people in hiding, into confident preachers, culminating at Pentecost (cf. Luke 24:36-49).

- :up:

The modern instrumentalization of science was probably the biggest shift for the "monozygotic twins," and it is probably why there are now tensions between philosophy and science.

Whether or not Christ was raised from the dead (physically, hence the purported visual apparition allegedly witnessed by followers) seems to me like an incredibly minor detail based on the underlying context of Abrahamic faith (which again different followers hold different beliefs as far as what the purported Messiah is, signifies, and functionally "does") If I'm not mistaken, Jewish prophecy states the Messiah would be a military leader who would ensure them a victory against their enemies. — Outlander

Sure, and who are the enemies, according to the Christians? Sin and death (and the powers connected to them). Without the resurrection Christ is not a victor. Christians retain much more of the militaristic approach than is commonly thought. It's just that the enemy is not human.

They do it different, but at least for the Mormans who really believe in the theology it's hard for me to separate them from Christianity because of the belief that Christ was risen from the dead and he conquers death and sin — Moliere

Fair enough.

And I hesitate to correct a former Mormon, but I think it is spelled Mormon, not Morman. In any case, your break is now complete. :razz:

- Haha, makes sense.

one of the best definitions of phil. that I know: "inquiry about inquiry" — J

I've never heard philosophy defined that way. I would grant that inquiry about inquiry is philosophical, but not that philosophy is inquiry about inquiry. It's also not clear to me that inquiry about inquiry is going to be as useful or fruitful as one hopes. It certainly didn't turn out well for Vizzini:

There are certainly people who embrace such positions today. Jordan Peterson seems to be suggesting something like this, although I haven't paid too much attention to him. People advocating "cultural Christianity," (e.g. Elon Musk now, lol) seem to be in the vein. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I am curious whether the OP is thinking along such lines.

Agree. I think I understand the radical nature of the Resurrection. It's not reasonable, or 'nice', or comfortable. — Wayfarer

Yes.

I guess the fact that I believe it, makes me Christian in some sense, whether I go to Church or not. — Wayfarer

Interesting. :up:

That said, I couldn't in conscience recite or believe in the Nicene Creed, I have some fundamental disagreements with orthodoxy which is why I declined Confirmation. — Wayfarer

I was talking to an elderly friend recently and they told me that the whole class cheated on the "Confirmation test" in their Episcopal church. It was a funny story, but it is good that you were more serious about the whole thing. :grin: I considered declining Confirmation as well, but I was more or less made to go through with it.

if Jesus didn't physically ascend, then it completely changes the nature of the Christian faith — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that's right. I think even those who tend to oppose Christianity like Hitchens or Dawkins are right to take this line on the resurrection. It is a keystone to the religion.

Theologically, the resurrection has been central to Christianity from the very beginning. But nowadays the inquiry is epistemic. We say, "If Jesus rose, then Christianity is true," and then we go on to try to decide whether Jesus rose. The theological and historical/apologetical questions are interrelated, but also rather different, and I don't see how the facticity of the resurrection is to be definitively adjudicated. You can make arguments for or against it, but it will never be proved or disproved by historical methods. From this perspective of the credibility of Christianity, it is but one part of the whole. So if the OP is "not sure if Jesus actually rose," he is not disbarred from Christianity when considered as an inquirer, and yet he is at best in via ("on the way") towards the fullness of Christian belief.

One book which tries to line up two different perspectives is The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions, co-authored by N. T. Wright and Marcus Borg.

didn't really undermine Jesus' core message of love for all, tolerance, etc etc. — Wayfarer

I have personally witnessed this approach lead to disillusionment, for good reason. It is a "religion" without substance. The mere emulation or appreciation of a historical figure is not religion. To take that route is to try to make substantial something which is inherently insubstantial.

You rely on Paul — Fooloso4

The OP is about Paul's words, which is why I commented on Paul. Did you read the OP?

You are not a Christian, you have no formal theological training, you constantly display ignorance in this area, and you are outright hostile towards professing Christians. I hope the OP finds a more serious opinion.

can they still have a rational belief in Christianity? — Brenner T

What do you mean by "a belief in Christianity"?

I think the best that can be done with this is to acknowledge that if you're a Christian who believes in the resurrection, and you do not believe in the resurrection, then you are not a Christian who believes in the resurrection. — tim wood

Brilliant stuff here, lol.

So I am a Christian. I believe I am the first Christian to post in this thread. There are a lot of folk around here who are not Christians, know very little about Christianity, and love to opine on Christianity. Indeed, I have literally never seen more ignorance of Christianity anywhere else in my life than on TPF. So your question is much better suited to a theology forum or a Christian forum given that many people on this forum are hostile to both religion and Christianity. With that out of the way...

I specifically am interested in two questions: 1) If Jesus did not rise from the dead, can there be a rational belief in Christianity? and 2) If one is not sure if Jesus actually rose from the dead, can they still have a rational belief in Christianity? — Brenner T

First, in 1 Corinthians 15 St. Paul is not making a primarily epistemic point. This is the lynchpin of his argument:

If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. — 1 Corinthians 15:17-18, RSV

We could put it this way: <Jesus is the conqueror of sin and death; the definitive conquering of sin and death occurred in the resurrection; therefore if the resurrection is a lie, then Jesus has not conquered sin and death but has instead been conquered by them, and Christians hope in a lie. They hope in a conqueror who is in fact not a conqueror>.

Christianity historically requires the belief that Jesus conquered sin and death, and that we therefore are (or will be) saved from sin and death (by Jesus). But maybe by "belief in Christianity" one means something entirely different, like, "Trying to be a nice person." Certainly you can try to be a nice person even if you do not believe that Jesus was raised; you just can't hold that Jesus conquered sin and death.

-

Note particularly the claim, "...your faith is futile." Suppose your island is on fire and you are forced to flee. There is a man selling boats. He tells you that the boat he is selling is a sturdy vessel, capable of navigating on the sea and easily able to reach the mainland. You believe him; you have faith; you buy the boat from him. You take the boat and complete the first nautical mile of your journey, and your companion says, "If this boat is not seaworthy, our faith is futile. Our faith is in vain." That's what St. Paul means. "If Jesus has not been raised then the guy who sold you this boat was a liar, and you were a fool to believe him."

In happy moments, I see this restlessness as philosophical.

I participate in discussions like this one, in some part, in hopes of figuring out what hold philosophy has on me, why I keep doing it, what it is I'm doing. — Srap Tasmaner

Fair enough. And I don't think it is necessary to reflect on what philosophy is in order to do philosophy. Perhaps the best philosophers are not self-consciously concerned about what philosophy is.

In the example Srap imagined, he did opt out. Rather than supplying the justification for his theories of motivation, he puts on his Freudian hat and says, "Very interesting . . .Tell me more about the sorts of occasions you feel the need to justify yourself" or some such. The distinction matters, because what the Freudian holds, and would have to defend, is different from what he has to do. I would say that, if he continues in reason-giving, then you're right, he's doing philosophy with us. But what he may hold to be true is different from what he may or may not choose to justify. If he doesn't make that choice, then . . . well, I want to say he's no longer doing philosophy, but certainly others on this thread would disagree. — J

But psychologists don't opt out of giving justification for their psychological theories of motivation. So it seems to me that we're talking about a fictional character. Or we're talking about a psychologist who is doing something stupid or stubborn qua human, not qua psychologist. Just as the philosopher bent on the 'gotcha' is doing something stupid or facile qua human, not qua philosopher. Humans do stupid things, and there are a few philosophers and psychologists who are also human. But not everything a real or fictional psychologist/philosopher does is representative of psychology/philosophy.

Note too that even the psychologist you envision would justify his diagnosis to a fellow psychologist who challenges him on it. He is not altogether refusing justification when talking to the philosopher; he is merely condescending on the basis of the premise that the philosopher lacks self-knowledge (whether that premise is true or false). He is intentionally talking past the philosopher, but this capacity for "talking past" is not unlimited, such that he refuses the notion of justification itself.

See also:

If the philosopher believes he's on firm ground demanding to know how the psychologist knows what he claims to know, the psychologist believes himself to be on ground just as firm in examining the philosopher's motives for demanding justification. — Srap Tasmaner

Aquinas does talk about the way that the intellect and the will are both infinitely recursive and intermixed, and you could think of "motive" as pertaining to the will and "justification" as pertaining to the intellect. That's fine as far as it goes, but that deep analysis of the will strikes me as philosophical, not psychological. It is certainly not psychological to the exclusion of being philosophical. The dispute between intellectualism and voluntarism has not historically been construed as a dispute between philosophy and psychology, even though it can truly be said that modern and contemporary philosophy are excessively intellectual. — Leontiskos

The final thing I find interesting about these quoted responses is that they all shy away from the idea that phil. is distinguished by its subject matter. — J

I think part of the difficulty here is that philosophy and science began as monozygotic twins. Given the way scientific specialization has occurred, philosophy probably represents "science" conceived as an undifferentiated totality.

If someone thinks Socrates' gadflyishness captures a manner in which philosophy is highest or unique, then they should argue that thesis. They should say, "Philosophy is highest because because it is the critical discipline par excellence," or something to that effect.

One relevant example of "Shooting down planes," would be, "It is elitist to say that philosophy is highest, therefore I will try to argue against anyone who gives an argument for philosophy being highest." There is too much moral bleed into this thread for my taste. Some are arguing about the relations between disciplines, some are arguing against elitism, and some are arguing around "gotchas" or bad actors. We're not on different pages, we're in different books.

It is hardly outside the mainstream to think philosophy's mission might be principally if not exclusively critical. Starts with a guy called 'Socrates' ... — Srap Tasmaner

But that's a plane, not a shot. If the substance of philosophy is criticism then you're on the runway.

If so, then as Srap pointed out, I've stacked the deck heavily against, e.g., the Freudian who wants to opt out of that sort of discourse. — J

As I said earlier, he holds that theories of motivation require justification, so he hasn't opted out. Beyond that, philosophy doesn't have a single answer to the question of ultimate justifications. There are many different epistemological approaches, and all of them are philosophy. The point here is not that philosophy is bound to a position of infinite justification claims (the classical philosophical position opposes this claim). The point is that there is no in-principle limit to philosophical inquiry or argument.

Srap's second point follows from this. He said, with disappointment, that what seemed to him the interesting issues raised by the OP never really got discussed. — J

I doubt we all agree on what the interesting issues are. I see the OP as essentially asking whether there is a substantive manner in which philosophy is highest. I think a lot of people were more interested in shooting down other planes than trying to fly their own.

For me, the deeper interest here is good old "thinking and being." The OP ended by bringing in Hegel and his dialectical concept of refutations, as an example of how an innocent recursion might point us to some very important truths. This was a gesture. — J

Right.

What we want to know, I think, is whether phil.'s lack of specialness is because a) the Q recursion isn't special to phil. at all, or b) this kind of recursive argumentation is indeed merely a gotcha! generated by a type of formalism we can look at and understand. — J

Okay, so what do we mean by "recursive argumentation"? Some candidates are: philosophy can offer infinitely recursive justifications for its claims; philosophy must offer infinitely recursive justifications for its claims; philosophers can debate endlessly. The philosophy/philosophers distinction is important.

You seem to have this set piece in mind: A philosopher and a psychologist are arguing about whether philosophy is useful. The philosopher continually says to the psychologist, "But you are doing philosophy here! How can you say that it is useless?" You want to say that this is a "gotcha," which turns the whole thing pejorative and subjective. The only way to address this set piece is to define what we mean by 'philosophy' and 'useful' (or whatever alternative for 'usefulness' we deign appropriate). Or else you could try to define what counts as a 'gotcha', but I doubt that will go far.

-

For me these sorts of issues come back to something like Srap's claim elsewhere, which says that different kinds of justification are incomparably different. If that is right then there is no such thing as logic in the older sense of 'the art of correct reasoning' (or the study of justification which you are associating with philosophy).

Some folk need there to be only two genders — Banno

Some folk need there to be more than two genders. Let's do philosophy instead of polemics. The question is whether beliefs have an impact on behavior.

- Rogan is a bit of a goon, but I do agree with the premise behind his long interviews. "If you want to understand who Elon Musk is, watch this 2-3 hour, unedited interview." That personalization is very helpful, and to have that contextualizing device available should be a great boon to society. A long, unedited interview is one of the least fakable portraits conceivable.

• November 4, 2024 Rogan-Musk chat
• June 27, 2024 Rogan-Musk chat
• February, 2021* Rogan-Musk chat
• May 7, 2020 Rogan-Musk chat
• September 6, 2018 Rogan-Musk chat

...So that's about 13 hours of unedited Elon Musk over the span of six years, on Rogan's podcast alone. Obviously you're not going to watch all of that, but it's not hard to compare Elon before and after his Twitter acquisition in 2022. It's not hard to get a very clear picture of who Musk is if one wants to do so.

Musk himself posted it. — Wayfarer

I know. Have you ever listened to Musk himself? There is lots of video interview footage available online. I think he recently did a long interview with Joe Rogan. It's worth taking advantage of an age where we can get it from the horse's mouth, and we don't have to take CNN's word for everything. Musk is eclectic, and has always been. I don't think he has changed much over the years.

generally sounding off on everything and nothing. — Echarmion

He's been doing that for a long time. Why has everything changed all of the sudden?

Be afraid. — Wayfarer

Be afraid? This was a photoshopped joke post on Twitter/X captioned, "Let that sink in." Musk was a [left-leaning independent] just three years ago. Now he has been demonized for political reasons, and many have been taken in by the propaganda.

The first time Musk voted Republican was 2022. (Business Insider) He opposed Trump in 2016 and in 2022. He has given political donations to both sides.

- We're not. It's fairly obvious that the philosophy goes on. If someone posts a thread arguing that conscious minds do not exist, we do not close the thread because it is non-philosophy. Your claim about the presupposition of philosophy is just incorrect. But your definition of psychology is also incorrect, which is why I would suggest that you try to clean up your argument altogether.

It's perfectly & easily feasible to believe the bones of dinosaurs were placed by Satan to trick creationists into believing in evolution. You just need to revise all your beliefs. — Sirius

Revising all one's beliefs is not perfectly easy.

I said changing a societal belief from X to Y would have radical implications. You replied that "one could believe" Y without moving into those implications. This is a modal notion which is quite foreign to reality. Beliefs have implications, just as knowledge does, and changes in belief will involve changes in behavior.

Once again. Harder according to whom ? — Sirius

Revising all one's beliefs is hard for everyone. It's not as if there is no commonality between humans, here.

I don't think this is true. Let's take someone who holds my view expressed above & also happens to believe in biological essentialism. He can still believe its possible to divide the essence of "male" or "female" or any other gender into different combination of biological essences. — Sirius

"Can still believe" is not a good test. For example, someone who does not believe that humans have greater dignity than animals "can still believe" that human rights trump animal rights, but it is a helluva lot harder.

I think Americans are tired of institutional capture, faceless politicians, and demagoguery. Harris is a creation and puppet of the DNC; Trump is a thorn in the side of the RNC. Harris doesn't seem to have a mind to speak, and tries to placate everyone simultaneously; Trump speaks his mind regardless of how stupid or ostracizing his thoughts are. The most interesting race in this respect is Trump vs. Sanders, but the DNC put the kibosh on that one.

The example I used was the assumption, what Collingwood calls an "absolute presupposition," that there is a conscious mind. — T Clark

In every discipline other than philosophy there are unallowed criticisms of the form, "You are presupposing X, but I deny X." For example, Parmenides cannot go to the physicist and say, "You are presupposing motion, but I deny motion." To offer such a criticism is to have stopped doing physics. In philosophy there are no such unallowed criticisms. In philosophy there are no such presuppositions. — Leontiskos

"You are presupposing a conscious mind, but I deny a conscious mind." So has this person stopped doing philosophy? Nope, in fact they haven't. The philosophy goes on.

1. Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. We would still believe in the existence of the same number of objects. In other words, the idealist and realist would live life behaving in similar manner. — Sirius

Why think this? Different beliefs often lead to different behavior. A pragmatist could argue for a belief on the basis of a desired behavior, as you suggest, but a non-pragmatist could argue for a belief on the basis of the truth and the consequences of believing the truth.

To take a common issue, realism or anti-realism with respect to sex or gender will have radical societal implications. "Realists and non-realists with respect to sex or gender would live life behaving in a similar manner," is not at all a plausible claim. Other examples would be less obvious, but still true, and would play out over a longer time scale.

Believe it or not, over 50% of the population voted Republican because they are Republican. — Hanover

Nah. It has to be [insert ad hominem here].

But it's worth remembering that not everyone votes. Historically speaking, voter turnout was high, but less than 2020.

- The post you quote does not say what you think it does.

I do not see a way around making some kind of distinction here. Either only mathematics (and logic) gets knowledge and deduction ― and everything else gets rational belief and probability ― or there are two kinds of knowledge, and two kinds of deduction. Pick your poison.

Mathematical knowledge and empirical knowledge differ so greatly they barely deserve the same name. Obviously the history of philosophy includes almost every conceivable way of either affirming or denying that claim. — Srap Tasmaner

Good post. This is a clear representation of the variety of univocity that I would oppose. I don't think we have to pick a poison. They are different but not altogether different. I only would have been happier if you had said, "...[they] differ so greatly they don't deserve the same name."

But this should be bookmarked as a jumping-off point for a substantive thread. [Do they deserve the same name?]