- Interesting. :up:

I am surprised to find these views among an undergraduate in Australia. Are you abnormal within your cohort, or is the rest of your generation on the same page?

Aristotle says that most Greeks are not fit to rule. It is implied that some are. Nothing is said or implied about all Greeks - or barbarians. — Ludwig V

Right, "Aristotle says that Greeks are fit to rule," does not mean that Aristotle says that every Greek is fit to rule.

The first sentence of Simpson's summary makes it quite clear that Aristotle equates the natural with the moral. So Aristotle's empirical case is not what we would call an empirical case at all. It is built round his moral principle that the rational should rule over the irrational. I'm sure he would accept that that is not always the case in practice. He would say that when it is not the case, something unnatural is going on, meaning that something wrong is going on. So his claim is fundamentally a moral claim, not empirical at all. — Ludwig V

Aristotle argues that the rational are more fit rulers than the irrational, and he thinks this is empirically demonstrable. He also argues that Greeks happen to possess the rational qualities most suited to ruling, which is also an empirical point.

But again:

Aristotle says that Greeks are fit to rule because they have x, y, and z characteristics. He does not say that Greeks are fit to rule because they are Greek. — Leontiskos

1. Anyone who possesses x, y, and z characteristics is fit to rule.
2. Greeks possess x, y, and z characteristics.
3. Therefore, Greeks are fit to rule.

Empirical arguments can be offered for (1), but when I spoke of the empiric nature of Aristotle's argument I was pointing to (2). This is because the counterargument against Aristotle (or else his successors) is that there is no middle term and therefore no argument. It is the idea that Aristotle has nothing more than a blind predilection for Greeks. But this is false, and because he gives an argument of this kind, if it can be shown that barbarians possess x, y, and z characteristics to the same extent that Greeks do, then Aristotle can be shown to be wrong about favoring Greeks over barbarians. (2) is an empirical claim, and because of this the conclusion which utilizes it is also empirical. (1) is beside this point.

In discussing Mormonism, you're confusing me with someone else; I've expressed nothing on the subject. — tim wood

In your response <here> you entered directly into the Mormonism discussion, which is what I was responding to.

You seem unclear about your own topic. On the one hand, people will claim all kinds of things, on the other is the question as to what something is and is not. — tim wood

The original topic between us, which you began, is about the Creed and its significance. Note that you began with the premise that the significance of the Creed tells about the essence of Christianity, and thus that the two topics are not separate.

On the topic of what Christianity is, with respect to the existence of God, I offer the following excerpt.

"[T]he proposition ‘God exists’ would seem to mean that there is a being more or less like human beings in respect of his mental powers and dispositions, but having the mental powers of a human being greatly, perhaps infinitely, magnified.... I have no fear of being contradicted when I say that the meaning I suppose to be attached by this author to the proposition ‘God exists’ is a meaning Christian theologians have never attached to it, and does not even remotely resemble the meaning which with some approach to unanimity they have expounded at considerable length....The creeds in which Christians have been taught to confess their faith have never been couched in the formula: ‘God exists and has the following attributes’; but always in the formula: ‘I believe’ or originally ‘We believe in God’ ; and have gone on to say what it is that I, or we, believe about him." An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 186-188. And here:
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414/page/n195/mode/2up — tim wood

Thanks for giving a source for your claims. First I want to note that Collingwood's argument against the "God" of the logical positivists on pages 185 and 186 suffices also as an argument against the Mormon conception of "God" as something compatible with Christian thought.

Now I think Collingwood becomes confused when he goes on to talk about presuppositions vs. propositions. When the Creed talks about God it is not talking about a presupposition of natural science, and Collingwood is right in saying that, "[The Christian Church] has not consistently taught that there can be no proof of God's existence."

But I don't want to get bogged down in Collingwood's personal project. What is the crux of the thesis you are proposing? It seems to me something like, <Christianity does not teach that God exists>, or else, <Christianity professes belief in God without in any way committing itself to God's existence>.

If this is not what you are saying, then what are you saying?

Or to dumb it down, I hope not fatally, two questions to be answered in turn. Do you believe in unicorns? Do they exist? — tim wood

What sense does it make to believe in unicorns without believing that unicorns exist? These look to be strange word games. Are you a Christian who claims to believe in God without believing in God? Are these positions related to your own claims?

Believe: to think that something is true, correct, or real — Cambridge Dictionary

"Christians" have been accusing each other of blasphemy, setting each other beyond the pale as apostates, heretics, heathens, or whatever, from before the time when the Bible as we know it was compiled; the texts to be included and those to be exiled to the Apocrypha were part of that conflict. Whatever consensus of belief has come to be accepted by you or anyone else about what constitutes a Christian has been arrived at through debate and conflict that has rejected more inclusive positions. — unenlightened

This is not an argument. It is an emotional appeal for inclusivity.

I should have anticipated that introducing the term "blasphemy" would elicit moralistic non sequitur from a secular audience (which is also ultimately self-contradictory, but I digress). The argument remains:

1. It is blasphemous for a Christian to consider themselves God's ontological equal, either now or in the future.
2. Mormons consider themselves God's ontological equal, either now or in the future.
3. Therefore, Mormons are not Christians.

"Blasphemy is mean" is not a logical response.

You, if I understand aright, maintain that they held that God existed. I merely that they believed that God existed and were explicit in that distinction. — tim wood

This strikes me as deeply confused, and I have no idea why you believe such a thing.

Cutting to the chase, you think that ancients, including Christians, did not make firm claims about supernatural entities. You think they only "believed" things about supernatural entities, which you say does not even rise to the level of predicating existence.

The simple answer here is the one I gave at the outset: any belief that is worth killing and dying for is a belief held with strong certitude and conviction, and the ancient world was full of religious and supernatural beliefs worth killing and dying for. Speaking specifically about Christians, they were willingly martyred for their beliefs, and there were severe internecine persecutions following the Council of Nicea on both sides. There was leniency up to a point in the Empire, but there was also some umbrella of orthodoxy which was enforced quite strongly, before and after the Christianization of the Empire.

To take but one famous example, for refusing to accept Monothelitism in the 7th century Maximus the Confessor was found guilty of heresy, was tortured, had his tongue cut out, had his right hand cut off, and was sent into exile for the rest of his life. Apparently Maximus' opponents did not fully understand the nuance of your distinction between Maximus' "believing" Dyothelitism and Maximus' "holding" Dyothelitism. :grin:

...And again, I think your distinction is nonsensical all throughout. On this forum we have some rare folk who go about saying they believe X but they do not believe X is true, and this strikes me as a deeply confused position. No one can ever get them to say what it means to believe X without believing X to be true. Traditionally the "belief" distinction has to do with the mode of assent, not with the conviction or certitude involved.

You, if I understand aright, maintain that they held that God existed. I merely that they believed that God existed and were explicit in that distinction. — tim wood

I could go on, as there are so many problems with your theories... The reason folk in the modern world are shy about professing belief in God is because the society is increasingly secular, and because of this it is unfashionable. So they make up new concepts of "belief." But in the ancient world most everyone believed in supernatural entities, it was only a question of which one(s) and where. That God or gods existed in some form was a fact of the ancient world, and there was no shyness about affirming it. The trouble came only with worshipping or denying the wrong ones. In the ancient world to say, "I believe that gods exist," would be like saying today, "I believe that cars exist." The natural response would be, "And...?"

It is perhaps also worth noting that the Creed was never primarily about the existence of God. That was taken for granted and obviously affirmed. The profession of the Creed is much stronger than that. It is something like a marriage vow. It represents a kind of relationship and covenant with God, hearkening back to the Hebrew Shema.

I don't think fundamental Christianity requires any super specific philosophy about what God exactly is. Hell, I don't think most Christians in history even gave that question much thought - and that's equally true of most Mormons, among whom this "god as man" doctrine is obscure and niche and not at all universally accepted. — flannel jesus

Mormons think they will ontologically become an independent "God." Christians think it is blasphemy to say such a thing. But no biggie, right? No significant difference there. :groan:

Agreed. Christians believe in God. — tim wood

It is simply the question of what is meant by "God" in that sentence. And we don't even need to do a deep dive into the term. We need only ask, "Would it include a formerly mortal human who is eventually given special powers?"

And I trust you will see this as a not-so-simple question — tim wood

It is an enormously simple question to determine whether the Mormon believes in the "God" just mentioned. I'm still perplexed that we are having this conversation at all.

You're asking me which percepts the word "red" refers to. I can only answer such a question by using a word that refers to these percepts, and given that there is no appropriate synonym for "red", all I can do is reuse the word "red".

...

There's nothing "viciously circular" about this. — Michael

Er, this is a quintessential example of vicious circularity. The fact that you can only answer such a question by giving a circular answer just shows that your account has failed. If you were correct in saying that 'red' means a percept, then your answer to Banno's question would viciously recur as follows:

• (Option 1: 'Red' = 'Red percept')
• "Red percept"
• "[Red percept] percept"
• "[[Red percept] percept] percept"
• "[[[Red percept] percept] percept] percept"

Or else:

• (Option 2: 'Red' = 'Percept')
• "Red percept"
• "[Percept] percept"

(As Banno indicates, option 2 fails to distinguish red from any other percept)

Cf:

every red is a percept — Michael

The red percepts... — Michael

If every red is a percept then it makes no sense to speak substantially about red percepts. The equivocation becomes more clear if you compare, "The red pen," to, "The red percept." If we follow your lead and reduce each statement consistently, then the first renders, "The red percept of the pen," and the second renders, "The red percept of the percept" (or else via option 2, "The percept of the pen," and, "The percept of the percept"). This all reflects a muddled understanding of language. Predications of color cannot be reduced to predications about percepts in the way you claim. You are involved in category errors which conflate an object-predication-intention with an efficient-cause-intention. It is two different things to talk about the redness of an object as opposed to the percept which mediates that redness. You are simply incorrect to claim that whenever we are talking about the redness of an object we are talking about nothing other than the percept which mediates that redness.* Your attempt to try to treat color predications as percept predications demonstrates that color predications are not percept predications at all, which should have been obvious from the start.

We can also see this by noting that we generally only refer to the perceptual apparatus when we are speaking about perceptual aberrations or abnormalities. For example, when colorblindness enters the conversation recourse to the perceptual apparatus of the colorblind subject will be at hand. But if we cannot distinguish the red object from the red percept, then we will no longer be able to talk about colorblindness, or any other kind of abnormal visual processing. Ironically then, if 'red' meant only a percept we would lose a great deal of scientific rigor. (This is similar to the Protagorean, "Man is the measure," result, which is akin to the way your approach overstates the case. Perceptions are not interchangeable with realities, even when it comes to color. Someone who forgets they are wearing red-tinted glasses might call a white ball red, but we all recognize that they are wrong despite their percept.)


* Your "scientific" argument would be more correctly exposited if you claimed that the subject commonly commits an error of inference regarding the cause of their visual experience. In that case I think you would still largely be wrong, but at least in a more plausible way.

- :up:

I agree regarding Kendi et al. I guess this is just a great counterpoint as its two prominent, intelligent black men basically saying 'not my circus'. It's neat. — AmadeusD

For sure. It helps remind me that one is not insane to question this stuff and that plenty of other folk are also questioning it. Perhaps that would be another reason to read the book.

- Okay good, that's what I figured. :up: I think you are right that there is a lot to be said once we get past the low-hanging fruit, and people are probably talking past one another to some extent. But the great thing about the internet is that there is always more low-hanging fruit to be had, whether self-generated or not. :grin:

Or if we want to go back to the horse's mouth:

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain. — Hanover

1. "The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation."
2a. "This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience."
3. "The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain."

(3) seems to be a non sequitur plain and simple. There is nothing at all here which proves that perceptions are "entirely the creation of the brain."

But what about (2)? An example would be, "Some people have visual hallucinations, therefore we cannot conclude anything about external objects of sight from the input of our eyes." This looks like a bad argument, albeit not necessarily false. The conclusion depends on the frequency and nature of the aberrations. I would simply say that not all visual aberrations result in the unreliability of sight. Instead of (2a) we could draw (2b) from (1): <Therefore sight is not infallibly a response to an external object>. At the end of the day the question is whether it is more rational to draw (2a) or (2b), and I think the answer is obvious.

But isn’t this approach failing to take into account that the witnessing selves are part of the semiotic construction of a witnessed reality?. . . — apokrisis

I will have to think about this post more, ideally when my head clears of Covid. I don't know that I disagree with any of it, but I also am not convinced that Hanover was making a semiotic argument in the way that you indicate. The argument that he gave seems to me to be invalid, and we could try to generalize it as something like this:

1. If a faculty is not infallible then it is not reliable.
2. X is not infallible.
3. Therefore, X is not reliable.

...Where 'X' is something like the senses or the mind, and (2) is justified by things like dreams and hallucinations.

I think this is just an invalid argument. Something can be reliable without being infallible. The person wielding the argument could press for (1) if they like, and there is admittedly a paradox at play in that neither (1) nor its opposite can be demonstrably proven, but I think we have good non-demonstrative reasons for believing that a faculty need not be infallible in order to be reliable.

If solipsism is the only logical conclusion of recognizing some amount of difference between the object and the perception and naive realism is the only practical solution to avoid that slippery slope, then I choose solipsism because at least it is logical. — Hanover

Okay, and it is no coincidence that you are choosing solipsism, here. Your presuppositions point you in this very direction.

That is, the system you use to prove that things are as they appear proves that things aren't as they appear. — Hanover

Where have I or anyone else here attempted to prove this so-called "naive realism"? The answer is simple: we haven't. Yet the strawman proves eternal.

What we learn is that there is no fully satisfactory answer, which is obvious, as if there were, this would be a physics class and not a philosophy class where there are no answers. — Hanover

The recurrent problem is that your position attempts to draw some kind of substantial conclusion from the fact that there is "no fully satisfactory answer," and this conclusion is logically invalid. There is no problem with pointing to someone's answer and arguing that it is not fully satisfactory. The problem arises when you say, "Your answer is not fully satisfactory, and therefore my opposed position is correct." The invalid inference is the problem, and it is what I have seen from folks like you and Michael in this thread.

Looked at from a different angle, a system which is not fully satisfactory is better than a system which results in performative self-contradictions.

The alternative, which is to just say WYSIWYG suffers from another host of problems. — Hanover

These are more false dichotomies. "My position is pretty bad, but the only alternative is what-you-see-is-what-you-get, therefore we have to accept my position." To claim that the only two options are the infallibility of the senses and the inability of the senses to penetrate reality is to posit a false dichotomy.

This is a recurrence of a kind of Cartesian dichotomy between perfect reliability and certitude, and zero reliability and certitude. The two extremes are not the only possibilities (and I don't mean to indicate that Descartes was himself unaware of this).

Exactly. Unspoken necessary presuppositions. — creativesoul

Right, and we can run these arguments directly if we like:

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain. — Hanover

Given that the "empirical proving" is itself an experience, according to Hanover we cannot conclude anything from this experience. His conclusion is self-defeating.

More concretely, suppose a scientist observes that they can evoke some form of experience via brain stimulation. Hanover thinks this proves that experience is untrustworthy, and yet the scientist's observation is nothing other than an experience. So why isn't their experience untrustworthy? *crickets*

Hanover is making exceptions for himself in an ad hoc manner. He wants to invalidate experience, except for all the experiences that he doesn't want to invalidate, namely the ones associated with empirical tests. Hanover and Michael are both thinking about science in a muddled way, as if it were distinct from human experience. This is on par with the way that our culture treats science as an omniscient and inscrutable god, such that the word 'Science' may as well always be reverentially capitalized.

This whole approach should be suspect from the start, for arguments for hard skepticism cannot be domesticated in the service of scientific knowledge. When your monster chainsaw cuts down everything in sight, there is no use pretending that you are sitting safely on the high limb of Science. Science is the very first victim of the idea that all human experience is untrustworthy.

It strikes me as a performative contradiction, given the fact those purportedly holding the first claim as true have been incessantly making claims about the constitution of the stimulus. — creativesoul

Yep, I think this is surely correct as well. Similar to what I said earlier:

When "science" undermines realism it undermines itself, and those who do not notice this live in an alternate reality where their perceptions are good enough when it comes to "science" and untrustworthy otherwise.* There is never a clear answer as to where the "science" ends and the "otherwise" begins. — Leontiskos

To place the idea in an image: someone in Michael's group might claim that, via the scientific findings of a microscope, they have proved that the human eye does not perceive reality. But without the legitimacy of the human eye the findings of a microscope have no value, for the microscope presupposes the human eye. More subtle iterations of this fallacy are percolating throughout this thread.

Talking Heads right? You might like McWhorter's book. A pretty good antidote the Kendi's, Crenshaw's and DiAngelo's of the world. — AmadeusD

Yes, and I might end up reading his book, but I'm guessing it will be a variant on things I already believe. I don't think an approach like Kendi's et al. has anything to recommend it. I thought McWhorter's analysis of Kendi's vantage point was insightful.

Did you enjoy McWhorter's book?

Yep - Michael is begging the question and then falsely appealing to "the science." This has been going on for a long time now.

---

The point of this is that it is empirically proven that an internal, subjective experience can be evoked by direct brain stimulation. This means that you cannot conclude anything about the constitution of the stimulus from the experience. The smell you smell is the product of stimuli upon the brain, so the perception is entirely the creation of the brain. — Hanover

This poor argument is at the bottom of so much confusion on TPF. I have often considered devoting a thread to it. It is the basic modern error of thinking that Cartesian anti-Pyrrhonism represents the only kind of knowledge.* The modern skeptic will characteristically identify some absurd possibility, note that it cannot be apodictically ruled out, and then conclude that we have no reason to believe it is not the case. This is sophistry. To give an example, we could cash it out this way:

1. If one does not know with perfect certainty whether they are dreaming, then they have no evidence for believing that reality exists.
2. We do not know with perfect certainty whether we are dreaming.
3. Therefore, we have no evidence for believing that reality exists.

The error relating to (1) is always the same, and the corrective is to note that there are different kinds of knowledge and evidence. Knowledge and evidence are not an all-or-nothing affair. Aristotle pointed out 2500 years ago that the one who is intent on applying a criterion of mathematical certainty to every subject is fundamentally confused about the nature of knowledge.

This is of course related to Lionino's thread on Cartesian dualism:

This whole thing is reminiscent of the Cartesian move that, "We of course have good reason to believe that X, but do we also have the fullness of certitude?" What standard of proof is being imposed, here? Are we trying to jump over the fence or over the moon? — Leontiskos

One approach to this modern form of skepticism is Pragmatism, but I think there is a simpler answer. The simpler answer is that one does not require perfect certainty in order to have knowledge. I do not need to have perfect certainty that I am not dreaming—whatever that is supposed to mean—in order to have good evidence for believing that reality exists.

* Burnyeat shows that Descartes was self-consciously interested in an inflated version of Pyrrhonism, which we might now call modern skepticism.

Here is the translation for the hard of hearing: Christians believe in God. They do not worship a "God the Father" who has a human past. The Christian concept of God is strictly incompatible with the Mormon view that God was somehow a former human and that all good Mormons will become gods and inherit their own planet. For Christianity this is not a minor mistake; it is a category error that destroys one of the most basic and most fundamental presuppositions of Christianity.

As to who gets to call themselves a Christian, as the whole topic is based in nonsense, who cares?! — tim wood

No one cares whether Mormons call themselves Christian. The question is whether they are Christian. The question is whether Christianity means anything at all. The pluralistic counter-arguments are simply vacuous.

I have an acquaintance who knows absolutely nothing about any religions. He was raised atheist and does not care at all. He also has a very strong opinion that all religions are the same. This results in the silly claim, "I know nothing about religion, but I have a strong opinion that all religions are the same." Of course his opinion is not worth a dime, but he is nevertheless welcome to hold it. This thread is just a redux, "I know nothing about Christianity, but I have a strong opinion that we cannot say that Mormons are not Christians." Three cheers for uneducated opinions. :clap:

That one does not care about a question does not show that the question is nonsense or unimportant. It merely shows that it is outside their scope of interest. And to opine on things that one has no knowledge of or interest in is to claim to know what they obviously do not know, and when people claim to know what they do not know the well of quality discourse is poisoned.

Why don't you tell me what you think they said constitutes the essence of Christianity? — flannel jesus

Where to start? As far as I'm concerned Mormons do not even believe in God. They think that "God the Father" was once a mortal human who, through Mormon doctrine, eventually became "God," or became god of the planet Earth. Mormons think they too will be able to become a god like "God the Father" became a god, with their own planet. When monotheists look at this sort of thing the obvious conclusion is that Mormons do not believe in God at all.* Or at the very least, "Mormons believe in God" requires a remarkable degree of equivocation.

This is a good example of the fact that any resemblance between Mormonism and Christianity is only superficial. Those in this thread who are claiming that there are no substantial differences between Mormonism and Christianity, despite the unanimous testimony of knowledgeable Christians and scholars, have no idea what they are talking about. It beggars belief that folks in this thread are claiming that those who distinguish Christianity from Mormonism only do so on an ad hoc basis. The content and claims in this thread are falling below even what one might expect from Reddit.

(I have Covid and am trying not to post on more complicated topics, but this topic is easy enough.)

* Note too that this falls short of classical polytheism, which generally posits an ontological distinction between gods and humans.

Mormons aren't Christian, neither are Kardecists. — Lionino

The number of Americans who see such claims as contestable speaks volumes about the American approach to religion. :sad:

But if you follow the pluralistic argumentation closely, the proper conclusion is that no one can say anything substantial at all when it comes to religion or the supernatural (and Tim Wood projects this mindset back into the 4th century). So it's not, "Mormons are Christian," but rather, "You said something substantial about the Mormon religious status, and you're not allowed to do that," or, "If someone says that they are something, then they are. You aren't allowed to contradict them." Luckily, this approach is open even to those who know nothing about Mormonism or Christianity.

The difficulty is that your thesis is so far beyond the pale.

Beginning in the 17th century there emerged a historical school which argued for a low Christology based on Enlightenment/naturalist presuppositions. In my opinion it is already intellectually dishonest to approach history with an anti-supernatural dogma, for in that case the conclusion that Jesus was not divine is a fallacious petitio principii rather than a substantial conclusion. Thus I would call such people "faux historians." Nevertheless, there is at least precedent for such an approach, and therefore it is not beyond the pale in a cultural or scholarly way.*

But the proponents of a low Christology have always had to contend with Nicea I, given that it obviously represents a high Christology. Thus progression theses were developed, such as the Hellenization thesis, which sought to make the high Christology of 325 consistent with the supposed low Christology of Christ’s life, three centuries earlier.

What you are doing is actually unheard of, and I have never seen anything like it. In one way or another, you are trying to deny that Nicea I represents a high Christology. Not even the faux historians are willing to engage in the mental gymnastics required to support such a bizarre thesis. Nicea I is simply a data point of high Christology. It is in no way up for grabs by proponents of a low Christology, and no one disagrees on this! Such a thesis would be the flat-earthism of historical theology, and the argumentation which claims that if the Christians at Nicea had wanted to make affirmations and predications then they would have used “fact-language” instead of “belief language,” is on par with the argumentation for a flat Earth. I don't usually engage flat-Earthers, and so I find myself in an odd spot.

* This approach is now crumbling, first because Enlightenment presuppositions are becoming more delineated and contextualizable, and second because the natural interpretive context of Second-Temple Judaism has replaced the artificial Enlightenment context, thus upending the Enlightenment conclusions. For those who are interested, three days ago Larry Chapp interviewed Brant Pitre on a closely related topic, “Jesus and divine Christology.”

Ok. You tell me something about God. And you tell me how the Patristic Fathers would have responded to someone asking how tall God was, or fat, or skinny. or bald, or smart. The problem with facts is that they come with accidents, and the Fathers were in my opinion smart enough to recognize that if on the basis of some fact you were compelled to say what God is, then you have also said what He isn't, and I'm thinking they were smart enough not to go there. So it's not a question of worrying about beliefs, but instead about what you may be forced to say about facts. Apparently you are unable to distinguish between belief and knowledge, and suppose that they couldn't either. But don't feel alone; I have lots of neighbors who cannot either. — tim wood

This is the sort of non-argument I would expect from a flat-Earther. Like it or not, there is predication about Jesus occurring in the Nicene Creed, and it is obviously supernatural predication:

I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Only Begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all ages. God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father; through him all things were made. For us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven, and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary, and became man. For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate, he suffered death and was buried, and rose again on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures. He ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the Father. He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and his kingdom will have no end. — Beginning of Nicene Creed

"Ah, but they didn't really affirm any of that because in the 17th century an (ultimately unsupportable) distinction between facts and mere beliefs emerged," is not a real argument. It doesn't even come close to a real argument.

You may be confused about the Christian balance of apophaticism and cataphaticism, but this is beside the historical fact that Nicea I affirmed and predicated of Jesus a high Christology. Dismissing the historical realities on the basis of quasi-theological hunches will not do. If you want to promote a low Christology you should follow in the footsteps of your forebears and avoid Nicea I at all costs, rather than pretend that it supports your conclusion! Your strange anachronistic claims about "beliefs" end up being little more than unfalsifiable arguments.

On the contrary, English is my native language. Your approach to this topic is about what I would expect from the average American middle-schooler, but I think you are older than that, no? Making a strong distinction between a belief and an affirmation and then anachronistically projecting that distinction back in time such that creedal professions of Christian faith do not involve predication is a confusion that American youngsters are prey to, but the slightest historical knowledge of the Nicene Creed and its history would clear up such confusion (such as, for example, passing knowledge of the prolonged debates over the appropriateness of predicating homoousious of Jesus at Nicea I).

The idea that one professes the Nicene Creed without involving themselves in affirmations and predications is deeply confused, and I am not quite sure where to begin with such an idea. I can only ask you to engage the points and arguments that have already been given, rather than sidestepping them.

You did indeed say that. Not quite oops! but nearly. Could you give me the reference? — Ludwig V

See my post <here> and the reference Simpson gives to the Politics.

Almost all of these churches have very simple definitions for what counts as a Christian, and by the vast majority of those simple definitions, Mormons meet the standard. These organisations start clarifying extra hoops to jump through only when you mention Mormons. — flannel jesus

I don't think this is right at all. It is not a coincidence or a conspiracy that Christians do not find Mormons to be Christian. The way that Mormons conceive of God, Christ, the afterlife, and original sin all differ drastically from historical Christianity. And that doesn't even touch the absurd rabbit hole of Joseph Smith and the birth of Mormonism.

It's not at all like science, because this is about what words mean, not about empirical observations. No empirical observations can tell you what the word "Christian" means. It's definitional. — flannel jesus

If we have to ignore 99% of what Christian leaders and scholars throughout history have said on what constitutes the essence of Christianity, then we are engaged in post hoc rationalization. Anyone who is truly interested in understanding a religion will attend to the leaders, doctrines, and history of that religion.

Ask the majority of Christians, "how can I know if something is a Christian?" They'll tell you one, two, or three criteria, if someone fits those criteria they're a Christian. Almost without fail, Mormons pass any intuitive criteria for being a Christian. — flannel jesus

I think this is entirely false. Or else, if your method is finding the most ignorant person in the room and hoping they help your case, then your method is deeply flawed. Those who are knowledgeable of what Christians have historically believed and practiced, and what Mormons believe and practice, do not conflate Christianity and Mormonism.

So you are a Mormon, then?

Did you know many protestants say Catholics aren't Christian? — flannel jesus

Did you know that's false? Unless by "many" you mean "a small minority." We can't just redefine words whenever it suits our purposes.

These fuckers really love gate keeping the word. — flannel jesus

:roll:

The problems with Mormonism and the mendacity of Mormon apologetics go deep, and should definitely be opposed. But that is a separate matter. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see the vast divergences between Mormonism and Christianity. For example, South Park mocks both, but as it turns out they still require separate episodes.

I mean, maybe if you're a Christian it makes sense for you to take that seriously, but I'm not beholden to any particular churches dogma and thus I'm not obliged to apply some arbitrary rule to decide Mormons, who are Christian by any obvious metric other than popularity among other Christians, are somehow not Christian. — flannel jesus

This is literally on par with saying that 99% of scientific professionals hold that such-and-such is pseudoscience, but, "I'm not obliged to apply some arbitrary rule to decide that such-and-such, which is science by any obvious metric other than popularity among scientists, is somehow not scientific."

This is very bad reasoning. It's not a minor argument to argue on the basis of what the vast, vast majority of experts in some field believe. The criteria and studies that go into such consensuses are anything but arbitrary or dismissible.

- When I talk about what a religious group believes, such as Catholicism or Mormonism, I am talking about what the bona fide representatives and scholars of that group believe (i.e. the leaders and their aids).

I can't say I have spent a lot of time in Unitarian Universalist Churches, but I wouldn't be surprised if a large percentage of UU leaders would be untroubled by such a claim by a Mormon. — wonderer1

Egads. Mormons would constitute 0.61% of Christians and UU would constitute 1% of Mormons. You are talking about tiny outliers here. And the simple reason why neither group is generally considered Christian is because they are not Trinitarians.

I made a claim about 99% of Christians and in response you effectively said, "Well, if UU can be called Christian then .006% of Christians might call Mormons Christian." This literally does not affect my claim or argument whatsoever.

(This thread explains why I rarely engage religious topics on TPF.)

At the least they thought to couch their creed explicitly in terms of belief and not of mere fact. Which only a little thought will show and demonstrate their wisdom. With beliefs you don't have to worry too much about predicates or predication, which are fatal if applied to any idea of God. — tim wood

Er, but the councils that produced the creeds were painstakingly concerned with predicates and predication, as was the Emperor himself. None of the history surrounding the conflicts of religion around the time of Constantine would make any sense at all on your view. For example, the martyrs who died for their beliefs were not dying for "beliefs you don't have to worry too much about."

As to being the first, it's merely a matter of recognizing that a belief and knowledge of a fact are different things, though possibly sharing some overlap. — tim wood

"Fact" as you are using it dates from about the 17th century. The belief-fact distinction is extremely anachronistic when applied to the 4th century. Neither does the Greek pistis indicate something that is not being affirmed.

so what do you mean? — flannel jesus

We can make it very practical:

• Flannel Jesus: Hello, I am already a Christian and I would like to join your Christian community.
• Church leader: Oh, okay. Which denomination do you hail from?
• Flannel Jesus: Latter-day Saints.

Now the only Church leader who will say, "Oh okay, I agree that you are already Christian and require no baptism or initiation before joining our community," would be a Mormon leader. So you can go on claiming that Mormons are Christians, so long as it is admitted that 99% of Christians disagree with you.

Affirmation as a fact.. I can affirm all kinds of things - and what would that mean? To affirm them as facts, then, would make them different, in all contexts where the difference would matter. — tim wood

I think that is an odd distinction in the first place, but it is certainly anachronistic to use "facts" in such a manner, contrasting it with the "beliefs" of 4th-century Christians. Unless I am mistaken, you are the first one in the thread to make use of the term "facts" in this manner.

Edit: If you are saying that Christians never affirmed that Jesus is God, they only believed it, I would say that this is both anachronistic and incorrect. A creedal profession involves such affirmations, and therefore an argument from creeds does not support this interpretation.

if that's NOT the litmus test, then you don't mean the words you said — flannel jesus

I don't mean your strawman, but that goes without saying.

You, and others, seem to feel that affirmation of the supernatural as a fact is a sine qua non of Christianity (which in fact is not and never was true - the creed is, "We believe..."). — tim wood

That is an odd line. The Nicene Creed affirms exactly what Lionino says, namely that Jesus is the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father. The Apostles' Creed is not much different. It's hard to see how any of this avoids being "supernatural."

...Or are you under the impression that belief and affirmation are altogether distinct?

That is decidedly untrue. All I have to do is find one non-mormon who thinks mormonism is a christian religion, and it's untrue. That's a pretty easy bar to pass. — flannel jesus

If that's the litmus test you would apply then it's clear you're not taking the question seriously in the first place.

Anyway, Mormons aren't Christian, the only ones who think so are Mormons. — Lionino

I hope you don't expect people on a philosophy forum to just accept your word for it without coherent arguments. — flannel jesus

It is true that only Mormons think Mormons are Christian, and this is a strong argument given that Mormons are a significant minority.*

In Christianity membership is usually defined by baptism, and therefore one can determine whether someone is seen to be a Christian by considering whether they require baptism upon converting. The majority of Christians are made up of Catholics and Orthodox, and neither group recognizes Mormon baptism as valid or Christian. Protestantism consists of many different groups, but they all seem to agree that Mormons are not Christians.

* Mormons would account for only 0.61% of Christians as of 2024, according to Wikipedia and a main source of the Wikipedia article.

I think that's the long and short of it: an anti-racist dogma comes up against an empirical argument. — Leontiskos

I was recently recommended a podcast hosted by Glenn Loury and John McWhorter. So last night I listened to my first episode, which focused on the notion of "racial equity." It was interesting without going beyond the realm of easy listening, but the tag clip at the beginning of the video highlights the beginning of McWhorter's argument in favor of equality, namely that blacks are not intellectually inferior (timestamp). What's interesting is that he intentionally avoids appealing to the dogma, and it cannot be overstated how odd this move is in the American landscape. McWhorter substantiates this, "We're going to get into trouble for even discussing [the empirical case for equality], but anyone who thinks we can't discuss it is being religious and not logical."

Aristotle gave an empirical case for inequality qua ruling, and I don't see how serious-minded individuals can oppose Aristotle's arguments without making their own empirical case for equality. Although he is not opposing Aristotle, there is a parallel sense in which McWhorter is one of those serious-minded individuals, and his arguments are perfectly reasonable.

Ah, okay. I didn't realize that the jpeg was from a different article or website. My bad.

Recently, I was warned about posting a piece of news from a mainstream journal, because it violates "discrimination guidelines". — Lionino

The article seems unobjectionable to me. In my opinion TPF has an ideological lean, especially when it comes to politics. Conservatives must tread with care in a progressive environment, especially if they wish to enter into political argument. The problems posed by immigration is one of those topics that is largely off-limits as far as progressives are concerned. That said, I think TPF is more open-minded than most progressive spaces.

If all Greeks turn out to have x, y, and z characteristics, so be it. But they will not be willing to assume that they do on such fragile grounds as the fact that they all speak Greek or live in Greece. There is no rational connection between speaking Greek or living in Greece and being fit to rule. — Ludwig V

Aristotle says that Greeks are fit to rule because they have x, y, and z characteristics. He does not say that Greeks are fit to rule because they are Greek. — Leontiskos