I said "you," not "I." I am thinking of non-hypothetical ought-judgments with respect to others. So if you are tutoring struggling first graders, and you inevitably base the various lessons and interventions on the belief that the child ought to believe that 2+2=4, then you are thereby a member of the rational community. Note well, for example, that every teacher and tutor is thereby a part of the "rational community."*

* Everyone is, but teachers are even in virtue of their teaching.

Isnt there a danger of relying too heavily on the validity of the other’s reasoning and too little on the possibility that the other is making use of conceptual senses of meaning you are u familiar with? Don’t many situations of breakdown in communication result from a confusion between reasoning that lacks validity, coherence, and rationale, and valid reasoning anchored to unfamiliar concepts? — Joshs

The thing is, my point holds in an even broader sense than you are interpreting it. As long as one separates the reasoning process from the conclusions/beliefs that are held, and also recognizes correctness and incorrectness with respect to reasoning processes, then what I say holds. Thus to, "Understand the other's reasons," is to understand the reasoning process being used, and to deem it at least partially correct. Whether or not we define validity as, "a quasi-correct reasoning process," or as something more strict, makes no difference to this broader point.

(Note too that one could understand another's reasons in a way that involves no judgment of correctness, but that this will not lead to an agreement to disagree, which is our topic.)

Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? — Joshs

Your posit here is, "If your conclusion is false, then your reasoning is invalid." Or, "If your belief is false, then the reasoning process which led to this belief lacks all forms of correctness."

None of that follows, and I think the whole idea is bound up with a preference for post hoc rationalization, or in this case a non-discrimination between the process of reasoning and the beliefs that are thereby generated.

Long ago, Srap Tasmaner threatening me with this essay. — Banno

This is a more promising thread. I appreciate the paper to ground the discussion. :up:

But I might also invite PM contributions — Banno

So long as you remember that PMs do not contribute to public threads any more than a "private language" is generally accessible. What is done invisibly cannot be appealed to to justify a visible thesis. There is no general continuity between any PM and a public thread. They are two different things.

- Thanks for the information.

This sub-topic is also related to Mikie's thread/request, and also my <post> which is admittedly wacky and entirely unrealistic given the forum features of all currently extant forum software. I think the principle is interesting, even though many of the objections given were also quite reasonable.

Let’s say that two parties who embrace sharply opposing philosophical, political or religious positions are bought together to engage in earnest dialogue. Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? If I tell you that I understand the reasons for your disagreement with me, but in the same breath I find those reasons to be irrational and logically faulty, am I really understanding those reasons? — Joshs

When I say, "each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing," I am not saying that they are able to mouth back the words the other person is using. I am saying that must be able to understand, at least in part, the reasons.

Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? — Joshs

Only if they cannot rise above post hoc rationalization, where reasoning is irrelevant and it's only assertions that matter. Anyone who understands what valid reasoning is should be able to see how a position possesses validity, coherence, and rationale, even if they do not agree with the conclusions. Anyone who cannot do that is more interested in ideology and "material positions," rather than true reasoning.

When I try to enforce the terms of the OP on other posters, they are often incensed. — T Clark

Yes. I wrote an OP where I wanted to work through a paper, chapter by chapter. I made it abundantly clear. This is what happened:

↪Banno - It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4...

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF. — Leontiskos

@Banno, who did his darndest to undermine the thread from the first page, literally flouted the terms of the OP and moved to unread sections, all in order to try to make those sections look stupid.

I think it would be great if the mods enforced intuitive OP-terms, but that thread showed me that they are not willing, or else are not able due to time constraints. I was even PMing one, asking for help.

's thread on Adorno is presumably one place where such terms would be enforced, and that is great. I think it would be enormously helpful if users could create reading groups where such simple and commonsensical terms were enforced, and trolls like @Banno were not allowed to sabotage the threads and contravene the terms of the OP. Again, Banno is himself the biggest culprit of the things he complains about.

I think people are making too much of this. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you're missing what is plain to see:

I fear your OP could be read not just as a suggestion that sometimes direct communication with a poster is helpful for clearing up issues, particularly if the matter is so esoteric that it might not be of interest or ability to others, but as a suggestion that one is better served if they remove themselves from the common man so they can discuss their thoughts among their elite equals. — Hanover

Banno comments (brags), quite often, about how he has to take things to PM since the forum is too dumb. What others are pointing out is much more in line with the reality of the situation. You are again missing the contextual situation of the thing you read.

I don't know. Would this mean that it would be impossible for a person to convert from one position to another? When I was a Christian I had one framework but began to notice things like how what you believed often depended on where you were born and raised, which made me start questioning my beliefs. I eventually became an atheist. I had overcome my upbringing. What you seem to be saying that what happened to me is impossible. Or are you saying I'm not really an atheist because my original framework prevented me from understanding what it actually means to be an atheist? — Harry Hindu

I'm saying that no one is both a Christian and an atheist, straddling that line neutrally. A Christian can become an atheist, but if they do so then they are no longer a Christian. No one truly says, "I am both Christian and atheist in a neutral sense."

We could perhaps imagine someone who is neither and views both objectively and neutrally. I'd be fine with that, especially for the sake of argument.

(But note that @Srap Tasmaner was not "neither" when he appealed to the very same framework petitio principii that @J was appealing to less eloquently. In fact Srap is very deeply committed to that framework sort of relativism. Nevertheless, the difference is that Srap is much more capable of questioning his own presuppositions by engaging in dialogue and answering questions.)

No, not necessarily. But most of all, I don't think it is a requirement for joining the rational community. — goremand

I disagree on both scores. I have a whole thread disagreeing with the first claim. I would argue against the second claim on similar grounds insofar as we concern ourselves with intellectual ought-judgments, i.e., "You ought to believe that 2+2=4." But no one "joins" the rational community. They are already rational, and they are already bound by the truth that 2+2=4. Even and especially as they ignore such truths will they feel their binding force. We can't opt in or out of the fact that 2+2=4 will have an effect on us and on our lives, as for example is seen when consulting one's financial transactions.

Yes, absolutely. — goremand

Okay, good.

- I'm afraid I'm doing to have to respectfully disagree. :razz:

The way I read many of these exchanges between those I will call the Wittgensteinians and the Atistotlians (although that is just to avoid naming people here, but you know who you are!), is the Aristotelians openly seek to understand the other position (or any position), so they can accurately analyze it; they ask specific questions about it, to both better understand it and to reveal the limits of their own understanding, and they provide restatements, to better ensure everyone is on the same page; they craft critiques, and offer positive alternate views. Whereas the Wittgensteinians may do these same things, but only when talking with each other - when someone disagrees with them who is perceived to be an Aristotelian, they act indignant and paranoid (emotional) and tired (as if dealing with their lessers), and argue about hidden meanings and bad-faith and psychopathy (authoritarian intent, myth-making, delusional), some of them making ad hominem comments, and position themselves as too smart to dignify such people. — Fire Ologist

(@Count Timothy von Icarus)


I ran across an idea that I found quite fascinating, both with respect to this thread and with respect to the Wittgenstein/Analytic Philosophy question. It was from the recent discussion between Jordan Peterson and Jonathan Haidt, from 44:11-46:53. Go ahead and listen to those few minutes, but what Haidt eventually says, drawing on Piaget, is, “A video game is really like the junk food of games, in that it doesn’t have the nutritious part which is the disagreements, the arguments.” Peterson interjects, “Right, so there’s no meta-negotiation about the rules themselves. So one of the things Piaget pointed out […] And that’s also why Piaget wasn’t a moral relativist – he thought there was a hierarchy of morality. And that’s also why he thought Thomas Kuhn was wrong…”

They don’t talk about Wittgenstein, but I have never heard anything which hit the nail so perfectly on the head with respect to axiomatic thinking, such as Wittgenstein’s or Analytic Philosophy’s! It is the idea that if there is no ability to see the rules, jostle against them, and engage in meta-negotiation (with respect to, say, so-called hinge propositions), then there is a deficiency and a lack of robustness in the activity. complains that Aristotle’s “induction” is not (deductively) valid, but according to Piaget this is a feature, not a bug. I think this is why Aristotle is so much more robust than Wittgenstein: because he doesn’t set those a priori limits on what can be done, and also because he does not have a set color palette before he begins his painting. This is what makes him so much less contrived and artificial (and here others would argue that Plato is better yet). Note too how it is Piaget—in his observation of children, progress, and development—who sees what Wittgenstein is so blind to – the Wittgenstein who literally physically abused children because they weren’t “doing it right”!

Now some have been claiming that they want the ability to negotiate the rules, and I have been at pains to point out their performative self-contradiction. They say they want to negotiate the rules, but they don’t negotiate, they don’t engage in dialogue, they don’t answer questions forthrightly, and they in fact “take their marbles and go home.” On the other hand, the people they dub “authoritarians” are precisely the people who are doing all of those things: negotiating the rules, offering arguments, presenting objections, etc.

Note too how well this reflects Aristotle’s discussion of the PNC in Metaphysics IV. He in no way attempts to prove it. He allows his opponents to try to argue, but he also shows why their arguments are doomed to fail. This leaves it open for his opponents to try to argue and see for themselves how Aristotle’s prediction comes to pass. Anyone who has read the text seriously has probably done this for themselves. This closely parallels @Count Timothy von Icarus’ discussion with @Banno over the principle concerning the falsification of data, where Banno's rejection of the word "principle" eventually turned out to be ad hoc.

---

what sort of explanation is left in order to account for profound disagreements? — Joshs

The better question to ask is, “How do we come to agree to disagree?” I want to say that if two people are to agree to disagree, then there must first be earnest dialogue, there must be honest irreconcilability, and each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing. It is easy enough to see why such a thing is not possible where dialogue at all, much less earnest dialogue, is refused.

- That is how I see the matter as well. What we could say is that if Trump had dyed his hair unbeknownst to the two persons having the dialogue, then the first person's belief would have been true. We don't have enough information to claim that the belief is false.

(Good post)

Your syllogism above does not work for me, and I've said why. — AmadeusD

Here is my argument:

The fellow believes Trump dyed his hair. Is his belief false?

In a logical sense what we say is that his argument for the conclusion that Trump dyed his hair is unsound, but that this does not entail that the conclusion is false. I don't think it is correct to distinguish belief from proposition in that way and say that the belief is false but the proposition is not.

There are three propositions and three beliefs:

1. If *this video* is reliable then Trump dyed his hair
2. *This video* is reliable
3. Therefore, Trump dyed his hair

Belief/proposition (1) is true; belief/proposition (2) is false, and belief/proposition (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) because (2) is false. The belief/proposition, "Trump dyed his hair," is therefore neither known to be true nor known to be false. I don't see what grounds we have to say that the belief in question ("Trump dyed his hair") is false. — Leontiskos

You responded by saying, "Yes. I have explained this explicitly above, to the degree that this feels like outright trolling..." But my argument was precisely against your assertion that beliefs and propositions, "are not falsified the same way," so it doesn't help to point back to the assertion I was arguing against.

As to this:

Any belief can be falsified without looking at the state of affairs, as I see it. — AmadeusD

Another assertion, which my argument addresses. Replace "Any belief," with, "Some beliefs," and I would agree with you. But the case from my argument cannot be "falsified" without knowledge of the state of affairs, namely without knowledge that the video is a deepfake.

There is a sense in which the passions are something we do, as one of our powers/facilities, and yet another sense in which they happen to us, in that they are often involuntary, and indeed often run counter to the will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up:

The passions and appetites aren't like a heart attack though. They can be commanded by the will, even if they are often recalcitrant. And our ability to command them can be improved with training; that's one of the ideas of asceticism. So, the other writer I was thinking of is Saint John Climacus, who I have been reading at night, and this is precisely what the monk aims at with "blessed dispassion," not the elimination of the appetites and passions per se, but their right orientation and ordering (granted, it sometimes seems like the latter in some passages). This is why, if you pray the Horologian, you end up reciting Psalm 50 many times a day. It's the "cultivation of blessed tears" and repetence, as Climacus would put it, a right emotional state that is willed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would argue that the Orthodox use of "passions" is at least somewhat different than Plato or Aristotle or colloquial usage. I would say that Orthodox "dispassion," very crudely, has to do with a state of self-possession and self-command. It is the idea that "thoughts" (again in a wide, Orthodox Christian sense) do not move you. So there is that connection of being unmoved by passions, and a desire to achieve a state of dispassion, but I don't see the Orthodox view contradicting the idea that passions are primarily things that happen to us in the postlapsarian state. That's why Orthodox on the whole view passions as bad and desire a state of dispassion (although I realize there are a few exceptions, who you have read). So my hunch is that the Orthodox might admit that the deified individual has motive powers similar to the passions, but that they would not generally call those things "passions."

The trick is that everyone agrees that unwanted passions happen to us in a way that desirable and cooperating passions do not, as Aquinas sets out in the text I gave. From this is eventually follows that the well-ordered individual's passions are part of him in a way that a disordered individual's passions are not. But these are all very fine and subtle distinctions.

The analogy of the wind may be helpful here. When the wind is with us, it flows into us and we become one with it. It facilitates our movement and combines with our will. When the wind is against us, it opposes us and pushes us in a direction we do not wish to go. Note too the Spirit/wind parallel.

- Okay. I just wanted to point back to that, since @Srap Tasmaner already did all my work for me, and I thought you might have read it.

- Coming back to the question of whether there is a common thread between history and, say, physics. Here is why Srap thinks so:

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. — Srap Tasmaner

History would fulfill that criterion, so the question is whether Srap is mistaken about his criterion for what makes a science.

---

I'll just add that the classical formulation of the difference is that science deals with the universal and the necessary. History is always particular though. Indeed, it's the particular in which all universals are instantiated. This doesn't preclude a philosophy of history, but it does preclude a science of history. Jaques Maratain has a very short lecture/book on philosophy of history that makes this case quite compactly, and he's drawing on the "traditional" distinction (in the West) that was assumed for many centuries. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is an interesting and useful point. :up:

Perhaps when we now talk about "history" we are talking about "knowing what happened in the past." Is that the thing that Maritain is considering, or is he considering history in some other manner? And do you happen to know the text where he talks about this?

In terms of a logos at work in history, I certainly think we can find one, just not a science. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I agree with this.

But you cannot predict this sort of thing in any strict sense — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the issue here is apparently prediction of future events, or a determination of the principles that led from one point to another?

However, although his gods (themselves a mix of personified man-like deity and more transcendent Logos) set the limit of logos in human history, and characters only ever recognize them when they leave. I've been rereading the Aeneid and this seems true in almost every case; only when they turn to go, when we are "past them" in the narrative, are they recognized as gods by man. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that is a beautiful idea.

Right. To say "both" is saying that the framework more accurately reflects the state-of-affairs than other frameworks do and is what makes you a solipsist or a realist. — Harry Hindu

Yes, that seems correct.

So is the question, "How can we know when a framework more accurately represents the state-of-affairs?" or "How can we distinguish between the framework and the state-of-affairs?", or something else? — Harry Hindu

I added this in an edit:

To say "both" would require the adherent to claim that their own framework (e.g. realism or solipsism) is superior to other frameworks. I suppose they could do that, but it seems like the very idea of a "framework" would impede them. — Leontiskos

I think what is happening is that you have two incommensurable ways of viewing something, and it is likely impossible to try to strike some neutral ground. This is almost certainly why @Srap Tasmaner's "St. Louis to Kansas City" idea failed.

So surely ampliation is required to understand the opposing view, and a rather abrupt and extreme form of it. This issue is explored a lot in the field of interreligious studies, where there can be significant limitations on one's ability to understand another view (and the same thing could be said to hold between secular and religious thinking). Religion and culture are the two biggies, where a form of conversion and life is required in order to truly understand.

Yes I remember reading your suggestions back then. I doubt the software allows such limits though. — unenlightened

I think you're probably right. But some forum software does, so it is possible.

You don’t always get to answer questions with a better question like “maybe you are actually an authoritarian because of your God delusion?” — Fire Ologist

Good post. :up:

I think what you say about Wittgenstenians is natural to that worldview, which is more enclosed. But it's also worth noting that @Banno was the primary Wittgenstenian in this thread. @J and @Srap Tasmaner are not as exclusively interested in Wittgenstein.

Regarding the Analytic question, I think part of the difficulty is that cutting with a knife is most easy and most precise. Doing other things is truly much harder. In that way Analytic philosophy can generate agreement regarding its dissections. That can be helpful, but unfortunately it is a very limited agreement due to the fact that it lacks all manner of comprehensiveness, as the OP itself admits.

Just so you know, there was a new rule added which says, "AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part." In any case, I don't respond to purely AI posts.

resident sophists — Janus

Yes. Imagine what you did <here>, but multiplied over twenty pages and then combined with hypocrisy. It was a truly impressive display of sophistry. :wink:

The continue from those who have consistently failed to engage in dialogue throughout the whole thread. "If you can't beat them..." then I guess you do whatever the heck you can to calumniate them, all the while refusing to dialogue with them.

As Srap Tasmaner said "you ought to be ashamed of yourselves". — Janus

@Srap Tasmaner's outburst was <bizarre>, to say the least, utterly lacking in context. It's usually a bad idea to fall into that form of judgmentalism when you're such a newcomer to the thread.

quality — unenlightened

If one wants to improve the quality of thought on the forum, I think the easiest way is to impose posting limits (see for example, 6). This is arguably what generated the quality submissions (i.e. the time allotted to composition). Quality diminishes when TPF is treated like Twitter and people post without first giving thought to the topic. But of course this would not satisfy @Banno, who is one of the worst culprits with over 27,000 posts and a tendency towards quippy, dismissive posts. So I'm not sure it's just a matter of his "style."

I don't know. Is solipsism a framework, or the state of reality, or both? — Harry Hindu

For the realist realism is not merely a framework; and for the solipsist solipsism is not merely a framework. To say "both" would require the adherent to claim that their own framework (e.g. realism or solipsism) is superior to other frameworks. I suppose they could do that, but it seems like the very idea of a "framework" would impede them.

Is the framework that supports the realism of other minds and their contents context-de/independent? — Harry Hindu

By calling it a "framework" I think we are already presupposing that it is contextualized, aren't we? I think realism presupposes that not every knowledge-claim is reducible to a framework, or is even able to be captured by framework-talk.

No, history isn't a soft science. — Moliere

Oh, that's an interesting claim. I will have to come back to this, but you said you agreed with Srap, and he clearly takes history to be a social science:

When you turn to the social sciences, there are additional impediments to a scientific approach. The sciences of the past (history and archaeology) face unavoidable limitations on what can be observed... — Srap Tasmaner

That's the most proximate reason I assumed you would accept history as a social science.

preach to his choir — Harry Hindu

Yes. I think it is a kind of preaching, which is why it is so resistant to argument, exchange, objections, questions, accurate representation, etc. Preachers who cannot find a receptive audience might end up preaching to themselves in PMs. Privately talking about how the people who object to their preaching are benighted.

I wouldn't describe this as "coming from without" though — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, and neither would I.

For instance, when a man cheats on his wife, even though he wished he hadn't (giving in to an appetite/passion), we say he has suffered from weakness of will, and perhaps even that his act was not fully voluntary. Whereas, when a man doesn't cheat on his wife because he sees this as truly worse, we don't say that he suffers from "weakness of passion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is because of the difference between receiving and doing that I pointed out. Your word "suffer" is similarly passive. Passion/passio/pathos are all etymologically related to suffering. If an action is something an agent does, then a passion is something an agent endures. Similarly, if I use a shovel to move a pile of dirt, then the shovel is active and the dirt is passive. The shovel is moving and the dirt is being moved.

They are also something we can have more or less control over, through the cultivation of habits (virtues/vices) and the will's ability to overcome the passions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I want to say that, at least in general, we only "control" the passions indirectly. For example, you can't just make yourself angry with the snap of your fingers, even though you can just snap your fingers. A passion is not an action. Snapping your fingers is an action; anger is a passion. In order to get angry you need to perceive injustice, and we cannot directly command ourselves to perceive injustice. We can make ourselves angry by doing things like searching out injustice, or focusing on injustice, or magnifying our perception of an injustice, but this is all indirect.

Passions pertain to passivity; actions pertain to activity.

Here's Aquinas, maybe more than we need:

The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. — Aquinas, ST I-II.22.1 - Whether any passion is in the soul?

I think soft sciences, whatever we happen to include ( and could argue about if we wanted), are just as scientific as the so-called "hard" sciences. — Moliere

Okay, but isn't history a "soft science"? If so, then by your own concession history must be just as scientific as any other science. And yet you've said otherwise...?

has argued over a number of posts that the soft sciences or social sciences are also sciences. What do you make of those arguments?

Oh, an argument? If science were history then they would be in the same department at the university. They are not in the same department at the university, therefore science is not history. — Moliere

Okay, well that is certainly an argument. :up:

"science" (what are we including under that heading...?) — Leontiskos

So I have never heard of a university with a science department. "What are you studying?" "Science." "Hmm?"

I mean, many universities offer a Bachelor of Science degree in history, so what do you make of that?

In other words, by using PM it's easier to avoid the masses who disagree with you, allowing you to escape into a fabricated world of illusion, with a close buddy. Avoid the distractions which reality forces upon you, and really build your own little dream scene.

When I want to escape into my own little world of creativity, I just pm myself. It's all done in the privacy and secrecy of my own mind, commonly known as thinking.

What's with the need for a buddy in your private and secret world of creativity? Do I detect a little insecurity? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you've hit it. Especially in the context of @Banno's recent attacks on religion, his accusations of authoritarianism, the growing acknowledgement that his favored mode of Analytic philosophy is deficient, etc. He makes accusations, the accusations backfire, and then he takes to PM. His problems are self-generated.

So I am worried that your scenario already assumes the thing that we are supposed to be proving. Obviously if we're thinking of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City, and St. Louis does not have the standard that Kansas City has, then that standard is not overarching. The question has already been answered. — Leontiskos

I actually worry about that too, especially with the stuff about translation that I posted. — Srap Tasmaner

I offered what I see as a non-question-begging way to approach the question <here>. Consider now another.

What does @J want? My guess is that if you asked him another simple question, such as, "You want people to avoid authoritarianism. What, precisely and concretely, are you asking them to abstain from?," he would again have no answer. Be that as it may, it is easy enough to point to the kernel of this thread and what @J (but perhaps not @Banno) is ultimately opining on.

So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in J's thought). — Leontiskos

He wants at least two things: niceness and the possibility of growing in knowledge as a community. Prescinding from @J's premise of truth as intersubjectivity, the question is about how and in what ways the two values of niceness and intellectual rigor ought to coexist.

This is closely related to Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - "Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?" This is a kind of limit case or paradigmatic question regarding the topic, and it is closely related to the discussion about the relation between truth and goodness from earlier in the thread. It relates to the so-called "principle of charity," yet without the thoroughgoing vagueness and ambiguity that "principle" inevitably carries.

It's actually worth quoting the article in full, given that it is so relevant and perspicacious. What Aquinas says here is offered as fodder for argument, as always. It may or may not be correct, but at least it is providing real arguments and attempting to answer the question at hand:

Article 4. Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Objection 1. It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools is infinite" (Ecclesiastes 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Genesis 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

Objection 3. Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.

On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 3, Reply to Objection 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply to Objection 1. He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply to Objection 2. It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3. One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above. — Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

(It is worth noting that if Aquinas' position requires religious premises—and it may well do so!—then it remains to be seen how such a position could be justified without those premises. This is another irony of this thread, which is anti-religious in spirit. But I digress...)

A feeling is an activity? — frank

:up:

Or more generally, "A passion is an action?"

A feeling is generally seen as something that happens to us, whereas an activity is generally seen as something we do. To define feelings as activities is a bit like saying, "Internal things that happen to us without our doing anything are things that we do."

When there is an impasse such as this, I would say that what is needed are formal arguments, with explicit premises and conclusions. That's why I have been doing this in many of my recent posts. If you want to give formal arguments I think we can continue. If not, not.

(I saw that a post of yours disappeared. Just so you know, I did not report it or even have a chance to read it. A moderator may have simply taken the initiative.)

The above caught my eye. Given that you believe humans have the same nature, and by this you apparently have in mind a powerful facility to understand the world from the other’s point of view ( linguistic, cultural, scientific), what sort of explanation is left in order to account for profound disagreements concerning ethical, epistemological and philosophical matters ( not to mention day to day conflicts with friends and family members)?

It seems that what is left falls under the categories of medical pathology, incorrect knowledge and irrationality, and moral failure. Is this characterization close to the mark? — Joshs

No, it's really not close at all, beginning with the idea that human nature is the ability to understand the world from someone else's perspective. I don't think that's what human nature is, although human nature includes that (which is why we answer arguments and questions).

If someone thought the only thing humans have in common is the ability to empathize, so to speak, then the opposite of what you hold would follow: there would be no possibility of disagreement; there would be no possibility of distinguishing one's own perspective from another's. There would be one lump of merged view, one over-mind that does not distinguish persons. If all we could do was empathize (so to speak), then there would be no possibility of disagreement at all.

Contrariwise, if we could not say to someone, "You are wrong,"—whether for moral reasons or for some other reason—then we would simply not be intellectual beings with individual views who are able to grow in knowledge and understanding. This so-called "compassion" ironically snuffs out all contexts and perspectives, which is yet another reason why the "contextualism" counter involves non sequitur.

Oh, not by choice -- not a priori -- but a posteriori I started to note how they're different.

It's certainly odd. I recognize that what I say is odd. — Moliere

Well they have something in common and they have something that is different. The question is whether the difference excludes historical study from being scientific, and we would need arguments for that thesis. Obviously the assumption that historical study is altogether unscientific would help preclude the possibility that there is some common thread between history and "science" (what are we including under that heading...?), but that's precisely the sort of assumption that needs to be argued.

I agree. That is the important contribution of the analytic school to the philosophic enterprise. Rigor. — Fire Ologist

mortis. :wink: — Wayfarer

:lol:

The Analytic is analytic. He is a knife: he cuts. He is very good at dividing, separating. He is not good at ...really anything else. So yes, he dissects, criticizes, and accuses; but he is evidently unable to construct, synthesize, or build up. Too often he is someone whose skill with a knife is over-developed, and whose skill elsewhere is underdeveloped.

Insert caveats about shared perspectives, bias and reasoning here. — fdrake

I.e. echo chambers, for people who refuse to engage those on the open forum who question their positions and suggest that they might be wrong. I think this is a very large caveat in the OP's case.

PMs can be great, but when they are being used to limit counterarguments one would prefer to avoid I think they are a poor choice, and a poor use of storage space. Gossip is also a very relevant issue, here, related to echo chambers.

Jamal, any chance of closing this thread, here?

Seems an appropriate point. — Banno

@Jamal, I would prefer that the thread stay open. Banno keeps making his bed. Why not let him sleep in it? <Here> is his newest iteration; his newest bed which will similarly disintegrate and which he will also eventually ask to be closed. He is making threads that are little more than excuses to crap on other members; he craps freely; he refuses to engage; and then he asks for the threads to be closed. I want to say that this habit of "thread"-making is a problem.

I think you successfully show that we can't make a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral norms such that anti-realism closes the door on only the former, and that people always act morally in the sense that their acts might be subject to moral scrutiny (which I think is a bit of a trivial truth). — goremand

Okay, thanks.

I don't quite understand how this gets us to the claim that people all have (implicit, I assume) moral beliefs. — goremand

Do all people make non-hypothetical ought-judgments?

I would like to know if you're even interested in justifying a particular set of norms (rational, moral, whatever) rather than just proving that they are implicitly assumed. — goremand

I wouldn't try to justify some to someone who doesn't see that they are already making others. Does that make sense?

The irony, as I have pointed out before, is that this thread is rooted in a self-contradictory moral accusation. It says, “It is morally impermissible to be so certain that one then accuses others of being wrong; I accuse those who do this of being wrong; and I am certain that they are wrong.” This is bad enough even before the rider is attached, “And I refuse to give arguments for my accusations, or offer 'due process'.”



What you are doing here is very similar. You have decided to ignore me because you think I should not treat any “witness” as “hostile,” even if they are hostile. Such a decision to ignore is inevitably based in an overarching standard, namely one regarding the treatment of witnesses. So in this thread, your exclusionary practice is oddly enough a position taken with respect to the OP. You are another person who excludes and attempts to shame those you disagree with (both directly and through inflammatory insinuation), even though you claim to deny the very standard that such a practice depends upon. This is self-contradictory. You are of course welcome to try to shame me based on your selective readings, but you cannot at the same time eschew the overarching standard that such shaming presupposes.

This is why the promoters of the thesis that there are no overarching standards end up as tyrants. It is because that extreme form of self-righteousness is inherently tyrannical, with an inherent double standard (“There are no overarching standards, but nevertheless my judgments are absolute, beholden to no standard!”). When someone like @Count Timothy von Icarus, @Fire Ologist, or myself tell another that their position is wrong, we provide the standard upon which our judgment is based, and to which appeal can be made. Hence truth and standards are the very things which prevent tyranny. The reason we are happy to answer questions and consider objections is because our will is not absolute.

This is the difference between tyranny and rule of law. In a tyranny you get locked up because the tyrant said so, and the tyrant is beholden to no overarching standards. Where there is rule of law you get locked up on the basis of a standard, and if you can show that the standard does not apply then you will not be locked up. Only where there is tyranny is there no recourse; only where there is tyranny can someone simply say, “Don't bother defending yourselves. [My will is absolute].” Similarly, only where there is tyranny is there a self-elevation above rational discourse, where one says, “I refuse to answer your questions and engage your objections, but I will at the same time pretend and act as if I have done so.” This latter is tyranny even when it is covered over by a thin veneer of politeness.

The ironies of this thread are endless.