In a YouTube video, Dr. Craig says that without creation, God is timeless and temporal after it. — BillMcEnaney

Do you have a link and timestamp to the YouTube video, or a quote from Craig? We need more than hearsay.

the "perfect" simulation seems to present some wrinkles — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of a "perfect simulation" always presents wrinkles because it contains within itself a contradiction. The contradiction is, effectively, that the simulation is both identical to and not identical to reality. In fact it must be recognized that if something is identical to reality, then it isn't a simulation; and if something is a simulation, then it isn't identical to that which it simulates. To argue with someone who presents a "perfect simulation" is to argue with someone who indiscriminately jumps from one side to the other (i.e. to identity or non-identity).

But I also wonder if this idea flows from the recent thread on direct and indirect realism, being based on the sorts of indirect realism we saw in that thread. After all, the whole premise of your thesis is that the human being is unable to distinguish perception from reality. It seems to me that the claim that reality is able to be perfectly simulated already involves deeply materialistic premises.

Maybe Aristotle gets at the relation to the good of others more directly in the Politics, I am less familiar with that work. Certainly, the Ethics has a sense of a "common good," and virtue supports the common good, but this common good is grounded in being a member of a polis, which the person in the machine is not. This might give Aristotle a reason for people not to enter the machine, but they still seem to be able to meet the psychological conditions of virtue (choosing and enjoying right action) from within it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know that you've understood Aristotle at all. For Aristotle the Ethics–Politics is a two-part work, with a common theme of happiness and human flourishing. Yet your position of subjectivistic happiness is also foreign to the Ethics taken in itself, not to mention Aristotle's moral metaphysics regarding acts and passions. Boethius was a rather strong Aristotelian, and offered translations of many of Aristotle's works.

Perhaps in a few days I will have time to gather some direct quotations, but for now I will just note that your prima facie take on Aristotle seems off. For Aristotle the moral virtues regard public life. The distinction becomes explicit when Aristotle contrasts it with intellectual virtue and the contemplative life, as well as the solitary life.

It seems like the machine could help guide someone to be able to respond virtuously to both real and simulated experiences, since the two are indiscernible for the subject. So how is the person in the machine still deficient in some good? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Boethius and Aristotle speak about living a virtuous life, not believing you are living a virtuous life. Your crucial premise in all of this is the idea that believing one is doing something or perceiving that one is doing something is the same as doing that something, and this is not granted.

For example, the ground of moral virtue has to do with interacting with other people. Such a thing simply does not occur in the experience machine.

Beyond this, there are interesting arguments to be had about the degree to which one can practice virtue, but rudimentary forms certainly exist in things like the role-playing that some psychological counselors promote.

(Maybe when I have more time I will come back to this. It has been a while since I've read The Consolation.)

That said, I have trouble imagining Boethius endorsing the machine, but I can't put my finger on why. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because "living a virtuous life [...] leads to knowledge of the true good," and someone who is connected to the experience machine is not living life at all. I actually don't understand how Boethius could be imagined to endorse the experience machine.

They say that in movies, you can kill as many people as you'd like, but to murder an animal is unbearable for the viewer. — Hanover

Aye, and perhaps the hero in Man of Steel was not Superman but rather his father, Jonathan Kent, who sacrificed his life for the family dog. 's "idiotic title" is presumably addressing those people who refer to their dog as their child. The world is changing in "interesting" ways.

- :up:

Incidentally, I would not have found Nagel's book very interesting if I hadn't first been exposed to the popular philosophies on this forum. The errors he is trying to address seem rampant, such as those related to language, science, ethics, and religion. More generally, there is the error of allowing what Nagel calls "first-order reasoning" to be eclipsed.

↪Leontiskos I frequently refer to that book, particularly the chapter Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, which I have reproduced online for the sake of discussion. His arguments in that chapter for the sovereignty of reason are important and can also be related to the 'argument from reason', which is significant especially because Nagel himself doesn't defend belief in God. — Wayfarer

Interesting! I was looking at another of his books which is on a similar topic, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament. I am looking forward to that chapter. I think Nagel's project in The Last Word is important and pertinent to our age.

As to the plight of contemporary philosophy, I have benefitted greatly from one of the first books I read when I started posting on forums, The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie. There's a useful abstract here which also contains links to other reviews. (I suppose Charles Taylor's A Secular Age is of a similar ilk.) But then, I started reading philosophy as part of a youthful quest for enlightenment, my overall approach is more influenced by theosophy (small t, I was never a member of the Society) than philosophy proper. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. I have enjoyed some essays by Owen Barfield, who was a theosophist. Granted, his theosophy is often downplayed and I don't know a great deal about that movement.

The issue may be stated in this manner: Aquinas' 3rd Way, as written, may require interpretation. — NotAristotle

There is a great deal of secondary literature looking at this argument. To start I would suggest Ed Feser's blog entries (first, second), and Jeff Speaks' close analysis of the argument (link).

I see Count Timothy von Icarus as favouring the Forman approach and @Joshs as advocating the latter. — Wayfarer

This is just one example of the way that Joshs consistently approaches reality, namely through a kind of relativism. I have been reading Thomas Nagel's The Last Word which is a good refutation of this general approach. As someone interested in ancient philosophy, I am a bit curious as to how modern philosophy got itself so mixed up, but I am glad to see that folks like Nagel can see beyond their cultural context.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states. — RogueAI

How about:

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Therefore, ancient peoples coherently talked about their brain states.

I agree that there is a very clear sense in which, at bottom, we do not know how iPhones work. I would be even stronger in your last sentence, virtually every phenomenon in nature is a kind of magic, as I see it. The reason we no longer see it that way is because we have become used to it and thus take it granted.

Certainly, newborns experience the world as baffling to them, because it is.

I specifically had in mind people like Krauss or Dawkins, or worse yet Dennett or the Churchlands, who are just off the wall. It is this strain in thinking, which I regard as kind of "superstitious" - the belief that science will allow to understand everything eventually. It's crazy to me to think this, for obvious reasons. — Manuel

Yes, these are good points. The givenness of nature lends itself to wonder and precludes perfect comprehension. There is certainly an interesting way in which we approach science as a field superstitiously, endowing it with impossible attributes.

How is it not that things are what we are directly aware of, because of the perception of them? It does not follow that because perception enables our awareness of things, that we are aware of the perceptions.

Perception is that by which objects are directly given; sensation is that by which of objects we are directly aware. These together and by themselves, are both sufficient and necessary to justify the doctrine of direct realism. Indirect realism, then, is merely a consequence of, or perhaps a supplement to, that doctrine. — Mww

Yes, quite right.

- Your analysis above is somewhat complicated by the fact that for Judaism and Christianity magic is a crime, no? Magic has to do with the manipulation of reality in a way that is considered illicit, and because of this it is not Abrahamic religious people but rather Baconian scientists who are the progeny of magicians. Again, our magical culture is obsessed with technology because technology is the twin sibling of magic. Religion always has an eye to the properly ordered whole; magic has to do with manipulation that is carried out irregardless of the whole.

The Christian practices you labeled magic are universally accepted to not be magic, except perhaps by Simon Magus. Some call them worship and others call them superstition, but no one thinks they are magic. This is relevant to the OP because in Judaism and Christianity superstition and magic go hand in hand.

The rituals of the church are no more magical than... — BC

My guess is that the rituals fit your idiosyncratic definition of magic (i.e. spiritual or invisible causation). You just perceive them in a demythologized sense. For example, the "sign of peace" has not historically been understood as a bit of hand-shaking.

If we are logically consistent with this sort of definition then someone is engaged in magic if they go to the grocery store and believe themselves to be using free will to choose which milk to buy; just as if we are consistent with the OP's definition then the fellow who brushes his teeth is superstitious. A thread which centers on pejorative terms without rigorous definitions ends up being a vehicle for propaganda.

Exchanging the sign of peace with other members of the congregation has no magical value. — BC

What is your definition of 'magic'?

- What if the desire for coldness is just a way to mask the unappealing flavor of one's drink, as some Europeans would say with respect to American beer? Subconscious mitigation of unappealing flavor? :razz:

Pascal's Wager would include the premise that one has no way of knowing whether [free will] exists. Is this part of your argument?

Very much so. And perhaps and argument can be given that we are quite superstitious today, we simply aren't aware of it or we have modified ancient beliefs into our modern outlook. For instance, some aspects of "scientism" are very much of the same caliber as believing in ghosts. — Manuel

Superstition goes hand in hand with ignorance, and because our age is wildly ignorant there is a high potential for superstition. For example, suppose Elon Musk said, "If you wave your iPhone in three big circles above your head after turning it on, the scrambling of the gyroscope will make it harder for political activists who are not in your contact list to send you unsolicited messages." People would instantly start doing this, and would probably soon swear by the practice. Why? Because we have no freaking idea how an iPhone works. Our scientific culture is faith-based, premised on arguments from authority. As Arthur Clarke said, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."

(The irrationality that emerged from Covid, left and right, was remarkable. Much of it could be called superstitious.)

I think I have defined it in a way that would preclude how you are generalizing its usage. — schopenhauer1

I literally just explained why that's false.

Superstition is a kind of religious excess, and that is why a secular age struggles to wield the word with any degree of accuracy. If we want to know whether X is part of the human psyche, we first need to figure out what in the world we mean by X. I think superstition is a variety of causal error, usually created by confusing correlation with causation. Still, to give the genre is not to give the definition.

I think what I defined and 1a seem pretty compatible. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure you're grasping how bad your definition is. According to your definition someone is superstitious if they get a haircut, or buy their girlfriend flowers, or exercise, because they are engaging in behavior meant to "make things go well or stay well."

"Superstition" is largely a pejorative word without a great deal of content, and this is why folks tend to have a hard time defining it. The definition process here is rather important.

Michael's unedited post:

If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. — Michael

I did see you make this strange argument earlier. As it turns out, we experience objects in various ways. But I'm not really interested in arguing against dogmas.

When you say that shapes are primary qualities, is that shapes-as-seen or shapes-as-felt? — Michael

For Locke a primary property belongs to the object, and it seems obvious that one can interact with the same spatial property via both sight and touch. Activities like driving a car presuppose this. Some humans can interact with spatial properties via hearing, but there are other species which tend to be better at that.

I suppose a doctrine concerning objects might be opaque to someone who presupposes "indirect realism."

Allegedly he had unprotected sex with one or two women, which resulted in criminal charges. — jkop

As I recall, the problem is that Assange professed innocence while utterly failing to comply with the investigation, and this in turn led to something of a forfeiture of his credibility.

and indirect realism in its simplest form is simply a rejection of direct realism. — Michael

Which must of course be defined if indirect realism is to have any content.

The common example is colour. I reject primitivism. — Michael

Remaining at 30,000 feet for the moment, Locke distinguished primary from secondary properties. Do you view shape the same way you view color? You think the unreliability associated with color is insuperable (or rather, from your side of the looking glass, asking about the ontology of color is misguided). Do you hold the same doctrine for all putative objects of perception? Even if one accepts your arguments regarding color, it's not at all clear that those arguments can arrive at this conclusion:

Well, I think that there is no “resemblance” between a thing’s appearance and a thing’s (objective) properties. — Michael

The argument from illusion is indeed one of the arguments against direct realism — Michael

If you are arguing against bent paddles then I don't think any of us would disagree.

But you didn’t really answer my question(s). How does non-naive direct realism differ from naive direct realism? — Michael

My form of realism differs from the indirect realisms on offer by introducing an understanding of experience or understanding that is not either flatly perceptual or else schizophrenic between rationality and perception.

I am interested in the question of insuperable non-reliability vs reliability, and in the context of this thread indirect realism has been associated with the former, whereas forms of direct realism have been associated with the latter. On my view superable non-reliability is a species of reliability, and the difference between direct realism and naive realism is whether there exist local unreliabilities that can be overcome, including perceptual unreliabilities. Naive realism says the unreliabilities don't exist; direct realism says they do exist but can be overcome; and indirect realism says that they exist and cannot be overcome because they are not merely local.* For example, the context of the original quote you excised:

Both hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism, and if the point is only that, "Sometimes our perceptions are mistaken in knowing what is real, but reason can step in and correct course, thus providing us with 'indirect' knowledge of the real," then I don't really disagree. This would not be an insuperable universal relativizing, but only a superable local relativizing. Such a position opposes naive realism but not direct realism. — Leontiskos

Or:

I think it is a matter of accuracy or reliability. "Are we able to form true propositions which accurately and reliably get at what truly exists in the world?" The so-called direct realist says yes. The so-called indirect realist says, "No, we do not know whether our knowledge is about the world or merely about our representations of the world." — Leontiskos

You yourself have said similar things:

...whereas indirect realists argued that phenomenal experience is, at best, a mental representation of external world objects and their properties, and so is possibly unreliable. — Michael

Now I really think you're talking more about perceptual experience than phenomenal experience, because your understanding of experience seems quite flat, divorced from reason. But if you're positing superable unreliability then I don't think nearly as much is at stake. I don't want to get into an argument about philosophical anthropology which makes distinctions between views which all see unreliabilities as existing and superable.


* But I have tried to get others to define their terms so we don't talk past one another.

It seems that humans are extremely, by default/nature, superstitious. That is to say that we possess thought patterns and behaviors that are meant to "make things go well or stay well". — schopenhauer1

Superstition is hard to define, but I think we all know that this is not the definition of superstition. Someone who has thought patterns and behaviors intended to make things go or stay well is a human being, not a superstitious human being.

Merriam-Webster, 'Superstition':

1a: a belief or practice resulting from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in magic or chance, or a false conception of causation
1b: an irrational abject attitude of mind toward the supernatural, nature, or God resulting from superstition
2: a notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary

1. Something is an object of perception iff it is a constituent of experience — Michael

I think the problem is that you are constantly building your own conclusions into your premises. For example, one of the cruxes of this whole debate is the question, "What is experience?," and yet you are just taking for granted an understanding of experience that presupposes your own conclusions. For example, see my post <here>.

What is the difference between naive and non-naive direct realism? — Michael

Here are two concrete examples where the two of you advert to naive forms of direct realism:

I'm afraid I still only have one clear answer: for perception to be "direct", naïve realism should be true. The features of our perceptions must be present in reality, so that barns really look red, and violins sound as they do, independently of an observer. — hypericin

At the very least we can apply modus tollens and simply say that if phenomenal experience is not reliable then these direct realists are wrong, even without having to ask what they actually mean by "direct presentation". — Michael

For example, if direct realism is thought to entail that when you place a paddle in the water it becomes bent, and when you remove it from the water it becomes straight, then according to that definition we can all call ourselves "indirect realists." We all accept that the shape of the paddle does not change, and that reason corrects for the illusion that the eyes see.

“Directness” is intended to resolve the epistemological problem of perception such that if perception is direct then there is no problem, but if (2) is false then the common kind claim is true and disjunctivism is false, the epistemological problem of perception remains, and so perception isn’t direct. — Michael

Does the bent paddle or Hume's claims about perspective prove the same point? "If the paddle isn't bent then perception isn't direct"? Are you trying to say any more than that?

These laborious discussions seem to terminate with a retreat into these sorts of quasi-vacuous positions.

Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position? — Leontiskos

That it is the position prior to actually thinking about the subject, I agree. — hypericin

What it means is that you are the one required to give a clear argument for your position, and I do not believe you have done so. If we were to do this topic justice then this is what you would need to do. Many seem to be underestimating the intuitive weight of direct realism.

I have been reading Nagel's The Last Word with J, and that whole book is about the sort of problems that plague the accounts of indirect realism in this thread (but also in your moral theory). Nagel will go after Kant as the king of that tradition, but the accounts in this thread fall well short of Kantian epistemology.

The nutshell problem with universal relativism is something like, <If someone is universally deceived, then they could never know that they are deceived, for they would have no fixed point of non-deception with which to compare the deception>. Now I realize that you have attempted to object to my idea of "accuracy or reliability" as the distinguishing mark between direct and indirect realism, but , who has done some good work of disambiguation, is less reticent about this.

The idea is that there is some alternative vantage point which is more fundamental than phenomenal experience, and which makes inferences based on the phenomenal experience. Of course there are ways in which reason can (and does) correct for perceptual distortions, but I don't find the schizophrenic separation that accompanies indirect realism tenable. — Leontiskos

Now as I have noted, the interesting thing about this thread is that the indirect realists wish to focus on perception rather than knowledge or phenomenal experience. Both @hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism, and if the point is only that, "Sometimes our perceptions are mistaken in knowing what is real, but reason can step in and correct course, thus providing us with 'indirect' knowledge of the real," then I don't really disagree. This would not be an insuperable universal relativizing, but only a superable local relativizing. Such a position opposes naive realism but not direct realism.

My guess is that you are more indebted to Scientism than Kantianism. You think that science provides us with access to the real, and that it is the preeminent way to gain knowledge of the real. "Sense data is unreliable, therefore in order to gain knowledge of the real we must have recourse to science." The idea is that the local unreliability of the senses can be remedied by science. Correct? I think this view is confused in a culturally understandable way, but it is a far cry from the lineage of skeptical thought inaugurated by David Hume. If you are only making these more mild claims then we may be talking past one another.*

We are indeed not aware of the bulk of the inference and interpretation we do. But that doesn't mean it's not happening. — hypericin

But what reason do we have to believe that it is happening? Again, positive arguments must be brought forward.

(Many have rightly balked at this highly metaphorical usage of the word "inference," but I believe that word may be more Michael's than yours.)

* Still, I think my post <here> ought to have cleared up such misunderstandings.

This is the important part. — Michael

Can you cite your source?

...if [2] is false then the epistemological problem of perception remains. — Michael

The "epistemological problem of perception." That phrase may capture the problem. As I see it the realism dispute is an epistemological dispute, and folks around here are focusing too strongly on perception at the expense of epistemology. Of course epistemological theories incorporate sense perception in one way or another, but to speak about sense perception apart from broader epistemological considerations is myopic at best. After all, we're not all Humeans.

There is. There's rational interpretation. — Michael

Hence the sentence that followed the one you quoted.

I have basically less than zero sympathy for the positions of Michael, @hypericin and their ilk. I’m aware there are still some philosophers around who tend to kind of agree with them, and I know that there do exist non-stupid ways of arguing for indirect realism. Even so, the position seems really weird to me. What I have the most trouble with are four things:

1. Their notion of directness, seldom stated and even seldomer relevant or coherent.
2. Their notions of “as it is” and “what it's really like.”
3. Their constant appeals to science, which are bewildering.
4. Their motivation: where they’re coming from is really unclear. — Jamal

Good post. I agree. And the distinction between physical and phenomenal mediation is useful.

This quote seems to identify the method, which is a kind of reactionary rejection:

At the very least we can apply modus tollens and simply say that if phenomenal experience is not reliable then these direct realists are wrong, even without having to ask what they actually mean by "direct presentation". — Michael

It is something like the adherence to an extreme based on the rejection of the opposite extreme. This is possible because there are a number of different indirect and direct realisms on offer, and thus one can reject an implausible form of direct realism and declare oneself an indirect realist.

's point about the "homunculus" still seems appropriate. The idea is that there is some alternative vantage point which is more fundamental than phenomenal experience, and which makes inferences based on the phenomenal experience. Of course there are ways in which reason can (and does) correct for perceptual distortions, but I don't find the schizophrenic separation that accompanies indirect realism tenable.

Is it an American thing or just a diversity of thought thing? Would a European nation provide both sides of a Trump related issue or would that just not be necessary due to the homogenous view they might have on the topic?

You don't need to use the press as a means to advocate if everyone pretty much already agrees on everything. — Hanover

Is that the telos of the press? Advocacy?

I think the argument behind much of this is that the telos of the press is to present citizens with accurate information so that they can make informed decisions. So if there is a political dispute in society, the press is tasked with presenting both sides of the issue in order that the population can choose wisely.*

But all of this is grounded in the idea of truth as a virtue. The people are expected to choose in favor of truth, and the press is expected to provide the people with truthful and balanced information. Yet if as a society we don't care a great deal about truth then this all falls apart. Is America particularly bad? I think America's pragmatism is a threat to the virtue of truth in an indirect yet real way.

* If a European nation is homogenously anti-Trump then the press apparently has no intrinsic duty to present pro-Trump points of view. The press would only have such a duty in certain circumstances, such as the circumstance where the political homogeneity is based on lies or other unethical means.

Michael's usage seems entirely appropriate. The knowledge that there is a tree in front of me is not a given, transmitted directly into my brain. The only thing about the environment that is a given to any organism is the sensory information it receives from it. What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin

Good. I was going to lump you with Michael, so I'm glad you agree.

I think the reason this seems appropriate to many is because they assume that humans are like machines. <Machines make inferences from sense data; humans are like machines; therefore humans make inferences from sense data>. I think the mechanistic premise is behind this sort of thinking, and I think that the petitio principii in @Michael's claim about "science" already does all of the work before the science even begins.

Now I don't really have time to do this topic justice, but if I did this would be my point of entry:

I think direct realism is the prima facie (naive) view. Indirect realism responds, throwing it into question. — Leontiskos

Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position?

---

To me it is crystal clear. Only by way of the sounds and sights coming from the viewing device do you experience the on screen action of the film. And only by experiencing and interpreting the on screen action do you construe the story. This seems indisputable. — hypericin

Well, if you plop a child down in front of a Disney movie, do they require special skills of interpretation and inference to enter into the story? A word is a sound, and so without the sound there is no word, but it does not follow that (conscious) interpretation or inference is occurring. It is the same, I say, for images and other sensory inputs.

No, not a window.

You said my view is not realism because it terminates at sensory experience, not the real. But rather, the real lies on the other side of the stack. Hence, indirect realism, where the stack of sensory experience, and all the indirection that may lie on top of that, sits between the knower and the known. — hypericin

Okay, and so it is not a window, but is instead a set of data that, if interpreted correctly, can lead to knowledge of the real?

- In theory scientism should not be a problem on a philosophy forum, but it always seems to be creeping in.

What will prevail is that the supply will meet the demand, meaning that if there is no demand for unbiased or balanced reporting, it won't be in the market, at least not terribly long. — Hanover

That's why I think this is a cultural and/or philosophical problem. Is there really a great deal of demand for unbiased reporting in the U.S.? The "cost" that individuals are willing to "pay" for that kind of reporting seems extremely low. As an Aristotelian I see this as a virtue problem. Those who are not educated in a way that helps them to love the truth do not love the truth, and in America we don't place much value on love of truth.

- :up:

And what does "more primary" mean? We are talking about experiential indirection... — hypericin

You claim that there is a primacy of the sound over the word or the story, but is this what is happening when we hear a word? For example, if someone is watching a film it is not at all clear that the sounds are more direct than the story.

and your position would not have been called realism at all, because it terminates in perception and not in the real. — Leontiskos

No, there is no termination in my view. We can know things though as many layers of indirection as we like (but never with certainty). — hypericin

If you say the base level is the sensory experience then that is where the stack of layers terminates, is it not? Or are you viewing sensory experience as a window through which we come into contact with something else?

No, I think something more like sensory experience is not a distinct layer, but just a component part of perceiving. — hypericin

Right, and they might also question the rest of your analysis. They might say, for example, that the meaningful story is not posterior to the sounds. They may even say that because we often shape and infuse meaning into sounds the meaning itself is more primary than the sounds.

But your characterization is fairly close to what Aquinas says:

Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. . .

[...]

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. . . — Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia.Q85.A2

Or to translate into your terms: <The sense data is related to the intellect as that by which it understands [, not as that which is understood]>. But this gets tricky because you want to talk primarily about sense data (which Aquinas calls phantasms) and Aquinas wants to talk primarily about knowledge.

It is interesting to me that when I studied epistemology the position I hold was called indirect realism, something vaguely akin to what you consider "naive realism" was considered direct realism, and your position would not have been called realism at all, because it terminates in perception and not in the real.

---

As to the "intelligibility of nature' example, I think I agree with you since it would be absurd to demand that intelligibility be pointed to as an object of the senses. — Janus

And is it not similarly absurd to ask the indirect realist to point to an instance of direct sensory knowledge? By definition, their position holds that such direct knowledge does not exist. So they might give a counterfactual analysis, "Well, if the world were such that Descartes' belief about direct or indubitable knowledge were correct, and this also held of our sense knowledge, then direct realism would obtain."

Whereas the direct realist does not acknowledge this layer, to them the computer in my example would be the most direct layer. — hypericin

So you believe the direct realist would hold that the layer of sensory experience does not exist and therefore the computer layer is most "direct"? Why do you believe the direct realist would say this?

---

Since, according to scientific understanding, thinking, like perceiving, is a process, I don't see why it would not, on the indirect realist argument, equally qualify as indirect. — Janus

Well Descartes thought that we know some things indubitably, and that the fact that we think is one of these things. Descartes' claim acts as a counterfactual which explicates the content of "directness" whether or not the indirect realist thinks it actually exists. I don't see why the indirect realist (or the direct realist) is required to offer more than a counterfactual.

Similarly, someone might claim that reality is fundamentally intelligible to the human mind. Another might object, "Ah, but if you think that fundamental intelligibility is coherent, then you must explain what fundamental unintelligibility is, and you must do this in a more-than-counterfactual manner. Viz., you must point to fundamental unintelligibility in reality." Do you see why this isn't an appropriate objection? Some 20th century logicians thought these sorts of universal claims were vacuous, but whether or not they are vacuous, they are what we are dealing with in conversations such as this.

Another argument in the OP is that because perception is a process we should not think of it as direct. That, if accepted would leave us with no coherent notion of 'indirect', since the terms is meaningless without some criterion of directness that it can serve as the negation of. — Janus

See:

First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? Apparently knowledge of the sandpaper without fingers, nerves, and brain processing would be direct? — Leontiskos

I think there is a general failure to consider a counterfactual understanding of either position. For example, if the indirect realist says that "direct" is as I have described it, this does provide a relevant foil, it's just that the foil is counterfactual and not actual. This directness is something like the way that Descartes' knows that he thinks. Such premises are not incoherent (although I think their conclusion is mistaken).