This is how the concept is used in law. It's a bit more complicated than this, but essentially its the "if but for..." rule. — AmadeusD
The one who controls the pre-selection of the candidates would lose enormous amounts of power and control if they were to yield up that prerogative. — Leontiskos
and who is that? — AmadeusD
The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.
Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet. — NOS4A2
Sorry, I forgot about this reply.
For my part, I am not convinced that speech is an inconsequential act. This is why free speech always becomes a difficult issue. If speech were inconsequential then no one would worry about free speech and we would need no civil right to free speech.
To give a very blasé example, suppose the captain orders his troops to kill the women and children. That is a consequential speech act, albeit a command. Its causal power is manifest. Other acts of speech, such as persuasive speech, can also be consequential. If someone traveled back in time to kill Hitler, they may very well aim to off him before he starts giving his big speeches, given what a powerful orator he was. — Leontiskos
It's the literalism that is unworkable. — Hanover
I think if you begin with an immovable preconceived notion of what God is (love, etc.) and you encounter a tradition inconsistent with that, you are left with either judgmentally or non-judgmentally responding to it. Non-judgmentally, you'd recognize it academically and consider yourself educated. Judgmentally, you'd tell the other side they were worshipping a false god. — Hanover
Both at extremes are not virtuous [...]
The problem is in taking these stories too literally. — Hanover
The point is this is a mythological story about responding to evil and the consequences of misplaced sympathy. I don't think a Christian should find that notion objectionable. It's the literalism that is unworkable. — Hanover
I was not aware of that, and that’s fine as long as we agree then that:
1. Not all people who lived in the culture of the Amalekites were Amalekites, since an Amalekite is a religious affiliation and those who lack the capacity or choose not to engage in it were not be properly affiliated. — Bob Ross
I find it implausible that no one in an entire city [...] [was] a person that disagrees with the cult but lacks the means to escape... — Bob Ross
No. It’s just regular old everyday knowledge. — T Clark
Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:
1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat
(2) can be true even if (1) is false. — Michael
I think this is an argument I could probably make. Not so much that philosophers don’t have knowledge, but that philosophy does not involve knowledge. Certainly metaphysics doesn’t. Neither do aesthetics or morals. — T Clark
You said it's heresy. — Hanover
But, assuming we don't care about that, I'd say it's perfectly fine to say the OT and NT are incompatible and you've got to choose one, the other, or neither. — Hanover
But to declare which must be chosen because it's the correct one is simply to declare your God the true God and all other believers wrong — Hanover
1. The God of the OT commanded Saul to put the Amalekites under the ban
2. There were innocent children among the Amalekites
3. Therefore, the God of the OT commanded the killing of the innocent
4. The killing of the innocent is unjust
5. Therefore, the God of the OT is unjust — Leontiskos
I can’t help think it must be something like gnosis or one of its cognates - subject of that rather arcane term 'gnoseology' which is comparable to 'epistemology' but with rather more gnostic overtones. In any case, it is knowledge of the kind which conveys a kind of apodictic sense, although that is a good deal easier to write about than to actually attain. — Wayfarer
That is philosophy’s claim*, but it neither claims it “absolutely”, nor “locally”, as these are predetermined, created standards. — Antony Nickles
(* the claim is: "as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the [absolute] conception is, my talk about it can remain "local.")
I was with you all the way, until this. Maybe I'm not understanding you. Let's grant that both "absolute" and "local" are predetermined, created standards. How does this exempt philosophy from nonetheless speaking from one or the other? What would be the third alternative? — J
I do think Bob has clarified. He did say he didn't think the OT God was consistent with what he knew God was. And I do see why a Christian would need to sort out what is pretty clearly a change from OT to NT if there is a commitment they are the same. — Hanover
Marcion preached that the benevolent God of the Gospel who sent Jesus into the world as the savior was the true Supreme Being, different and opposed to the malevolent deity, the Demiurge or creator deity, identified with Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible. — Marcionism | Wikipedia
If your hermeneutic leads to inconsistency, you either (1) live with the inconsistency as not overly relevant, (2) declare humility and lack of grasp of the mystery, or (3) change your hermeneutic. — Hanover
God didn't write the Bible, so inconsistency should be expected and I choose a very non-literalist interpretation. — Hanover
My objection was to the suggestion of an a priori knowledge of God as being consistent with the NT and a declaration of invalidity to all other beliefs in God.
That is, an option 4 was being chosen. The OT was being rejected as invalid. That's the equivalent of me saying the simple solution is to reject the NT. That would work too. — Hanover
Honestly, you're coming across as kind of clueless. — frank
This isn't my position. It's Bob Ross's. He said the OT description of God wasn't God, and I said if it's not, the he saying those who do accept it as God don't believe in God. — Hanover
I never did. I've been consistenly open to other interpretations. I've only pointed out that if one claims to know what the true God is and then you claim others don't adhere to it, then you're just telling me your religion is right and mine wrong. — Hanover
It seems like God in the OT is not really God. — Bob Ross
is where you present Christianity as The truth. If one is Christian, they'll say Amen, if not, then not. — Hanover
not everyone who relies on the Bible relies solely on the Bible for all direction — Hanover
Does this help with the puzzles of how and why and whether they ought? — bongo fury
The vertical part of the symbol is not just signifying some act of judgment it seems, rather “the judgment stroke contains the act of assertion”(I3). This raises the question whether the judgment stroke is a sign signifying an act or whether writing it actually effects the assertion. — Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, 11
The issue here is that we reason discursively, and we do not (strictly speaking) ever simultaneously engage in more than one judgment. So when <I judge that I judge that a is F> there is at least a temporal distinction between the two instances of judgment, and in this case there is also a logical priority issue, i.e. one of the two judgments must be logically prior to the other.
So if Rodl wants to read that proposition as a non-temporal angelic intellection, it won't make any sense. That is, if we try to make both instances of 'judge' temporally and logically identical, it won't make any sense.
One way for Rodl to dispute true recursivity would be to say that the only way to interpret <I judge that I judge that a is F> in a non-vacuous way is to interpret it as <I judge that I have judged that a is F>. — Leontiskos
Added: Just to be clear the Kimhi quote is against writing ⊢(⊢p → ⊢q), not ⊢⊢(p→q). — Banno
Instead of writing the whole inference, consisting of the three assertions “ ⊢ p”, “ ⊢ (p ⊃ q)” and “ ⊢ q” , Russell and Whitehead propose an abbreviation containing the assertions of the two atomic propositions connected by an implication: “ ⊢ p ⊃⊢ q”. Frege would consider this a category mistake; in the Begriffsschrift it is not possible to have a judgment stroke within the scope of a conditional.
...
A reason why Russell and Whitehead consider this abbreviation acceptable can be found in their explanation of syllogisms... — Rombout, 44-5
But I don’t get it. I can’t even figure out what the question on the table is. — T Clark
I agree with that assessment so far. It's the killing of innocents that my OP is objecting to: I recognize that the Canaanites were doing horrible things and a war against them is justified. However, that doesn't justify purposely attempting to genocide the people in their entirety. — Bob Ross
A nested judgment-stroke would not violate Frege’s logical vision; — Banno
You simply do not know what you are talking about. For Frege the notation is unified and continuous. The horizontal represents the content and the vertical represents the judging or asserting of that content. There is no such thing as a double vertical or a nested judgment-stroke. Here is Kimhi:
Since the vertical does not belong to the functional composition of a proposition, it has no referential import. This distinguishes it, within the Begriffsschrift, as the sole syncategorematic expression. The whole symbol governed by a judgment-stroke, for example, “⊢p,” is itself a syncategorematic unit since it cannot be embedded as a functional or predicative component within a logically complex whole. (In particular, it cannot be either a subject or a predicate term in a proposition.) As such, it cannot be repeated in different logical contexts, but can only stand by itself.
— Irad Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 41-2 — Leontiskos
I agree that it (the solution) must be about recognising the interplay of object- and meta-language. — bongo fury
"⊢the cat is on the mat"
and
"the cat is on the mat"
... A sentence is already an assertion sign. (I assert.) How does it end up needing reinforcement? — bongo fury
The prefix, however we phrase it - "I hereby assert that...", "I think that...", "I judge that..." etc - does seem to iterate naturally. — bongo fury
But we are not forced to that result [that philosophy is absolute knowledge]. The absolute status of philosophy would not be required just by their being some absolute conception of the world, but rather by our knowing that there was, and what it was. We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a conception would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know . . . is to ask for more – very probably for too much. — Williams, 303
In short, I can be right about this, but not assert it as a piece of knowledge. As long as I don't say I know that I've got it right, I've avoided the trap. — J
One problem I see, is that people vote for what's on the table. Not what they want. It's almost assured that any vote does not give us actual public opinion. — AmadeusD
Therefore, lawmakers have to be quite reticent, in lieu of a binding referendum, to give a piss about it. — AmadeusD
I want to at least listen to those 18 minutes to refresh my memory, but I will set out the basic argument after I get around to that. — Leontiskos
Thank you: I will take a look! — Bob Ross
Like I noted before, it seems somewhat plausible but still has issues. — Bob Ross
But we are not forced to that result [that philosophy is absolute knowledge]. The absolute status of philosophy would not be required just by their being some absolute conception of the world, but rather by our knowing that there was, and what it was. We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a conception would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know . . . is to ask for more – very probably for too much. — Williams, 303
I think this is ingenious. — J
[Philosophy can't] claim to be absolute knowledge. — J
But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J
Amusingly, the refutation could also go the other way – philosophy would be shown not to be an absolute conception! — J
Yes, your summary of my argument is correct. I am curious what your thoughts are on it. — Bob Ross
I listened to Jimmy's video, and it was good: I could see that as a semi-viable solution to the conquest of Canaan. However, the fact that... — Bob Ross
I would be interested to hear Leontiskos response to this. — Bob Ross
Regardless though, exceedingly few religions do (2) as (1) says.
Those who practice according to the Old Testamant, those who practice according to the New Testament, and those who rely upon no text at all for some reason pretty much lives their lives the same morally. — Hanover
This is the argument that appears here every few months if not more often. — Hanover
I already said what I did say... — Banno
If you reject the notion that philosophy has aims, then how do you avoid the implication that philosophy is aimless? — Leontiskos
