Comments

  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    It is in that context that I am interested in Marcion who wanted to separate the creator of tradition from the gentle lord of the Savior. It can be noted that Maricon was clearly more 'Hellenized' than the followers of the Torah in Jerusalem. One does not have to purge all traces of 'Greekness' from those followers for the difference to be significant.

    A similar condition applies to the earliest gnostic materials. Some are drawn from Greek ideas, some from other sources. There still is a tension between traditional life and visions of apocalypse. The desire to change a world of brutal power such as the Romans deployed remained a goal for Gnostics centuries later.
    Paine

    Ah, so your response to Count Timothy had to do with Marcionism or Gnosticism? I think this could make for an interesting thread.
  • Empiricism, potentiality, and the infinite
    I have observed more than a few people argue that potency/potential is best left out of natural philosophy because it is, in principle, not empirically observable. Only act can be observable, hence, being good modern empiricists, we have no need for potency.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Who are you thinking of? I have a hard time believing that someone who understands potency/potential could leave it out, at least on the basis of empirical grounds.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    So with "appears to say", I meant something like "appears to us", "can be interpreted as", and so on. And I mean those expansively, provisionally and contingently. I think part of what makes Moore's Paradox interesting is because it invites us to bracket a normal functioning of language and thus throws it into relief.fdrake

    Here is my edit in case you didn't see it:

    I would say that the context-independent interpretation is clearly contradictory, and that it doesn't make much sense to present it as context-independent and expect the hearer to place it in some idiosyncratic context. The additional context could be as simple as, "Sally, a deeply intelligent woman, said..."Leontiskos

    For me the paradox is too obviously contradictory to be a good candidate for exercises regarding misinterpretation or ambiguity of meaning. It's not a coincidence that you will go through your entire life without ever once hearing someone say, "X is true but I believe it is false."

    I would say that the detective who has only Sally's statement in front of him is not a good detective if he multiplies all sorts of theories without any evidential basis for those theories. The exercise feels like being put in the place of a sophist's pupil who receives the task, "Politician Sally said this and nothing more. Find a way to spin it so that she didn't contradict herself. It won't be easy."

    And what is the difference between Sally saying, "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining," and Sally saying, "It is raining but it is not raining"? I think the difference is only minor, and the same maneuvers that saved the first could equally well save the second. If this is right then on your approach every statement is unfalsifiably noncontradictory.

    And moreover, I'd bet that this conflict of appearances is commonplace and essential out in the wild.fdrake

    When we hear something like this in the wild we either ignore it given our dearth of information, or else we try to gather more information in an attempt to account for the seeming contradiction. But the fact that it is a contradiction at face value will not go away.

    Is it a contradiction? Yes. Could there be some extenuating circumstance or idiosyncratic use of language or intent that renders it non-contradictory? Yes.

    In the wild I'd be inclined to read "believe" somewhat figuratively, like an exasperation, or an alternatively that Sally is experiencing a disconnect between whatever engenders her to assert statements and whatever engenders her to assert her own belief in statements. Basically I want to trust Sally rather than calling her out.fdrake

    Supposing it never occurs in the wild, does that matter? In that case, "What would an unspoken sentence mean," is a bit like the question about the sound of the tree falling in the unoccupied woods. Perhaps there is a good reason why Moore's sentence is never actually spoken.
    Language is flexible, but there are limits to this.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    The distinction is total and fundamental. Frege goes so far as to say you cannot talk about functions (i.e., predicates) at all, because to talk about them is to treat them as objects. We do, nevertheless, talk about them, because it's handy, but he considered this a shortcoming of natural languages. In his system, it is simply not possible: functions cannot be values of variables. ((That's first-order, of course, and it's well known that even to define arithmetic you have to pass on to second-order. I don't recall what he says about this, and whether a switch to classes as stand-ins for functions is good enough. Anyway, there's a gap in my account here.))

    He goes further, and says that he cannot even tell you what a function is -- that is, what belongs to the type <function> -- for related reasons, but, and this is a key point, though he cannot tell you what the difference is between an object and a function, he can show you. This is the whole point of the Begriffschrift, to show this difference clearly, perspicaciously. Perforce that means logical form is not really something to be defined (though I don't recall him saying this) but shown.

    ((This distinction -- that there are some things that can only be shown -- I think had a tremendous influence on Wittgenstein, that was still percolating after the Tractatus, or so I believe.))
    Srap Tasmaner

    Very interesting. That all makes sense, and fills out my understanding a bit.

    Kinda, but I'd be more inclined to say that predicates neither exist nor fail to exist. No more than red is tall or short. It just doesn't apply. Objects are the sorts of things that exist (or fail to), and functions aren't objects.

    I don't remember how Frege deals with non-existent objects, or if it even comes up, but in the world he left us, empty classes serve. I can name "the smallest positive rational number" but it will turn out I have defined an empty singleton class. (Extensionally equivalent to any other empty class, but not intensionally, if that matters.)
    Srap Tasmaner

    Good, and this is more accurate than the way I was stating it.

    My idea was basically that it is curious that Frege is comfortable saying that Fido is not a cat, but is unwilling to say that Fido does not exist. As you point out, this makes sense for Frege given that the former statement is just a matter of class exclusion, and given that classes—empty or otherwise—are not said to exist. ...But I think @J's confusion about Frege may stem from a similar place. J may be thinking, "Kimhi criticizes Frege for divorcing the sense of a proposition from its assertoric force; 'Fido exists' is a proposition; therefore Frege divorces this proposition's sense from its assertoric force; therefore Frege thinks we can quantify over Fido before predicating existence of Fido." At the same time, J knows that Frege does not accept the idea that existence is a predicate, and so there is a tension.

    I don't remember how Frege deals with non-existent objects, or if it even comes up, but in the world he left us, empty classes serve.Srap Tasmaner

    According to the paper I have been citing:

    Frege poses the rhetorical question as to whether it is possible to produce an example of a meaningful true statement of the form “A is B”, where A is a proper name, but there are no B’s. The challenge is not met by Frege’s opponent in the dialogue as preserved, but in case we attempted to suggest e.g. the sentence “Smaug is a dragon” as an obvious counterexample (assuming that, of course, there are no dragons), according to his principles Frege would be bound to saying that this is “not a real (i.e., meaningful) sentence”. This counterintuitive result was to be mitigated in a later phase of the development of Frege’s thought, as the distinction drawn between Sinn and Bedeutung enabled, under certain circumstances, expressions (including sentences) to have a Sinn despite lacking a Bedeutung. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of Frege’s theory, viz. that objects capable of being judged about are, trivially, exclusively existing objects, was never abandoned by Frege, nor did he ever consider it in the least controversial. Quite the opposite – Frege regarded it as empty and tautological, since the term “existing”, insofar as it is applied to individuals, is devoid of any content and as such it does not impose any extensional narrowing: ...Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 158-9

    Peirce had quantifiers too, I hear, but I've never studied his logic. I certainly defer to Kenny -- I just think of the likes of Boole and De Morgan being quite nearly there already.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes - my point is only that a critique of Frege could be a critique of his propositional or predicate calculus. I assume that bit about the repeatability of 'p' pertains to the propositional calculus.

    I think we're all on the same page, I'm just using the word "claim" instead of "assert", and also drafting the word "say", all three of which have considerable overlap in everyday speech.Srap Tasmaner

    :up:

    (4) Leontiskos seems almost to suggest that statements have a sort of hole in them, like Frege's functions, waiting for an agent to be inserted and complete the assertion. But we need more than an agent, we need an actual utterance (even if internal), and then we're faced with the problem of intention as well --- some of that context will take care (I'm acting in a play), but some it won't (I was just saying what he wanted to hear).Srap Tasmaner

    I have often given an impromptu and half-baked account, and this will be no exception. The idea is not so much that they have a hole, but rather that in order to be understood even qua proposition they must have an intentional sense, and they cannot have an intentional sense without an implicit speaker. And there is no neutral intentional sense, or non-intentional sense.

    So to take @fdrake's example of Sally asserting Moore's paradox, there is no interpretation of Sally's linguistic utterance which is entirely divorced from an intentional sense and an implicit speaker (in fact fdrake cleared up the implicit speaker problem by making the speaker explicit). According to @J, and as I supposed, Kimhi is after something more substantial and controversial than this. But my point is that there is a kind of default or prima facie intentional sense of every proposition, given the fact that there is no way of interpreting or even apprehending a proposition without assuming some intentional context or another. It's not so much that the proposition has a hole or an intrinsic intentional force by its very nature, but rather that it can never be handled as a proposition, or as a linguistic utterance, without some intentional sense (and implicit speaker) being supplied. There is no possibility of fully prescinding from the intentional sense of a proposition, and the intentional sense would seem to involve a "force" dynamic. In your language we might say that affirming a pre-existing saying will involve one in different intentions and assertoric force, depending on the content of the saying.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    One way it seems relevant is that understanding the sentence as weird and contradictory on a gut level... pumps the intuition that it must function as an assertion. It would never be uttered in normal circumstances since part of its mechanism asserts something and then undermines the act of assertion.fdrake

    Good, this is precisely the way that it sheds light on the OP.

    And it would probably be better to look at it in the form "Sally said "It is raining but I believe it is not raining"", since that dodges all the weird crap involving "I", since we know who is saying it.fdrake

    Yep, this helps a great deal to clear away the tangential issues.

    So when Sally says the second clause, "I believe it is not raining", a reading of the phrase in which Sally's assumed to be truthful and sincere associates the "I believe" in the sentence with asserting the claim "It is not raining". So the first clause appears to assert "It is raining", the second clause appears to assert "It is not raining", and those things clash together in our heads.fdrake

    Right.

    Nevertheless, Sally is not in a state of contradiction.fdrake

    Isn't she, though?

    For Sally only appears to assert that it is raining, and only appears to assert that it is not raining.fdrake

    This is a different matter as far as I'm concerned:

    1. Sally said, "It is raining but I believe it is not raining."
    2. Sally appeared to say, "It is raining but I believe it is not raining."

    Did she appear to say it or did she say it? First we were dealing with (1), but now we have suddenly switched to talking about (2), which is quite different. If she only appeared to say something, then of course she could not contradict herself. The conclusion would not be, "Sally contradicted herself," but rather, "Sally appeared to contradict herself."

    Eg, I've said "I don't believe it's raining!" while wincing up at a sky thick with summer rain.fdrake

    But note that this is no longer an assertion. The assertion would be, drawn out, "It is false that it is the case that it is raining." Or, "It is not the case that it is raining."

    A similar logic lets you provide a model for Sally's odd phrase. I'm sitting here now, I believe it's not raining since it wasn't forecast to rain this evening last time are checked. But my curtains are closed. I just said "It is raining and I believe it's not raining" aloud... and it turned out it wasn't raining after all, when I opened the curtain.fdrake

    This doesn't strike me as intelligible. Why did you say it was raining? Were you having a stroke, with random words exiting your mouth? There is no question here that people can say nonsensical things and contradict themselves. The question is whether some utterance is contradictory.

    I would say that to assert is to believe. Therefore if Sally asserts that it is raining then she believes that it is raining. This is all that is needed to recognize her contradiction, and this premise seems very secure. What you have done is given some possibilities where she doesn't actually assert, but that strikes me as beside the point.

    What I think makes Moore's paradox a good gateway in this discussion is that there's a whole context of cooperative use and interpretation, which contains a myriad of exploitable oppositions and contradictions, that just don't show up when you analyse the phrase as an instance of asserts(p & believes not-p) & asserts(p)=>believes(p). Particularly how you can make sense of it, and the kind of doubt you might have regarding Sally's faculties and situation. Maybe those are the kind of things J was looking to incorporate into a logic.fdrake

    That's fair. You've sufficiently established your thesis about the relevance of Moore's paradox.

    Now, in my opinion, the sort of ways that you are defending the coherence of Sally's statement are not going to be plausible ways to critique Frege. But with that said, I have seen folks who are devoted to Fregian logic who have a tendency to oversimplify locutions, so there is that. That's a hard thing to critique.

    ...there's a whole context of cooperative use and interpretation, which contains a myriad of exploitable oppositions and contradictions, that just don't show up when you analyse the phrase as an instance of asserts(p & believes not-p) & asserts(p)=>believes(p)...fdrake

    I would say that the context-independent interpretation is clearly contradictory, and that it doesn't make much sense to present it as context-independent and expect the hearer to place it in some idiosyncratic context. The additional context could be as simple as, "Sally, a deeply intelligent woman, said..."

    Though there remains the question of whether this can be incorporated into normal flavours of logic, whether it's something that can be formalised, whether it should be formalised... and so on.fdrake

    Right.

    As an aside, when I said the phrase aloud I felt a powerful compulsion to immediately open the curtain to check... Surely something we expect Sally to have done in my shoes!fdrake

    :grin:
  • How to Justify Self-Defense?
    In reply to this edit: Since you're being ultra-formal in reasoning, what pacifist (either directly or indirectly) causes no harm to other life in their persisting to live by consuming nutrients via food?javra

    So then you think pacifism fails for two reasons: both because it is permissible to intentionally harm others, and because pacifism is impracticable. Either way you disagree with conclusion (4) and the stipulations that undergird it.

    The question here is whether you contradict yourself in claiming to accept all three stipulations while simultaneously claiming that it is okay to intentionally harm others (or, put differently, whether the stipulations entail pacifism). As I have shown, the three stipulations do logically entail the conclusion <It is always impermissible to harm others>, and therefore you contradict yourself by claiming that you accept the three stipulations while maintaining that it is sometimes permissible to (intentionally) harm others.

    Now you want me to enter into a debate about whether one should choose the least of all wrongs. I am not a consequentialist, and because of this I do not think one should do what is wrong. I would counsel others to abstain from acting if the only possible actions are wrong. But I am not going to enter into this debate in full. Showing your contradiction was my aim.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion


    Let me first say that I think the first half of your first post was excellent and deeply relevant. As to the second half, about Moore's paradox, I continue to vacillate on whether it is really relevant. It sheds a bit of light but also raises a lot of issues that seem to be tangential. With that said...

    Just for the specific sentence "It is raining but I believe it is not raining", taken as a stand alone. When you read that, you can understand it. Even though you don't know who "I" refers to. You just know it's the person in the sentence.fdrake

    I can't understand it. The received view seems to be that it is absurd. I don't know who "I" refers to. And I don't know who "the person in the sentence" is supposed to refer to. The problem is that, taken at face value, the locution is schizophrenic, and therefore talking about a single speaker is not intuitive.

    This is why talking about Moore's paradox seems to require a great deal of explanation and verbiage, in the first place as to how it is being interpreted.

    I'd make the same conjured into existence analysis for "I" or "me" in the sentences:
    A) It's an egg, I know it's an egg.
    B) Ask not for whom the egg tolls, it tolls for me.
    C) I have to block out thoughts of eggs so I don't lose my egg.

    when they are presented without further context.

    Because, as internet brainrot would have it, the who "I" is is ghosted, for real.
    fdrake

    I worry that we're on a tangent, but the difference is that any statement has a kind of implicit, "I say..." "(I say) It's an egg." Moore's sentence is absurd (and contradictory) because the speaker disagrees with himself (or else has a very idiosyncratic notion of belief).

    It seems that originally Moore was looking at two propositions, both of which are said to be true:

    1. It is raining
    2. I believe it is not raining

    He supposes that any two true things can be conjoined and spoken, hence, "<It is raining> and <I believe it is not raining>". I think this reflects the confusion in modern thought where it is presupposed that there can be statements without implicit speakers. This is all somewhat interesting, and there are many ways we could go with it, but you may first have to convince me that it is on topic for this thread.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Excellent citations from Frege. My claim was twofold: 1) that predicate logic restricts what we can say about existence; and 2) we have to start with a logically grammatical proposition that fills the argument slot with a term, thus creating what Frege called a “name,” before we can say whether it exists or not. I’m not sure what “wider than existence” means exactly, but your citation clearly shows that Frege believed we have to presuppose that “sentences [can?] express judgments” and that there is a world out there, about which we are trying to say things. No disagreements here, and sorry if I seemed to say otherwise.J

    I am disputing your (2). For Frege we don't quantify things and then go on to decide whether they actually exist (and this is very much related to your QV thread).

    One point about something Frege also says here. He asks: “Can you produce an example where a sentence of the form 'A is B' is meaningful and true, A being a name of an individual, and yet 'There are B’s' is false?” To me, this shows why quantification comes first in his method.J

    His claim seems to be counterfactual, not temporal. "If there are no B's then 'A is B' is neither meaningful nor true."

    He requires, correctly, that “A is B” be “meaningful and true” before...J

    You seem to be reading this word "before" into the text, contrary to the text.

    If we changed Frege’s question to read: “Can you produce an example where a sentence of the form 'A is B' is unasserted, A being a name of an individual, and yet 'There are B’s' is false?”, the answer would be, Of course we can.J

    I don't know if what you are saying here makes sense, as Frege's whole point is that if there are no B's then 'A is B' cannot be meaningful or true. Were you able to download Lukáš Novák's paper? I think it would be of great benefit.

    The irony here is that Frege would presumably not say, "Of course we can." If there are no B's then 'A is B' is not merely unasserted, it is not meaningful. The second quote I gave has Frege literally denying that we can meaningfully deny that something exists (tout court).

    But what I was trying to point out (or what I think Roberts means, anyway) is that “the universe of discourse” isn’t neutral or discoverable or God-given or whatever. We have to determine it, which requires quantification.J

    For Frege there is no non-existent universe of discourse. Existence is not an afterthought to quantification.

    The charge is more radical than that. The Kimhi-inspired challenge says that the mandatory dissociation of force from sense in logic is wrong. Kimhi: “[Frege and Geach] want to dissociate assertoric force from anything in the composition or form of that which is primarily true or false in a propositional sign.” And yes, I hope Srap keeps pressing his points; we need to interrogate this challenge sharply.J

    Okay. I can see how Frege mandates a dissociation between sense and assertion. Is that the same as mandating a dissociation between sense and force? Or sense and assertoric force? Kimhi seems to believe that something can have assertoric force without being asserted. It seems like Frege wants to make one big distinction (between propositions and their truth values), and Kimhi wants to make lots of small distinctions (between different kinds of force, or different levels of assertoric force).

    I find this all fascinating but, as I say, I don't want us to digress.J

    Agreed. :up:
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - Great posts.

    (1) Assertion is (a person, an agent) claiming that the possible state of affairs, let's say, described by a statement does in fact hold.
    (2) Assertion is (a person, an agent) affirming the claim about the world made by a statement.
    Srap Tasmaner

    I am struggling to see the difference here, but maybe that is just me. I was understanding @J to be saying that propositions can have assertoric force independent of persons/agents who would speak them. Therefore I would prefer a distinction between a possessor of assertoric force which requires a speaker/asserter and one that does not. I thought J was saying, "This thing has assertoric force even before you pick it up and assert it."

    This seems slightly at odds with the descriptions involving a repeated identical 'p': there are no repeated complete symbols here.Srap Tasmaner

    Interesting point. Substitution of individuals/particulars occurs beginning with (2), and substitution is a different kind of logical move.

    But I would say the middle term (the recurrence of 'p') is found in the substitutability itself. (1) quantifies over all integers, and because '5' and '2' are integers they are substitutable into the formula of (1). Does the OP's point about the repeatability of p break down in cases of substitution? I shouldn't think so, but perhaps that argument needs to be refined.

    I suppose it is worth noting:

    Frege isn't remembered for the propositional calculus, which predates him, but for quantifiers and their use in tidying up the predicate calculus, to make it safe for mathematics.Srap Tasmaner

    According to Anthony Kenny's history of philosophy Frege and Peirce simultaneously and independently developed the propositional calculus (which therefore did not predate them, at least in this robust form). But you are right that Frege is remembered for his predicate calculus. The point, though, is that a critique of propositional calculus (and the repeatability of propositions) is a Fregian critique just as much as a critique of predicate calculus would be.

    I noticed that too. Absolutely. I think the general thrust of the whole modern Frege-Tarski-model-theoretic approach is to presuppose the existence of the objects within the universe of discourse, and then the questions addressed are which objects satisfy which predicates, and that's all.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, that's right. Jumping ahead a bit, I am curious about the Fregian presupposition which cleanly distinguishes predicate bearers from predicates, because apparently it associates existence with the former but not the latter. That is, apparently we can talk about non-existent predicates but not non-existent predicate bearers. This seems to reveal an odd lack of parity. For Aristotle a substance and an accident both play by the same general rules, even though an accident has a different kind of being than a substance does.
  • References for discussion of truth as predication?
    The ones for Greek scholarship (mostly re Aristotle) that I can find in the text are: Charles Kahn (mainstream, right?); Jennifer Hornsby; Jonathan Beere; Michel Crubellier; Lukasiewicz (also mainstream?); Anscombe (not sure how she's regarded now); C.W.A. Whitaker; Benjamin Morison; Walter Leszl; John McDowell; Edward Lee; and I may have missed some. So I think the scholarship is there (minus the Medievals, as you point out), it's just hard to get an overall picture of what Kimhi is relying on.J

    Right, good points. And Kimhi interacts with some of these scholars a great deal, some hardly at all.

    Re Beere, Kimhi does say, "Both my usage and my understanding of the Aristotelian terminology of capacity and activity are informed by Jonathan Beere's illuminating study, Doing and Being (OUP, 2009)." Do you know Beere's work? Is Kimhi wise to rely on it?J

    I have never heard of him, but I haven't kept up with Aristotelian scholarship, and what I read is in large part limited to what I am able to access. OUP is of course a good press.

    Kimhi does a fair job of noting the ways that he is interacting with the scholars he cites. I think whether his view agrees with the received view depends on the topic at hand. One reason I mention the Medievals is because Aristotle's works are underdeveloped or underdetermined on many of these later issues, and they can therefore be taken and run with in different directions.
  • How to Justify Self-Defense?
    Irrespective of what your anticipated answer will be, I again deem the choosing of the least bad to be a good in an of itself, rather than a bad in and of itself.javra

    Then you are directly denying #3.

    Is it a bad to choose - or else to intend the manifestation of - the lease bad from all alternatives that are available to oneself at the juncture of the given choice?javra

    It is impermissible to choose harm on such a basis given the three stipulations. (1) and (2) form an exhaustive division: ends and means. According to (3) harm is bad, according to (1) what is bad cannot be done for its own sake, and according to (2) what is bad cannot be done for the sake of something else. The three stipulations logically entail pacifism. There is no way around this given that every act is either a means or an end. It is contradictory to accept the three stipulations without being committed to pacifism, and therefore you are contradicting yourself.

    Edit: Here is a more formal version, which may help you see your contradiction:

    1. It is morally impermissible to perform an action that is X.
    2. It is morally impermissible to directly intend something that is X—even for the sake of something good.
    3. Harming someone is X.
    4. Therefore, pacifism is true.

    (2 is strictly speaking superfluous, but I think Bob was going for the exhaustive division noted above.)
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    It’s true that this doesn’t moot the ontological question, but it’s a special and severe restriction on what we can say about existence. It’s also a precise description of the order in which Fregeans have to proceed: quantification first.J

    I don't think this is correct at all. Here is Frege:

    Here I would retort: If “Sachse exists” should mean “The term ‘Sachse’ is not an empty sound but it stands for something”, then it is correct to say that the condition that “Sachse exists” must be satisfied. This, however, is no new premise, but a self-evident presupposition of all our words. The rules of logic always presuppose that the words used are not empty, that the sentences express judgements, that we are not playing with mere words. Given that “Sachse is a man” is an actual judgement, the word “Sachse” has to stand for something; in which case I do not need any further premise to infer “There are men” from that. The premise “Sachse exists” is superfluous, as long as it means nothing over and above that self-evident presupposition of all our thought. Or can you produce an example where a sentence of the form “A is B” is meaningful and true, A being a name of an individual, and yet “There are B’s” is false?[4]

    [4] [...] Gottlob Frege, “Dialog mit Pünjer über Existenz” (between 1879 and 1884), in Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie: Aus dem Nachlass (Meiner Verlag 2001), 99, p. 11–12. [...]
    Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 157-8

    If we attribute any content to the verb “to be”, to the effect that the sentence “A is” is neither superfluous nor self-evident, we shall have to concede that the negation of “A is” is, under certain circumstances, possible, viz. that there are subjects to which being must be denied. Then, however, the notion of “being” generally won’t be suited to be used as an interpretation of the meaning of “there is” any more, according to which “there are B’s” would be equivalent to “some being falls under the concept of B”. For if we applied this interpretation to the sentence “There are subjects to which being must be denied”, we would obtain the sentence “Some being falls under the concept of non-being”, or “Some being is not”. This is unavoidable, as soon as one ascribes any content whatsoever to the concept of being. If the interpretation that “there are B’s” means the same as “some being is B” is to be correct, then it is simply necessary that “being” be understood as conveying something completely self-evident.[5]

    [5] [...] ibid., 20-21
    Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 159

    Given this evidence it would seem that it is incorrect to claim that for Frege quantification is wider than existence. I think the sources from your thread on QV attest to this same fact.

    I have been snipping the second sentence of that title, "Can we speak about that which is not? Actualism and Possibilism in Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism." The general critique of Frege seems closely related to the Actualism and Possibilism debates.

    -

    Newtonian physics is still a powerful tool, despite getting the big picture all wrong.J

    As I said in the first sentence of that post, "I think it is a useful tool." By "tool" Srap is apparently implying a strong sort of ontological pluralism, as he favored in your earlier thread. You are welcome to press him on it, or on the question of better and worse logical tools.

    If Frege’s system is insufficient in its basic understanding of how propositions work, how they must be understood within logic, then while it may remain a powerful tool, it’s defective in explanatory power at the metalogical level.J

    Yes, well put.

    I’m suggesting we think of force as something that can be displayed without assertion. And having said that, the question is whether this is just playing with words – whether the nuance I’m proposing really clarifies anything, or would change how we think about logic. To that question I would say, “Kimhi thinks it does, but I’m not clear on it yet.”J

    This is what I suspected, and said, "...But is there any formal logic that will really be able to dodge this bullet and provide the same cornucopia of locutionary flavors that natural language possesses?" ().

    There are systems of logic that set about mapping other forms of force, such as belief, but it doesn't strike me as a great approach to lay the charge at Frege's feet that he hasn't sufficiently accounted for non-assertoric forms of locution. This is where I think Srap's critiques are helpful, for they demand more precision as to the actual conclusion being argued for.

    Both@Leontiskos and Fdrake have concerns about the “I” of assertion. This is very important, in my opinion.J

    It strikes me as a simple question of intent. One asserts something if and only if they intend to, and I don't think any material sign contains within itself any variety of illocutionary intent. For example, "The grass is green" can be placed in that modus ponens premise, and thus stripped of its assertoric force. Now it does have a kind of prima facie assertoric force, which must be stripped or prescinded from if we want to avoid it. Is that the same as being intrinsic?

    I think the answer is no.J

    I don't think you understand what I am saying. "I" refers to the person speaking the sentence, and this person is not fdrake. The oddity is that @fdrake seems to think that there was no asserter prior to the one who was "conjured" by the "I", but I recognize that he is not trying to give an answer to the paradox.

    I have seen analytics fall into this trap of thinking that sentences can float in the ether without any speaker, even a logically remote one. In that sense I would agree with the OP that all sentences have a kind of force, but I would call it an intentional force rather than an assertoric force.Leontiskos

    Does, "It is raining," have assertoric force, and if so, who is the asserter? There is a sense in which it has a kind of meta-assertoric force insofar as we are forced to imagine at least an implicit speaker. But my use of the quotation marks indicates that I am holding it aloof rather than asserting it myself. I don't suppose this is all Kimhi is saying?
  • How to Justify Self-Defense?


    For starters, I don't see how you can claim to accept all three stipulations and then argue for harm consequentialism. The stipulations logically entail the conclusion that harm cannot be done. You say you accept all three stipulations but then go on to say that harm can be done. It seems that if you want to hold to harm consequentialism then you will at least need to reject #2, no?
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    I'm not sure how damning it is to describe something as merely useful, but you've got a hobby horse to ride and I'll not stop you.Srap Tasmaner

    No one said it was damning. Is mine the hobby horse, here? If you are averse to the topic of a thread, why post in it? After all, if you are ultimately just going to say, "None of this matters at all, and 'logic' is nothing more than a word," then it would seem that you are averse to the topic.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - I think it is a useful tool, but Frege thought it was more than that and it seems he was wrong. When one sees that Frege's system is insufficient it at the very least must be demoted to the level of a "tool." Whether @J is arguing for more than this, I do not know.

    I don't think "logic in its entirety" is a thing.Srap Tasmaner

    Do you think logic is a thing?
  • How to Justify Self-Defense?
    In short, when the only available alternatives to one are all of differing degrees of wrongness, or of badness, then it is virtuous (and hence good) to choose that alternative which is the least wrong, or bad, among the available alternatives. This in contrast to choosing an alternative which is more or else most wrong, hence bad.

    Choosing not to choose between the alternatives in this situation would also be, by my reckoning, a non-virtuous act - for, in so choosing not to choose, one then of one's own accord allows for the possibility of the more or else worst wrong to be actualized.
    javra

    This is pretty stark consequentialism, is it not? Especially your final sentence?
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    It looked to me like the argument form here was something like this:

    A: Fs are not Gs.
    B: But in a way they are.

    That's a disagreement, I guess, but I wouldn't call it an argument. And yes maybe it's a disagreement over presuppositions, but what's the argument for dropping the presupposition?
    Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, that's fair. :up:

    If we find that there are multiple frameworks for analyzing the symbol systems of humans and their utterances, and each is useful for particular purposes, we might consider the possibility that the speakers of a language also have at their disposal multiple frameworks for thinking about the utterances of their fellows. The distinction between between force and logical form might not be a fact, so much as a strategy, something people do because for some purposes it's very useful to do so.Srap Tasmaner

    I don't think it is a question of whether there are non-logical forms of discourse. That can be granted. The question is whether Frege's system is a flawed logical form of discourse.

    Kimhi defines philosophical logic as, "the idea of a study that achieves a mutual illumination of thinking and what is: an illumination through a clarification of human discursive activity in which truth (reality, aletheia) is at stake" (1).

    So logic is not indirect discourse, and indirect discourse would not function as a counterexample to Frege's system. It may be otherwise for Quine, but for Frege the ontological question is not moot, and Frege did not consider his system to be a strategic, pragmatic deployment. Specifically, the system was meant to capture logic in its entirety. You are saying that it does not capture all of human symbolic activity. Would you also say that it does not capture all of logic?
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    The odd part of it seems to be "I" conjures an asserter. Which isn't the person who writes the sentence (me), it's the person in the sentence.fdrake

    "I" always refers to the person speaking the sentence, does it not? These are two different claims:

    • It is raining and I don't believe it is raining.
    • It is raining outside, and he says, "I don't believe it is raining."

    I have seen analytics fall into this trap of thinking that sentences can float in the ether without any speaker, even a logically remote one. In that sense I would agree with the OP that all sentences have a kind of force, but I would call it an intentional force rather than an assertoric force.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    The Fregean picture is more like “p would or could be an assertion under the right illocutionary circumstances (thanks, Banno), but unless it’s actually being asserted, p has nothing in the way of force.” That’s what I’m challenging.J

    The simple argument from Geach in Kimhi's book is that p has assertoric force in (2) but not in (1):

    1. p → q
    2. p
    3. ∴ q

    What you seem to be saying is that if we let p = "The grass is green", then it will have assertoric force in (1). Is that really true?

    The force of a locution is context-dependent, but doesn't formal logic always need to nail down and simplify this context-dependency? If the argument of the OP is that natural language is a more powerful or complete logical tool than formal logic, then I would agree. But is there any formal logic that will really be able to dodge this bullet and provide the same cornucopia of locutionary flavors that natural language possesses?
  • References for discussion of truth as predication?
    Curious to know if K's interpretation [of Aristotle] is mainstream or outlier/revisionist.J

    The difficulty, which also strikes me as a red flag, is that Kimhi provides no bibliography. Therefore it probably goes without saying that he has no clear sources to corroborate his interpretations of Aristotle. I don't see much Aristotelian scholarship being appealed to.

    And a weakness is that Kimhi completely ignores the Medieval period. One cannot oppose Frege without an alternative, and the most basic Aristotelian alternative to Frege is the Medieval development of Aristotle. Kimhi may be committing the faux pas of providing a critique without any alternative.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    ‛The grass is green’ is not neutral as to forceJ

    The closest Frege's system can get to modeling something like this is to say, "There exists something which is both grass and green." Fregian logic has an especially hard time with individuals since it is built for concepts or classes. Given that the statement is not Fregian in the first place, it raises a whole host of issues.

    But for now, what do you all think? Have I succeeded in raising a genuine challenge to Frege, or does the Fregean have an obvious counter-argument?J

    All the objections to Frege's logic that I have seen are metalogical objections, and yours is no exception. says that there is no (counter)-argument being offered, and this is true at least insofar as there is no counter-argument which adopts Fregian presuppositions. What is being questioned is the presupposition.

    So how does one offer an argument against logical presuppositions? The most obvious way is to argue that the presupposition fails to capture some real aspect of natural logic or natural language, and by claiming that natural propositions possess a variety of assertoric force that Frege's logic lacks, this is what you are doing. Yet this is where a point like Novák's becomes so important, for logicians like Russell, Frege, Quine, et al., presuppose that natural language is flawed and must be corrected by logic. This moots your point. Further, Quine will set the stage for a "pragmaticizing" of logic, which destroys the idea of ontologically superior logics at its root:

    In Quine’s hands, however, the principle takes on a purely descriptive meaning, stating merely what kind of entities a given theory presupposes to exist – namely those that can figure as values of bound variables in that theory. In other words, the Principle features in Quine as his famous criterion of “ontological commitment”, which, since language has been purged of all directly referring expressions, lacks any a priori connexion to reality and becomes rather a matter of pragmatic choice.Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 166-7

    It is a question of what you're up against.

    And that’s what Kimhi’s book is about.J

    Kimhi's approach strikes me as a attempt to kill Frege by a kind of "death by a thousand cuts." Whether or not this works, it will not be convincing to entrenched Fregians, as it requires a willingness to abandon Fregian presuppositions for the sake of argument. Beyond that, with each small cut Fregians will presumably respond, "It's such a minor issue - who really cares?" It seems to me that your Sider paper—which never in fact received a hearing within your earlier thread—was much more "punchy" and effective as directed against Fregians. Kimhi's book seems to be directed towards those who are predisposed to question the sovereignty of Fregianism, rather than committed Fregians themselves.

    And finally, this argument about assertoric force is an argument where I can see both sides, and I don't know that the clarity and merits of the OP are sufficient to overcome the weight and presuppositions of the opposing side. For example, on the one hand we have some obscure gesturing towards real problems or at least wrinkles with the Fregian presupposition. What do we have in favor of the Fregian presupposition? Something like this, which is both clear and strong: <The first and second premises of a modus ponens both display p, but with entirely different assertoric force. Therefore assertoric force is not intrinsic to p>. That's a strong argument, and from my skim of Kimhi and the ND review I did not understand Kimhi to be questioning this distinction between sense and assertoric force tout court.* To question the distinction tout court would require a very clear and very strong argument. The ultimate nub here is always going to be, "Well if you aren't questioning the distinction tout court, then in precisely what way are you questioning it?" Does Kimhi have a clear answer?


    * In fact all logic seems to require a distinction between sense and assertoric force, and therefore if the conclusion of your argument is that these cannot in any way be separated then logic itself would appear to be doomed. The subtlety of Kimhi's argumentation results in a subtle conclusion. There is the danger here of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    These are not statements that apply to angles or even Zeus.Count Timothy von Icarus

    :up:

    Paul literally has the Son creating the spiritual powers here in Colossians 1, namely the other "divinities" that some in this thread are identifying with Jesus.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    Can you provide some examples of that?Paine

    The basis is referred to as the Hellenization Thesis, often traced to Adolf von Harnack, but it also has earlier antecedents in many anti-philosophical approaches to Christianity. You could think of three camps: Christianity was strongly Hellenized, and it was bad; Christianity was strongly Hellenized, and it was good; Christianity was not strongly Hellenized.
  • References for discussion of truth as predication?
    I’m looking for some source help. I know that the parallel between ‛X exists/doesn’t exist’ and ‛p is true/false’ is a familiar one, but I can’t find a focused discussion of it in the literatureJ

    I originally skimmed the works of Gyula Klima when I saw your thread, but I did not see anything related in a precise way. Yesterday I picked through some of the volumes of a journal he co-edits, "Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics." I found an article that is remarkably on-topic in volume 12. It is Lukáš Novák's piece, "Can We Speak About That Which Is Not? Actualism and Possibilism in Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism." Unfortunately after volume 10 they stopped making the pdfs available online, but it looks like you may be able to get a copy of volume 12 here.

    Instead of asking about predications of truth and being, which is a bit general, the article looks at the question of whether we can speak about that which is not. Novák looks at Frege, Russell, Meinong, Quine, Strawson, and then a number of scholastics, particularly Henry of Ghent, Francis of Meyronnes, and John Duns Scotus.

    One of the interesting points that Novák makes is that there is a characteristic divide between the scholastics and the analytics with respect to natural language:

    In scholasticism the matters are rather more complicated. Generally speaking, the scholastics lacked the Russellian revisionist attitude towards natural language, and therefore they rarely explicitly challenged the obvious capacity of the natural language to refer to non-existents. Their approach was, generally, to explain and analyse, not to correct language – and so the standard scholastic theory of supposition (the mediæval counterpart of reference) naturally allows (via devices like ampliation etc.) for reference to non-existents.[18] — Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 168-9

    Kimhi's reliance on Wittgenstein is curious insofar as Wittgenstein has one leg in both camps, although both legs seem to be underdeveloped.

    -

    Volume 5 is also on topic, although less so. It deals with the question of direct and indirect realism as applied to Aristotelian Medievals such as Avicenna, Averroes, and Aquinas. Aquinas ends up with a doctrine where Kimhi's both-and holds, namely reality is present to the intellect in itself and yet representational/propositional moves are not thereby excluded. This volume is available from Klima's faculty page: "Universal representation, and the Ontology of Individuation."
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    So much for ignoring me.Fooloso4

    I'm sure the referee will award you a point for eliciting a reply to your trolling.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    - That was a devious splicing of many different contexts and conversations, which still didn't get you very far. At this point you've lowered yourself to the level of a dishonest troll. Those who thought you were otherwise should take note.
  • Perception
    You are not following what I've said. My point is only that perception is a mental construct.Hanover

    I would say that you are not following what you are doing, for your <post> in question is obviously not primarily about the thesis that perception is a mental construct. Instead of standing by your interpretation of Banno's claim and answering for it you've retreated back into your motte. I don't intend to keep chasing you back and forth.
  • References for discussion of truth as predication?
    What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'."J

    I think Kimhi has some good insights, but in things like this I wonder if he is pushing his point too far.

    The problem is that Frag. B2 of Parmenides' poem presupposes that truth and falsity are asymmetrical, and I think this is correct. In the early pages of his book Kimhi takes for granted that they are symmetrical, and this creates problems. He assumes that in speaking of truth one can equally well speak of falsehood. For example, we can say that there is no gap between a reality and an assertion of that reality, but it does not follow that there is no gap involved in an assertion of falsehood. The proper object of an assertion of falsehood is always a proposition or representation, whereas the proper object of an assertion of truth can be reality itself.

    Later in the book Kimhi seems to get a lot clearer on this asymmetricity, but at least at the beginning it looks a bit confused to me.

    I have always found it interesting to read Genesis 3 in light of that aspect of Parmenides' poem, because the serpent introduces (partial) falsehood into creation for the first time, and this places Eve on a "path entirely unable to be [traveled]" (2). In Augustinian language we would say that falsehood is a privation of truth, and presupposes it in a way that truth does not presuppose falsehood. There was truth in creation before the serpent spoke, and falsehood (and doubt!) only emerged by and through his speaking.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    In Judaism the messiah is not God.BitconnectCarlos

    That's right, and therefore claiming to be the messiah is not blasphemy.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    To break the Law is not limited to infractions.Fooloso4

    Absolutely not!Fooloso4

    I doesn't need to be. When you claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy, that means that all breakings of the Law are blasphemy. If one can break the Law without blaspheming then your claim that breaking the Law is blasphemy is false. The fact that you still can't admit this basic logic just shows what a hot mess you are. Speaking with such an unserious person is an utter waste of my time, and this is also on par with the intellectually dishonest way you discuss other topics. You are now on my ignore list.
  • A Thought Experiment Question for Christians
    Point being, from what are likely the very earliest Christian sources Christ is seen as divine.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Right, but Fooloso will argue against all of these sources and Tim Wood has literally claimed that the Christians of the Council of Nicea did not even affirm that God exists. I don't see that any amount of evidence is going to overcome this level of post hoc rationalization.
  • Perception
    I thought that that 'issue' had been long since resolved.creativesoul

    I think the reason Michael's threads never get fully resolved is because Michael refuses the transparency that is a prerequisite for such resolution. In this thread the refusal was in place from the start: instead of making arguments for his position he would only ultimately make arguments from authority from "the science." He was never willing to try to explain how his conclusions followed from "the science." If you don't set out your argument you cannot be critiqued, and if you cannot be critiqued then you can never be wrong.
  • Perception
    Fair interpretationHanover

    Okay, well I have no idea how (2) is supposed to follow from (1).

    Why would I demand that language not be a factor in how we interpret the world?Hanover

    No one has said you would. The question is why you think (2) follows from (1).

    As to Banno's statement, you fully ignored the heart of it, "Things in the world [...] also have a say in what colours we see."

    At this point it seems like you are trying to continue agreeing with Michael despite not agreeing with him on much of anything.
  • Perception
    - Is this your argument?

    1. The people around us have a say in what colors we see.
    2. Therefore, language is necessary for perception.
    3. Therefore, babies do not see, color or otherwise.

    If that is not the reasoning that takes you from Banno's statement to your inference, then what is the reasoning that takes you from Banno's statement to your inference?
  • Perception
    This past 30 minutes of conversation arose from this comment of Banno's:

    'Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see."
    Hanover

    Yes, and I gave my interpretation of Banno's statement here, which included a critique of your interpretation:

    This seems like the same equivocation between determination and influence that Banno pointed out to begin the exchange.

    The claim seems to be that things in the world influence what we see, and our linguistic community influences the names of what we see and the aspects we pay attention to. It does not follow from this that babies do not see.
    Leontiskos

    You responded with a question. Would it help if I added that it neither follows from this that babies do not see color?

    How do you get from Banno's statement to your inference that, "babies can't see, color or otherwise"? What is your reasoning?
  • Perception
    You indicated language was a necessary element in the formulation of a perceptionHanover

    Where did I indicate that? This thread has been running on poor reasoning for dozens of pages, so I think it's time to address the reasoning itself. Where did I say or imply that language is a necessary element for perception? Where is your reasoning coming from?

    so I asked why my example was inapplicableHanover

    Where do you believe you did that?

    The question here is how you interpreted Banno's claim in order to impute to Banno the conclusion that, "babies can't see, color or otherwise." What sort of strawman is intervening to produce such an incredible conclusion? If it doesn't follow from what Banno said, then what is happening, here?
  • Perception
    - And should I answer your question with a different question?

    You made an argument, I pointed out why it was a bad argument, and then instead of responding you asked a question. Was your argument a good argument or a bad argument? Does your conclusion follow?
  • Perception
    - Ok. Whatever you say, Hanover.
  • Perception
    I assume babies can't see color because "Things in the word, and the people around us, also have a say in what colours we see." Since babies don't know words and words determine what we see, babies can't see, color or otherwise.Hanover

    This seems like the same equivocation between determination and influence that Banno pointed out to begin the exchange.

    The claim seems to be that things in the world influence what we see, and our linguistic community influences the names of what we see and the aspects we pay attention to. It does not follow from this that babies do not see.