I do think that it cannot be accomplished by people external to Islam — ToothyMaw

Right. That seems like a key point.

I don't have much to offer to this complex problem. What I would say is that we need to hold Islamic groups responsible for Islamic individuals, such that this pressure causes Islamic groups to eschew Jihadism.

There is very little reason to think the problem would have just "gone away." — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

- Sounds good, those are reasonable counterpoints.

Yes, that's my hypothesis. — J

Okay.

Right, that's the natural next question. This is where Rodl's idealism comes in. He believes there's a great deal more to be said about the structure of thought1, the "I think". I'm still working on finding a clear and concise way of articulating his ideas here. — J

Okay.

I don't think I understand this question. Could you say more? — J

An example of a real distinction would be the Platonic model where there are real "Fregian" propositions and there are real temporal acts in which we leverage those propositions, such that there is a real distinction between thought1 and thought2 (i.e. a distinction in reality). An example of a mental distinction would be a model where there is only one (temporal) thought under two different guises; thought1 and thought2 can be distinguished mentally but these notions do not correspond to separate realities.

The oddity is that Rodl sounds a lot like Frege, given the way we are utilizing Fregian propositions. That is, there is a strong way in which thought1 resembles force and thought2 resembles content.

I believe we can now see that there are subtleties and distinctions we need to make here. On the hypothesis of there being these two construals of "think/thought," the first quoted statement would be "Thinking2 p requires thinking1 p." But was your statement "No one disputes this" based on the observation that this is a pointless tautology, or were you aware of the different senses of "thinking p"? It reads to me like you were indeed making that distinction, and going on to raise the question of self-consciousness. But now what we must ask is, How would you divvy up the "thinks" in the next statement? The relevant bit is "whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p". Rather than guessing, I'll just toss it to you. How would you disambiguate the various "thinking/thinks" here? — J

What I am suggesting is that no matter how we rearrange the various senses of thought1/thought2, we won't get an answer to the self-consciousness question. This is because thought1 (event) and thought2 (Fregian proposition) do not possess the qualities necessary to generate conclusions about self-consciousness. It seems that we have stepped away from the basic thesis of self-consciousness (of being conscious of my own thinking).

Yes, that's right. Can you say more about why (with the necessary disambiguations) this is problematic? I may not be seeing your point. — J

It just feels very odd that this is what we mean by "thoughts" in that second sense. Note that for Kant:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; — Kant, CPR, B131-133 (pp. 246-7)

..There is a possessive ("my"). A Fregian proposition is not possessed, being "timeless, unspecific, 'the same' no matter who thinks it, or when." When we talk about "my representations" or "my thoughts" we seem to be talking about things that are temporal, specific, appropriated by a subject, etc. This makes a lot of sense given that Kant is apparently saying that the I think (which involves self-consciousness) accompanies some thoughts1 but not others.

There is a theological difference between a religion and a sect... — Arcane Sandwich

Let me try to cut to the chase a bit. What if Jihadis win the entirety of the judicial placements in the Islamic schools? At which point all of the Islamic authorities favor "Jihadism" as part of Islam? What happens then? I submit that all the people who are now pointing to those scholars and schools that oppose Jihadism would simply pivot and claim that religious tolerance is not unconditional, and that the religion of Islam does not need to be tolerated vis-a-vis Jihad. I don't think they would claim that Islam is no longer a religion.

So the buck stops at the fact that nations (including especially secular nations) do not tolerate the violence of Jihadism. If it is non-religious they won't tolerate it, and if it is religious they won't tolerate it. It makes no difference whether it is religious or non-religious. It's not as though if the Islamic authorities can convince everyone that Jihad is part of Islam, then Jihad will be tolerated. Besides, I find the implicit idea here that religions are never inherently violent to be simply ahistorical.

- That's fair. I'm just trying to capture the OP's usage in a way that is at least loosely related to the meaning of the words. We can restrict Jihadism to extremists. I don't see that as a problem for the purpose of this thread.

-

Some Muslim scholars argue that jihadism, understood as the violent overthrow of a non-Muslim state, is not compatible with Islam, and it is therefore not the correct, religious interpretation of what Jihad is in the context of the Muslim religion. — Arcane Sandwich

Okay, but I don't see this as sufficient for the conclusion that Jihadism is not religious. Even if the Jihadi is not a "real Muslim," what they are doing still seems to be a religious act. On the premise that they are not a "real Muslim," their religion is a deviant form of Islam, but I don't see how this quantitatively small deviation from "true Islam" can cause the Jihadi to be non-religious.

I wouldn't expect any country to blanketly tolerate all religious tenets. The tenets that infringe on other's rights of non-interference will not be tolerated and should not be. — RogueAI

Right:

Suppose a state has a law against prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Now suppose they prohibit a Jihadi from exercising their religion. I would submit that what is occurring is a prohibition on the free exercise of religion, which is religious intolerance. I think the state would acknowledge this and say, "Free exercise of religion is not unconditional."

But note that religious tolerance and free exercise of religion is precisely what is not occurring in this scenario. It is being overridden by a higher law. — Leontiskos

Unless it's not a religion to begin with — Arcane Sandwich

Sure, but no one is arguing that Jihad is not religious.

It applies to some religious tenets. If your religion requires you to punch nonbelievers in the face, that shouldn't be tolerated. — RogueAI

I take it that "religious tolerance" means tolerating religiously motivated acts. So if you do not tolerate the punch in question, then you are not practicing religious tolerance. You are being intolerant of a religion.

I think the only alternative is to say, "I am tolerating religiously motivated acts by prohibiting or censuring religiously motivated acts," which is contradictory.

I'm thinking that we can say that "Jihadism" represents part of the religion of those Muslims who accept and practice Jihad in the "outer" and violent sense.

"Jihadism refers to militant Islamic movements that use violence to achieve their political and religious goals." — BitconnectCarlos

I take it that this is not pejorative. I take it that Jihadis would not disagree with this description of themselves.

Your argument is not a truism, but its crucial premise stands without support. — SophistiCat

Which one?

Intelligence sets its own norms and ends.
Computers don't set their own norms and ends.
Therefore, computers are not intelligent. — Leontiskos

-

I don't know why it is so controversial to insist that in order to make a substantive argument, you need to say something substantive about its subject (and not just things like "AI cannot transcend its limitations"), and for that you have to have some knowledge of it. — SophistiCat

I don't know why, "Computers don't set their own norms and ends," is not substantive. If this is the premise that "stands without support" then you're simultaneously claiming that the same proposition that is an unsubstantive truism is also lacking necessary support.

If “the I think accompanies all our thoughts” has been rendered uncontroversial, is it now also uninteresting, unimportant? This is a further question, which I’m continuing to reflect on. — J

It is unanticipated, but perhaps not unimportant. I have often critiqued that same tendency to reify propositions here on TPF. Aristotle's critique of Plato seems very similar to this critique of Frege.

I always read PhS as sort of suggesting, like Aristotle, that Absolute Knowing is more a sort of a virtue—and I suppose it might make more sense if the recognition of the self-conscious nature of knowledge is an ideal we are removing road blocks to attain, as opposed to something clearly applying to all human thought. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is how I read something that @Wayfarer said. But the funny thing is, I'm not convinced it's a virtue. Or perhaps it is, up to a point. I think the younger generation's fixation on self and self-consciousness perhaps pushes beyond the virtue into the vice, and so I'm a bit wary of these younger scholars pressing so hard into self-consciousness.

In an intellectual sense we see the same thing with excessively self-scrutinizing epistemologies, as if having perfectly clear knowledge of our act of knowing will justify our knowledge. When it is done in this way it has gone too far - a kind of intellectual incurvatus in se.

Fregean thought as "propositional content" versus thought as a current event, so to speak, something my mind thinks at time T1. — J

Okay, so here is an edit I added:

My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when. — J

Okay, but is this a real distinction or a mental distinction? Doesn't the event involve leveraging a proposition? We think thoughts and propose propositions, right? So the theory here is that there are timeless Platonic propositions that we can do stuff with in time, like doubt, entertain, assert, etc.

...Which I think tracks what you've said...?

The important insight is that, when someone argues that “the I think accompanies all our thoughts,” they are using both senses in the same sentence. We should translate this sentence as “When I think p (thought2), I must also think: ‛p’ (thought1).” Put this way, it shouldn’t even be controversial. You can’t propose or entertain or contemplate a proposition without also thinking1 it. — J

This seems to go back to <what I said to javra>. It looks like you are turning "I think p" into "p was thought."

There it is! -- "the I think accompanies all our thoughts2". — J

So the I think = thought1? Such that Rodl's claim is, "The temporal event of thinking accompanies all our [Fregian propositions]."

If the I think means only a temporal event of thinking, then what does it have to do with self-consciousness? What does it have to do with the self-reflective "I think"?

And it is also strange to try to make that term "thoughts" = [Fregian propositions]. Remember, this would mean that they are non-temporal, such that "thoughts" are not temporally distinct acts of thinking, but rather notionally distinct Fregian propositions. That is, the plural "thoughts" would capture two distinct Fregian propositions, but not the same Fregian proposition thought on two different days.

For clarity

• "The [ I think] accompanies all our [thoughts]"
• =
• "The [temporal event of thinking] accompanies all our [Fregian propositions]

So with I would say that this looks rather stipulative. But I agree that a temporal event of thinking accompanies every Fregian proposition. Like you say, that is uncontroversial (for non-Platonists).

- Sure, but they gave substantive reasoning. They didn't say, "Because no state or country recognizes it as such."

Why not? Because no state or country recognizes it as such. — Arcane Sandwich

What I would say is that it is not a religion because it is not a religion, and this is unrelated to what states or countries recognize. Talking about states, countries, or the IRS seems to simply pass the buck. For example:

Easy: You let the Federal government decide that. — Arcane Sandwich

The substantive question is about how the matter is decided, and this means that, first, the Federal government must itself engage that substantive question in determining what is and is not a religion, and second, the Federal government could get the question wrong. "The Federal government said it's a religion therefore it must be a religion," is not a valid argument.

And again, I don't think the courts would rule that Jihadism is not a religion. I think they would rule that freedom of religion is not unconditional. It seems clear to me that Jihadism is a religion (or a religious tenet).

But that's one of my other points: no state in the West, no country in the West, prohibits the free exercise of religion. — Arcane Sandwich

But why think that? Is it only because "religion" gets defined in a way that makes the claim true by definition? "Anything we are intolerant of is by definition not religion"?

The reason the U.S. has a First Amendment is because those rights are often transgressed by states. The First Amendment gives citizens legal recourse when the state prohibits the free exercise of religion, which it is prone to do.

To recap: a thought may be a mental event, which occurs to a particular person at a particular time. “I had the thought that . . .” “Right now I’m thinking whether . . .” “Hold that thought!” But a thought can also be construed as the content of said mental event, what the thought is about – this is Frege’s use of “thought” as “proposition”. — J

I don't follow the fundamental distinction here. It looks like when a thought occurs as a mental event it will always have a content, and that this content will be inseparable from the mental event. So what are the two different senses of "thought"?

The primary distinction that appears is thinking (as pointing to someone's opinion) vs. asserting (claiming that something is true). "The Earth is round {assertion} but he thinks it is flat {pointing to an opinion or judgment}."

Edit:

My main distinction here (which I do think Popper would uphold) is between an event in time and the idea of a proposition’s being timeless, unspecific, “the same” no matter who thinks it, or when. — J

Okay, but is this a real distinction or a mental distinction? Doesn't the event involve leveraging a proposition? We think thoughts and propose propositions, right? So the theory here is that there are timeless Platonic propositions that we can do stuff with in time, like doubt, entertain, assert, etc.

Isn't that what you meant here (on Rodl's behalf, not your own)?: — J

I meant to construe that not as a separate thought, but as a part of the thought p. But maybe that is not a very clear way of expressing Rodl's claim.

Yes, that's right, but I don't understand why we are talking about the IRS or the state.

Suppose a state has a law against prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Now suppose they prohibit a Jihadi from exercising their religion. I would submit that what is occurring is a prohibition on the free exercise of religion, which is religious intolerance. I think the state would acknowledge this and say, "Free exercise of religion is not unconditional."

But note that religious tolerance and free exercise of religion is precisely what is not occurring in this scenario. It is being overridden by a higher law.

See my point? — Arcane Sandwich

Sort of, but does the "religion" in "religious tolerance" exclude Islamic Jihadis? If so, why? Why is Jihadism not religious?

It may be worth pointing out that this recent tangent on judgment comes not from the OP nor from Rodl's book, but from <an article that Rodl wrote in 2020> (linked here).

And at the heart of this what I see happening is that Jihadists transgress the basic dogma of secularism, which is that the power of coercion/force belongs only to the state. Anyone who transgresses that dogma forfeits all rights, and particularly the right to be tolerated. The secular tenet of "religious tolerance" is at best second-tier. It is easily trumped by the more basic dogmas. Cf. "A fire strong enough to consume the house : the wars of religion and the rise of the nation state."

Secularism aside, there is also the natural end of self-preservation, such that anyone who tries to eliminate you forfeits their right to be tolerated. "Religious tolerance" also tends to be trumped by this natural end, and for this reason any state—secular or otherwise—will tend to repel Jihadists.

So, you see, Leontiskos, it is the jihadists themselves who claim that jihadism and secularism are incompatible. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, of course they claim that. But do they claim that the one who is intolerant of Jihadists is still practicing religious tolerance?

I think my original point stands. I am not questioning the idea that secularism and Jihadism are incompatible. I am questioning the idea that one can be intolerant of a religion and still be practicing religious tolerance.

I did something subtle — Arcane Sandwich

The subtlety that I picked up was using "the concept of religious tolerance" rather than simply "religious tolerance." This could mean that there is some specialized concept. For example, in the West we don't consider militant religions real religions, and this allows us to think that intolerance of such religions does not transgress religious tolerance.

• If I am intolerant of a religion then I am not practicing religious tolerance
• Jihadism is a religion (or a religious tenet)
• Therefore, if I am intolerant of Jihadism then I am not practicing religious tolerance

Do you disagree with that argument?

3. "Legg and Hutter (2007b, p. 402) defined intelligence as “an agent's ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments”" — frank

It sounds like the idea is to conceive of AI as a "soulless" human. So that it has no goals of its own, but if someone gives it a task/goal then it will be able to complete it. A super-duper slave. And its ability to complete arbitrary goals is what makes it intelligent. It is a hypothetical imperative machine which not only provides information about how to achieve any given end, but in fact achieves it.

1) If jihadism is incompatible with secularism, then the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism.
2) Jihadism is incompatible with secularism.
3) So, the concept of religious tolerance does not apply to jihadism. — Arcane Sandwich

Pardon, but I think this is a bit too easy. For example:

4. Jihad is a religious tenet.
5. Religious tolerance applies to religious tenets.
6. Therefore, religious tolerance applies to Jihadism.

The implicit premise of your arguments is <Secularism never transgresses religious tolerance>, and I take it that this is the erroneous premise. If someone does not tolerate a religion, then they lack religious tolerance. It doesn't matter if they are secular or non-secular. It doesn't make sense to say, "If I do not tolerate something, then that something is not a religion," or, "By definition I {or secularism} never transgress religious tolerance."

If this is right, then the substantive question asks when religious tolerance should be abandoned.

That it is empty. — SophistiCat

How is it empty if it supports the second premise of the argument that you ignored?

Truths about the nature of computers may be "truisms" in that they are obvious, but if you don't understand the implications of such truths then they are less obvious to you than you suppose. And if you won't address the arguments that draw out those implications then I don't know what to tell you.

I was addressing the argument - not the thesis about what is sine qua non for intelligence, but that it is out of reach for AI by its "very nature." — SophistiCat

But the sine qua non of setting one's own norms [and ends] is the premise used to draw the conclusion that it is inherently out of reach for AI. That sine qua non isn't separate from the argument.

Given that there is a valid syllogism at hand, I think the only question is what to do with it. "The syllogism relies on a truism" is not a counterargument. And while I am glad that you agree with my "truisms," not everyone does.

- Interesting, thanks Wayfarer. :up:

- Sounds good. And know that it can be a tricky book. A commentary like <this one> can be helpful.

I was just pointing out the emptiness of critique that, when stripped of its irrelevant elements, consists of nothing but truisms. — SophistiCat

I think you just haven't understood the argument, and thus are engaged in a "lazy dismissal." You could disagree with the claim that humans are able to "set their own norms," but you wouldn't be on very solid ground. Most people see that humans do have a capacity to set their own norms and ends, and that this explains the difference between a human and an animal. If we understand that capacity as intelligence, then the question is answered. AI does not set its own norms and ends.

Your rejoinder that, "Humans are also bound by their 'architecture'," doesn't carry any weight unless we have reason to believe that human "architecture" also precludes the ability to set one's own norms and ends. The reason we argue from architecture in the case of the computer and not in the case of the human is because we understand the computer's architecture but do not understand human "architecture."

dismissive truisms like this: — SophistiCat

What exactly is your complaint, here? That it is true? That I've relied on a general truth about computers in the argument?

• Intelligence sets its own norms and ends.
• Computers don't set their own norms and ends.
• Therefore, computers are not intelligent.

Do you have a counterargument?
If you are just going to say, "That's too easy!," then I would point out that not every problem is hard.

PS -- As the writer of the OP, I officially declare that we no longer have to use the umlaut when referring to Rodl. What a pain in the ass :wink: . — J

:lol:
I was using copy-paste, but as others stopped using the umlaut it became harder to find.

At least for this thread,
Rödl = Rodl = Roooooooo4dl

Well, no. Rodl specifically says, "This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p." — J

Sure, but again, Rodl is asking us not to assume that being self-conscious means having two simultaneous thoughts, as above. — J

But I have nowhere said that there are two thoughts. That is not the issue. I wonder if you are conflating the issue of simultaneity from the other thread with the issue of self-conscious thinking of this thread? The proposition I have been attributing to Rodl comes from the OP.

We saw that for Kant the I think is not a thought, it is a kind of representation, it does not always accompany representations (or thoughts) and, when it does accompany them, it therefore represents a true form of self-consciousness.

I hate to say it, but a great deal of this comes down to how we want to use very ordinary words like "thought" and "accompany." — J

That's right, and I think it's just a matter of using words wrongly. When we are not conscious of thinking a thought, we are not self-conscious of our thinking of that thought. It doesn't make sense to say, "He is self-consciously thinking a thought without being conscious of his thinking the thought." If he is not conscious of thinking then he is not thinking the I think.

See my comment in the previous post about the possibly unfortunate choice of this term by phenomenologists. Most of our uses of "I think" are indeed conscious and intentional. (Not sure if they're also self-conscious, but often enough, I suppose.) But "the I think" is, or may be, different. — J

We could omit "intentional" if we like, but I don't see how we can omit "conscious." Once we say "I think" has nothing to do with consciousness of thinking we have departed much too far from the meaning of words.

- I agree with the others who claim that you are mistaken in calling intelligence a psychological construct.

The "I think" is not supposed be some simultaneous, conscious "thinking about thought" or "thinking that I am now having thought X." — J

I am wondering what it is supposed to be.

But now this occurs to me: Is it possible that you don’t countenance the idea of any thoughts that are not conscious? — J

Again, as I understand it what is at stake is self-conscious thought, not conscious thought:

Thinking p requires thinking p. No one disputes this. The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p." — Leontiskos

-

So therefore the “I think”, on that understanding, would be either present to consciousness or nonexistent? — J

See:

And what is that supposed to mean? "I think" is a self-conscious, intentional act. Does Rödl think people engage in self-conscious, intentional acts un-self-consciously and unintentionally? Do they think "I think" without realizing that they think "I think"? — Leontiskos

So the claim of the OP by Rodl is <Every time p is thought, I think p is thought>. And I don't think it makes sense to say, "You are thinking <I think p> but you don't know you are thinking <I think p>." Or more succinctly: self-conscious thought is self-conscious, and if a thought isn't self-conscious then it isn't a self-conscious thought.

We can talk about architecture in a loose sense, as an essential and enduring structure of a thing. — SophistiCat

This doesn't help with the logical fallacy of equivocation, for "the essential and enduring structure" of humans and computers are very far apart, both actually and epistemologically. Computer programs don't transcend their code. You can say that humans don't transcend their code, and even "talk about code in a loose sense," but the fact remains that, even if humans have "code," we have nothing like an exhaustive understanding of that "code."

Well, like I said, the fact that AI is designed by people has little bearing on the question of its potential capabilities — SophistiCat

That which is designed has a determinate end. It acts the way it was designed to act.

The issue here is that we reason discursively, and we do not (strictly speaking) ever simultaneously engage in more than one judgment. So when <I judge that I judge that a is F> there is at least a temporal distinction between the two instances of judgment, and in this case there is also a logical priority issue, i.e. one of the two judgments must be logically prior to the other.

So if Rodl wants to read that proposition as a non-temporal angelic intellection, it won't make any sense. That is, if we try to make both instances of 'judge' temporally and logically identical, it won't make any sense.

One way for Rodl to dispute true recursivity would be to say that the only way to interpret <I judge that I judge that a is F> in a non-vacuous way is to interpret it as <I judge that I have judged that a is F>.

Yes. I deal with a number of people on a daily basis that do not seem to understand how worldviews form, grow, and evolve over time and/or how they work. — creativesoul

Right. And we didn't really have developed theories on that score until the 19th and 20th centuries.

One reason I opted out of further explanation earlier was based on the succinct manner in which you drew the distinction between self-conscious thought and conscious thought. That was enough to make the basic case against the claim at the heart of the OP. — creativesoul

Thanks. :smile:

Think about children's thought prior to their ability to think about other minds as well as their own. Their thought is most certainly not prefixable with "I think". When they say "That is a tree" it is not accompanied by any sort of unspoken or implied "I think". It is their thought nonetheless. — creativesoul

Yep. :up:

I think developmental considerations often give the lie to these theories. When a child runs up to a puppy to pet it, upon recognizing a puppy they are not saying to themselves excitedly, "I think puppy! I think puppy!" This seems fairly uncontroversial. — Leontiskos

What's interesting is that, even for adults, the "I think" is quite difficult. Most people have difficulty understanding how others could think differently than they do precisely because there is no recognition of their own act of thinking.

Rödl goes on to argue that the problem can't be contained this way — J

Well without those arguments I have no reason to assent to their conclusions.

Again, Rodl is giving a reductio, and I am pointing out that no one sees any problem with the so-called "absurdity."

You could phrase it this way, as a true/false question:

• Judging 'a is F' is different than judging 'I judge a is F'
  
  • True
  • False

Most people would answer, "true." So why believe Rodl when he says "false"? Again, what are needed are arguments for the implausible position. Recursive thought is odd and rare, not impossible.