Correct. I never claimed that, I said, "I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you." — Bob Ross

Then you think people should do what they are in no way bound to do, which is a contradiction. Your statement is a perfect example of a moral judgment, and you are even introducing the notion of truth.

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. — Bob Ross

Why would you try to stop someone from doing something which is not objectively wrong (i.e. something that is not wrong for them or for all)? (Of course it makes no difference how you try to stop them.)

This is patently false. Moral anti-realism is the denial of one of three things:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).

2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism).

3. There are at least some true moral judgments.

Denying any of these lands you in moral anti-realist territory. Denying just 1 lands you in moral non-cognitivism; denying just 2 in moral subjectivism; and just 3 in moral nihilism.

You have attempted to define moral realism such that it is ‘anyone who imposes a moral standard’, which includes subjective and objective standards, and this is just not what moral realism is at all. Perhaps you are presupposing that standards are always objective, then clearly I am not a moral realist since I impose subjective ‘standards’. — Bob Ross

Your beliefs and your actions with regard to torturing babies constitute a moral judgment (3). Your claims are "subject-referencing prescriptive statements," for you are prescribing how other subjects ought to act. This isn't rocket science. You enforce your belief that no one should torture babies, and therefore you are a moral realist. This is the contradiction I have been pointing to: you are a moral realist while simultaneously claiming that moral realism is false. You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist.

More concisely, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a moral judgment, and one that you affirm to be true.

- :up:

I see it more that she was using the ACLU to say that legal organizations that promote free speech should take all cases. — schopenhauer1

I think this is an important mistake in reading the article. She says just the opposite:

Is the solution to urge the ACLU to return to neutral liberalism? That seems unlikely. It would be strange indeed for conservatives to take up the cause of liberalism now that its former champions have abandoned it. Even if it were possible to rediscover neutral liberalism as a cross-ideological common ground—and it is not—conservatives would still be better off pursuing other theories of law based on concepts closer to their tradition, such as the common good.

There is one means of restraining the woke that we all can insist upon, liberals, originalists, and integralists alike, and that is a return to professional standards. — What Happened to the ACLU? by Helen Andrews

In my opinion you are focusing too heavily on the ACLU. The ACLU isn't central to the argument. But I literally kick myself off the internet in one minute, so that will have to be sufficient for the time being... haha

- Thanks for that. I am not a legal professional and my point is broader. If such acts as were charged with sedition in wartime (e.g. distributing the leaflets in Abrams) are now protected by free speech in the U.S., then I do not see how a book attempting to abridge the free speech of ballerinas would not be protected. Of course I grant that if the book sets out plans for a coup d'état then it would be illicit. I wasn't reading anything that extreme into your comments. My assumption is that the means the book prescribes are not themselves blatantly illegal.

Okay fine, it is a rather political article. My memory had failed me. :lol: Still, there are deeper layers at play which I appreciate.

I don't have the article right in front of me. Did she cite specific examples of that happening with the ACLU? I think she did, but I can't remember the details. I believe someone was dropped, right? It seemed to me the article was more lamenting what the ACLU used to be about mid-century. But I do remember her explaining the fiduciary argument. I just don't remember the egregious examples, other than the organization has become generally taken over by the "woke" politics that many academic/legal institutions have become — schopenhauer1

I think the ACLU is a set piece, used in the early part of her article. My interpretation is that the article is proposing a strategy for addressing "wokeism," and the ACLU served as a useful example. It is the idea that upholding fiduciary duties and professional standards is a better approach than the more recent debates on liberalism, communism, and integralism.

The one instance she provided of (1) seems to have been here — schopenhauer1

Others include the Dobbs leak, investment firm quotas, racial Covid supply rationing, medical ethics and malpractice, and things related to attorney-client privilege.

Left-wing hostility to the basic rules of the game culminated in the Dobbs leak. Supreme Court deliberations and decisions have always been protected by the strictest codes of confidentiality. In May 2022, in an unprecedented breach, an unknown person leaked Justice Samuel Alito’s draft decision overturning Roe v. Wade to reporters at Politico. The identity of the leaker has not been discovered, but the logical motivation would have been to spook one of the moderate conservative justices into changing his or her vote. A professor at Yale Law told a reporter that he assumed the leaker was a liberal “because many of the people we’ve been graduating from schools like Yale are the kind of people who would do such a thing. They think that everything is violence. And so everything is permitted.” — What Happened to the ACLU? by Helen Andrews

That may be legally tricky actually depending on the modes of enforcement your book called for. — AmadeusD

I don't think so. Not after Holmes' dissent in Abrams won the day.

I get it. I'm on board with that, but I think we have to look at it as a series what we mean by "abandon fiduciary duties".

If we mean
1) A specific lawyer is doing things like dropping their clients or misrepresenting them in court intentionally, then this is an obvious flagrant violation of fiduciary duties.

2) An organization chooses to no longer represent "free speech" on all sides that used to do that. Less egregious, but agreed that it is troublesome that it has shifted to only taking on leftist causes and not ANY speech, free or otherwise. But technically, if it is not part of the government, it can decide to change policy. I don't necessarily agree with it, but it is more about how the organization is deciding to take on cases at that point, which oddly enough, is their "right" to do. — schopenhauer1

I'd say she means (1). The argument she makes pertains to expertise, vulnerably entrusting yourself to an expert in a sphere in which you have extremely limited knowledge. She gives the examples of doctors, lawyers, etc.

Indeed, correct. I guess I mean problematic at what degree it reaches. At what point is it actually affecting other people's rights? I would say at the point that judges actually take those positions and agree with it and make it part of the common law in which case hopefully it could be appealed and overturned. — schopenhauer1

Sure, but at this point you have moved from considering legal rights to considering natural rights, and it is here that legal precedent and even positive law itself becomes less relevant. That's a much larger conversation.

But thanks for reading. I kept forgetting to post it, so it is inevitably belated. Oh well!

That whole online publication seems pretty conservative, so it makes sense it was a conservative article. — schopenhauer1

I think a close read would disabuse this stereotype. It is a conservative article, but not in the way you seem to imagine.

I actually don't think this at all contrary to what I eluded to here — schopenhauer1

True, but her point isn't so much that the left should be liberal, but rather that the ACLU should not infringe civil liberties. It's a tighter and less partisan argument. She is more or less conceding that the left need not be liberal. The whole conclusion is, "Even if the left wants to abandon liberalism, it should not abandon fiduciary duties."

My broader point was, what if the speech you are representing is trying to silence the other points of view in the name of X (religion, tradition, hate, etc.)? That is a tricky one to defend, no? — schopenhauer1

I think our approach is summed up in the adage, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." If the ACLU examples in question were dealing with conflicting civil liberties, then I think this question would be more relevant. The Westboro example would then be more appropriate.

For example, I could write a book that argues for a change to the first amendment, restricting all ballerinas' rights to free speech. The book is protected by the first amendment. It is not legally tricky.

Okay, let me say something to your point...

So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? — AmadeusD

Because it's not binding and therefore provides no defense for the imposition of moral claims. Unless Ross was trying to resurrect the bogey of Hare's universal prescriptivism, which he was almost certainly not attempting to do. Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them.

- Take care

- Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose.

Well, I can agree and disagree with this very conservative account of things. — schopenhauer1

Freedom of speech has not traditionally been a particularly conservative issue. Indeed, it is very much a liberal issue.

I agree that organizations promoting free speech must be impartial, but we have to be careful what that means. In the US, the Supreme Court defines speech. They have defined things such as hate speech and "inciting speech", speech that causes a "clear and present danger". And those are there for a reason. — schopenhauer1

I don't think much care is required when we are talking about censoring books. The Supreme Court criteria for impermissible speech is incredibly stringent, such a shouting 'fire!' in a crowded theater (beginning with Holmes' dissent in Schenck v. United States). The Court recently reaffirmed that hate speech is permitted (Matal v. Tam, 2017).

I agree that organizations promoting free speech must be impartial... — schopenhauer1

The difficulty here is that organizations promoting free speech should promote free speech. The reason the ACLU is making their new hires delete official tweets is because the tweets are opposing free speech.

That being said, the article is right in the fact that this can happen on the left as well as on the right. — schopenhauer1

I don't find your overtly political reading of the article a propos. It is not controversial that the ACLU should not censor speech. The ACLU readily admits this. I think the article is about the homogenization of leftist causes, even where this homogenization creates institutional incoherence (e.g. the ACLU); it is about the difference between rule of law and equality under the law; and finally it is about the trump card of fiduciary duties, which existed long before liberalism and communism. Andrews is basically saying, "The left is obviously content to snowplow liberalism out of the way, but we really should put our foot down when it comes to fiduciary duties."

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that? — Bob Ross

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. So if you think that, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a prescriptive statement that is objectively binding on all, then you are surely not a moral anti-realist. Now we usually speak about objectively binding statements as true statements, but I'm not especially interested in the moral cognitivism debate, which I think is misguided. I'll leave that debate to the side.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross

Answered here:

"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos

-

If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"? What makes it special? You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.

Edit:

I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is. — Bob Ross

You are presumably saying, "The moral realist imposes his tastes, so why can't I impose mine!?" First, the notion that the moral realist is imposing tastes begs the question at hand. Second, tastes are not imposable by their very nature. When we talk about a taste that's part of what we mean. Third, just because your opponent engages in a practice you believe to be arbitrary does not give you license to engage in arbitrary practices, and this is particularly true when you are in the process of criticizing the supposed arbitrariness. Fourth, if you are imposing a moral standard of any kind then I would say you aren't a moral anti-realist. The moral anti-realist eschews objective moral values just as much as they eschew objective moral "facts".

Hrmm, not if the cure is making you happier, I'd imagine.

Or here we are -- if you withdraw consent then this is just a failure on the part of the doctor to administer the cure. "Fault" here not in an ethical sense, but rather in an exploratory sense -- if we find a person who is resistant to the cure then we have more to overcome. — Moliere

But aren't cures almost always painful? And won't patients need to accept and tolerate pain if they want to be cured? I don't track your idea that the cure will be painless, or that a doctor treats a patient without any cooperation on the part of the patient. I mostly think that Epicurus will require Aristotle's continence, unless perhaps he has a cure the likes of which the world has never seen!

(Churches require continence as well, e.g. Romans 7:21-25)

I don't see an inherent difference between a preference such as " I don't think my favourite sports team should play in such a manner " and an ethical statement like " people should be nice ". Both are framed normatively in terms of what should be done but I don't necessarily think the idea that my favourite sports team should play in a particular way is an objective fact. In the same way, just because someone thinks torturing babies is wrong, doesn't mean they think it is an objective stance independent fact. — Apustimelogist

"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them.

You are implying that someone saying that torturing babies is not a stance independent moral fact also believes that torturing babies is not wrong. — Apustimelogist

How does your previous claim about preferences follow from this? In any case, I will just quote Banno:

But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true? — Banno

So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do. — Bob Ross

Let me offer another story. One fellow responded to my moral anger argument as follows. "Anger presupposes justice, but because moral realism is false justice does not exist. Therefore anger is irrational. Nevertheless, I myself do get angry with other people. This is only because I am irrational. If I ever succeed in becoming perfectly rational I will no longer get angry."

Well, fair enough! That is an example of thoroughgoing moral anti-realism. Still, I don't find such a position cogent or appealing.

The fact you have an opinion or preference does not mean you are expressing a belief about something being objectively correct. — Apustimelogist

No one has claimed such a thing.

If i'm happy with (in light of potential objections in practical day-to-day life) understanding my position is subjective, but that it is the 'best' position by my lights, given the information I believe I can rely on, how would that necessarily mean it was senseless to get angry about a behaviour that I have, by those previous subjective position/s, understood to be 'wrong'? — AmadeusD

Because if one is going to hold others to a standard then they either have to admit that a standard exists or else accept the fact that they are performatively self-contradicting themselves. This is quite basic.

By world, I was meaning it more generically than ‘natural world’: I meant ‘the totality of existence’. — Bob Ross

But isn't your claim tautological at that point? Obviously moral claims must be situated somewhere within "the totality of existence."

This is something I get from moral realists all the time: if I truly care that someone is being immoral, then I am not a moral anti-realist. But this just presupposes that if something isn’t objectively immmoral, that it doesn’t matter. Obviously, I am going to deny that. So I can get as furious as I want about people torturing babies for fun and never once concede that it is a factually wrong thing to do. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think that makes any sense. If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. You get angry and intervene because you believe it is wrong for them to torture babies. Moral anti-realism is too often <affectation>.

@schopenhauer1 - I read this article a few weeks back and forgot to tell you. I think you might enjoy it. "What Happened to the ACLU?" by Helen Andrews. The journal itself (First Things) has fallen on hard times content-wise, but I thought this was a good piece.

The cure!

The way I understand it -- if the Epicurean master had a brain surgery he could perform on people that would be effective that'd be acceptable. In a way this is, for the Epicurean, a question for medical science. It's not just telling people what to do, but more or less manipulating them for their own good. It's not just a spiritual practice, it's a cure that must be performed on the human soul for their benefit.

This is what I'd say is the most uncomfortable aspect of the philosophy from my perspective -- but we do practice like this in some circumstances in our society, we just limit it to whether a person can be rightly judged to have agency. The way I'd hodge-podge these two concepts would be to say from the perspective of the Epicurean doctor you don't have agency until you've been cured because people resist the cure. It's just not their will which is being taken into consideration, but rather their happiness. (at least, in accord with the Epicurean notion of happiness) — Moliere

Okay, so in our culture we would think a lot about consent. So if you are an Epicurean doctor and I submit myself to your care then you can work your magic on me, but as soon as I withdraw my consent then it is no longer permissible for you to operate on me. If the "medicine" is onerous then I will be liable to withdraw consent, and thus continence will be necessary, no? And this isn't such a new idea; folks have been running away from doctors and asylums long before the dawn of the age of consent. :wink:

As to the passive/active question, could a brain surgery really rectify my behavior and make me happy? (Perhaps this is just the pharmaceutical question in a different guise.)

Finally, Epicureanism has been around for millennia, and has not had access to brain surgeries or potent, ongoing medication. What have the Epicurean doctors been doing for these millennia? Have they found ways to operate on and transform souls without any effort or difficulty on the part of the soul? This is where my skepticism swells.

could you provide some examples (so I can research them)? — Bob Ross

I was thinking of religious moralities, Kantian moralities, and conscience-based moralities. It seems to me that very many of these are not arguing from "how the world is," as if one could infer morality from the natural world.

Edit: Incidentally, I don't know of any knock-down treatments for moral realism. It turns out to be rather difficult to bridge the gulf between moral realism and moral anti-realism. As an example, some years ago I was engaged in a rather superficial argument with an atheist who professed that there are no moral truths. As we conversed it became very obvious that she held the prohibition on slavery as an objective moral truth, and I was able to tease this out in a dozen different ways. Nevertheless, she never admitted it, and continued to hold to her position, construing, for example, the necessary freeing of slaves as an act of violence rather than justice. As far as I'm concerned, that's a reliable interaction. Folks who profess moral anti-realism tend to be engaged in a rhetorical tack, and it is primarily their actions that betray them. For instance, creatures who don't believe in morality would never perceive injustice and never get angry. We get angry all the time. :grin:

- Eep, this thread is getting away from me. In truth it will probably be best to save this conversation for another day, but let me say one or two things.

And I suppose this is why I find statements like ""One ought not kick puppies for fun" is true" as unpersuasive. Sure, but It's the hard questions that give me pause, not the points of agreement. And our love of puppies does nothing to speak to our, what appears to me, thirst for violence. — Moliere

I think it's the easy questions that are important. If you accept a moral truth then you are a moral realist, even if that truth is "easy." I don't think hard questions disprove moral realism; they only prove that there are places where moral truths come into practical conflict and create scenarios which are difficult to judge. ..But I am skating over the question of disagreement that you are thinking about.

"If morals were real then we would agree to such and such a standard. We do not agree to that standard, therefore morals are not real" — Moliere

As I said elsewhere:

Somewhat relatedly, a lot of people seem to think, “Because they can be ignored or argued against, therefore duties do not exist.” I would respond, “If duties could not be ignored or argued against, then they would not exist.” — Leontiskos

Whether I look to Christ or Aristotle, I find that most people are not moral, and a fortiori, most people care nothing for moral philosophy. So I don't take the state of affairs to be as odd as you do. That said, while the conclusion of your view may not be absurd, it is quite odd. It is something like, <In a world where morality manifestly existed, everyone would act morally and acknowledge morality, or at the very least the wrongdoers would admit that they are wrong and accept their punishment graciously>. It's hard to present such a view without a grin on my face! :grin: Incidentally, this is related to your claim that ethical homogeneity would produce societal harmony (), which I also tend to disagree with. A Judeo-Christian view would say that oftentimes evil and a disregard for the moral law is the best piece of evidence for the moral law, insofar as it pricks one's conscience and leads them to consider and acknowledge the moral law.

Now, there may be people who earnestly profess to fail to comprehend morality. But I would say that if it is observable in their actions then they understand it just fine, it's just that their theory is at odds with their actions. Interestingly, it's not clear whether Aristotle and Aquinas were "moral cognitivists," even anachronistic as the question might be. They thought that morality was more a matter of acting than thinking; that one could not usually think their way into morality or a moral life; and that theoretical moral discourse is quite limited.

(Thomas Pink has a paper on academia.edu about the force of, "Moral Obligation." This thread makes me want to read it, but it will be awhile before I have time.)

- I think there are plenty of forms of moral realism that do just fine without P2, but as an Aristotelian I am not averse to it.

Now I barely have time to respond to the discussions I am already involved in, so I don't mean to begin new ones, but in general you need to take more time in defending your premises (in prose). An argument almost always requires a defense of one's premises, even if only a sentence or two.

P1: If we do not know of any moral facts, then we have no reason to believe them.
P2: We do not know of any moral facts.
C: Therefore, we have no reason to believe them. — Bob Ross

Yep, I think that's a useful revision of the argument. :up:

I think I agree, but with one caveat. It's not the believing that "one ought not kick puppies for fun" that renders it true. — Banno

Sure. I would have to revisit our conversation on belief, but what I meant is that Moliere holds the proposition to be true. Thus in the following sentence, "Moliere believes some moral propositions are true..."

This is why astrology is a persuasive example to me. The astrologists think of the statements as true or false, and make use of the statements in deductions: it's at least possible for us to talk this way and believe it and it be false. — Moliere

I'd say you need to think about yourself instead of displacing the question out onto others, such as astrologists. The claim is that, "there are statements that we think of as true or as false." This does not hold of astrology.

The crux here is that you hold to moral truths. You believe, "One ought not kick puppies for fun." The idea that <Moliere believes some moral propositions are true, therefore Moliere should accept moral realism>, is a very, very strong argument. :grin: I don't mean to discount your consideration of error theory, but I think the argument is often dismissed because it is thought to be too simple. I say the simpler the better. Our simple certainties are generally much more reliable than our intricate and complex theories ().

You seem to want to say, "Well, not enough people agree with me, so it probably isn't true." If you really think this is a good argument, then the rational course is to throw out all of your moral convictions. Throw out your prohibitions against kicking puppies, executing the innocent, treating people unjustly, etc. I think the reason it is so hard to take this step is because, among other things, it is highly irrational.

I think morality maps to other sciences more closely than is often admitted. Most people know that 2+2=4, even if they do not know <more complex mathematical truths>. Most people know that we should not execute the innocent, even if they do not know what is supposed to happen in the Middle East. Although it is easier to corrupt our moral intelligence than our mathematical intelligence, a lot of the opposition to moral realism is purely academic. Is there really much disagreement on things like, "One should not kill their newborn infant," or, "One should not lie without reason"?

I added an Updated 2 section to the OP. Let me know what you think. — Bob Ross

Okay, thanks. Honestly, my sense is that you are somewhat new to philosophy and/or logic, so I am trying to do little more than give you nudges in the right direction for the better development of your ideas.

P2-A*2*2: There are no known subject-referencing prescriptive statements which are facts. — Bob Ross

This sounds to me like, "There are no moral facts."* Presumably if there are no moral facts then the moral realist is wrong, but this is still question-begging because it is asserting the very issue at stake. It is not conceivable that any moral realist would respond to your assertion by saying, "Oh, I see now. There are no moral facts. I am wrong after all!" Banno already addressed this issue in his very first post:

That one ought not kick puppies for fun is a moral statement.
It is a true statement that one ought not kick puppies for fun.
Facts are true statements.

Therefore there are moral facts. — Banno

You responded:

technically “one ought not kick puppies for fun” is non-factual — Bob Ross

But why is it non-factual? (enter )

What's happening in this thread and in your threads generally is a shifting of the burden of proof. What begins as, "I am going to argue for moral antirealism," always ends up in, "Prove to me that moral realism is true!" I am not convinced that it has progressed beyond, "Moral facts don't exist." "Sure they do: here is a moral fact." "That's not a moral fact."

* Or, "There are no moral statements that are factual," where a 'moral statement' is a "subject-referencing prescriptive statement."

---

- :sweat:

- Interesting story at OpenAI! Yes, Aquinas is rather optimistic about the power of reason, so I haven't encountered this idea as much in my own religious setting.

- Thank you! I downloaded a copy.

All things being equal, would you rather trust the ethic of someone whose actions are premised around the belief that, when you're dead you're gone. Or someone who believes in the idea of an ongoing responsibility for deeds? — Pantagruel

The latter, obviously. Most of the replies haven't managed to hold "all things equal," and are evading the question.

Yes, we need at least P2-A*1i and P2-A*1ii...

:grimace: — Banno

Shit, I'm going to need to grab my wristband pretty soon. (link) (link)

I'd say that it's error theory which demonstrates how ethical propositions can be truth-apt, but false. — Moliere

Why pay this any heed, when it is clear that there are moral facts, and that we can and do use them to make inferences? — Banno

Right. I sketched a thread related to this idea and used part of it in <this post>.

But isn't "asserting our convictions" what we do in physics as well as morality? We engineer planes from what we believe to be true. Why shouldn't we do the same thing in Ethics? — Banno

Additionally, it is widely recognized that in epistemology there are simple truths and complex truths (e.g. Locke's simple and complex ideas). I don't see why this shouldn't also be the case when it comes to morality. It seems that Anscombe took things like, "Do not harm the innocent," to be something like simple moral truths, and I see no problem with this approach.

()

But isn't "asserting our convictions" what we do in physics as well as morality? We engineer planes from what we believe to be true. Why shouldn't we do the same thing in Ethics? — Banno

This strikes me as an important point in these conversations.

P2-A* (fucksake!) is not an argument, it is an assertion. As has already been explained. — Banno

:lol:

---



Sure, you should try to defend P2-A*1 if that is how you wish to defend P2-A. Give us a persuasive reason to accept your thesis.

- This is interesting but I sort of feel like it deserves its own thread. I mean, age-old questions at least deserve their own thread. :razz:

- Yes, that's exactly right. :up:

P1: If Hume’s Guillotine is true, then ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P2: Hume’s Guillotine is true.

C1: Therefore, ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

P3: ‘What one ought to do’ is the subject matter of morality.

P4: ‘what one ought to do’ is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions.

C2: Therefore, morality is determined by a set of non-factual prescriptions. — Bob Ross

So this could have been summed up by, "I agree with Hume." Yet the forum is filled with critiques of Hume. I thought you were attempting to go beyond Hume in one way or another.

I think I see what you mean: technically, I did not provide an argument for my conclusion (in a valid syllogistic form) but, rather, just explained it in english. So I amended my OP with the full argument at the bottom. Please let me know which premise you disagree with. — Bob Ross

Okay, thanks. That is clear enough.

As I said in my first reply to you, you are begging the question. P2-A is the contentious premise, and it receives no defense/justification. You responded to me by setting out an interpretation of what a fact is. Now what you need to do is use that interpretation to flesh out an actual argument in favor of P2-A. Only once you do that will moral realists have something to interact with.

Edit: This seems to be your argument in a simplified form:

1. Anything which depends on non-facts is a matter of taste.
2. Moral claims depend on non-facts.
3. Therefore, moral claims are a matter of taste.

(2) needs to be defended by something more than a mere appeal to Hume.

I'm basically arguing for 's claim. I don't think it has anything to do with the OP (). Again, I think your arguments against the OP are sound. What I am doing here is tangential. All of the interesting parts of this thread are tangential.

Oh, OK, so you meant that "T is a normative fact" is a non-normative fact. — J

...Or to be a bit more precise, I would say that we can reasonably speak about normative realities in non-normative ways.

I'm repeating myself, but I don't see how what you have set out addresses what I have set out. — Banno

Let me clarify the post you were responding to. Consider the original proposition and two inferences:

• P2: T is a normative fact.
• I1: T is factual.*
• I2: T is normative.

Now we agree that P2 implies both I1 and I2 when considered in itself. But with reference to <my previous post>, H involves both I1 and I2, whereas S really involves only I2. S2 and S3 depend not on the facticity of S1, but rather on the normativity of S1. This is why I said in another post that one is "prescinding from one or more implications in favor of a different implication" (). Again, the key is that, "S1 differs from H1 vis-à-vis normativity, and this is seen by looking to the conclusions..." ().

Similarly, we could have a premise, "Lightning McQueen is a red car." The predicate of course involves two notions (red+car). An argument could utilize this premise on the basis of both notions simultaneously, but it could also leverage only a single notion in a way that prescinds, partially or wholly, from the other one. <Lightning McQueen is a red car; Red cars look like apples; Therefore Lightning McQueen looks like an apple>. Even though all red cars are cars, this syllogism has very little to do with cars per se. Presumably it has more to do with redness than carness, and the second premise could have equally been, "Red things look like apples" (or, "Red things that are rounded and shiny look like apples").

Just because something is a fact or a car does not mean that every piece of reasoning about that thing must be based on its facticity or carness. Bringing this back to the original question, the same applies to normativity. Something which is normative can be thought and reasoned about in non-normative ways (e.g. even though S1 implies H1, H1 is at best accidental to the conclusion S3).

* Note that I do not accept the idea that 'truth' and 'fact' are exact synonyms. The word 'fact' has a long and interesting history, but it has never been simply equated with 'truth', or 'individual truth'. Nevertheless, I am going to ignore this tangent for the moment.

Okay, that is somewhat helpful, but the other problem is that you don't seem to present any arguments for your position in the OP. Your whole thesis rests on a single sentence:

This implies, even if it is conceded that normative facts exist, that what informs the individual of ‘what they ought to do’ is a taste: not a normative fact. — Bob Ross

This is really just an assertion. Else, what rule of inference are you using to arrive at this conclusion? What in the OP supports such a conclusion? The word "taste" appears exactly once in your OP, and this in itself is evidence that your conclusion is not the result of an argument.