Pascal's Wager would include the premise that one has no way of knowing whether [free will] exists. Is this part of your argument?

If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic

Not believing in free will does not make me negligent because being negligent (lazy) is also a choice.
You can easily flip it to: If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and better, you do your obligation.
Whether there is free will or not, whether we believe in it or not, there is still the impression that we have it, everybody who is not lobotomised or in a coma is under that impression.
Believing in free will or not makes no practical difference in real life. You can choose to do whatever it is that you will choose, you just may think that it was predetermined for you to choose it.

I would say it doesn't matter whether it's knowable or unknowable. If we know there is no free will, then it doesn't matter what we do, we'll just do what we're willed to do. But if we know there is free will, that would just make the denial of free will even worse.

If you don't believe in free will, then you can't intentionally fulfill your obligation, it's just happenstance. Of course I think people who dont believe in free will still have values and will act in accordance with them, but if you truly believe its not your choice, then you can't claim praise or blame. So you might as well believe it.

If you don't believe in free will, then you can't intentionally fulfill your obligation, it's just happenstance — QuixoticAgnostic

If you don't believe in free will and free will does not exist*, you can't intentionally fulfill your obligations. But that does not contradict my post — in fact it is almost an analytic statement.

but if you truly believe its not your choice, then you can't claim praise or blame — QuixoticAgnostic

You can reformulate the concepts of praise or blame within a deterministic worldview no problem. In common language, praise and blame involve free will simply because we all have the impression of free will.

Your argument is roughly that "Well, if free will is not real [one believes], I should stay on the couch all day doing nothing". But one does not follow from the other, it is a contigent psychological result.

D. If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic

Well, if there is free will, then you're wrong. Obligations is another matter. But the choice is still the result of free will. It can't not be the result of free will if you have free will. Every time you reaffirm your belief that there is no free will is an act of free will. You are still taking agency, whatever you do. You can't not.

Neither (A) whether or not there is "free will" nor (B) whether or not one believes one has "free will" changes the fact that actions (causes) necessarily have consequences (effects). I think, however, any coherent conception – convention – of agency presupposes compatibilism.^

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism ^

:up:

D. If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic

This doesn't seem like a necessary conclusion to me. Do you think the majority of people who don't believe in free will, in reality, are "denying their obligations" in any important ways more than people who believe in free will?

I really like what your exercise reveals for me.

C is the only one with any functional value. If free will didn’t exist C would revert to B. So yes, it is better to live as though we have free will; and besides the deep digging of philosophy; that is exactly what we do.

Could that reasoning be the mechanism, buried from conventional awareness, which "makes" free will seem to be real when there are strong opposing arguments?

Can you now reverse your exercise and bring it back to Pascal's original? Do we believe in God because it is functional, and thus a form of Reasoning like or unlike Pascal's caused such a mechanism to evolve in human Consciousness?

Can we go other steps further and suggest we believe in an individual Self, the Subject "I" because it is functional, and thus a form of Reasoning like or unlike Pascal's caused such a mechanism to evolve in human Consciousness?

And so on?

In other words, are all thing we "find ourselves" almost naturally or inescapably believing in (like God, Free Will, Self Consciousness, objective reality, morality, etc) even when there are strong reasonable opposing arguments, believed because they are functional and a mechanism for such belief evolved over time for that purpose?

Would the bulk of us be better off cutting the crap, and going on as if God, Free Will, and My Self, are Real, leaving the crap to a small minority of obsessive philosophers?

To address D, it's not so much that someone who doesn't believe in free will can't behave freely or do good. Clearly they can, because free will exists. But I am pointing out the absurdity in the belief, because even if you do do good, you don't have any grounding for it. Any grounding you might suggest necessarily will either invoke some conception of free will, or imply you actually do believe in free will.

Are you referring to my A and B, in which case youre mistaken, or is this your own statement? Either way, I don't really get the point or where your contention of what I'm saying is, if there is a contention. Compatibilism argues for free will, no?

Interesting. Perhaps this form of argument can be applied to something like the self, which seems necessary for experiencing the world and reasoning.

Yes.

The precise exercise doesn’t fit as well for the Subject as it does for Free Will. But it's the same finger pointing at tge same moon.

Never mind.

Firstly, A-D are all presupposing certain axiological claims that I would completely reject. For example, A and B are false. What matters is relative to values; and values are subjective and relative (e.g., if one values truth, then it absolutely matters if one believes that they have free will even when they don’t).

Secondly, pascal’s wager is a poor argument: one should never believe something out of fear of the consequences, despite its probability, of believing it. E.g., if I don’t go out tonight with my friends, then I can’t get run over by a car; or if I go, then there is a chance I will: best case scenario, I have fun; and worst case scenario, I die. According to Pascal’s wager, I am to stay at home because the worst case is “clearly” what I should avoid over such a trivial best case scenario (if I were to do the contrary). Pascal’s wager ignores probability, and this is way it is a bad argument.

Thirdly, leeway free will (i.e., libertarianism) seems plausibly false. If one rewound the clock (and only the clock), then it is unreasonable to expect any other decision to be reached and action to be made by an agent: the ability to do otherwise is incoherent with physics.

Fourthly, I think your argument works perfectly fine, notwithstanding my previous worries mentioned above, with compatibilism: what exactly is the ability to do otherwise, instead of just the ability to choose, doing in your argument?

Bob

Firstly, A-D are all presupposing certain axiological claims that I would completely reject. For example, A and B are false. What matters is relative to values; and values are subjective and relative (e.g., if one values truth, then it absolutely matters if one believes that they have free will even when they don’t). — Bob Ross

Expand on this, if you would, because the implications of lacking free will make it clear to me that we can't hold any real (free) value in something like truth.

Starting with B, surely valuing truth implies avoiding error, and perhaps some sort of pride or otherwise virtue in comporting with reality. But, such a value implies we have the power to "avoid" error, i.e., we have a certain freedom to do otherwise. Denying free will (in certain senses at least) is to deny that we have this freedom, so, if it is the case that there is no free will, we can not value our belief in the truth of this proposition, because we could not avoid erring.

Same principle with A. It seems the fear we have with believing in free will is that we could be wrong. But as I say, if we are wrong, meaning free will doesn't exist, then, since their can be no value in having true beliefs, that means there's also no negative value in having a false belief. So there is nothing to lose for believing in free will, and, by C, everything to gain (which is where the parallel to Pascal's Wager comes in, even though they don't function on exactly the same principles).

Expand on this, if you would, because the implications of lacking free will make it clear to me that we can't hold any real (free) value in something like truth.

If one is a compatibilist, then they would respond with (something along the lines of) “because causal determinism [or some weaker variant] is true, one cannot do otherwise but they can choose; thusly, they can choose what they value and what they don’t, and if one values the truth then they will believe that it matters if they believe something that is false”.

If one is a incompatibilist, then they would respond with (something along the lines of) “because causal determinism [or some weaker variant] is true, one cannot do otherwise and they cannot choose; however, this does not negate the fact that they have values and, thusly, if one values the truth <...>”.

In either case, one can have values without being able to do otherwise. I value the truth and even if it is the case that I am utterly determined by causality it does not take away from the fact that I value truth.

What this really boils down to, I suspect, is that you don’t value anything unless you have the ability to choose and had the ability to do otherwise when you chose; and this is the underlying axiological position that is fueling your argument.

Starting with B, surely valuing truth implies avoiding error, and perhaps some sort of pride or otherwise virtue in comporting with reality. But, such a value implies we have the power to "avoid" error, i.e., we have a certain freedom to do otherwise

One can try to avoid error without having the ability to do otherwise nor to choose: this is just a non-sequitur. Likewise, valuing something just means that one assigns it a worth and not that they had the power to choose that valuation nor to have chosen otherwise.

The only major (counter-intuitive and practical) implication for incompatibilists, irregardless of its truth or falsity, is that if one has no free will (whatsoever), then there is no accountability nor responsibility: this is the only substantial difference (other than considerations about whether it is simply true or not).

we can not value our belief in the truth of this proposition, because we could not avoid erring.

Again: non-sequitur. The formulation of a value judgment has nothing whatsoever to do with “avoiding erring” [in a libertarian nor compatibilist sense].

So there is nothing to lose for believing in free will, and, by C, everything to gain (which is where the parallel to Pascal's Wager comes in, even though they don't function on exactly the same principles).

Pascal’s wager is a bad argument, because it renders the probability of the consequence occurring omissible when, in fact, it is the most critical factor for analysis.

Bob

is that if one has no free will (whatsoever), then there is no accountability — Bob Ross

Many incompatiblist determinists would disagree with this on purely practical terms. If we imagine humans as decision-making machines in a deterministic world, it's clearly the case that some of these machines *do* make decisions to hold other machines accountable for their harmful (or perceived-harmful) actions - they punish those machines, imprison those machines, etc. - and even if you assume incompatibilist determinism is true, it's not a given that those consequences are irrational to impose (any ineffective pain caused by those punishments would be, though).

Full disclosure, I'm a compatiblist. And quite frankly, I think the difference between a compatilblist and the type of determinist who would argue what I said above is PROBABLY a semantic difference of opinion, rather than a real one.

...one cannot do otherwise but they can choose

How? If they accept sourcehood freedom? Is that not different from choice, or do you speak of leeway freedom, in which case I ask again, how does one choose if they can't do otherwise?

one cannot do otherwise and they cannot choose; however, this does not negate the fact that they have values

I don't deny that one can value (or at least define values such that it is possible) under hard incompatibilism. However, notice I claimed we couldn't hold any value "freely", not just that we couldn't have values.

One can try to avoid error without having the ability to do otherwise nor to choose: this is just a non-sequitur.

And this is just an unsubstantiated claim. I ask again: how is it possible to "try to avoid" without being able to "choose" or "do otherwise"? Are these all diffferent things? If so, you have to explain how they're different, you can't just assert that "no, this doesn't mean that" and be done with it.

Pascal’s wager is a bad argument, because it renders the probability of the consequence occurring omissible when, in fact, it is the most critical factor for analysis.

There's no probability in this argument, there's no numerical "cost-benefit analysis". It simply claims that if you value truth, and additionally, you value "ownership", i.e. "free control", over your beliefs, then the only way these two values are satiated occurs if you believe in free will. I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value.

So let me ask you this to further the discussion: why do you value truth? Does it even matter? Will you argue that reasons for valuations don't matter, because so long as one just so happens to value truth, the argument is defeated?

And? Is that not just a pretentious way of saying everything is determined?

firstly, that in every act of willing there is, first of all, a multiplicity of feelings, namely, the feeling of the condition away from which, a feeling of the condition towards which, the feeling of this "away" and "towards" themselves, then again, an accompanying muscular feeling which comes into play through some kind of habit, without our putting our "arms and legs" into motion, as soon as we "will.". . . — Vaskane

So is his general point in this segment that it's reductionist to claim all of these different mechanisms going on almost simultaneously boil down to one act of free will? That when I make a "free" choice, it's nonsensical to say there's a single event or something I think or "will" that causes me to follow through with that choice?

That we do act as though responsibility exists, does not make it true that people have responsibilities.

If one really thinks that free will does not exist (and not even in the compatibilist sense), then they are being irrational by holding people accountable. Should implies can: viz., one is not responsible for consequence of an action that they did not choose.

then they are being irrational by holding people accountable — Bob Ross

We were predetermined to put some people in jail.

How? If they accept sourcehood freedom? Is that not different from choice, or do you speak of leeway freedom, in which case I ask again, how does one choose if they can't do otherwise?

A choice is merely to decide for or against something, and this process absolutely can happen by something which is deterministic.

Even if I am completely determined, I am nevertheless generating reasons for and against particular actions and conclusion, weighing and contemplating them, and reaching a decision which is in conformance with my will: that, my friend, is a free act.

To be able to do otherwise is an extra-attribute which goes being merely reasoning and making conclusions (in accordance with one’s will): it is that, if one rewound the clock (and only the clock), one legitimately could, this time around, choose differently.

For example, I am debating on eating vanilla or chocolate ice cream. I think of various reasons for and against each, and ultimately reach the conclusion that I want vanilla. Now, I had the ability to choose IFF my reasons and conclusion originated from me--i.e., they are in accordance with my will--whereas I had the ability to do otherwise IFF I could have come up with different conclusion (and arguably different reasons too)(i.e., if one rewound the clock, although I chose vanilla the first time around, I have the ability to do otherwise only if I legitimately can choose chocolate this time around even with all other factors the same).

I think that I have the ability to choose because I can come up with reasons and reach conclusions in accordance with my will; but I don’t think I have the ability to do otherwise because if you rewound the clock, then I would expect nothing other than myself to generate the same reasons and reach the same conclusion—afterall, nothing changed other than the rewinding of time.

The ability to do otherwise entails that an agent is a source of indeterminancy.

There's no probability in this argument, there's no numerical "cost-benefit analysis".. I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value

Then you are not using Pascal’s wager properly (with all due respect). The wager is a cost-benefit analysis which, dare I say, ignores probably of each outcome.

It simply claims that if you value truth, and additionally, you value "ownership", i.e. "free control", over your beliefs, then the only way these two values are satiated occurs if you believe in free will

This claim just collapses, then, into “if one values “ownership”, then one should believe in free will even if it doesn’t exist”. That one values truth has nothing to do with this claim: again, a hard determinist can perfectly coherently value truth and deny that they have free will. If you deny this, then you are arguing, necessarily, that one cannot value truth as a matter of being determined to value truth; which is clearly, by my lights, false.

I can further argue that our "ownership of beliefs" takes precedence over merely having true beliefs, because it is the reason for that value.

This is incorrect with your claim that “if you value truth...and...’ownership’...then the only way these two values are <...>”: if one values truth, then they necessarily will value having only true beliefs. You are saying “hey, to all those who value truth, you should believe in a lie that free will exists because it gives you an illusion of ‘ownership’ over your actions”: you are preaching to the wrong crowd.

So let me ask you this to further the discussion: why do you value truth?

Firstly, it is a matter of my pyschology. I am simply wired, biologically and (probably) sociologically, to commend truth. In fact, I believe that my primary, core motivation is coming to know the absolute truth; and this is why I spend so much time trying to think about these kinds of things.

Secondly, I think that truth is good, and I value what is good.

Thirdly, I think that truth is useful and beneficial for society: no society can function properly if its citizens are very untruthful.

Will you argue that reasons for valuations don't matter, because so long as one just so happens to value truth, the argument is defeated?

Reasons for believing something always matter to me, but I don’t see how this is relevant to your OP. The problem that I pointed out was that your argument have presuppositions about what matters that no serious hard determinist is going to accept; and it is not internally incoherent for them to reject it.

Bob

???

I think you can.

I can imagine a society of ai robots, who all are determinists and think their ais are deterministic, who have policies for how they treat robots in their society who do things that are distinctly contrary to the values of the society as a whole, and the well being of the members of that society.

For various "crimes", they can decide to exile, destroy or retrain ais that commit those crimes - this is what "accountability" means to these deterministic robots, and I don't think there's anything irrational about it. I don't necessarily think they need a concept of free will to do this either.

One thing about this society that's different from humans is that their sense of accountability and justice does not include pain for pains sake, punishment for punishments sake. Consequences aren't there to inflict pain on the perpetrator, they're there to fix the problem and protect other members of the society.

You are judging a determinist from the libertarian point of view. People do bad things because they were predetermined to, that is one thing; we judge them because we were predetermined to, that is another thing. In the determinist universe, there is a causal connection between the two. So calling someone irrational for doing what they were predetermined to does not make sense.

There is no doubt that beings with no free will can construct a society which is predicated off of having accountability for one's actions: what makes it irrational is that accountability, in its common use, is about holding a person responsible for their actions that they chose yet a hard determinist would like to hold people accountable for what they didn't choose to do.

For example, we normally wouldn't hold someone accountable for a car crash that they were uninvolved in, and hard determinists view everything akin to that: you deciding to go stab that person to death wasn't something you chose to do, just like how you didn't choose for that other person to crash into that other person with their car. Normally, we hold people accountable, and accountability only makes sense, for what we believe they have sufficient control over (in the sense of making choices).

What hard determinism is missing is exactly what is the difference between it and compatibilism: sourcehood free will is the answer to these problems.

:sad:

Vaskane, it does not help further the discussion by insulting people whom you disagree with; and it certainly does not help to straw man their position, especially to the point where you have shoved, not just words but, complete ideologies (which I do not subscribe to) down my throat. If you ever would like to have an honest, genuine, and respectful conversation, then my door is always open; but I am not going to entertain, with all due respect, your ingenuine insults and wreckless, blatant misunderstands of my beliefs.

You are judging a determinist from the libertarian point of view.

Not quite. I am a compatibilist: I was noting the differences between incompatibilism, libertarianism, and compatibilism.

So calling someone irrational for doing what they were predetermined to does not make sense.

I never claimed it was irrational to do what one is predetermined to do.