In what sense, derives from a mandate? — Wayfarer

One of Trump's campaign promises was to address the federal debt. Musk and others are the ones he put on that job. There is no such thing as an elected debt-reducer. Musk represents Trump, and the President has more control over the federal bureaucracy than any other individual.

And sure, Congress is the ideal party to address federal debt, but they have shown themselves unable to do so for a long time now. It's really not that strange to see a president who was elected in part because of his promise to reduce the debt appoint an official to reduce the debt.

I don't think the average citizen is concerned that Musk is trying to address the debt. I think they are grateful that someone is finally doing what should have been done decades ago. The problem of the federal debt is one of the least partisan issues. And those who are making cuts are basically guaranteed to make certain groups angry, namely the groups who are benefitting from the money that needs to be cut.

The real wonder here is that Trump is giving Musk so much authority. That's surprising, but also hopeful. Musk has even expressed a willingness to make cuts to defense spending (which is where it would really count), but it is less likely that he will be allowed to touch that. Even Bernie Sanders was pretty happy about that idea.

But, remember, this guy has never been elected to any public office. — Wayfarer

"Unelected bureaucrat is appointed by President to cut costs associated with bureaucratic bloat."

As has been pointed out, Musk is the democratic bureaucrat, given that his job derives from a mandate. So if we are using principles of democracy to calculate whether the bureaucracy that Musk represents or the bureaucracy that Musk opposes should win out, obviously the bureaucracy that Musk represents wins out. Musk's job is to address the budget problem, and this is something the citizens of the U.S. have been desiring for decades. The U.S. debt is $36.4 trillion and counting.

Does it matter if Jesus claimed that he was God? My contention is that he could be God even if he never claimed such a thing. — Arcane Sandwich

It is logically possible, but it doesn't surprise me that no one goes around arguing that Jesus was God even though he never claimed to be God. Basically, if Jesus and the documentary evidence we now possess are not self-consciously presenting evidence for Jesus' divinity, then the whole point is moot. If that is not in place then one could as easily claim that Benjamin Franklin was the Son of God as Jesus.

- When you say "arguments" you presumably mean formal arguments, and on that reading the answer is that historical arguments are more difficult to formalize. I don't find arguments for Jesus' divinity to be at all lacking. In fact I see them more often, probably because it is usually admitted that Jesus is a historical figure, and because the question of whether Jesus claimed to be God usually precedes the question of whether God exists. This is because, if Jesus claimed to be God, then the atheist has a new case to consider, whereas if he did not claim to be God, then everyone is off the hook. And given the Christological theology that has become popular especially since Barth, leading with Jesus has become very common. This is particularly true in a secular age which is more opposed to traditional notions of God.

(Here is an example of just such an article published today.)

Let me refine the argument I gave:

If a logical form need not be isolated, then it "behaves in precisely the same manner" (and therefore does not have a different logical structure...).

That's the key point, namely:

Put it this way: when someone gives a modus ponens you don't have to check with them first, to make sure that p!=q. It makes no difference at all. There is no caveat when it comes to modus ponens, no condition where if p=q the rule fails. — Leontiskos

Call this MP1:

1. p → q
2. p
3. ∴ q

And this MP2:

1. p → p
2. p
3. ∴ p


If MP2 behaved differently than MP1 (in a relevant logical sense), then MP2 would need to be isolated from MP1. In that case every time someone offered up a modus ponens we would need verify whether we are talking about MP1 or MP2. But we don't. Because nothing is at stake. They behave in the same manner (because modus ponens doesn't care whether the first premise is tautological). It makes no difference. And therefore they have the same structure. We don't say that things which do not need to be differentiated have a different structure. MP2 is merely a particular kind of modus ponens. For the formalist it is no more or less modus ponens than any other modus ponens. It is not anything other than modus ponens (and therefore has no different inferential structure).

The difference between MP1 and MP2 is metalogical, and one of course needs to move into the meta-language if they want to understand what an argument really is.

(We actually have a lot of threads on these sorts of topics, so I don't want belabor this for too long.)

Not quite, because the difference between p → p and p → q affects their truth values. — Arcane Sandwich

It is merely a subset of the truth table where p!=q. The truth values are no different. Or in other words, at no point would someone become alarmed upon learning that p=q. It makes no difference at all. Nothing that was valid where p!=q will become invalid where p=q. This is why representing them with the same letter or a different letter makes no difference at all.

That's not what I claim. Formally they have different structures, not poetically. — Arcane Sandwich

If two things behave in precisely the same manner, then they do not have two different logical structures. The two modus ponens "arguments" under scrutiny behave in precisely the same manner; therefore they do not have two different logical structures (on the formalist's understanding).

Put it this way: when someone gives a modus ponens you don't have to check with them first, to make sure that p!=q. It makes no difference at all. There is no caveat when it comes to modus ponens, no condition where if p=q the rule fails.

The same goes for the notion of degeneracy. It only makes sense outside of logic, not within it. — Arcane Sandwich

You say that but then you want to make an ad hoc distinction between the "structure" of different modus ponens "arguments," so I still have hope for you. :wink:

There's two types of structures in logic: the structure of arguments, and the structure of propositions. Two arguments can have the same structure (i.e., both of them are modus ponens) while having propositions with different structures (i.e., p → q instead of p → p). — Arcane Sandwich

That's an interesting account, but I don't know of any rule of logic which requires that a modus ponens where p=q magically has a different structure. The validity rules are all the same, so it's not clear what it would even mean to claim that it has a different structure. If you're all about formalism, then the structure is exactly the same.

When I say that some arguments are good and that some of them are bad, I'm speaking poetically. In other words, I'm being rhetorical, not logical. I don't dismiss rhetoric, I simply declare that being persuasive and compelling are within its province, instead of being qualities of the formal science that we call logic. — Arcane Sandwich

Then you have no reason to claim that the modus ponens where p=q has a different structure, apart from poetry. "Poetically they have a different structure, but formally they do not."

On my view if someone cannot see that this is a degenerate case of modus ponens, then they haven't grasped the raison d'être of logic:

1. p → p
2. p
3. ∴ p

...and of course someone who limits themselves to "formalisms" cannot admit the notion of a degenerate case.

They have different structures. "If p, then p" is not the same structure as "If p, then q". — Arcane Sandwich

Same structure:

p: God exists
q: God exists

1. p → q
2. p
3. ∴ q

(The structure is modus ponens, and you yourself claimed that 1-2-3 is a modus ponens.)

But I wouldn't endorse that argument myself, because it's easily refutable. To speak poetically for a moment, it's not a good argument, even though it's both valid and sound. — Arcane Sandwich

But just a few minutes ago you said, "An argument is either sound or unsound. There's nothing more to it." Now you want to say that some sound arguments are good and some sound arguments are bad. So clearly there is something more to it.

There's nothing "degenerate" about such cases. That notion has no place in a formal science such as logic. — Arcane Sandwich

<Sure it does>. And when Frege first tried to introduce the material conditional he was resisted for decades for this very reason.

Which is why the arguments in the OP, while being modus ponens, do not have the same structure as the one in your example. Because in your example, the conditional has the form "if p, then p", while the conditionals in the arguments of the OP have this other structure: "if p, then q". — Arcane Sandwich

But you yourself said that it is a "perfectly valid modus ponens." So what's the problem? What's the difference between a modus ponens where p=q and a modus ponens where p!=q? It seems that on your view there can be no significant distinction between the two modus ponens. You said, "An argument is either sound or unsound. There's nothing more to it. Logic is a science (a formal science, just like mathematics)."

It's not a sound argument, at least not to my atheist eyes. It is valid, however. Just not sound. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes: you think 4-5-6 is the sound argument, right?

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all. — Janus

Yes, I agree. I had a conversation with Banno on this topic awhile back, such as <here>. One example exchange from that thread:

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno

But the novice does have a description of 'Thales'. If they had no description they would not be able to ask the question. Specifically, if they did not believe that 'Thales' described an ancient philosopher, they would not be able to ask the question. "Thales was an ancient philosopher" is a description, as is (1).

Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc.

So again, you are contradicting yourself in simultaneously holding that the novice has no description of 'Thales' and nevertheless uses the name in a meaningful sense. — Leontiskos

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description."

Both premises can be true, but they can't both be false. Only one of them can be false. — Arcane Sandwich

Sure, if you rely on the degenerate cases of the material conditional, where a false antecedent or a true consequent guarantees a true conditional. But I think I spoke to that.

What can I say? I don't share your notion of a "substantial" argument. An argument is either sound or unsound. There's nothing more to it. Logic is a science (a formal science, just like mathematics). It has nothing to do with persuasiveness, just as algebra or geometry have nothing to do with persuasiveness. — Arcane Sandwich

Let me show why I disagree.

Suppose I say that God exists, and you tell me that I've made an assertion rather than an argument. So I give what you view as an "argument":

1. If God exists, then God exists
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God exists

Now apparently this is an argument, which is entirely different from an assertion. Since I have given an argument, you have the burden of proof in addressing the argument. You might say, "God does not exist," and I might say, "That's an assertion, not an argument." So you comply:

4. If God does not exist, then God does not exist
5. God does not exist
6. Therefore, God does not exist

We could do that for eternity, and on my view we are neither arguing nor giving arguments, whereas on your view we are (and I have encountered people who literally did this).

Aristotle tells us that arguments move from premises that are better-known to conclusions that are lesser-known. If it doesn't do that, it isn't an argument. Note too that "better-known" and "lesser-known" can easily be indexed to persons, but that they are also indexed to communities, which is why not all sound arguments for the same conclusion are equal. In fact 1-2-3 is a sound "argument," but I would contend that it is not a real argument at all.

An since an argument is the same thing as a proof, it follows that I already gave two proofs in the OP. — Arcane Sandwich

Well if you "spoke" the proofs then you have the basic burden of proof, no? Your Wikipedia article says that the one who speaks has the burden.

Due to how the burden of proof works, I don't need to prove a negative — Arcane Sandwich

According to your Wikipedia article you have the burden of proof, for you are the one who spoke.

Or rather, you have simulated a scenario in which someone gives a very opaque argument (FTI), and then you "denied" part of FTI (to quote Wikipedia), so for Wikipedia whoever spoke FTI has the initial burden of proof. So who spoke FTI? No one at all, it seems. It is part of an OP that offers no real argument, and which does not accept the burden of proof for what it claims.

You lost me here. Can you please clarify what you mean by that? — Arcane Sandwich

For example, you said, "if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false." Why? Why can't both premises be true?

I'm not sure I follow. The formal structure of that argument is the following one:

1) If p, then q.
2) p.
3) so, q.

If (1) is false, then (2) is true, and if (1) is true, then (2) is false. — Arcane Sandwich

Okay sure, if you are appealing to the "degenerate cases" of the material conditional then I agree that the former Muslim cannot deny that God exists without affirming that, "If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus," at least if he is consistent. But I'm not sure how useful arguments that depend on such degenerate cases are.

Here you might be right, but only in the sense that both arguments might be valid and yet unsound. — Arcane Sandwich

But isn't that precisely what you meant when you spoke about the possibility of "rejecting both arguments at the same time"?

If so, then that's a powerful reason for rejecting both arguments. — Arcane Sandwich

Why think that?

However, it's still the case that if one of the conclusions is true, then the other one is false, and vice-versa. — Arcane Sandwich

Correct.

The concept of soundness (and unsoundness) applies only to arguments, not to propositions (premises and conclusions), just as the concept of validity (or lack of thereof) only applies to arguments, not to propositions. A proposition (being a premise or a conclusion) can only be true or false. That is at least the modern understanding of such notions. — Arcane Sandwich

On the contrary, a sound conclusion is the conclusion of a sound argument. And as I said, "if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true" (given material conditionals).

This is indeed an argument — Arcane Sandwich

It is not an argument in any substantial sense, and the "arguments" of the OP are similarly insubstantial. Namely, there is nothing persuasive or compelling about them. For example, I could write an OP:

1. If the moon is made of cheese, then pelicans are vegans
2. The moon is made of cheese
3. Therefore, pelicans are vegans

I might follow this with, "Options for resisting the argument." But there is no argument to resist, not in any substantial sense. The person making the argument has the burden of proof in showing the argument to be persuasive or compelling, and mere validity does not succeed in doing this. (Formalizations such as this are only valid consequences, not cases of true inference.)

So rather than give a substantial argument, you've asked TPF users to give substantial arguments against at least one of four propositions (namely, the premises). It's a bit like saying, "I think X. Prove me wrong."

(I would grant that ATI is closer to a substantial argument than FTI, since FTI1 is entirely opaque.)

- That gets into the questions similar to <this thread>. My point wasn't to claim that both first premises are false. That cannot be done if we are using material conditionals. Note, though, that if we are talking about material conditionals, then if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true.

Due to the rules that govern the truth table for conditional statements, it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa. Likewise, if ATI1 is true, then ATI2 must be necessarily false, and vice-versa. — Arcane Sandwich

I think was correct the first time (in challenging some of these claims). Let me just poke a few holes:

...it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa. — Arcane Sandwich

First, if it is not possible to deny both premises, then it would follow that if one is false, then the other must necessarily be true. Your opposite claim simply does not follow.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

To give a counterexample, consider a Muslim who became an atheist. They deny (1) and (2). So it is very clearly possible to deny both premises.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one — Arcane Sandwich

This too looks to be false. The conclusions are contradictories, but that does not entail that the arguments are "contradictories" (so to speak). The believing Muslim is someone who rejects both arguments.

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.)

- Because I am covering multiple posts of yours. Count Timothy already pressed your early, question-begging posts into the arguments that appeared in the later posts (although those arguments are still fairly thin).

Having read through Roark's paper and Klima's response to Roark, I think Klima successfully defends his positions. Let's look at the facet that was brought up:

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here is Roark's explicit claim:

The upshot of all of this is the following: in order simultaneously to render the sufficiency claim in the third premise plausible and to accommodate (γ), the predicate ‘Ix’ must also be interpreted as including a modal-pistic component: ‘x can be thought to exist only in the intellect’. One obvious consequence of this reinterpretation is the fact that the conclusion of the argument is not that God exists in reality, but rather that one cannot think God to exist only in the intellect. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 8

Note that Roark wants to reinterpret Ix for two reasons: both because he thinks validity requires that Ix be pistic, and because Ix introduces conceptual closure.

Klima's first point is that Ix is already pistic:

The original interpretation of the predicate ‘I( )’ in the reconstruction was ‘( ) is only in the intellect’, which I expounded further by saying that an x is only in the intellect in this sense if and only if x is thought of, but does not exist in reality. So, this predicate does contain a certain ‘pistic component’, namely, the component that x is thought of, which of course entails the ‘modal-pistic component’ that x can be thought of. Now, if g is only in the intellect in this sense, then it seems clear that something greater than g can be thought of in the sense of Roark’s interpretation (γ) by a thinking subject S who assumes premise (2). For S, by virtue of assuming premise (2), is thinking that g is in the intellect and does not exist in reality. Therefore, S can obviously think of something with ‘a greater cardinality’, whether g itself or anything else, by simply thinking, or counterfactually assuming, that that thing does exist in reality. — Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132

But this does not foreclose Roark's claim that the conclusion of Klima's formulation of Anselm's argument ought to itself be pistic. Klima responds to this idea as follows:

Accordingly, the argument does have to prove its conclusion for any thinking subject S, provided S assumes all the premises in the required senses, interpreting the phrase ‘x can be thought to be greater than y’ as expounded by Roark. The important point here is that what S has to conclude on the basis of the premises thus interpreted is not that he simply cannot think that g exists only in the intellect, but that it is not true that g exists only in the intellect, from which he further has to conclude that, since g is in the intellect and not only in the intellect, g also has to exist in reality.

To be sure, an external observer E, listening to the reasoning of S, can describe what she observes by saying that S had to conclude that g exists because S cannot consistently think that g does not exist. And E may further claim that she is not thus committed to accepting S’s conclusion, for S can plausibly argue only for himself, since he is the one who makes the comparisons of his own thought objects regarding their assumed cardinalities within his own ‘modal-pistic’ context.

But then, this result seems to make perfect sense in the larger context of the paper. After all, my main argument in the paper is that Anselm’s argument can genuinely work only for those who are willing to make constitutive reference to God. But for them it is indeed an inevitable conclusion that they cannot consistently think of God and think that he does not exist. So they have to conclude without any pistic-modal component in their conclusion that God exists. — Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132-3

To be clear, Roark is claiming that Ix should be reinterpreted as I₂x:

• I(): "() is only in the intellect"
• I₂(): "() can be thought to exist only in the intellect"

...and from I₂x Roark thinks the conclusion should be changed to, "One cannot think God to exist only in the intellect."

Klima's point, quoted above, is that Ix always meant, "x is thought of, but does not exist." Thus the conclusion of the reductio for the one thus thinking of x is that x must exist, not that one cannot think x to exist only in the intellect.

But Klima admits that Ix brings with it "conceptual closure" on account of the non-existence claim that it includes. To Roark's conceptual closure objection, Klima simply notes that global solutions to semantic or conceptual closure, such as Tarski's or Roark's, are overkill. He provides an alternative local solution where one can reject the paradoxes of conceptual closure (such as Modest) without rejecting the non-paradoxes of conceptual closure (such as Anselm's argument).

(Of course, strictly speaking Klima addresses the Modest paradox without arguing whether or not it is truly analogous to the Liar.)

---

If we think about the importance of parasitic reference for dialogue, and then we think about the tendency of modern philosophy and logic towards a self-referential, closed system which is quasi-solipsistic, then I think it becomes plausible that the notion of parasitic reference could breathe life into the modern paradigm, opening it up to encounters with other forms of thought. This is because parasitic reference provides a principled way to speak about that which is not yet understood, and in this way erects bridges between interlocutors. On the Quinian conception there is a fairly dire absence of such bridges (even the point that, for example, Quinians are unable to make sense of questions regarding quantifier variance as representing substantive disagreements).

I should have written the last words of the sentnece differently and added something like the underlined: "Looking at the actual conditions in, and nature of, our world and viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be untenable".

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se. — Janus

Okay, I see what you are saying. Thanks for clarifying.

---

An immediate consequence for Anselm's is that what is in his understanding is an idea, and thereby cannot exist in reality - is not any kind of thing at all. — tim wood

See the section of my post from the first page beginning, "We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge..."

---

However, these are also distinctions made throughout philosophy, and all the time in everyday language. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and this is one of the reasons Klima gives for refusing a global ban on causal closure, for it would ban existence predications.

Ok, so why do you think [...] ...implies anything to the contrary? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up:
@Banno keeps asserting things without argument.

---

The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the speaker has at hand a description in order to fix the referent. — Banno

I think you are getting hung up on the word "description," and trying to make it a technical term. Here is Klima's quote in context:

[The intentional theory of reference] agrees with the recent “historical explanation”19—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.20 On the intentional theory not even this is always required.

20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

Klima is explicit that Kripke's theory differs from Russell's descriptive theory. Now Kripke says that the speaker "believes [the referent] fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator," and Klima interprets this as saying, "that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description."

• "[The speaker] believes [the referent] fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" (Kripke)
• "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description" (Klima's interpretation)

You are hung up on that word "description," and you want to say that Kripke differs from Russell on descriptions. Sure, but Klima already noted that. "Description" is a common word. Klima is quite reasonably reading "designator" as a description, given the belief about the semantic referent condition.

So using Kripke's own example that Klima picks up, consider the referent, "Her husband," in the sentence, "Her husband is kind to her." For Kripke the speaker must believe that the man fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator, "Her husband." For Kripke, even though he is mistaken, his reference succeeds in virtue of his belief. Klima riffs on that very same example and shows how one can use parasitic reference even without the belief that Kripke requires. If Klima can say, "'Her husband' happens to be her kind boss," (or Roark can say, "The most significant British composer in history is a hack"), without involving the belief that Kripke claims is required, then obviously the theory of reference is different from Kripke's. And that's the point here: the intentional theory of reference differs from Kripke's theory of reference.

Must we pretend? Do dogs do not exist outside human linguistic frameworks? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If your philosophy of language forces you to ho and hum and deflect away from questions like "did cockroaches not exist until humans decided to 'count' them as such?" then yes, that seems like a rather major defect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you have to affirm nonsense like "fish don't exist," it's a knock against your philosophy. Fish would have existed in Melville's day as both a commonly recognized type of animal and a scientific designation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good stuff. :up:
The absurdity of nominalism can hardly be overestimated. It's high time we stop letting people pass off absurd theories as normal.

Is the problem not enough democracy, or too much? — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

Thanks. This is an idea I've been researching, and I would appreciate your
view of it. — Wayfarer

This relates to your recent post as well (), but I am going to place it in this thread. (And I realize Arcane Sandwich will disagree with this.)

I was listening to an interview with Rachel Coleman on her recent paper, “How is it with the nothing?, Her emphasis is a Thomistic critique of Heidegger. It reminded me of the way that you oppose Scientism or J opposes Frege, and it helped crystallize some of my thoughts on the subject.

As I see it, the modern period is characteristically domineering rather than receptive. It is a kind of grasping at being God, which is the antithesis of Philippians 2:6. Everything is in our hands; everything is up to us; knowledge is primarily something we do; we are the occupants of the view from nowhere; and making-knowledge is the highest form of knowledge. Now Scientism is a kind of grotesque epitome of this attitude, and one which is widely recognized to be aberrant. But it is only an epitome. That is, the basic mindset is much more widespread than Scientism. For example, if there were a harsh drought then Scientism would be the place where the fire starts. But the drought is a problem even apart from the fire, and it is precisely what gives rise to the fire.

Now when I see your response to Scientism (or J’s response to Frege), it reminds me of antinatalism as an analogy. On this analogy everyone recognizes that suffering is a problem, and also that antinatalism would technically solve the problem of suffering, but also that antinatalism is a kind of overreaction or over-correction to the problem of suffering. In just the same way I would say that Idealism (a denial of mind-independent reality) is an overreaction or over-correction to Scientism and the surrounding “drought.”

Now perhaps the most effective response to Scientism has been Heidegger. Heidegger sees that what is ultimately at stake is not a doctrine or theory, but rather a posture, and in particular a posture towards being. But for Catholics Heidegger’s response is flat-footed in its own way, and here I am thinking of Catholics who critically engage Heidegger, such as Cyril O’Regan, John Deely, Ferdinand Ulrich, and to a lesser extent, John Caputo. Essentially the idea is that Heidegger is right to emphasize a receptivity to being and a shedding of that domineering attitude (which comes to a breaking point in Scientism), but that Heidegger’s thought ultimately leads nowhere. It over-corrects into, and over-relies on, nothingness. This is similar to what Coleman’s paper on Ulrich seems to argue (note: I do not have access to the paper itself).

In any case, what is required is an attitude toward reality that is receptive and not merely domineering and activistic; an attitude that does not pretend that one can exhaust reality but nevertheless recognizes that reality can be truly known. That our interaction with the real is not just running quantifiable scientific experiments on inert matter, but that being nevertheless does possess its own character and subsistence that meets us as a true, mind-independent “interlocutor.”

The difficulty with over-correction is that it fails to give the devil his due. It fails to see what is right and true in Scientism, or in Frege, and instead wants to fully negate the thought. Instead of looking at the problems that Scientism or Frege address, it is only willing to look at the problem that itself wants to address, and when only one problem is considered the answer will inevitably be one-dimensional, like antinatalism.

Anyway, those are my thoughts on Scientism.

- Well no one seems to want to give an argument for their claims. No one wants to be transparent. So I did the work for you. . But still, no one seems to want to interact with that construal to say whether it is a correct or incorrect construal.

So if folks want to make assertions against omnipotence, but they won't provide an argument for their assertion, and they won't interact with the argument that I offer them, then there is little more for me to do to help.

You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference. — Banno

You are falling into yet another ignoratio elenchus, for Klima tells us explicitly that the intentional theory and the causal or historical* theory agree on this (my bolding):

This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

-

But what you are doing is trying to change the subject. In and you were claiming that Klima is mistaken when he attributes to Kripke the doctrine that, "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description." In I showed why Klima is not mistaken at all. That you did not reply to the substance of that post implies that you admit that Klima correctly captures what Kripke has said. To fall back on the appeal that Kripke's theory is "tentative" is nothing but a quibble, and a quibble that is preempted by Klima's footnote where he quotes Kripke. Klima is proposing something authentically different from Kripke's (tentative) theory. That is the point of the comparison with Kripke.

* 'In the ensuing discussion, I consider how the conception of reference presented in the first section handles these problems, and how it is related to contemporary discussions of the “causal”, or “historical explanation theory” of reference' (Klima, introduction).

---

You have still not said what you think parasitic reference is. — Banno

Did you read the paper? Klima gives his account of parasitic reference in section 4. Roark gives additional explication of the concept in section 4 of his own paper (beginning on page 8).

The following appears mistaken — Banno

The sources are available, and it does not appear to be mistaken at all. Klima quotes Kripke in footnote 20, which attaches directly to your quote:

20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

That he is characterizing him correctly can be verified by consulting the text in question: Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics, page 173. There Kripke says precisely what Klima claims, namely that "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description."

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. — Banno

As @Count Timothy von Icarus correctly pointed out, there is nothing here contrary to what Klima has said.

Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description. — Banno

To again quote the footnote, "...and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator." Klima is pointing out that on the intentional theory of reference such a belief is not necessary.

Her semantic reference is to Kripke. Hence it is not true the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies her description. — Banno

This is a non sequitur, for it is in no way clear that Sarah does not, "believe ["Kripke"] fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator." That Kripke disagrees with your construal is clear if we read the text that Klima cites (my bolding):

Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the conditions for being the semantic reference of a designator, "d." Then, wishing to say something about a, he uses "d" to speak about a; say, he says "Φ(d)." Then, he said, of a, on that occasion, that it Φ'd; in the appropriate Gricean sense (explicated above), he meant that a Φ'd. This is true even if a is not really the semantic referent of "d." If it is not, then that a Φ's is included in what he meant (on that occasion), but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion).

So, we may tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator. — Kripke, Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics, 173

-

The speaker's reference may succeed when description is not satisfied by the referent, or if the belief of the speaker is in error. — Banno

This is yet another ignoratio elenchus, for this is not in question.

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Coming back to this, I think it's basically right, except that I think Klima sees that bracketing as bound up with parasitic reference. That is, for Klima when one refers to another's thought object—a thought object which is outside of one's own universe of thought objects—one is engaged in parasitic reference. But as I said just above, I don't really like the way he uses the words "property" and "description" to convey this bracketing in section 4. Regarding the quote from Roark:

[The atheist] does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

In Klima's terms, there is a parasitic understanding of what the theist is referring to, but there is no possible candidate in the atheist's universe of thought objects to which this thought object would correspond. On Klima's view, for the atheist to even have such a thought object in his own universe of thought objects would require the process of concept acquisition.

Else, if we want to isolate and scrutinize the idea of parasitic reference, then perhaps we should ask whether one can achieve what Roark (and Klima) are trying to achieve without recourse to the notion of parasitic reference. I mostly think that one cannot do so. Nevertheless, it may be that parasitic reference is necessary but insufficient to account for the intricacies of disagreements over Anselm's proof, which gets at the difference between questions 1 and 2 <here>.

I thought section 5 was helpful in filling out section 4. By the time Klima finished the quote from Gaunilo I thought his case was quite strong.

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”).

Let’s compare the standoff between Anselm and Aquinas to the earlier standoff between the theist and the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought a greater is thinkable
• Anselm's thought is a thought
• Therefore, Anselm’s thought is not what it claims to be

We could also phrase the two options this way:

• God is that than which a greater cannot be thought
• That than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought object a greater is thinkable
• ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is a thought object
• Therefore, ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is not thinkable

(Note the inverted commas within the second premise and conclusion, which in some sense are themselves the whole issue.)

So for Aquinas someone could simply hold the premise, “For any thought a greater is thinkable,” in a way that overpowers Anselm’s argument. Indeed, Aquinas himself may hold the premise in this way.

But there is still an important cleavage or equivocation between Anselm and Aquinas insofar as the mode in which Anselm’s thought refers is equivocal between the two of them. This doesn’t map exactly to Klima’s parasitic vs. constitutive reference (unless one reads Klima’s parenthetical remark on constitutive reference in a special way – a remark that may have been added for this specific issue). The essence of this difference is this: Anselm would not see himself as referring to God constitutively with his definition, at least if by “constitutively” we mean that he would think that the thought conceived exhausts or comprehends God. Put differently, Anselm’s thought is ultimately pointing to the limits of thought qua thought, not thought qua Anselm (or whichever individual is doing the thinking).

When Klima glosses Aquinas in terms of one’s “universe of thought objects,” a bit more clarity is brought to the issue. Note that what Klima is assuming both in this and when he splits the horns of Anselm’s dilemma is that there is more than one level of thought objects, which on Klima’s view are conceived as intentional. That is, we have our universe of thought objects, and we also have knowledge of the other’s universe of thought objects, and these two universes do not occupy the same intentional space. This is how the atheist can think about Anselm’s thought object as necessarily existing without committing to its existence.

Thus I would depart from Klima when he claims that for the atheist Anselm’s thought lacks a certain property or description, and prefer instead to say that it contains the same property or description under a different intentional mode. If it did not contain the property of necessarily existing under this secondary intentional mode, then the atheist would be unable to see why the theist sees Anselm’s thought as necessarily existing (and in fact in some ways he does see why and in some ways he does not). Note that in most cases the difference of opinion is self-consciously accounted for by a disagreement on some premise, but in this case it isn’t quite that simple (because a “meaning-postulate” is not inherently contentious or truth-apt). (Cf. )

I really liked the quote from Gaunilo, which is highly reminiscent of Newman’s Grammar of Assent. And there is plenty to be said on the final paragraphs about concept-acquisition. But I will leave it there for now.

It is worth noting how the medievals think in terms of argument, intention, and one’s interlocutor, and how this extends even to notions of reference. It is in this way that Aquinas asks whether one can reject Anselm’s argument while avoiding inconsistency, rather than imposing a paradigm of logic or thought onto the proof itself (except insofar as Aquinas and Klima permit the atheist a mode of reference that Anselm does not grant, but there is nothing particularly idiosyncratic or system-based about this move).

Part 5. Conclusion: Parasitic Reference, Natural Theology and Mutual Understanding

(Expedited for the impatient.)

In this final section Klima reads his notion of parasitic reference, which he sketched in section 4, into Aquinas and Gaunilo’s responses to Anselm’s proof. He begins by saying that parasitic reference is especially important in cases of basic beliefs, including religion (and non-religion) of all kinds. He then brings in Aquinas along with the idea of one’s “universe of thought objects.” After that he brings in Gaunilo and the “conceptual buildup” that is required for real dialogue and the possibility of changing one’s mind through that dialogue.

(It is a bit of a wonder that Klima does not reference Newman’s real vs. notional assent in this section.)

The first few sentences of section 5:

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most sensitive cases are, of course, those that involve people’s most basic beliefs, such as religious belief. Accordingly, parasitic reference is a phenomenon to be seriously reckoned with not only in dialogues between theists and atheists, but also between people of different religious faith. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 5

The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, it's pretty basic. A real Porsche is greater than the idea of a Porsche. I haven't seen anyone present an argument against this.

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, you give great clarity to this. :up:

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I was thinking the exact same thing when I was looking at section 5. Let me open that up so that everything is on the table and then come back to this...

- That's fair. You've definitely shed a great deal of light on the book, as have @Wayfarer's synopses. It has helped to orient me to what it is all about. :up:

Roark has his own critique. I would have to look at it more, but on first glance his main counter seems too strong. He argues that the atheist should be happy to allow that they are only engaged in parasitic reference because the theist's definition requires a framing that at least allows for the possibility of liar's type paradoxes. However, showing the mere possibility of paradox is far weaker than demonstrating a paradox. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark's paper is quite good. When I saw that it was hosted on Klima's page, I checked and found a response from Klima (both of which are now linked in the OP). Especially helpful is the way in which Roark gives additional explication of Klima's basic ideas (in sections 1 and 4 of Klima's paper).

He is good at putting his finger on things. The "ambiguity" he tries to untangle is something that I had also noticed, and in particular, for me it manifested in the way that the word "can" functions in Klima's rendering of Anselm's thought concept. His pointing up of the Modest "genie" is also perceptive, along with the "conceptual closure" that accompanies it. And Klima is quite familiar with the Liar's Paradox, even through the medieval Buridan (see for example his chapter, "Logic without Truth: Buridan on the Liar"). ...There are pretty strong themes of univocity vs analogy running though the exchange, particularly when we get into questions about the relation between the object language and the metalanguage. This is especially interesting given that Klima's expertise is Buridan and the late medieval period, which was quite comfortable with univocity.

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

For now I am just going to quote something simple from Roark that may help shed light on section 4, and which is also related to the question I posed to you:

And so we are now situated to appreciate the dialectical weight of the proper conclusion of Klima’s argument, as it was specified in Section 3. The consistent atheist should be quite comfortable admitting that one cannot think of God as a mere thought object (i.e. as existing only in the intellect) when one conceives of God under Anselm’s description. In fact, we ought to regard Klima’s argument (properly understood) as a way of making this point explicit insofar as it derives in a formal way from the Anselmian concept of God the impossibility of thinking that He does not exist in reality. So when the atheist denies that God exists, he is not saying of the thing than which nothing can be thought greater, that it (conceived as such) does not exist; rather, he is saying of the thing that the theist (mistakenly, by his lights) thinks of as that than which nothing greater can be thought, that it does not exist. He does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. After all, he is an atheist, and to think of anything as that than which nothing greater can be thought requires thinking of it as an existing thing. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

It's simple. You appear to think that omnipotence is the greater. That in order to be the than which & etc., the than which & etc must be omnipotent. But I conceive of a being that has no need of omnipotence, and that being the greater. — tim wood

Then premise (1) does not involve omnipotence for you. So what? As I said:

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?) — Leontiskos

-

As to the good or morality, your being must be absolutely good and moral, yes? — tim wood

I addressed this in my . If you want to talk about Anselm's argument, then you have to address that. If you don't want to talk about Anselm's argument and you just want to argue against God, then there is probably a thread for that. (No, of course I don't think that being powerful and being moral are incompatible, and so when I think of Anselm's concept I don't have to choose between the two. I want to know if you and @kazan really think you have to choose between the two.)

Some questions regarding section 4:

1. Is parasitic reference coherent?
2. Does parasitic reference adequately account for the atheist’s position?
3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist?


I think parasitic reference is coherent in general, but I am not yet convinced that it adequately accounts for the atheist’s position. Consider:

But then, the same thought object may be intended also by another mind, which may not endow the same thought object with the same properties, i.e. it may conceive of the same thought object, but not as having the same properties.

…

The atheist, however, can then think of the same thought object, but not think that the description applies to it, whence he is not forced to conclude to whatever valid implications the description may have concerning that thought object. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

What is unclear is how the thought object is related to its properties. That is, if the atheist is thinking of a thought object with different (intentional) properties, then why should we think he is thinking of the same thought object?

Anselm himself brings this up, and Klima echoed Anselm’s concern:

Anselm claims that when the Fool said in his heart: “There is no God”, he could do so only because he did not know correctly what he was speaking about […], as he simply did not understand the word “God” properly. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Anselm is giving a dilemma: Either you are thinking of something other than God or you are thinking of God (as I have defined ‘God’). If you are thinking of something other than God, then you can deny its existence but you have not denied God’s existence. If you are thinking of God, then you cannot deny his existence on account of my proof.

Klima’s parasitic reference attempts to split the horns of the dilemma. Klima thinks the atheist can think about the same thought object and yet, “not endow the same thought object with the same properties,” or, “not think that the description applies to it.” Isn’t Anselm just going to say that if he is thinking about an object that can be thought not to exist, he is not thinking of the same thought object?

Along similar lines we have a form of ampliation entering in here. The atheist takes the thought object and understands that existence attaches necessarily to this thought object, but he nevertheless brackets or prescinds from this existence-description.

Another question: what is it that explains the difference between parasitic and constitutive reference insofar as these two forms of reference differ with respect to whether one is committed to perceived implications of the thought?
(This is presumably where Roark wants to talk about "conceptual closure," which Klima also speaks to in his reply to Roark (both of which have now been linked in the OP.))

Part 4. Intentional Identity and Parasitic vs. Constitutive Reference

In this section Klima appeals to his intentional theory of reference in order to provide the atheist with a way to think about the same thought object that Anselm’s theist is thinking about, while simultaneously rejecting the idea that the theist’s description applies to that thought object.

He begins by situating the theory in the context of Russell and Kripke; he then draws our attention to one of Kripke’s examples, then fiction, and then guessing games. After that he claims that the theory “sidesteps the problem of trying to find criteria of intentional identity in terms of the properties thought objects have.” He goes on to compare this “parasitic reference” to “constitutive reference.” He then finishes by bringing this theory to bear on the question of the atheist who rejects Anselm’s argument.

Here are the first few sentences:

At this point, however, we have to notice that precisely the theory of reference outlined earlier as being implicit in Anselm’s argument offers the atheist a way out of his predicament. According to this theory, we should recall, what determines reference is primarily the intention of the speaker, whence it may be called the intentional theory of reference. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 4

- So are you saying that if someone wanted to be great, they would have to choose between being powerful and being moral, because to be powerful is to lack moral constraint and to be moral is to lack power? Put differently, "The greatest thing is powerful and the greatest thing is moral, but something cannot be both powerful and moral, therefore the greatest thing does not exist." Is that about right?

(I think this gets at @tim wood's point as well.)

He could clearly articulate the two different sentiments behind both systems of values. However, to become political platforms, both must manifest within the same global digital medium, adhering to its structural fields, temporalities, and rules of engagement. — Number2018

Well, one could argue the point of whether those specific conceptions actually do manifest concretely in political platforms. In the U.S. the two-party system makes it easier to map, but one could conceivably argue that the Republican Party is not conservative and the Democratic Party is not progressive (in Reno's senses). But I think there is something right about applying that conservative/progressive lens to the political sphere, given the way that permanence and change are fundamental aspects of life.

The dictates of this medium inevitably transform any system of values into a populist mode of expression. — Number2018

But why? If for Laclau (as also for Reno) populism is a revolutionary desire for change from the status quo, then why must any system of values be transformed into a populist mode of expression?

and Trump’s second administration can serve as an experimental setting for this. So far, MAGA seems to function as a façade for the vast concentration of executive power, which is where it reveals its affinity with the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society.' — Number2018

Well first, can a empty signifier function as a façade? And if not, then it seems that MAGA must be more than an empty signifier. But perhaps you are not claiming that it is MAGA per se that is the empty signifier?

Second, for the sake of argument let's say that MAGA is all about concentrating executive power. Still, what does that concentration have in common with "the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society'"? Trump seems to be using the power of the executive to do just the opposite, and all concentrations of power seem to have a conservative bent (in the sense that they want to maintain that power - they want permanence qua power).

In regard to Rödl militating against the mind/not mind opposition, perhaps a closer example of concordance with Wittgenstein is in the Blue Book where solipsism is said not to be an opinion. — Paine

Hmm, okay. So Rodl is just telling us "what anyone always already knows." He need not jockey among "possible contenders of a true condition." He is above that, no? He wants to eclipse that whole debate.

It is a relevant brief account of recent U.S. history. I would just add that what you refer to as ‘oligarchy’ is likely an extremely complex agglomeration of political, bureaucratic, and corporate groups and forces. We do not know its exact structure and mechanisms, but it seems reasonable to assume that the ‘oligarchy’ progressively augmented its power and its detachment from the ‘demos.’ — Number2018

Yes, that is definitely true.

Your understanding of Laclau’s theory is quite similar to mine. He provides an elaborate conceptual framework for understanding the rare and precarious events of democratic eruptions.It is a valuable contribution to the discussion of our political realities, avoiding partisan clichés, stereotypes of mundane language, and biased media coverage. Another challenge is the incredible speed with which the political landscape shifts and the rapid alteration of related narratives. Who remembers Brexit or the COVID pandemic today? It is also quite frustrating to observe the reflections and commentaries of most of pundits and academics. Many of them seriously argued that Trump’s election marked the revival of Nazism in the U.S. or he constituted a genuine threat to democracy. — Number2018

Agreed. Good points.

So, I believe that Laclau does not sufficiently elaborate on the affective component of the populist process of 'constructing internal frontiers and identifying institutionalized 'others.' His book was published 20 years ago, and he could not have predicted the ubiquitous spread of the 'woke' attitudes and the overflow of various aspects of populist phenomena. — Number2018

Right, and this is reminiscent of Girard's work on the scapegoating mechanism.

I don't know quite what to make of the 'woke' phenomenon, nor am I certain how it relates to populism. If Reno is right, then an age when the bourgeoisie sees themselves as being progressive (change-oriented) and in solidarity with the demos/poor is an age of decadent progressivism, which is an inflection point when the tide begins to turn. It may be that the high-flown ideology that populism is now resisting goes hand in hand with the 'woke' phenomenon.

Surely a perfect God, or at least one "than which &etc, would not have unnecessary or superfluous powers, so omnipotence directly implies something to be omnipotent about - something, a task, that needs doing for something to be perfected. And only God can do it, and thus thereby Himself obliged. — tim wood

"God is omnipotent, therefore he is obliged to do stuff (and anyone obliged to do stuff isn't as great as someone who is not obliged to do stuff)."

I don't follow this reasoning at all. Is there an argument behind it?

- Thanks Kazan. Good to know that there are others paying attention. :up:

- It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4, but refrain from skipping to section 5.

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF.