...discussion transplanted from "Belief" at Banno's request.

You must be familiar with Kripke's point, that we do not need to know the essence of some individual in order to refer to that individual? — Banno

I am probably as unfamiliar with Kripke as you are with Aristotle, but I am willing to explain Aristotle if you are willing to explain Kripke. In school we covered some of his contributions, such as rigid designators, but I don't remember covering this idea. Do you have a link or an explanation?

That you ask this perhaps shows how badly we are talking past each other. — Banno

Okay, that seems probable.

I had a tree fern in the front garden... and my apologies to those who have heard this story. Now you suppose that knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is
That's just not true. We use words correctly without ever setting out exact definitions. — Banno

The problem with this argument is that, just because one uses a word without setting out an exact definition, does not mean that they use the word without knowing what a tree is.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". — Banno

If the word didn't signify any determinate thing then it wouldn't be useful to us. For Aristotelians words are primarily about things, and things have a determinate form. To talk about the difference between two things, such as zebras and horses, is just to talk about the difference between the essence of a zebra and the essence of a horse. The reason we don't use the word 'essence' is because we are Aristotle's children, and it is implied. We believe there are real substances with stable, determinate forms, or at the very least this is the received view. There aren't many heirs of Parmenides or Heraclitus running around.

Fuzzy borders, such as those between trees and shrubs, reminds me of the Sorites paradox, and I don't see it as a debilitating difficulty. You would have to flesh out your argument if you think it presents a true problem for the Aristotelian.

Now, if you have a definition of "essence" that gets around the issues spoken of hereabouts, please set it out. — Banno

I think this is a good place to start:

"what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its essence (en tôi ti esti)" — SEP | Substance and Essence

The first argument is that some properties are not essential. The color brown does not belong to the essence of 'horse', because not all horses are brown, and a thing need not be brown in order to be a horse.

A second argument relates to the Humean notion of contiguity. Just because two things are contiguous does not mean that one enters into the definition of the other. That you were born in Pisces does not mean that the celestial bodies entered into the definition of your birth, nor that they bear some essential relation to your being.

- See:

A pacifist could around armed, presumably to scare off attackers. They just won't actually use the weapon on someone. — RogueAI

So then you think it is moral to threaten to do things that you believe to be immoral, which is a difficult position to maintain.

Yes, Jesus has a temper tantrum and tosses some money-changers out. That doesn't negate all his other teachings on non-violence. That's the human side of him coming out. — RogueAI

There is nothing in the text to support your thesis that this event indicates a failure or moment of weakness on Jesus' part. On the contrary.

More "live by the sword die by the sword". If you beat people, you'll come to a violent end. — RogueAI

Except if you understand these parables you will understand that "the master" is the God of Israel, and therefore the violence is not only approved but it is also a foretelling (or at the very least, a severe warning about what may happen).

Jesus is using the imagery of a particularly nasty death to make a point. — RogueAI

No, the point is that what awaits him will be much worse than this particularly nasty way to die, and Jesus approves both of what awaits him and of that which he proposes.

Pacifists don't talk this way. The examples I gave only scratch the surface.

My point is that simple, ready-made interpretations of Jesus almost always fudge the evidence. It seems to me that at the very least Jesus was a deeply complex figure, and that simple interpretations therefore cannot stand.

He must've intended for them to turn them into plowshares because... — Average

If we disregard all of the evidence that contradicts a pacifistic interpretation then our self-fulfilling prophecy will indubitably be fulfilled.

But if you are familiar with the four canonical gospels then you must be aware of when Jesus instructed his disciples to sell their cloaks to buy swords (Luke 22:36); or when Jesus made a whip out of cords to drive the money changers out of the Temple (John 2:15-17); or when Jesus foretold that, "the master of that slave will come on a day when he does not expect him and at an hour that he does not know, and will cut him in pieces, and put him with the unfaithful" (Luke 12:46, NRSV); or when Jesus, speaking about a grievous sinner, says, "it would be better for him if a great millstone were hung round his neck and he were thrown into the sea" (Mark 9:42).

I could go on.

- Jesus' teachings according to which documents? Which documents are you purporting to be familiar with?

Perhaps christians should remember when they recite the lords prayer and repeat the words "on earth as it is in heaven" that there was war in heaven once upon a time. — Average

The book of Revelation involves the idea that the fight will eventually be brought to Earth. If you are thinking in terms of the traditional Christian canon then that book will be a helpful key, but also the other eschatological writings in the New Testament (and Old).

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I don't know how you can read Jesus's teachings as anything other than total pacifism. He couldn't have been any clearer on the subject. — RogueAI

Serious question for you: have you ever read the New Testament in its entirety? I find that those who make such claims have almost invariably never read the New Testament.

Our culture presents a very strange and lopsided version of Jesus, and it seems that such claims are more influenced by the culture than by the Bible or by historical Christianity.

The first quote you give does not seem to involve any direct claim about wisdom. The second does speak about wisdom, but if not for its Heideggerian lingo it could easily be from an Aristotelian. For Aristotle ethical wisdom is manifested in doing, not in discursive knowing. Of course Aristotle would not consider ethical wisdom the highest form of wisdom, so if that is Varela's claim then it is somewhat at odds with Aristotle. But the first sentence (and thesis) of that quote is in perfect accord with an ancient Aristotelian approach to ethics and ethical wisdom.

So perhaps there is a postmodern shift insofar as the ethical takes center stage, but I think the Heideggerian and the Aristotelian concepts of ethical wisdom are very similar.

Returning to that first quote, if skillful navigation of the world represents the "most basic" form of understanding, then I think wisdom involves more than this. The foundation must be properly laid, but the wise person will have a deep understanding of the fact of skillful navigation, along with how it works and comes about. That is, they will be able to write about it and provide insight into it. This is why Heidegger is considered wise, because he is able to do these things, and his exposition is a theoretical form of knowledge.

It is true that some views are held uncritically or unreflectively, but oftentimes the most interesting philosophy occurs precisely at the point when these views come under question:

One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with arguments, especially when an assertion has been questioned or has become contentious. — Leontiskos

So I think @Jack Cummins makes a good point when he talks about "going beyond one's philosophical blindspots."

We all have certain views that we suppose do not need justification (and often they may not need justification). But the crucial thing is the ability to pivot and justify these views when they come into question.

Good stuff.

I especially like the connection between vulnerability and transparency: forthrightness can be a boast, but if you're really at your limit of certainty then it's a good idea to let go of the desire for certainty — Moliere

Thanks! Yes, I very much agree with this as well. Last year I wrote a thread on this topic on a different forum, "The Philosophical Virtue of Certitude Shifting." I hadn't thought about the way it is related to transparency until you brought it up.

I think some of these points seem obvious, and they probably are obvious, but at least for me it is helpful to have reminders from time to time.

Transparency, though, is a way to subject yourself to the criticism of philosophy. — Moliere

Yep, and I also think of it as a means to the common good of truth, knowledge, wisdom, etc. When there is transparency there is a better chance that everyone involved will enjoy these benefits.

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Transparency is important in argumentation because it leads to truth and is an example of the virtue of courage. — NotAristotle

Additionally, transparent argumentation makes for a more productive argument because one's views will be more clearly presented and because the actual beliefs of the individuals will be honestly assessed. — NotAristotle

Yes, that's just how I would put it @NotAristotle. :up:

The concept of Logos is problematic not only for its spiritual connotations and connotations of intentionality (the idea that nature is not teleological is a bit of a dogma in naturalism today) but even moreso because it implies that any order in nature is enforced externally, say by eternal "laws of nature," that exist outside nature. This isn't popular due to Hume's "problem of induction" and Kripke's essentialist response. We generally now think that nature has the properties of order that it does because of what nature is, or because of what natural entities are. That is, the "logic" of state progression in nature is intrinsic, not extrinsic. But this in no way means that the order doesn't exist outside the mind, it simply means that such an order is inherit to nature because of what nature is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I think that's accurate.

I think the Logos idea has to do with the whole, whereas the idea that you've been focusing on has to do with subsets of the whole, "isomorphisms between how members of these sets relate to one another" (). Then there is the other question of the <isomorphisms between mind and reality>.

So let's look at how Merriam-Webster defines logic:

• 1a
  
  • (1): a science that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration : the science of the formal principles of reasoning
    
    • a professor of logic
  • (2): a branch or variety of logic
    
    • modal logic
    • boolean logic
  • (3): a branch of semiotics
    
    • especially: Syntactics
  • (4): the formal principles of a branch of knowledge
    
    • the logic of grammar
• 1b
  
  • (1): a particular mode of reasoning viewed as valid or faulty
    
    • She spent a long time explaining the situation, but he failed to see her logic.
  • (2): Relevance, Propriety
    
    • could not understand the logic of such an action
• 1c: Interrelation or sequence of facts or events when seen as inevitable or predictable
  
  • By the logic of events, anarchy leads to dictatorship.
• 1d: the arrangement of circuit elements (as in a computer) needed for computation
  
  • also: the circuits themselves
• 2: something that forces a decision apart from or in opposition to reason
  
  • the logic of war

Now let's subdivide your third definition:

3. Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

• 3(a). Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted.
• 3(b). Logic is a principle at work in the world, in the order of subsets of the whole. "The logic of natural selection."

Interestingly, there is no correlate in Merriam-Webster (MW) for 3(a). I think this is right. Logos and logike are two different things. 3(b) maps to MW-1c. I think the idea about isomorphisms between mind and reality is implicitly related to MW-1a(1), MW-1a(4), and MW-1b(1). This idea is implicit in science and phusis, especially Aristotle's "form or source of motion" vis-a-vis phusis. To speak about the "logic" of natural selection is to speak about the nature (phusis) of natural selection.

The other central question is the question of what exactly you are asking or aiming to do in the OP. Apparently you are trying to understand how the various different usages relate to one another, no? We must inevitably ask what methodology is being presupposed in responding to this inquiry. But I will leave this for another post.

It seems to me that a general difficulty here is that the third account of 'logic' that you give has not yet been shown to be coherent. It seems to piggyback on the Stoic or Christian idea, but "disenchanted," as you say. It is not the anima mundi of the Stoics nor the divine Word of the Christians, but it attempts to inherit and "naturalize" that concept. But again, is this really coherent? Do naturalists really speak this way when they are being rigorous and are not engaging in loose and poetic metaphor?

The crux is that there is an age-old connection between Logos and mind or spirit, and its not clear that one can take one and leave the other. What is in fact occurring, I aver, is that an entirely new concept is being introduced under an already-established word. This results in a sort of equivocation, where a new concept gets disguised in the garb of an old word, and an attempt is made to pass it off under the old concept. Those promoting such a thing perhaps do not understand how radical is their break with the traditional and established meaning.

Or the act of the other builder bringing a slab such that the initiate sees what a slab is without an essence. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. Hume ridiculed the idea of essences, but Hume hardly read any Aristotle. I think most moderns are following Hume in ridiculing something they do not understand.

Here is one possible introduction: Essential vs. Accidental Properties (SEP)

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No, he doesn't. He thinks that we would be better served considering use rather than essence. — Banno

You will have to say what you mean by 'essence' at some point. At this point I'm not convinced you have the slightest idea of what you mean by it.

It's almost exactly like when you <dismiss the logic of the middle ages>, yet clearly know absolutely nothing about the practice of logic in the middle ages. It doesn't often go well when one criticizes things they are perfectly ignorant of.

He's saying hat the structure of beliefs is not well reflected in the predicate form B(a,p).

Nothing here supports your claims. He's saying belief is not a relation. He doesn't appear to be saying anything about normativity, determinism or "real" definitions, whatever they are and whatever they might mean in this context. — Banno

I have already addressed this <here>, and you continue to ignore the points at hand. "If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the 'inferior' of P1 falls to pieces," etc.

Searle makes strong claims about what belief is and what belief is not. He is clearly committed to the position that there is a definition of belief and an essence of belief. If there were neither then such claims would be nonsense. If beliefs had no more of an essence than an artifact like a scissors then Searle wouldn't be able to make sweeping claims about the damage done to philosophy.

(NB: To say, "they are mistaken about X," is to imply that there is something normative about X. If there were nothing normative about X then one could not be mistaken with respect to it.)

What Wayfarer captured is a classical Greek notion of wisdom carried over into the Enlightenment. What I am depicting is a postmodern notion of wisdom (Later Wittgenstein, Deleuze, Foucault, Rorty, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche). — Joshs

I am not convinced that even the postmodern vision of wisdom is based in practicality. Do you have any quotes or sources that would support this thesis?

Isn’t wisdom the ability to make pragmatic sense (what works) of an aspect of the world, — Joshs

I don't think so, but if you have a source in mind I would be willing to look into it. I think captured it well.

Here is another quote from Aristotle:

We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles.

Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is wisdom. If we were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I (Tr. Ross)

Specifically, "and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive." For example, we would not call the effective businessman wise. He may be crafty, or clever, or intelligent, or efficient, or administratively gifted, but it would be uncommon to call him wise.

But I am also in complete support in having an Artificial Intelligence write a good portion of my code. — Bret Bernhoft

If good code is wisdom and artificial intelligence is a shortcut, then your claim would make some sense. Trouble is, I'm not convinced that good code is wisdom (or is comparable to wisdom). Neither would I want to call wisdom "what works, what is effective." Usually when we talk about wisdom we are talking about something more than that, and that something is not particularly susceptible to shortcuts. Maybe another way to say, "Beware of unearned wisdom," is, "Don't make the mistake of confusing that bumper sticker with wisdom." "Do not believe that you are wise because you have read lots of bumper stickers, or because you spend a good deal of time on Facebook."

Indeed! That's an odd mix up on Wayback Machine.

- Thanks for your posts, they are very interesting.

On the other hand, here is an proposition that states any cognition or series of cognitions shared by all members of a set capable of them, are for that reason, objective cognitions. I’m not so sure about that myself, but, it’s out there. Some folks rejecting that form of objectivity favor a thing called “intersubjectivity”, which just looks like subject/object version of Frankenstein’s ogre. — Mww

I suppose I wouldn't want to invoke the objective claim on those grounds, although it would be fair to ask what alternative grounds there are. I am thinking more of the idea that if all members of a set claim—implicitly or explicitly—to have knowledge of some objective reality, then this is a strong indication that such a reality is objective and is accessible to members of that set. The strength of the indication would weaken as the percentage of the population which makes the claim diminishes.

Are you a Kantian, then?

What categorical error were you thinking as possible? — Mww

Well if we only argue about things that we believe to be objective, then apparently we think morality is objective. Or else everyone who argues about morality is making a category error in holding that morality is something worth arguing about (and hence based on something objective).

The easiest case for morality as something we argue about would seem to be your example of the "ethical"—societal laws that objectively exist and are argued about.

Sounds good Jamal, that all makes sense. Given that the article is available via Wayback Machine (and perhaps other internet archives) it might be nice to have the old link visible somewhere. Here is the link to the most recent archive on Wayback Machine: The Argument for Indirect Realism.

The missing premise is that belief names a substance, in the sense indicated here, which I suppose means something like "part of the natural world," and thus its essence can be sought by means of natural science, where we might expect theories ("only") to approximate that essence.

But that may be false. "Belief" is a category from folk psychology, which means it is just as likely to turn out to be defined only as well as "hammer" or "chair" or "government." You may disagree, and consider "belief" to name a natural kind, but you ought to recognize that in doing so you are relying on, if not advancing, very strong claims about psychology. Is that what you want to do? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you are right to point out that there is enthymeme at work, but I would express it a bit differently. (I would say that belief is not an artifact, but it is also not a substance. It is an accident. Let that pass for now.)

Yes, I would want to say that 'belief' is a natural kind, found among humans and accessible to natural science. Banno gave a <quote from John Searle>. Specifically, my claim has been that the final sentence of that quote commits Searle to the view that the notion of belief is both determinate and normative, and to the view that there exists a real definition of belief that the "mistaken view" has gotten wrong.

(This twofold point is getting at the same thing, but I broke it up at some point to try to help the argument along.)

Also: every thread turns into the same thread eventually, about the nature and status of concepts in general, as this one has. — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, how soon you forget about the threads which end in us calling one another "Hitler"! :razz:

(In fact when I began pressing Banno on his claim, found elsewhere, that definitions do not exist, I admitted that my line was tangential.)

The scissors example, the understanding of which pair of scissors is the better, is determined by seeing which one cuts more quickly, straightly and cleanly; I think this is all empirically observable and has nothing to with essences, although we can think about it in those terms on reflection. — Janus

I agree, and I would say that the essence of a scissors includes sharpness. Banno apparently disagrees, and thinks the essence of a scissors is neither sharp nor dull. Of course we are talking about artifacts, but we can still think of them as having quasi-essences.

So the best scissors cuts most quickly, straightly, and cleanly, and we will compare any two scissors according to this ideal. That's basically what a (quasi-) definition is: that conceptual ideal that you have in your mind when you compare or assess scissors. Or if we want to be precise we could call it a nominal definition. Really it doesn't matter what we call it. It's the thing that matters. If someone is superstitious about the words 'essence' or 'definition', we can go with something else. It seems to me that to deny the existence of such things is mistaken and also very odd.

It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken...

I think a dog associates its bowl with the act of eating, and conditioning occurs, but it does not use the bowl as a tool (like a screwdriver). Thus the mode of recognition would seem to be quite different.

Getting back towards the topic, if someone says, "A is a better X than B," then they must have at least some vague notion of what the best X looks like. If they say, "The Phillips is a better screwdriver than a flathead for this screw," then they must understand the shape of the screw as well as the proper screwdriver needed to drive it, and that the Phillips is closer to the proper choice than the flathead. Or perhaps the Phillips simply is the proper or best conceivable tool for the job. Either way, they have a definition of "the right screwdriver for the job."

The dog doesn't have that definition, because they do not use things as means to ends in that way.

The post at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/834084 wasn't directed specifically at you. I was simply making a general observation; seems it hit a nerve. — Banno

You were making a general observation? About truth-preservation? When I was the only one who had brought up or defended the idea of truth-preservation in the entire thread? :brow:

And again, (third time?) yes, I agree. — Banno

Realizing that the analogy might not suffice, I amended that sentence to make the idea clearer, but I think we are agreed that we should be done in this thread, no? We're not going anywhere.

How broadly are you defining definition? — wonderer1

Mmm, Banno has shifted this discussion quite far from its origin, which was not focused on practical knowledge or artifacts. My claim has been <If you want to say that X is a better understanding of belief than Y, then there must be some real definition of belief that X better approximates>. Banno's position seems to be <X is a better understanding of belief than Y, and there is no real definition of belief that X better approximates>.

His justification has to do with scissors and screwdrivers. Apparently the idea is that if one does not need an ideal conception of scissors or screwdrivers, then they do not need an ideal conception of belief (in order to make the claim that X is a better understanding of belief than Y).

And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.

And what's an "internalised definition"? One that is not explicit? One that cannot be made explicit? Could such a thing count as a definition? — Banno

Practical knowledge bears on the essence of a thing, yes. In the case of practical knowledge one does not need to be able to communicate their knowledge to others in order to possess it. A mechanic who can fix anything in the world but can't explain the mechanics of mechanic-ing to another person still knows the essence of a screwdriver. Whether he knows the definition of a screwdriver is perhaps arguable, but I would say that he does.

Incidentally, this bears on your thread about definitions. Definitions are about things, not words, and so circularity of words (description) does not undermine the notion of definitions. When we teach children by pointing, "dog," "grandpa," we are teaching them how to name things and take the first step towards definitions. The words are never ultimately about words. They are about things. The one who understands the thing possesses the definition, not the one who possesses mere words. ...Of course words are rarely "mere," for they themselves tell us about things.

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I rather doubt that dogs make choices with regard to their food bowl in the way that we make choices between screwdrivers. I see this as association vs. use.

The contention I criticises was that logic consists in the preservation of truth. — Banno

For a third time now, that "contention" is a figment of your imagination. Do you think that when I spoke about the "central criterion" as validity in our current day, I was saying that logic "consists" in validity? Or that logic is "defined only in terms of preserving truth"?

Russell, on the other hand, asserts that "Logics are theories of validity..." (my emphasis). If there is anyone who thinks logic consists in validity, it is Russell, at least if we can take this general statement from her SEP article to reflect her views.

I pointed out that parts of logic do not involve truth. For example the sequent calculus consists in a bunch of rules setting out what you can write down next - or previously. Truth doesn't enter until the tack, and even then it's the false that is introduced... — Banno

But your argument here is no good. There are rules in logic which must be attended to, but from this it does not follow that this part of logic is unrelated to truth or validity (I happen to think that logic is more consistently related to truth than validity, but your argument fails on both scores). The rules are themselves related to truth and validity.

To take an analogy, language is about meaning. Someone might say, "Ah! But when we utilize rote memorization to teach children to spell words we are not teaching them about meaning." True enough, but the whole reason we teach children to spell words is so that they can use the words in sentences and paragraphs to convey meaning. The spelling of a word is not unrelated to meaning, and the rules of a formal system are not unrelated to validity. To think otherwise would be to fundamentally misunderstand language and logic.

A valid argument is one that follows the rules. — Banno

According to what definition of validity? Russell prefers the Generalized Tarski Thesis to define validity, and this is altogether at odds with the definition you now offer.

I'm saying that there is a difference between a valid argument and a sound argument. — Banno

I think most anyone would agree with such an innocuous claim. Yet according to Russell logic is about validity, not soundness. Such is the received view, and I have not challenged it here.

No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw. — Banno

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. That's what a definition is. An understanding or concept of what something is. If you claim to know what something is then you have at least a nominal definition of it, and if you have a definition then you claim to know what it is.

What sort of strange misunderstandings are you laboring under? What do you imagine an Aristotelian (or an average person) means when they talk about the definition of some thing?

Continuing where I left of in my quote from <this post>:

The second objection, that definitions cannot express real essences, is mere trifling. The suggestion that the word "definition" be restricted to statements of meaning is purely stipulative: if the stipulation is accepted, as a convenient way of avoiding ambiguity, nothing need happen to Aristotle's theory beyond a change of name; and until one is proposed, we may either follow ordinary usage, which surely allows us to apply the word "definition" to statements of essence, or else avail ourselves of the scholastic distinction between 'real' and 'nominal' definition. The whole question is insignificant. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii-xiv

I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”. Is morality a real thing? Even if it isn’t, per se, it seems the case there is in all humans a condition by which certain behaviors are legislated, so if the behaviors are real in one sense of the term, wouldn’t that condition by which behaviors are caused be real is some sense? I dunno….it’s a fine line between granting the realness of behavior but denying the realness of behavior’s causality.

I think there must be as many moral facts as there are acts in accordance with subjective moral commands. But that is not sufficient reason to grant objective moral facts in general, to which one is morally obligated. While I am perfectly entitled to say my act is in fact a moral act, am I thereby entitled to say my act is derived from a moral fact, and if I am not so entitled, by what warrant is my act, in fact, moral? If I then fall back on moral command as necessary causality, am I then forced to deem a mere command of reason, a fact? — Mww

You should start a thread. :wink:

If there are subjective conditions by which behaviors are legislated, and these conditions come into conflict which results in argument, does it then follow that they are in some sense objective? Or are all such arguments based on a category error? Surely these anthropological facts must carry some sort of weight in considering the question.

To get things going on our articles web site I've published something I wrote some time ago about indirect realism.

[EDIT: broken link removed] — Jamal

I found this interesting, especially as a window to see how some contemporary philosophers approach Hume's work. (Note that the link is now down and perhaps the domain needs to be renewed.)

Arguments like this one, so colossally influential in philosophy and beyond, are also colossally mistaken. — Jamal

I am reminded of David Oderberg's quip:

‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’ would be almost too much for a Pyrrhonist to swallow. — David Oderberg, Hume, the Occult, and the Substance of the School

In a footnote he notes that David Stove gave this as an example of ‘the worst argument in the world’.

This reflects the somewhat common argument that if a reality is mediated then it must also be inaccessible or at least distorted. If our eyes mediate reality, then apparently we cannot see. But what, then, is the alternative to mediated realities?

The problem of erroneous perceptions was obvious to all philosophers, but very few took the route that Hume took, and none with such confidence and even hubris.

- That's enough for me. Take care.

If a valid inference must be truth-preserving then the notion of truth is built in that of valid inference. Q.E.D. — neomac

Again, "If something is meant to preserve another thing, then it is not building or creating that thing" ().

Let's apply your reasoning to mortuary. "A mortician is concerned with preserving bodies. Therefore a mortician builds/creates bodies. Q.E.D."

Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.

I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

Well, do you think the scissors analogy maps to Searle's claim? Do you imagine that Searle might be caught saying something like, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by [the mistaken view that scissors ought to be dull rather than sharp]"?

If someone wants to make a bold and striking claim they can't immediately fall back into a kind of nominalism. To do so is, in effect, to say, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that X is Y. Also, it makes no difference whether philosophers and cognitive scientists believe X is Y. It's merely a matter of perspective."

If someone makes a substantial mistake then there must be some matter of the fact that they are mistaken about. To say that they have made a mistake and then to simultaneously hold that there is ultimately nothing to be mistaken about is to contradict oneself. Searle's claim is normative, not merely hypothetical.

I think you are the one misrepresenting Searle, here. Suppose you write Searle a letter asking, "Are there certain facts about what belief is, such that some construals of belief are more accurate than others?" I think he would write back, "Yes, of course there are real facts about what belief is and what belief is not. The people who are mixed up about these facts are more mistaken than those who are not mixed up about them."

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. — Banno

But when Aristotelians see people saying things like this, we can only wonder what sort of bizarre strawman is at play. When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task."

I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

You need a clear definition of a Phillips screwdriver and a clear definition of a flathead screwdriver if you are to choose between them. When you look at a screw and think, "A Phillips will be better than a flathead for this screw," you have already appealed to the ideal screwdriver for this job. This is all the argument requires.

"Built-in" is a figure of speech, we are talking semantics. So the point is that the notion of truth is semantically built in the idea of correct inference. This holds even if we occasionally fail to process the inference or if the inference is simply valid but not sound. — neomac

This just isn't right. It is not true that, "[T]he notion of 'truth' is built in the 'logic' rules themselves, in other words the meaning of 'truth' is determined by 'logic rules' too" ().

The notion of truth is not semantically built in the idea of correct inference. Truth is something beyond inference and beyond validity. Validity can be formally defined, but truth cannot be formally defined. Of course we can talk about "truth" qua some logical system, but this is technically an equivocation. This sort of "truth" is different from actual truth, and we do not hesitate to call it false in certain instances.

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The next sentence is "Different logics disagree about which argument forms are valid". There is some considerable subtlety here. — Banno

But they do not disagree that logic is about validity, and that validity is about the preservation of truth. So what you say here is not to the point.

But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal. — Banno

Such as...? Do you have any arguments or examples to give? You are remarkably tight-lipped for someone who is "nonplussed."

I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this. — Banno

But your appendix doesn't affect my argument. You merely explained the manner in which the view is mistaken.

So taking your appendix:

I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno

The idea here is:

• P1: "Ceteris paribus, a construal of the belief-relation as a thing in the mind or brain is inferior to a construal of the belief-relation as a thing that is not in the mind or brain."

Now your ideal belief-relation here—whatever else we want to say about it—must not be a thing in the mind or brain. This characteristic is part of your own definition of the belief-relation, and it is a characteristic which must be in place in order for you to implicitly assert P1. If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the "inferior" of P1 falls to pieces.

And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.

So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed. — Banno

Well so am I. What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. But at least I am providing arguments for my position, even though I think it is the most obvious thing in the world.

(As I said earlier, this tangent is closer to your thread about definitions, for I am focusing on the definition of belief that underlies your claims about belief.)

If logic is "rules for stringing symbols together," then these rules can either be arbitrary or non-arbitrary. If they are non-arbitrary, then logic must itself be connected to the non-arbitrary determination of these rules.

I see that Russell defines logic in terms of the preservation of truth, so that's an interesting start. "Logics are theories of validity: they tell us, for different arguments, whether or not that argument is of a valid form" (SEP). (She appeals to the Generalised Tarski Thesis to define validity.)

I'm guessing I might agree with much of what she thinks. But 'logical pluralism' feels a bit like 'situation ethics', in that it gets at something true but mixes up epistemological and metaphysical spheres. I clearly think formalized systems have significant limitations, so if "logical monism" is the view that there is some formalized system without limitations then I am not a logical monist. It's not hard to think that two different 'logics' "can be getting things right."

Well, that would mean that, say, an uninterpreted explication of propositional calculus does not count as part of logic. — Banno

I added to my last post, "Logicians can temporarily and usefully prescind from truth, but entire detachment is something different." There are more proximate and more remote relations of logic to truth, but something with a perfect non-relation to truth is not logic.

The point here is just that logic is bigger than the preservation of truth in an argument. — Banno

This is an ignoratio elenchus, as I already noted.

"have a certain logic to them..." — Banno

This is a metaphorical use of the term, similar to what I pointed out <here>. Logic depends on order, and thus ordered things are sometimes called "logical." But logic is more properly an art of ordering, not mere order. You are appealing to usage, but the etymology and the historical usage point very clearly to logic as an art of reasoning.

They say that one of the best ways to learn something is to teach it. A few weeks ago I looked at your thread which is intended to teach propositional calculus (link). It's no coincidence that in your third substantial post you were already into truth tables. But even in your first substantial post you said, "What we want to do is to examine the relations between these propositions, rather than their contents." It seems to me that it would have been more apt to say that we want to examine the relations that obtain between these propositions based on their content. Relations hold or fail to hold in light of the content of the relata, and this has everything to do with truth.

Now a pedagogue might choose to introduce the rules of logic before introducing the purpose of logic, much like you could teach a child to kick a ball before introducing them to the game of soccer. Of course I am not convinced that this is sound pedagogy.

Logic has advanced somewhat since the middle ages. — Banno

Do you have any actual acquaintance with the logic of the middle ages?

Well, I never said that logic can only be defined in terms of preserving truth. But that someone makes up a formal system that has nothing to do with truth and calls it 'logic' is not much of a counterargument. Logicians can temporarily and usefully prescind from truth, but entire detachment is something different.

Best answer might be that it is rules of grammar; rules for stringing symbols together. — Banno

But logic is not merely rules for stringing symbols together. If I make rules for stringing symbols together I have not necessarily done anything related to logic.

Formalists need to take a step back and consider why the formal systems were constructed in the first place.

On the other side if your claim is supposed to question my claim that “the notion of ‘truth’ is built in the ‘logic’ rules themselves”, then you are failing since your own notion of logical system as a set of truth preserving rules is also grounded on the notion of “truth”. — neomac

If something is meant to preserve another thing, then it is not building or creating that thing.