It should be obvious to anyone who understands what phronesis is that it involves thinking through ethical questions. Thinking through ethical questions, however, does not mean the attempt to find abstract, universalizable, one size fits all answers that can be appealed to in lieu of moral deliberation. — Fooloso4

Moral principles are part of moral deliberation, and thinking to them and through them is part of ethics. Else, you fall into caricatures and strawmen if you think that inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense is seeking "one-size-fits-all answers."

If by “bracket” you mean “declare them out of bounds when discussing predication,” then yes, there wouldn’t be much left to say about whether predication might reveal parallels between existence and truth. — J

Right.

But I think it’s fine to get clear on what the standard commitments are, and why they’re so useful. Particularly useful for those of us like me who hated actually doing logic. — J

Sure, I agree.

“It’s the end of analytic philosophy as we know it, and I feel fine!”* — J

Hah, I like that quote. I have a love-hate relationship with analytic philosophy. I was trained at an analytic school that strongly emphasized Thomism, and after a long time I began to see the downfalls of analytic philosophy, as well as the idea that a reduction of Thomism to analytic philosophy is an impoverishment. At the same time, Thomism is conducive to analytic philosophy, and can form a bridge between analytic philosophy and more substantial approaches to philosophy.

Analytic philosophy ought to be a transparent frame that can represent all different kinds of thinking, but it turns out to be pigeon-holed in certain directions. But I digress.

Part of what’s confusing in Kimhi is that he often uses ‛I think p’ to mean ‛I judge that p’, as you can see in the above passage. But of course ‛I judge that p’ is even closer to what you’re calling “the notion of the true,” and Kimhi is certainly pointing to a second act of the intellect which makes self-conscious what has been initially thought or judged. — J

Yes, exactly. Clearly Kimhi is interested in using a finer scalpel than Thomas, but there may be a disagreement insofar as Thomas thinks apprehension of being and apprehension of being-as-true are two subtly different things, and that this represents one of the subtle ways that being and truth are separable. Given what you say, it is not clear to me whether Kimhi sees there to be any apprehension of being that is (metaphysically) prior to an apprehension of truth. Or in other words, does Kimhi see the fundamental "act of consciousness" as already bound up with truth?

It may be that while Aquinas is interested in comparing being to truth, Kimhi is interested in comparing being to the superset of truth called "thinking." For Aquinas being and truth are not the same thing, and yet it requires great subtlety to discern and describe in what way they differ. Nevertheless, if we set aside the very fine scalpel for a moment, it seems that their difference has to do with the difference between apprehension and judgment. For Aquinas there is a subtle way in which being precedes truth, and also apprehension of being precedes apprehension of truth (and certainly judgment of truth).

When we think about formal predications being and truth seem to always go hand in hand, because in formal predication truth is being taken for granted, and as Aquinas points out, being is always taken for granted. For this reason I don't see how the two could separate in that formal context (and by "formal predication" I am not necessarily talking about anything more complicated than things like, "The grass is long."). If we want to test their separability we must move out of that context.

- Yes, good.

It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. — Fooloso4

You leave out the other thing that Plato and Aristotle knew: thinking through ethical questions aids us in arriving at good judgment. No one has ever arrived at good judgment by avoiding all thought of ethics.

It seems to me pure nonsense to say 'we only ever see indirectly', because it draws on the image of 'direct seeing' only to deny that such a thing exists. — cherryorchard

Right, and when I tried to bridge your thread with the thread discussing whether we see colors or only our perceptions of colors I ran into this same problem (link).

It's a little like saying 'we only ever drive cars indirectly, because we use the pedals and the steering wheel' – that is what driving a car consists of. 'Indirect' (or indeed 'direct') doesn't enter into it, unless there are two varieties of driving (real or imagined) that can actually be classified using those words. — cherryorchard

This is a great analogy. It is right to give the rejoinder that driving a car in itself is not direct or indirect, it is just what it is, namely driving a car. What the proponent of indirectness might say is that when we "drive" our body we are doing so directly, and in comparison to this driving a car is indirect. They would probably say that to drive is to mobilize, and that when we interact with the steering wheel and the pedals we are interacting with the things that interact with other things that mobilize the car. I would rather say that we use instruments (or instrumental causes) to drive a car, and that there is no such thing as driving a car without this instrumental causality.

But note that if a relevant contrast can be provided, such as "driving" a body, then the statement can be made sense of. The reason I think Austin is correct is because the people who speak in this manner can usually only provide a superficial contrast, which does not hold up under scrutiny.

But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument. — cherryorchard

Usually when this topic comes up on these forums the proponent of indirectness ends up being pushed in the direction which says that we directly see our sensations and impressions, and then we infer from those sensations something about the external world. It would be a bit like if you received an encrypted message, and once you decrypted it you would possess information about the external world. As far as I can see, the correct response to this idea is that sight does not involve anything like this inferential process, and that to go further and talk about subconscious inference places us in very dubious waters.

(Oh, and just for future reference, though I realise it's hardly relevant to our discussion – I am a 'she' rather than a 'he'!) — cherryorchard

Well that's refreshing! I am in the habit of making the assumption on this forum and this is the first time I was wrong. Sorry about that.

Just a reminder... — wonderer1

But I've got that off my chest now, so carry on. — wonderer1

You did say that, but you obviously didn't follow through on your word. Remind yourself that not two hours later you showed yourself untrue by continuing your petty attack on philosophy:

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

I am of the opinion that Banno at least somewhat derailed your thread on QV by immediately shifting it away from Sider's ontological realism and towards pure logical formalisms which intentionally avoid questions of ontology. I hope that does not happen again, as it would apparently be completely against the spirit of this thread to bracket all questions about being and ontology.

With that said, a bridge from Banno's concerns could be formed by considering the opinions of the inventors of the formalisms. What did Frege and Peirce, or older logicians like Kant, Abelard, or Aristotle think about the questions of the OP and the way that their systems interacted with it? Probably I am just repeating the prompt of the OP, but maybe that's okay.

It seems that many here are under the mistaken impression that Christianity is and always was monolithic. — Fooloso4

Many more are under the impression that there are no good historical or theological reasons to hold that Mormons are not Christians. I hope your post was not yet another non sequitur argument for that idea.

Paine was responding to Art48, and there is no evidence at all that he was limiting Christianity to Nicean or Chalcedonian Christianity. Curiously, Art48's OP is more theologically astute than your excursus, because it is a very late phenomenon for self-identified Christians to identify Jesus as a mere man. Dozens of early Christian sects would have disagreed with the Christology of Nicea, but none of them held that Jesus was just a man. All of the disputes among early Christians were about what sort of non-mere man Jesus was.

I put you on ignore for reasons that have been made manifest, but I can write another post. My response will help show why you are on ignore.

It seems you think that God's existence cannot be proved, and therefore it cannot be affirmed. So then you look at Christians who say they believe in God and you conclude, "Ah, they can't be affirming that God exists, so they must be believing in God without affirming God's existence." You think that in doing this you are taking up a very intelligent and benevolent position, and you disdain the peons who say that Christians affirm the existence of God. It goes without saying that you can't find a source to support your position for the life of you, and of course anyone with two brains cells to rub together knows that Christians (and all theists) affirm the existence of God. Be that as it may, you continue to pat yourself on the back and evade every inquiry into the substance of your strange position. You may have even read a theological text or two and confused yourself further by reading your stupid theory into the text.

When your position is scrutinized, instead of giving a transparent answer you evade and pivot to the standard variety of atheist apologetics, "Well then you must be able to prove that God exists, so do it!" You would turn a thread on Christian alternatives into a thread on proofs for the existence of God, just like all the banal atheists roaming the internet. Of course there are serious inquirers into the existence of God, but you don't seem to be one of them, and this thread is not about that topic. "I can't prove God's existence, therefore Christians don't affirm God's existence," is a deeply impoverished argument.

The notion that you think your stupid position makes you sophisticated is curious. It is like the fellow who thinks he is sophisticated because he refuses to admit that 2+2=4, and everyone who wants to do geometry or algebra or calculus just ignores his raving and goes about their business. Or like I said earlier, it is like the flat-Earther. You are of course free to start a thread about your stupid idea. Call it, "Do Christians really think God exists?" I don't think it will fool even the theologically illiterate users within this thread, and I certainly have no interest in arguing with flat-Earthers, but you can carry on in that way if you like.

It doesn't concern me a great deal exactly what Wittgenstein or Austin held. The OP is an inquiry into the question of whether The Contrast Theory of Meaning (or some contrast theory of meaning) can stand. So cherryorchard is looking at Gellner's objections as well as other devil's advocate objections he thought of, and seeing if a contrast theory can stand. If you disagree with contrast theories then you could probably give cherryorchard some additional objections. Or if you want to argue that Wittgenstein or Austin did not hold to a contrast theory, I suppose you can do that.

My position is that at least the sort of meaning that is communicated to others must abide by some variety of contrast theory. This is because that which is not placed in relief against some backdrop cannot be picked out, and if someone cannot pick something out then it cannot be communicated to them. Therefore if someone is to understand what is meant, the communication must involve relief against some backdrop.

Perhaps meanings that are not communicated between linguistic agents do not need to abide by the contrast theory, but the sort of meaning that is communicated to others apparently does need to abide by some variety of contrast theory.

Nevertheless, if we are to remain within the spirit of the OP we would be asking whether there are any good objections to contrast theories.

What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory of meaning"? — Banno

That is a central question of the OP, and in the second half of the OP cherryorchard gestures towards a few of Gellner's objections to try to get the ball rolling. I don't have the book of Gellner's in question.

If I discover that there is something that is a ball, whatever reasons I give to support that discovery will be the same reasons needed to show that ‛There is a ball’ is true. There is no further fact I need to learn in order to affirm the truth of the proposition about the ball’s existence. This takes “parallel” extremely close to “identity,”... — J

Bringing in Aquinas:

Truth is being under the aspect of being-known (Aquinas). — Leontiskos

Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Freddoso's alternative translation:

Objection 3: Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But true
seems to be prior to being, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (sub ratione
veri). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be
apprehended without the notion of the true (sine ratione veri).
In the first way, it has this sense: ‘A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows
upon the apprehension of the being’. So interpreted, the claim is true.
In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: ‘A being could not be apprehended unless the
notion of the true were apprehended’. And this is false.
It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is
apprehended. For being enters into the definition of true.
It is the same as comparing intelligible to being. For a being cannot be understood unless that
being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood.
Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding being, one understands true. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Is 'true' convertible with 'being'?

Perhaps Kimhi recognizes this, but the idea is that to recognize the notion of the true requires a second act of the intellect, a kind of back-folding of the intellect, or the trough and the crest of the selfsame wave of apprehension. This second act is what I was pointing to above dialogically with the interaction between Plato and Aristotle. Aquinas would presumably say that the apprehension of being is in some sense prior to the apprehension of the notion of (its) truth.

You are reading Gellner backwards. He is not saying that the Contrast Theory of Meaning defeats Wittgenstein and Austin. He is saying that something like the Contrast Theory of Meaning is held by Wittgenstein and Austin, and that it is incorrect. If you don't like the Contrast Theory of Meaning, then you are agreeing with Gellner, because he doesn't like it either.

I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. — schopenhauer1

They have all been addressed.

It’s either not suffering as we normally define it — schopenhauer1

Pain isn't suffering? This is ad hoc, and it brings with it more problems:

It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

-

since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. — schopenhauer1

Again, completely irrelevant:

Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise. — Leontiskos

-

The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus — schopenhauer1

Again, there is nothing about balancing or hedonic calculus involved in the objection. At this point your reading comprehension is coming into question.

Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world... — schopenhauer1

Again:

What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

The point can be rephrased in any number of ways. "The woman learns that any children she has will inherit her extremely painful disease. Should she bear children?" "The antinatalist learns that any child she has will experience a pinprick of pain. Is this sufficient to exclude children?" To be blunt, the idea here is that your argument is stupid because it justifies stupid decisions. It makes no sense to say, "Ah well the advice does justify stupid decisions, but it is still good and reasonable advice."

he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected. — schopenhauer1

...and paternalistic gaslighting is the icing on the cake. "Humans think life is good even in spite of the pain, but they're wrong so we're going to exterminate the race through lack of births." What is the difference between this and genocidal insanity?

I see the consequentialist antinatalist rationale as something like this:

1. If we polled everyone on their deathbed, X% would wish they had never been born
2. Therefore, X% of potential future persons would not want to be born
3. Therefore, we should not give birth to new human beings

Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference. — Down The Rabbit Hole

You seem to be saying, "It looks like X isn't going to be high enough to justify (3), therefore we can't give them a choice." This is a bit like the father at the theme park who reasons, "My daughter wants to go on this ride, and if she goes on it she will probably enjoy it, so I can't let her go on it." This is reminiscent of the "paternalism" that schopenhauer1 claims to oppose.

My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole

The imaginary poll is taken at end of life:

The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born. — Leontiskos

Thanks for this response – it's extremely helpful. — cherryorchard

Okay, good. :up:

I suppose what I'm struggling to understand is how exactly we know which sort of term is a 'genus' and which isn't. 'Coffee machine' is quite obviously just a specific example of a 'machine' (so I apologise for the inanity of my example). But then, 'seeing' is perhaps just a specific example of 'perception' or even 'experience', or at least some people could plausibly think so. — cherryorchard

At minimum what we would say is that to convey an understanding to another, there must be a genus and a specific difference. Examples would be "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference), or "the perceptual act" (genus) "which is visual" (specific difference). We could also put this in SophistiCat's terms:

A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. — SophistiCat

A coffee machine is that subset of coffee-making things within the superset of machines. "Seeing" is that subset of visual acts within the superset of perceptual acts. In order to point to some kind of thing we must delineate the genus or superset or universe of discourse, as well as the species or subset within that broader set. Whenever we are conveying an understanding we are doing this, and if we are not doing this then we are not going to be able to convey an understanding.

So suppose we are on the phone and I try to point you to the machine that makes coffee, but you can't find it. I might pivot and say, "It is the medium-sized black machine." This gives you at least one additional genus-specific difference identifier: "The medium-sized machine" (genus) "that is black" (specific difference). Or in SophistiCat's terms, that subset of black things within the superset of medium-sized machines. According to my information this subset should contain only one thing.

Sense-data theorists might say something like 'we can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly' – and thus hold that their claim 'we never see directly' still has meaning, because 'seeing' is contrasted with other kinds of 'experience' like feeling pain.

I think the issue is in the particular conjunction of terms. The word 'seeing' has meaningful contrasts, as does a word like 'directly' and a word like 'never'. But the combination of these terms together in the claim 'we never see anything directly' is meaningless because it eliminates the possibility of any contrast. That makes complete sense to me – I'm just still struggling to pinpoint why. Is it because 'seeing' is sui generis, and nothing else is really 'like' it? But is that a subjective judgement? — cherryorchard

These get a bit tricky:

1. We can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly
2. We never see anything directly

The genus of (1) can be construed as actions, the set which includes things like feeling (pain) and seeing (objects). Within that broad genus one can distinguish feeling from seeing, and argue that to feel is more direct than to see. Whether they are right or wrong remains to be seen, but their distinction is not prima facie irrational. The coherence of the argument depends on the idea that the directness of feeling can be compared to the directness of seeing.

If (2) is not placed in a genus-context similar to the genus-context of (1), then it is a nonsensical statement. This will depend on the backdrop of (2) and the context of the locution.

'we only ever digest what we consume' — cherryorchard

3. We only ever digest what we consume

The contrast obviously requires the possibility that we might digest something that we have not consumed. In a literal sense (3) is very self-evident. Is a tautology meaningful? In fact most things we call tautologies are not strictly tautological (e.g. p is p). The act of digestion is separate from the act of consumption, and to understand that digestion only ever results from consumption requires an understanding of the relation between the two (and it is debatable whether knowledge of one entails knowledge of the other).

But given that the literal sense of (3) is self-evident to almost all people, it would not generally count as a meaningful statement in dialogue. Usually it is used meaningfully in dialogue only in a metaphorical sense: something like the idea that, "He will never understand what he has not experienced." This has a real contrast given that it is not uncommon for people to impatiently expect others to understand what they have no experiential basis to understand.

For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? — cherryorchard

4. We only ever hear sounds

It is a meaningful statement to someone who is under the impression that we can hear non-sounds or we can perceive sounds in some other way than hearing. For example, are we feeling the bass at the concert or hearing it? But without that context it will not be a meaningful statement.

Of course, there are things we don't hear and things that aren't sounds. But couldn't a sense-data proponent say there are things we don't see and things that aren't indirect? Just no such thing as direct seeing – as there is no such thing as hearing smells. — cherryorchard

Generally we would say that "things that aren't indirect" are direct. Things neither direct nor indirect are usually considered to be outside of the genus of discourse.* If one wants to open up that genus of discourse they should be more explicit and say something like, "There are things we see neither directly nor indirectly. There is an entirely different way of seeing." Or, "There are things that cannot be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled, but yet can be perceived. There is another way of perceiving." But it is very hard for two people who are talking past one another regarding the genus of discourse to connect. In this case they each mean substantially different things by 'perception'.

As regards "hearing smells," the genus is supposed to also perform the role of specifying the type or domain of discourse. For instance, if I start telling you about a "bleg" you will instinctively probe for what type of thing a bleg is. Does it belong to the genus of material things? Immaterial things? Acts? Accidents? Colors? Shapes? Numbers? Times? Set-theoretical entities? Etc. Usually when we speak these very high kinds of genera are implicit and obvious, but to convey an understanding always requires them, and where they are not implicit they must be made explicit.


* For Aristotle this has something to do with the difference between contradictories and contraries. Usually 'indirect' means non-direct, not some third thing other than direct and non-direct. Usually 'indirect' is the contradictory of direct.

I would say Michael, and others, are committed to a particular metaphysical worldview I like to call “The Private Theater.”

...

Doubt creeps in again. But if one thing they can gain comfort in is the certainly that what appears to them in the theater is always certain. — Richard B

Yes, this captures it well. It's not an indirect seeing of color; it's an inability to see beyond percepts.

I think you’d get a lot out of Kimhi’s book – I certainly have. — J

Okay, thanks for the recommendation. I will consider it.

Minor point: The passage you quote from p. 39 isn’t actually about Frege and Geach. — J

Thanks for the correction. It resolves the question I had after skimming that passage, as I had added "[Frege and Geach]" in an edit.

These deep borderline questions are exactly what Kimhi is chasing down, just as you'd expect from a book called Thinking and Being. — J

:up:

↪Johnnie Appreciate the references — J

I would say that Scholasticism does not make truth a property of being when it calls them convertible. "Truth is convertible with being," does not mean, "Truth is a property of being." It means that everything which has being has truth qua intellect. Truth is being under the aspect of being-known (Aquinas). The trick is that this is not limited to the discursive intellect, and for theists all being simultaneously has truth through being known by God (or thought by God). Modern philosophers would see this as substantial insofar as it commits itself to the position that all being is knowable.

The corollary is that all truth has being. All knowledge and acts of knowing also have being. I.e. thought is not ontologically neutral. Further, to know a proposition and to know that proposition is true are two different acts of knowledge, two different truths with two different kinds of being.

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

The blinding hypocrisy in your last two posts here is a bit much.

[Edited]

- Yes, and this is a good demonstration of how the propositions, assertions, and knowledge of intellectual agents are not ontologically neutral, even though they are stipulated to be ontologically neutral within the logical frame. @J could easily respond by restricting his sphere of discourse to the logical frame and asking something like, "But do they add anything as far as the logic is concerned?" But this raises the fraught question of where the logical ends and the metalogical begins, or else where the metalogical ends and the ontological begins, in any given system.

Yep, I often thought if Wittgenstein wanted to theorize instead of just describe he might have moved in the direction that Searle has. — Richard B

That makes sense.

I will have to take your word about Aquinas as I am only familiar with his arguments for the existence of God. — Richard B

Here is an example where Aquinas is considering the question of whether the impression is related to the intellect as that which is understood or that by which it understands. The Bad Argument would reflect the idea that understanding terminates in the impression. In terms of this thread we would ask whether the percept is what is seen, or whether the percept is that by which we see:

Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. . .

...

Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. — Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia.Q85.A2 - Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?

I little more exposition on Searle's view of colors:

From Seeing Things as They Are:

"...So it is wrong to think of the visual experience as itself colored. Also, to think that visual experiences are colored is almost inevitably to commit the Bad Argument because one has to ask who is seeing the color..."

(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.) — Richard B

This is closely related to and in another thread:

Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean. There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly'. And thus (Austin argues) the term 'seeing indirectly' when used in this way appears to mean something but actually doesn't. — cherryorchard

When Michael says that colors are percepts or that we only ever see percepts and never colors, he is in a very real sense committing himself to the position that we only ever see colors indirectly.

The challenge would be met with examples like Austin's:

...

(Some ordinary language philosophers leveled a similar criticism against the realism vs nominalism debate.) — SophistiCat

Yes, it's a good point, and we've seen it manifest often enough on these forums. For example:

First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? — Leontiskos

---

- :up:

- :up:

But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. — cherryorchard

Is it possible to imagine any other kind of machine?

For me this all goes back to Aristotle's idea that a definition or understanding requires a genus and a specific difference. "Coffee machine" is "A machine" (genus) "that makes coffee" (specific difference). In order to understand a term we must understand how it is alike other things (genus) and how it is unlike the things it is alike (specific difference).

One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate.

This falsely assumes that the Contrast Theory is one-directional. Gellner himself denies this with, "either so severe, or so loose." Like Aristotle's theory, the Contrast Theory seems to nestle term meaning between two erroneous extremes.

One could go on to ask whether the Contrast Theory can be contrasted with other theories, and it obviously can, qua theory. If we think about the principle as an ontological law instead of a theory, then it becomes something like the principle of non-contradiction, elucidated in Aristotle's Metaphysics IV. One can also state the PNC linguistically, as applied to language. In that sense we would say, "If language is to have meaning, then the Contrast Theory must hold." The relevant contrast here is the scenario where language has no meaning, and authors like Aristotle do not deny this at least as a logical possibility. Indeed, Aristotle claims that those who do not apply the PNC to language and predication are not able to use language meaningfully.

This ability to look at a proposition abstractly while prescinding from its truth value would seem to require the use of truth and falsity as predicates. — Leontiskos

Peeking at Kimhi's book at the library, this is very close to the same idea:

In other words, [for Frege and Geach] a propositional sign manifests, through its symbolic composition, the semantical character of each actual occurrence of the proposition, but not the force character of any [of] those occurrences. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, page 39

In a recent thread I was trying to get people to consider the difference between the "force character" of an assertion vs. the "force character" of a reductio's supposition, but everyone in the thread proved incapable of these metalogical distinctions. As Kimhi points out through Geach on p. 38, the context of a proposition has implications for its meaning (see my post here).

But again, I have not found anyone on this forum who is interested in or even open to discussing the metalogical issues that Kimhi is interested in. Given the subtlety of such a topic, that's not surprising. Deep dives into the basis for Aristotelian realism (which necessarily involves the realism of propositions and assertions) produce the same incomprehension on this forum. The logicians on TPF tend to be what I would term 'logical pragmatists', and they have little interest in the inner workings and meta-workings of logic itself. In some places it is even assumed that some sort of isomorphic mapping between logic and language obtains.

1. God is finite, ie we can define it as what it is and what it is not.
2. God is infinite, ie it is everything. We can define it as what it is but can't define what it is not because it is everything. — Haafiz Mohammad Beigh

Classically we say that the infinite God can be known by way of analogy, eminence, and negation. Or as Aquinas says, "but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion":

Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above [...] that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition. — Aquinas, ST Ia.13.1 - Can God be named by us?

What do you mean by 'defending itself'?? How should religious people defend their religion? — boundless

I would say that because Christianity is unfashionable at the moment, anyone can make terribly fallacious arguments against Christianity or Christians and no one bothers to correct them. The thinking is something like, "Yeah, these arguments are garbage, but we know Christianity is false or unimportant anyway, so who cares?"

I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Do you think it is unreasonable to determine that the majority of people would rather had never been born?

This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime" — Down The Rabbit Hole

Apokrisis' statistic already included such folks. It was baked in.

The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born.

* For Amadeus this is something like "99.85%"

What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met... — schopenhauer1

What are you talking about? The reductio objection has nothing at all to do with a threshold, and that is the problem. For Benatar's argument even a pinprick suffices to trigger antinatalism—ad hoc counterarguments aside. The objection requires only the presence of suffering, not a threshold. The whole premise of the objection is that Benatar's argument absurdly greenlights antinatalism even when suffering is outstripped by happiness by 1,000 miles.

Amadeus rightly notes that any position which assumes antinatalism before considering the balance between suffering and other considerations "would be stupid":

Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. Obviously, that would be stupid. — AmadeusD

His key distinction is between suffering trumping other considerations before a balance-analysis, and suffering outweighing other considerations after a balance-analysis. The deontological antinatalist is committed to the former, which Amadeus disagrees with.

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos

This would I would think fall more into those objections... — schopenhauer1

Nah. Note, for example, that the reductio objection that we have been considering recently simply has no force at all against Amadeus' position. Amadeus' position does not support the conclusion (3) as Benatar's does.

This also conveniently shows that the objection is not ad hoc, it is not superfluous, and it does not prove too much. Instead it is tailor-fit to your own account in a way that does not necessarily fit alternative antinatalist accounts.

- Good stuff. These are very similar to the arguments I had considered putting forward were Michael less intransigent.

(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.) — Richard B

It is uncanny how close this sort of thing is to Aquinas. I think Searle would've been edified to read the pre-modern realists who dealt with some of the same problems in a less skeptical age.

Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. — AmadeusD

Okay, interesting. I do see this as a more conservative version of antinatalism than schopenhauer1 holds.

It only does so once the calc is run. The statement is not meant to be a position of it's own. It's more "I've run this calc 60,000 times and zero came up on the side of procreation". — AmadeusD

And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position.

Edit:

My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential — schopenhauer1

Yes.

But I assume Aristotle did not describe truth as a property that could or could not be predicated; that way of thinking wasn't available to him. — J

Intuitively, the reason I doubt this is because it seems that anyone involved in the analysis of arguments will need to wield truth and falsity as predicates. They will need to talk about propositions as being true or false. For example, if Plato and Aristotle differ with respect to the exact same proposition, won't this quickly lead to the recognition that one holds that it is true whereas the other holds that it is false? This ability to look at a proposition abstractly while prescinding from its truth value would seem to require the use of truth and falsity as predicates. Granted, this predication may still not mean much over and above simple affirmation and denial, but it does show that one can consider a proposition without assuming that it is true.

Is there something he did say that would be more or less the equivalent of "To say of what is that it is, is not to provide additional knowledge about it"? Or maybe: "To assert of what is that it is, is the same act as identifying the being/existence of what is"? — J

My hunch is that the answer to the two questions is no/yes, but I will do a bit of digging and come back to this. I also want to let the thread percolate a bit before posting overmuch.

Prima facie, I would say it doesn't tip the scales because other pleasures out weight a pinprick (scratching a decent itch would be enough v a pinprick). — AmadeusD

Okay, so are you saying that a pinprick (or small amount) of suffering would not suffice for antinatalism? There must be more suffering before the arguments in favor of antinatalism become plausible. Is that right?

But if it is right then it seems like suffering does not always trump any other consideration, for the suffering of the pinprick does not trump the consideration of other pleasures.

Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere.. — AmadeusD

Good, this is my main concern: If suffering always trumps any other consideration, then how is it that the balance between suffering and other considerations constitutes an interesting discussion? How could one be talking about balancing suffering with some other consideration if suffering always outweighs any other consideration?

As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. — AmadeusD

Okay. Well at first blush it seems like you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not.

And I answered you. — schopenhauer1

You haven't. Getting answers out of you is like pulling teeth. It literally took three months to get a real answer to my reductio, and that was the simplest argument on offer by design. Even then I had to draw out the argument you were intimating. Answers are not forthcoming, and you fall into petitio principii at the drop of a hat. :roll:

Although I'll certainly grant that it is common to think that way when one is accustomed to think in the folk psychology terms promoted by a religion. I have faith in your ability to develop a more psychologically informed view though. — wonderer1

I suppose I would pay your attempted insults more mind if I thought you had any pull or intelligence. Self-knowledge is at an all-time low, here. In fairness, I am making the assumption that you are not the 13 year-old you act like. If you are then your IQ rises considerably.

I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have (and honestly, the one whcih is usually attempted cross-positionally). The type though doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thrad) between suffering and other considerations. The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD

@schopenhauer1 seems to assume that "other considerations" could only be positive experiences, which I was not assuming.

That said, I don't really understand Amadeus' post here. This is how I read it:

I think the discussion of which sorts of suffering need to be prevented is more or less the discussion that antinatalists have among themselves (and it is also the discussion that others wish to have with antinatalists). The type of suffering doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance between suffering and other considerations that is interesting. The antinatalist position is that suffering always trumps any other consideration. — Interpretation

the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad — schopenhauer1

Who is making this consideration? Certainly not me, as I explained above.

It is undisputed that in this world, at least there will be suffering — schopenhauer1

I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. The prima facie answer is that it does count as suffering.

And Lastly, from Seeing Things as They Are by John Searle:

"Question 2 How does the account deal with color constancy and size constancy? I will consider these in order. Imagine that a shadow falls over a portion of the red ball so that part of it is in shadow and part not. Did the part in shadow change its color? Well, obviously not, and it is obviously not seen as having changed its color. All the same, there is a difference in the subjective visual field. The subjective basic perceptual properties have changed. The proof is that if I were drawing a picture of what I now see, I would have to include a darker portion of the part in shadow, even though I know that there has been no change in its actual color. It is extremely misleading to describe this phenomenon as "color constancy", because of course the experienced color is precisely not constant. It is because of my high-level Background capacities that I am able to see it as having the same color even though at the lower level I see it as having in part changed its color. I want to emphasize this point. At the basic level, the color is precisely not constant, neither subjectively nor objectively. It changes. It is just at the higher level that I know, because of my Background abilities, that it still keeps the same color." — Richard B

This would be a neat argument for why colors and percepts are not the same thing. The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same.

ANs do the balancing exercise, and suffering tips the scales. — AmadeusD

Ah, okay, I see what you are saying.

The question then is this: Why does the suffering of the pinprick do nothing to tip the scale?

I see two possible answers. Either the suffering of the pinprick is for some reason not counted as suffering; or else the antinatalist is in fact balancing suffering with some other consideration, in which case suffering does not always tip the scales.