- Thanks for your posts, they are very interesting.

On the other hand, here is an proposition that states any cognition or series of cognitions shared by all members of a set capable of them, are for that reason, objective cognitions. I’m not so sure about that myself, but, it’s out there. Some folks rejecting that form of objectivity favor a thing called “intersubjectivity”, which just looks like subject/object version of Frankenstein’s ogre. — Mww

I suppose I wouldn't want to invoke the objective claim on those grounds, although it would be fair to ask what alternative grounds there are. I am thinking more of the idea that if all members of a set claim—implicitly or explicitly—to have knowledge of some objective reality, then this is a strong indication that such a reality is objective and is accessible to members of that set. The strength of the indication would weaken as the percentage of the population which makes the claim diminishes.

Are you a Kantian, then?

What categorical error were you thinking as possible? — Mww

Well if we only argue about things that we believe to be objective, then apparently we think morality is objective. Or else everyone who argues about morality is making a category error in holding that morality is something worth arguing about (and hence based on something objective).

The easiest case for morality as something we argue about would seem to be your example of the "ethical"—societal laws that objectively exist and are argued about.

Sounds good Jamal, that all makes sense. Given that the article is available via Wayback Machine (and perhaps other internet archives) it might be nice to have the old link visible somewhere. Here is the link to the most recent archive on Wayback Machine: The Argument for Indirect Realism.

The missing premise is that belief names a substance, in the sense indicated here, which I suppose means something like "part of the natural world," and thus its essence can be sought by means of natural science, where we might expect theories ("only") to approximate that essence.

But that may be false. "Belief" is a category from folk psychology, which means it is just as likely to turn out to be defined only as well as "hammer" or "chair" or "government." You may disagree, and consider "belief" to name a natural kind, but you ought to recognize that in doing so you are relying on, if not advancing, very strong claims about psychology. Is that what you want to do? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you are right to point out that there is enthymeme at work, but I would express it a bit differently. (I would say that belief is not an artifact, but it is also not a substance. It is an accident. Let that pass for now.)

Yes, I would want to say that 'belief' is a natural kind, found among humans and accessible to natural science. Banno gave a <quote from John Searle>. Specifically, my claim has been that the final sentence of that quote commits Searle to the view that the notion of belief is both determinate and normative, and to the view that there exists a real definition of belief that the "mistaken view" has gotten wrong.

(This twofold point is getting at the same thing, but I broke it up at some point to try to help the argument along.)

Also: every thread turns into the same thread eventually, about the nature and status of concepts in general, as this one has. — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, how soon you forget about the threads which end in us calling one another "Hitler"! :razz:

(In fact when I began pressing Banno on his claim, found elsewhere, that definitions do not exist, I admitted that my line was tangential.)

The scissors example, the understanding of which pair of scissors is the better, is determined by seeing which one cuts more quickly, straightly and cleanly; I think this is all empirically observable and has nothing to with essences, although we can think about it in those terms on reflection. — Janus

I agree, and I would say that the essence of a scissors includes sharpness. Banno apparently disagrees, and thinks the essence of a scissors is neither sharp nor dull. Of course we are talking about artifacts, but we can still think of them as having quasi-essences.

So the best scissors cuts most quickly, straightly, and cleanly, and we will compare any two scissors according to this ideal. That's basically what a (quasi-) definition is: that conceptual ideal that you have in your mind when you compare or assess scissors. Or if we want to be precise we could call it a nominal definition. Really it doesn't matter what we call it. It's the thing that matters. If someone is superstitious about the words 'essence' or 'definition', we can go with something else. It seems to me that to deny the existence of such things is mistaken and also very odd.

It would be nice if there were a thread where random tangents could be taken...

I think a dog associates its bowl with the act of eating, and conditioning occurs, but it does not use the bowl as a tool (like a screwdriver). Thus the mode of recognition would seem to be quite different.

Getting back towards the topic, if someone says, "A is a better X than B," then they must have at least some vague notion of what the best X looks like. If they say, "The Phillips is a better screwdriver than a flathead for this screw," then they must understand the shape of the screw as well as the proper screwdriver needed to drive it, and that the Phillips is closer to the proper choice than the flathead. Or perhaps the Phillips simply is the proper or best conceivable tool for the job. Either way, they have a definition of "the right screwdriver for the job."

The dog doesn't have that definition, because they do not use things as means to ends in that way.

The post at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/834084 wasn't directed specifically at you. I was simply making a general observation; seems it hit a nerve. — Banno

You were making a general observation? About truth-preservation? When I was the only one who had brought up or defended the idea of truth-preservation in the entire thread? :brow:

And again, (third time?) yes, I agree. — Banno

Realizing that the analogy might not suffice, I amended that sentence to make the idea clearer, but I think we are agreed that we should be done in this thread, no? We're not going anywhere.

How broadly are you defining definition? — wonderer1

Mmm, Banno has shifted this discussion quite far from its origin, which was not focused on practical knowledge or artifacts. My claim has been <If you want to say that X is a better understanding of belief than Y, then there must be some real definition of belief that X better approximates>. Banno's position seems to be <X is a better understanding of belief than Y, and there is no real definition of belief that X better approximates>.

His justification has to do with scissors and screwdrivers. Apparently the idea is that if one does not need an ideal conception of scissors or screwdrivers, then they do not need an ideal conception of belief (in order to make the claim that X is a better understanding of belief than Y).

And what could "know what it is..." mean, apart from being able to pick the driver from the chisel, the flat from the Phillips? Knowing what screwdriver is, is exactly being able to make use of it, and not understanding what it's essence is.

And what's an "internalised definition"? One that is not explicit? One that cannot be made explicit? Could such a thing count as a definition? — Banno

Practical knowledge bears on the essence of a thing, yes. In the case of practical knowledge one does not need to be able to communicate their knowledge to others in order to possess it. A mechanic who can fix anything in the world but can't explain the mechanics of mechanic-ing to another person still knows the essence of a screwdriver. Whether he knows the definition of a screwdriver is perhaps arguable, but I would say that he does.

Incidentally, this bears on your thread about definitions. Definitions are about things, not words, and so circularity of words (description) does not undermine the notion of definitions. When we teach children by pointing, "dog," "grandpa," we are teaching them how to name things and take the first step towards definitions. The words are never ultimately about words. They are about things. The one who understands the thing possesses the definition, not the one who possesses mere words. ...Of course words are rarely "mere," for they themselves tell us about things.

---



I rather doubt that dogs make choices with regard to their food bowl in the way that we make choices between screwdrivers. I see this as association vs. use.

The contention I criticises was that logic consists in the preservation of truth. — Banno

For a third time now, that "contention" is a figment of your imagination. Do you think that when I spoke about the "central criterion" as validity in our current day, I was saying that logic "consists" in validity? Or that logic is "defined only in terms of preserving truth"?

Russell, on the other hand, asserts that "Logics are theories of validity..." (my emphasis). If there is anyone who thinks logic consists in validity, it is Russell, at least if we can take this general statement from her SEP article to reflect her views.

I pointed out that parts of logic do not involve truth. For example the sequent calculus consists in a bunch of rules setting out what you can write down next - or previously. Truth doesn't enter until the tack, and even then it's the false that is introduced... — Banno

But your argument here is no good. There are rules in logic which must be attended to, but from this it does not follow that this part of logic is unrelated to truth or validity (I happen to think that logic is more consistently related to truth than validity, but your argument fails on both scores). The rules are themselves related to truth and validity.

To take an analogy, language is about meaning. Someone might say, "Ah! But when we utilize rote memorization to teach children to spell words we are not teaching them about meaning." True enough, but the whole reason we teach children to spell words is so that they can use the words in sentences and paragraphs to convey meaning. The spelling of a word is not unrelated to meaning, and the rules of a formal system are not unrelated to validity. To think otherwise would be to fundamentally misunderstand language and logic.

A valid argument is one that follows the rules. — Banno

According to what definition of validity? Russell prefers the Generalized Tarski Thesis to define validity, and this is altogether at odds with the definition you now offer.

I'm saying that there is a difference between a valid argument and a sound argument. — Banno

I think most anyone would agree with such an innocuous claim. Yet according to Russell logic is about validity, not soundness. Such is the received view, and I have not challenged it here.

No. You are not appealing to any such thing by choosing a Philips head. One does not need a clear definition of a Philips head screwdriver in order to use one to remove a screw. — Banno

In order to pick out a screwdriver you need to know what it is, and in order to know what it is you need to have an internalized definition of it. That's what a definition is. An understanding or concept of what something is. If you claim to know what something is then you have at least a nominal definition of it, and if you have a definition then you claim to know what it is.

What sort of strange misunderstandings are you laboring under? What do you imagine an Aristotelian (or an average person) means when they talk about the definition of some thing?

Continuing where I left of in my quote from <this post>:

The second objection, that definitions cannot express real essences, is mere trifling. The suggestion that the word "definition" be restricted to statements of meaning is purely stipulative: if the stipulation is accepted, as a convenient way of avoiding ambiguity, nothing need happen to Aristotle's theory beyond a change of name; and until one is proposed, we may either follow ordinary usage, which surely allows us to apply the word "definition" to statements of essence, or else avail ourselves of the scholastic distinction between 'real' and 'nominal' definition. The whole question is insignificant. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii-xiv

I’ve been thinking about “moral realism”. Is morality a real thing? Even if it isn’t, per se, it seems the case there is in all humans a condition by which certain behaviors are legislated, so if the behaviors are real in one sense of the term, wouldn’t that condition by which behaviors are caused be real is some sense? I dunno….it’s a fine line between granting the realness of behavior but denying the realness of behavior’s causality.

I think there must be as many moral facts as there are acts in accordance with subjective moral commands. But that is not sufficient reason to grant objective moral facts in general, to which one is morally obligated. While I am perfectly entitled to say my act is in fact a moral act, am I thereby entitled to say my act is derived from a moral fact, and if I am not so entitled, by what warrant is my act, in fact, moral? If I then fall back on moral command as necessary causality, am I then forced to deem a mere command of reason, a fact? — Mww

You should start a thread. :wink:

If there are subjective conditions by which behaviors are legislated, and these conditions come into conflict which results in argument, does it then follow that they are in some sense objective? Or are all such arguments based on a category error? Surely these anthropological facts must carry some sort of weight in considering the question.

To get things going on our articles web site I've published something I wrote some time ago about indirect realism.

[EDIT: broken link removed] — Jamal

I found this interesting, especially as a window to see how some contemporary philosophers approach Hume's work. (Note that the link is now down and perhaps the domain needs to be renewed.)

Arguments like this one, so colossally influential in philosophy and beyond, are also colossally mistaken. — Jamal

I am reminded of David Oderberg's quip:

‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’ would be almost too much for a Pyrrhonist to swallow. — David Oderberg, Hume, the Occult, and the Substance of the School

In a footnote he notes that David Stove gave this as an example of ‘the worst argument in the world’.

This reflects the somewhat common argument that if a reality is mediated then it must also be inaccessible or at least distorted. If our eyes mediate reality, then apparently we cannot see. But what, then, is the alternative to mediated realities?

The problem of erroneous perceptions was obvious to all philosophers, but very few took the route that Hume took, and none with such confidence and even hubris.

- That's enough for me. Take care.

If a valid inference must be truth-preserving then the notion of truth is built in that of valid inference. Q.E.D. — neomac

Again, "If something is meant to preserve another thing, then it is not building or creating that thing" ().

Let's apply your reasoning to mortuary. "A mortician is concerned with preserving bodies. Therefore a mortician builds/creates bodies. Q.E.D."

Well, I gave the example of scissors before, and you met it with some irrelevancies.

I made the point that what counts as "better" depends on what one is doing. Whether blunt scissors are better than sharp scissors depends on the task at hand, not on some ideal essence of scissor.

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

Well, do you think the scissors analogy maps to Searle's claim? Do you imagine that Searle might be caught saying something like, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by [the mistaken view that scissors ought to be dull rather than sharp]"?

If someone wants to make a bold and striking claim they can't immediately fall back into a kind of nominalism. To do so is, in effect, to say, "It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that X is Y. Also, it makes no difference whether philosophers and cognitive scientists believe X is Y. It's merely a matter of perspective."

If someone makes a substantial mistake then there must be some matter of the fact that they are mistaken about. To say that they have made a mistake and then to simultaneously hold that there is ultimately nothing to be mistaken about is to contradict oneself. Searle's claim is normative, not merely hypothetical.

I think you are the one misrepresenting Searle, here. Suppose you write Searle a letter asking, "Are there certain facts about what belief is, such that some construals of belief are more accurate than others?" I think he would write back, "Yes, of course there are real facts about what belief is and what belief is not. The people who are mixed up about these facts are more mistaken than those who are not mixed up about them."

I suppose someone might reply that implicit in what one is doing is an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task... seems a bit far fetched. — Banno

But when Aristotelians see people saying things like this, we can only wonder what sort of bizarre strawman is at play. When you look at a screw and decide to use a Phillips rather than a flathead screwdriver, you are inevitably appealing to "an ideal essence of the perfect tool for that task."

I don't need a clear definition of the perfect screwdriver to choose between a Philips and a flat. — Banno

You need a clear definition of a Phillips screwdriver and a clear definition of a flathead screwdriver if you are to choose between them. When you look at a screw and think, "A Phillips will be better than a flathead for this screw," you have already appealed to the ideal screwdriver for this job. This is all the argument requires.

"Built-in" is a figure of speech, we are talking semantics. So the point is that the notion of truth is semantically built in the idea of correct inference. This holds even if we occasionally fail to process the inference or if the inference is simply valid but not sound. — neomac

This just isn't right. It is not true that, "[T]he notion of 'truth' is built in the 'logic' rules themselves, in other words the meaning of 'truth' is determined by 'logic rules' too" ().

The notion of truth is not semantically built in the idea of correct inference. Truth is something beyond inference and beyond validity. Validity can be formally defined, but truth cannot be formally defined. Of course we can talk about "truth" qua some logical system, but this is technically an equivocation. This sort of "truth" is different from actual truth, and we do not hesitate to call it false in certain instances.

---

The next sentence is "Different logics disagree about which argument forms are valid". There is some considerable subtlety here. — Banno

But they do not disagree that logic is about validity, and that validity is about the preservation of truth. So what you say here is not to the point.

But we do judge one thing to be better than another without having in mind some ideal. — Banno

Such as...? Do you have any arguments or examples to give? You are remarkably tight-lipped for someone who is "nonplussed."

I've explained, a few times, I think, how it seems to me that you misinterpret this. — Banno

But your appendix doesn't affect my argument. You merely explained the manner in which the view is mistaken.

So taking your appendix:

I might append "...in that they find themselves searching for that relation as if it were a thing in the mind, or worse, in the brain". — Banno

The idea here is:

• P1: "Ceteris paribus, a construal of the belief-relation as a thing in the mind or brain is inferior to a construal of the belief-relation as a thing that is not in the mind or brain."

Now your ideal belief-relation here—whatever else we want to say about it—must not be a thing in the mind or brain. This characteristic is part of your own definition of the belief-relation, and it is a characteristic which must be in place in order for you to implicitly assert P1. If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the "inferior" of P1 falls to pieces.

And all of this seems so obtuse, given the topic at hand.

So I must admit to being somewhat nonplussed. — Banno

Well so am I. What I am saying seems the most obvious thing in the world. But at least I am providing arguments for my position, even though I think it is the most obvious thing in the world.

(As I said earlier, this tangent is closer to your thread about definitions, for I am focusing on the definition of belief that underlies your claims about belief.)

If logic is "rules for stringing symbols together," then these rules can either be arbitrary or non-arbitrary. If they are non-arbitrary, then logic must itself be connected to the non-arbitrary determination of these rules.

I see that Russell defines logic in terms of the preservation of truth, so that's an interesting start. "Logics are theories of validity: they tell us, for different arguments, whether or not that argument is of a valid form" (SEP). (She appeals to the Generalised Tarski Thesis to define validity.)

I'm guessing I might agree with much of what she thinks. But 'logical pluralism' feels a bit like 'situation ethics', in that it gets at something true but mixes up epistemological and metaphysical spheres. I clearly think formalized systems have significant limitations, so if "logical monism" is the view that there is some formalized system without limitations then I am not a logical monist. It's not hard to think that two different 'logics' "can be getting things right."

Well, that would mean that, say, an uninterpreted explication of propositional calculus does not count as part of logic. — Banno

I added to my last post, "Logicians can temporarily and usefully prescind from truth, but entire detachment is something different." There are more proximate and more remote relations of logic to truth, but something with a perfect non-relation to truth is not logic.

The point here is just that logic is bigger than the preservation of truth in an argument. — Banno

This is an ignoratio elenchus, as I already noted.

"have a certain logic to them..." — Banno

This is a metaphorical use of the term, similar to what I pointed out <here>. Logic depends on order, and thus ordered things are sometimes called "logical." But logic is more properly an art of ordering, not mere order. You are appealing to usage, but the etymology and the historical usage point very clearly to logic as an art of reasoning.

They say that one of the best ways to learn something is to teach it. A few weeks ago I looked at your thread which is intended to teach propositional calculus (link). It's no coincidence that in your third substantial post you were already into truth tables. But even in your first substantial post you said, "What we want to do is to examine the relations between these propositions, rather than their contents." It seems to me that it would have been more apt to say that we want to examine the relations that obtain between these propositions based on their content. Relations hold or fail to hold in light of the content of the relata, and this has everything to do with truth.

Now a pedagogue might choose to introduce the rules of logic before introducing the purpose of logic, much like you could teach a child to kick a ball before introducing them to the game of soccer. Of course I am not convinced that this is sound pedagogy.

Logic has advanced somewhat since the middle ages. — Banno

Do you have any actual acquaintance with the logic of the middle ages?

Well, I never said that logic can only be defined in terms of preserving truth. But that someone makes up a formal system that has nothing to do with truth and calls it 'logic' is not much of a counterargument. Logicians can temporarily and usefully prescind from truth, but entire detachment is something different.

Best answer might be that it is rules of grammar; rules for stringing symbols together. — Banno

But logic is not merely rules for stringing symbols together. If I make rules for stringing symbols together I have not necessarily done anything related to logic.

Formalists need to take a step back and consider why the formal systems were constructed in the first place.

On the other side if your claim is supposed to question my claim that “the notion of ‘truth’ is built in the ‘logic’ rules themselves”, then you are failing since your own notion of logical system as a set of truth preserving rules is also grounded on the notion of “truth”. — neomac

If something is meant to preserve another thing, then it is not building or creating that thing.

I don't see how this fact could even be arguable, whatever we might think the implications of it are. — Janus

You underestimate the power of the Dark Si... erm, of Materialism. :naughty:

But Davidson says there are no psycho-physical laws, which I take to mean that there are no laws which detemine mental acts analogous to the laws which govern physical events... — Wayfarer

In the post of Feser's that you referenced above this seems to be related to, "3. There are no strict laws on the basis of which we can predict and explain mental phenomena." If I read Feser correctly, then it is more the idea that there are no laws that connect the psychic and the physical realms in a strict way (and this is based on the "Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental").

Davidson says:

There can be no "psychophysical law" in the form of a biconditional, ' (x) (x is true-in-L if and only if x is Φ) ' where, ' Φ ' is replaced by a "physical" predicate (a predicate of L). Similarly, we can pick out each mental event using the physical vocabulary alone, but no purely physical predicate, no matter how complex, has, as a matter of law, the same extension as a mental predicate. — Davidson, Mental Events, p. 141

It seems that he is saying that the "mental" truth predicate, 'true-in-L', is not reducible to the "physical" Φ. This seems right to me, because universals have greater extension than particulars.

But your statement “Logic is a set of formal systems; it is defined by the formalism” (which is neither a logic formula nor a logic tautology) seemed to offer a definition for “Logic”. And valid definitions should not be tautological in the sense that what is to be defined should not occur in what is defining. Yet your other claims made your definition of “logic” look tautological (even claiming “Logic is all about tautologies” would sound tautological if it equates to “Logic is all about logic”). — neomac

I think this is exactly right. "Logic is a set of formal systems," does not approach a coherent definition of logic. The question that immediately comes to mind is, "Which set of formal systems?" It's much like saying, "Hyenas are a set of animals." It gives the genus without a specific difference. The specific difference of logic is related to (2), namely that logic aims to provide us with a means of reasoning well and arriving at previously unknown truths.

Those who study formal systems as some sort of end in themselves are doing meta-logic, not logic. It would be like if a traffic engineer became so interested in traffic lights that he comes to focus on the lights themselves, independently of traffic. At that point he is no longer a traffic engineer—he is just a guy who studies a specific sort of light. I think this sort of detachment from reality is a big problem in contemporary philosophy.

If the thread is about cataloguing the different ways that the word 'logic' is used, then (1) has a place. If it is about logic, then I think it doesn't.

But there is no way for me to make sense of “true” as applied to “logic” since the notion of “truth” is built in the “logic” rules themselves, in other words the meaning of “truth” is determined by “logic rules” too. — neomac

On the other hand, I don't agree with this. Logic can be said to be true insofar as it does what it is supposed to do: aid us in reasoning well. Currently our central criterion is validity, where the truth of the premises ensures the truth of the conclusions. So if I take a logical system and I scrupulously follow the rules, beginning with true premises, but then arrive at false conclusions, the logical system is bad or false. It is false in the sense that it is not doing what it was meant to do (i.e. preserve truth). Truth is not built in logic; it transcends it.

That's pretty well it. — Wayfarer

And thus I come to understand the basis of your worries. The colloquial and etymological sense of 'supervenience' lends itself to epiphenomenalism, so it should come as no surprise that recasting it as a "philosophical term of art" failed to fully insulate it from that broader semantic context. Much of what I have said in this thread presupposes SEP's claim that it is merely a technical term of art. Now I'm not so sure if this can be granted.

...I think the case can be made that Aristotelian Thomism is a Western form of perennialism... — Wayfarer

I think so too.

On the other hand, I do recognise that space needs to be given for discussion of the modern mainstream... — Wayfarer

I agree again.

(BTW that last quote attributed to me is from Ed Feser, although I'm in furious agreement with the thrust of it.) — Wayfarer

Fixed. :wink:

Thank you, I read the whole thing and it was helpful. I am not familiar enough with Davidson's thought to confidently interpret short quotations, so Feser is a good mediator.

What's interesting to me is the Aristotelian-Thomistic maxim that, "Nothing is in the mind that was not first in the senses," and the way it parallels the thesis that the mental supervenes on the physical. I don't think Aristotelians can ultimately hold to such supervenience, but it is an interesting parallel.

I searched Feser's blog posts for 'supervenience' and this is the first thing that came up:

In his book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim puts forward the following characterization of the materialist supervenience thesis:

I take supervenience as an ontological thesis involving the idea of dependence – a sense of dependence that justifies saying that a mental property is instantiated in a given organism at a time because, or in virtue of the fact that, one of its physical “base” properties is instantiated by the organism at that time. Supervenience, therefore, is not a mere claim of covariation between mental and physical properties; it includes a claim of existential dependence of the mental on the physical. (p. 34) — Edward Feser | Supervenience on the hands of an angry God

This is almost exactly what you were worried about, no?

I have not followed these debates in philosophy of mind, and therefore my exposure to the term 'supervenience' is more quotidian. I think this helps me in some ways but harms me in others, given that there are such bitter debates in philosophy of mind that hang on the precise meaning of supervenience.

The notion seems to rest on a category mistake, a failure to understand that the network of rationally-cum-semantically interrelated mental states is no more susceptible of a smooth correlation with a particular network of causally interrelated physical states than the content of a book can be smoothly correlated with a certain kind of physical format — Edward Feser

That seems exactly right to me.

Subtle, ain't it? — Banno

Wouldn't someone like Davidson just say that it is precisely through the different physical events and characteristics that we know the different [final causes] of the two lists?

Fair enough, . :up:

No, it fails to make sense because you left out an important part of the sentence, namely the leading IFF. — frank

Well, I left off the merely definitional part because we were already talking about the supervenience of A on B, "A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if..." But in fact you knew exactly what I meant, and you responded by claiming that the "quoted words do not describe supervenience."

Entailment and supervenience aren't identical, but supervenience can overlap entailment, causality, and dependence. — frank

Okay, I can agree with that.

This is because A can entail B without "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties." — Leontiskos

Well, not to quibble, but because you left the IFF off of the beginning of the sentence, your quote from the SEP didn't make any sense. — frank

It would only fail to make sense if someone did not understand that we are considering the possibility of A supervening on B, but this should be apparent both because it is the standard usage which was present even in your OP, and because A and B were introduced explicitly via the entailment relation that you put forward.

But I think the reason "entail" isn't exactly equivalent to "supervene" is because the latter is proprietary wording and the former isn't. — frank

Hmm. Both terms have technical and non-technical senses. I don't think any mixture of those senses would support your idea that, "You could also say the music entails these actions." The SEP article covers the difference between supervenience and entailment in some detail.

Yes, that was the claim from that I first responded to (link).

Let me just repeat my claim now that you see that the definition is accurate:

I think this direction of entailment is necessary but not sufficient for supervenience. This is because A can entail B without "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties." — Leontiskos

- Right :up:

I think someone could even hold to the [mental supervening on the physical] while also maintaining that the mental state causes the physical state. — Leontiskos

@Wayfarer - If I am right about this then it constitutes a stark example of the way that supervenience as a philosophical term of art differs from the colloquial or etymological meaning of supervenience. This may be part of the reason why the mental/physical debate gets so tricky. Another reason is probably that there are so many interrelated notions of supervenience, even in the philosophical sphere.

Effectively, the distance between the philosophical meaning of the term and the colloquial and etymological meaning biases the debate.

---

That quoted words do not describe supervenience. — frank

It was a quote from the SEP definition of supervenience, in the introduction of the article you quoted from in your OP:

A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if a difference in A-properties requires a difference in B-properties—or, equivalently, if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties. — SEP | Supervenience Introduction

If it's scientific knowledge, can't it ultimately be tested and therefore verified without AI? — NotAristotle

Sure, but in that case you are not "trusting AI," which is a central premise of my argument. If we fact-check AI every time it says something then the conundrum will never arise. I don't think we will do that. It would defeat the whole purpose of these technologies.

Some quotes:

To some extent supervenience is intuitive. The music created by an orchestra supervenes on the actions of the players. You could also say the music entails these actions. — frank

I think this direction of entailment is necessary but not sufficient for supervenience. This is because A can entail B without "exact similarity with respect to B-properties guarantee[ing] exact similarity with respect to A-properties."

If we think of supervenience as pertaining to propositions, the truth of "Orchestral music evolved" is true IFF statements about required activities at the lower level are true. — frank

Given the differences between entailment and supervenience, I am not convinced this sort of IFF correctly represents supervenience. But I suppose I would need more clarity on what you are saying here.

Scientific knowledge is verifiable, not to the layman but to the scientist. Verification is incredibly "pragmatically important" for scientific knowledge, and I believe AI will deeply undermine our ability to verify.

But there is also no inclusion of those notions, and so the overlap is accidental. In this thread we often see overlap mistaken for identity. For example, in your previous post you incorrectly imply that logical supervenience guarantees entailment (via your 'if-an-only-if' definition). For the most part supervenience brings with it entailment, but entailment does not suffice for supervenience.

. . .The upshot is that the logical supervenience of property set A on property set B will only guarantee that each A-property is entailed by some B-property if A and B are closed under both infinitary Boolean operations and property-forming operations involving quantification. — SEP | Supervenience and Entailment

Leontiskos - can you throw any light on my query? It seems related to the last paragraph you quote from the SEP entry but I’m struggling with putting it together. — Wayfarer

As I understand it, supervenience and causation are two different things:

Neither of these property realization relations is the supervenience relation. A property can supervene on other properties even when it is not the kind of property that has a causal role associated with it, as is the case with pure mathematical properties, for instance. Nor is property supervenience required for property realization in either of the above senses. — SEP | Supervenience and Realization

The concrete point here is that just because a mental act supervenes on a physical state, it does not follow that it is caused by that physical state. I think someone could even hold to the supervenience while also maintaining that the mental state causes the physical state, for example.

Reason/explanation is also a bit different from supervenience:

Supervenience claims, by themselves, do nothing more than state that certain patterns of property (or fact) variation hold. They are silent about why those patterns hold, and about the precise nature of the dependency involved. — SEP | Supervenience and Explanation

See also, "Supervenience as a philosophical term of art."

I am glad that you two are sussing out some of the ambiguity between supervenience, cause, reason, etc. Much of the language in this thread is being used too loosely.


Sidenote: I did not receive a notification that you mentioned me, which is why I am late to this. I think it might be because you added the mention in an edit. If so, I think this is a quasi-bug that would be good for the forum wish list.

So you take it that supervenience means a cause but a non-essential cause? — Hanover

Relevant excerpt:

Grounding and ontological dependence are distinct from each other. The simplest way to see this is by means of the kinds of case that revealed to David Lewis that causation is distinct from causal dependence (1973): preemption and overdetermination. Just as cases of causal overdetermination and preemption involve causation without causal dependence, so too do cases of ‘grounding overdetermination’ and ‘grounding preemption’ involve grounding without ontological dependence. For example, the fact that I exist grounds the fact that something exists, but the obtaining of the latter fact does not depend upon the obtaining of the former; the fact that something exists is massively overgrounded. — SEP | Supervenience, Grounding, and Ontological Depdendence

So when you say that, "Without B there is no A," you seem to be positing an ontological dependence which overlooks the possibility of grounding overdetermination. Nevertheless, ontological dependence and grounding are both separate from supervenience.

Regarding the relation of entailment to supervenience:

Nonetheless, that B-properties entail A-properties is neither necessary nor sufficient for A-properties to supervene on B-properties. (The notion of property entailment in play is this: property P entails property Q just in case it is metaphysically necessary that anything that possesses P also possesses Q.) To see that such entailments do not suffice for supervenience, consider the properties being a brother and being a sibling. [...]

To see that supervenience does not suffice for entailment, recall that supervenience can hold with only nomological necessity. In such cases, there is no entailment; thermal conductivity properties do not entail electrical conductivity properties, for example.

But what about supervenience with metaphysical or logical necessity? Even that does not in general guarantee that there are B-properties that entail the A-properties. At best, the logical supervenience of A on B means that how something is B-wise entails how it is A-wise. But it does not follow that every A-property is entailed by a B-property, or even that some A-property is entailed by a B-property. Consider two examples... — SEP | Supervenience and Entailment