The Abrahamic religions are essentially exclusive and intolerant. — Ciceronianus

Where do the Abrahamic religions fall in your genealogy of modern tolerance?

Quite! Your points are well-taken. — Wayfarer

Well, if you're going to give up that easily then I will be forced to admit that there are a lot of important similarities between religions as well. :razz: Folks like Huston Smith have argued this claim closer to the ground. I used to hold to something like Hick's thesis 15 years ago, but I have changed course over time. So I do think the points you've made have merit, and I am not entirely unsympathetic to that approach.

I don't think 'eclipse' them, as much as viewing them in a wider context. — Wayfarer

Well I don't know how long it's been seen you read Nagel's book, but I think Hick does the same thing. So maybe we want to say that Hick is "viewing them in a wider context," but it seems to me that the exact same claim could be made about the kinds of thought that Nagel targets. Your point about a multiplicity of views is something that Nagel addresses directly in the chapter on ethics, and all of the parallel arguments would hold with respect to religion. Because of the multiplicity problem, second-order reasoning is more persuasive when it comes to ethics and religion (I actually think Nagel's chapter on ethics was objectively weaker than his other chapters for this very reason). Still, that seems to be what Hick is doing.

What is the move of Nagel's second-order relativizing? It is something like saying that the claims of first-order reasoners are false, but nevertheless the field of inquiry (including aspects of those claims) can be resuscitated under a different guise and form. So for example, for Wittgenstein philosophy in the traditional sense is impossible and misguided, but nevertheless by examining language we are able to salvage certain aspects of traditional philosophy and solve some of the problems which befuddle us, problems which are necessarily linguistic. Or for Kant, science in the traditional sense is impossible (i.e. study of the noumenal), but by introducing a Kantian theory of cognition we can resituate science in such a way that phenomena rather than noumena form the subject of investigation. Similarly, Hick thinks that substantial knowledge of God is impossible, but that philosophy of religion and the existing knowledge-claims can be salvaged by reconceiving religious epistemology along Kantian lines.

Again, my primary thesis here is that Hick runs afoul of Nagel's project, not that Hick is wrong. Nagel might not even think he is wrong.

The three philosophical traditions that I am at least slightly familiar with are Christian Platonism (my native tradition), Vedanta, and Mahāyāna Buddhism. Certainly, they all differ, but their distinctions can be seen as complementary rather than conflicting. — Wayfarer

They could, but Aristotle's warning about "small errors in the beginning leading to large errors later on" is incredibly pertinent. If we start out with an a priori desire to seek out commonalities, then—lo and behold!—we will find commonalities, and we will come to the conclusion that the similarities are very great. If we start out with an a priori desire to seek out differences, then the opposite will occur.

It seems to me that if we try to remain unbiased, then we are forced to admit that there are significant differences between religions and between religious conceptions of God, even to the point where Hick's thesis fails. For example, it is not coherent to say that God manifests to zealous Muslims or crusading Christians as someone who demands violence and war, and that God manifests to Shakers as someone who demands pacifism. Unless God is schizophrenic, it simply cannot be the same God manifesting to both groups. If we assume that God does exist then one group's belief or interpretation must be more correct than the other, and Hick's idea that both are equally interpreting the same divine reality surely fails. (I think those who have no skin in the game are quick to observe significant religious differences.)

Would we accept this kind of jump in other areas? If we say that Trump voters and Bernie Sanders voters are really just different expressions of the same truth about politics, I'd see this a largely fruitless simplification. — Tom Storm

This strikes me as an apt analogy. It really is possible to see Trump and Sanders through the same lens (reactionary populism, professed opposition to the political status quo, etc.). Nevertheless, stressing that aspect and concluding, "Mostly the same," would not be valid.

Of course Hick does not seem to be engaged in "rationalization." He is not a religious apologist. It would be more apt to call him a pluralist, or a globalist, or a cosmopolitan.

With respect to having rational justification for believing in a supernatural entity in general, I would say no. Back then, we had very limited understanding of nature. Any test I would have been able to, plausibly, come up with, just like Gideon, would most likely be in vain: this is the same reasoning that every civilization has had for believing in their own gods (e.g., if <this-god> exists, then it will rain tomorrow and, what do you know, it rained!) and it is by-at-large very faulty reasoning indeed. However, iin principle, if there was some phenomena that could not be adequately explained naturalistically and has much positive support for it (viz., it is not enough to just posit, as a gap-like explanation, that it is supernatural because we have not explained it naturalistically; instead, the positing of something supernatural must be supported by sufficient evidence of the laws of nature and how the phenomena seemed to have truly violated those laws), then yes. — Bob Ross

It's just hard to take you seriously when you compare this rain example or your jumping jacks example to Gideon. It's like you're not even trying. The irony is that Gideon's grasp of "naturalism" is more keen than your own.

I would say that the rational naturalist will necessarily disagree with you here (and I am certain that Oppy would disagree with you). If naturalism is true then there must be counterfactuals which would demonstrate the supernatural, else the thesis of naturalism is entirely vacuous and unfalsifiable. Or at the very least, that form of naturalism which provides for predictability would become entirely vacuous, and that is what we mean by naturalism in our own day and age.

- Yes, good points. :up:

---

Well, glad to have come across someone who actually knows who John Hick is. (And Paul Knitter.) But I don't necessarily agree that he's guilty of the kind of relativism that Nagel critiques. — Wayfarer

Well, would we agree that Hick has attempted to eclipse first-order religious claims? It is in that way that it mirrors Nagel's target, for Nagel is targeting the attempt of second-order reasoning to eclipse first-order reasoning. Hick posits what he sees as a kind of meta-thesis about all first-order religious claims.

That's not to say I subscribe to the kind of 'many paths up the mountain' approach, either. I think there are genuine and profound distinctions to be made between different religious philosophies. But then, there are also genuine and profound distinctions between different cultures, but they're still human cultures. But, we're called upon at some point to make a decision as to which we belong in, I guess. — Wayfarer

True. I myself don't like Hick's approach, but it is a complex subject with many facets. Perhaps a more obvious way of critique comes from Francis Xavier Clooney, who is a scholar of Catholic-Hindu dialogue. He says, paraphrasing, that today everyone will say that all of the world religions are equal, and are ultimately saying the same thing, and yet no one today seems to know anything about any of the world religions. That is more or less the difficulty I have with Hick. His approach seems more a priori than a posteriori. His thesis cannot be rejected out of hand, but it needs concrete evidence in its favor.

I would again invite you to present an actual argument for your claim, preferably with formal logic. If you try to flesh out your reasoning I believe the invalidity will become more apparent to you. — Leontiskos

↪Leontiskos Don't worry about it, have it you own way...I think you are simply wrong and I've given reasons why I think so...but I have no confidence that you will admit it, so I don't want to expend any more time and effort. — Janus

I mean, you are making implausible claims and then refusing to provide arguments or reasons for those claims. This is a philosophy forum, last I checked.

I can relate to being uncomfortable sharing that sort of thing, because even when I believed I had had experiences of God, I knew in the back of my mind that I really couldn't justify those beliefs in the face of critical thinking being applied to them.

So I'll leave it to the back of your mind, to let you know whether your reasons for believing that you have had experiences of God really stand up to scrutiny. — wonderer1

...but just read this back to yourself. You're a troll, and what you're doing here is trolling, and we know you're a troll, and we know that there is no good reason to throw pearls before trolls. ...but apparently to your mind the religious are simply afraid of subjecting their personal inferences to your superior rational skills, lol.

I would suggest retiring from trolling, at least on a philosophy website. Instead you could take up the practice of philosophical argument and addressing things from a third person perspective.

- It seems to me that the simpler answer is to just note the fact that only the tiniest percentage of religious people have stressed an apophatic approach to such an extent that the cataphatic approach is entirely excluded. Therefore the claim that, "God can only be thought of as a wholly unknowable entity," is false on its face. Neither Maimonides, Aquinas, or even Eckhart believed such a thing. Such strange, contentious claims surely require justification.

1. Do you believe yourself to be somone who has interacted with God on a number of occasions? — wonderer1

Sure.

2. If so, are you willing to talk about how you came to that conclusion? — wonderer1

A third-person example has already been provided: link. Feel free to address it.

(I won't "make it personal," no. That is a terrible approach in general, especially when it comes to contentious religious debates.)


But I'm glad you didn't say, "God doesn't exist," because that would have been begging the question, and it would have followed the sort of lack-of-reasoning that has characterized this thread. For example, <You can't interact with God, therefore you can't interact with God>. The pro-OP side is in need of some actual arguments and syllogisms to support their claims.

- Someone who has interacted with God on a number of occasions is similarly situated to the child. Your objection here is that one cannot have knowledge of that which transcends them (), and the objection fails in a very strong way, as being logically invalid.

I would again invite you to present an actual argument for your claim, preferably with formal logic. If you try to flesh out your reasoning I believe the invalidity will become more apparent to you.

That people might say they know something about God does not entail that they actually know anything about God. They would need to be able to explain how they came to know things about a purportedly immaterial, infinite entity. — Janus

The same way a child draws conclusions about the unfathomable abilities and acts of their parent:

Or has been told by the parents that they fixed the bike, this time and every other time that it needed repair. — Janus

And why wouldn't that method also apply to God? — Leontiskos

Yes, this is absolutely true, I did not mean to imply otherwise; there is nuance here. I was thinking of Gideon in particular and Jesus' words about the value of signs in John. The nature of the asking matters. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I agree with that. And what I am interested in is the basic rational idea—apart from moral considerations—that if someone claims to be supernatural or divine, then their ability to do supernatural things will tend to justify their claim.

I agree. It is a straw man that Janus is arguing against (most of the time). — Bob Ross

Yes, and it is also a form of the "No True Scotsman" fallacy. Apparently Janus thinks that 98% of religious believers are hopelessly mistaken when they use the word "God," because on Janus' premise anyone who believes they know something about "God" is not actually talking about God. This is a word game, and obviously Oppy was not directing his argument to some invisible 2% of "true believers."

The problem I have with this example, and most like it, is that I don’t think it demonstrates, even if the events were all granted as having occurred, justification for believing in God’s existence (even if just for that particular subject in the example) because the tests are wholly incapable of verifying the claim. — Bob Ross

Pay more attention to the claim that is being verified. It is not that God exists. It is that God is with Gideon, and will be with him in battle. The OP is not fundamentally about God's existence; it is about any event that provides good reason to posit a supernatural cause. So Oppy would apparently say that, in Gideon's case, naturalism provides the more "parsimonious" account for what occurred.

So the question here is, "Does Gideon possess rational justification for his conclusion that he is dealing with God?" That's not rhetorical. You need to actually answer it.

Let me give you a much easier example of what I mean (that I believe we can both agree on): let’s say I am holding something in my hand, and you say “that’s a banana”. Now, let’s say I do not know if it is a banana or not, and so I respond “if what you say is true, then do five jumping jacks...if you can do five jumping jacks, then I know what you say is the truth”. Lo and behold, you drop down and do five jumping jacks: am I justified in believing that the object in my hand is a banana? Of course not! Why? — Bob Ross

Because your test/sign was incredibly stupid, that's why. The ability to do five jumping jacks has no power to justify the claim in question.

This is an interesting thought. — Bob Ross

Let me make this easier for you. If you were Ahaz in Isaiah 7 (or Gideon), is there some sign you could think of, some test, that would prove to you that you are dealing with something other than natural occurrences?

---

<- this post branches in too many directions. If you like, pick one of the many topics and I will reply.

Declaring it a sign of poor character, to engage in critical thinking when it comes to one's religion, — wonderer1

I actually don't think ' absolute prohibition on asking for signs is Biblically tenable. In the Bible asking for a sign is one of those things that can be done well or poorly, and the opposite error of religious credulity manifests in many stories as well.

Aquinas explicitly argues that miracles are the rational means for establishing the credibility of supernatural claims:

...Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. — Aquinas ST II-II.178.1

A useful essay by John Hick. He was an English philosopher of religion, notable for his commitment to religious pluralism. Rather a dense academic work, but then, it is a philosophy forum! — Wayfarer

While Hick is far and away more coherent than anything that is occurring in this thread, I would still argue that he represents little more than an academic fad in philosophy of religion. A little over a decade ago I took a graduate seminar on interreligious dialogue, and even at that time Hick was already but a footnote in the history of that field. When we did the historical overview each student was assigned one or two figures to research and present on, and I was assigned Hick along with Paul Knitter.

Thomas Nagel's The Last Word includes no chapter on religion proper, but if it did Hick would be the subject of that chapter. Hick extends the precise sort of relativism that Nagel opposes to the religious sphere, and he is a Kantian to boot. If Nagel had been more knowledgable of religion I think it would have been good to include such a chapter, but plenty of other folks have leveled the same sort of Nagel-esque arguments against Hick.

I think there is a reason Hick's influence waned more quickly than his compatriots in other fields. It is because the sort of a priori second-order argumentation that Nagel targets has always been less effective when it comes to religion. Religion favors the a posteriori, the experiential, the earthy realities like ritual and tradition. Antiseptic a priori systems of philosophers don't often drive religious thought, and the academic religious anthropologists understand this same truth. Hick's thesis has left a more lasting impression on the popular mind than on the academic field (or, one could equally argue, the popular mind and the conditions of modern life birthed Hick's thesis).

If we want to take Janus seriously then he is proposing a kind of apophatic exclusivism, and I admit that this resonates with Hick to a certain degree. But what Hick has said is a great deal more fleshed out and Kantian than what Janus has said. In Christian terms Hick is a modalist rather than a strict apophaticist, and as such his proposal is a great deal more coherent than Janus'. It seems to me that Janus has given voice to an extreme form of cultural secularism, where Charles Taylor's "self" is buffered not only implicitly but explicitly. "Thou shalt not have contact with God!"

This is not what democracy is about. — Athena

No? Isn't everybody trying to "rule America"? Isn't it becoming commonly accepted that so-called "liberal neutrality" was always farcical? There is a real sense in which progressivism quickened the demise of liberalism, but in this it only quickened the inevitable. Historically and in truth a separation between religion and politics is altogether artificial, and where separation is enforced quasi-religious ideologies sprout like weeds.

Surely not an argumentum ad populum? Yes, I would agree that there are countless numbers of people who have had any number of experiences they are wrong about or misinformed about or exaggerate about or lie about. This is not news. — Tom Storm

Janus claimed that, "God can only be thought of as a wholly unknowable entity." Think about what that claim entails for a few seconds, Tom.

...since God cannot be thought but as a wholly unknowable entity. — Janus

If God can only be thought of as a wholly unknowable entity, then how is it that billions and billions of people across the world think they know things about God? The things you are claiming are rather remarkable, and clearly false.

The Biblical response to @Bob Ross' inquiry usually goes to miracles, and often the specific miracle of sortilege. There are endless examples, but to take one:

And Gideon said to him, “Pray, sir, if the Lord is with us, why then has all this befallen us? And where are all his wonderful deeds which our fathers recounted to us, saying, ‘Did not the Lord bring us up from Egypt?’ But now the Lord has cast us off, and given us into the hand of Mid′ian.” And the Lord turned to him and said, “Go in this might of yours and deliver Israel from the hand of Mid′ian; do not I send you?” And he said to him, “Pray, Lord, how can I deliver Israel? Behold, my clan is the weakest in Manas′seh, and I am the least in my family.” And the Lord said to him, “But I will be with you, and you shall smite the Mid′ianites as one man.” And he said to him, “If now I have found favor with thee, then show me a sign that it is thou who speakest with me. Do not depart from here, I pray thee, until I come to thee, and bring out my present, and set it before thee.” And he said, “I will stay till you return.”

[...]

Then Gideon said to God, “If thou wilt deliver Israel by my hand, as thou hast said, behold, I am laying a fleece of wool on the threshing floor; if there is dew on the fleece alone, and it is dry on all the ground, then I shall know that thou wilt deliver Israel by my hand, as thou hast said.” And it was so. When he rose early next morning and squeezed the fleece, he wrung enough dew from the fleece to fill a bowl with water. Then Gideon said to God, “Let not thy anger burn against me, let me speak but this once; pray, let me make trial only this once with the fleece; pray, let it be dry only on the fleece, and on all the ground let there be dew.” And God did so that night; for it was dry on the fleece only, and on all the ground there was dew. — Judges 6:13-18, 36-40, RSV

Again, this sort of thing is quite common. "Hello, this is God." "Prove it by doing X." "Okay." "Alright, now I know you're God." (This kind of verification is also used in human affairs, except without miracles.)

Now are you going to tell me that Gideon has no rational justification for his belief that he is dealing with God?

The case for @Bob Ross' OP is much the same, because apparently if God appeared to Oppy, Oppy would claim that there is no possible sign that could convince him that he is dealing with God (a variation out of Ahaz' playbook in Isaiah 7). Gideon's reasoning is, "If you can do X, then this will prove to me that you are God." What @Janus and @Bob Ross seem to be claiming is that there is no X that would yield any form of rational justification for the claim that one is dealing with God. This seems clearly wrong.

(Wayfarer is right to note that we do not need to depart from natural theology to answer the OP, but I think the OP fails in all sorts of ways.)

The child might have seen the parents fix the bike. — Janus

I already gave the scenario <here>. They didn't see it.

Or has been told by the parents that they fixed the bike, this time and every other time that it needed repair. — Janus

And why wouldn't that method also apply to God?

There is no problem with understanding how a material entity (a parent) can do things to another material entity (a bike) so the analogy is not a good one. — Janus

Again:

The key here is that the parent "transcends" the child, so to speak. The parent can do things that the child cannot do or even understand, and the child knows this. — Leontiskos

What you are doing is trying to minimize a counterargument by rewriting it as a strawman. For example, you might think of a 17 year old "child" rather than a 4 year-old child. This methodology is bad philosophy. You ought to consider the robust counterargument rather than the emaciated counterargument.

- I have seen no evidence that supports your claim that we are not self-movers. I have seen evidence which supports my position that we are self-movers. For me, the arbiter of truth is evidence.

No, the logical conclusion is that we cannot, with rational justification, say that there is a God who does things. — Janus

Right, same difference. And by the same sort of reasoning, the child cannot say that their parent fixed their bicycle.

You here commit the error I outlined in your own words:

If we want to say that there is a God who does things, on the other hand, believing we have rational justification for such a claim then a cogent explanation would be required. But such an explanation is impossible since we have no idea how an immaterial entity could do things. — Janus

The logical conclusion of these two sentences is, "Therefore, we cannot say that there is a God who does things" (modus tollens).

I understand what you said — Truth Seeker

Do you?

but the problem is that we are not self-movers. We don't choose to come into existence. — Truth Seeker

You are mistaken to claim that, <If we are self-movers, then we choose to come into existence>.

We don't choose our genes — Truth Seeker

You are mistaken to claim that, <If we are self-movers, then we choose our genes>. (etc.)

We are not deserving of any praise or blame because our choices are not free from variables not chosen by us. — Truth Seeker

No philosopher who holds to classical volition has ever held that, in order for us to make free choices, our makeup must be free from all variables not chosen by us. Arguably, choice presupposes forms of natural determination, because choice is a means which must align with natural, causal means. Or in other words, if there were no reliable constraints and causes, then there would be no reliable means to any end, and hence no possibility for choice.

↪Leontiskos Who has free will? Aren't all living things prisoners of causality? — Truth Seeker

Free will is the traditional answer to the question you pose in the OP. Something with free will is a self-mover, and that is why culpability attaches to such things. If a bullet rips through your leg we don't put the bullet on the stand and see if it is guilty, because the bullet's movement/act comes from outside itself. Neither do we see if the gun is guilty, or the hand that pulled the trigger. We stop at the person who fired the gun, because they are potentially the principle of their own acts.

There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. — Aquinas, ST I-II.6.1

- This goes directly back to my original post that @Janus papered over: . That is how I would want to begin answering this premise underlying Janus' argument.

- If we believe that someone or something does not choose or act with free will then we do not hold them morally culpable for those choices or acts. For example, if a lawyer convinces the jury that a defendant was insane at the time of the putative crime, then the defendant will not be held (fully) responsible for their actions. You could look up a case like that if you want to see the manner in which this sort of investigation is carried out.

Who is morally culpable? — Truth Seeker

Those who choose and act with free will.

I haven't made that argument. — Janus

Then what is the reasoning underlying your argument? It seems pretty clear to me that it is what I laid out, but if you reject that interpretation then you will need to tell us what the reasoning is. "Neti, Neti," does not an argument make.

A few sentences later you give the same underlying reasoning that I imputed to you:

My criticism was made on the grounds that supernaturalist accounts that claim to be explanatory are really not so, because they present no clearly understandable causal series of events and conditions. No mechanism of action in other words. — Janus

Ergo: <If the theist can't explain how God did it, then the theist is not justified in claiming that God did it>. I explained the problem with this presupposition: .

The parallel argument is:

• "God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God cannot be said to do things.
• Or more simply:
• "God did it" is a bad explanation, therefore God does not do things.

Can you elaborate? — Bob Ross

You said, "...when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing." How do you think this affords naturalism an equal footing? Does naturalism believe in an infinite being? Is a system which posits an infinite being on "equal footing" with a system that denies an infinite being, so far as the inexplicable goes? Of course not. Infinite things are less explicable than finite things.

Incompatibilist free will: I don’t see how supernaturalism affords a better answer. — Bob Ross

What is the proportion of naturalist incompatibilists to non-naturalist incompatibilists? Why?

The minds which are derived from the universal mind... — Bob Ross

Generally we would say that someone who believes in a universal mind is a theist.

Moral facts: I am a moral realist and a naturalist. Irregardless, moral realism is more parsimoniously explained with atheistic accounts than theistic ones. — Bob Ross

These are just question-begging assertions, and I spoke of transcendent moral norms, not moral realism. Again, what is the proportion of naturalists who believe in transcendent moral norms (or also moral realism) to non-naturalists who believe in such a thing? Why? At every juncture you will end up saying something like, "Well, 90% of incompatibilists are non-naturalists, but incompatibilism is still way more parsimonious on naturalism," which is a prima facie irrational claim. Beyond that you still haven't told us (and specifically @NotAristotle) what parsimony has to do with anything, much less truth.

miracles like that defy our understanding of nature and not nature itself — Bob Ross

Then you've botched the definition of a miracle, and you are equivocating.

If a person does genuinely believe that there is something naturalism cannot account properly for, then, of course, this argument holds no water (for them). BUT, if one finds themselves, like me, in a situation with nothing that seems to demand the use of supernaturalism; then they should be a naturalist. — Bob Ross

The very fact that so many people are and have been non-naturalists is itself strong evidence against the OP. If naturalism was such an obviously better explanation then everyone would be naturalist.

I think they do tend to... — Bob Ross

They do, and that's the point. For example, theists (tend to) believe in miracles; naturalists don't. The explanandum differs. Each camp is attempting to account for a different set of existing things, because each camp believes different things exist. Oppy falsely presupposes that they are trying to account for the same set of things.

I’ve been reviewing a bit of Rupert Sheldrake’s material again. He claims to have evidence of psychic phenomena that call naturalism into question, at least insofar as they’re paranormal. The phenomena he speaks of are fairly quotidian in nature - dogs who know when their owners are about to come home, the sense of being stared at, and so on. He is, of course, characterised as a maverick or crank by a lot of people, but he persists, in his quiet way, and claims to have significant evidence. The argument then turns into one about whether he does present evidence. — Wayfarer

There are often problems in arguments such as the OP's, such that "supernatural" (or non-natural) is effectively defined out of existence, and many responses have referred to this problem.

When Newton first posited his theory of gravity it was met with incredulity as an "occult"/hidden account, insofar as it posited no intermediary or reason for gravity. At that time it was believed that objects at a distance could only interact through some physical medium, and Newton posited a kind of instantaneous interaction without any medium. Newton's account was question-begging or "magical" in the very same sense that supernatural causality is often referred to as magical or question-begging. I think we could even go so far as to say that, at the time, Newton's account was non-scientific or non-naturalistic insofar as it disregarded the prevalent canons of scientific reason. For the opacity of Newton's account would call into question its rationality.

I would go further and say that all explanations based on reason are naturalistic. "God did it" is not really a cogent explanation. Even if it were accepted as an explanation, there is no detail, no step-by-step explication of just how God could have done it. None that can really make any rational or experiential sense at all to us in any case. — Janus

But what is the argument, here? Is it, <If we cannot say how X has done Y, then we cannot say that X has done Y>?

This relates to what might be called orders of being, and there is a sense in which you are right that it relates to faith. For example, a child's bicycle might break, and they might go to their parent and ask them to fix it. The parent says they will fix the bicycle, and a week later it is fixed. Is the child justified in believing that their parent has fixed the bicycle?

The key here is that the parent "transcends" the child, so to speak. The parent can do things that the child cannot do or even understand, and the child knows this. Thus the premise of your argument is that there are no "parents" vis-a-vis humans; there are no orders of being that transcend the human order. Once this premise is questioned the argument seems to collapse. What remains true is that the epistemology of things-above-us will tend to differ from the epistemology of things-below-us.

(I should also note that your argument pertains to discrete events, and this is only a subset of the subject of this thread.)

...when God is posited there are things about God which never are explained (and can’t be) and this affords naturalism an equal footing. — Bob Ross

There was a recent debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor. I only watched a few minutes, but one of Shapiro's arguments was the exact opposite of what you say here, and I think he's right. The theist simply has a more justified recourse to inexplicability than the atheist or naturalist does. There is nothing in naturalism which parallels the opacity and transcendence of God.

anything theism can posit with God is equally available for the naturalist to posit about the universe (or nature) — Bob Ross

This is a strange claim, and I don't think it is even plausible. Theists posit things like incompatibilist free will, an eternal soul, transcendent moral norms, miracles, etc., and clearly these are not equally available to the naturalist. What in fact happens is that the atheist or naturalist tends to deny the very things the theist posits, in part because their system cannot support them.

More succinctly, the prima facie problem with Oppy's argument is that theists and atheists hold to vastly different beliefs and explananda. This is a big oversight, and it becomes even more acute as one moves away from our secular historical epoch.

- I would suggest giving an actual reference to the source you are using in the OP.

Nor, Leontiskos, do I think that God is a hypothesis, in the scientific sense of the term; and I don't think that negates anything in the OP. — Bob Ross

When Oppy speaks of the "theory" of theism he is clearly construing theism as a hypothesis.

The principle of parsimony is NOT that the simpler theory is better: it is that the theory which posits the least conceptual entities to explain the same thing is better than one that posits more. — Bob Ross

Which is to say nothing else than that the simpler theory is better.

Graham Oppy's argument for naturalism from the principle parsimony — Bob Ross

Along the same lines as 's post, see Edward Feser's, 'Is God's existence a "hypothesis"?' (link)

That's sort of why I'm talking about systematic disagreements, rather than just raw disagreements. — flannel jesus

Whether or not the disagreement is systematic, they will reliably learn that they are mistaken once they begin to see the problems in their own account, and I believe this is best done via contradiction. Those who float at 10,000 feet are good at avoiding the contradictions in their thought. Things must be concretized and brought down to the ground level. I also think the correction should go beyond disagreement in terms of consensus. Consensus is not the best argument.

If they don't accept that premise in the first place - if one of the faults in their reasoning facilities is to completely ignore the possibility that other people systematically disagreeing with them might be a sign that those other people are correct and they themselves are incorrect - then this avenue of correction gets shut down. — flannel jesus

To disagree is not necessarily to identify a contradiction. It is harder to ignore a putative contradiction than it is to ignore a disagreement. At the foundational level others need to point to the contradictions in the poor reasoner's thinking. Everyone attends to putative contradictions to one extent or another.

One can discover that they are bad at reasoning by bumping up against contradictions in their own thinking. This happens most obviously when others call them out on their contradictions, and less obviously when they encounter signs that their own beliefs are not coherent. One can become capable of understanding and perceiving contradictions even with very simple tools, such as an understanding of truth and falsity, and simple rules of inference like modus ponens and modus tollens.

classical theists believe that God is absolutely simple with no parts of any kind — BillMcEnaney

See the discussion between Bishop Robert Barron and William Lane Craig on divine simplicity. In his response Craig explicitly targets the Thomistic view: Symposium Part 1 - Divine Simplicity. Craig's rejection of divine simplicity is apparently well-known.

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