Morality is a filter for life. Certain elements of life are acceptable, other elements are not. Morality sets itself the task of filtering out the unacceptable from social life. Morality cannot filter out the unacceptable from life itself. — ucarr

Hoo-boy.

NMorality is a mental habit; social pressure is the filter and the elements of life considered moral pass through this filter and are thus categorised by the individual, culture or institution. Morality is not an aspect of the world outside of human minds.

I'm not sure what you could mean by 'the unacceptable of life itself'. Life simply is.

And of course this tired claim has been shown to be unsupportable any number of times in the recent thread — Leontiskos

Having gone back to this after a long break: Absolutely not and it seems totally ridiculous you could claim so.

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself. — Mww

The exact type of incomprehensible non-statement that CPR parochialism leads to, all too often. This tells me, as similar things do with many other 'classical' works and writers, that you have inhabited this world to such a degree as to write sentences that do not make sense outside of your interpretation of the one work (or, perhaps one philosopher). There is nothing wrong with doing this, but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. How does this translate to non-Kantian language?

Kant makes clear that he knows there is a mysterious link between the thing-in-itself and our perception. We can't know, other than the a priori categories, how there's a connection between the two, but that is enough to know it exists by logical inference. Without hte connection between our perception, and the thing, there is nothing to infer and no transition to make between anything, and anything else. Perception would be completely and utterly arbitrary. But Kant is clearly, and unequivocally not claiming that they are not related. Your positions here would require that either:
1. thing-in-itself and our perceptual experience are entirely unrelated; or
2. The fact we cannot access thing-in-itself is somehow a reason to utterly ignore that previous issue.

I see nothing, anywhere, that could support either position. Do you read other work?

Yes, because I am a person. — Echarmion

That gives you no authority to that claim. Dogs don't know what Dogs are.

They aren't person though. — Echarmion

There is no settle consensus on this. All claims of this kind are personal, and don't adhere to any particular argument in biology. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beginning_of_human_personhood#:~:text=In%20the%20college%20text%20book,silent%2C%20secret%2C%20unknown%22 . the complete chaos of this page should be illustrative.

It's not helpful to simply implore others to take your concept on, and argue on that basis. It's the concept that's in question. I should be quite clear that I am in no-way "pro-life" politically, but I notice that pro-choice people tend to have really, really shitty arguments. The only reason i'm pushing back on them (and to rark Banno up) is that they aren't good arguments, and often are counter to the facts. Such as here - personhood isn't a fact.

You want us to consider them based on their future personhood, not the current one. — Echarmion

He believes otherwise. You would need to fully ignore this to make a claim, as if it were an objection to his position. If personhood starts at conception (a fully acceptable formulation, just not one I personally think helpful, even if true) then the position is fine. Silly, imo, but fine. He's asking you to consider his position that personhood starts at conception. These are just competing theories of personhood. Should be fun to discuss LOL.

Which brings in the much much more interesting question: If personal identity doens't obtain other than through relation R, how is it possible that a child of three weeks could be considered 'a person' and be afforded the rights of a person? Hehehe.

Both aspects of this reply are awesome.

even your quips are nonsense.

Weird. What’s funny about it? — John McMannis

It arouses my humour mechanisms.
Have you tracked Mikie's posts through this thread? Several attempts have been made to catalogue his inane, insulting tirades that he seems to take pride it.
HIlarious he's a mod.

Oh Banno, lol. Just avoiding the issue again. What constitutes a 'human being' is what matters in the distinction you're discussing. Given your initial, unedited reply: Should have left it unedited to show your colours. You’re not any good at this and that would have served the dual purpose of making this clearer, and not giving that reply which should probably be a bit embarrassing:

not a human being with memories, needs, and preferences. — Banno

Most things with these attributes aren't humans and all humans go through at least one post-womb phase where they have only needs (which are, unless you're genuinely stupid, insufficient - and even then, arguable. The needs are institutional, not intrinsic). Your cart is literally before the horse. Your criteria for "human being" (which is here, undefined, and exactly what is being discussed) is baked-in to your objection. This kind of failure of either creativity, or clarity of writing is not helpful. Barely asserting your position is not helpful. On your account plenty of people aren't human beings, and vice verse. That's a cool move, i guess..

The day I come in here, and don't laugh, is the day I'll start bothering with stuff like that claim from Biden.

A blastocyst is a cyst. — Banno

Not in the way you need it to mean for your glibbery. A blastocyst is specifically a state of zygotic development, and not comparable to say, an ovarian cyst. It requires an embryoblast - which gives rise to the potential to become a human being. It is set apart, and Bob's gripe was legitimate, if in hte wrong place and about the wrong part of hte account.

Clearly, 'cyst' is not what's being talked about. We know this because ovarian cysts are sometimes mistaken for zygotic blastocysts. You seem, oddly, to be entirely aware of this.

My objection to it is that infinite regress isn't an issue, and magicking up an uncaused cause is a fucking wild move for a Fantasy novel.

Why is the latter shunned, or is it? — schopenhauer1

(if i'm reading right) I think the latter is shunned in practice as considered 'bigoted' (top tip: It's not) and the former is shunned in theory because we couldn't possibly land on "everything is permissible by it's own group". No one seems to think that moral theory works (otherwise, Rotherham rape gangs are acceptable, if you see where i'm taking this...)

I do think there's an 'essential' tension there. Cultures should be able to protect themselves. But people should be able to move through cultures without demand.

because there is no one there to witness it or not enough at least to really do much about it except shake their heads or tacitly accept this is their way... — schopenhauer1

I think I've addressed with this in mind. For instance, we don't, generally, look to the mid-East and want to do anything the stark cultural differences. But, if it were a group within our borders, we would want to. So, if there's geographical separation, I think it needs to be of a kind that crosses jurisdiction for my point to make sense. That said, I think the version of yours that I think actually happens is simply 'hiding'. Once found, we don't shake out heads - we prosecute.

Not sure what you mean.. — schopenhauer1

What I mean (I thought his was clear above, so apologies) is that this confrontation necessarily precedes any geographical separation giving the appearance of multi-culturalism. It's a literal rejection of multi-culturalism.

Why would safety not be considered valuable for the sake of child/animal? — schopenhauer1

Because (and this really is the rub, to me) that culture either doesn't possess the concept, or rejects that account. There's no real argument if that's the case..

So in a way, the multiculturalism does persist, it is reconciled by geographic separation. — schopenhauer1

These seem to run up against each other?

This starts getting muddled when things like "gentrification" happen and the old-subgroups and the new subgroups may clash a bit.. — schopenhauer1

I think this precedes the geographical demarcation above. I think it works by initial acceptance, until this (the clash) occurs, and hten over time, either there's violent confrontation, or geographical separation. This, to me, is not multi-culturalism and it seems, to me, that its a bit of a red herring. We want cultural acceptance so we're not invading each other. I can't see much more than this being achievable cross-culturally.

There are dozens of other examples where things get entangled. Let's say you have a subgroup that allows their kids to essentially run amok in a neighborhood.. They let 3 year olds run in the street, but that is part of their culture.. But let's say in the major culture it would be frowned upon to let a three year old run back and forth on a street. — schopenhauer1

This is the exact issue which is going to, likely, prevent any real multi-culturalism every working. We would need to be blaming hte other culture to support those positions. THe 'home' culture wins, on principle alone. But this doesn't have anything to say morally, if you want a reasoned position, as opposed to 'this makes sense to me culture'. And back we are to the first issue.. It just wont work.

What things are you wanting to assign blame for? I think that would preclude certain versions of this, and allow others, depending on which.

I don't think any specific behaviour can be excused by/ blamed on culture.

Not sure how it could be. The concept of God, in any defendable form, is unfalsifiable from within the Universe - seems baked-in to it, and the reason it gets taken seriously.

they tend to still think that how we perceive reality is predominantly a reflection of reality in-itself. — Bob Ross

This, itself, is based on a tendency for experience to converge in its narrative though, as doesn't do much at all for hte problem itself. Searle is a perfect example of ignoring hte problem, for a more palatable exegesis ("I think "go up" and my hand goes up" is all he has to offer in terms of securing hte inference as knowledge). That doesn't make it any more or less 'true' - It could be the case that our experience is a relatively close match, ignoring biographical impediments to psychological interpretation for ease, to what we 'actually look at'. But it could equally be nothing of hte kind. It seems to be more a result of hte modern turn toward 'continental' or 'post-modern' philosophy as it presents less conflict when presented to non-philosophers, largely because it turns on not having to answer difficult questions (in my view) and can simply be word-gamed away ala Hegel, Witty etc... such that a question of 'Do we really see things as they are?" becomes a non-question. Its ammo for bad-faith discussions about meaning and intentionality. This is, to be 100% sure, an illustration of my personal bias in these ways - but i think I'm pointing out either legitimate distinctions, or legitimate gripes.

To my mind, being a naive realist because its easier (it undeniably is easier, regardless of plausibility) is as useless as not taking a position.

It is very complicated because you have no thing nor structure nor any formation to point to that can proven to be connected to your body, and that can be labelled with such a pronoun, other than the things, structures, and formations already in there. — NOS4A2

Which makes it extremely simple. If this connection doesn't obtain, then the other possible connection we could either observe, or care about, is a psychological one. And that clearly does not obtain, if a person 'who would be you' then has it's own experiences. They are not you, any longer. No trouble with this; it's just really uncomfortable for people who want to say they have a definable, observable identity in the sense meant here (rather htan some kind of social character).

As regards abortion, I cannot wrap my head around you knowing, as a fact, that a non-living clump of living cells (by almost any definition of 'living' that isn't arbitrarily academic (i.e tells us nothing about our experiences or intuitions, but could be called 'correct')) could be considered morally important, yet at some arbitrary point along that line, you're happy to make the call - Why is not the same for anyone else? Some call it at conception, some call it at viability with margins of error, some call it at birth.. Where's the catch?

Added later because I read another of your comments:

Why do you think it's alright to kill any invasive being in the human body, but a zygote/fetus? Is there some distinction (other than 'human') you would want to put here to explain it? Legit question - i'm sure there are good answers. I take it you don't have an issue eviscerating a tape-worm, eg.

this is what I am talking about. — Dan

I was trying to clarify what you think the Bold is. It is getting less clear as this discussion goes on. I've taken long leave, re-read the parts I was involved in, continued through pages and still cannot grasp exactly what you're getting at.

It may be the case that you are, in fact, being insufficiently clear, or not noticing hte flaws in your grounding such as to make it really, really difficult to actually discuss what you're trying to discuss (because it is insufficiently clear what that is, in the same sense as the 'this' above).

Onward, I guess..

I love watching cats fight over the remote to a TV they can't turn on.

False. It was taken up as a slogan by a rather detrimental portion of the male populace of the USA for a short period. That said, this also contributes to the ledger you mention lol.

I don’t know if I condone getting drunk and slapping women. Not a good look. — NOS4A2

Yeah, wtf are you talking about my dude. You 'don't know' if you condone this? What's hte hold up?

Doesn't seem relevant, other than as a contributor to my dissatisfaction LOL.

Insofar as it was ever taken up as a slogan, yes.

I see no one has grown beyond teenage sloganing yet. Cool.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?

Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant?

I support, in other words, your interpretation. I also hope this helps Tom avoid similarly circular arguments.

Treating the universe as an object is a category error. — noAxioms

This is highly likely to be the case. Makes for some really interesting Philosophy Club debates.

It is, because is-ought isn't about specific prescriptions but the nature of prescription itself. — Vivek

THis wouldn't get you closer to solving it, and it isn't the case. It's a preference of yours for reading hte term 'the good'. This violates its applicability to anyone else, but the person who assents to this reading of 'the good' as a relationship property. This is the entire issue in a nutshell, seemingly ignored, as it is in the Objectivist Ethics by commanding assent to a particular desire ("To Live! To Surive! To Thrive!"). Its not relevant that rejecting that desire might be irrational (whatever else could be so rational as to continue being?). But incredulity doesn't help. More on that below..

As soon as that assent is denied, the relation fails.

Have a read of Moore's Principia Ethica. Then Philippa Foot. Then Martha Nussbaum. — Banno

Good suggestions, but I don't think referring to other people is a good way to answer a direct question about your conceptions, is it? If the idea is that your view is directly derivative, providing three sources across two, arguably three generations, might not be as helpful as you think. Then again - it's TPF lol.

I need others with some deeper reading/interest to talk about it. — Tom Storm

It is useful for understanding human behaviour, but it essentially is a position (in all versions I've seen, from Moore to Harris) that relies on mere incredulity in the face of denial. This, to me, is left wanting and doesn't inform me at all.

Brilliant! So the is-ought problem is not solved. :)

Sorrow all looks pretty much the same; anger all looks pretty much the same; amusement all looks pretty much the same: emotions in humans are expressed in the same physiological responses. — Vera Mont

I don't see this one in my experience.

But:

No, emotions, either positive or negative, cannot be lumped in buckets. — Vera Mont

I think somewhat misunderstands emotions. At base, we have either aversions or affinity behaviours. Are we wanting to say that emotions are secondary to these directives, or that they are, in themselves, constituents of the direction (direction being the positive/negative on an experience spectrum, let's say)?

If the former, doesn't really do anything to even mention emotions other than as a description explanation of one's specific mindstate. If the latter, it seems to be that 'emotions' are just the circumstantial manifestation of a bare positive or negative valence (which, admittedly would put more truck into you " emotions in humans are expressed in the same physiological responses" - otherwise, it would be very hard to account for the apparent, pretty overwhelming, element of shared emotional states) which, I think might not capture what most consider 'emotions'. 'Sadness' probably isn;t it's own mindstate, for instance).

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. — Mww

For my part, you have previous tried to do this but I have not seen you succeed. The CPR seems to explicitly state that the thing-in-itself is what impresses on the senses, which triggers phenomena, from which we infer the thing-in-itself based on the apparent logical requirements of the phenomena.

If you could find something that directly addresses this (no where is this to be found, so far) that would be helpful. Acknowledging the difficulties interpreting Kant, it's almost certainly best to figure out what you think is doing this job before arguing about whether or not it obtains in the text. As an example of why this is fundamentally important:

"The noumena are not objects of our possible experience; but by the same token, we can neither know how they are in themselves, nor can we know what influence they exert upon our sense perception."

This quote doesn't do what you're wanting, on my view.

The answer lies within the question itself. It is in relation to ourselves. It is in relation to us being alive. It is in relation to our very fundamental essence as living things. To live! To survive! To thrive! — Vivek

This is shitty Randian claims to non-existent properties. The only possible way this gets off the ground is admitted it is entirely subjective. And then that defeats the premise. So, good luck!

Neither nonsense, nor on stilts.
Your handwaving may rise to that charge, though.

Not particularly interesting, no.

Don't be afraid of your own views. Far, far, far, farrrrrrrrrr too many modern philosophy departments, philosophers, publications and lets say 'popular discourse' which is philosophical rely heavily on the filter of social acceptance for their comportment.
Don't do this. Be honest, forthright and be ready to be wrong, or be shown to be irrational or unreasonable, These are pejoratives, despite how much vitriol some who use them would have you believe.

I think the point is that this is still, at base, an inference and not a certainty verified from without. There's no reflective way to ensure this is the case, despite it being logically required for the question to arise. Every body wins :P

Wouldn’t you agree, though, that the brain is the representation of the thing which has those faculties? It’s two sides of the same coin. — Bob Ross

This is a really good point, just by the by, imo.

It points out the strict incoherence of referring to the organ of perception as anything more than a result of it's own function. Which is ... wild.

The indirect realist believes the same thing, but just adds things like apples and chairs to the list of things that cannot be perceived directly, and can only be inferred by the effects that they have on the things that can be perceived directly (which for them is something like qualia or sense data).

It's the same reasoning for everyone, they just disagree on where the line is drawn. — Michael

I think this is, perhaps, a little far, but given the point I've elucidated above I think its pretty clear that there is no line to draw, if we're going to accept that the organ/s of perception do not rise to the level of 'certainly extant as they are'.

do you think gives you accurate enough information to make an inference about reality as it is in-itself? — Bob Ross

I'm conflicted. On the one hand, my understanding of hte physical elements of perception lend themselves to 'No'. But, my understanding of my experience in the round lends itself to 'yes'. However, I think 'common sense' is often not at all sensible and reject arguments of the likes of Searle and Austin which literally hand-wave these problems away. They seem to refuse to do philosophy when it comes to perception, and enquiring into their own (imo clearly erroneous) priors. They don't seem to even be priors - they wont tell us their priors!! LOL

So, I have to say i'm not entirely sure where i land here anymore. It's likely in the previous discussions I was dead-set on 'no'.

You might say that with my philosophy it would still be impermissible, and I would probably ask you why you are killing a sperm in the first place. — Igitur

That's consistent, to me. I reject it, but it's a consistent view if this negative view is open to you.

Furthermore, if the implications of this idea do in fact clear back to a sperm, then why doesn’t the crime of killing an infant clear back to the fetus back to the sperm? — Igitur

I think this was the 'corner' I was trying to push you into (politely, lol). You've responded very well imo.
For me, that viability argument, coupled with the acceptance of a meaningful, but acceptable, margin of error in probability claims of a given case, give me the line I need.

Thank you :)

if we can trust our experience to tell us that we exist with other things in a reality — Bob Ross

We can only do this because it aligns with our experience. It poses no obstacle to indirect realism to use hte best of what we have.

I see @Michael is doing hte Lord's work already. Really telling how uncomfortable people are with the facts of perception.

OK, why do you think viability is what is morally relevant enough to make the difference between for it to be or not be permissible to abort/kill someone? — Hallucinogen

Couldn't be sure, but I'm an emotivist so my position doesn't hinge on my being able to explicate it.

That said, I'll have a go:

Viability is where the 'potential' slips from 'potential to eventually be able to survive outside the womb' (which, consider, has infinite ways to not manifest) to "(apparent)actual ability to survive outside the womb" (which, consider, requires essentially 'morally relevant action' to extinguish in most cases).

These lines are too stark, and (i think I noted) I accept some level of overlap in terms of acceptable abortions, or refusal of abortions, on my account. Edge cases will have to just exist within the frame work, and some will be, on the facts probably wrong on my view, but fit hte framework and are an acceptable trade off. Viability seems to be the only worthwhile way to distinguish. Whether it matters is up to the person making hte moral statement.

The difference is the probability. Killing one sperm isn’t really going to affect the chances of a successful pregnancy and birth. Killing a fetus is massively more likely to have prevented a life. — Igitur

Agree, but I have no idea what the import of that distinction is. The 'probability' for a single sperm could be, all else equal, the exact same as some other fetus (obviously, from a Sperm which had the same chances as the one im talking about). Point is taken, nonetheless. I would just suggest that what matters is that it is not 'actual' in either case (i take it arguments over 'actual' here are the real meat).

It's about the moral implications of the practical view of the potential of a fetus, specifically. — Igitur

This doesn't really give me anything. The 'moral implications' of a fetus are zero, as far as I'm concerned until viability (which means I have to take a bit of a pot-shot If I'm going to commit to a policy, but it would ensure probablity is taken account of ;) ). Could you perhaps elaborate on what you feel is presented here (in the concept of the 'practical view of the potential of a fetus' and why this wouldn't clear itself back to the Sperm without fault.

it's morally OK to abort a foetus because it isn't viable? — Hallucinogen

It is.

it seems like the worst kind of crime to purposefully prevent that individual the chance of a life. — Igitur

It really, truly does not seem like anything of any note. This would be the same as pretending "every sperm is sacred" . Preventing a potential is the same as allowing a potential. It is prior to the issue.

to become an individual — Echarmion

I think this matters, and is not quite as frivolous as many like to assert. Obviously, moments before birth would present moral issues, but if this is based on average viability it becomes as workable policy driver, at the least. There will always be people uncomfortable with where the line is drawn. I don't think we need to care too much. It certainly doesn't strike me as something that needs to be accounted for as between differing views. Just something we live with, unless we have some absolute moral compass (religious, for example).