Pain without a moral claim: change this to pain without a moral dimension or possibility, and now you have a contradiction. Claims can be made or not, and they are often complicated, but what it is for something to BE pain at all, that is, IN the analytic unpacking of the term, carries in it the moral possibility, and since it is impossible to conceive of pain without agency, any pain at all is a moral actuality, putting aside the ambiguity of what pain IS in entanglements and involvements, for pain, it has to be kept in mind, as a concept is an abstraction from actuality. — Astrophel
Perhaps I'm missing something, but this seems a perfect "non-sense" paragraph. It says nothing to me at all. What I can respond to is the bolded. There are plenty of scenarios without this, like random bodily malfunction or pain from sources unknown. The facts are that there is pain. That's all. The person can then react how they react and that has a moral dimension to it, i suppose (though, realistically, if the person isn't affecting anyone else there's an argument that's till not a moral dimension).
Does much pain
have a moral aspect? Yep. But its not in the pain. Other than these comments, I do not think the above says much that can be talked about. The point I made, and i still make, is that pain is a sensation which we can all agree is "x" when described adequately. It involves (or need not involve) any claim to good bad, moral immoral or anything of the kind. Causing pain would fall into your bucket, at any time.
That does cut to the chase. — Astrophel
You seem to have now moved into the causing pain discussion. Unfair play, but I agree with your points. They say nothing for the above, though.
for surely you are not objecting to calling pain bad — Astrophel
That is precisely what I am saying. Some kind of pain can be bad. "Pain" is just a thing that can obtain. It isn't moral. It is just is. I cannot see that you're addressing this beyond trying to curtail the discussion into human
reactions to pain - but even there, you're on shaky ground as plenty of pain is
not considered bad.
How bad is it? she screams bloody murder in your face for asking such a silly question. You are saying, with Mackie, that yes, you understand all of this, but in a very special analytic of pain, a philosophical analytic, the term "bad" has no place at all, for it carries with it a moral dimension that cannot be evidentially grounded in actual conditions like screaming agony ( I am assuming you are willing to allow there to be screaming agony). — Astrophel
You are very, very much not talking about the right things here. Pain isn't agential. It has no moral valence (take this, just for now). "she" being in pain is bad, because I dislike seeing people in pain (usually). The pain itself is the cause of her behaviour which is bad, to me (awkward wording, but yeah). The pain, itself, is bad
to her in this instance. There will have been plenty of pains she did not consider bad in her past. You cannot design scenarios which are
emotionally bad and claim we are talking about 'pain'. We are not. We are talking about human reactions to pain, as above noted. If you feel these cannot be extricated, so be it. I do, and I cannot see why not.
But what is evidentially absent from the agony, which is so profoundly manifest? — Astrophel
This is
not the question. You're talking about agony - a human emotion - not pain, a physical sensation presumably felt by all sufficiently ccomplex conscious entities.
I think you want to regard the agony just what you would regard the sun shining — Astrophel
As above, exactly not what is being said. Please take heed.
it is simply classificatory for things that are intersubjectively "taken as" good and bad. — Astrophel
This is precisely what labeling things good and bad is. It isn't referring to any higher order reasoning, it doesn't draw on some objective measure, it simply tells me what you think. You've done quite a bit of it here, without giving me anything more than exactly that.
Facts are facts, and moral affairs are really just facts, called moral affairs in preanalytical contexts — Astrophel
This seems totally senseless. Facts are facts. "moral affairs" doesn't really mean anything. Morality is literally the dispositions of humans
about facts (including what
to do about them). You haven't presented anything to the contrary.
Call them moral facts, if you like: Moral facts are qualitatively distinct from "mere" facts. — Astrophel
They don't even obtain, so no (on my view. They aren't even distinct from nonsense.
e may intersubjectively agree that, yes, there is agony, and we have a good idea what it is. — Astrophel
Again, you are not talking about pain. You are talking about agony. They are without doubt different things which come apart. I cannot understand most of what you're saying because of this confusion.
This makes for an error in category for this discussion. — Astrophel
The irony is quite strong here, and I am having an extremely hard time not quipping becuase of how intensely obviously, from line one, the reverse of this was. You have made the category error, and consistently interchanged "agony" for "pain". Agony is pain with a negative moral valence. You have baked in a winning argument, but about somehting I am not talking.
ust to be clear, you did say agreement is all that constitutes pain? — Astrophel
Nope. I said agreement leads to us labeling pain. The agreement is about a description, which we can all recognize. It does not constitute
anything but the narrative under the word 'pain' which (as clearly noted, and is not really in question) does not require any moral evaluation at all (beside, perhaps, mentioning that sometimes pain causes suffering, and sometimes it does not where suffering is clear a moral term). This, again, seems a total misunderstanding of what's going on both in this discussion and with "pain" in general. The reason I've used to the term "constitutes pain to a human" is because the word "pain" must be constituted by something, and its construction involves only that agreement aforementioned. I should have scare-quoted the word 'pain' there, but hopefully you now understand what you've missed: We wouldn't know how to use the word 'pain' or what to apply it to unless we had that agreement underling it. To be brutally clear: The use of the word pain, and what pain
is are clearly different things which require different treatments in discussion. You have picked up two separate points and run them together - reasonable, as I was imprecise, but please understand it is not what was being said.
So, are you saying screaming agony in its essence is entirely exhaustible in the analysis of what is SAID about it? — Astrophel
To some degree, but that's far less interesting and nuanced that what I'm getting at. Various descriptions of pain (not our reactions to it, but
it - stinging, dull, major, minor, niggling and them comparisons with other sensations (too hot, v just hot enough)) can be amalgamated to represent a
category of sensation which includes much variation, but generally speaking (with grey areas) distinguishes it from other sensations. Is it the case that these sensations have a tendency to cause certain reactions in us? Yep. And those reactions are moral. The pain (inarguably, now) is not the same and (almost inarguably) is not liable to those same considerations without adding the reactions.
It stands unrefuted — Astrophel
If this is your position, I cannot understand why you're here doing this, or the vast majority of what you've said in this reply. It is, as best I can tell, patently, obviously and demonstrably (as I feel I have done) wrong. "the bad" is nothing more than something you think everyone else agrees on, apparently. They don't and there is no criteria for "the bad". Even if there were, "pain" would not be liable to it's confines. So, yeah. I shall leave htis here given that response.