There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think maybe position Z could possibly be a slight bit better than the other positions on offer, even though all the positions are very beautiful and very true and very thoughtful. All the positions are equal, but I just have an inkling of a sensation that position Z might be more equal than the other positions. ...In my ever so very humble opinion!
Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. — Moliere
We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. — Moliere
Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and — Moliere
Eventually we'll disagree again on this. — Moliere
Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. — Leontiskos
That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought. — Moliere
We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos
I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher. — Moliere
I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.
Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem. — Moliere
Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis. — Moliere
I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless. — Moliere
Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.
We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm. — Moliere
If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable. — Leontiskos
That'd be a rule which I agree with that I wouldn't want to do. That is, I'd say putting yourself on a pedestal is a bad thing -- where I somehow gain immunity to criticism and you somehow are more vulnerable to criticism. — Moliere
What instruction do I require? What would that do, other than make me agree with you? — Moliere
Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is a broader problem, in that, on TPF, discussions of ethics or politics or metaphysics are usually wholesale irrational. The current state of philosophy is incapable of addressing such topics in a rational manner. That's why the threads on logic or mathematics or reference are so popular: because they represent that small slice of reality where the Western mind can still manage to engage in rational thought. — Leontiskos
Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But to suppose that metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. is not like engineering, medicine, military science, etc., i.e. that it has no proper authority, or that its measure is man and not the subject matter, is extremely consequential. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. You can, if you really want, separate 112 beans into groups of 8. It is clear when the emperor wears no clothes. Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think you're rather missing my point, but this is quite common for you -- if you can't understand why someone would say something then you conclude that they must be incoherent.
But it could be that you just don't understand someone, and they only appear incoherent to you. — Moliere
Here come the tu quoque replies.
They are logically questionable. They attack the person, not the claim. They shift focus from argument to biography. But mostly, tu quoque's a continuation of that very authoritarianism — Banno
So falsifying your data so that you can gain fame and wealth is can sometimes good practice vis-á-vis good inquiry? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yup. Only sometimes. — Moliere
I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.
And then the Judge would force you to answer “are all narratives acceptable or not?” The most liberal progressive judge would demand, “in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say ‘all narratives may be true’ stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the ‘truth’ you swore, since you won’t answer the question and think it doesn’t matter.” — Fire Ologist
But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. If you throw J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). I don't think it is biased towards "foundationalism" or "infallibility"... — Count Timothy von Icarus
As a lawyer, at work in the real world... — Fire Ologist
Answer the simple question. Whatever the answer is, I’m not seeing it, and neither is Count or Leon.
If the answer is, “there is no truth, we know nothing absolutely, so the context in which every opinion sits can never be certified or ultimately proven certain, and so the value of every opinion is as arbitrary as the next one,” then so be it. Tell me that. That’s what I am paying for. Something that hangs together that we can try to apply and show the value of in the real world. — Fire Ologist
Who is behaving like a tyrant, answering to no one in this debate? — Fire Ologist
I would have an easy time convincing a majority of people that you and Banno are dodging the issues and questions.
I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court. — Fire Ologist
Non-arbitrariness should now be the anchor (or unknown “X” we keep in mind). We are all trying to say how non-arbitrariness is a possibility, because we all agree and have said in one way or another, arbitrariness is bad. — Fire Ologist
Seems like “in context” is meant to do the same work as “in truth, or absolutely”, all of these to avoid arbitrariness.
But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist
Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered..." — Leontiskos
Put differently, there are two theses:
1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).
Which thesis is J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).
Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same. — Leontiskos
I don't think it's a coincidence that Tim and Leon are so adamantly disagreeing with the idea that one can coherently maintain an agnostic position. — Banno
I thinks the questions can be separated. — J
Expertise is demonstrable within the sciences and practical matters in general. How could expertise of a purported religious authority be demonstrated? — Janus
You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno
and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes". — Banno
Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno
That said, here with Tim and Leon, we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand? — Janus
Is not the 'argument from authority' generally (and rightly) considered to be a fallacious argument in philosophy, or at least contemporary philosophy? — Janus
9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is either not really an authority or a relevant authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence—when, for example, celebrities endorse commercial products or social movements. Similarly, when there is controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to base one’s view on the authority of just some of them. — The Core Fallacies | SEP
That the dissectors disagree with themselves is only consistent with dissection and disagreement and difference :D — Moliere
My aim, in writing on these forums, and in applying the analytic tools we have at hand, is to achieve some measure of coherence. — Banno
In that sense, coherence—not completeness—is my measure of success. — Banno
Mysticism presents as a desire to leap from the aporia to a conclusion, to complete the dialogue.
But it does so at the risk of losing coherence. — Banno
So again, we might prefer coherence to completeness. — Banno
But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist
But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist
However, to me, the first step in solving a problem is admitting it. Arbitrariness is no use to anyone - how do we avoid it? — Fire Ologist
I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO. — J
The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. — J
Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That'll do. If we allow it to remain undecided, does a contradiction follow? — Banno
He is providing examples of where the binary does not hold. That is different to pointing to places where there is a third option. See ↪J. Note ↪Srap Tasmaner's response. Consider what it is they are agreeing on. — Banno
I don't see how what you say here forms an argument. I do not see why Tim's statement implies anything about burden of proof. — Banno
That's not how it looks to me. It looks more as if you have reached a conclusion and are looking for an argument that will hit it. — Banno
Not my experience in curriculum development or in building co-design. Indeed it seems to me that the cases in which we share a "target", beyond a vague agreement as to the direction we might head, are rare. — Banno
That’s a different model—less like archery, more like building without a blueprint. — Banno
Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
That makes sense. I was thinking "binary" in terms of 2, because this seems to be the objection. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I might add:
5. If one claims standards are wholly unique in every instance then one cannot keep arbitrariness out. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That's a little trickier. But 5 is obviously false as a descriptive claim. To use the example of economics given earlier, it is not the case that economists use different epistemic standards for every question. They do not complete peer review by judging each submission by entirely different standards. And so too for philosophy of science and epistemology.
This gets at one of the unaddressed issues, which is identifying pseudoscience.
And the idea that standards are wholly different in each instance is at odds with the idea that authoritarianism is always inappropriate in epistemology or that only reasonable narratives need be considered. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom). — Fire Ologist
And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or don’t know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.
But Banno is wrong because we can’t even identify or determine something specific, like “wisdom”, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about “stupidity” or “my shoes”. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous. — Fire Ologist
The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you don’t like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? — Fire Ologist
See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus
[1] Either every narrative is correct, or else every narrative is incorrect.
[2] Every narrative is either correct or incorrect
[3] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else not all narratives are equally correct
[3a] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else some narratives are unequally correct
[4] Either one can give reasons for their standards, or else their standards are open to arbitrariness
We're 14 pages into the thread and Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:
Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
(Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.) — Leontiskos
Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying... — J
And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing. — J
I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his ↪statement, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary. — Leontiskos
Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary. — Banno
That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold — Banno
Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does? — Banno
A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. — Banno
Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. — Banno
We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both. — Banno
Why need we presume the conclusion? — Banno
Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable. — Banno
Why does J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes? — Leontiskos
"Qualia" are either a something about which can share nothing, or they are the subject of the common terms we already use to talk about our experiences. — Banno
(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. ) — Banno
So, can we agree that sometimes determinate/indeterminate are not contradictories? — Banno
And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content? — Banno
See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults. — Banno
Others have an obsession with the same. — Banno
Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; — Banno
Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else... — Count Timothy von Icarus
Logic is about language, not about the world itself. — ChatteringMonkey
[2] and [3] have the same logical structure as [1]. They are the same logical statements. — SophistiCat
Logic is only about something insofar as we make it to be. It can be something perfectly sensible, like [1], or frivolous, like [2], or even nothing in particular, like [3]. — SophistiCat
Exactly!
Thanks for your help. :lol: — Banno
There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far. — J
I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree that it's the wrong way to put it. That's what I should have written, "sentences lack intellects," and the meaning of given sound waves, written symbols, etc. is wholly accidental and dependent on human beings. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I would like to say though that the "set of all true propositions" is ens rationis, a hypothetical being of thought, the idea that "if I knew everything I could write it all down if I had an infinite list." It would take a while to unpack, but I think this is based on a deficient notion of truth, which maybe answers Banno's question about Great Lists. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Aristotle's distinction between the simple apprehension of wholes (whose opposite is ignorance) and of judgement (whose opposite of falsehood) is interesting here. I'd want to associate the former more with intellectus, but I see your point that it also seems to be present within judgement. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Wayfarer pointed out this too. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes. — Banno
Maybe more plainly, we speak of what is indeterminate and what is determinate.
And I agree there are worlds (or at least the world) that sits between these poles. — Fire Ologist
Why must wisdom "have some determinate content"? There's the idea again that if it has no "determinate content" then it is nothing, but that doesn't follow. The assumption is that without determinacy—without clear, specifiable content—“wisdom” is vacuous. But this is not a necessary conclusion. The leap from indeterminacy to meaninglessness is unwarranted. — Banno
Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying, "How could I possibly be wrong?" — J
I promise this is the last time I'll mention it, but . . . . Chakravartty and Pincock? — J
As an aside, there are lots of metaphorical possibilities that can be applied to the intellectus / ratio / will triad. I like the idea of reason as a boat with the skipper as ratio, the compass as intellectus, and the rudder as will. The compass "intuits" directionality, the skipper interprets the compasses readings and decides through a chain of reasoning where (s)he should steer the boat in accordance with them, and the rudder enacts the actual work of pushing the boat in the required direction. All three are needed for reason to be actualized. — Baden
Nominal freedom, the right to respond to passions in varying ways---passions which themselves are provoked in ever more varying ways and to which we respond primarily in order to satisfy our sensuous appetites---takes precedence over ontological freedom, the space to respond according to reason, the telos of which is to increase the quality of subjectivity’s relation to its world—“to actualize the good”.
This castration of reason and freedom is too a castration of subjectivity that tends to lead to self-instrumentalization and self-commodification (of course the Frankfurt school has a lot to say about this, but I’m going to leave them aside here). — Baden
Regardless of level of abstraction, including mathematical abstraction, the dissolving of subject and object in a relation at the direct edge of experience is crucial as a base on which to build rational understanding. — Baden
This is where an openness to that direct edge of experience comes in and where nominal freedom, the freedom to choose from sensual options becomes much less relevant than ontological freedom, which is first and foremost an intuitive divination of the quality of these options that lends us the power to reject those of them that lack quality, or do not fit with the telos of reason which again is to deepen subjectivity’s access to the truth as direct intuitively accessed experience (wisdom) rather than mere second hand linguistic knoweldge. — Baden
I think the particular lower faculty we are predominantly directed to in contemporary life is novelty as a good in itself rather than a signal to be investigated and evaluated by the intellect. That is, novelty is presented as a means for the will to directly manifest the experience of pleasure in a bypassing of the intellect. — Baden
If we were to take seriously the idea of the intellect as a means to intuit the likely quality of potential behaviours instantiated by the will, or the ratio as a means to process the meaning of the possibilities of action in relation to a proper intuitive understanding of them, our contemporary milieu would look very different. In fact, in terms of power hierarchies and the accumulation of capital that largely determines them, it would be utterly transformed. — Baden
Utterances are acts, yet it is substances—things—that primarily possess being, and so it is people (and God) who primarily possess truth. — Dante and the Deflation of Reason, 3-4
Ratio is the means by which we move from truth to truth and come to “encircle” new truths. The acquisition of human knowledge begins and ends in intellectus, but proceeds by discursive ratio. — Dante and the Deflation of Reason, 5
If you throw J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). — Count Timothy von Icarus