Within my formulation, I think it would be obligatory; because, as you noted, my version compares the bad side effects of each foreseeable means (towards the end) and not just the good effect (of that end) and the bad side effect being considered (of an action). — Bob Ross

That's fine, but what you're describing is not the principle of double effect. The principle of double effect never obliges, because it determines whether an act with a bad effect is permissible. You are giving a principle which tells us what to do given two or more legitimate choices, and this is not the principle of double effect.

In both cases, they are intending something good but both have bad side effects; so the less severe one should be chosen. — Bob Ross

I will continue to call this the second principle (as opposed to the principle of double effect). This second principle of yours is more straightforwardly consequentialist than the principle of double effect, and @I like sushi's comments make more sense in light of this.

Yes, I agree. I just see that as a weakness in the classical formulation: it is completely silent on if one should pick the means with the least severe bad effects, and instead only comments on whether the bad effect does not outweight the good effect. Both are arguably important. — Bob Ross

They are two different questions. Suppose you are going golfing and you take a club to the golf pro, and ask him if the club is fit for use. This is the first question. Then you go on to show him a second club, and you ask him which of the two clubs should be preferred. This is the second question. Answering the first question does not answer the second question, and an answer to the second question is not the same as an answer to the first question. It is not the job of PDE to compare acts one to another, or to determine whether something is obligatory. To call this a "weakness" of the PDE would be like calling it a weakness that a rake cannot cut down trees. It was never meant to cut down trees. A rake is not an axe.

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Edit:

The frame of your definition is correct:

The version of PDE that I accept is that it is permitted to bring about a bad effect in the case that [all six conditions hold]. — Bob Ross

I.e. "It is permissible to bring about a bad effect if..." Note that, by your own words, the matter is not one of positive obligations or of choosing between acts. If your version of PDE tells us what is permissible then it does not tell us what is positively obligatory, for what we are permitted to do is not the same as what we are obliged to do.

- Right, although even the foreseen effects that are not part of the principal intention have some indirect relation to the intention of the agent, insofar as the agent accepts their occurrence and acts despite foreseeing them. Thus, if the foreseen effect is particularly undesirable then the agent will refuse to engage in the act which causes it.

Although you have said we don’t always know whether we were trying our best, at least some of the time we know it, and in those cases maybe the simplest way to measure our effort is to use a verbal scoring system: On a scale of one to ten, how hard were we trying? — Joshs

Okay.

I would put it this way. We are always putting our effort into some game or other... — Joshs

Except when we do things like sleep, but putting effort in and putting maximal effort in are two different things. I do not do my best when I drive in ideal conditions, but I do apply effort.

I’ll know how successful I was at my game of touring by how satisfying the trip was for me, not by how fast I was going. — Joshs

Sure, I don't dispute any of this. It doesn't affect our topic. I don't expect you to have a very robust theory of the specification of human acts, but I think even bad theories arrive at the obvious conclusion that we don't always do our best.

I would put it this way. We are always putting our effort into some game or other , but the criterion of success changes with changes in the game. — Joshs

So what? Attempting to achieve success is not the same as applying maximal effort. I can beat my three year-old nephew in a wrestling match with one hand tied behind my back. This has nothing to do with whether I am trying my best. The reason we shouldn't always try our best is because some things are easy, and do not demand our best.

We could speak about acting in an optimal manner rather than applying maximal effort, and this indeed seems to be what you are interested in. Are human beings always acting in as optimal a way as they are able? This relates to the "broader question" I spoke to in my last post.

There are a nearly infinite variety of games we can opt to play, and we switch among them all the time. When we naively assume another is continuing the play the game we believe they are playing, we may not notice this shift in games. So we only notice their failure to perform within the rules we assume they are abiding by, and we fail to notice that they are already involved with a different game. The are still doing their best, but their effort is applied in a completely different direction, with different criteria of success. — Joshs

We don't always misidentify another's "game," and even if we did, it remains true that we do not always apply maximal effort to the "games" we are self-consciously "playing." (I dislike speaking in Wittgenstenian metaphor. Our activities are not games.)

I grant that there is a somewhat interesting way in which the contemporary mind sees effort as flat and unchangeable. To see the fault in this one might consider the case of an extreme rock climber who climbs free (with no safety rope) and compare him with the fellow who is walking to the coffee shop before work. The rock climber is exerting more effort in an absolute sense than the man walking to the coffee shop, and he is likely exerting maximal effort. Now compare the free climber with an identical climber who has a safety harness, and there will be a different level of effort vis-a-vis the same activity, ceteris paribus.

The obvious conclusion once again arises unperturbed: human beings do not invariably do their best.

How do you define "doing your best"? I would define it as doing what the situation or task at hand requires so as to avoid negative outcomes. If you are paying adequate attention to the conditions—the road. traffic signals, other drivers and so on, such as to avoid an accident, or getting booked, then I would count that as "doing your best". — Janus

If you could do better are you doing your best? Is someone who is doing an adequate job doing the best job? See:

Someone who is not doing their best is by definition not putting all of their effort into something. The reason we seldom do our best is because it is very difficult to put all of our effort into something. — Leontiskos

You might say that if you failed to do your best then you might, for example, have an accident or be booked for speeding, but could that failure ever be counted as intentional? If you drive too fast, is it not on account of a failure of attention... — Janus

In moral philosophy neglect is a failure involving intention or volition. "Attention" comes under our intention and volition, after all, and that is why it is not unjust to ticket speeders.

It's much more complex than that. If anything, it's Catholic...

Not a strong recommendation in my opinion. — Banno

It was nurtured in a Catholic context, but that is true of more philosophical concepts than you would care to know. The principle is common parlance in bioethics and has arguably always been part of medical ethics. The seeds of the principle are traced back to Aquinas, but he doesn't take himself to be stating anything novel:

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention... — Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Regarding the common use in medicine, see for example:

To this effect, Dr. Mary S. Calderone tells of a group of eminent doctors who implicitly affirmed the validity of this aspect of the principle when they refused to classify hysterectomy for uterine fibroids as a therapeutic abortion, even though therapy had lead to the destruction of the fetus.

At the Symposium on Aspects of Female Sexuality, heId in New York in 1958, Dr. S.A. Cosgrove made a similar though somewhat marginal statement. He stated in this respect that he would not perform a therapeutic abortion since he did not consider it "good medicine", but that he would treat a definite life-threatening disease even if fetal death might result from the treatment. — Paul Micallef, A Critique of Bernard Häring’s Application of the Double Effect Principle

So ... a mass-murdering and torturing rapist's intent to torture, rape and murder as many as possible cannot be ethically incorrect. He cannot thereby want what he shouldn't. — javra

A central claim in that previous thread was that a serial killer need not be acting immorally:

For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether." — Leontiskos

Because to me this kind'a speaks to that whole bemoaning of modern-day ethical standards as being in a state of decadence, demise, or however one ought best term this. — javra

Yep. :up:

My objection to Aristotle’s concept of happiness as eudaemonia, and this whose ethical theories are influenced by it, is that it conflates the hedonic and the cognitive aspects of experiencing. As a result, it fetishizes intent over sense-making. One can allegedly ‘want’ suffering , pain or misery instead of pleasure and happiness. We make decision all the time between short term reward and long term benefit, between the thrill of the moment and an ‘eventual good.’ But in doing so, we are not dealing with different forms of the hedonic, but different ways of making sense of the situations that will produce happiness. In other words, it is the cognitive aspect of goal-seeking that is involved when we choose none route to happiness over another. Choosing the longer term benefit over the immediate reward requires construing this far off reward within the immediate situation. — Joshs

The more you talk about Aristotle the more convinced I am that you have never read him. Perhaps you should try to produce texts which you believe support your claims. Aristotle's account of pleasure is rather complicated, and his theory of practical reason is not "hedonic." It would be almost as odd to say that Plato is "hedonic."

The Principle of Double Effect is utilitarian. What is there is agree or disagree about other than the overall balance of outcome (which is precisely what the PoDE is describing)? — I like sushi

gave six different conditions and only one of them is consequence-based. For the consequentialist good consequences are sufficient to justify an act. For the PDE good consequences are necessary but not sufficient for the justification of an act.

- Yes, this seems right to me. :up:

If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." — J

It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness.

Of course, in our culture "happiness" has become much more psychological than eudamonia. For example, lots of people will skip the "happiness pills," but it's not because they don't want to be happy, it's because they don't think the pills produce happiness. They don't think psychological ease is happiness. Pat seems to fall easily within this group.

Robbie replies by explaining in great detail why none of those suggestions are options that would work for them — J

Robbie, by your own admission, does not believe that your advice will make him happy (because it is not achievable for him). This doesn't mean he doesn't want to be happy; it only means he doesn't think you are giving good advice.

But perhaps the more important point is this: Aristotle doesn't mean "everybody" when he talks about the human desire for happiness — J

I think he surely does.

If we could bring him into this conversation, I think Aristotle might say: "Yes, sadly, there are those whom you have to actually convince to desire their own good, but that doesn't put the idea of 'the good' up for grabs in any important way." But wait a minute, Ari, we reply; we're talking about happiness, not the good. Aristotle smiles serenely . . . "Oh, are you?" he asks. — J

In the very first pages of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle connects happiness with the good. You could say that for Aristotle not everyone wants to be virtuous, but not that not everyone wants to be happy. Everyone does want to be happy, and they try to do so within their unique circumstances.

As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4

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Edit:

What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite? — J

If "exact opposite" means virtue then we are speaking about the akrates. On the other hand, someone who desires vice is the akolastos that you read about in Kevin Flannery’s paper, “Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds.”

Robbie hates the condition they are in, and has no desire to keep pursuing it . . . or so they say. Do we need to say that Robbie "secretly" or "deeply" enjoys being stuck in misery, in order to explain their condition? I'm not sure that's right. But in any case, I would hesitate to judge Robbie by the same yardstick I'd use to judge the typical, "standard" person in a state of vice. — J

Robbie is the akrates. Generally we say about Robbie that he is conflicted. See my post <here>:

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction. — Leontiskos

I’m not blaming or reproaching you. — Joshs

The absurdly emotional tale that you told indicates otherwise.

But I will insist that claiming someone is not doing their best is an accusation, regardless of how you sugarcoat it. All forms of blame (including concepts like narcissism and laziness) are based in hostility, and as such are accusations, even if they masquerade as affectively neutral rational judgements. — Joshs

I’d say you’re about 300 miles off course. Underlying your thinking is the argument <Everyone should do their best, therefore everyone does do their best>. Not only is this argument invalid, but it also has a false premise.

The question of whether someone is doing their best is a matter of fact which must be determined on a case by case basis, a posteriori. It is not an a priori necessity, as you have made it.

“The Corvette is going 100 mph.” This is also a matter of fact that must be determined on a case by case basis. When a police officer uses his radar gun to determine how fast the Corvette is traveling, he is probing this matter of fact. The normative question arises second: how fast should the Corvette be traveling? With regard to this second question, the police officer will ticket the driver if the Corvette is traveling too fast (or too slow).

“The Corvette is going 100 mph,” is a statement about the speed of the car, and cars can travel at different speeds. “Johnny is doing his best,” is a statement about the effort that Johnny is applying to some activity, and humans can apply different levels of effort. Step 1 is assessing the level of effort, which is a matter of fact. This step is like using the radar gun to determine the car’s speed. Contrary to your moralizing worldview, the assessment of effort is not yet a normative or moral matter. Step 2, the normative step, only arises when we want to judge how much effort Johnny should be applying to the activity. The answer to this question is not, “Johnny should always be applying maximal effort.” That is a stupid idea inherited from the Puritans, on a par with other stupid ideas like, “If a job isn’t done well then it’s not worth doing.”

Again, when I am driving a car I am usually not trying my best. In ideal driving conditions it would be stupid to try my best, as this would be a needless waste of energy. In that case your moralizing would be perfectly backwards, and, “He is trying his best,” would be the accusation, as opposed to, “He is not trying his best.” It is not uncommon to ridicule someone in that manner, by noting that they are trying their best when they shouldn’t be.

So if someone says to you, “Joshs, you aren’t trying your best,” and they mean it as a corrective, then you should 1) Ask yourself whether you are trying your best, 2) Ask yourself whether you should be trying your best. If the answer is no/yes, then you should thank them for correcting you, tell them you will try harder, and possibly ask their advice about how to improve. If the answer is not no/yes, then you should tell them why you disagree. Whatever you do, do not say, “I am a human being, and human beings always try their best, therefore I am trying my best.” They will probably just reply that they thought you were smarter than that.

The broader question you are after is the question of whether it is ever prudent or legitimate to make a normative judgment.* Your proximate rejoinder would be something like, “Well, we should never presume to tell anyone that they should be applying a different level of effort than they are in fact applying.” I think this is completely wrong, but it is not worth addressing here. I would point you to my thread, “The Breadth of the Moral Sphere.”

* A normative judgment about others, but perhaps also about ourselves.

I am glad to see that you have revised your position on this. Truth be told, PDE is an unwieldy principle. There are cases (such as the hysterectomy) where it seems to obviously apply, but it has often been noted that in other cases the principle can be easily abused. Our topsy-turvy discussion in the other thread got at some of the nuance involved.

Two simple points regarding that nuance:

it is morally permissible and obligatory to pull the lever — Bob Ross

In the other thread I ended up in the end saying that it is not permissible to pull the lever, but I think it is uncontroversial the PDE does not make it obligatory to pull the lever. Thus:

because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either the deaths of five or the killing of one) and the bad side effect of pulling the lever is consequentially less severe than the bad side effect of not pulling it.

...

The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer. — Bob Ross

The key here is that the PDE does not apply to omissions, and this is because omissions (non-acts) do not have proper effects. So I would say that you have two principles operating: the PDE which renders the act permissible, and another principle regarding omissions which renders the act obligatory.

In the other thread you were quite adamant to distinguish commissions from omissions, and you got a lot of pushback. I never actually opposed that distinction, but I put it off as a separate topic. What I would say is that there is a morally relevant difference between a commission and an omission, but this does not mean that we are never responsible for omissions, or that omissions are always permissible.

Classically speaking, you misstate the proportionalist/consequentialist condition of PDE:

6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially). — Bob Ross

The proportionalist condition classically compares the good effect(s) to the bad effect(s) of the single action, not the effects of different actions. For example, in the case of the tactical bombing the circumstances will determine the proportion of good effects to bad effects, and if the bad effects are significantly greater than the good effects then the bombing should not be done, even if the other conditions are met.

This second principle you are utilizing is distinct from double effect, and involves a comparison between multiple acts or between positive acts and omissions. Double effect is more restricted, and has nothing in particular to say about that. It is only about the moral permissibility of an act which has more than one effect, some of which are undesirable.

- :roll:

Presumably Godel is making the same sort of error, equivocating on "possibility." — Leontiskos

I'm addressing modal ontological arguments. These arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God. — Michael

You literally said:

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God." — Michael

You asked what an English sentence means, and then you tried (and failed) to translate it into modal logic.

◊∃xG(x) is false given the fact that it denies what is true of God by definition. "God possibly exists" is not false, and it is not false precisely because it is an epistemic claim. Therefore your translation into modal logic fails. Modal logic is not capable of distinguishing the notion of necessity from the actuality of necessity, and that is precisely what is required in order to translate, "God possibly exists." Modal logic is not sophisticated enough to represent the claim, "A necessary being possibly exists." I explained why above ().

Modal ontological arguments try to use modal logic to prove the existence of God... — Michael

You asked:

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? — Michael

You responded:

In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God." — Michael

And I pointed out, among other things, that:

Then the modal logic fails to translate, because <it is possible that there exists a necessary being> does not mean <it is possibly necessary that there is a being>. — Leontiskos

The implications of the natural English propositions and the implications of the modal logic propositions diverge drastically, and it would be silly to prefer the modal logic to the natural English. That would be to let the tail wag the dog, as I argued (). Presumably Godel is making the same sort of error, equivocating on "possibility."

a. It is possibly necessary that there exists some X such that X created the universe — Michael

No one thinks creation was necessary. It seems that you have gotten your theology from Richard Dawkins.

- It seems that @Banno understands better than you what the word "God" means.

Now, what does "God possibly exists" mean? In modal logic we would say ◊∃xG(x) which translates to "it is possible that there exists an X such that X is God."

Using the definition above, this means:

It is possible that there exists an X such that X necessarily exists, is all powerful, is all knowing, etc.

But what does this mean? In modal logic we would say ◊□∃x(P(x) ∧ K(x) ∧ ...) which translates to "it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X is all powerful, is all knowing, etc."

Notice how "it is possible that there exists an X such that X necessarily exists ..." becomes "it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X ...".

...

All we are left with is the claim that it is possibly necessary that there exists an X such that X is all powerful, is all knowing, etc. This is a claim that needs to be justified; it isn't true by definition. — Michael

Then the modal logic fails to translate, because <it is possible that there exists a necessary being> does not mean <it is possibly necessary that there is a being>. The former is an epistemic claim, and in my opinion the ◊ operator of modal logic does not capture this (others might argue that it is not epistemic, but I would still say that it is not represented by ◊). Logical possibility and epistemic possibility do not seem to me to be the same thing. When most people say, "It is possible that there exists a necessary being," what they mean is that there may exist a necessary being that they do not have knowledge of, for the necessity of some being does not guarantee knowledge of it (i.e. necessity does not preclude epistemic possibility).

Necessity opposes possibility on any given plane (logical, epistemic, theoretical, actual...). But epistemic possibility does not oppose logical necessity, or actual necessity, etc. Thus, supposing God exists, He is actually necessary (i.e. he is a necessary being), but it does not follow that he is epistemically necessary (i.e. that everyone knows He exists and is a necessary being). Thus someone who does not know that God exists is perfectly coherent in saying, "It is possible that God exists."

's point is well put but I would phrase it somewhat differently. Suppose there were a modal argument that proved God's existence. What would the hardened atheist say? "Why put so much faith in modal logic?" This is not wrong. Modal logic is derivative on natural language, and therefore to assent to an argument in modal logic that cannot be persuasively translated into natural language is to let the tail wag the dog. What I find is that most who dabble in modal logic really have no precise idea what the operators are supposed to mean ('◊' and '□'), and as soon as they try to nail them down other logicians will disagree. Is the nuance and flexibility of natural language a bug, or is it a feature?

So the English language claim that "God is defined as necessarily existing" is a deception. — Michael

You are letting the tail wag the dog. The problem isn't the English, it's the modal logic. Everyone who speaks English knows that things cannot be defined into existence. @Banno both understands the definition of God as necessarily existing and nevertheless denies his existence, and this does not make Banno incoherent.

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Here is Aquinas:

Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 53:2). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (I:3:4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. — Aquinas, ST I.2.1 - Is the proposition that God exists self-evident? (NB: objection 1 and its reply omitted)

Note in particular, "it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally."

However, I do think this has to be weighed against other factors like the surge in suicides and "deaths of despair," as well as plummeting self-reported well being. Then there is declining membership in pretty much all sorts of social institutions, marriage, etc. Hell, even the age old past time of having sex or being in romantic relationships is plummeting, especially for the young. And then you have the political climate, which at least here in the US is arguably as bad as it has been since the Depression, even if it hasn't been particularly violent (yet...). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. Political nominees in the last 8 years would also be worth noting.

As to music, this is sort of comical. I don't think it's possible to get any more sexually explicit than 2 Live Crew's hits like "Pop that Pussy," or something like Notorious BIG's "Unbelievable." White Zombie's 1995 hit single "More Human Than a Human," literally opens with a clip from a porno, and Nine Inch Nails 1994 hit "Closer" was all over the radio when I was growing up. At the very least, MTV's "The Jersey Shore," maxed us out on hedonistic degeneracy many years ago, lol. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think these assessments of changes from 1995 to 2024 are really on point. Presumably the OP is thinking far beyond a 30-year period.

But I think the thread has mostly been a distraction. The OP is about Aristotle and the claim that his moral ideas are better than those that prevail in our own time.

Anybody who doesn't know what Bob means by moral decay is simply playing dumb. — Lionino

I agree.

Good post, I agree in large part. :up:

"Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency” – (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch.6, p. 35) — Bob Ross

People tend, nowadays, to think that happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains; but this couldn’t be further from the truth: living a well-regulated life—i.e., a morally virtuous life—is going to give one a deep and persistent sense of happiness. — Bob Ross

I think Aristotle's mean is very important. People think happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains, but they also fail to observe the mean in explicitly moral thinking. For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether" (Joshs takes the culturally popular route of saying that everyone is always doing their very best, and therefore it is illogical to blame anyone for anything).

For Aristotle it is never that simple. We can't just run to the extreme and call it a day. Things like blame and anger will involve a mean, and because of this there will be appropriate and inappropriate forms of blame and anger. The key is learning to blame and become angry when we ought to blame and become angry, and learning not to blame and become angry when we ought not blame and become angry.

The is-ought gap objection would go something like this: “it seems as though that one should fulfill their nature does not follow immediately from the fact that one needs to fulfill their nature to achieve happiness; and so it seems as though Aristotle is just appealing to ‘obviousness’ to justify what is good being a thing fulfilling its nature”. — Bob Ross

More simply, the objection asks why one ought to want to be happy. For Aristotle this is sophistry. Humans do want to be happy, just as fish do want to be in the water. It's just the way we are. "We don't necessarily want to be happy," is nothing more than a debater's argument.

What's nonsense is having barely read the SCOTUS opinion is you having such strong opinions about it. The decision is fine and fully in line with what I would expect coming from a Dutch legal background. Tobias maybe you want to have a look as well but I find the media reporting on this ridiculous and dissenting opinion confused. — Benkei

I agree, but some have argued that Barrett has the better argument in her concurrence. See, for example, Jonathan Adler's piece over at The Volokh Conspiracy.

Are you saying that Susie might not be consciously aware that she is not doing her best? — Joshs

Yes, of course. Do you have a real argument against this or are you just going to appeal to the weird emotional stories you tell? Your theory is literally premised on fictional anecdotes you made up in your head.

The irony is that these stories are dripping with blame and reproach, attempting to guilt-trip me into buying into your irrational system. "How dare you tell poor little Susie that she wasn't doing her best! You monster!" I do think that guilt-tripping on the basis of fictional shame-porn is a problem. :roll: I would imagine you could do better, especially given the fact that your strange accusation-based strawman followed my distinction between an assessment and an accusation ("The person in question need not even be told").

I thought the morally responsible agent must be acting from free will? — Joshs

Perhaps you should try reading Aristotle on volition. I drove into town yesterday. Was I doing my best when I was driving? Of course not. Was I attempting to not-do my best? Of course not. Nor was I self-consciously aware that I was not doing my best. If I can drive well enough without doing my best then I will do that, because it requires enormously less effort. The habits that I have created around driving have to do with a balance between effort and conservation of energy, and that balance is not met by constantly expending the maximal amount of effort possible at each moment driving.

When someone regrets something and says, "I shouldn't have done that," they are very often acknowledging that they were not doing their best. Indeed, it is hard to see how we could regret any decision at all if we are constantly doing our best. Those who think that they are at fault for everything and those who think they are at fault for nothing both have deep psychological issues. The world you are proposing is one full of narcissists who believe they are not at fault for anything and are beyond criticism.

But my position is a priori — Joshs

Of course it is, and it is highly irrational to have an a priori belief that everyone is constantly doing their best at each moment of their life. It's as if you don't even understand what the clause, "doing their best," means. Or you don't understand that effort is not always maximal.

1b) You agreed with the point of this example (or so you said), that someone's positive project, even if it leads to their welfare, cannot be an excuse to cause harm to another. — schopenhauer1

The argument you have been making has two parts: 1) If I am not allowed to do something then I am not allowed to do it even if it would be helpful or useful to me, 2) I am not allowed to cause suffering. Clearly you are arguing for antinatalism.

What I have said from the very start is that the problem with your argument is (2). (1) is trivial, but you keep arguing it even though no one has opposed you.

3) You then said that "one doesn't have a right to no suffering". — schopenhauer1

No I did not. The accurate quote is, "we have no negative right not to be caused suffering*" (). Strawmen aside, I was saying that we have no negative right not to be caused suffering [by other people]. Obviously we also have no right not to be caused suffering by nature.

3b) You seemed to agree, but then shifted the focus to the non-identity problem — schopenhauer1

No I did not, and in fact I already told you that I did not. You are persisting in an error that has already been clarified.

3c) You disagreed and said it's because "If they don't exist they have no rights". — schopenhauer1

You failed to read what I wrote. Go back and try reading it again.

If we continue this we should move it into the antinatalism thread.

OOOHH so instead of the argument at hand, it's moving the target to a different one (non-identity). Lame. — schopenhauer1

I never said that the reason the preexistent person has no such right is because they do not exist, although that is also a perfectly good objection. There is a cornucopia of problems with antinatalism. A piñata with candy for everyone who takes a whack. :wink:

...I've just realized why you utilize the strange term "negative ethics." It's ultimately because you want to have duties which are not correlated to any rights. Rights-based ethics is very difficult for antinatalism.

First off, you didn't address my example. I take this that you don't have a good response? — schopenhauer1

It's not a point of disagreement. I already said that, "I am among those who hold that a good end does not justify an evil means." If you have a right to life and I need an organ transplant then I cannot kill you in order to obtain an organ, because the end does not justify the means. The real question has to do with what our negative rights are.

I don't have the right to CAUSE you to suffer because I want something out of it... — schopenhauer1

No one thinks you have that right. The question is whether your victim has a right that prevents you. You are incorrectly multiplying rights.

Thus, "I want this to happen, therefore I get to make you suffer" is the more-or-less what is being discussed. You subtly changed it from "no right to not be caused suffering" in the impersonal. — schopenhauer1

The antinatalist seems to think that the right of a preexistent person is being infringed when they are conceived. The right that is said to be infringed is the right to not be brought into a world which contains suffering (absent consent). My point is that the preexistent person has no such right, and therefore procreation does not infringe this right.

Here is an extreme microcosm of what I mean about YOUR projects versus MY rights... — schopenhauer1

I understand, and again, my point is that the rights you are invoking do not exist. For example, we have no right to not be caused suffering. Again, the crux of the question is what counts as a negative right.

- Thanks, I plan to get to this, but I also want to <link> to my last post in our discussion of Gerson.

When she practices for her lesson, is she doing her best? — Joshs

On my account the answer to that question is contingent, and rides on how she has actually practiced. Hence my point about contingent vs. necessary truths.

You could just poll piano teachers or school teachers. 100% of them will tell you that it is false that each child is doing their best at each moment.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but wouldn’t you argue that ‘not doing one’s best’ generally requires that the person who is the target of such an accusation be aware of the fact that they are not doing their best, that they deliberately desired and chose to underperform relative to what they knew they were capable of? — Joshs

No. That someone has not done their best only means that they have not done their best, not that they must have known it. Note too that an assessment that someone is not doing their best need not be an accusation. The person in question need not even be told. If you stop using words like "accusation" you will draw some of the emotion out of this debate, and we might actually come to a considered answer.

Bringing this back to little Susie, dont we need to surmise that she simply didn’t feel like putting all her effort into practicing? — Joshs

Someone who is not doing their best is by definition not putting all of their effort into something. The reason we seldom do our best is because it is very difficult to put all of our effort into something.

It wouldn’t be a question of aiming a radar gun at her speed of playing, since this wouldn’t tell us anything about her performance relative to her potential unless we compared the results over time and discovered that she was moving in the wrong direction. — Joshs

Here is what I have already said to that:

By my knowledge of their capacity as a cause. Ergo: I am best situated to praise or blame myself given my uniquely informed knowledge about myself, and I blame myself precisely when I fail in relation to my capacity and my ability. — Leontiskos

As you can see, I’ve moved the terrain of the issue of ‘doing one’s best’ away from that of a variability in performance given an unchanging ground of positive motivation (intrinsic reinforcement) to push the limits of one’s ability and understanding, and toward connecting variation in performance directly to shifts in intent and motivation. Now things become complicated. Let’s say the teacher calls Susie lazy. What does laziness mean? Does it mean that Susie has decided not to push her creative potential to its limit, and that my claim that such a directedness toward expansive knowing is not intrinsically motivating? Or does it mean that Susie continues to actively expand her curiosity and inventiveness, but not in the direction her teacher wants her to direct it? There are all kinds of reasons we hold back in performance situations. We may be entering a crisis of commitment, where we discover that our time is better spent elsewhere. Perhaps our daydreaming which gets in the way of a current task lead us to our true calling. The question , then, is whether laziness reflects a failure on the part of the accused or a failure on the part of the accuser to recognize that the lazy person is in fact doing their best, but not in a way that conforms to the accuser’s expectations. Perhaps your perception that the other is not doing their best indicates an inability to see past the normative expectations through which you judge their motives. You see what they’re not doing, but not what they are doing. — Joshs

You're making this a great deal more difficult than it is. Susie has had 100 piano lessons with Mrs. Scott. Has Susie tried her absolute best at each and every piano lesson? Of course not, and Mrs. Scott will attest to this. We can give explanations of why Susie did not do her best, and we could even use a great deal of mental gymnastics to claim that every single aspect of Susie's playing which seems to indicate she is not doing her best is merely a matter of circumstances outside of her control. But why fool ourselves in such a way? We all know that we and others do not constantly put 100% of our effort into things. I think this is beyond obvious.

The idea that there are no lazy pupils is simply false. There may be bad teachers, and some teachers may falsely claim that their pupil is lazy, but it remains the case that there are also lazy pupils. It should also be noted that our actions compound, and because of this our responsibility extends into the future. We are not only responsible for our acts; we are also responsible for our habits. When we perform a bad act it may have more to do with a habit than with our current level of effort, but it remains an open question whether we are responsible for the bad habit that produced the bad act.

The central question still looms: is your position a priori or a posteriori? Is the proposition you assert necessary or contingent?

Seems to me that the default is "requires consent" and so we have to justify why it is we are ignoring consent in some circumstance. — Moliere

In adult surgeries, sure, but apart from that not really. There are lots of things that require consent and lots of things that don't. For example, I honk my horn at someone on the road without getting their consent.

No one when it comes to hard in fast rules. I clarified the kinds of persons I'd point to in a circumstance parenthetically, but I value autonomy in that process of selecting who the professional is. — Moliere

But then you aren't talking about ceding professionals coercive tools at all, which is what we were discussing.

"Against their will" would have to incur a pretty strong justification for me, given my respect for autonomy. But serial killing is pretty extreme. We've been dealing in some extreme examples where the question is when to use coercion. — Moliere

Okay, but you still require a principle which explains why things change in the extreme case. Many of us have brought up the extreme case precisely because it disproves the OP. The extreme case disproves the claim that one can never transgress another's will.

I'm admitting in this question that I don't see the appeal of punishment, yes.

What's the appeal? — Moliere

What do you think punishment is? That's where I would say we need to start if you think it makes sense to talk about consensual punishment.

Hrrmm, I think it's just a disagreement about what is entailed by socialization -- is it a process of moral admonition, or a process of learning to think for yourself, or a process of collective deliberation, or a process — Moliere

As far as I can see each one of those processes requires the sort of admonition and criticism that is being opposed in this thread, which leads me back to the original point that socialization involves moral admonition, criticism, etc.

I don't see legislators or policemen as moral tools. — Moliere

What I said is that the professionals who wield moral tools are more likely legislators and policemen than doctors.

But hierarchy and coercion are generally things I don't think of as ethical, but rather expedient: they are political, not moral tools. They are useful to this or that end, but that doesn't mean they're good, per se. — Moliere

The question is whether they are bad per se; whether they are ethically permissible. To say that they are expedient doesn't answer that question.

The serial killer might be acting rightly to his intrinsic nature. But that's also a pretty extreme case for thinking ethically -- it's not on my radar as a thing I have to consider very often. I tend to believe that ethical thinking occurs between persons who respect one another, at least, so these are just difficult circumstances rather than cases against some approach. — Moliere

The idea that morality has to do with acting according to one's intrinsic nature is diametrically opposed to the idea that "ethical thinking occurs between persons who respect one another." This is what the serial killer example shows.

Philosophically I don't think there is such a thing, really, as an intrinsic nature. For myself I'm coming at it more from the existential side. The "intrinsic nature" is created along the way, and changed with circumstances. — Moliere

Okay.

...I'm somewhat overloaded so I will probably need to start drawing myself out of some of these conversations. I suppose the main idea here is that extreme individualism which prizes autonomy and consent ends up being opposed to social living. The members of a society necessarily bump into one another and in doing so change one another's trajectory. A position which rejects this fact of life is simply unrealistic. It doesn't matter whether that position is premised on morality, or autonomy, or consent, or "Taoism," etc. A morality is an idea about how that bumping ought to operate. Ideas which claim that the bumping should not exist are unrealistic and pointless, and in fact they are not moralities. Like antinatalism, such an idea is more a metaphysical critique of reality than a morality.

(NB: The "bumping" necessarily involves the non-consensual ways that we effect one another. An example of an unrealistic idea would be one which tries to make every bump consensual. In reality even defining a 'bump' is probably impossible given the complexity of human and social agency.)

Nobody asked me, but I hate the Golden Rule. — Joshs

No worries -- I'm interested in hearing a proper go at refutations of the golden rule. — Moliere

The Golden Rule might deserve a thread of its own.

But that is a very uncharitable understanding, don't you think? — schopenhauer1

I don't, and I think it's simply true.

It's not that we have 'no negative right not to be criticized'. That's not necessarily part of the negative ethics. That is simply interaction. Rather, if I said to you, "Please leave me alone", and you stood there yelling in my face, chasing me down, harassing me, then that might qualify for a negative right not to be harassed. But simply criticizing someone doesn't meet that threshold. — schopenhauer1

Okay, then we agree on this.

What qualifies as "right not to be... (fill in the blank)" can be up for interpretation. The point is, whatever negative ethic there is, you cannot use your understanding of what is a positive "right" to violate it. WHAT COUNTS as a negative ethic, is up for interpretation though. — schopenhauer1

I am among those who hold that a good end does not justify an evil means, but my point is that what counts as a negative ethic (right) is enormously important. That is where the crux of the question lies.

It seems to me like you are doing that throughout this comment You insinuate... — Paine

But the claim has to do with, "assumptions regarding the truth of such things as Forms and Recollection." I do not make any assumptions at all about Forms and Recollection in that quote you provide, and Fooloso's whole paragraph is centered around Forms and Recollection. What is he talking about?

This is actually a good example of what I am talking about. Fooloso is protecting against "assumptions regarding the truth of such things as Forms and Recollection," and there need be no evidence of such assumptions in order for him to mount a defense against such an interpretation. This is an example of "protesting too much," albeit not in a strictly Christian register. If I am to judge from his posts on the forum since I have arrived, he reads Plato primarily against a foil of his own construction; hence the "contrarian polemicism."

You insinuate Foolsoso4 resembles a gnostic sophist here... — Paine

I do think that.

And yet you impose your own assumptions regarding the truth of such things as Forms and Recollection. Contrary to his identification of Forms as hypothetical and Recollection as problematic, you accuse me of sophistic interpretation when I pay attention to and point out what is actually said. — Fooloso4

Where have I done that?

My approach is to pay careful attention to both the arguments and actions in the dialogues. You dismiss this as convoluted and sophistic. Rather than hold out these purported theories and doctrines against the text itself, you hold to them in place of the text. As if the details of the text itself are superfluous and can be ignored. — Fooloso4

Where have I done that?

You seem to be capable of spinning anything to make it say whatever you like, and I'm sure this includes my own posts. It should not surprise when a witch hunter finds a witch.

The problem is that the "negative ethics" being espoused are not true ethics at all (and of course this all relates obliquely to your antinatalism). We have no negative right to not be criticized; we have no negative right to not receive moral admonition; we have no negative right not to be imprisoned and coerced when we commit serial murder; we have no negative right not to be caused suffering*, etc. This is "negative ethics" run amok, and it violates the sort of minimalism that has classically characterized negative rights.

* At least in the way that the antinatalist thinks of the causing of suffering, which includes everything from inconvenience to bringing about conditions which may lead to suffering.

Mead of course leant into the “anthropological theory of cognition” angle with his symbolic interactionism. — apokrisis

Thanks for the background. :up:

By the end of the dialogue each moves up one spot on the hierarchy. Thus the imparting of knowledge of that cannot be spoken of in mere words, but which must be lived, is imaged in a story where the fruits of knowledge show up in the deeds of those involved. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Michael Sugrue gives the same interpretation. I assume your quotes are coming from something written by D. C. Schindler?

The point of my post was to counter the charge against Strauss that he was an oracular figure who mystified what was there for all to see. Strauss established his point of view in the context of Schleiermacher and Klein. He taught his classes with the spirit of that lineage clearly on display. Burnyeat either knew of that or he did not. In either case, awareness of that lineage rebuts Burnyeat's argument. — Paine

Fair enough, and perhaps you are right that Burnyeat was not sufficiently aware of this lineage.

Now, there are writers who oppose that lineage for a variety of reasons. Their opposition does not make them all saying the same thing. To make such an equation was the core of Apollodorus' method of argument.

He was a venomous fountain of ad hominem attacks and contempt. Everybody had to be speaking from a particular camp or school. His opponents were always tools in the hands of their masters. It deeply saddens me that such a spirit has returned to visit condemnation amongst us. — Paine

That's unfortunate. I wasn't around at the time. Fooloso has continually reminded me of Burnyeat's article, but I could not remember the name of the article and so simply searched, "Burnyeat sphinx" on the forum, and found Apollodorus' post (which was in fact a response to Fooloso). I am thinking of Burnyeat more than Apollodorus, but I wanted to reference that exchange as an antecedent of the point I was making. I don't find it coincidental that after Timothy pointed up the incongruence of Fooloso's approach, others started coming out of the woodwork, testifying to the same impression.

Burnyeat's article is 15 pages long and I don't want to fall into a detailed dispute of the article, especially given the fact that it is not publicly available. I think the discussion regarding Gerson's thesis would be more fruitful, but there is plenty of overlap between the two, and it is interesting that Burnyeat's criticism of Strauss in many ways parallels your own criticism of Gerson.

For what it's worth, the editors included a postscript to Burnyeat's article:

This review was met with a storm of rebuttals from the leading Straussians of the day, plus a letter of support from Gregory Vlastos: NYRB 10 October 1985; 24 October 1985; 24 April 1986. The title ‘Sphinx without a secret’ derives from a short story by Oscar Wilde. — Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Volume 2

I tend to agree with this. Fooloso4 has a very hardened way of looking at Plato. It appears like an opinion of Plato as useless. But to make that argument, there is a tendency to portray Plato as misleading. There's a very big difference between these two. Useless is simply non-productive, having no effect, and that is basically to say that there is no substance there at all. To say that Plato is misleading, is to acknowledge philosophical substance, and claim that it is wrong, pointing us in the wrong direction. Fooloso4 tends to argue both about Plato, without distinguishing one from the other, and without revealing what is truly believed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite right, and I think there are also false dichotomies at play, such as the idea that either Plato espoused concrete doctrines, or else he held to no positions whatsoever. Such false dichotomies push and pull the conversations and interpretations in unnatural ways. I would never want to impose such wooden assumptions on a subtle thinker like Plato. And if the false dichotomies are only being used as a rhetorical tool, then I would say that the rhetoric and agendas need to be tamped down.

- Good post.

It would seem that since we're on the 8th page of this thread arguing back and forth, criticizing as we do, we actually think that critical feedback is a useful means to promote free will, which in turn protects our autonomy, which then defeats the suggestion we shouldn't be critical. Those sorts of things are likely to happen when we admit that the highest good isn't not being critical, but that not being critical is just a rule of thumb that often (but not always) works to promote those higher order goods. — Hanover

Yes, I agree.

To state that an attack on a person's intellectual or moral decision detonates his individuality is a questionable claim, as it would seem that special element within the person is indestructible given the proper spirit. If that's the case, then it would follow we ought instill virtue into individuals so as to not make their spirit subject to dissolution at the simplest of criticisms. — Hanover

Right. I would say that the criticizing of someone's decision or action is an important part of human and social life. The ability to make decisions uncoerced is important, but the opportunity to see the shortsightedness of one's decisions and to grow into someone who can receive criticism and then make better decisions is also important. I don't think we can just take the first and leave the second.

And I do agree that this comes down to virtue more than anything else, in which case it must be asked how we are to instill virtues so that people don't find autonomy absolutism so alluring. Bad ideas need to be addressed when they take root in a culture. In my estimation the vice of pusillanimity is at the heart of many of these autonomy-based ideas. There seems to be a lack of courage to face challenge or criticism. There may also be an intellectual component regarding the pure ideality of autonomy, but I think the vice is the bigger player. Another name that this sort of thing goes under is "moral subjectivism," where everyone's moral system is supposedly self-enclosed.

That is to say, sometimes it is important to hear that one's thoughts and actions are stupid when they in fact are. Otherwise, you are just allowed to be born stupid, to live stupid, and then to die stupid. How that can be described as a life respected and cultivated is stupid of the highest order. — Hanover

Yes, as I said:

Those who do wrong are very often ignorant of their wrongdoing, whether culpably or not. It has always been considered a mercy to make them aware of it - to help them avoid what will only become a bigger problem for them and for others. — Leontiskos

For example, if such a grounding of intentionality reduces to mechanism, i.e. something like causal closure (is it supposed to?), then I would say such a theory has dire epistemic and explanatory issues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is right. @apokrisis seems to now be using "semiotics" to refer to an anthropological theory of cognition.

Natural selection would never ensure that phenomenal experiences don't drift arbitrarily far from whatever the world is actually like because the contents of awareness have absolutely no bearing on reproduction if they don't affect behavior. It's self refuting. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. From what I understand semiotics began as the study of intentional sign use (among humans), and then eventually incorporated a study of the way that sub-human organisms utilize signs in a non-intentional manner. Given what @apokrisis says, what may now be happening is that humans are being appraised as organisms that utilize signs in a non-intentional manner, and one use of the word "semiotics" apparently refers to this anthropological theory of cognition.

Of course humans do utilize signs in non-intentional ways, but when someone like apokrisis explicates an anthropological theory to explain the manner in which humans do this—which in this case seems to be premised on some combination of evolution and entropy—he is using intentional signs to explicate his theory, and is therefore back to the original sense of semiotics. As you say, this is self-refuting. It is self-refuting in the same way that an explanation of reasoning via reasoning would be self-refuting. In this case it is an explanation of human signs via human signs, or else an explanation of human being (including sign-use) via human signs. Such can never achieve a true explanation. In these cases the explanandum always outruns the explanans. Apokrisis' explanation of human sign use cannot, after all, manage to explain the sign-use he is involved in in this thread.

I thought you were here to discuss pragmatism in some way. — apokrisis

Peircian pragmatism or some other? Most of the pragmatism that occurs on these forums is not Peircian, and I would assume the OP is referencing the forms that are common on these forums.

Unfortunately I am not going to be able to respond to all of that. I found some of it accurate and some of it inaccurate, but these psychological theories of yours are icing on the cake, and we must first build the cake:

If everyone is doing the best they can at each moment of their life then no one is responsible for anything, and therefore it is entirely backwards to say that humans are responsible because they are always doing the best they can. — Leontiskos

If we are always doing the best we can, this means no one is responsible for immorality. — Joshs

I want you to think about why it is that someone who is doing their best is not responsible for immorality and for bad effects that might result. A central question here is whether "everyone is doing their best" is supposed to be a contingent and synthetic truth, or a necessary and analytic truth. On my lights it only makes sense as a contingent truth, because the question of whether someone is "doing their best" relies on an investigation into how they are doing what they are doing. In everyday language when someone says, "Johnny is doing his best out there," the presupposition is that it is possible that Johnny might not be doing his best. In doing his best he is doing something that he need not be doing.

On this account, "Johnny is doing his best," is a bit like, "The Corvette is going 100 mph." The claim about the Corvette is not a necessary truth, and therefore in order to verify its truth condition we must examine the speed of the car via the speedometer or a radar gun or something of the sort. Only once our examination is complete are we justified in confirming or denying the claim about the Corvette.

It seems to me that what you have done is to borrow from negative freedom, the bad things that happen despite our best intent, and attach it to intention itself ( I WANTED to be callous, insensitive, cruel, immoral). — Joshs

Nah, this is very far from Aristotle's or Aquinas' view. I'm not sure where your ideas here are coming from. For Aquinas we always aim at what we perceive to be good, and therefore no one ever aims at immorality qua immorality.

Also, for Aristotle and Aquinas what we all ultimately aim for is happiness, and in my opinion many of the errors of your post consist in reducing that happiness aim to something smaller, such as, "deepening the intimacy of our anticipatory understandings within the social groups that matter to us." Someone can seek happiness in social intimacy, and as social animals that will contribute to our happiness, but it is a mistake to confuse social intimacy with happiness or our aim.