I think we can be skeptical any such theory is possible, either on general grounds of human fallibility or even on logical grounds (the problem of the criterion),
So what are we about? — Srap Tasmaner
@Sam26 does seem to want to say, "My claim to know certain things is justified because I used a really good epistemology." I don't think it works that way. — Srap Tasmaner
That is, it suffices for the proposition to be true or false, whether there is any way to determine its truth value or not. — Srap Tasmaner
If I justifiably believe that P, then if P is the case, I am in a state of knowledge that P, and if not then not. — Srap Tasmaner
When do I ever know something is true apart from having the right justifications? — J
We know analytic statements are true. — Janus
If we say, a person S knows that P when P is the case, they believe that P, and their belief that P is "justified," in whatever sense we give that word, then what S says or is entitled to say about their possible knowledge that P just doesn't enter into it — Srap Tasmaner
the difference between "P is true" and "I know that P is true".
These are not the same. — Banno
But JTB is not about what makes something true, but how I can say [see reply to Srap above] I know it to be true. The truth or falsity of the proposition under discussion remains what it is, no matter what I know or don't know. — J
But the T in JTB is dependent on P's being true, not on the circularity of your knowing that P is true.
Am I misunderstanding you in some way? You seem to miss this very obvious point. — Banno
A question remains though― what use is something's being true if we don't know it. — Janus
So maybe the “absolutely fantastic” fact isn’t that reason is supernatural intruding into nature, but that nature itself is fecund enough to give rise to symbolic beings whose grasp of universals is more than merely biological. — Wayfarer
So now the task seems to be to 'explain' reason - this I take to be the task that the 'naturalisation of reason' has set itself. — Wayfarer
The J in JTB is supposed to exclude cases of epistemic luck: the truth of your belief, if the belief was not formed in the right way, is not enough for us to count it as knowledge. — Srap Tasmaner
(I was asking) whether when you thought it was raining you would have said you knew it was raining. — Janus
The trail it sent me down was the implied ‘divinity of the rational soul’ in medieval philosophy (stemming from Aristotle’s ‘active intellect’.) — Wayfarer
Hence, It seems to me, ↪J's reservations. — Banno
But to be sure, at the core, we do not know things that are not true, we do not know things that we do not believe, and we ought be able to give an account as to why we know some proposal. — Banno
What might be problematic here is some expectation that there be no exceptions, no fuzziness as to what counts as knowledge and what doesn't. — Banno
Ideas can’t be explained in terms of something else, they are the fundamental coinage of rational thought. — Wayfarer
Whether one challenges the rational credentials of a particular judgment or of a whole realm of discourse, one has to rely at some level on judgments and methods of argument which one believes are not themselves subject to the same challenge. — The Last Word, 11
Yet it is obscure how that is possible. Both the existence and the non-existence of reason present problems of intelligibility. — The Last Word, 11
it includes understanding (+U): You grasp the concepts involved and know how to apply them correctly, avoiding confusion in how words or ideas are used. — Sam26
Traditional JTB does not require fully grasping the ideas. I insist on it, so you demonstrate knowledge by using concepts properly. — Sam26
the real issue lies in how we understand justification. — Sam26
It is more than simply a person thinking they are justified. — Sam26
when a defeater arises that overturns what seemed to be justified, we recognize that the claim was never knowledge to begin with, but only something that masqueraded as such. — Sam26
Returning to your 'raining' example, would you have said that you know it is raining? — Janus
would it not be the case that sometimes we possess knowledge, but cannot know that we do? And doesn't that seem a little weird, that we might know something to be the case, but not know that we know? — Janus
Assuming that we can say that some beliefs are justified, which might yet turn out to be wrong . . . — Janus
But, consider Descartes' comment here:
“But when I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but assent to it. Even if I will to the contrary, I am nevertheless drawn into assent by the great light in the intellect; and in this consists the greatest and most evident mark of human error.” — Hanover
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” — What is Math? Smithsonian Magazine
But the same can be said of the real numbers, generally. Do they exist prior to being discovered? — Wayfarer
it is not referring to a domain in the sense of a place. — Wayfarer
It is the domain of ideas that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. But at least some of these are not generated or created but discovered by the mind. I think that's what Popper was driving at. — Wayfarer
I don't see why a N-teenth prime is a problem. We know how mathematics works, whether we discovered it or invented it. — Patterner
we can experiment on the physical world and come up with causal explanations in a way that we can't do with the "non physical mental world" you suppose exists. — flannel jesus
These might sound like vague poetic gestures but in reality they're often vivid and life-changing realisations — Wayfarer
. . . apodictic, even, to those who undergo them. — Wayfarer
If I can only determine some fact on my own can I talk about it being objective? — Janus
The ambiguity here is the reason I prefer 'intersubjective' to 'objective'. The witnessing of the alighting bird and the falling leaf could in principle be shared. An experience of God, or the thought I am having right now cannot be, even in principle. — Janus
I don't count introspection as all that reliable. — Janus
Many folk seem to be uncomfortable with uncertainty...but for me understanding uncertainty and the challenge of living with it is a major part of doing philosophy. — Janus
This seems to be the central issue―what is a fact, and does the qualifier "objective" add anything? — Janus
Facts are usually taken to be determinable by either observation or logic. — Janus
how will you know, any more than you would in this life, that an experience that you felt was of God is really a confirmation of said entity? — Janus
the Aristotelian sense of logos as both reason and structure — Wayfarer
It depends on the stance. Substance dualists have a completely different view to monists. — I like sushi
It's not clear to me that they can be separated from 3rd-person/objective claims such as "God exists".
— J
I'm puzzled by your last sentence here. How can "god exists" be an objective claim if there is no possibility of confirming it such that anyone unbiased would have to acquiesce, or even at the very least the possibility of assessing it against our overall experience in terms of plausibility? — Janus
some metaphysical claims are far more consistent and coherent with the human store of knowledge and understanding than others.
Of course it is still up to the individual to make their own assessments. — Janus
↪J I believe Timothy has addressed this adequately in his subsequent post. — Wayfarer
Hume speaks about this quite a bit (not using modern terminology). — Manuel
But what was 'real' to the scholastics, was not the physical world as such. When we say “physical world,” we usually mean what modern physics investigates—matter, energy, and their interactions. But for St. Thomas, there was no such concept as a self-subsisting “physical” realm. — Wayfarer
Scholastic philosophy was not at all 'realist' in the sense we now understand the word. They were realist with respect to universals, — Wayfarer
Can you explain what you mean by "these intuitions are correct as to their source"? — Janus
. . . the presumption that those beliefs are demonstrably true. — Janus