If something is inexpressible, then by that very fact one cannot say why... Doing so would be to give expression to the inexpressible. — Banno

That's what I'm not sure about. I don't think I'm asking for the inexpressible itself (call it P) to be expressed; that would indeed be impossible. Rather, I want to know why P is inexpressible. Call that explanation Q. Does it really follow that, if P is inexpressible, Q must be as well?

In a certain sense, I agree with you (and Witt) that justification becomes pointless when what we do is interpreted as rule-following. Nor am I disagreeing that, often, rule-following is a good way to think about what we do. But I'm not convinced that this entire situation is opaque to explanation, or at least to elucidation.

Probably this all depends on whether one considers the Tractatus to be a demonstration or an explanation. Some of both, surely? I know Witt said very austere things about how not-philosophy his approach was, but I see a lot of explaining and justifying going on nonetheless.

This denotes a very particular approach to the tradition Wayfarer is talking about though. One cannot take a Meister Eckhart, a Rumi, or a Dogen as simply conveying "novel and perhaps inspiring experiences" and take their claims seriously. Indeed, since such "experiences" generally involve the claim to the apprehension of truth, and so demand to be taken exclusively, this would be sort of a contradiction in terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I took the liberty of adding the bolded phrase, because leaving it out does make it appear that you're asserting that they succeeded in apprehending truth, which would beg the question.

I too think there's more to Eckhart et al. than "inspiring experiences" but again, let's be careful of the difference between "taking a claim seriously" and "believing it to be true on personal authority." I can be very impressed by a mystic's account without accepting it as somehow self-verifying.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "inexpressible". I take Wittgenstein to mean not expressible in a way that what is being said can be confirmed or disconfirmed. He applies this to ethics and aesthetics. For example, I can say that Beethoven was greater than Bach, but there is no determinable truth to that. So, do you think that by "inexpressible" he means "not truth apt"? — Janus

Others on TPF know the Tractatus a lot better than I do, but I think he meant something more than merely "not truth apt" or "not confirmable." I think it's closer to "incoherent" or "illusory." And he wasn't just thinking of ethics and religion, but also of certain supposedly bedrock metaphysical truths. In any case, what I meant by "inexpressible" was more like "unsayable save by metaphor and indirection."

It depends on what is meant by "justified." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is more complicated than I intended. By "justified," I just meant "explained" or "given an account of." Whereas a demonstration would be simply to show that it is the case, without further explanation why.

Example: A singer attempts to hit a high C, but is unable to do so after repeated attempts. She has thus demonstrated that the note is inexpressible by her. But the question "Why?" remains, and would be answered in terms of anatomy and acoustics. Similarly with philosophy. We may demonstrate that a particular thought is inexpressible, either by argument or some other way, as Wittgenstein claimed to do, and in addition offer an "account" (what I called an explanation) of why that is so. Such an account wouldn't merely repeat the demonstration; it would try to tell us why the result makes sense, or was to be expected.

Well, isn't it reasonable to ask why it is? Granted, in some cases the answer will be obvious, but surely not always. The sorts of thing Wittgenstein had in mind as being inexpressible are hardly obviously so.

What troubles me is the presumption to knowledge - justified true beliefs - in the absence of a coherent way of providing a justification.

Which of course leads into the discussion of what is to count as a justification... — Banno

I think when it comes to matters of faith personal experiences may serve as justifications for one's own (but certainly not anyone else's) beliefs — Janus

It seems to me that "I had an experience of God" may be both true and justified, in terms of my own (reasonable) standards. But the degree of justification -- the standards involved -- are quite different from those I would use if someone asked me to justify my belief that my cat is on the mat. Different degrees of certitude, in other words. Arguments for God based on personal experience are arguments to the best hypothesis. That's why it's unreasonable to expect anyone else to treat my belief as knowledge.

But if something can't be said, it might be important to say why and surely philosophy has a role to play there. — Wayfarer

I . . . take [it] to be one of the main themes of the Investigations - that what cannot be said may be shown or done. — Banno

I just want to point out that these two views are not the same. You can indeed move on from inexpressibility to a demonstration or showing of what can't be expressed. But first (or conjointly) you can also say why, as Wayfarer suggests. Or would the claim be that inexpressibility itself can only be demonstrated, not justified?

Language is one of the things we do. Didn't Habermas reflect on this in his use of unavoidability and irreducibility? That it is action that has import? — Banno

I don’t recall what Habermas says about unavoidability and irreducibility (of language, I assume), but I have only read sections of the 1,000-page Theory of Communicative Action, along with a lot of secondary criticism, so I may have missed it entirely. I think it’s fair to say that Habermas sees rationality as procedural, and the procedure necessarily involves language. Anthony Giddens has a good overview of TCA in which he says that for Habermas, “rationality presumes communication, because something is rational only if it meets the conditions necessary to forge an understanding with at least one other person.” (“Reason Without Revolution?” in Habermas and Modernity, Richard J. Bernstein, ed.). In general, Habermas sees reason and communication as activities that we do together, which fits the picture of language (perhaps including logical and mathematical languages) as already given in the life-world we find ourselves born into. You can't fly solo.

there is an hierarchical ontology, meaning different levels of being or existence. — Wayfarer

Well, here we are again. That is absolutely one way to employ the terms "being" and "existence," a way with a distinguished history. If you were willing to say that the hierarchical organization may be an actual metaphysical structure but not necessarily described by the terms you've used (being, existence, ontology), I would be inclined to accept that. The map is not the labels.

That's a lovely display, thanks.

Lots to be said about Nagel and religion. Is he really open to religious belief? We know that he doesn't want religion to be true, and that he's provoked (in a good way) by the fact that so many philosophers he respects are deists of one stripe or another. Your distinction between belief in God and belief in a sacred dimension may be relevant here.

I've read a bunch of Habermas but as you say, there's a mega-bunch to read! You'd probably like Between Naturalism and Religion (2008), which addresses a lot of our topics here. His concept of a "detranscendentalized use of reason" is a real contribution. He is absolutely unwilling to give up the Nagelian position that reason is the "last word," and equally unwilling to accept the traditional foundationalist explanations for why this is so. In addition, several of the essays in the book are extremely sympathetic discussions of the role of religious belief -- and religious adherents -- in secular, liberal society.

Now, Quine took himself to be ridiculing the grand pronouncements of metaphysics. But it was hard not to hear that ‘bound variable’ stuff as itself an ontological theory according to which existence is dependent on language: — Sartwell, The post-linguistic turn

You can sense the parodic aspect of the Quinean formula, but I always took him to be saying, essentially, "There is no way to usefully define 'existence' such that all customers will be satisfied, so let's just limit existence-talk to what we do with quantification." And I don't think the resulting ontological "theory" says that existence is dependent on language -- it's dependent on a certain understanding of logical thought, which we're free to maintain is independent of language if we want to. See Frege the platonist.

So - they're the themes I'm exploring. But I agree that it is a different to the subject matter to philosophy per se. — Wayfarer

Sure. And Nagel is one of my favorites. I was raising a brow at the idea that fear of religion, specifically, accounts for the current interest in naturalized Explanations of Everything. The passage you cited -- and just about all of The Last Word -- articulates a position that I think is broadly correct, but you can hold it and still be an atheist to the core. Likewise, you can find it unconvincing on the merits, not because you're afraid you'll "cross the Tiber" (as they used to say) if you start believing that reason provides a privileged access to the world.

And yes, the Habermas discussion is very interesting. He's still alive, you know -- we could ask him what he thinks now (at 95!).

We can take Quine's joke seriously: to be is to be the subject of some quantification — Banno

Oh, I think he meant it! But more to follow.

Yes, these parallels with Augustine are good. Anyone who favors the idea of an intelligible realm is going to have to say whether there's anything populating it before we humans arrive; Plato, Augustine, and Frege opt for saying that it's full, and we encounter it as such.

Which leads to the passages from Peirce and Nagel. History of philosophy isn't my forte, and I defer to Nagel on this, though it does seem a little oversimplified? I suppose there is a generalized "fear of religion," especially in analytic phil., but anti-Platonists seem to be offering genuine justifications for their position, that have to be taken seriously in their own right. And though my own sympathies are with religious modes of life, I don't doubt for a minute that one can be an anti-Platonist and a non-believer without also subscribing to what you're calling "the relativization of reason." Nagel himself is a good example. So is Habermas. And really, so is (most of) analytic phil., which questions various points concerning reason but rarely abandons it to relativism; the questioning is itself usually done using entirely standard assumptions about reason and its grounding.

Which is maybe just to say that evolutionary explanations aren't the only game in town, if one is dubious about platonism.

We bring one and two into existence, by an intentional act - it's something we do. Some important aspects of this. First, its we who bring this about, collectively; this is not a private act nor something that is just going on in the mind of one individual. Hence there are right and wrong ways to count. — Banno

I agree with the emphasis on the collective creation of counting (if the non-Fregean story is correct). I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say that intersubjective agreement results in the idea of "being right about counting." One can imagine mistakes in math that are widely accepted, but then corrected by reference to some Popperian discovery in the 3rd world. Wouldn't we say that it was that discovery that now made us "right," rather than the fact that everyone now agrees? After all, we agreed before, too.

Next, the existence had here is that of being the subject of a quantification, as in "Two is an even number". — Banno

Extremely important. @Michael and I are having a related conversation about what role "existence" plays in descriptions of platonism, and it hinges on a similar point. In the case you describe later in your post, the moral of the story would be: "P" is brought into existence depending upon an interpretation of (ideal logical) language; there are no facts in the world that change as a result of that interpretation. If -- as I do -- I lean toward the quantificational interpretation that allows P to be a "new thing," and if you dispute it, we aren't offering arguments pro and con about the object of the concept "to exist". We are specifying that very concept, rather than assuming it, in our differing interpretations. Or so it seems to me. And I think it's the gist of your comment here:

the account I gave above indicates how stuff like numbers and property and so on are constructed, by modelling that construction in a higher order logic. — Banno

I'm not a best-friend of formalism, but this is the kind of case where formal models really excel.

I read the Tyler Burge paper. It gives a convincing case for viewing Frege as a pure mathematical platonist. I hadn't known that Frege used the term "third realm" in such a similar way to Popper.

The key difference between Frege and Popper here is, as both @Banno and @Janus allude to, whether the 3rd realm exists independently of human thought, or is created by our thought. If Burge is right, then there's no doubt what Frege believed: complete independence. Popper stakes out a middle ground. In Objective Knowledge, Popper says:

The idea of autonomy is central to my theory of the third world: although the third world is a human product, a human creation, it creates in its turn . . . its own domain of autonomy. — Objective Knowledge, 118

And in fact, he chooses natural numbers as his example for how this works:

The sequence of natural numbers is a human construction. But although we create this sequence, it creates its own autonomous problems in its turn. The distinction between odd and even numbers is not created by us; it is an unintended and unavoidable consequence of our creation. — Objective Knowledge, 118

This is odd (sorry!) at first, but Popper goes on to explain that there are "facts to discover" about our human 3rd-world products. I think his use of "unintended" is key to understanding what he means. Just because I have created or invented something, it doesn't mean that in the act of doing so, I find myself in complete command, or complete awareness, of every single fact about my creation. And this does seem plausible with regard to numbers. If the number series is indeed invented, pace Frege, it's easy enough to imagine that early users would then discover that certain numbers -- invented merely for counting purposes -- had the quality of being either odd or even. This was never intended, but is certainly a fact for all that. Same with multiples, and primes, and on and on.

It's even more intuitively clear with regard to products we tend to agree are human creations. When I write a piece of music, I am very far from "intending" everything the music contains. In the process of (hopefully) improving what I write, I absolutely do discover things that are really there, but that I was not aware of when I wrote the music. Often enough, the discoveries are unpleasant, and I have to revise accordingly. But sometimes I find connections or implications that are fruitful and aesthetically interesting; they feel like genuine, "autonomous" facts about the music. Yes, I created the whole thing, but no, that doesn't mean I understand it completely. Only God, one supposes, creates in that fashion.

So anyway, Popper demonstrates that we can believe in all sorts of abstracta without needing to be platonist about it, and also without giving up the sense of discovery that goes along with exploring the 3rd realm.

If anyone is spending their holiday on TPF, poor devils, then Merry Christmas!

And I just noticed that "sense act" probably doesn't refer to what, in English, we mean by "sense perception," but rather to an "act of making sense."

Good. Interesting that he includes psychical, abstract, and imaginary objects. I would have thought that contradicted the idea of "concrete data," but God knows how the German reads. The point is clear, in any case.

A very helpful explication, thanks for taking so much trouble with it.

I think my question gets addressed in this passage:

The first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed”. In the case of numbers, one must abstract away everything else about those elements (color, size, texture) other than that they have been individually noticed as an empty ‘unit’. — Joshs

This helps me imagine the process Husserl is speaking of, but I'm still left wondering what counts as a "part" or "element" (and these would presumably also be the "concrete contents" mentioned earlier). It is from these parts or elements that we must first abstract away qualities like color, size, and texture, and then engage the remainder -- the empty "unit" -- in the multiplicity-constituting process.

So . . . can this process take place with any physical series? Would Husserl countenance using an apple, say, as the starting part or element? Does it matter where we start? I think the answer is, "Sure, anything at all will do, as long as its perception counts as a 'sense act'," but I want to get your take on it.

Here's how to raise the issue of "further distinguishing" the SEP definition:

"There are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us" etc.

You simply ask, "What do you mean by 'existence'?" There is no one obvious reply. What are we supposed to say? -- "You know, exist, be. The opposite of not-exist. Case closed." Hopeless, and to make it worse, this so-called definition acts as if it is settling the matter, just by using the word and expecting readers to import their own concept of 'existence'. It looks like it is defining a certain kind of existence -- platonic existence -- but that's not possible without first knowing how existence itself is being construed.

Honestly, this isn't meant to be merely verbal gymnastics. I'm trying to demonstrate what I think is an important and all-pervasive issue, namely that there is no such thing as a sentence using 'exist' which can settle the question within the sentence itself of what 'exist' means. Again, this could be written using quantificational language, but I think it comes up often enough in ordinary discourse. A discussion of platonism is a great example. I'll leave Harry and Sally alone and just say: One person thinks there are abstracta which exist independently of us; another person says there are not. Why should we think they are both working with the same concept of what it means to exist? Indeed, if they were, wouldn't the issue be quickly resolved? The SEP talks about abstracta "whose existence is independent of us." Very well; what does SEP mean by 'existence'? Does it refer to a dimensional embodiment? being the subject of a proposition? being rationally apprehendable? being thinkable? being the value of a bound variable? something non-contingent? etc. etc. Thus the definition of mathematical platonism has told us absolutely nothing about what it means to exist. It cannot, formally.

My claim is that it doesn't make sense to argue that both of these are true:

1. Quine atoms exist in the platonistic sense
2. Quine atoms don't exist in the platonistic sense

One of them is true and one of them is false. — Michael

Is it likewise not sensible to argue that both of these are true?:

1. Sherlock Holmes exists.
2. Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist.

There is more than one way to construe 'exist' here, as I'm sure you'd agree. 1 & 2 can't both be true with the same construal, but that doesn't mean there is no genuine argument about it.

What you're wanting to say is that there is only one way to construe 'exist in the platonistic sense'. As evidence for this, you cite the ongoing disagreements among platonists, nominalists, etc -- they wouldn't make sense, or be to the purpose, without consensus on 'exists'. Indeed! -- and that may be the very problem. What I've tried to argue is that there is another way to understand what these disagreements are about, and why they are so intractable. It may be down to these different construals of 'exist platonically'.

In short, it isn't obvious that mathematical platonism necessitates a commitment to only one construal (one use of ∃) of what it means to exist.

But does each thing (or, what is equivalent here: does any thing at all) have such an essence of its own in the first place? Or is the thing, as it were, always underway...?

Husserl's answer seems be that there is no such essence, and each "thing" is indeed always underway (a nice phrase) as a phenomenon to/for our consciousness. I'm wondering, though, whether trying to invoke an essence somewhat prejudices the discussion. My question concerning numbers, for instance, wasn't about whether there was some "essence" of number that is pre-theoretical for us. The question was much more ordinary: What are the concrete contents or data of which Husserl speaks, that allow us to form our idealization of numbers? Can you give an example of how this might work?

drawing from encounters with concrete data — Joshs

activities exercised upon concrete contents

What might be some examples of the concrete contents or data? Is the implication that there is some level of sense impression which is not mediated by ideas or "abstractive idealization"? This connects with the thread awhile back about scheme/content distinctions, especially this:

The alternative, more robust scheme-content distinction Wang proposes involves what he calls “common-sense experience” (this plays the role of content) and whatever conceptual scheme may be in play among a given community. What is key here is that, for Wang, common-sense experience (which he also calls “thick experience,” drawing from James) is not “innocent” of theoretical influence. It is not the same thing as a Kantian/Quinian uninterpreted world of sense-data or things-as-they-are. Our basic experience, the most basic one possible (and this will prove to be crucial), is already theory-laden. — J

So the question I'm posing is whether the "concrete data" are pre-theoretical, which Wang thinks is not possible. Personally, I think it is possible, but I'm wondering how you think Husserl understood this in relation to numbers.

Count T's answer -- that Harry and Sally need to define their terms -- is the direction in which I was going. With all respect to Michael, we have no way of knowing whether H & S are disputing platonism until we get an answer to the question I posed. I was hoping to develop this thought in a dialogic fashion, but I'll go ahead and just say what I mean.

Two accounts of the Harry/Sally dispute are possible.

In the first, H & S share a common understanding of how they're going to use the term 'exist'. Either they live in a cultural community in which this is taken for granted, or -- better, for our purposes -- they have a preliminary conversation in which they discover that they do indeed mean the same thing by 'exist'. So if they're having a dispute, as we imagine them doing, it must be over what a proposition is. They're in full agreement about what it means for something to exist, but they differ about what sort of thing a proposition is -- what its characteristics and qualities are. Thus, Harry, using his ideas about propositions, makes the case that they exist; Sally, using hers, that they don't.

In the second, the reverse is the case. H & S share a common understanding of what a proposition is -- again, we can picture them determining this beforehand. So if a dispute is occurring, it must be over what it means for something to exist. They're in full agreement about the "characteristics and qualities" of a proposition -- how to use the word, how to recognize one, what functions it serves -- but they differ about whether existence can be ascribed to that sort of thing.

(Yes, this little story is about the existential quantifier, ∃, and quantifier variance, but I'm trying to avoid Logicalese so as to keep it accessible.)

So what does this have to do with platonism, and in particular with the idea that only one type of quantification could be countenanced in a world of mathematical platonism?

Let's look again at Michael's suggestion that, depending upon which version of logic/math you're using, certain items would either exist or not exist:

We can only take the approach of mathematical fictionalism and say that they [the items in question] exist according to New Foundations but not according to ZFC. — Michael

Now apply the "Harry and Sally question": Is the mathematical fictionalist saying that New Foundations and ZFC share the same meaning for 'exist' but differ about whether the items in question qualify? That, I think, is Michael's meaning. But we can now see that it's equally possible for the mathematical fictionalist to claim that New Foundations and ZFC differ about what 'exists' means. They may share the same understanding of, say, what a Quine atom is, but because they don't agree about existence, their conclusions are different.

To simplify, we can either hold X steady and differ about existence, or we can hold 'existence' steady and differ about X.

So what I'm saying is that one version of mathematical platonism will indeed have room for only one correct logic, because it will be a logic that debars certain entities from existing at all. Those other, renegade logics would have to be "man-made." But another, equally reasonable version of math platonism will be liberal or agnostic about different uses of 'exist', so that both New Foundations and ZFC, e.g., may be "found" in the platonic world.

This all circles back to my question about how correctness has a bearing on the plausibility of mathematical platonism -- whether math platonism requires a single correct logic for it to be plausible. It seems that two incompatible logics could both be found as objects of mathematical platonism. For:

I don't think it makes any sense to say that they platonistically exist in New Foundations but don't platonistically exist in ZFC. — Michael

but if my argument is sound, then it does make sense after all. That's because now we're no longer fooled by seeing the word 'exist' occurring twice and believing it must mean the same thing each time. It may or it may not. But if the use of 'exist' itself is not consistent, then anything goes, platonically. We can't put a fence around it by using an operator like "according to Y" or "to Z" because we don't know Y and Z's account of existence. Either, or both, of them may be claiming that its own version is compatible with quantifier variance.

Well, let's fill it in.

Harry: According to me, propositions exist.
Sally: According to me, propositions do not exist.

Is their dispute about propositions, or about the meaning of 'exist'? For the moment, let's not worry about which way of seeing it is closer to what mathematical fictionists are saying. What answer would you be inclined to give?

I don't think it makes any sense to say that they platonistically exist in New Foundations but don't platonistically exist in ZFC. We can only take the approach of mathematical fictionalism and say that they exist according to New Foundations but not according to ZFC. — Michael

I see where you're going with this. But I don't think that what you're calling the "only approach" is quite so straightforward.

Suppose I say, "x exists according to Harry." You say, "x does not exist according to Sally." What is the subject of the dispute between Harry and Sally? Are they in disagreement about x, or about what 'exists' means?

Tell me how you'd be inclined to answer that, and I'll develop the thought further.

Thanks, I'll read it. I too find Popper's "Three Worlds" concept helpful. It's an interesting question, whether a commitment to World 3 items necessarily involves a commitment to some form of platonism.

How does the issue of correctness arise? As I understand it, intuitionistic logic doesn't contradict classical logic, it only uses different semantics. Couldn't both types of logic exist platonically -- awaiting discovery by sentient beings? To put it another way, if you believe that any abstracta can exist platonically, why draw the line at a single, putatively correct logic?

You can believe that numbers and other abstracta really and truly exist without being a mathematical platonist. You merely assert that they exist because we have created them, and they will cease to exist if we also cease.
— J

What about the laws of logic, like the law of the excluded middle? Does that cease to obtain in the absence of rational sentient beings? — Wayfarer

Right, what I was describing as a possible position about numbers was meant to sharpen the question: Are we disputing whether abstracta as such can be said to exist, or is the dispute about whether they can exist independently of us? Like you, I find the "existing, but not independently" position re numbers to be unconvincing. Some abstracta probably have that characteristic -- the rules of chess, perhaps? -- but logic and math do not seem arbitrary in that same way. If personal testimony counts, the two mathematicians I have known well are both committed platonists, and speak fervently about the experience of math as one of discovery, not invention. But that's hardly decisive.

Meaning whatever reality they possess is contingent - so they can’t ‘really and truly exist’. — Wayfarer

It's hard to talk about existence without presupposing a certain use of the term. So I'll just point out that you're wanting "exist" to mean "not depend on something else". Or perhaps it's "really and truly exist" that has the characteristic of non-contingency? I'm not making fun; these are perfectly legitimate lines to draw, it's just that there's no agreement about which terms to assign to the resulting map.

I tend towards objective idealism - that logical and arithmetical fundamentals are real independently of any particular mind, but can only be grasped by an act of rational thought. — Wayfarer

I like this too. It suggests a useful map, one which shows some existing things as graspable by reason, others by perception (or however you want to characterize what we do with stuff in space/time). We might also want a third location on the map for imaginary things -- maybe this would be a region of non-existence. Now of course someone is going to come along and say, "Yes but what is existence really? You can't just reduce it to a dispute about terminological conventions!" To which the only reply I know is -- all together now! -- "To be is to be the value of a bound variable." In other words, it all depends what you're talking about. But how you talk about it is not arbitrary at all. There really is privileged metaphysical structure; we're just not sure about the terms to use.

Platonism about mathematics (or mathematical platonism) is the metaphysical view that there are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent of us and our language, thought, and practices.

I just want to point out that the bolded phrase is what's at stake. You can believe that numbers and other abstracta really and truly exist without being a mathematical platonist. You merely assert that they exist because we have created them, and they will cease to exist if we also cease. Whether you want to say this or not will depend on how you wish to use the word "exist." Clearly, if you are a friend of "existence = spatiotemporal objects or arrangements thereof", then you won't want to claim even a human-made existence for numbers.

Sebastian Rödl
— J

I've read about his books and tried to tackle some of his papers, but I'm finding him difficult reading. I would be pleased if there was another here with some interest. — Wayfarer

Me, definitely. Working my way through Self-Consciousness and Objectivity now.

Is the idea here that just thinking something is asserting it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not quite. Think of it in terms of Frege's "force" as equivalent to (one sense of) "assertion". The question is then: How does the "content" (of the force/content distinction) make itself known independently? If "p" is different from "I think p", how exactly does p come to be present to us? This quote from Rödl captures the problem:

Philosophers are in the habit of indicating the object of judgment by the letter p. There is an insouciance with respect to this fateful letter. It stands ready quietly, unobtrusively, to assure us that we know what we are talking about. For example, when we do epistemology, we are interested in what it is for someone to know—know what? oh yes: p. If we inquire into rational requirements on action or intention, we ask what it is to be obliged to—what? oh yes: see to it that p, intend that p, if p then q, and so on. However, if we undertake to reflect on thought, on its self-consciousness and its objectivity, then the letter p signifies the deepest question and the deepest comprehension. If only we understood the letter p, the whole would open up to us. — Self-Consciousness & Objectivity

This point of view is very congenial to yours, I would think, since Rödl is doubting whether "p" -- a proposition -- could possibly do the things, all by itself, that formalism says it can. A thinker is required.

So yes, the distinction you're making between contraries and contradictories is extremely important. The essential unity of the thinker with the thought, the knower with the world, can only be shown by rejecting, as Kimhi does, the idea that a proposition can be true or false in the absence of some context of assertion.

Agreed, although I don't know if "context of assertion" is the right framing. Beliefs can be true or false without being needing to be "asserted." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't much like "context of assertion" either, but the deeper challenge here is whether, in fact, a belief can be true or false without being asserted. I know that sounds absurd, but so much depends on how we construe "assertion," and the long thread on Kimhi a few months back revealed a lot of work to be done on this question.

Are we sure that thought and being exist in the sort of relationship that needs to be "conformed" or "adequated"?

Well, presumably we need to be able to explain false beliefs and false statements. There is adequacy in the sense of "believing the Sun rotates around the Earth" being, in important ways, inadequate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. One problem for being/thinking monism a la Kimhi is that it seems to imply that any valid thought also has to be true. That can't be right, so we need to work out whether there really is a concept of validity independent of truth. Again, sounds absurd -- there has to be, right?! -- but stand-alone "validity" turns out to be very tricky. The monist wants to be able to say that there is no disjunction between truth and validity -- that there is something ill-formed or incoherent about "A thinks ~p", as opposed to "A doesn't think p". This is the problem from Parmenides that Kimhi begin T&B with, you may recall: How can we think that which is not?

Can we paint a plausible picture that is at bottom monistic?

Monistic in what sense? — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Thinking cannot be dependent for its success on anything that is external to it." — Kimhi, 23

Monism in that sense, a tall order. Rödl, another monist as far as I can tell, subtitles his book Self-Consciousness and Objectivity as "An Introduction to Absolute Idealism."

So, without having to make any commitments to any specific sort of correspondence or identity relationship between thought and being, we can simply leave it as "truth is the conformity or adequacy of thought to being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Predating Tarski by several centuries! And the challenge to that, coming from people like Kimhi and Sebastian Rödl (who I'm now reading with great interest) is, Are we sure that thought and being exist in the sort of relationship that needs to be "conformed" or "adequated"? Can we paint a plausible picture that is at bottom monistic? I'm still working on that, and I want to do an OP soon that lays out some of Rödl's ideas about the Fregean force/content distinction.

A major difficulty for modern thought has been the move to turn truth and falsity into contradictory opposites, as opposed to contrary opposites (i.e. making truth akin to affirmation and negation). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. (Aquinas)

Kimhi is helpful here:

A capacity meta logou is categorematic: it is specified by a verb -- say, to heal -- and its positive and negative acts are contraries. A logical capacity is syncategorematic: it is specified by a proposition, and its positive and negative acts are contradictories. — Thinking and Being, 61

He adds this footnote:

Capacities meta logou are two-way capacities because they involve logical capacities. It is because doctors must judge how best to heal their patients that they can also judge how best to poison them. — Thinking and Being, 61

On this understanding of Aristotle, a contrary pair will display positive and negative acts involving a verb, whereas a contradictory pair either affirms or denies the truth of a proposition. Roughly, (A thinks p, A thinks ~p) vs. (p, ~p).

So yes, the distinction you're making between contraries and contradictories is extremely important. The essential unity of the thinker with the thought, the knower with the world, can only be shown by rejecting, as Kimhi does, the idea that a proposition can be true or false in the absence of some context of assertion.

We say that the utterance is true if its propositional content "resembles" (for want of a better word) the landscape being described and false if it doesn't. — Michael

This helps point out the question I was asking. It's the matter of resemblance. I understand you're using that word because there isn't a more perfect one, and you're not claiming some literal resemblance between propositional content and a landscape. But that's the rub. We know what we mean when we say that the picture resembles the landscape, but the whole debate about propositions, utterances, and truth can only occur because we don't know what this resemblance is supposed to consist of, precisely. That's why I'm dubious about picture analogies -- they confer "borrowed certainty," if you will.

Even if we want to distinguish an utterance from its propositional content, an utterance is required for there to be propositional content. Propositional content, whether true or false, doesn't "exist" as some mind-independent abstract entity that somehow becomes the propositional content of a particular utterance. — Michael

Agreed, prop. content doesn't exist as a mind-independent entity. But I think we should be careful in saying that "an utterance" is required. Does my thought of p qualify as an utterance? It's tempting to say that I am simply thinking p, the prop. content itself -- utterance-free.

The word “it” in the phrase “is it true?” refers to either an utterance or an utterance-dependent proposition, and so asking if an utterance or proposition is true before it is uttered is a nonsensical question, like asking if a painting is accurate before it is painted. — Michael

The word “it” in “Is it accurate?” in reference to a painting must, on this argument, refer to either a particular painting (“utterance”) or some other possible pictorialization of the “same thing” (p) that is “pictorialization-dependent”. Are you sure this makes sense as an analogy? I think the difference lies in the fact that utterances can have propositional content whereas paintings cannot. What we refer to, in the case of a possible utterance, is the propositional content. Thus, “utterance- (or pictorialization-) dependent” has two different meanings or implications, in the two cases. This makes the analogy appear more persuasive than it is.

Well, yeah, it’s pretty philosophical - that was kinda the idea! You can find good explanations of it on SEP and elsewhere, I’m sure. Just a suggestion.

True, we don’t usually get a consensus on this. Just to help the discussion along, suppose we took Quine’s formulation - “To be is to be the value of a bound variable” - and asked ourselves what that might say about the status of ideas and/or numbers?

OK, it's a sort of genealogy of ethics. As such, it's foreign to the questions of ethics as I understand them, but I appreciate your laying out your point of view for me.