Leontiskos

A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Mundane claims: It would be too much of a stretch to claim that "I have an apple in my pocket" depends on this or that system. For our purpose lets say these are system-free claims. — hypericin

Okay. Well the first thing I want to say is that your system/claim distinction is somewhat arbitrary. For example, you say that Kant's categorical imperative explains why something is the case, and therefore the categorical imperative is the brute fact, not the prescription. This is fine as far as it goes, but I think it is wrong to go a step further and claim that explanation implies a system. All claims, including moral claims, depend on a categorical premise, but it does not follow that all claims are system-based. Your claim here is similar: <All apples are such-and-such; the thing in my pocket is such-and-such; therefore I have an apple in my pocket>. Earlier I noted that some moral claims are presumably system-based, such as utilitarian claims (
↪Leontiskos
). But not all are. "Do not execute that innocent man," is much like, "I have an apple in my pocket."

More generally, arguments for moral antirealism in our scientific age usually take the following form:
- All truths must be accessible via the methods of natural science.
- Moral claims are not accessible via the methods of natural science.
- Therefore, moral claims are not truths.
More precisely, it is the idea that there is not parity between moral epistemology and the epistemology of natural science, and that only the latter is legitimate. I usually point out that the non-parity claim is false, or at least it is not supportable on my interlocutor's framework. This theme recurs in our conversation. Presumably you would say that the claim about the apple is system-free but the claim about the innocent man is not system-free. @Michael has done a good job laying the groundwork in this thread and the other thread regarding things like brute facts and @Bob Ross's "(moral) facts."

That calculation may be true or false according to the systematic rules of special relativity. These systematic rules themselves may be true or false, to the degree that they accurately predict all the parts of empirical reality that they ought to. — hypericin

Okay, but I think it is somewhat confusing to call that which follows from a system "true." It is simply not the case that things are true insofar as they follow from any arbitrary system. In effect you are offering a false concession to moral realism with this sense of "true."

So a surgeon learning how she ought and ought not to wield a knife, is learning "morality"? This is not the "morality" I am familiar with. — hypericin

Yes, exactly. You are familiar with a Kantian morality, of (exceptionless) categorical imperatives, no?

---

Every "should", "ought", and value proposition, may be perfectly truth-apt, but it must explicitly or implicitly include an "according to" clause, just to be structurally correct. — hypericin

I agree with
↪Michael
.

---

I don't follow your point. Making moral claims seems voluntary, one is under no obligation to make them. And I don't see why voluntary/necessary is an important distinction in this discussion. — hypericin

The simpler point is that everyone on this forum did get out of bed this morning, therefore everyone on this forum does make moral claims or judgments. The same is not true of chess. Presumably we do not all play chess. So I reject the notion that anyone, practically, does not engage in moral judgment.

---

You are just playing with words. This is not the same meaning as the "true" we are discussing. — hypericin

Well, what is the notion of "true" that we are discussing? You have never defined it.

If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? Is "one mustn't hurt cats" a brute fact, just as "one mustn't hurt dogs"? Or is there some rule they flow from? — hypericin

If "One musn't hurt cats," is a system-based claim, then so is, "There is an apple in my pocket."

My point is to challenge the idea that

* people make moral propositional claims
- therefore
*moral propositional claims are truth-apt
- or
*everyone is running around making mistakes.

My argument is that there is a third way: people make propositional moral claims, but they are claims within systems of ideas, not claims about the world. And that you can make true or false, therefore truth-apt claims within systems of ideas which themselves may be true, false, not truth apt at all, or nonsensical. — hypericin

I think anyone who claims that those who intend to make a truth claim are not doing so has a very odd notion of truth, propositionality, and intention. The claim that most everyone, including some of the most competent philosophers who have ever lived, have been plagued by first-order deception at the level of their very intention, is just a weak theory. It reads like a conspiracy theory. I'm not even sure it is coherent to claim that one can be deceived about their intention. (@Michael has also covered this topic in various ways.)

Indeed, I believe this. But, how do I know it? What tells me it is true? If it were false, how would I know it? How do I reality test it? How did I or anyone discover this fact? These are the questions that seem to bedevil any moral proposition, and it is in this sense that they aren't truth-apt: not only do we not know they are true, we don't even know what knowing they are true, or knowing they are false, looks like. — hypericin

As @Michael pointed out, I think this is a separate consideration. I claimed that it deserves its own thread (
↪Leontiskos
). But as I pointed out to you early on, discursive reason/justification must end at some point. The same holds of the epistemology of natural science.

The moral rules/systems I have in mind aren't necessarily prescriptions. They may be something like, "all sentient life has value". Indeed, I believe this. — hypericin

What does it mean to say, "I believe this," other than, "I believe this to be true"?
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Moral claims may indeed be true, but only in that they are true representations of the moral system within which they operate. — hypericin

H If moral claims aren't true by virtue of moral rules/systems/etc, what are they true by virtue of? — hypericin

Hypericin, I hope to respond to your posts tomorrow, but let me ask a preliminary question. You have given an argument against the truth of moral claims, such that, <Moral claims can only be true in virtue of moral systems, and moral systems cannot be true. Therefore, moral claims cannot be true in a supra-systematic way>. (In my post, "in the strong sense" = supra-systematic)

Do you have examples of non-moral truth claims that are true in a supra-systematic way? Is any system true or false? Does your argument prove too much? Namely, that truth itself is always system-constrained? (This is the question that my initial responses have addressed.)

Generally not. "I ought to get out of bed because otherwise I will be late for work" is not a moral judgement, it is purely pragmatic. — hypericin

See:

You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior. — Leontiskos
Is Philosophy still Relevant?
However, with the diremption of philosophy and science since Bacon, and the ever-increasing hegemony of science (technology), has philosophy moved from being an "outlier" to a superfluous branch of study? — Pantagruel

Now that @Banno has introduced me to existentialcomics.com I should be able to avoid dialogue altogether! Here's one for your thread: "On the Usefulness of Philosophy."
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Banno
- Haha, these are great. I will have to check out existentialcomics.com.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Banno
- That's great. :lol: I downloaded a copy.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Yes, something along those lines. Any theory that requires differing senses of truth is to my eye dubious. I'd apply Searle's analysis, using status functions - "counts as" sentences. Moving along a diagonal "counts as" a move in chess, and so on. No need to re-think truth in order to play chess, which strikes me as a huge advantage. — Banno

Quite right. Your post about chess-deductions made me thing of something similar, where any restrictions on the movement of the pawn depend on whether the pawn "counts as" a chess piece or just a piece of carved wood, and statements about chess pieces will have different truth conditions than statements about pieces of carved wood.

But if you and @hypericin engage one another on these points I will be interested to look on.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Apustimelogist

I can see how chess would be a useful example to hypericin's position. I think the problem is that chess is a voluntary activity, whereas morality is not (
↪Leontiskos
).

For example, you got out of bed this morning because you believed that the proposition, "I ought to get out of bed," was true. On my reckoning that is a moral judgment, pertaining to your own behavior. Is the reasoning that grounds that moral judgment purely hypothetical, with no reference to, or support from, objective values or 'oughts'? I really, really doubt it. When people make decisions they do so on the basis of the belief that some choices are truly better than others, in a way that goes beyond hypothetical imperatives. After all, in real life a hypothetical imperative needs to be grounded in a non-hypothetical decision or imperative in order to take flesh.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Banno

I think he might say that a game like chess involves voluntarily abiding by stipulated rules, and that deductions can be formed in light of these stipulated rules, but the truth of the deductions is only derivative, deriving from an artificial reality (namely, the stipulated rules). It's the idea that there is chess-truth and there is real-truth, where the first depends on stipulated rules and the second does not. Thus claims about the rules of chess are truth-apt in light of the rules of chess, but the rules of chess taken as a whole are not truth-apt. He would say that, "Chess is true," and, "Chess is false," are nonsensical statements.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Banno
- Thanks for that.

...and what I said above applies here too. If the rules of chess are neither true nor false, then they cannot be used in deductions such as: — Banno

Yes, this is interesting. I was just pulling an example that hypericin gave in the other thread (
↪hypericin
). I want to say that the case depends on a kind of material imprecision which prescinds from the intent/context of the statement. Your response to him in that thread was presumably to the effect that context is always at play, and that "context-independent" is a fiction. His point here, though, is that the rules taken as a whole, or the game taken as a whole, are apparently not truth-apt:

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"? — hypericin

It's moving towards conceiving of morality as a set of hypothetical imperatives.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
So then you agree, the rules of chess themselves cannot be "true". — hypericin

Even if the rules of chess cannot be true, it would not thereby follow that no rules or systems can be true. We are apt to speak about the truth of an artifact according to the goal of the artist. So if there is a horse drawing competition, the drawing that most resembles a real horse will be the winner, and will be deemed truest. Or a carpenter's square is true when it achieves an exact 90° angle. We could apply the same rule to games, and perhaps claim that the true game is chess and not checkers, because it better achieves the end that games are meant to achieve.

How do you make the check icon, btw? — hypericin
```
[math]\checkmark[/math]
[math]\unicode{x2718}[/math]
```
(There might be a shortcut for the 'x'. I don't know.)

A moral claim C is true, or false, in virtue of moral rules, R. (doctrines, axioms, etc.) — hypericin

This is really the whole of your argument, and it is nothing more than an assertion. Moreover, it is an assertion I have already addressed (
↪Leontiskos
). Feel free to engage that post.

Or, R itself is true. I contend, R can no more be true than the rules of chess. You can follow R, or not, like R, or not, find R useful, and virtuous, or not. But R by its nature, cannot be true, it is not truth-apt. — hypericin

I think at bottom your claim is rather simpler. You are saying that all truth is formal, deriving from axioms, and where axioms are not truth-apt so conclusions are not truth-apt (in the strong sense). But the moral axioms you have in mind are qualitatively identical to the conclusions. For example, the Utilitarian begins by saying that one should achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and ends by saying that Bob should ride his bike to work instead of driving. At the end of the day you just think prescriptions cannot be true or false, no? It is not that R is systematic/doctrinal/axiomatic, but rather that it is prescriptive. If all you are saying is that prescriptions are not truth-apt, then all that talk about systems and axioms led me to misunderstand your position.

Do you think mundane claims are also true in virtue of systems, such as the claim, "Frogs can jump"?
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
My position hasn't changed one iota. — AmadeusD

Swell. Your zealous defense of your honor hath succeeded. I concede all points. I surrender. You win.

Now go do some actual philosophy.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪AmadeusD
- Ye doth protest too much, methinks.
When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
But is not truth finally something we have to arrive at via apprehending and understanding? I feel like this is a bit of a loop. — Tom Storm

I would put it this way: there are truths that we do not arrive at. Not everything that is true is known to be true. Part of the difficulty here is that 'truth' is a complex and multivalent term, as it should be.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
This is absolutely the case. And i've certainly learned to be far more careful. I've cleaned a fair bit of egg from my face. — AmadeusD

No, the point is that it is not about you. It's not personal. <This post> was meant to convey something other than personal culpability. I don't count it an error to claim that we should not torture babies. At worst it is an understandable mistake from a moral non-realist. But if it was a purely accidental utterance/agreement, then so be it.

Not really. I queried why it would be senseless. I can see where you've gone with that, though.

In that case, yes, but for the above (in regard to your take on my position). — AmadeusD

:up:
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I have no idea how to get this through to you lol - I misspoke. I walked nothing back. Given that I entirely overlooked where I misspoke you took my claim for something it wasn’t. — AmadeusD

Well, if it was purely accidental then my point remains instructive. But we have been talking about the torture of babies for days now, and I would be surprised if you have consistently misunderstood that claim to be about only oneself, and not also about others.

Note that you had already staked out the same position earlier (
↪AmadeusD
). There you claimed that it was justifiable to get angry at others who behave in a way you deem incorrect. In that case it was also obvious that we were talking about the behavior of other people.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
What does it mean for the rules of chess to be "true"? Can a games rules be "false"?

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"? — hypericin

The truth in question was the claim, not the doctrine. "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." Sorry - sloppy writing, I admit!
When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
It will perhaps come as no surprise that I agree with
↪Banno
. In
↪Wayfarer
's thread the question arose of whether 'shape' is a mind-independent reality. My argument was that boulders treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not any minds are involved:

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape. — Leontiskos

The point is that objects have existence in themselves and exercise causal powers independently of anything we do or know. We have to do certain things in order to learn that there is a flower and that it has four petals, but the flower with four petals exists whether or not we learn about it.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Nice, thank you mate. Really appreciate the grace. It's been a really cool thread. — AmadeusD

I don't mind if you retract statements or mistakes, but it is worth noting that the point at hand was not insubstantial. You tried to affirm a moral claim while denying that it involves a norm. I pointed out that, in effect, moral claims involve norms. After that you saw that the norm was attached and backed away from the claim, due to the norm. The more fundamental point here is that moral claims and moral norms are all around us. Avoiding them would be like avoiding CO2 and only breathing oxygen. "We should not torture babies," is a moral claim, but so is, "He should not have cut me off in traffic." We are social creatures, and as such we are constantly judging actions.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Which of these don't you agree with:
(By "Doctrine", I mean any doctrine, system of thought or belief, ideology, etc. ) — hypericin

Okay:

Claims can be about doctrine, or about reality, or both. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinal truth is independent of truth in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ )
Claims can therefore be:
Doctrinally true, but false in reality. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinally false, but true in reality. ( $\checkmark$ )
Doctrinally true or false, but have no truth value at all in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ /?)
Doctrinally empty, and true or false in reality. ( $\unicode{x2718}$ ) — hypericin

The form in English of doctrinal and reality claims is identical.
Therefore, people are apt to get all this wrong. They may confuse doctrinal claims with claims about reality, or mistake doctrinal truth with truth in reality. — hypericin

I tend to think you are digging around in the grave of Logical Positivism. I don't think people are often confused about this matter. It is only very seldom that we speak about doctrinal claims qua doctrinal. Do you have any examples:?

"One cannot move pawns backwards" — hypericin

For me the problem with this Logical Positivist-esque approach is that it reifies judgments and propositions. You are trying to read that as a material, intent-independent sentence, when in fact it is not. The material sense creates an ambiguity, but in the context of organic intent the meaning is, "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." This is about the "doctrine" of chess, which is itself a part of reality; and it is true.

Edit: Changed comma to semicolon in last sentence.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I fucked up. I apologise. That is not my claim. We good? hehe — AmadeusD

Sure, fair enough. :up:
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I really don't care how we got here. — AmadeusD

We got here when you tried to agree to a commonsensical claim that we should not torture babies, and then I pointed out that the claim is inconsistent with your position, and now you've slowly and painfully walked it back. So now you agree with me: you do not hold that we should not torture babies, because your presuppositions do not allow it.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I have clarified this multiple times, at much pain (linguistically). i think this. I don't think it about anyone else. — AmadeusD

Then you would not agree to the claim that "we should not..." 'We' = 'Myself and other people.' Like I've said all along, your claim contradicts your position.

But by all means retract the claim. I assume this is what you are now doing?
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I don't make that claim. — AmadeusD

I already provided the quote where you agreed to the claim. Here it is again:

In my case, I do think this — AmadeusD
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I make no such step. I think it's probably better that other people don't routinely do that, but that's only a comment on my own discomfort. I say literally nothing, and claim literally nothing, about how others should behave. I have thoughts, sure, but I refuse to(tbh, am not motivated to either) conclude anything. I inform my own actions. No one else's. And i don't, unless by incident. I suppose one could say 'norm' OR 'norm for me'. And yeah, it's normal for me not to want to torture babies. That doesn't extend to anyone else (again, other than the fact that it actually is normal, rather than normative, to not do that). — AmadeusD

I addressed this in my post to you <here>. Judgments need not be enacted to occur. To judge that, "we should not torture babies," is to apply a norm to people. Even if it is not applied externally, you are still applying a norm in your judgment. If you do not apply norms to others, then you cannot agree with that claim. Instead you might say, "I should not torture babies, but this 'should' does not apply to others."

I just can't see an issue with this. If your principles are applied only to yourself, you are making no attempt whatsoever to enforce them. You are not making judgements or proclamations on actions per se, but on your actions. — AmadeusD

Sure, but the claim involves the word 'we'. It's a rather important word within the proposition.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
But, I would say, within my metaethical framework, the reason I agree with you is not because there is a fact of the matter: it is because what we both consider “worthy” of imposement is similar to one another. They are both tastes (to me), but one hits towards my core morals and the other seems negligible. Why? I can’t give you a full account of my psychology, but I would guess it is a bit of biology, sociology, nurture, and psychology that motivate me towards finding that a reasonable assessment. — Bob Ross

If you agree that there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and not wanting babies to be tortured, then what is the difference!? How does a taste become justifiably imposable? You claim they are exactly the same, and you treat them entirely different. You claim they are tastes, but you treat them as laws. This is irrationality at its finest.

So I don’t think you should find it that controversial when I say I would impose my belief that one should not torture babies but no the vanilla ice cream because I value the former simply so much; just like how you value moral facts so much that you will impose that taste on other people. — Bob Ross

Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on.

I would find them “unreasonable”... — Bob Ross

Good, and why are they unreasonable?

What is incoherent about any of that? Please explicate two propositions which I affirm that you find to be incoherent. — Bob Ross

It is irrational to impose tastes; it is irrational to hold that there are non-objective truths; it is irrational to treat two alike tastes entirely differently; it is irrational to claim that rationality is a subjective matter. Your thread is overflowing with irrationality. When faced with a contradiction in your thinking you try to defend it, and seven more pop up.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪AmadeusD

Fair enough. I don't really know enough about your position to say much, and I may not have enough time for that anyway, but I suppose there is one thing that could be said. You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior.

Or in the other thread I spoke of the claim that "we should not torture babies." You replied:

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm — AmadeusD

First, note that it is a principle of action. Now when a principle of action is applied, it becomes a norm. That is, the one applying it is utilizing it as a norm or standard, which is being applied to persons and their actions. So to say, "I think we should not torture babies, but I don't think it's a norm," is a contradiction (or else the English language is being used in a highly abnormal and unconventional manner). Else it is the claim that it is only a tentative norm or a watery norm. But just as tentative judgments are still judgments, so too are tentative norms still norms.

To be honest, then, I think the "moral subjectivist" lacks self-knowledge. They are trying to have their cake and eat it too, and this comes out in various ways. One such way is by applying or maintaining a principle of action and refusing to call it a norm. Another is vacillating on the question of whether they are within their rights to project their subjectivity onto others. The more precise problem, in my opinion, is that "subjective" and "objective" are much less precise words than the so-called "subjectivist" recognizes, and this leads to odd claims and presumptions.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Hi Leontiskos, thanks for making this point, it is crucial. It is precisely here that I am an error theorist. People go around all the time making doctrinal claims as if they were correspondence to reality claims. Pick any ideology, religion, political system, etc., you want, and you will find people talking about it as if they were claiming things about reality. When in fact, they are making doctrinal claims about and within a certain framework of beliefs. This is in fact a basic cognitive error, and it is for the clarification of errors of this sort that philosophy exists in the first place.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this, as much as it might hurt the feelings of those making them. Moral claims are simply impossible without a moral doctrine within which they exist. And this moral doctrine itself, unlike the claims made within it, is not truth apt.

The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

I think you missed my entire point, because I agreed that doctrinal claims are "correspondence to reality" (truth) claims. I think you are putting the cart before the horse. Truth in the primary sense is not tautological, and systems are secondary realities. Propositions are primary. Everyday language is not a logical system. Analytic philosophers have basically built a pretty house and then pretended that there is no reality outside of it. Systems are contrived, not basic. Truth is a great deal more wild and unwieldy than the analytic philosopher's domesticated schema can account for.

So the category error is yours, for the truth-claim is not a system-claim. It is not a framework-claim. It is a metaphysical claim, and there is no contextualizing framework or system for truly metaphysical claims. Modern philosophy has dug itself into a rabbit hole by claiming that metaphysics and metaphysical claims are impossible.

Here is something I wrote elsewhere:

It is such a strange and deep-seated malady of analytic philosophy whereby intelligence is reduced to computation and truth is reduced to tautology! Some philosophers have become so preoccupied with their systems that they seem to have forgotten that reality exists at all. Their Tower of Babel always ends up crashing down, and this occurs at approximately the same moment that the average person understands truth better and more clearly than they do. Truth is arrived at by judgment, not primarily by computation or syllogism or system. Judgment always comes first and precedes the others. The terms, the premises, the first principles, the inferences, the realities at stake—all of it is first subjected to judgment. There is no magic way to circumvent judgment and truth in the realest, most primary sense. In real life there are no axioms, only first principles that are either true or false. The suspension of judgment that putatively applies to axioms is but a useful fiction.

The same problem that occurs in moral epistemology also occurs in natural epistemology. The initial judgments that connect reason to the real world tend to elude analytic philosophers and “empiricists.” Hume ends up undermining not only morality, but also natural science. A truncated understanding of intelligence leads to a truncated understanding of reality. If intelligence were only computational, a matter of combining and separating, synthesis and analysis, then empiricists like Hume would be justified in their strange conclusions. But it is not. It is also comparison; comparison of things to one another and also comparison of ideas to things and to reality, whence the ideas are true or false. The most basic act is not even comparison per se, but rather affirmation and denial (the recognition and assertion that something is or that something is not). The simplicity of affirmation and denial precedes discursive computation and also grounds it, giving it meaning and purpose. If there is no truth in non-discursive reason, then there can be no truth in discursive reason (unless we substitute truth for a formalism, but this is not truth).

Else, take my post <here> and replace "theory" with "system" and "fact" with "proposition." The same point holds. There is no automatic rule that systems must be met with systems, or that systems are more fundamental than truths. I think it is quite the opposite.

(Of course there are exceptions, moral approaches which are system-fundamental. Utilitarianism comes to mind, where a systematic abstraction grounds the moral conclusions.)
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Firstly, it isn’t immutable. I have the taste that everyone should not torture babies, and that could very well change (although I doubt it) in the future.

Secondly, it is not ‘universal’ in any objective sense. I subjectively commit myself to trying to universalize my goal.

Think of it this way. Imagine that we programmed an AI such that they had the sole goal all the time of trying to convince and ultimately stopping people from torturing babies. All else being equal, that people shouldn’t torture babies is not a fact, the AI just has this ingrained taste. Now, does this change the fact that this AI is trying to universalize their taste? Not at all. You seem to omit this option in your analysis. — Bob Ross

Okay, that was a useful clarification. The thrust of my point is this: Why are you trying to universalize a taste that is not universal in any objective sense? If moral subjectivism is the claim that moral judgments are idiosyncratic (flowing from subjectivity), then the evangelistic moral subjectivist is attempting to impose idiosyncrasies.

Again, I think there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and the belief that no one should torture babies. Imagine there were someone who went around, everywhere, trying to convince everyone that chocolate was the best ice cream, and if they saw anyone eating any other flavor they would violently prevent them from doing so. I ask them, "Do you think there is some objective reason everyone should only eat chocolate ice cream?" They respond, "No, it's my personal and subjective taste, but I just go around trying to persuade and even force everyone to eat only chocolate ice cream." And they take this to be a reasonable answer to my question. What would you say? Is that anywhere near reasonable? I think the proper word for such a person is "vain." They want everyone to have the same tastes that they do.

To be clear, I grant that your 'moral subjectivism' is probably not a form of moral realism, but I do not grant that it is coherent. It requires one to do things like impose idiosyncratic beliefs, or speak of judgments that are true and yet not objective.
Perverse Desire
Fair enough -- if what I'm describing is, in fact, Aristotelian then the distinction between the thinkers isn't as important to me as the line of thought itself.

Let's say that this emphasis on willpower is a common belief, that I have heard it attributed it Aristotle's psychology (in the sense of having authority due to Aristotelian roots), and that I believe this is a bad way of thinking about how human beings change their behaviors. It seems what you're saying is that this is an incorrect way of understanding Aristotle, so fair enough -- then I misunderstand Aristotle. — Moliere

Sure. There may be some differences, but I tend to think you are overstating them. The Aristotelian tradition is not at all will-centered in my opinion. Of course that doesn't mean that it might not involve a greater emphasis on the will than Epicureanism.

Why would you disagree with "total inability"? Isn't that the actual problem case that I'm talking about? From the perspective of the doctor, at least, the one who gets themselves to the AA meetings and undergoes change because they realize they have a problem and they need help -- that's the case that's already solved itself. From the perspective of the Epicurean doctor the person who doesn't attend the meetings, that cannot stop themselves from pursuing anxious desire -- those are the cases that need the most help. — Moliere

I am saying that the person who doesn't go to the doctor will never be cured, and no one who sees a doctor has a total inability. In the general case I think there needs to be some baseline of willpower in order to seek the cure in the first place. I want to say that the doctor-patient relation is synergistic.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
The question is not whether moral statements are truth-apt. They clearly are.

The problem is, are the moral systems against which moral statements are true or false themselves truth-apt? Here I think not. — hypericin

I think there are a number of problems with this post, but let me just focus on the most basic. As outlined by @Michael and others in the other thread (link), moral truth claims adhere to a basic sort of correspondence theory of truth. At least this is how I mean them. You are thinking in terms of a formal systems notion of truth. It’s an equivocation on what “truth” means. For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. We do not mean, “If you accept our axioms then this follows tautologically.” We mean, “This is true, it correctly describes reality.” A moral claim works the same way. The claim is not, “If you accept my system then this follows,” but rather that the proposition itself is true (and if your system can’t handle it then you need an upgrade).

A system or context can condition the meaning of a proposition, but the proposition itself is ultimately true or false depending on how it comports with reality. The primary bearers of truth are therefore propositions, not systems.
Perverse Desire
it's not a lack of willpower, though a presence of willpower would surely make the doctor's task easier, it's that this person requires something more than willpower (given their total inability in that regard). — Moliere

I think you are describing Aristotelian continence. The value of continence does not reside in the idea that willpower suffices for happiness.

Again, for Aristotle the route for the depraved person is <depravity $\to$ incontinence $\to$ continence $\to$ temperance>. I have been presenting it as the idea that willpower is necessary (but not sufficient) to move from depravity to temperance.

The only thing I disagree with is "total inability." They must be able and willing to undergo the painful cure, and this requires willpower. More than willpower is needed, but without willpower they cannot be cured. Those with a total inability would not commit to the cure, attend the AA meetings, etc. Again, temperance is the goal, not continence, and temperance is not a matter of willpower. For Aristotle continence is not even a virtue, because it is not good in itself.

The overemphasis on willpower is presumably a descendant of Puritanism.
Convince Me of Moral Realism
I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration... — Bob Ross

"Moral subjectivism" seems to be one of those terms that is hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the fact that you affirm that there are true moral judgments, and that these judgments are universally applicable, would seem to move you out of the "moral subjectivism" category by most definitions of that term. In other words, your "universalism" forecloses "subjectivism," and moves you into what is clearly moral realism.

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. Therefore you are not a subjectivist. Moral subjectivism cannot achieve unchangeable universality, at least as commonly understood.

I have no problem with this, I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to.
Welcome to The Philosophy Forum - an introduction thread
Welcome,
↪JuanZu
. :smile:
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there? — AmadeusD

I think it's a cultural problem. In the West we are culturally (and morally) conditioned "not to judge others," and therefore we are uneasy with moral judgments. But it seems to me that this is unhelpful because moral judgments are unavoidable. Then there is the additional philosophical problem of grounding moral judgments, which is also particularly Western.

There are some people who try to obey this conditioning, and try to at least never act on the basis of their moral judgments (of others). That may be possible (and it may not be), but I think it's unhealthy either way. The way forward seems to be the virtue of humility. Embrace moral realism while simultaneously embracing humility. Form and enact moral judgments in a way that is neither brash nor shortsighted. Like truth, morality is best accepted willingly and arrived at via persuasion. Once it is admitted that moral propositions are truth-apt, persuasion becomes a possibility. Morality is largely social, so it is in everyone's best interest to know moral truth and to move forward in unison, with argument and dialogue to the fore.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). I hope there is some certitude that these actions are actually wrong! (I don't mean to open up the law-morality debate. Again, I am defining a moral judgment as a judgment of a person's action.)

Anyway, sorry for the snippy post earlier. These morality threads drive me a little crazy, and therefore I try to limit the number of my interlocutors.

(Awhile back I drafted a thread on why all acts are moral acts, or at least all interpersonal acts. It seems there might be some interest if I ever get around to finishing it.)
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I think I have pinpointed the crux of our disagreement (and let me know what you think): it is twofold. Firstly, you believe that someone is a moral realist if they accept #3 (i.e., “There are at least some true moral judgments.”), whereas I believe one needs to accept all three prongs of the thesis (that I outlined before). Secondly, you believe that there is it is illegitimate to impose a taste on another person. — Bob Ross

It seems that I did somewhat misread your three conditions, but you already agreed to my own definition:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos

With respect to the first point, I think this is just wrong, in the sense that this is not a standard definition of moral realism. The contemporary view holds those three prongs, which makeup of the moral realist thesis in its most generic form, and rejecting even one of them entails anti-realism. If you think that #3 (and I would presume #1 as well) are all that are required to be a realist, then, by your definition, I am a realist. I simply do not agree with the semantics. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. According to the standard view, someone who accepts objective moral values is a moral realist. What source are you using?

Again, my definition pertains to the bindingness of a moral prescription, and you agreed to that definition. Are you withdrawing your agreement?

I wholly agree: moral subjectivism agrees with moral anti-realism insofar as it also affirms there are true moral judgments — Bob Ross

I assume this is a typo and you meant to say "moral realism."

Nope. I affirm that “I believe thou shalt not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

"I believe the proposition, but that doesn't mean I think it's true." This is the sort of sophistry that has led me to avoid your threads on these topics. Anyway, let's just go back to the definition that I already gave and you already agreed to, because that was constructed so as to avoid these sophistic responses.

it makes no difference if morals are truth-apt and there are true moral judgments if those judgments express something non-objective. — Bob Ross

This all goes back to the bindingness I have already brought up. Your moral judgment depends on a moral norm. If others are not bound by that moral norm, then what in the world gives you the right to force them to obey it? If the moral norm does not objectively apply to their actions, then why are you applying it to their actions? This claim of "subjectivism" is ad hoc, and that is what I disagree with. Enforcing moral norms that you claim are not binding is irrational, even if it is called "subjectivism."
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements. — AmadeusD

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense. In any case, this seems to go right back to my point about tentativeness.
Western Civilization
She seems to conflate 1 with 2 and 3. — schopenhauer1

She is saying that wokeness results in all three, but that (1) is the most important thing to oppose. (3) is not even a contention of the article except insofar as the ACLU historically attempted to avoid it.

She seems to assume that legal organizations cannot take on preferred political sides in constitutional law cases. For example, doubtful you will see the Heritage Foundation taking on various leftwing causes. — schopenhauer1

I don't think there's any evidence for such a claim. The whole argument flows from the specific nature of the ACLU, namely its relation to civil liberties and its historical opposition to communist logic. Andrews is surely aware that the argument would not work against any and all legal organizations.

This is one of the essays in the print edition of the journal. It's not a blog post. I don't think you read it carefully enough.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement? — AmadeusD

To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude.

↪Bob Ross
does the same thing when he says that he only thinks that others should not torture babies (and he thinks this independently of others' beliefs, and he will act to prevent them by force if necessary). His claim here is something like, "I only think, I don't know, therefore I am not a moral realist." This is incorrect for the same reason outlined above. A tentative moral judgment is still a moral judgment, and I would further argue that a moral judgment that one is prepared to act upon decisively is not a particularly tentative judgment.
When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
↪Hanover
- Right, and if we are forced to choose between Hanover's and Joshs' account, Hanover's should win every time. Theories which undermine the most well-known facts are bad theories, and exceptions do not always disprove the rule. Just because there are cases where perception diverges along cultural lines or somesuch, does not mean that perception is inherently divergent. The example of the infant is helpful because it approximates a baseline.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
↪Apustimelogist
- I'm just saying that if you treat both "preferences" in a significantly different way, then you must hold that there is something significantly different about them. I'm leaving it up to you to do the math.

As an aside, this thread has become sophistry-ville. :confused:

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