In the OP I said people crave it, and I definitely still believe that - even if they do not know it. — ToothyMaw

Okay.

It is usually just so-and-so is evil, too extreme, too centrist, too censorious - and no one provides practical solutions, even if those solutions are just favorable tradeoffs. — ToothyMaw

Yes, I can see this as well. I suppose the difficulty is that if we are to go beyond "duty for duty's sake" then we are effectively required to proffer a moral argument, and this is difficult in the midst of such strong skepticism.

You claim that a novice asks about Thales while having no description of Thales. I pointed out why you are wrong and I gave a number of different arguments to that effect. In response you provide nothing at all.

The difficulty is that your argument simultaneously requires that the name identify and not-identify Thales:

The argument is pretty straight forward. Suppose that it turned out that nothing we thought we knew about Thales were true; that he did not think all was water, did not fall into a well... Who is it that the previous sentence is about? Well, it is about Thales. — Banno

So let's look at these three properties of the (formal) name 'Thales':

1. 'Thales' existed and lived in ancient times.
2. 'Thales' believed that all is water.
3. 'Thales' fell into a well.

Why do you think the sentence is about Thales on the basis that (1) is true and (2) and (3) are false? How do those truth assignments ensure that the sentence is about Thales? Your privileging of the existence-predicate (1) seems arbitrary. I see no reason to believe that such a speaker would be talking about a man named 'Thales' who lived in ancient times but did not believe that all is water and did not fall into a well. In fact I think we can be confident that is not who (or what) he is talking about.

But if, "in order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable", we now have no way of identifying Thales, which would imply that the sentence is not about Thales. — Banno

For the sake of simplicity, I've been focusing on the third... — Banno

If there is no way of identifying Thales, then of course the name cannot be used. The speaker who uses the name necessarily has a description in mind. This is the same false assumption that you gave earlier:

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno

But the novice does have a description of 'Thales'. If they had no description they would not be able to ask the question. Specifically, if they did not believe that 'Thales' described an ancient philosopher, they would not be able to ask the question. "Thales was an ancient philosopher" is a description, as is (1).

Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc.

So again, you are contradicting yourself in simultaneously holding that the novice has no description of 'Thales' and nevertheless uses the name in a meaningful sense.

In this passage Locke shows that he supposes it to be understandable what individuals are called Wewena, Chuckery and Cousheda without its yet being determined whether these are proper names of men or what. To point and say ‘That is Wewena—and I mean that “Wewena” is the proper name of that’ should prompt the question ‘That what is Wewena?’ Or, what comes to the same thing: ‘And how am I to go on using the name Wewena?’ Locke writes as if an intelligible reply would be ‘so long as it is the same individual’. And hence the question which often concerns philosophers: ‘What is an individual? What is a particular?’ — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions

I was saying to NOS that we had the same heuristic but applied to completely different realms (I am against forcing life onto someone, he is against forcing government onto someone). — schopenhauer1

Ah, fair enough. I was not familiar with this history. I was talking past you. :up:

In the context that we are speaking, the claim is that it is unjust to put someone in the compulsory situation in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Okay, but isn't it true that government puts people in compulsory situations whereas nature does not? The key here is that the government is a responsible agent, capable of injustice, whereas nature is not. Nature "gives rise" to compulsory situations, but it does not "put" people into them, because it does not will this or that.

You're welcome. I find it helpful. There are downsides to the model, but the people who created it seem genuinely interested in trying to provide a means to an unbiased perspective. And yes, it is only about American politics.

If I want to understand an issue I will generally read articles from both sides, so the quotes and links that flipside provides are an easy entryway into the different perspectives.

Well, this goes back to word games and sense and reference. I was playing with words here a bit. We are a "serf" to the burdens and overcoming of harms that life offers. There is no getting around this taskmaster (metaphor obviously). This is why I have always maintained that life provides "de facto" dictates that we must follow. — schopenhauer1

Sure, but I think this will all depend on the original objection. One could object that government is unjust, or one could object that government gives rise to compulsion. The point about nature applies to the second objection but not the first, because nature does give rise to compulsion and yet it is not unjust.

(Granted, the notion of the injustice of nature does seem to arise at times via theism, but I am leaving this to the side.)

- https://www.theflipside.io/

To quote the eminent philosopher John McCrea:

When you sleep,
Where do your fingers go?
What do your fingers know?
What do your fingers show? — When you Sleep, by Cake

The reason I follow their rules is because they are allowed to kidnap me or kill me if I do not. — NOS4A2

Peter L. P. Simpson has often drawn attention to the fact that the state has a monopoly on coercion (and violence) in the modern world, and that this is different from any time in the past.

Thus, your life is always in a way a serf. Your very procreation means that you must comply (with the game of life) or die. — schopenhauer1

I think the difference is that nature is not a feudal lord. Nature has no will and therefore does not coerce. Neither is it capable of injustice.

I think that’s a great point. The larger the aggregate, the more difficult it is to discern the extent to which its members relate. — NOS4A2

Right, and they also relate in a much more diffuse and indirect way.

---

That is to say, our ethical obligations are to individuals, and not abstractions. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and I think the first thing to do is to specify the level of abstraction. Apparently everyone agrees that a mere abstraction has no dues (nothing that it is owed), but there is disagreement over whether, say, the object of socialism is a mere abstraction (or a mere aggregate).

A family is not simply an abstraction, although it is a collective-relation (a relation between a number of individuals in which their ends or goals become unified). So it makes sense to make a sacrifice for the sake of the family, because the family is a real thing even though it is also a collective or a relation. The sacrifice is not made for the individuals qua individuals, but it is also not made for a mere abstraction. It is hard to identify this notion of a common good for which the sacrifice is legitimate, but it is something like the good of a unitary organism, an organism which is composed by the members of the family. Then if this analysis makes sense, we can approximate the real-ness of a collective—the degree to which it is not a mere abstraction—in terms of the extent to which it is a unitary organism.

Unlike loose aggregates of individuals sharing a roof, families are raised by one another, play with one another, work together, love one another, and so on. The dynamics of their relationship are different. They are not only nominally or proximally bonded, but have a history together. — NOS4A2

But if a family is a real collective, then is not also an extended family a real collective? And a clan? And a tribe? A village? A town? A city?

Once we grant that a marriage or a family is a real collective or a real relation, then it only becomes a question of where to draw the line.

The essence of a thing is the rigidity with with which we designate it.
the essence of :—
Frodo is the ring bearer.
King Arthur is the legendary hero of an imaginary magical realm on the pattern of Britain.
Thales is that he fell down a well and thought everything was water, and was one of the founders of Greek philosophy.
Lavender is the fragrance.
unenlightened is his willingness to make up shit on the fly.

I imagine some tedious archeologist finding the remains of a real king called Arthur, and his wife Guinevere, and some record of his reign that did not include quests or saving damsels in distress or the Holy Grail, or the round table. "Oh, that King Arthur, no one is interested in him." I would say, as if allowing that names are not always unique, while maintaining the rigidity of my designation. — unenlightened

This is not bad as far as it goes. The key here is that there is a big difference between saying, "But how do you know that that definition captures this essence," and saying, "But it has no essence at all." There seems to be a lot of conflation between these two questions, where skeptics drawn to the first fall into the second. Whether the preserving quality of salt belongs to its essence is a coherent question; whether salt has an essence at all is not a coherent question. Or so I say. For once we admit that salt and sugar are different, they must be different in virtue of some real quality. They must be different in virtue of what they are; their what-ness; their quiddity; their essence.

I would say, as if allowing that names are not always unique, while maintaining the rigidity of my designation. — unenlightened

The other important thing here is intention, and this is a place where modern philosophy is characteristically poor. Names with the same token obviously do not all have the same designation, else every name "John" would point to the same man. The referent of a name is therefore tied to the intention of the speaker, and I believe we must interpret names according to intention (including "formal" names—hence the unraveling of Donnellan's conundrum). It is first in the intention where the name is attached to the description (or as Anscombe calls it, the "identifying predicate").

I am not aware of anything in which Anscombe directly addresses Donnellan and Kripke. IF you come across something, I'd be most interested. — Banno

Yes, I also like Anscombe. I did run across an article relating to Kripke, albeit relating to his sceptical argument. It is in the same volume, and is named, "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language."

(There was another article or typescript she wrote on Kripke, but I would have to look to find it again.)

The argument is pretty straight forward. Suppose that it turned out that nothing we thought we knew about Thales were true; that he did not think all was water, did not fall into a well and did not say "know thyself". Who is it that the previous sentence is about? Well, it is about Thales. But if, "in order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable", we now have no way of identifying Thales, which would imply that the sentence is not about Thales. — Banno

But this is a confusion of a name with an individual, and it hinges on that mistaken assumption that the referent of a name must be an existing individual. Specifically, "the previous sentence is about" <concept-Thales>, or in Anscombe's Medieval language, a formally assigned name. Following her usage, I will talk about formal names and real names.

Again, there are two things attached to the name 'Thales' in the class that the novice takes on ancient philosophy. One is the formal name, which is fit to function in the dialectical philosophical narrative. The other is the real name, which specifically depends on a person who actually existed in the past. I really do think these referents overlap (although there is a primacy of the formal name in the context of the philosophy class because the non-existence of Thales will not impede the purpose of the philosophy class). But if you like we can be pedantic and keep the two designations separate. In that case the non-existence of Thales would undermine the real name but not the formal name. The identification of the formal name depends on a conceptual scheme vis-a-vis the received view about the dialectical history of philosophy. The identification of the real name depends on historical investigation. In both cases the referent is identifiable.* In the latter case the legitimacy of the name will depend on the historical investigations (ergo, it is ostensive).

I'm sorry that you haver been unable to identify the argument. — Banno

It seems that I identified it just fine and addressed it earlier in the thread. To reiterate, he is wrong when he claims that the non-existence of Thales entails that 'Thales' has no referent; and he is wrong that a name must have an existent referent. Apparently Anscombe came to just the same conclusions in response to a very similar view.

Donnellan is apparently being tripped up by the fact that mistakes are possible, or that there is such a thing as an ostensive name (or that a name can be applied to a historical hypothesis). This apparently relates to @schopenhauer1's point about the errors which occur when logic attempts to dominate language. I will leave this to the side for now.


* Note that it is very different to say that "We don't know whether Thales existed," versus, "We don't know what the real name 'Thales' means or references." It ostensibly refers to a real historical person, and sufficient historical data will allow us to verify or falsify his historicity.

That has less to do with how effective duty is as a motivator and more to do with perceived ethical obligations. — ToothyMaw

Okay, fair enough.

Read my reply to ↪schopenhauer1 — ToothyMaw

Yes, I did read that exchange, and I think it is on point.

The thing that is interesting about duty is how powerful it is... — ToothyMaw

It seems to me that a sense of duty is powerful given the nature of duty, but at the same time a sense of duty is becoming harder and harder to find. Duty is powerful in a practical sense because it concerns precisely what ought to be done, but I find that a lot of people no longer experience a sense of duty, and this is especially true as familial ties continue to weaken.

I think contemporary philosophy is generally averse to duty and normative morality, and I wonder if this explains some of the motivation behind your "open letter." Is it in part an admonishment for philosophers to stop undermining the notion of duty, and to approach the idea more constructively?

@Banno,

I have been perusing Elizabeth Anscombe’s writings due to the fact that she forms a helpful bridge between Aristotelian-Thomism and contemporary philosophy, particularly in the Anglophone world. In one of her unpublished typescripts she expresses some of the exact same things I have been getting at. The essay comes from, "From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe."

In a rebuff to Locke, Mill, and Russell, she says:

But it is absurd to speak of any name at all without a nominal essence; if a name can be without a nominal essence, there can be no right or wrong about its repeated use. — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions

She goes on to note the way that Locke sidesteps the issue of how the referent of a name is identified, just as you are doing:

In this passage Locke shows that he supposes it to be understandable what individuals are called Wewena, Chuckery and Cousheda without its yet being determined whether these are proper names of men or what. To point and say ‘That is Wewena—and I mean that “Wewena” is the proper name of that’ should prompt the question ‘That what is Wewena?’ Or, what comes to the same thing: ‘And how am I to go on using the name Wewena?’ Locke writes as if an intelligible reply would be ‘so long as it is the same individual’. And hence the question which often concerns philosophers: ‘What is an individual? What is a particular?’

That a word is a proper name is some information as to its meaning: it means that it has a very special kind of use; this is parallel to the information that a word is the name of a colour. The further enquiry ‘What kind of thing is it a proper name of?’ should elicit an answer such as ‘a city’, ‘a river’, ‘a man’, ‘a trumpet’, which we may reasonably say gives the full meaning, or connotation of the word. Thus Mill would have been nearer the truth if he had said that proper names have both denotation and connotation, but predicates only connotation. A small boy gave a moving spot of light that appeared in his room the proper name ‘Tommy Noddy’. Locke writes as if one could know what individual Tommy Noddy was without knowing that this was the proper name of a spot of light. To see the mistake in this, imagine that someone who had grasped that ‘Tommy Noddy’ was a proper name, asked to have Tommy Noddy pointed out to him. The child points to Tommy Noddy at a time when the spot of light is on a human being.

That is to say, with every proper name there is associated a predicate x, such that when a proper name is assigned to an x, the proper name is rightly used for the future to name the same x. The information ‘Tommy Noddy is the name of a spot of light’ thus gives the sense (meaning, connotation) of the proper name. . . — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions

She then goes on to talk about the notion of an "identifying predicate," which accompanies a name.

She also disagrees with Russell's idea that names require existent referents in the same way that I disagreed with Donnellan's assumption that names require existent referents (and seems to be saying something very similar). I used the distinction of 'real' and 'conceptual'. Anscombe uses 'real' and 'formal'. Her second thesis is:

that [Russell] is wrong in that conception of ‘logically proper names’ which demands the existence of a logically guaranteed bearer for every real proper name; — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions

In defending this, she says:

I fear the correct reply to this may seem to muddy the clear waters of logic; but that may be an illusion, and at any rate I have no doubt it is correct. We should distinguish between a formal and a real assignment of a proper name. The assignment is formal when it is simply an assignment to a bound variable in the narrative. King Arthur is a character of uncertain historicity: thus ‘There was a man—and only one—who was King in Britain such that the stories of the Arthurian cycle derive from or are embroideries on stories about him’ may be true, but it is not certain; and the assignment of the proper name is a formal assignment to the variable in ‘an x such that x was a man who was King etc’. (In ordinary language the bound variable is represented by ‘who’, ‘which’ and the personal pronouns when they have e.g. ‘someone’, ‘anything’, ‘no one’ as antecedents.) But when such narratives are (a) certain, (b) secondary to the use of the proper name itself, as in ‘There was a man called Churchill who was Prime Minister in England for the greater part of the Second World War’, then the assignment of the proper name is real and not formal and is prior to the existential narrative. An historical assignment can be real and not formal when we have the proper name by tradition from those who used it of its bearer.

Where the assignment, necessary for an ostensible proper name to be a real one, is real, then the proposition containing that proper name (or any sub-clause containing that proper name) is a genuine predication and is true or false if the predication makes sense for φs, where φ is the identifying predicate associated with the proper name. Where the assignment is pretended or clearly only formal, then there is no genuine predication (except within the scope of the existential quantifier) and no proposition either true or false. When the assignment is neither pretended nor real we can say that we do not know if a genuine predication has been made; and that an analysis of the proposition will show the relevant formal assignment. — Elizabeth Anscombe, On Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Anscombe talks about the character "who was King in Britain such that the stories of the Arthurian cycle derive from or are embroideries on stories about him." I spoke about "the person-concept [...] which is fit to function in the fictional accounts in question."

The Donnellan arguments show that a name may work even when the associated description fails.

And that it follows that the name's referring is not dependent on the description. — Banno

I read the part of the paper relating to Thales and I find that the arguments do nothing of the sort. If you wish to try to argue for such a conclusion you will have to present actual arguments or actual quotes from Donnellan, rather than simply gesturing towards a 25-page paper. So far the only thing you have provided in that vein is the claim that the novice uses 'Thales' without any description. I pointed out why that claim seems to be false, and I don't see that you have responded to this.

I can flesh out my position a bit more by way of an informal argument. This is the same argument that was implicitly present in my first post.

1. A name is always attached to some thing.
2. In order to use a name the thing to which it is attached must be identifiable.
3. The identification of things occurs via description.*
4. Therefore, names presuppose description.

* The fuller account of 'description' was given in my first post. Specifically what is needed is a set of perceptual or conceptual qualities which are used to identify the name's referent. If you actually believe that (4) is false, you will have say why the argument fails, and what alternative there is for identifying the referents of names.

When studying language, one could heed Wittgenstein's suggestion to delve into the anthropological route. — schopenhauer1

I want to circle back to this. I think you are right that anthropology is crucial. If Aristotle is correct about the nature of reality and knowledge, then anthropology will have a certain primacy.

@Moliere began a discussion of essences with the example of hammers. This is a strange move from the perspective of an Aristotelian, because hammers have no real essence. A hammer is a derivative being, a human artifact. Hammers should always be studied in relation to humans, because their existence is dependent upon humans.

In a very real sense the same thing holds of language. Trying to study language apart from man (anthropos) is a bit like trying to study hammers apart from man. For Aristotle the reason is obvious: language is an act of man, and originally an act expressed vocally. The actor is more primary than the action (even though it is true that language conditions man in various ways). Language therefore cannot be cordoned off and studied apart from a study of man and anthropology. Such an attempt leads to distortion and confusion. The same holds for logic.

(Of course philosophical anthropology and general anthropology are slightly different, but in many ways they are similar.)

Sometimes names do not work. But sometimes they do. Your conclusion that names do not work is odd. I gather I must be misunderstanding your point here. — Banno

Correct me if I'm wrong, but your argument seems to be, <Names pick out things in a definite way; Description does not pick out things in a definite way; Therefore names depend on something more than description>.

The idea is apparently that description is insufficient to account for naming because names are capable of picking out a unique referent whereas descriptions are not. My response is that your first premise is simply mistaken. There is parity between names and quasi-definite descriptions in precisely the way that my account requires. The usage of a name fails precisely when the application of the quasi-definition description, which is attached to the name, fails. I could echo back to you, "Sometimes descriptions do not work. But sometimes they do," so what's the difference between descriptions and names vis-a-vis unique reference?

No, I said the right leaders should use everything available to them to rally people to their cause and instill a sense of duty in them. I might have used the term "manipulate", but that doesn't always mean unscrupulousness - it can just mean controlling something cleverly. — ToothyMaw

In Banno's defense, to speak about duty and to speak about the manipulation of motivation is to speak about two different things. The idea that, "We need good outcomes. X is a strong motivator, therefore X should be manipulated for the sake of good outcomes," in fact has nothing to do with the nature of X. X can be anything you like so long as it is a strong motivator. The idea is more truly about the manipulation of strong motivations for the sake of good outcomes, and is only about X in an incidental way.

Now using duty as a means to an end is rather ironic given that duty is supposed to be intrinsically contrary to such use. If a leader believes that someone has a duty to do something, and he tries to convince them of this, then he is being honest. If a leader believes that someone has no duty to do something, but he tries to convince them that they do, then he is being dishonest. He is being dishonest even if he is lying to them for a good end (good outcome). The dishonesty arises because he uses the word or concept 'duty' in a false sense, and he wishes them to falsely believe that they have a duty so that he can achieve his end, which he considers to be good.

Thus if duty is being recommended independently of what ought to be done (in a rather intrinsic sense), we are on shaky ground. If one is opposed to lying, then they should not attempt to make people believe that they have duties which they do not have. Couching the whole conversation in terms of good outcomes and utilizing duty as a means really runs the risk of this danger (and this equivocation).

Some:

A natural reply to the sceptic's challenge is that S intended to use 'plus' in accordance with certain laws not satisfied by the quus function, i.e., the recursion equations for '+': (x) (x + 0 = x) and (x) ( y) (x + y' = (x + y)'), where the apostrophe indicates successor. This intention of S's, we might propose, constitutes the fact that S meant plus, and not quus, for only addition conforms to these laws. But Kripke opposes this kind of reply on the ground that 'the other signs used in these laws (the universal quantifiers, the equality sign) have been applied in only a finite number of instances, and they can be given non-standard interpretations that will fit non-standard interpretations of "+" ' (p. 17).

Kripke's objection, however, misses its target. For while it is true that S might have given '(x)' or '=' a non-standard interpretation, it is also true that S might give these signs a standard interpretation. Suppose then that S understands the universal quantifier in accordance with the standard interpretation, while intending to use 'plus' in accordance with the above recursion equations. In this case Kripke's objection will not apply. [...]

But, of course, we cannot therefore infer that S can answer the sceptic's challenge to the sceptic's satisfaction. For clearly S's having a certain intention that constitutes his meaning plus does not entail S's being able to establish beyond any doubt that he has (or had) such an intention. [...] Of course, the sceptic might object to S's reliance on non-demonstrative evidence or on memory beliefs in particular. But this kind of objection will give rise to a sterile form of scepticism, as one of the ground rules for any useful exchange between the sceptic and the non-sceptic is that justifying empirical evidence need not be demonstrative evidence. Insisting on such evidence, if only for the sake of argument, S might challenge the sceptic by asking what he means, or intends, by 'quus'. Further, the present sort of objection certainly will not provide us with a new form of philosophical scepticism; at most it will provide a traditional kind of epistemological scepticism to which recent philosophical literature provides some plausible replies. — Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery, Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox, pp. 311-12

I still think gave the most apt reply.

Is it possible to act without knowing? — Moliere

Basically, no. Some degree of knowledge is always present. If no knowledge is present then you are not acting in a philosophically relevant way. For example, your knee might move when the doctor hits it, or you might sleepwalk, but these are not volitional actions.

And if you use a hammer then you have some knowledge about what it is, however incomplete. You will know, for example, that it is a physical object which possesses weight. If you use a word then you will have some (nominal) definition of it, however incomplete.

The modern conception where knowledge and action are two entirely different things does not hold for Aristotle (or Aquinas). There is a distinction between speculative knowledge and practical knowledge, but action still involves intellect and reasoning. Hence practical knowledge.

Yes, more good points. I am sure that we would disagree on any number of things, but on this you are preaching to the choir. I like the references to prophets and also to aphoristic writing styles.

I'd also like to posit that logicism and language approaches to solving epistemic and ontological problems do not seem to be a fruitful way of going about it. I think Russell and other early analytics (Meinong, Frege, etc.) ran into trouble because they tried to limit themselves to what can be said via symbolic logic, and lost the forest for the trees. — schopenhauer1

Right. I don't have the expertise to locate the precise problems here, but when logic and language are conceived in a manner that cuts them off from external reality, and are studied in themselves, there is certainly no possibility of addressing epistemic or ontological problems.

I have recently been considering a related problem. Beginning even slightly before the Reformation we see an individualistic streak in intellectual life. There is a desire to break with the past and to carve out one's own niche. This is compounded when insuperable paradoxes moved thinkers to jettison the whole husk that contained the paradoxes and never look back. After that point the return to the older paradigms (realism, Kantianism, etc.) is a non-starter, even when the alternatives are obviously foundering.

A "philosophical schools" approach to philosophy is much different than the modern individualistic approach, and it is one that I prefer. In this case the individual is in some ways subsumed in the school, and philosophical output is intended to be a link in a long chain. Instead of prophets and augurs you have transparent claims and arguments which do not claim any special authority. There are no figureheads or personality cults. The philosophy is at the service of the school, and links past and future in a respectful way. The focus is on steady development and synthesis rather than originality. I think we have strayed a long ways from this sort of approach.

It's an insidious habit, leading to all sorts of problems... — Banno

Yes indeed.

Hear ye, hear ye! :fire: I agree so much! Granted, I can appreciate the 'linguistic' character of much of this forum, especially as it represents recent philosophy in the Anglophone world, but you hit the nail on the head.

So I find a lot of these debates about reference come about because of oddly sticking to this idea of language pointing out individual entities. It is seen in Russell's On Denoting (there exists a unique x such that x is...). It seems to be in early Wittgenstein. I don't get why this emphasis on having to pick out a unique set of properties in an individual and it not just being a class (like it seems Donnellan allows for in attributive notions of reference). Can it just be that this is just debates on wrong initial premises causing confusion? Is there good reason Russell made this move to care for picking out individuals in the world? Is there reason to keep correcting this if that assumption is not even a good basis for names to begin with? — schopenhauer1

Thanks for your interesting posts. If we want to look at Kripke I would probably need to refresh myself on his work, but the irony here is that Kripke may well be committed to the strange theory that is commonly (but mistakenly) identified in Aristotelian essentialism, namely the idea that an essence (or in this case, identity) is discernable apart from accidents and appearances.

More generally, this whole line seems related to modern philosophy's obsession with what I would want to call infallibility. "But how do we know that we are correct?" "But how do we know that a description is truly definite, or that a name truly designates uniquely?" The simple answer is that we don't. At least not with the certainty and precision that modern philosophy seeks.

Sure, he has a description. That description fails to pick Thales from all the other men who lived a long time ago. So I don't see how it helps choose between them, in such a way that the student is talking about Thales... which I had taken to be the point of having a description handy. — Banno

By way of background, I'm pointing to the issue of definite descriptions, claiming that the arguments to the effects that one does not need a definite description in order for reference to function are pretty convincing. — Banno

I would want to say that a name is intended as a unique designator, but that in fact it fulfills this reality no more than a description does. There are humorous stories of identical twins, such as the famous Bryan brothers, whose spouses will spontaneously start identifying and kissing the wrong sibling. The intention of a name pertains to metaphysics, but your point about description pertains to epistemology. Yet the day-to-day use of naming runs into the exact same epistemological problems as the day-to-day use of descriptions.

But if we do not need definite descriptions in order for proper names to work... — Banno

Your argument is valid, but the problem is that names don't work, at least not in the way that you purport. Names work about as well as quasi-definite descriptions work. Even the wife of a twin can fail to make his name work.

Further, you seem now to be saying that we can know which object is being identified from any description, and not just a definite description, which I find quite enigmatic. As if "The fish nearest to Corinth" were adequate to give the essence of Thales. — Banno

As I noted, the two questions are distinct. Of course we can talk about either one.

The point is that in order to arrive at a definite description one must begin with an indefinite description, particularly the novice who wishes to learn. The same sort of thing holds with names. In order to understand the unique referent, one must begin with a description (or a description vis-a-vis a perceptual cue, which includes pointing).

The broader point is that names presuppose description, and the description that they presuppose is supposed to approximate a definite description (because this is where the uniqueness of the referent arises). Again, this does not mean that a name is a description.

Regarding your paper by Donnellan, it leaves me perplexed (I read only the section on Thales). I find his focus on the physical existence of the referent somewhat strange. Supposing Thales never existed, it would not follow that 'Thales' has no referent. The referent in that case would be the person-concept fit to function in the philosophical accounts in question, much like the referent of "Sherlock Holmes" is the fictional person-concept created by Arthur Conan Doyle, and which is fit to function in the fictional accounts in question. Perhaps I am deviating from some modern technical sense of 'name', but deviation from overly technical senses is itself a mark of Aristotelianism. The intentional designations of real-Thales and concept-Thales are, of course, somewhat different, but I don't see this as insuperable. It is not insuperable because the two intentions overlap in the novice's class on ancient philosophy, and the raison d'être of the name is more directly tied to the latter intention.

Not sure how that would help. — Banno

Help what? You said, "A novice who asks 'Who is Thales?' does not have at hand a description of Thales..." I explained why that is wrong. Doesn't that help? :grin:

Again, it is not apparent to me that we need any sort of description to be attached to a name in order for it to function. — Banno

Yes, and you gave an example to demonstrate your claim, and it turned out that your example failed to demonstrate the claim. So now what?

At the very least a name identifies an object, and makes the identification of that object communicable to others. But in order to know which object is being identified, we must have a description of the object. A name is not a description in itself, but it depends upon and presupposes a description, and this is why the act of naming and the act of communicating a name require description.

...I see you edited your post:

Supose the student thought Thales was a Spanish fisherwoman. — Banno

Then his description is partially right and partially wrong, and can be refined and corrected. But note that the novice still has a description. If someone has no description at all then they cannot use the name, for they will have no knowledge that there exists any object to be named.

These are two different questions: Do names presuppose descriptions? Do names presuppose correct descriptions? My understanding is that we have been talking about the first question.

The article is paywalled on the links I found, so I guess we will have to take your word for it. — Banno

Yes, I checked as well. I tried to quote more but the OCR is flawed.

Yep, the generally agreed view is that the problem Kripke posits is not found in Wittgenstein, that Kripke should not be seen as engaged in exegesis. — Banno

But it would be interesting if Wittgenstein had already provided an answer to the challenge that Kripke derived from his work. Granted, I don't know the chronology of when each wrote what.

---



This is somewhat interesting but I don't think Kripke is himself engaged in a Hume thing.

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno

But the one who inquires about Thales already has some notion of Thales, and this should count as a description.

[When we learn,] There are two ways in which we must already have knowledge: of some things we must already believe that they are, of others we must grasp what the items spoken about are (and of some things both). — Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.i, tr. Barnes

Contrary to your claim, the novice already has a description of Thales and he wishes it to be filled out. His description involves things like, 'Thales was a man', 'Thales lived a long time ago', etc.

About the coherence of his position, about the claim that there is no fact about S that constitutes S's meaning plus rather than quus, and about the claim that the challenge represents a new form of scepticism.

I was digging through some old articles and I happened upon a paper, "Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox," by Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery. In the first half of the paper they give some simple explanations of why Kripke is wrong, but in the second half they actually marshal evidence from Wittgenstein's own works to show that Kripke misunderstands Wittgenstein when it comes to intention.

Admittedly, we have met the sceptical challenge by relying on an as yet undiscussed notion of intention. It should be recalled, however, that Kripke himself introduced this notion as being relevant to the sceptical problem, thereby suggesting that the notion is at least intelligible. Intention, indeed, makes all the difference. For assuming that an intention to use the standard interpretation of addition is present in S's mental history, we can readily admit that no object in the world, no picture in the mind's eye, no formula of any sort determines by itself how S goes on to employ the rules of addition. And we can do this without entertaining any sceptical doubts about his ability to add. Thus, should the sceptic challenge that '(x)', for instance, might mean '(x<h)', S can readily reply, 'But that's not how I intended it'.

This, however is not how Kripke conceives of intention. As a matter of fact, he excludes from the scope of his paradox the things to which Wittgenstein applies the paradox of §201 and he includes the things Wittgenstein would exclude... — Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery, Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox

The upshot is that Wittgenstein's understanding of intention "does not fall within the scope of the sceptical paradox."

Edit: Added link

Well, no. I don't see what it does. Why do we need it, if at all? — Banno

I don't think the modal view is correct, either. My point is that if you have no stake in either position of the OP, then Fine's argument won't be very interesting. I want to lure you out of that crevice. :razz:

Sounds like descriptivism to my ear. Surely not? Hence my reference to Thales, a simple case I think pretty convincing. Names do not refer in virtue of some description.

So perhaps you might share what "description will be implicit in the name relation" when we talk of Thales? IS that a way to proceed? — Banno

Sure, so from my last post:

"Yet we could also use 'definition' in a less strict manner, in which we are talking about descriptions more generally. In that case I think the description will be implicit in the name relation. The name will be attached to a perceptible reality,* and that perceptible reality will be susceptible to a description, particularly when one is trying to communicate the name to another. So in that sense I think the description is implicitly or explicitly needed to "pick out" individuals. If I cannot distinguish one candidate from another then I will not be capable of applying the name in the unique way that it is intended."

So perhaps my first question is: If names do not require descriptions, then why are descriptions needed to communicate names? How are we to know which candidate a name picks out if not for descriptions?

Hmm. Not sure how this is going to work. — Banno

Neither am I, and a crucial point here is that dialogue requires compromise. If you are willing to put in the same amount of effort that you expect of me, then the dialogue will have legs. If you aren't, either because you aren't interested in Aristotelianism or because we are too far apart or for some other reason, then we should cut our losses.

The article goes on to proffer a view of essence based on definitions. I gather you think this a better approach, whereas I remain unconvinced. — Banno

Are you committed to the modal view that Fine is addressing?

It seems to me that we do not need definitions in order to "pick out" individuals - the classic case here being Donnellan's Thales. — Banno

I'm not sure what proper names would have to do with definitions. Proper names pick out individuals, whereas (Aristotelian) definitions pick out essences, which belong to species. So naturally a definition of homo sapiens will not help you pick out Socrates from among the species homo sapiens. For an Aristotelian this is uncontroversial.

Yet we could also use 'definition' in a less strict manner, in which we are talking about descriptions more generally. In that case I think the description will be implicit in the name relation. The name will be attached to a perceptible reality,* and that perceptible reality will be susceptible to a description, particularly when one is trying to communicate the name to another. So in that sense I think the description is implicitly or explicitly needed to "pick out" individuals. If I cannot distinguish one candidate from another then I will not be capable of applying the name in the unique way that it is intended.

So taking a bit more care, I am going to say that I do not know of a way of talking about essences that is of much use, and that I am quite confident that we do not need to be able to provide an account of a things essence in order to talk about that thing. — Banno

I am going to say that I do not know of a way of talking about a thing that does not implicitly advert to its "essence" (haecceitas - essence in a sort of individual sense). Whenever we talk about an individual we advert to its haecceity and the description thereof. But strictly speaking haecceity is not an Aristotelian notion, and is quite foreign to the Aristotelian tradition.


* Or in the case of a historical figure like Thales, it will merely be attached to a mental concept.

I should begin by saying that it has been some years since I have worked extensively with Aristotle's primary texts, so a strict Aristotelian may quibble with me on this point or that. Still, I think I will give an accurate account.

My understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence is that it is a given something's definition. — Moliere

An essence is what something is in virtue of itself, and the definition describes the essence. It will also be useful to note that for Aristotle the standard beings are substances: things which exist of themselves and which possess their own mode of being and acting. So hammering would be an act of a substance, in particular an act of a human substance.

The first thing that comes to mind is know-how. I know-how to hammer, regardless of what the hammer is pointed at (or even what the hammer is -- animal, vegetable, mineral, or familiar tool). I don't need to know the essence of a thing in order to manipulate it. And a lot of knowledge is at this level of manipulation rather than at a definitional level. The definitions come later when you're trying to put knowledge into some sort of form which can be shared to assist in spreading the knowledge. — Moliere

A hammer is an artifact, not a substance, but be that as it may, we still need to understand what a hammer is before we use it. For Aristotle definition is not restricted to a means by which one shares knowledge. To understand what something is is to have its definition, and to have partial knowledge about what something is is to have a nominal or partial definition.

So when you approach a hammer for the purpose of manipulation you have already formed a partial definition of it. It is a physical object (which can be manipulated physically). It is graspable by the hand. It possesses a kind of leverage. It has a hard head which can be used to hit things without incurring damage. All of this is part of the definition, and is already implicit in one who manipulates a hammer. For Aristotle it wouldn't make much sense to say that you manipulate a hammer without some understanding of what it is.

Writing about something and providing insight isn’t necessarily the same thing as understanding a fact theoretically. — Joshs

I would say that when Heidegger writes and publishes he is doing theory, not practice, and he is manifesting theoretical wisdom. So long as we maintain that the one who can (theoretically) exposit as Heidegger does is wiser than the one who cannot, Aristotle's point about the relation of theory to wisdom holds. I don't believe your quotes from Heidegger are at odds with this. For example, that Being is not a theory does not invalidate the point I am making. We consider Heidegger wise primarily because of his theoretical exposition. It would not surprise me if Heidegger wished his theory to be non-theory, but it is not. The sort of exposition present in a treatise is inevitably theoretical.

It reminds me of a speech Chimamanda Ngozi Aldichie gave, the Freedom of Speech, in the Reith Lecture, where she stressed the importance of allowing ourselves to say something wrong and warned people of the danger of self-censorship. — Hailey

This sounds interesting. I found a link to it <here>. I will have to check it out when I get a chance.

Apart from arguing that people, especially youngsters should engage more in conversations, she also pointed out the damage that cancel culture would do to the society, which would all impair transparency of arguments and hinder the freedom of speech. — Hailey

Exactly. :up:

...neither concealing our own ignorance nor keeping silent to avoid conflicts would do anything good. — Hailey

Right. Perhaps social media has raised vanity to such a pitch that it has become exceptionally difficult to overcome. We are often more concerned with how others will react and view us than with whether our contribution will further the conversation.

- Sure thing: <link to new post in other thread>.