You should be ashamed — Srap Tasmaner

Consider a story

You see a thread about two different ways to do philosophy. Looking closer, you find that the subtext reads, "The right way to do philosophy and Srap Tasmaner's way to do philosophy." Soon enough it becomes clear that the premise is even simpler, “Srap Tasmaner is an authoritarian.” This isn’t surprising to you, given that the duo who produced the thread has been consistently doing this sort of thing for over a year now.

So you enter the thread and push back, also giving arguments and asking questions with respect to the thesis. The duo refuses to consider your arguments or answer your questions. For 22 pages they even stonewall a premise of your most basic argument, namely <p v ~p>. So the duo won’t consider your arguments, they won’t answer any questions, and all the while they maintain their thesis, “Srap is an authoritarian.” At one point one of them actually says, “My answer to your questions is, ‘I don’t know.’ And you’re still an authoritarian.” A banana republic. Splendid.

But then someone who is more serious enters the thread: someone who agrees with a speculative thesis that the duo believes supports their moral thesis. He is willing to hear your arguments and answer your questions. He is not neutral, but he is at least genuinely trying. You point out some of his non-neutral presuppositions, and he tries to reconfigure his analogies. He is intent on turning a blind eye to the moral nature of the central accusation and wants to keep to the speculative thesis. That’s fine. At least he is answering questions and exchanging arguments. He is the first person to do that on the duo’s behalf, and he is offering the first real arguments for anything resembling the thesis of the thread.

Then he sees you give an argument for why the duo are themselves authoritarian.* He takes umbrage, refuses to continue, and says, “You should be ashamed.” All because you argued that someone was an authoritarian. Imagine how fucking crazy that would be. :meh:

(In the end you think wryly to yourself, “Maybe I should have just called them authoritarian instead of arguing the point. Surely that’s what makes all the difference.” :grin:)


* What you mistakenly took me to be explaining I have indeed explained elsewhere in the thread.

"the problem with J" — Srap Tasmaner

Much like your strange claim that I was concerned with pseudoscience in this thread, this claim is similarly lacking in accuracy. None of the posts you reference make any mention of @J. I certainly don't think he is a "hermeneuticist." I had in mind those who explicitly appeal to "philosophical hermeneutics."

Nevertheless, it is quite natural to opine on what @J believes when he refuses to answer question after question, and also to opine on why he constantly refuses. It's no coincidence that human systems such as courts have remedies for that form of evasion. The solution is simple: @J merely needs to engage in philosophy and answer the questions posed to him. To engage the members of the forum. That is a guideline here, after all. As is the guideline against "evangelization," such as the incessant opposition to so-called "monism."

(See also )

So I'll not be participating in this thread anymore. Fire Ologist and @Leontiskos, I think you should be ashamed of yourselves.

@Leontiskos, back when I was a mod, I would have warned you pages ago to cease your relentless attempts to diagnose "the problem with @J". It's inappropriate. It's disrespectful. And in my view it's a violation of the site guidelines, but none of the other mods have ever been as committed to reining in this sort of behavior as I was. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's nonsense. From your very first post you've had a biased read on the whole discussion. The strawmen you've relied on and your inflammatory language throughout is indicative of this (e.g. "juvenile," "unserious," "policing," "stuck," "imprisoned," "anxious," "baggage"). Your whole concept of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City begs the question, as has been pointed out. And you haven't even acknowledged the other ways to consider the question. But it is convenient that you won't have to confront that growing laundry list now, isn't it?

I am disappointed to see this silliness from you. @Fire Ologist said it very well:

I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.

And then the Judge would force you to answer “are all narratives acceptable or not?” The most liberal progressive judge would demand, “in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say ‘all narratives may be true’ stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the ‘truth’ you swore, since you won’t answer the question and think it doesn’t matter.” — Fire Ologist

And in my view it's a violation of the site guidelines — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, insofar as I think moderators ought to address the way that @Banno and @J make accusations and insinuations before prevaricating and hiding in the bushes, thread after thread.

This thread is a testament to what happens when the targets of catty, moralizing sniping confront the snipers, and it turns out the snipers have nothing of substance to offer.

I am beginning to think that as soon as they see an end in sight, they feel the need to back track, take a turn, or just stop moving. — Fire Ologist

It's .

Ends, like foundations, are anathema to the purely analytic philosophic enterprise. And sets a standard that cannot be met, namely, deconstruction without construction. — Fire Ologist

I mostly agree, but I would say that Analytics do hold to a standard of consistency. Hence the between two self-described dissectors in the thread.

@Banno tends to become "aimless" whenever he tries to move beyond a criterion of consistency, as he is doing in this thread.

If there are many, then we cannot know who shares our form, and so we cannot know that we are playing a language game at all. — Hanover

Yes, and we certainly cannot know that we are playing the same language game as someone else.

There are certain assumptions that need to be made for it to be the case that all general epistemic principles (or any at all) must require a standpoint outside any paradigm to achieve. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the work you did can be utilized elsewhere, which is why I keep bringing it up. Don't we all agree that data should not be falsified? How did we do that? Did we all have to step outside ourselves in order to recognize it, grab hold of the truth, and hold on tight as we stepped back inside ourselves? How were we all able to recognize that standard even though some of us live in St. Louis and others live in Kansas City?

What I find funny about the "hermeneuticists" I have encountered is that their practice shows them to be looking for a "view from nowhere," even as they speak against it. They attempt to float above the fray with endless qualifications and contextualizations, and to what end? They clearly think that they are approaching some kind of objective view. My approach is much different, it is, "Cut out the fat and just give me an argument for what you believe to be true." Jump into the water right where you are and start swimming. That's how you get somewhere. It's no coincidence that many of the folks who fret day and night about frameworks and contexts and all the rest of it are remarkably bad at giving and recognizing arguments. That sort of dancing can become an excuse for avoiding arguments; a way to "rise above" without getting your hands dirty.

Yeah, that's one of the points I wanted to make. There are certain assumptions that need to be made for it to be the case that all general epistemic principles (or any at all) must require a standpoint outside any paradigm to achieve. I don't think those are good assumptions though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. :up:

Consider Plato's "being ruled by the rational part of the soul," as an epistemic meta-virtue. The basic idea that, ceteris paribus, one will tend towards truth... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. I've been pondering misology, and the way that the passions can hijack the reason.

For example, if someone wants to never admit they're wrong, then might achieve that by holding that every narrative is equal, including their own. They might avoid clarity in conversation, avoid being "put on the record," avoid answering questions, etc. All of that is great if you want to ensure that you will never be proven wrong. Opacity in general is a great help. But this is all passion-driven. The desire to never be wrong, or to never be shown to be wrong, is derived from the passions, not the reason. It's not at all clear how one can argue against such passions.

Though "science" in scare quotes makes me think you have something else in mind, and the examples are not persuasive. — Moliere

I just find it odd to separate scientific study from historical study. This bears on the discussion of "scientificity" from <another thread>.

I wonder most about where Banno said in the OP “perhaps we need both.”

I’d say we certainly do. No one ever says something meaningful about the world without both. (But I can hear the police sirens again… — Fire Ologist

I think that's right. Those darn sirens. :smile:

In general I wouldn't define it onone way or the other but would leave it to the particular referent (the particular case of incommensurability) -- but I do think the more interesting case would be when we say "No, not even one strand relates but the referent is the same"

For this I just go to science and history -- they both speak about "the world", but in their own particular idioms and ways of making inferences. They both mean "reality", and they mean it in a realist way such as "reality outside of my particular opinions about reality, but rather what the best methods/values which produce knowledge say"

At least that's the example which impresses me the most... — Moliere

There is simply no argument here to the effect that "science" and history have no common thread.

It'd be foolish to say either scientists or historians don't know anything because of the universalization of the standards of science or history exclude the other. Much better to shrug and say "I'm not sure how these guys relate -- perhaps we don't translate one into the other, but are about the same thing, and so demonstrate different facets of the same reality" — Moliere

We can say that "science" and history have a common thread without saying that either "scientists" or historians don't know anything. Similarly, saying, "I'm not sure how they relate," says nothing about whether there is a common thread.

I'm afraid these are all invalid arguments.

We've already seen a common thread between "science" and history, namely, "Do not falsify your data."

Given my best take on reality, it looks to me like it's impossible to arrive contextless and baggage-less . . . But I'm happy to add those qualifications. — J

Leaves open the possibility or at least hope of baggage free observation. — Fire Ologist

Yes, "I believe there is an overarching standard absolutely precluding contextlessness, but I could be wrong." So @J believes in an overarching standard. That he thinks he could be wrong is neither here nor there, since no one is claiming infallibility.

The objection here is, "That's not a 'standard', that's just how reality is!" Again:

The central contention of the thread can still be denied even if there is no view from nowhere, so long as there is a common thread running through the entire domain of “contexts.” The quintessential example would be the principle of non-contradiction (PNC), which is not merely a psychological principle; it is something that we both can and cannot choose to obey or disobey. It is not merely elective or optional, and yet it is nevertheless normative. This is precisely to the point, given that the “real ambiguity” I spoke about exists because we are talking about “exclusion” from the rational community, and it is not at all clear that one can opt in or out of the rational community. — Leontiskos

I want to say that the question of this thread is bound up with the question of whether we all have common aims, or more precisely, common ends. — Leontiskos

@Count Timothy von Icarus is not a police officer going around saying, "You're now in the jurisdiction of Venezuela, and therefore you're beholden to this Venezuelan law I have here in my pocket!" He is engaged in a Socratic move, "Although you don't know it, you just contradicted yourself. And if you think you don't care about contradicting yourself, then I will show you that you really do care about it."

Well, actually I meant the opposite.

I can put it another way: it's a question of whether the subject who judges things like narratives and paradigms and cities is thick or thin. In the thick conception, the subject comes with a history, a culture, a worldview, all that relativist business; in the thin view, he comes armed with rationality.

It's in that sense that taking the subject as a quite abstract rational judge is treating them as starting over each moment, entirely without the sort of baggage we all actually have. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that no one in the thread is claiming such a thing, but you anticipate this objection:

I think Count Timothy von Icarus is especially interested in being in position to tell someone that they *should* put down some baggage they're carrying. The grounds for saying so would be (a) that this particular burden does not help you in making rational judgments, and (b) that Tim can tell (a) is the case by exercising rational judgment. (Stop thinking you need to sacrifice chipmunks to the river every spring so it will thaw, would be a typical Enlightenment example.)

I'm not sure how close that is to your view (or if it is in fact Tim's), but that's the sort of thing I imagine is on the table when people say they want an overarching standard. — Srap Tasmaner

First I think it is quite important to note the initial claim. @Count Timothy von Icarus did not start a thread saying, "I want an overarching standard." It is the other way around, where @Banno started a thread after private conversation with @J, opposing overarching standards.

Be that as it may, let's suppose someone claims that there is an overarching standard and that Jake has violated it. Does it follow that the person has a thin and not a thick conception of paradigms, or that Jake is being asked to put down baggage? I don't see why it would. All that is needed is a common thread running through every paradigm, from which the standard can be derived. The paradigms can be as thick as you like.

Do we agree that one can coherently say "I don't know"? — Banno

You're welcome to say "I don't know" when presented with ' question about whether all narratives are equal or some narratives are unequal. But if you really don't know the answer that question, then it is odd that you would write a thread claiming that dissection-narratives are better than discourse-narratives. You can't maintain your OP here while simultaneously saying that you don't know whether some narratives are unequal. :kiss:

Here is how I would approach the topic. First, read to Banno, beginning with the words, "I concede..."

What I do there is identify a common aim that Banno and I share within that conversation. I want to say that the question of this thread is bound up with the question of whether we all have common aims, or more precisely, common ends. Let me be very explicit about how this relates to the central question: if we do not have common ends, then there is no overarching standard; if we do have at least one common end, then there is at least one overarching standard.

(Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II.Q1 - Man's last end)

Oh, so as in -- one standard that was there before the paradigm shift and one that was there after the paradigm shift such that we know that the new paradigm is better than the old paradigm due to the standards external to the paradigms of evaluation? — Moliere

Sort of. It's asking if there is a common thread between the two paradigms, given that each paradigm is made up of many different strands.

My intention was absolutely to treat it as an open question. — Srap Tasmaner

Understood.

I actually worry about that too, especially with the stuff about translation that I posted.

I want, on the one hand, to leverage the recognition that people do not start from scratch every moment of their lives, but to avoid suggesting -- what is clearly false! -- that change is impossible. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. I suppose I can see how that recognition has leverage with respect to the central question, namely insofar as the premise which says we start from scratch would invalidate the possibility of an overarching standard.

Ultimately I think we need to give arguments for or against the central thesis of the thread. It seems like you're trying to present things that stay perfectly neutral with respect to the central thesis, but nevertheless elucidate the question. I think it is often possible to do that, but it is very difficult in this case. I actually think gave a pretty definitive argument, providing an example of an overarching standard. Perhaps everyone already agrees that the standard he presented is overarching...?

If I wanted to try to straddle the neutrality fence, then I would present an image that pertains to bindingness or beholden-ness. Such as, "Is this a question of Venezuelan jurisdiction or is it a jurisdiction-less question?" I struggle to see any way in which the example about St. Louis and Kansas City has even the capacity to support the position which holds there to be overarching standards. I could manufacture some possibility, but it will look weak given that predetermined setup. In other words, the very notion that someone would posit an overarching standard which says that someone must move from St. Louis to Kansas City is pretty outlandish.

Hey you're right! I suppose it's all one big thread to me. We all end up saying the same things in every thread, myself included, though I keep trying to have new ideas... — Srap Tasmaner

No worries. :lol:

I think that was Count Timothy von Icarus's phrase. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I added this in an edit:

...Count has spoken about pseudoscience, but I take him to be speaking analogically, and I do not take him to be interested in that question per se, apart from the parallels it has to the more central question. — Leontiskos

I see the pseudoscience question that @Count Timothy von Icarus has raised as an analogy for something that would be more generally considered beyond the pale.

It's whether there are overarching standards we are beholden to and can rely upon when judging the worth of a narrative (all the etc). — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, excellent. Thanks for setting this out. I agree. :clap:

All I was trying to do is see what such a thing would look and act like when you are already committed to such a narrative, when you already live somewhere and the question is not the abstract "Where should one live?" but the more concrete "Should I move?" — Srap Tasmaner

This makes the assumption that the person's starting point is not beholden to the the standard, no? It's a bit like, "Well I live in Brazil and I could move to Venezuela, but I'm going to have a look at the Venezuelan laws to see if it would be a good idea to move."

So I am worried that your scenario already assumes the thing that we are supposed to be proving. Obviously if we're thinking of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City, and St. Louis does not have the standard that Kansas City has, then that standard is not overarching. The question has already been answered.

This is really, really helpful, for I believe it highlights precisely what @J has been doing all along. It also shows how easy it is to get leverage on such things when someone just answers simple questions simply.

They are, quite clearly, self explanatory — AmadeusD

That's sort of your answer to everything. You very seldom give reasons or arguments for your positions. That's a problem when you're on a philosophy forum. Know that I am simply not going to continue responding to your posts if they do not present any arguments or reasons for your claims.

I was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder on the 5th of March 1998. My parents told me to ignore the psychiatrist and not take the prescribed medications. I didn't listen to my parents. I trusted my psychiatrist and took the prescribed medications. 27 years and 3 months later, I am still struggling with depression and all the side-effects of the prescribed medications. I have gone from 65 kg to 98 kg as my medication causes weight gain. My mental illness has ruined my physical health, education, career and relationships. I often wonder how my life would be if I had listened to my parents instead of my psychiatrist. — Truth Seeker

One way we improve is by identifying mistakes and then resolving to change. What do you see as your mistake in this instance? What is the thing you wish you had done differently?

Ideally you want to identify something that is more than surface-level. So you shouldn't look back and say, "I shouldn't have taken medication, and therefore I now resolve to not take any medications." Or even, "I shouldn't have taken psychiatric medication, and therefore I now resolve to not take psychiatric medication." You want to identify something deeper than that.

The case you give is tricky because you were stuck between the authority of a medical professional and the authority of your parents, both of which have a strong purchase on you. Ideally you should start with smaller changes and less difficult questions if you want to improve your ability to make choices. "Small steps," as they say.

A book that might help, "Prudence: Choose Confidently, Live Boldly."

More simply, Aristotle's advice would be to identify people who you believe make good choices, and emulate them. Also consult and associate with them if at all possible.

Q7. Is there some standard that is being followed both before and after a paradigm shift? — Leontiskos

Yes. Though they need not be the same standard. — Moliere

To be clear, "some" = "one."

The plan was to approach the problem of relativism in a particular way, by acknowledging that you are already relying on some particular worldview (etc) when you face the question of whether some other worldview is "acceptable" or in some other way good. It's not like going shopping for something you don't have yet. (Hence the usefulness of the metaphor of where you live, since you must already live somewhere ― although I guess your thorough-going skeptic or cynic just wanders, "no fixed abode," which I guess we will now get dragged into talking about.)

The sorts of issues I wanted to raise seem obvious to me: you've got a worldview, and presumably it provides the framework within which you will evaluate alternative worldviews ― smart money is on finding that you've already got the best one and the others are crap. Even leaving that aside, what are you even evaluating? Is it a genuine alternative? Or is it that alternative as understood in the categories you're already using? It's an issue of translation, right? You have to translate the other framework into yours ― how do you evaluate the fidelity of that process? Is it even possible to access a different worldview that way? (Can you know a city the way the locals do without just being one of them?) — Srap Tasmaner

It sounds like you're an investor with some initial capital and you're looking to improve your lot. "Maybe I should move to Kansas City. Hmm..."

Again, I'm not sure what this has to do with this thread. What is the normative question you believe to be at stake? How does this relate to what has been discussed in the thread?

So when they discount all references to the world as metaphysical and vacuous and ill-conceived, in addition to contradicting themselves by speaking at all and situating themselves outside of the world in a language, they in effect make speaking meaningless. Which is, if they are conscious of it, why they devour all attempts to say anything. — Fire Ologist

Good. This is almost exactly Aristotle's argument for the PNC in Metaphysics IV. "You are welcome to deny the PNC, so long as you never speak or use language."

I am starting to see the dialectic as between process oriented (with no clear goal) (like this thread Banno set up), and goal oriented (with a clear process) (like proponents of truth like). — Fire Ologist

The trouble is the fact that processes have goals by definition.

We probably should not allow the constant reframing of the central question. — Fire Ologist

Yes, and even more fundamentally, we should all be willing to state what we believe the central question is.

This thread will certainly never get there, which is ironic as they are stuck in the mud, mud being the clearest form and context for them. — Fire Ologist

The thread is another example of, "X is bad and I won't say why." It is very similar to the faith thread, "Faith is bad and I won't say why." Whenever they try to say why they end up utilizing strawmen of faith (or whatever it is). So you say, "What is faith, on your reckoning?" Or, "What is authoritarianism, on your reckoning?" And their response is prevarication. It's just tyranny, and you can't reason with a tyrant. They have to be open to rational argumentation and a defense of their views before you can reason with them.

---

And note that this entire line of posting was started by your conflation of "all narratives are true or they aren't" that is "all x are y or not all x are y," as being equivalent "each x is either y or not-y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

More than conflation. @Banno decided to stick his head three feet into the sand to avoid seeing what had been pointed out to him ad nauseum. That he still hasn't admitted the point is beyond belief, even for him.

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So by "making sense of such beliefs" you mean something like achieving coherence i.e. exposing the contradiction in denying it? I think that's a step short of justification. — goremand

Have a look at the thread in question if you like. I would again liken this thread more to my thread on the moral sphere, where I try to show people that they already have moral beliefs.

(So much of this is closely parallel to debates about moral bindingness. I feel as if <my thread on the moral sphere> could be retooled for intellectual virtue rather than moral virtue, and it would address the central contention of this thread. In that sense we would say, “Whether or not there are binding and overarching standards, everyone believes there are.” Similarly, my <recent thread> says, “We all believe there are binding and overarching standards, but can we make sense of such beliefs?”) — Leontiskos

You're latching onto that last sentence, which is about a different thread.

Because one or two folks are denying it. Even their simple claim, "You are bound to not-bind people," is self-contradictory.

(My internet cut at <this post>, so this reply is directed to what came before.)

My understanding was that if you're intent on policing the boundary between science and something else (art, sport, pseudoscience), you want to reliably pick out all and only sciences — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not sure about your premise, but either way I think the conditional is mistaken. One does not need to reliably pick out all and only sciences in order to exclude pseudoscience. All one needs is a single necessary condition in order to exclude something like pseudoscience.

It's just another way of talking about "all and only" — Srap Tasmaner

Whether or not that is correct, I don’t see the need to talk about “...and only.” If something doesn’t have legs then it isn’t a table (on that example I gave). We don’t need to claim that only tables have legs in order to make exclusions based on the necessary criterion of legs.

This is exactly why I moved to anchor the normative question to relations among or transitions between given epistemes (worldviews, frameworks, ideologies, whatever). — Srap Tasmaner

What do you suppose the normative question is? I gave my account <here>. I hope it was clear.

You are assuming that we have some species of activity and we need to define it in order to justify exclusionary practices. Let me show you a different way to think about it...

Again, I want to say that the central contention of the thread is, “There are no overarching standards by which we are bound.” A number of us are opposing that thesis. @Count Timothy von Icarus' example of falsifying data or evidence strikes me as an excellent counterexample, and the fact that @Banno resisted him shows that it does cut against the thesis of the thread.

I’m not quite sure what your analogies about St. Louis and Kansas City have to do with this central question. I can dream up ways to connect them, but those dreams involve lots of contentious assumptions.

I’m guessing you want to talk about necessary conditions because necessary conditions pertain to exclusion, and you seem to have assumed that someone is trying to “police” or “exclude.” Of course, Banno and @J are trying to police and exclude (certain levels of certainty), but I don’t think that’s what you meant.

A moral analogy might be helpful (and the thread is really just moral philosophy in the end anyhow). Compare law to morality, namely legal jurisdiction to the universal moral “jurisdiction.” If we say, “You’ve broken a law of Venezuela,” then we will of course need necessary conditions for what counts as Venezuelan jurisdiction. But if we say, “You’ve murdered someone,” we don’t need to figure out whether the guilty party was under Venezuelan jurisdiction, because murder is impermissible everywhere. The thread is precisely about such universal standards, such as a standard which says that one may not falsify evidence as a matter of inquiry. We are talking about standards that apply everywhere, so it doesn’t matter whether we move from St. Louis to Kansas City. The contextualists are saying, “There is nothing which is impermissible everywhere.” On this “different way to think about it,” we are asking about unconditional necessities, not necessary conditions.

Now there is real ambiguity in whether we are talking about excluding from some species of activity, or else opposing certain things regardless of the species of activity. I have been leaning towards the latter, as I think it is closer to the heart of the thread. Someone of your mind would naturally transpose any enunciation of the latter into some variety of the former, and I think @Count Timothy von Icarus’s points about falsifying data offer a good example of how to confront such an approach.

More precisely, I think ’s claim that view-from-nowhere thinking is more pervasive than we realize is correct, and that this is related to your own belief that <If there is no view from nowhere, then there are no standards or rules that apply regardless of the species of activity>. The central contention of the thread can still be denied even if there is no view from nowhere, so long as there is a common thread running through the entire domain of “contexts.” The quintessential example would be the principle of non-contradiction (PNC), which is not merely a psychological principle; it is something that we both can and cannot choose to obey or disobey. It is not merely elective or optional, and yet it is nevertheless normative. This is precisely to the point, given that the “real ambiguity” I spoke about exists because we are talking about “exclusion” from the rational community, and it is not at all clear that one can opt in or out of the rational community. It is not clear that in the face of an accusation of irrationality, one can respond, “Oh, I wasn’t attempting to be rational.”

(So much of this is closely parallel to debates about moral bindingness. I feel as if <my thread on the moral sphere> could be retooled for intellectual virtue rather than moral virtue, and it would address the central contention of this thread. In that sense we would say, “Whether or not there are binding and overarching standards, everyone believes there are.” Similarly, my <recent thread> says, “We all believe there are binding and overarching standards, but can we make sense of such beliefs?”)

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Glancing at this:

Take Leontiskos's anxiety about distinguishing science from pseudoscience. — Srap Tasmaner

Note that I have literally not said a single word about "pseudoscience" in this thread, so you're clearly mixed up. What I think is happening is that you are projecting <this thread> and <this thread> into the one we are in now. ...Count has spoken about pseudoscience, but I take him to be speaking analogically, and I do not take him to be interested in that question per se, apart from the parallels it has to the more central question.

@Srap Tasmaner:

I actually think the thread—at least this part of it—has largely been considering the question of whether scientists in two different fields can be said to be doing the same thing, rather than whether a scientist can pry himself out of his field and embed himself in a different field. For example, it could be asked whether a scientist's opinion with regard to a foreign field is capable of being worthwhile, or whether a non-scientist's opinions about scientific questions are of any worth. The thread has also been concerned with normativity, e.g. "criteria." So we have been asking whether there are common threads that are criteria. — Leontiskos

Although it may sound partisan, the simple fact of the matter is that @Banno and @J have been trying to chastise a certain moral disposition:

I guess it kinda grounds my OP - a moral preference for doubt. — Banno

They think it is morally wrong to philosophically engage in a certain way (i.e. with a particular level of certainty).

The whole thread has a moral flavor. It is about whether we are allowed to do certain things, philosophically, and specifically whether we are morally allowed. Your posts are interesting, but they may be missing this central piece of the thread.

The moral thesis of Banno and J is something like, "It is impermissible to judge someone wrong simpliciter, because there are no unconditioned criteria that bind everyone." It is the idea that we can only ever say that someone is wrong according to such and such a standard, but that there are no overarching standards which can be said to bind everyone. And this is applied in a scientific or philosophical register, as for example in claiming that someone's philosophical position is wrong. My notion of, "Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB)," may be helpful, even though it is a rough sketch.

May she rest in peace. :flower:

Looking at these recent responses, I don't think it's useful to set up a dialectical between "contextlessness" as a "view from nowhere/everywhere" on the one hand, and admitting the relevance of context on the other. This sort of thinking is, as far as I can tell, something that largely emerges in the 19th century and had cracked up by the mid-20th century. It relies on certain metaphysical presuppositions that are endemic to much modern thought, but which I don't think hold water. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, I think we're falling into Enlightenment categories. I don't think anyone here favors Enlightenment rationality (except perhaps when @J channels Nagel).

I think of reason and principles of knowledge in analogous terms to this example, not as a dialectic where one pole is "contextless." This means looking for unifying principles. For instance, the principle of lift is in some ways the same in different sorts of insect wings, bird wings, bi-planes, drones, fighter jets, etc. and yet it is clear that these are all very different and require a unique understanding. Likewise for principles in complexity studies that unify phenomena as diverse as heart cell synchronization, fire fly blinking, and earthquakes. Identifying a common principle is not a claim to have stepped outside a consideration of fire flies and heart cells, but rather a claim to have found a "one" that is present in "many." If such principles didn't exist, I don't know how knowledge would be possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is well-stated. :up:

---

- Thanks for your answers. I will try to come back to this. :up:

It seems to me that you're simply asking if realism is the case. — Harry Hindu

Why do you think that? The problem is that the "contextualists" presumably do not see their position as precluding realism.

Count’s been doing one thing for about 10 pages now. Beating his head against the wall... — Fire Ologist

Yes:

This is why I effectively ↪told him, "There is very little evidence that Banno and @J are interested in playing basketball at all." — Leontiskos

And the irony of it all is that, IMO, it is the absolute and truth alone that defeat tyrannical authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is about a person, not an idea. The absolute is knowledge, which makes you, the knower, your own authority. That is the beginning of any possibility of avoiding tyranny. — Fire Ologist

Exactly. Those who are bound to the truth are not bound to any person's will. Truth is the only thing that liberates from authoritarianism, as we have seen especially in Communist regimes.

And you are always the one on these threads who sees God lurking. — Fire Ologist

Was the OP just an attempt to supply an argument for the predetermined conclusion that religious thinking is bad? It doesn't seem to have succeeded.

The irony here is that Banno does a 180 when he goes after religion, relying on unimpeachable principles that religion has supposedly transgressed. "Any stick to beat the devil."

I’m going to move on to the Srap-Leon conversation, with Moliere and Wayfarer, where people seem to be working together. — Fire Ologist

Good choice. It's not a coincidence that my first serious post in the thread was written to @Srap Tasmaner. In fact, in writing my Last rigorous thread, I tried to wait to post it until Srap or fdrake were around, and I literally went out of my way to post it in the early morning, when I knew Banno was asleep in Australia. It was all for naught, given that he sabotaged the whole thing anyway. The only threads where you can do <this> would be threads like Jamal's, where the owner writes the thread.

Yes, that's the idea ― and I'm glad it's clear enough despite me mixing up the numbers. (Anyone who found the post deeply confusing should reload to see my edits.) — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, I understand it better now ...I think. Some of this relates to my point about the part-whole relationship, where each implies the other.

We landed at some point on questions like this: Are all narratives acceptable? — Srap Tasmaner

Right: "narratives" was another of the words floating around in this ocean of a discussion. :smile:

To be fair, in many of these discussions I feel like someone drives their truck into a giant swamp, and we're all watching from the sidelines. They inevitably end up stuck in the middle of nowhere, and when they look around for help everyone is sort of scratching their heads and staring at each other, wide-eyed.

What this means is...

Hence my plan of grounding the question instead on the relations among thingies — Srap Tasmaner

...I want to ask specific and clear questions. For that reason I am wary of the word "thingies." It's not a good combination when the words are vague and everyone is looking for an excuse to claim that they are correct.

I don't want to, but in the interests of comity I will also answer your questions ― with the proviso that I'm not altogether happy about my answers. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, thanks. I think it will serve as a helpful starting point to orient us and clarify misunderstandings. It's something I can come back to and reference if I become confused about your position, and it allows us to see if we've actually changed our minds or not in the end.

I like your discussion of "scientificity" since it is so focused, and because I know what you're talking about:

[When it comes to the sciences...] I think (a) we are really talking about a classic "family resemblance" here, where there are a great many criteria in play, an evolving set, and you won't find all of them or a consistent subset that identifies all and only science, and (b) science doesn't have a monopoly on any of the strands of the rope that binds the sciences together ― which is why identifying a few things common to all scientific practice (as I confidently do above) is not quite enough to identify only science (necessary but not sufficient). — Srap Tasmaner

This is presumably related to Q3:

Q3. Is there some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them? — Leontiskos

First, to (a) I would say that we have to think about abstraction here. What the opponents of myself and @Count Timothy von Icarus have consistently refused to do is engage in more encompassing abstractions (see my post <here>).

Let me try to illustrate this with a very simple example:

• "Tables have no single thing in common, because some have three legs, and some have four legs and some have five legs, etc."
• "It is true that if we confine ourselves to the genus, "Number of legs," then tables have nothing in common. But what if abstract beyond the number of legs and think instead about the fact of legs? Even if all tables have a different number of legs, once we pry ourselves out of that confined genus we can see a commonality: namely that all tables have legs."
• "But not all tables have legs!"
• "Perhaps not, but do you see how we can abstract by expanding our thinking beyond a single confined genus?"

Now note that you have to omit "and only" from (a) if (a) is not to collapse into (b). And note that Q3 asks precisely whether there is something common to the sciences, not whether there is something that is only common to the sciences. This is a good example of why I want to pay attention to the questions that we take ourselves to be answering.

Your preliminary answer to Q3 was, "Yes-ish ― this one is in some ways too easy and too hard." Now is it too easy when we ask what is common to the sciences, and too hard when we ask what is restricted to the sciences? Or is there a different reason why it is "too easy and too hard"?

I think the question is easy because it asks what is common to the sciences (and I think that is what the thread has been focused on, namely the possibility of "overarching" characteristics or norms). We've already identified some of the commonalities recently, for example here:

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. — Srap Tasmaner

Now regarding (b), I sort of agree with you. I am happy to agree for the sake of argument, given that I don't think (b) bears on Q3 or this thread. I think it is a separate question, and I don't want this thread to balloon more than it already has. But let me know if you think we need to answer (b).

It is clear that people sometimes leave St. Louis and light out for Kansas City. It is possible,... — Srap Tasmaner

Let me lay my cards on the table regarding these questions of "switching positions with someone else." Humans are enormously adaptable, and they all have the same nature. I think we can switch positions with others, whether linguistically, culturally, scientifically, etc. There are a few limitations and immutabilities, but when we are speaking about volitional realities I don't see much in the way of per se impossibility of switching positions.

I have very mixed feelings about the issue of "commensurability" but yeah, I would like everything you mentioned to be on the table. I think it is perfectly reasonable to ask whether any of us can truly understand the ancient Greeks, say. I think it's perfectly reasonable to ask a question like that even if I were later convinced that it's in some way a defective question. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, good.

I once saw a small flock of birds attempt to perch in a very small yellow-leaved tree. It was too small for all of them to light so they sort of swarmed around it, some finding a spot then taking to the air again moments later. They gave up after maybe five or ten seconds and set off to find a better spot, and left behind a nearly bare tree, the beating of so many wings and jostling about of all these little birds had caused nearly every leaf to fall. I felt, just for a moment, as if I had seen the tree ravished by Zeus, who had taken the form of a flock of birds. — Srap Tasmaner

Very nice. That's part of why I wanted to bring up commensurability and communicability - precisely because they are not agonistic. They presuppose no "prying out what is stuck." Of course one could pick up "commensurability" and revivify the metaphor of stuckness, but I want an optional lens that does not presuppose stuckness.

I actually think the thread—at least this part of it—has largely been considering the question of whether scientists in two different fields can be said to be doing the same thing, rather than whether a scientist can pry himself out of his field and embed himself in a different field. For example, it could be asked whether a scientist's opinion with regard to a foreign field is capable of being worthwhile, or whether a non-scientist's opinions about scientific questions are of any worth. The thread has also been concerned with normativity, e.g. "criteria." So we have been asking whether there are common threads that are criteria.

Kicking myself for not noticing you had already used the same metaphor: — Srap Tasmaner

I'm glad you pointed it out because I think it's the same metaphor applied differently. I.e. "common thread" vs. "binding thread." Or, "Is there some thread common to all the sciences?," vs. "are there threads that run through the sciences and through nothing else?" Note that the first question is neither about the necessary or sufficient conditions of science. It is simply about whether there are things that all the sciences share. For example, if we accepted that all tables have legs, it would not follow that nothing else has legs. The idea that this criterion must therefore have to do with "necessity" is bound up with (Kripke's, among others) modal essentialism, which I don't find helpful.

And the answer is almost certainly yes, but what's common is only part of what makes both science, or both the same science, or whatever, so it's not the whole explanation. Anyway, that's my hunch. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that's exactly what I was just trying to say. :nerd:

"Is there a common thread?," is different from, "What threads must [this] have in order to call it 'this', or in order to be [this]."

...Apart from that setting of the stage, I will add one thing. We can also think about this in terms of commensurability and communicability. For example, we could ask whether two people could communicate with one another even despite their different "languages." We could ask whether people from two different paradigms or epochs would be able to communicate despite that difference. We could ask whether someone before a paradigm shift could understand or anticipate the post-shift reality, and whether someone after a paradigm shift could understand the pre-shift reality. And so on...

I've been dithering about whether to get back into this. I've been looking for a way to do so without simply playing partisan to one side. — Srap Tasmaner

Well we owe you, because the thread is in need of such a thing. :up:

The conflict here is certainly about (1). — Srap Tasmaner

I agree.

I would like to see this approached as an open question, but I'd like to frame it in a particular way, as a question about (1), upon which we all agree. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, so we are searching for a question...

That's close enough to what I have in mind, only I'd throw in every sort of framework, worldview, evidence regime (or whatever it's called, Joshs has mentioned this), and so on. If you like, you could even throw in language-games. — Srap Tasmaner

So now we are asking, "Are there [paradigm/framework/worldview/evidence regime/language game/scheme]-independent standards?"

Is that the question you want to ask?

I thought "context" was too broad, and I am similarly worried that your question is too broad. I think I vaguely understand what you mean, though. When talking about this "question" (it is questionable whether it is a single question), I will try to use a single term to help us keep to the same page.

In the thread we have been talking about whether there is some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them. I think that question is more manageable, but we can ask many. I am not averse to questions.

So here's how I would want to address question (2): is there some mechanism available for prying yourself out of a given scheme/worldview/framework, and is that mechanism the use of reason? We might see this as a step required for the change or evolution of a worldview (though not the only way), or as a mechanism for shifting from one paradigm to another, Kuhn be damned. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, so the premise here is that I'm stuck and I need to be pried out?

I haven't read Kuhn's book either, but perhaps we're asking if there is some common thread between the two paradigms in which the shift is effected.

So there are two ways it could be anchored to issue (1): either (a) as what connects one thingy (worldview, framework, conceptual scheme) to another, or changes a thingy noticeably; or (b) as something that enables you to free yourself entirely from the false prison of all thingies. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. We could also say (c) that there is some standard that is being followed both before and after the paradigm shift. A standard that is not affected by the paradigm shift. This is like (a) but it abandons the premise of prying out what is stuck.

I want to add that it seems clear to me that the project of the Enlightenment hoped that reason could pull off (b), and much follows in its train (reason is the birthright of all, no one need ever again be beholden to another in areas of knowledge, and so on). — Srap Tasmaner

Right.

So is it possible to set aside all worldviews, frameworks, and schemes, by the use of reason? (To achieve, in that much-reviled phrase, a "view from nowhere".) Is reason the crucial means by which one jettisons the current framework for a new one? Or is there something other than reason that can allow such transition or liberation? — Srap Tasmaner

What if we give our preliminary answers to the questions on the table before proceeding? Would that be a bad idea? Here is a collection of the questions:

• Q1. Are there context-independent standards?
• Old2. Are there context-dependent standards?
• Q2. Is there some mechanism available for prying yourself out of a given scheme/worldview/framework, and is that mechanism the use of reason?
• Q3. Is there some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them?
• Q4. Are there [paradigm/framework/worldview/evidence regime/language game/scheme]-independent standards?
• Q5. Is there something that connects one thingy (worldview, framework, conceptual scheme) to another?
• Q6. Is there something that enables you to free yourself entirely from the false prison of all thingies?
• Q7. Is there some standard that is being followed both before and after a paradigm shift?

My preliminary answers, to the best of my ability and in a yes/no format:

• Q1. Yes, depending on what is meant by 'context'.
• Old2. Yes.
• Q2. Yes, and it will involve but not be exhausted by reason.
• Q3. Yes.
• Q4. Yes...ish. (yes/yes/eh/yes/yes/yes)
• Q5. Yes. (yes/yes/yes)
• Q6. No, even if we omit "the false prison of."
• Q7. Yes.

It's not some principle that leads to knowledge, but repeated, open, communal discussion. — Banno

Where do you suppose principles come from?

As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? — J

This whole approach is misguided, namely your idea that we need to look at one single field. The whole question is about overarching relations, both of the whole and between fields. Zooming in on one field will never answer such a question. Looking at an isolated part will never tell you about the whole qua whole, nor will it tell you about relations between parts. This appeal to look at a single field in isolation is another prelude to evasion.

The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground. — J

There are two questions:

1. Are there context-independent standards?
2. Are there context-dependent standards?

You have refused to answer the first question for 17 pages. Every time you are asked about the first question you dodge and start talking about the second question.

I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work? — J

Getting you to answer questions is like pulling teeth. That's why a theory like "Brownian motion" has to be postulated. Because you won't give honest answers to simple questions.

The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Following this:

Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way." — J

Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why do you see this as a virtue epistemology? Here is what I think is required for a virtue epistemology in the way you are intending:

1. Intersubjective agreement grounds knowledge.
2. Virtuous classes will more reliably produce knowledge intersubjectively.
3. We ought to be virtuous; or we ought to look to the virtuous class and not the non-virtuous class.

It looks like @J accepts (1) and (2) but not (3), and without (3) I don't think you have virtue epistemology. @J presumably wouldn't admit that the virtuous class is better than the non-virtuous class, given that this would require an "over-arching standard."

It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of this sort of thing:

And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J

Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions? — Leontiskos

When someone uses evaluative terms but claims to be using them in a value-neutral way, you're in trouble. This is true whether the evaluative terms are positive ("virtue") or negative ("authoritarianism"). The person who talks about the non-pernicious authoritarianism is manipulating language in a very problematic way.

This is another way to understand why it is fraught to simply assume that @J is doing "virtue epistemology." Virtue epistemology takes for granted the normativity that @J is vacillating on.

I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what does it mean to not be against arguments and reasons but deny overarching standards? Isn't rationality itself an overarching standard? I certainly couldn't be for squirrels but against mammals, given that squirrels are mammals.

I agree with most of your post, but I don't think it contradicts what I've said. Granted, I was trying to give a sort of microcosm of the reasoning, so that probably needs sussing out. For example:

The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note that the position I set out both insulates claims from challenge and results in atomization. I don't think either are incompatible with democratization. So this is an example of how I think you are right and yet it does not clash with what I've said.

But let's look at a place where it might clash:

But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right, and we could revise 3 so that it doesn't exclude reason-giving, but instead excludes certain forms of reason-giving. I want to say that however we devise 3, it will eschew strong attempts to rationally influence others. As I tried to illustrate with the more- and less-grievous transgressions, at some point a line will be drawn, and that line will have everything to do with the Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB). Someone who thinks that rationality binds us and that we ought to be persuaded by (good) arguments will have a higher ERB. Someone who thinks that rationality does not bind us and who disagrees that we ought to be persuaded by arguments—however good—will have a lower ERB. They will also differ on whether and to what extent good and bad arguments exist in the first place.

To give an example, someone who gives an argument and expects their interlocutor to be persuaded by the argument will tend to have a higher ERB than someone who gives an argument but doesn't really expect their interlocutor to be persuaded. And a moral realist will have a higher ERB than a moral non-realist by definition, at least with respect to moral arguments and claims.

In @J's utopia everyone has relatively low ERBs, and therefore the intentional strength of arguments will be limited. Combative argumentation will be non-existent, given that no one has a strong sense of the bindingness of rationality or of their own arguments.

Rule 3 is merely a limit case which illustrates the asymptote. If someone prefers that everyone have a low ERB, and there are no limiting factors on that preference, then they will prefer rule 3. But there will of course be values that are in competition with that preference:

I am saying that if something is incoherent, then there must be two parts that can be shown to fail to cohere. — Leontiskos

So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in @J's thought).

But the reason I don't think much of what you said conflicted with what I said, is because the motivations that you identify are largely all consistent with the motive for a low overall ERB. For example, the desire for there being, "No way to exclude anyone," is, "different from the desire for excluding reasons," but it is not inconsistent with the desire for excluding reasons, and both are bound up with the desire for a low overall ERB.

The wrinkle in what I am saying is that the desire for a low overall ERB is not an end in itself, and therefore it must be instrumental to some further end. Nevertheless, this is part of the problem with @J's approach, namely that it conflates means and ends, and is not able to identify its own ends. Further, the democratic paradigm seems obvious and invasive. I would want to say that the atomization and the restrictions on reason are part and parcel of that democratic paradigm, and are not opposed to it.

Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.

But I do not think J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good point. @Banno would agree that falsifying data is impermissible, and is not good practice vis-á-vis inquiry. I'm not sure whether @J would agree. He would doubtless avoid giving a clear answer. He would certainly not disagree, as @Moliere did.

But in reality anyone who holds to a firm rational standard such as this is evincing a high ERB with respect to that standard in question. So a clear and consistent @J would say, "We must strive for low ERBs, with the exception of things like the falsification of data." This is parallel to Popper's idea that, "We need to be tolerant except for when we don't." What is occurring is a clash of two different values or standards, and what is required is an attempt at reconciling the two conflicting values. In this thread we have seen a refusal to try to reconcile the two values or even recognize them, and this makes it easy to vacillate between the two (or three, or four...) in an ad hoc way.

Thoughts? — tom111

Good post.

I would add that logic is ineluctable, to a certain extent. If someone tries to be altogether illogical they will fail. Their unconscious mind is logical, and often moreso than their conscious mind. This is part of why emotions and intuitions posses an intrinsic logic, and can be unraveled.

There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I muse, I want to say that for @J and the intersubjectivists/democrats, knowledge is conceived as a kind of democratic vote. These are the rules for how knowledge is generated:

1. We ask a question.
2. Everyone gets one vote, and only one vote.
3. One must simply vote. It is not permitted to give reasons alongside one's vote.
4. Whichever position wins the most votes wins the "knowledge election."

Obviously on this democratic view everyone is perfectly equal, and therefore there is absolutely no "authoritarianism." Rule 3 may seem odd at first, but I think someone like @J or @Moliere actually sees reason-giving or argument-giving as illegal, because it gives one person more power than the others. After all, if one reason or argument is more compelling than others, then the person wielding that reason or argument will effectively have a greater say over the final outcome. They would have "more votes" to cast, so to speak, and this would make the process undemocratic. This inequality would be inimical to intersubjective agreement conceived in a democratic fashion.

This would explain why @J is so particularly opposed to demonstrations, i.e. arguments from foundational premises. Demonstrations are characteristically strong arguments, and therefore create even more inequality than a mere argument. The point more generally is that rule 3 can be more grievously or less grievously transgressed. A demonstration is a grievous transgression of rule 3. A simple argument is less grievous. A mere opinion less grievous still. Least grievous of all would be the waffling claim:

I think maybe position Z could possibly be a slight bit better than the other positions on offer, even though all the positions are very beautiful and very true and very thoughtful. All the positions are equal, but I just have an inkling of a sensation that position Z might be more equal than the other positions. ...In my ever so very humble opinion!

...we might even be able to allow this sort of waffling assertion, given that it is such a mild transgression of rule 3.

On this view mathematics is not a problem, not because it trades in objective arguments, but rather because everyone agrees when it comes to mathematics. We only look at the votes, and the mathematical vote is unanimous. Thus we don't really care whether people give arguments for mathematical positions, given that it isn't a close race. That some people are effectively "casting more votes" than others isn't a big concern given that a few votes won't sway the election.

Contrariwise, on @J's subjectivist view music is also not a problem, because it is a matter of taste. It is not a matter of knowledge and therefore no vote needs to be taken, and we know that it is not a matter of knowledge because if a vote were taken there would be no clear winner (petitio principii).

The real problem for @J comes in fields where the vote is contested, and this is precisely what we would expect from a theory of intersubjective-democratic knowledge. It is the same problem that most besets democracies. For example, in the field of ethics there are strong coalitions and substantial pluralities, and what this means is that the race is close. In mathematics the race is not close so we don't need to worry about cheaters who violate rule 3. In ethics the race is close and we really do need to keep an eye on cheaters who violate rule 3. Thus particular attention and effort must be expended to make sure that no one gives arguments—much less persuasive or strong arguments!—when it comes to fields like ethics, politics, etc. It is precisely in those areas that we must put a particular emphasis on the democratic dogma, "All positions are intrinsically equal. We will vote to decide, but it is impermissible give arguments alongside one's vote. The giving of arguments presupposes that not all positions are intrinsically equal."

(Obviously this whole conception ignores the reason mathematics generates more consensus than matters of taste do, but I think this sort of reasoning really is at play in @J's worldview.)