Sebastian Rödl
— J

I've read about his books and tried to tackle some of his papers, but I'm finding him difficult reading. I would be pleased if there was another here with some interest. — Wayfarer

Me, definitely. Working my way through Self-Consciousness and Objectivity now.

Is the idea here that just thinking something is asserting it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not quite. Think of it in terms of Frege's "force" as equivalent to (one sense of) "assertion". The question is then: How does the "content" (of the force/content distinction) make itself known independently? If "p" is different from "I think p", how exactly does p come to be present to us? This quote from Rödl captures the problem:

Philosophers are in the habit of indicating the object of judgment by the letter p. There is an insouciance with respect to this fateful letter. It stands ready quietly, unobtrusively, to assure us that we know what we are talking about. For example, when we do epistemology, we are interested in what it is for someone to know—know what? oh yes: p. If we inquire into rational requirements on action or intention, we ask what it is to be obliged to—what? oh yes: see to it that p, intend that p, if p then q, and so on. However, if we undertake to reflect on thought, on its self-consciousness and its objectivity, then the letter p signifies the deepest question and the deepest comprehension. If only we understood the letter p, the whole would open up to us. — Self-Consciousness & Objectivity

This point of view is very congenial to yours, I would think, since Rödl is doubting whether "p" -- a proposition -- could possibly do the things, all by itself, that formalism says it can. A thinker is required.

So yes, the distinction you're making between contraries and contradictories is extremely important. The essential unity of the thinker with the thought, the knower with the world, can only be shown by rejecting, as Kimhi does, the idea that a proposition can be true or false in the absence of some context of assertion.

Agreed, although I don't know if "context of assertion" is the right framing. Beliefs can be true or false without being needing to be "asserted." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't much like "context of assertion" either, but the deeper challenge here is whether, in fact, a belief can be true or false without being asserted. I know that sounds absurd, but so much depends on how we construe "assertion," and the long thread on Kimhi a few months back revealed a lot of work to be done on this question.

Are we sure that thought and being exist in the sort of relationship that needs to be "conformed" or "adequated"?

Well, presumably we need to be able to explain false beliefs and false statements. There is adequacy in the sense of "believing the Sun rotates around the Earth" being, in important ways, inadequate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. One problem for being/thinking monism a la Kimhi is that it seems to imply that any valid thought also has to be true. That can't be right, so we need to work out whether there really is a concept of validity independent of truth. Again, sounds absurd -- there has to be, right?! -- but stand-alone "validity" turns out to be very tricky. The monist wants to be able to say that there is no disjunction between truth and validity -- that there is something ill-formed or incoherent about "A thinks ~p", as opposed to "A doesn't think p". This is the problem from Parmenides that Kimhi begin T&B with, you may recall: How can we think that which is not?

Can we paint a plausible picture that is at bottom monistic?

Monistic in what sense? — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Thinking cannot be dependent for its success on anything that is external to it." — Kimhi, 23

Monism in that sense, a tall order. Rödl, another monist as far as I can tell, subtitles his book Self-Consciousness and Objectivity as "An Introduction to Absolute Idealism."

So, without having to make any commitments to any specific sort of correspondence or identity relationship between thought and being, we can simply leave it as "truth is the conformity or adequacy of thought to being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Predating Tarski by several centuries! And the challenge to that, coming from people like Kimhi and Sebastian Rödl (who I'm now reading with great interest) is, Are we sure that thought and being exist in the sort of relationship that needs to be "conformed" or "adequated"? Can we paint a plausible picture that is at bottom monistic? I'm still working on that, and I want to do an OP soon that lays out some of Rödl's ideas about the Fregean force/content distinction.

A major difficulty for modern thought has been the move to turn truth and falsity into contradictory opposites, as opposed to contrary opposites (i.e. making truth akin to affirmation and negation). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. (Aquinas)

Kimhi is helpful here:

A capacity meta logou is categorematic: it is specified by a verb -- say, to heal -- and its positive and negative acts are contraries. A logical capacity is syncategorematic: it is specified by a proposition, and its positive and negative acts are contradictories. — Thinking and Being, 61

He adds this footnote:

Capacities meta logou are two-way capacities because they involve logical capacities. It is because doctors must judge how best to heal their patients that they can also judge how best to poison them. — Thinking and Being, 61

On this understanding of Aristotle, a contrary pair will display positive and negative acts involving a verb, whereas a contradictory pair either affirms or denies the truth of a proposition. Roughly, (A thinks p, A thinks ~p) vs. (p, ~p).

So yes, the distinction you're making between contraries and contradictories is extremely important. The essential unity of the thinker with the thought, the knower with the world, can only be shown by rejecting, as Kimhi does, the idea that a proposition can be true or false in the absence of some context of assertion.

We say that the utterance is true if its propositional content "resembles" (for want of a better word) the landscape being described and false if it doesn't. — Michael

This helps point out the question I was asking. It's the matter of resemblance. I understand you're using that word because there isn't a more perfect one, and you're not claiming some literal resemblance between propositional content and a landscape. But that's the rub. We know what we mean when we say that the picture resembles the landscape, but the whole debate about propositions, utterances, and truth can only occur because we don't know what this resemblance is supposed to consist of, precisely. That's why I'm dubious about picture analogies -- they confer "borrowed certainty," if you will.

Even if we want to distinguish an utterance from its propositional content, an utterance is required for there to be propositional content. Propositional content, whether true or false, doesn't "exist" as some mind-independent abstract entity that somehow becomes the propositional content of a particular utterance. — Michael

Agreed, prop. content doesn't exist as a mind-independent entity. But I think we should be careful in saying that "an utterance" is required. Does my thought of p qualify as an utterance? It's tempting to say that I am simply thinking p, the prop. content itself -- utterance-free.

The word “it” in the phrase “is it true?” refers to either an utterance or an utterance-dependent proposition, and so asking if an utterance or proposition is true before it is uttered is a nonsensical question, like asking if a painting is accurate before it is painted. — Michael

The word “it” in “Is it accurate?” in reference to a painting must, on this argument, refer to either a particular painting (“utterance”) or some other possible pictorialization of the “same thing” (p) that is “pictorialization-dependent”. Are you sure this makes sense as an analogy? I think the difference lies in the fact that utterances can have propositional content whereas paintings cannot. What we refer to, in the case of a possible utterance, is the propositional content. Thus, “utterance- (or pictorialization-) dependent” has two different meanings or implications, in the two cases. This makes the analogy appear more persuasive than it is.

Well, yeah, it’s pretty philosophical - that was kinda the idea! You can find good explanations of it on SEP and elsewhere, I’m sure. Just a suggestion.

True, we don’t usually get a consensus on this. Just to help the discussion along, suppose we took Quine’s formulation - “To be is to be the value of a bound variable” - and asked ourselves what that might say about the status of ideas and/or numbers?

OK, it's a sort of genealogy of ethics. As such, it's foreign to the questions of ethics as I understand them, but I appreciate your laying out your point of view for me.

Yes, but you have said that from your perspective the choices made by Boethius are better for them and "the best option they have available," and that it is better for them. But now you seem to think it is actually better for them to lack the strength of will to follow through on their convictions. Such a view also entails that Socrates, Boethius, etc. are simply wrong about what is truly to their benefit. Egoism is actually to their benefit. They are deluded in thinking it isn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know how I can make any more compelling the idea that we're simply playing around with what "benefit" means. I don't think "the best option available" has to be beneficial for anyone; you do. I think it is a better thing for Socrates et al. to do right, but I don't equate this "better" with being beneficial for them; you do. If Socrates uses "benefit" the way I do, then he wouldn't say that doing the right thing is always necessarily a benefit. If he uses it your way, then he would. I would greatly like to know if there is a Greek word that discriminates here, allowing "beneficial" to break off into these two senses -- roughly, the benefit of personal goods and the benefit of acting well.

Which way is the "right" way to use the word? How do you think we should answer such a question?

Is there any way I can persuade you that we really aren't having a substantive disagreement here? This harks back to what I meant, earlier, when I said that all this discussion of "good" (and now "benefit") can only be coherent if there are different, equivocal meanings of "good" in play. It saddens me a bit, because it seems so clear that you and I are both on the side of the angels, as it were, and this kind of infighting when there is so much genuine ethical atrocity to call out, seems unfortunate.

I don't see how such a position doesn't require the presupposition that "benefit" means something like "egoistic pursuit of one's own pleasure," or something similar. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, it says nothing about motivation, and there are many things besides pleasure that are beneficial. It says that a benefit improves a person's lot in life, or something equally general. Again, I appeal to ordinary usage: If one's daughter is raped and murdered, she may have refused to give up a wanted man and been punished accordingly, and so acted virtuously, but what father would claim she had anything beneficial happen to her?

you seem to have stepped back from your previous positions to presupposing "morally good is a sui generis sort of good unrelated to other uses of the term. " — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I think that's too strong. I don't believe the various usages of "good" are unrelated. Equivocation often occurs precisely because various usages are so closely related -- yet distinct. What I want is a union of these related goods, as do you.

Right, but now you seem to have stepped back from your previous positions to presupposing "morally good is a sui generis sort of good unrelated to other uses of the term. "

What's the justification for this? Where is the argument for it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Continuing this thought, my argument for the idea that usages of "good" differ significantly has, I think, already been made. Better, perhaps, to say "I've given my reasons," because, as I acknowledged, arguments from usage are tricky. Is it even an argument? Could I argue for the fact that "phrasing," in music, has been used to mean both the performance intentions of the composer, as found in the score, and also the practice of a particular performer, such that a passage can be "phrased" in different ways? All I can do is point out how I think educated musicians use the word, and I will be either right or wrong depending on how they do use it. That's not exactly an argument, but I don't know what more one could do.

Stalin lived a fairly miserable life, a life defined by constant paranoia and a lack of close relations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I was afraid, when I reached for Stalin as an example, that a biographer might reveal that he was actually miserable, confusing the issue. But that's beside the point -- unless you're wanting to say, with Plato, that every wicked person has to be miserable as a result. (I'm thinking of the tyrant in the Republic.) I'm sorry to say I've personally known a few exceptions. We're not talking about who's happy and who's miserable, because we both agree that these conditions aren't indicative of a virtuous life. What we want to know is whether the wicked person benefits from their wickedness. Well, certainly they do, especially if (unlike Stalin, evidently) they live a prosperous life and die happy. But then, I'm using "benefit" my way . . . part of why he's wicked is that he does act for his own benefit, rather than considering the welfare of others.

A prescriptive ethics ( we SHOULD avoid hostility ) only makes sense in a psychology which requires a separate motivational mechanism pushing or pulling us in ethical or unethical directions . But we don't need to be admonished to choose in favor of sense-making strategies that are optimally anticipatory, since this is already built into our motivational aims — Joshs

This is the claim that needs arguing, I think. When you speak about something being "built into our motivational aims," are you describing it from the point of view of psychology? That is, as a description of the human animal, of how we behave? Or do you mean "built in" as a sort of stand-in for a transcendental argument that would show it must be the case? I think it will make a big difference, which way we understand it, because if I want to go on to say that we do need a separate motivational mechanism, I need to know whether I'm arguing against an empirical or a conceptual claim.

The question of why and to what extent a person embraces hostility should be seen as a matter of how much uncertainty that person's system is capable of tolerating without crumbling, rather than a self-reinforcing desire for hostile thinking. — Joshs

The last part is certainly true. Even people who believe they enjoy hostile thinking can probably be shown to lack a level of self-awareness that would reveal something more fear-based. I'm not sure, though, whether hostile behavior is only a matter of one's own system of concepts and values being in jeopardy. Can we use the word "hostile" without also meaning "aggressive toward others"?

Of more concern is where this stands vis a vis ethics. Are you wanting to say that, when we give a correct, or at least perspicacious, analysis of the person who has raped and killed someone, we are no longer in a position to describe the actions as wrong?

Nothing in virtue ethics suggests that we need to claim that being tortured "benefits us." This is a creation of your own invention you keep returning to, moving from "it is good to be virtuous," to "it is good to be tortured" seems a bit much, no?

It benefits us to possess the virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Truly, we're disputing words now. We both agree that there is something of great value in standing up for a principle even if it means enduring a dreadful death. You want to call this "something" a benefit, I do not. But is there anything more to it than this? I don't really mind what words we use to describe the problem, I only ask that it be seen as a problem.

What's weird is, you accept that Socrates or Boethius choose the best possible option available to them. But then, on your view, choosing the best possible option doesn't benefit us. We would benefit more from choosing what is worse (e.g. fleeing and escaping for Socrates, or recanting and obsequiously pleading for mercy) in this case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's exactly right. Virtue ethics commits you to finding a benefit in virtuous action, and I know it seems weird to you that virtue might not always be its own reward. (Maybe this is a bit of what MacIntyre was pointing to, in terms of the difficulty of building bridges between ethical systems.) But that's not at all the only way to see it. Deontology, as I've summarized it, asks us to ignore this question of self-benefit entirely. Or, if we must talk of benefits, let's stick to the ordinary usage and admire Socrates and Boethius precisely because they chose to forego any benefit for themselves by taking a virtuous course of action.

we have a case where "it is better/more to our benefit for us to choose what is worse?" and the "worse is better than the better." — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, again, this is only a contradiction if we insist on a link between "benefit" and "ethical goodness." From my point of view (which you may not agree with but I hope you will acknowledge is not unreasonable or ignorant), it makes perfect sense to say "It was greatly to Stalin's benefit [or substitute any wicked person who succeeded and died happy] to choose what was worse, that's part of why it was worse -- it was entirely selfish."

I'd like to invite us both to step back and consider this as a problem of the relation between personal and public goods. What I've been calling a "metaphysical union of goods" returns as an issue in political ethics. Or perhaps I shouldn't say "returns," since the Republic is full of discussion of this problem. We've been talking about this in highly abstract terms, but I submit that the issue is one of daily concern, as we attempt to navigate between personal, familial, community, national, human, and creation goods. I want to find a way to unite these goods, both philosophically and in my own life. Habermas opposes what he calls "a supposedly irreconcilable conflict between justice for all and the individual good"; when put this way, I think we can see that this is the same "benefit" problem, writ large. How do we further the goods or benefits of a life -- love, pleasure, family, achievement -- yet hold them in balance with our duties as citizens and members of a much larger ethical community?

This is a different subject, in some ways, but I thought I'd at least bring it up because I've found that, when sharp disagreements arise between intelligent people, it's often best to focus on their common beliefs and aims. I think we both want to keep searching for a resolution to this "supposedly irreconcilable conflict." Disputing how to use the word "benefit" probably isn't the way, and I apologize if I've encouraged too much logomachy.

Is your contention that it isn't beneficial for us to be virtuous? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite often, that's correct. But more importantly, it doesn't matter whether it benefits us or not. We're supposed to do the virtuous thing regardless of whether it benefits us or not.

And here, in all simplicity, we see the difference between virtue ethics and deontological ethics. Virtue ethics is committed to the position that there simply must be a benefit to the individual from all virtuous action. So, to make this plausible in cases where by any normal use of language there is no benefit whatsoever, the virtue ethicist has to stipulate the definitions of words like "benefit," "good," and "virtue" so as to reveal that we are mistaken about what benefits us. We think being tortured in a good cause is merely the best alternative, the least of many evils? No, that won't do -- it also has to benefit us. This is because what I've been calling the "metaphysical union of goods" is assumed or stipulated by virtue ethics. It's a place to start, rather than a desideratum that needs to be argued for or explained.

Deontology, in contrast, says that what's good for me is neither here nor there. The purpose of the virtues is not to secure any sort of benefit, no matter how implausibly defined. We act virtuously in each case because it is the right thing to do, and this "right thing" can be discovered and described without any reference to what is good for me. It's essentially an other-directed ethics, I would say.

Now I'm not satisfied with that, because I think it's too austere. It ignores some basic facts about human beings and the things that make them flourish. But what I do like about deontological ethics is that it recognizes the supposed union of personal and universal goods as a problem, a very deep and difficult one. It doesn't begin by assuming that good acts must be good for the people who perform them. It is skeptical of all easy equations between the "good" of flourishing, say, and the "good" of standing up against injustice.

If I can lighten the mood for a moment, there was a cartoon from many years ago (National Lampoon?) showing some poor sods writhing in torment in some dreadful hellscape, being poked by devils, etc. One of them is saying, "Ah, but far worse than these torments is the knowledge that I shall never experience the Beatific Vision!" That's the problem, captured in a gag. It is worse, in some important way, to be deprived of the presence of God, but whatever way that is, it can't belong on a comparison scale with being tortured. That's why the caption is funny.

I think much of 20th century ethical thought is devoted to finding a way over the gap, and creating a genuine metaphysical union of goods. Has anyone come close? Perhaps I reveal my admiration for Kant (though not, I insist, my agreement with his conclusions) by saying that John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas seem to have made the most progress. Each is a neo-Kantian of sorts, Rawls explicitly and Habermas by courtesy. And anyway, there are modalities other than philosophy that are far more useful, if you really want to be a decent person. Or so I've found.

This is an interesting psychological picture of how people experience their connections with others, but isn't an awful lot of ethical talk being presupposed here, in order to give this analysis? As an example,

This is the hostile option. — Joshs

You are clearly not trying to present "hostile option" in an ethically neutral way. It is not to be preferred, on your account. We ought not to choose the hostile option. So how is that judgment arrived at, and is it meant to carry ethical weight?

We cannot get beyond this link between the lovable and the recognizable without losing the basis of any ethics, which is the ability to distinguish between, even if without yet defining, what is preferred and what is not. — Joshs

I liked what you said about the important connections between recognition and empathy. I might have put it a bit more directly -- it's hard to love, and stand up for, someone you can't even recognize as suffering.

But the quoted passage above seems out of phase with this. If the basis of ethics is only about distinguishing what's preferred, how does that create any impetus to change preferences? I would have said that that -- the desire to prefer what, to the best of our knowing, is truly empathetic, or just, or compassionate -- is central to ethics, not so much the act of preferring itself.

OK, thanks.

Ethical striving toward empathy, love and compassion are derivative modes of sense-making. — Joshs

Sorry, this is opaque to me. Could you expand? And, no offense, but in your own words if possible? I'm less interested in what other philosophers have said about this than I am in what you think.

intelligibility is socially constrained — Joshs

We need, in a word, hermeneutics.

I’m not trying to suggest that a single monolithic episteme underlies all forms of cultural creativity in a given era for a given community, but I am saying that these systems are interlocked, such that it makes sense to talk about Romantic painting, literature, music philosophy and science and mean more than just that these domains all belong to the same chronological period. — Joshs

Yes, with a heavy emphasis on your warning about simplistic "single monolithic episteme" talk. The interlocking is complicated, and the parallels are stronger or weaker from era to era. Also, the role of science here is, to my mind, by far the most problematic. "Romantic" science? I'd need to hear more about what that might be. We all remember the Sokal hoax . . .

More importantly, when we move from one era to the next a certain discontinuity and incommensurability is involved — Joshs

Put this carefully, I think you're right. . . .

An entire metaphysics of ethics is dependent on flattening and ignoring these discontinuities in intelligibility. — Joshs

. . . but this is very sweeping, and needs arguing for. Rather than simply assume these "discontinuities in intelligibility," why not put them in question? Again, a hermeneutical approach can help us understand the limits -- but also the strengths -- of interpretation across cultures. We need, at the least, a sophisticated understanding of the concept of intelligibility.

But if matters of fact depend for their understanding on systems of intelligibility which are contingently culture-bound, why should notions of the ethical good be any different? — Joshs

I think this is indeed the conclusion we'd be forced to draw, and I think it's the wrong one. So I'd want to go back to look more closely at the fact/system/intelligibility relationship. How much of this is cultural? Do all matters of fact really depend on such radically contingent systems? Is there no value in the distinction between the natural sciences and human sciences?

I think that Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Habermas have a lot to teach us here.

Why shouldn’t Socrates be able to understand Kant, the thinking goes, given a sufficiently thorough period of study? Why shouldn’t the Qanon -touting Trump voter sitting next to you be able to absorb the raw facts when conferences directly with them? — Joshs

The pairing of these two questions is a bit alarming! I think Socrates probably could understand Kant, if we could imagine the impossible situation of someone being magically transported back to Athens to explain it to him using the language of Greek thought. But the Qanoner is not in the business of trying to understand anything. Giving them "raw facts" (presumably about the lack of sinister conspiracies?) is not the same as introducing Socrates to the idea of the kingdom of ends.

According to this dualism of ethical value and matters of fact, the ethical disagreement between a neoliberal and a progressive socialist is based on considerations entirely different from those having to do with matters of fact. — Joshs

I've lost you here. I thought you were arguing the opposite -- that the problem is a lack of shared, mutually intelligible facts. Could you say more?

This flattening of discontinuities in intelligibility between eras, and between individuals, provides justification for the idea that there is such a thing a a universally shared notion of the ethical good that comprises not just the desire to be moral, but a shared conceptual content that is as transparent as matters of fact. — Joshs

This is interesting. The implication is that "the desire to be moral" can exist without some particular "conceptual content" -- that the desire can be present from era to era, but with a differing notion of the ethical good. Are you sure that's possible? What is this common denominator of desire? I'm not saying that there is no such common denominator, of course; I'm arguing, in the opposite direction, that in addition to such a common desire there is also ethical conceptual content that is translatable from era to era and individual to individual.

The other falls short of our ethical standards due to a failing of ‘integrity’, a ‘character flaw’ , dishonesty, evil intent , selfishness, etc. In doing so, we erase the difference between their world and ours, and turn our failure to fathom into their moral failure. — Joshs

To me, this describes the process of "othering," in which opponents or adversaries are assumed to be in disagreement with us due to certain traits they possess, rather than because there is genuine, potentially resolvable disagreement. Oddly, I see this as erasing the similarities between their world and ours, not the difference. But I think we may be getting at the same idea. Your point, perhaps, is that reducing ethical dispute to some sort of character failure makes the assumption not only that the other is wrong in ethical terms, but also that those terms are already quite clear to all concerned. And what would my ethical duty be, in such a case? Just as you say -- try harder, keep trying to stay in "communicative action" (Habermas), don't simply give up and start "othering."

The above, rather rosy description, has an important caveat: Some people really are hateful and cruel. There is such a thing as moral failure. An entire society can even approach such a dreadful state. But to begin from such a premise, when in disagreement, is foolish and unjust.

Good questions. To the first, yes, I think an interlocutor of Socrates (let's call him Kantias) could have posed theories about the moral value of motivation, and whether in order for an act to be virtuous, it would have to be something that anyone would do in the same circumstances. Those two questions alone would get us quite deeply into Kantian ethics. Kant's emphasis on freedom would, I think, be harder for Socrates to understand, but if Kantias laid it out in terms of physis and nomos, and then led the discussion into whether there is a law for humans that we may freely follow, Socrates would probably have some good insights.

To the second, I'm not entirely sure what it would mean to "think up something similar." Socrates was more of a dialectician than an armchair thinker, so let's switch it from Socrates to Aristotle. Could Aristotle have come up with the idea that an act is only virtuous if it can be recommended as a universal maxim? I suppose so. I'm not sure the question would have interested him very much, but that's not the same thing as saying it would be opaque to him. He might not have cared whether the virtues were applicable to all people in all (similar) circumstances. His emphasis seems to be on how I may live a good life, not so much on whether living that good life involves defeating selfish motives and willing a universal "kingdom of ends." I'm not really entitled to an opinion here, as Aristotle isn't my forte. If someone can point me to something like "A Kantian interprets Aristotle," I'd love to read it.

I do want to affirm something you don't come right out and say, but that I think is implied in your questions. Creativity is socially constrained; it has a history and a context; and to ask "Would X have understood A?" is not the same as asking "Could X have created A?" In one of my fields, music, we often kick around stuff like "What would Bach make of Stravinsky?" Well, given enough time and examples to acclimate himself to Modernism, Bach might well have loved Igor. But there is absolutely zero chance he could have written Rite of Spring in 1725. So I read you here as pointing out, rightly, that we mustn't engage in some sort of "leveling of history" and imagine that Socrates, Aquinas, and Kant all spoke essentially the same creative language. They did not. And I suppose, if that is all MacIntyre's thesis amounts to, then I don't really disagree. I'm just troubled by this idea of incommensurability and decline, which seems too strong.

OK. I still see problems with equivocation, and unless I missed it, you haven't addressed the use of "good for me" as in "beneficial,"* but I will definitely spend more time on this.

*Unless, once again, we just have to accept that being virtuous is the most beneficial thing for me. I still think this is being set out as a conclusion without an argument, and that one is entitled to ask how it can be that death by torture benefits me.

Even J's approach seems to challenge this continuity, for he thinks that Kant's view is uniquely correct. If Kant's view is uniquely correct and is not a continuation of earlier moral philosophy, then how could Kant be continuous with earlier moral philosophy?
— Leontiskos

I've been reading along but not that closely.

What say you to this J ? — Moliere

Nonsense. I've been at pains to say that I do not agree with all of Kant's solutions to ethical problems. Just for starters, I don't think the categorical imperative can be stated in such a way as to do the ethical job Kant wanted it to do. I said that he "offers perspectives that I believe are central." They certainly are. He is for me the most important and impressive "modern" moral philosopher because he framed the problems with enormous originality and insight, raising questions that have been impossible to ignore ever since -- not because he always gets it right. This idea of philosophers being "uniquely correct" is a fantasy.

As for the continuity question, I see nothing in Kant's ethics -- apart from the Christian aspects -- that Socrates would not have both understood and been eager to debate.

I think the idea is something like modern thinking broke us off from ancient thinking to such a point that modern thought has lost the fundamental truth of philosophy -- wisdom -- in place of whatever it is pursuing right now (the idea here being that the ancients have a kind of "time tested" wisdom) — Moliere

I wish I knew what "modern thinking" consisted of, that supposedly made it either so unique or so pernicious. Anscombe doesn't persuade me. When I read Plato, I feel as if all those arguments might be occurring among my neighbors, they are so vivid and contemporary. (Well, if my neighbors were a little more philosophical!) The things that concerned Plato and Aristotle are right at the top of my list too -- to say nothing of Christian thought. As for wisdom, it's true that Aristotle often sounds to me as if he believes he's achieved complete wisdom in all matters -- but not Plato. So this is perhaps another instance of how there was important disagreement between ancient and ancient. And I bet I'm oversimplifying Aristotle's complacency as well.

The problem with "time-tested wisdom," of course, is that we are still in time, and the wisdom continues to be tested, and you could hardly maintain that no one has raised any important questions about Greek philosophy, or about ethics in general, since. I suppose there is an illusion of "time-tested-ness" because it started earlier, and for so many centuries had no serious challengers in Western culture. But I am not a historian of philosophy, so I'm guessing. I also think, as I wrote somewhere recently, that the "loss of fundamental truths" picture is meant to go hand in hand with a picture of actual moral decline, such that Western society is now supposed to be much worse, ethically, than it used to be.

This view of a continuity between ancient and modern ethics is similar to what I’ve been saying to Count T, if you’ve been following that conversation. I agree that the disagreements among ancient ethical systems may be evidence for this view. Even more striking, to me, is the fact that ethical discourse—and disagreement— has gone on, right into the present. If ethical truth had indeed been achieved in the context of virtue ethics, the continued dispute about it would need some explaining. I don’t remember — does MacIntyre offer some account of why things went so downhill? Why did Western culture end up in this “Canticle for Liebowitz” situation?

Thanks for this. You've offered two suggestions I will take up: to question more carefully whether this is a case of wanting univocal predication when that is inappropriate; and to explore analogous predication more fully. The first I can spend time on myself. For the second, could you perhaps say briefly how analogous predication would apply here, in the case of what looks like two usages of "good"? It's quite possible I don't yet understand how that would work.

Is "I am here now" a logical truth? Intuitively, anyone who utters such a sentence is uttering a truth; yet it is not true in every possible world that I am here now - I might have been somewhere else... — Banno

Which would lead me to think that it's actually an empirical truth, a fact about this world -- which gets back to Nagel's question, "What kind of fact is it?" Because we want to say that empirical truths are verifiable in certain standard ways. "I am here now," it would seem, is irreducibly first-person, and yet it would make no sense for you -- or anyone -- to deny it about me on those grounds. You couldn't very well say, "Well, that's just your point of view." This is where some kind of formalism that could "translate 1st person" might help, I really don't know.

It is not always good for us to have what we "perceive as good." We can be wrong about what is truly good or truly best. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair enough. So my suggestion for Version 1 should have read, “If you are good, it will be good for you, in the sense that either you or someone else is able to identify it as such by experiencing or observing some particular thing about you.” This is starting to sound a little lawyerly but I’m working hard to avoid saying something that can’t be falsified. For after all, if I said, “. . . it will be good for you but no one can tell, we just know it must be true,” we’d be back at square one, with a merely asserted union.

I would say "it's good (truly better) for you to be good—to be a good person and live a good life," is circular in a sense, but the way an ascending spiral is circular. It loops back around on itself at higher levels, with greater depths beneath it, in a sort of fractal recurrence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is the sort of thing we want to be true, and it’s very poetically expressed. But at this point one really has to stop and say, “But what do you mean? If you can’t explain what it means without images of spirals and fractals, aren’t I entitled to wonder if it’s actually (rationally) explicable at all?” For, when all’s said and done, I’m still left with what appear to be two quite different usages of “good,” and the desire, but not the means, to unite them. Simply asserting their union won’t do.

Are the theorems of geometry vacuous because they are already contained in Euclid's postulates? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now here is a Kantian question! As I’m sure you know, Kant believed that mathematical truths were synthetic, and not contained in any premises. Dodging any deep debates on math here, let’s just say that if Kant was wrong, and arithmetic, geometry, and logic are indeed all analytic, I don’t think anyone has ever suggested that analytic truths are vacuous. But that’s just the problem here -- “It’s good for you to be good” is not being put forward as an analytic truth. It’s meant to inform us of something we didn’t know, or so I assume. Or perhaps you do mean it analytically? -- something like “To understand what ‛the good’ means is also to know that it is good for you to be good”?

. . . another "slide into multiplicity" whereby we have many sui generis "Goods" with "moral good" constituting just one good among a plurality. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This, to me, is an important insight into the whole question. What I find interesting is that both you and I believe in the desirability of avoiding a multiplicity of goods. I very much want “the Good” to be univocal, and all the uses of “good” to be instances of the same thing, so that “moral good” would not be sui generis in a worrisome sense, any more than “aesthetic good” would be. But . . . the problem is that, IMO, you haven’t yet shown how it can be the case. Perhaps no one can, but we have to do more than assert what I’ve been calling a “metaphysical union of goods” but not explain how it works in a way that defeats the objections I’ve raised so far. How in the world can execution be good for Socrates? Better than the alternatives, sure, but good? You can’t just fold the two meanings of “good” together by fiat, and say that because Socrates has made a good choice, has done a virtuous thing, it therefore automatically becomes good for him. That is what we want for a conclusion, but we lack the argument.

Also, I do think that to stop the discussion before modern philosophy is to greatly decrease our chances of a solution to this problem. I mean no offense, but have you given a lot of thought to Kant’s ethics? This problem of avoiding a multiplicity of goods is central to his project. His solutions are very different from Plato’s or Aristotle’s or Aquinas’s, and offer perspectives that I believe are central. Moreover, he was a firm Christian believer and insisted that the truths of morality be consistent with the truths of revelation, so, again, I just can’t see this as some huge gap with the ancients – at least not the ancient Christians.

I’m sure TPF has done a thread on the Groundwork at some point in the past – maybe revisit?

Yes, this is more or less the way I (and I believe Nagel) see it. It's not a matter of contradiction. What remains concerning, of course, is the huge gap between these sets of facts that we're calling objective and subjective. Nagel presses home the point that the fact of my identity isn't trivial to me, it can't be ignored, or relegated to an unphilosophical minor level. And yet it isn't even a fact at all, objectively. What's worse, we place a great deal of emphasis, ordinarily, on the concept of a "fact" as being objective, something independent of individual viewpoints.

I'm not suggesting any solution to this concern. I think we should treat it rather as a koan, something we're aware is not comprehensible to us at this moment, but stimulates thought.

As for the idea that there might be a formal logical description of this: Would it involve handling statements like "It is true that, from Peter's point of view, 'I am Peter' is true" and "'I am Peter' is true IFF the extensions of 'I' and 'Peter' are the same"? Interesting idea. Someone must have done some work on this. We could also play around with whether it's possible to claim that "I am Peter" is an objective fact, odd though that may appear. If I'm in the room with Peter, and he says, "I am Peter," would I be likely to deny that he's stating a fact? No. Am I just taking his word for it, then? His word for what, exactly? I think there's more to it than that, but I need to think about it more.

This is an excellent question, and immediately takes me back to another excellent question first posed by Thomas Nagel: "What kind of fact is it -- if it is a fact -- that I am Thomas Nagel?" He means, is it a fact about the world, something that is objectively true? He then invokes the "centerless world" of objectivity, and says, "One very large fact seems to have been omitted from its description: the fact that a particular person in it is [my]self." Not "Thomas Nagel", you understand, but "myself".

I see you imagining a very similar situation. It appears to make no objective difference to anything whether you are Peter or Alexa. And yet, to you, it makes an enormous difference. Here you and Nagel part company, because he doesn't see this as a logical contradiction, but rather as a puzzle we haven't solved. It's an indication that we don't know what to do with terms like "objective" and "subjective" when changes of state, such as identity, appear to be merely subjective. Can subjectivity be viewed objectively? No doubt we'll understand this better if and when we understand how consciousness comes to be.

When people say "it is good for you to be good," in the overwhelming number of cases they are attempting to draw a contrast between apparent or lesser goods, and true and greater goods. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ah, a light has dawned for me. I think what’s gotten confused in our discussion is the grammatical impact of “for you.” I’ve been reading “It is good for you to be good” as meaning “If you are good, it will be good for you, you will experience something that you perceive as good.” And you’ve been reading it as “It is morally more desirable for you to be a good person.” The difference shows up even more clearly in an example like “It is good for you to tell the truth no matter what,” which can be understood either as “If you tell the truth, it will be good for you, you’ll derive a benefit”, or as “It is a good thing, a morally correct thing, to tell the truth.” What seems key here is that the second version can be true even if the first version is not. It could be the case that telling the truth in a particular case will do you no good whatsoever – it is not a good for you -- but truthtelling is still important to our community, so we recommend it nevertheless.

I call this a grammatical question because you can analyze the “for you” as appending to “good,” (“It’ll be good for you!”) or as requiring the verb that follows it: “It’s a good thing for you to . . . [do X Y Z]” Both these usages are very common, and I’m not surprised we got muddled. Moreover, what we really want is for there not to be a difference, somehow, in these usages -- the metaphysical union of goods, again.

So if this indeed clears something up, I can now say that on your reading of “It is good for you to be good,” I agree completely. It is always better to be a good person than to pursue apparent or lesser goods. I wonder whether, in turn, you can now agree that on my reading, “It is good for you to be good” is often, sadly, not the case. I suspect you may not agree, because I think you want to say that the tortured victim is deriving a benefit of some sort, but this remains obscure to me. Is it supposed to be good for his soul even while disastrous for his body? Or is the benefit he derives merely that he has not done evil, he has stayed true to his principles? But perhaps I’m wrong.

The next step would be to consider which of these two readings is the one that various ethical traditions intend.

Sample: A: “I don’t see what good will come out of exercising and eating a balanced diet.” B: “No, it’s healthy for you to be healthy.” A: “Oh, I see. Exercising and good nutrition will make me healthy, and being healthy is desirable and good for me.” I’m sure you can analyze this for yourself and see why it involves different uses of “healthy” to avoid vacuity.

The terms here aren't completely equivocal either though. They have an analogous relation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the equivocation is a matter of degree. But if they meant exactly the same thing, the statement would be vacuous.

I cannot conceive of being maimed and tortured as not robbing someone of their flourishing – unless you arbitrarily make “flourishing” torture-proof, thanks to previous "patterns of behavior." It seems the very epitome of such a robbery to me. Does it make them a bad person? Of course not. Was it the lesser of two evils?

Again, this seems to be trying to make the case that it isn't evil to torture or maim people. Who is going to claim that? — Count Timothy von Icarus

 

You are pivoting from "'it is good to be good' is vacuous," to "executions and maiming are good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, sorry if I’m not being clear. I say that not only is torturing and maiming evil, but it is also an evil to be tortured and maimed, so much so that a concept of “flourishing as a person” that could include being tortured to death must be wrong.

Socrates is not saying that good men never stub their toes, or get the flu. He is focusing on what goodness is primarily said of. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But then there’s Aristotle. Surely he’s right when he says that a good life consists of all the many good things he names, with the highest being contemplation. Aren’t these things that “goodness is primarily said of” too?

Edit: Just thought of another way to paraphrase the 2nd version of "It's good for you to be good" -- "It's good that you be good." That eliminates the confusing "for you" entirely.

But the more general point would be that it is better not to flee, or more importantly, better to be the sort of person who will not flee. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, no question. In the circumstances in which Socrates finds himself, he’s made the right choice. But I believe we’re all familiar with the expression “the lesser of two evils”? This, to me, is a much more accurate description of what is happening to Socrates, than to say he has chosen something that is “good for him.” This should not be read as denying or downplaying how admirable Socrates’ -- or Carton’s, or any martyr’s – decision is. What he does requires enormous bravery and integrity. These are virtues of the highest order. But no, it hasn’t been good for him. He has done good, which I’m trying to argue is quite different.

I’m essentially making a point about language, about how people use words and the meanings they hold for us – not so much about deep ethical questions. I’m trying to persuade you that using “good for him” in the context of what happens to Socrates is stretching words past the breaking point.

It’s the same (though for different reasons) with “It’s healthy for you to be healthy.” This is simply not something we have occasion to say, so it’s hard to know what it would mean. Intelligent people are disagreeing about this here, so before writing this, I sat down, cleared my mind, and tried to imagine a circumstance in which the statement “It’s healthy for you to be healthy” might occur. I imagined person A saying something, to which B replies with the statement in question, and then A responds. I could not find any dialogue that didn’t involve some kind of discrimination among meanings or connotations of “healthy.” Sample: A: “I don’t see what good will come out of exercising and eating a balanced diet.” B: “No, it’s healthy for you to be healthy.” A: “Oh, I see. Exercising and good nutrition will make me healthy, and being healthy is desirable and good for me.” I’m sure you can analyze this for yourself and see why it involves different uses of “healthy” to avoid vacuity. In contrast, when I imagine the statement being simply asserted, say to a 10-year-old child, if the child is bright then I imagine their response to be: “But that doesn’t say anything. That’s like ‛It’s fun for me to have fun.’ ”

In the conversation with Glaucon, Plato distinguishes between those things that are good in virtue of something else, those that are sought for their own sake, and those that are both. It seems that you are afraid that anything in the "both" category is at risk of becoming either vacuous or else must actually be composed of two equivocal notions, but I don't totally understand why this is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good, that’s a concise way of showing the problem. Let me see if I can clarify my position. You are arguing, if I’m understanding you, that ethical good is an example of the “third way” -- a good that is sought because it is made good by something else, and is also good for its own sake. I don’t think there’s anything vacuous about thinking this way. It’s an instance of what I called a “metaphysical union” of goods, and highly to be valued, if we can make a strong case for it. What I’m arguing is that the word “good” is necessarily doing double duty here; it has to be, otherwise there would be no issue of “union” at all.

Now you might accept this idea of some sort of union being proposed, but reply, “It’s not a union of two kinds of ‛goods,’ but of particulars and generals. I’m saying that when an individual does good things for their own sake, they are made good as a result. And the way in which they are now good is exactly the same as the way in which those good things are good. The concept of ‛good’ has remained the same; it’s the individual who has united themselves with the Good.”

And now we return to the question of the “good” of Socrates’ execution. If what you’re saying is that Socrates has become a better person by accepting his death, we have no argument. If you’re saying that Socrates has united himself, as an individual, with something we can broadly capitalize as the Good, again we agree. My contention is now twofold: 1) We have to resort to something like capitalizing “Good” because we want to show clearly that we mean a special use of good, an ethical use which is of enormous worth; and 2) When we talk about something being “good for you,” this is not the sort of good we’re talking about. If it were, then we would be forced into maintaining that being executed is good for you. And this offends common sense.

Laying all this out, I’m aware that it’s partially an appeal to something I find self-evident among English language-users, and I hardly know what more to say to justify that. I don’t mean I couldn’t be wrong, and what I’d actually like would be for you to show me some usages of “good” that contradict this in a relevant way. And mind you, I don’t mean good as in “better than” in the “lesser of two evils" sense. I mean an actual, positive "good for me." Maybe there’s some way we speak of "good for you" that I’m overlooking or failing to see clearly. But I hope this gives you a better sense of why I think the “two equivocal notions” idea is important.

And this doesn't require the absurdity that someone like Origen or St. Maximus enjoys being maimed and tortured. Rather, the point is that even this, the height of bad fortune, doesn't rob them of their flourishing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess this is also a good illustration of the point in dispute. I cannot conceive of being maimed and tortured as not robbing someone of their flourishing – unless you arbitrarily make “flourishing” torture-proof, thanks to previous "patterns of behavior." It seems the very epitome of such a robbery to me. Does it make them a bad person? Of course not. Was it the lesser of two evils? Yes, but . . . and here the argument begins all over again.

There are actually several more points you made that I wouldn't mind taking up, but no doubt this is enough for one post!

PS -- I like the story of the unvirtuous Frenchman. Is that from Sartre? :wink:

Good stuff, thanks. I have to get offline for a period but I'll respond as quickly as I'm able.

Really? I find this dichotomy occurring constantly in the Platonic dialogues. If these two concepts were so inseparable, why do so many of Socrates’ interlocutors dispute it? It reads to me like the debate was hot and heavy then, as it is now.

BTW, this is absolutely true, but Plato is essentially the origin point of the classical metaphysical tradition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That makes sense -- but do you read MacIntyre as saying that, as a result of the classical metaphysical tradition taking sway, it was no longer a "thinkable thought" that perhaps the good was not the same as what was good for me? Even limiting ourselves to the elite thinkers, or the "philosophically adept," or the ones with "better opinions," I find this a bit hard to believe. They could actually no longer put that forward as a position? But then, as you know, I take issue with MacIntyre's whole idea that there is a huge gap in ethical thinking between ancients and moderns. Considerable disagreement, yes, but not radical incommensurability of concepts. I could be wrong, but I think Socrates would have been able to follow our discussion here without difficulty. I think he might even have wanted to get into it!

I really feel fortunate to have someone like you describe the connections among these earlier philosophical views. You’re able to produce a world view that I understand and admire. I’m not sure whether this is a point in favor, or against, MacIntyre! Certainly what you’re doing is an act of translation, in part, but I don’t think I’d be reacting so favorably to it if there really was a deep incoherence between ancients and moderns.

So no, you are not explaining it poorly at all, quite the opposite.

Now perhaps it’s I who need to explain better. For you say,

When people say, "it will be good for you to study philosophy," "it will be good for you to start exercising," or "it's good for you to learn to appreciate Homer, Hesiod, and Horace," they certainly don't mean "you will enjoy those things." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I thought I had made clear that “enjoying things” is only one – and certainly not the most interesting – way of interpreting what I was calling personal goods. You can interpret “good for you” in the most ethically high-minded way possible (which some might criticize as “sensuously sterile” but shouldn’t; it merely takes a broader view of what one experiences as good). I only ask that you acknowledge the “for you” in “It will be good for you to study philosophy.” And it is a sensible and coherent thing to say. But again, consider “It will be good for you to [be good / do good things / live a good life – I’m not sure which way of filling this out you prefer].” What is being said here? That the good you do will also be good for you? But if, per Aristotle, the highest good is contemplation, then being tortured to death as a result of the good you do wouldn’t seem to qualify. The only way I can think of for “the good you do will also be good for you” to make sense with a single meaning for “good” is simply to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for “good” that excludes all our normal personal uses, and insist that, even though we don’t realize it, the virtuous person always experiences everything as “good for him.” I find this far-fetched and ad hoc.

I definitely see that your viewpoint is an attempt to create what I called a metaphysical unity between personal and universalizable goods. I also want to do that, I just don’t think this road is very promising.

I think history had to pull apart the concepts of "doing right," and this being "what is best to do 'for you.'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Really? I find this dichotomy occurring constantly in the Platonic dialogues. If these two concepts were so inseparable, why do so many of Socrates’ interlocutors dispute it? It reads to me like the debate was hot and heavy then, as it is now.

Here’s a different way to talk about this that might help. The ends of virtue ethics and Kantian ethics are the same – good action that gets good results, and in turns “bounces back,” so to speak, on the doer, improving them as well. The difference is direction of motivation. This is a broad-brush picture, but: The virtue ethicist wants to achieve eudaemonia, and she realizes that she can’t do that unless she acts virtuously, which (let’s say; it isn’t always so clear in Greek philosophy) means acting with justice, compassion, and honesty towards others. The Kantian wants to act with justice, compassion, and honesty toward others, and realizes that in doing so he will necessarily also improve his moral character and live a flourishing life, but that’s not the point.

Do we see the difference? It’s direction of motivation. Even though both persons’ actions have exactly the same consequences, one proceeds toward eudaemonia, the other proceeds toward right action. Kant thought this made all the ethical difference. I don’t completely agree, but laying it out in these terms is helpful, I hope.

I'll add my welcome! and offer what I hope is a helpful clarification.

We can have strong evidence for something without being certain about it. In fact, you could say that characterizes almost everything we believe to be true. But we sometimes forget this and instead create a binary, where "know for certain with absolute proof" is opposed to "have no warrant to believe true," with nothing in between. So, when you say:

If I were to tell a person that they do not have consciousness, they would not be able to give me evidence that they do, even though they can definitively prove that to themselves. Neither of us can prove, or have any way to know for certain, that the other has consciousness. The belief that others have consciousness, as we lack the evidence, is pure faith. — Reilyn

. . . I would reply, "Right, you can't have proof that they're conscious. You can't be certain. But a great deal of strong evidence could be provided to you. That being so, it isn't correct to say that we 'lack evidence,' and so believing in their consciousness is 'pure faith'. What we lack is certainty, a different matter."

When we speak of what health is for organisms generally and what health is "for you," why it is "healthy (for you) to be healthy," we are not speaking of two totally equivocal concepts, nor do I see how this analagous relationship would render "health" conceptually vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't render "health" vacuous, it renders the statement vacuous.

This is a good example, and helps me clarify why the use of "good" is different. Try to imagine a circumstance under which someone would actually say "It's healthy for you to be healthy." What sort of response would be appropriate? I could say, "Well, duh!" Or scratch my head and say, "So you're saying that it's a healthy thing for me to be healthy?" or . . . I'm not sure what else. The point is that we don't say such a thing -- it doesn't mean anything in our normal discourse. It just expresses some kind of redundancy. (Perhaps a person might be trying to say, "You'll feel good if you're healthy," but that's an entirely different assertion.)

Now compare to "It's good for you to be good." This is often said, especially in ethical contexts. Why does it have such a common use? I contend that it's because here, the first "good" has a different meaning from the second "good." We would paraphrase the statement, and commonly understand it, as saying, "It will turn out to be a good thing for you if you do good things." The difference in meaning that's being employed is: "good" as a personal experience of some sort, versus "good" as a quality of actions you perform. (Importantly, this personal experience needn't be selfish in the pejorative sense. It just needs to be about you. "Experiencing your telos through flourishing" is a good of the first, personal kind.) Understood this way, not only is the statement not vacuous in the way that "It's healthy for you to be healthy" is vacuous, but it raises profound and difficult questions about the relation of personal goods like pleasure, flourishing, esteem, etc. with ethical conduct toward others. Would it be handier if English had a more precise vocabulary for expressing this distinction? Sure, but we don't.

So, on this analysis, you're absolutely right to defend the tradition of the Good as not being conceptually empty. But that's because it really does use "good" in two different ways, while searching for a metaphysical way to unite them. It's perhaps the most important question in ethics -- whether this union of the personal and the universalizable is possible, and how -- and I believe it was Kant who showed this most carefully, though I don't accept his solution in its entirety. But let me stop here and see whether this makes sense to you.

These are all interesting and worthy points, and I want to go on to discuss them. But can you return to the question of "It's good for me to be good"? What I'm trying to understand is whether, when I'm being urged to "be good", we're using the same concept of "good" as the assurance that "It (will be) good for me". My contention is that they must not be the same concept, in order to avoid conceptual emptiness. When Socrates says, "No evil can happen to a good man," do you think he means, "Nothing evil [not-good] can happen to a good man because good men only experience good things"?

But - the process of learning does not exist separate from our neurological capability to do so. — Questioner

Yes, but what we're discussing is whether there's also a neurological capability to discriminate true from false, and right from wrong, in the same way we discriminate red from green, or high pitches from low pitches. That would be extremely useful, but given how often we humans are wrong (in both senses), I'd need a lot of convincing. Rather, it seems to me that, while evolution may give us the capacities to think and learn, we require reasons for saying and doing correct things. We have to find those for ourselves, and the method for doing so is entirely different from consulting hard-wired intuitions.

"Good" discussion! To start a reply, let's take seriously the possibility you raise, that this is an example, a la MacIntyre, of an ethical discourse that seems incoherent to a modern (me) but was sensible and important in an earlier tradition. So my first question would be, Can you take the statement "It is good for me to be good" and either paraphrase it or state it in other terms, such that it would resist my objection that it's either empty or equivocal? I don't think MacIntyre uses "incoherent" to mean some sort of Kuhnian incommensurability, whereby ancients and moderns will never be able to talk to each other no matter how hard they try. So you ought to be able to fulfill my request, or I hope so. (This would be for starters. We need to be very clear, I think, about the job "good" is doing in the target sentence, before we can move on to the other substantive points.)

To be sure, you might be able to attain some goods by acting unethically. An unethical businessman might cheat and manipulate his way into having wealth and status, the ability to procure all sorts of goods for himself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So what ought we to say to the unethical businessman? Should we say, "You're being inefficient and improvident. You're not getting as many goods as you'd get if you behaved ethically, and furthermore when the hard winds blow, you won't do as well as the ethical person"?

That doesn't strike me as ethical discourse at all, and I'm fairly sure you wouldn't endorse it. The problem here is that you're still allowing "It's good for you to be good" to represent a coherent statement within ethics. But either each instance of "good" means the same thing, in which case the statement provides no information, or else "good" is equivocal, with each "good" meaning something different, in which case you could get a variety of interpretations, such as "You'll receive things you desire (= good1) if you are virtuous (= good2)" or "You'll flourish (= good1) if you are virtuous (= good2)" or "Being virtuous (= good2) will be pleasurable for you (= good 1)." But what you can't derive is a statement that says either "It is not virtuous (= good 2) to achieve good1" or "Good 2 does not refer to the things named as good1". Both of those require ethical argument of a particular sort -- an argument that shows why the goods of personal life (pleasure, success, honor, love, etc.) are distinct from right action. An appeal to any of those goods as a reason for right action takes us once more out of ethics and into . . . well, psychology, or power dynamics, or something.

Yeah, OK, I'm impressed by Kant's ethics, so sue me! :wink: