Coming back to this but trying to shorten the length a bit...
In general I see no reason to claim that causality is physical. — Leontiskos
I can't see that it could obtain if not. This is a really weird statement, for me. It's almost like saying "I can't see a reason, in general, to assume that heat causes hotness". I mean, causation happens in the physical world. We don't have other examples (ignoring some "hard problem" considerations that would beg the question on either side). — AmadeusD
I think this is the central point. If there are no good arguments that causality is physical, then we have no reason to claim that causality is physical. Of course if we ignore the ubiquitous phenomenon of mental causation, then we are closer to a physicalism that would favor physical causality. But at the moment I think we're asking whether causality that does not involve mentality is physical.
The way that causality abstracts from objects—physical or otherwise—and is situated in between objects (in their relationality) is another example of the way that two differentiated genera provide us with the power to reason. — Leontiskos
It doesn't obtain "between" the objects, in physical space. It only obtains "between" the objects in thought (like the "relationship" between two corporate entities. In reality, it is the "relationship of them - how the two relate). — AmadeusD
Yes, but even then the relationship between two objects is something that is between the two objects. It is neither one object nor the other nor some third object. Thus to say that causality occurs between physical objects does not seem to prove that causality is physical, unless by "is physical" we only mean, "occurring between two physical objects."
There doesn't seem to be any reason whatsoever to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer yet. — AmadeusD
Well "basis" is a strange word here. If there is no reason to claim that causality is physical, and there is no reason to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer, then why not simply abstain from affirming either of those things?
In light of the above, i think I need an elucidation here. It seems this has been answered adequately above: Yes, they are one-and-the-same but in concert, not considered individually. The energy of one ball is part and parcel of itself, and not something "other". The same true for ball 2. They then interact, physically, and pass physical matter between themselves causing "work" to have obtained. — AmadeusD
Note though that if you think energy transfer is the transfer of physical matter, then it seems that you do think energy is a physical object, even though you said, "Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is." This is a large part of the difficulty. The concept of "capacity to do work" (energy) is not physical matter, and yet you think the transfer of energy is the transfer of physical matter.
and therefore a mathematical distance-measurement is not physical — Leontiskos
This is wrong as I see. The division is not physical. The division is artificial and, as you say, abstract. The measurement is entirely physical and rests on the actual physical limitations of point A in relation to point B and the physical space between them, along with our measurement methods which are also physical. — AmadeusD
I have a hard time with your claim that measurement is physical. I would say that a measurement of distance and the two endpoints belong to a different genus. The spatial orientation of a physical object, especially relative to something else, is not a property of itself. It is a Cambridge property. This is why points can be dimensionless even while line-lengths are not. In Euclidean geometry a line is always qualitative more than a set of points.
IN fairness, this was rough-and-ready and I'm technically misspeaking, even on my own understanding. Different forms of transfer require different descriptions, but something like this seems to work for your example. A version below:
"At the interface where the two objects meet, the faster-moving, higher-energy particles from the hot object collide with the slower-moving, lower-energy particles of the colder object."
At collision, "energy" which is read essentially as head or speed in this context, passes between the two objects, more-or-less replacing the hotter, faster particles in the moving object with colder, slower particles from the stationary object (again, not quite right - but the net effect is this).
An easier example is something like boiling (convection more broadly): less energetic particles are heated, move faster and spread about over a larger area, which causes them to move (as they cannot be as close to other particles when vibrating so fast, lest destruction occur) upwards and transfer that heat as essentially movement, to the more dense, less hot particles which they encounter. There's a purely physical explanation going on there.
Energy is just an assignment of value to the ability for a system to "do work" or affect other systems and objects. It's not claimed to be a "thing". Its a physical attribute, described very different across different media. — AmadeusD
I agree that the case of boiling water fits your account better than the case of collision. The difficulty here is that if you think every cause is physical, then you will need to defend not only the boiling of water, but also the collision of objects, gravity, etc.
it is hard to see how gravity is itself supposed to be physical. — Leontiskos
I don't find it hard. But then, I include certain assumptions about "fabric" being involved in space-time. That there is a finite set of work that can be done within the Universe leads me to understand that all bodies will be affected by all other bodies. This will represent itself in a ubiquitous force exerted by everything, on everything else. I'm unsure its reducible in any way from that. — AmadeusD
But I think "fabric" is another metaphor being reified. Does the physicist see the "spacetime fabric" as
physical? In what sense is it said to be physical? We can surely stretch the word "physical" far beyond what we ever generally mean by it, but I am not much interested in that approach.
I'll go with your example though [but add premise 3]: — AmadeusD
1. Billiard ball1 causes billiard ball2 to move
2. Billiard ball1 and billiard ball2 are both physical
3. There is nothing else involved in the interaction
4. Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two billiard balls is itself physical — Leontiskos
I still don't see that (4) follows. There is no sufficient reason to believe that the (causal) interaction is itself
physical.
Consider: <Muhammad Ali causes George Foreman to move; Muhammad Ali and George Foreman are both human; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two boxers is itself human>.
Or: <The cue-ball causes the the nine-ball to move; The cue-ball and the nine-ball are both phenolic resin; There is nothing else involved in the interaction; Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two balls is itself phenolic resin>.
This form of reasoning does not seem to be valid. A kind of
metabasis eis allo genos is occurring in the conclusion, where the predicate term is of an improper genus. Causation is not human, or phenolic resin, or physical, etc. We can say that what causes the nine-ball to move is the collision with a phenolic resin object, but words like "collision," "interaction," "relation," are also not amenable to the genera in question. Collisions are not phenolic resin, or phenolic resin objects. Collisions can occur
between objects made of phenolic resin; or objects made of phenolic resin can collide, but it is still improper to say that the collision is itself phenolic resin.
I would say that the majority of talk about causation is in non-physicalist terms. — Leontiskos
I agree. I think most of it is doomed to be self-contradictory, empirically untenable or down-right ridiculous (God did it, for instance). — AmadeusD
That's not what I am saying. If two physicists are studying billiards and you ask them, "Are you
assuming that the collision is itself phenolic resin?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Or, "Are you
assuming that the collision is itself physical?," they will tell you, "No, I am not." Physics by its very nature has always prescinded from the idea that collisions are themselves phenolic resin or that collisions are themselves physical. I gave the reason why earlier, "explanation and reasoning requires differentiated genera." If everything is reduced to the physical (or to any one homogenous thing), then explanation will be impossible, including causality-explanations.
But I think what you say is right when taken with respect to our cultural "religion" of materialism or physicalism. If we just assume that everything is physical, including causality, then we lead ourselves into absurdities. In this case it is the absurdity which makes interactions the same
kind of thing as that which interacts. ("The Physical" is the new Ur-explanation)
Exactly: "that a car could make." It is potential. "Energy, in physics, the capacity for doing work" (Britannica). — Leontiskos
Physically deducible. — AmadeusD
"Physically deducible" is a strange and ambiguous phrase. Better to say, "deducible from physical interactions." And there simply is no valid deduction to the conclusion that the interaction is itself physical.