ots of biological phenomena emerge from bio-chemical events (e.g. photosynthesis), so you'd need a good counter-argument with which you could reject the idea that conscious experiences emerge from brain states. — jkop

You wouldn’t. They aren’t explaining the same things unless you take the evolution-only view of exprience (which is then post-hoc and hallucinatory). But if experience can be “real time” and veridical then I thinn the DR needs a better line.

All of what? — jkop

All of what you had just quoted. Which was a defense of DR. So your tone is odd here.

Furthermore, brain states are necessary for any conscious experience, veridical or hallucinatory, but this has little to do with the directness of perception, which is supposedly what you wish to reject. — jkop

It has a lot to do with it. If experience is to be veridical it must be directly caused by the objects it represents. But we know that’s factually not true. So ‍♂️

Heh what a thread.

I give it a B, in light of its timing. It would be pithy old news these days.

I do claim ignorance of many subjects - origin of the universe, idealism, gods, consciousness - 'I don't know' seems reasonable to me. Pretty sure no one on this site knows either. — Tom Storm

This is equivocal, though. Is it hte case that you don't know anything, or that you don\t know some things?

Who saysit is open ended? It might seem that way to you now, but who knows? — Tom Storm

referred to two different ideas, — Tom Storm

Oh, no you don't. Hehe.

Is your position not a case of a fallacy from ignorance? — Tom Storm

It's not really a case of anything. Intuitively, like 90% of people, I feel as if there are non-physical properties to my experience (and the world). I have never seen an adequate explanation of how many things are physical. I have no reason to commit to either, but I have plenty of reason to lean against physicalism, as it is. Its mild. Possibly insignificant.

Certainly could be good to discuss that in another topic. Nevertheless, you'd really hold the position that there is no duty, or then you are uncertain about it, to report evidence of child sexual abuse that you encounter? — boethius

I can confidently say I would report it, but not on moral grounds (assuming, as I think is warranted, that your/our use of obligation here is a moral term). I want it to stop. That's all. If I didn't want it to stop. my moral outlook wouldn't matter anyway. I can't get further than that. I don't have to do it. I don't think claiming I 'have to' or 'ought' to do it makes any sense. Based on? *insert any possible non-supernatural answer* Okay, thank you. Well, I reject that premise. I can't think of response to this which isn't a reiteration of the *insert..* portion.

The West, in creating and leading industrial civilizaton, is likewise unsuccessful, trading short term performance for long term viability. — boethius

I just cannot understand how one could think this about the West. *shrug*

Again, a discussion for another thread, but where it relates to Trump (and equally Biden for that matter) is in representing exactly why the West is unable to solve our long term problems; coherence doesn't matter and partisans are irreconcilable and political discourse is simply a short term power struggle and mostly, and most damning, no one cares, seeing no duty to even try to understand any topic of importance, much less do anything about it. — boethius

Given I think there isn't a duty, take this with a grain of salt - I think you're making a huge mistake.
The political sideshow, is a really bright shiny sideshow. It simply does not represent most people.

Regarding the balance of your post, firstly, thank you for illustrating a number of those ideas from MacIntyre. Interesting. Partially, i dismiss some of the heat in those passages due to the above (politics=/real life in some sense) but moreover, I don't think this is a bad thing.

Western Culture would, surely, allow for an adaptation and evolution of society following the, lets say, dismantling of a current paradigm. This seems to have happened several times in the last 500 years or so. Major, major changes in governance and infrastructure seems inevitable. We're in the midst of a Kuhn revolution!

If the answer to that question is deemed to be negative, then inverted-qualia arguments cannot get off the ground — sime

Huh? Why? Inverted qualia arguments are specifically about different S experiencing different things. The degree of difference is what seems to defeat certain theories.

doesn't adequately capture the form of the argument that someone made in this particular case. — Pierre-Normand

= fails.

You are saying that "the lawn is wet if and only if it rained" is a false biconditional statement. — Pierre-Normand

It is. They are obviously, patently, inadequate. They neither capture the nuance of reality, or justify their relation. It is a nonsense.

I didn't believe it then, or now. I have been quite clear I'm not across formal logic enough to make those types of claims. |

The only one I've been able to stand behind is that bi-conditional logic isn't relevant to real life, in most cases.

I do. You can prove just about ANYTHING like that. "Imagine we live in a world where <x is true>. This proves we live in a world where <x is true>.

As far as I can tell, this is a rather ungenerous way of reading hte passage, but one i understand.

It wasn't suggested that the thought proves the empirical. The point is that if we could show that disparate phenomenal experience can arise from identical brain states, then this would defeat physicalism as currently thought about. It seems to me reasonable that this is a live argument that will probably survive most attacks, given we cannot show one way or the other. As noted elsewhere, no two people have 1:1 Hardware to bear this out. Which is why it's a thought experiment, I would think.

But, i concede, it is not irrational to just say "yeah, well, so?" but its meaningful to me.
— flannel jesus

How so? I — Tom Storm

At risk of sounding like a dick, I did quite lengthily do this in the post you quoted.

While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation. — AmadeusD

(we will need to tease apart some things here, because you've quoted large parts of that explanation)

Who says it is open ended? — Tom Storm

but who knows? — Tom Storm

Oh my guy, come on now.

Open ended ignorance also seems possible. — Tom Storm

For sure. But my pressure, such as it was, was trying to get you to commit to this as it would require you to basically claim ignorance on everything.

Well, it is the case that science provides reliable but tentative models which are regularly the subject of revision, so there's a sense in which we never arrive at absolute truth. — Tom Storm

For sure, but again, would you commit to the above?

non-physical (apart from concepts). — Tom Storm

Seems like a plain contradiction to me ;)

Sure. — flannel jesus

Nice.

That's not how the thought experiment goes. — Michael

Not sure that's a reasonable response.

Yes, and that much is clear - Largely why I didn't say anything until this last couple of pages: You lot had it well-covered.

But that's not what I was saying was wrong. I entirely misspoke in my objection.

It is not entailed that hte denial of one requires the denial of hte other. I should have been clearer in my objection. It was clearly inadequate. — AmadeusD

This seems to me something I can claim without knowing much formal logic (at least, not conversant).

"It has rained, and so my lawn is wet"

It is plainly true that denying your Lawn is wet does not entail denying that it has rained and vice verse. They are conditionally distinct. The only thing that requires the truth values to align in P and Q here is so. It's possible that what I'm outlining, without hte requisite knowledge to discuss it adequately, is that bi-conditional statements aren't a logically sound tool because we can look at the logic of a bi-conditional statement that appears sound, and it can be wrong.

This is not my utterance. Here's an interesting further response I got:

"I apologize for the confusion. Let me clarify:

In a biconditional statement "P if and only if Q" (P ↔ Q), the truth values of P and Q must be the same. This means that if P is true, then Q must also be true, and if P is false, then Q must also be false. So, in the context of affirming the components, the truth values are indeed dependent on each other.

However, when we talk about denying one component not necessarily leading to the denial of the other, what is meant is that if we deny the truth of P, it does not automatically mean that Q is false (and vice versa). The components are logically connected in a biconditional statement in the sense that they must have the same truth value, but denying one component does not automatically imply the denial of the other."

I believe the difference I'm seeing is between assertion and assent. It seems fully wrong to me that you can assent as a result of assertion, without something (other than triangle of dots) between them.

Who is the author of the long paragraph between quotes that you posted above — Pierre-Normand

An AI. Which also, when i pushed further, said this:

"So, in a biconditional statement, if you affirm Q, then you must also affirm P, and if you deny P, then you must also deny Q in order for the statement to be logically sound. The truth values of P and Q are interconnected in a biconditional statement, so they cannot be affirmed or denied independently of each other. Thank you for pointing out the inconsistency in my previous responses."

So, my objection isn't to the logic, it seems. It's to the application. The logic clearly fails in many cases.

You've just said it proves that people with the same physical states can experience different things. Which is, indeed, the point being got-across in my view (and again, one with which I agree so perhaps I'm being a soft touch).

I do not see anything wrong with your passage being (rightly, a rehash of the quoted from M) totally sound.

If the claim is that the above isn't possible on account of experience being identical physical states, then we're good. You've shown it to be false (assuming you accept the above - but i figure that's what you're trying to ascertain - what does someone who accepts that read into it)

denying one component does logically allow us to conclude the denial of the other — Pierre-Normand

Therefore, denying one (saying it's false) does indeed allow us to conclude that the other is also false, which is a valid form of reasoning in this specific context. — Pierre-Normand

"This statement is logically incorrect because when one component of a biconditional statement is denied, it does not necessarily allow us to conclude the denial of the other component. In a biconditional statement "P if and only if Q" (P ↔ Q), denying one component does not automatically lead to the denial of the other component. This is because the truth values of P and Q are independent of each other in a biconditional statement, and denying one does not necessarily mean the denial of the other. So, it is not valid to conclude the denial of one component based on the denial of the other in a biconditional statement."

It is not entailed that hte denial of one requires the denial of hte other. I should have been clearer in my objection. It was clearly inadequate.

Fair enough.

Well, the way i'm reading it we have two distinct things 'in action':

1)

qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties — Matripsa

2)

Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical statesare identical — Matripsa

I understand that you read them as the same thing, and I can see why. I have, by way of formatting, linked the concepts I think need to be linked (and, by inference, that the two types of format (referring to the passages highlighted by each type of formatting) are not linked).

This is because 1. is a claim and 2. is exemplar. That is how supporting a claims works (not being facetious). IN this case, the two sentences seem very similar but their tenses and meanings are very different. "as" puts the latter into the empirical box (at least, on M's account) and the former into the conceptual box.

It is the specific, empirical instance in 2) of the concept discussed in 1) which gives rise to supporting the claim made about the concept in 1).

I happen to agree, so it's possible im reaching a bit but I'm having no trouble explaining this so i don't get the feeling i am reaching.

air enough. But I think you agree (are there people who don't?) we don't really judge these types of theories for there impact on history. . . wait, or is that exactly what we do but don't like to admit it, so when someone says, "I disagree with N because he ruined discourse," we call them out and remind them to judge the theory on the merits, as in, does it stand to reason? — ENOAH

I think this is true for most of the shallower readers (the teenagers I've discussed at times, for instance) so they're just as easily able to discard N as not 'worth reading' rather than 'Not a philosopher' which i think is probably the most scathing (reasonable) criticism of N.

But Philosophers (broadly speaking) who read N seem to read into his work philosophy even he didn't necessarily understand or think of while writing (also true for a lot of lyricists!!) He was writing for other reasons.

Deliberation is a human activity. — L'éléphant

And each incidence of deliberation is determined by the previous. Which is determined by its reasons. Which are determined by previous states of affairs, which consist in previous deliberations and reasons.

This is not avoidable without some novel element interloping.

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise.
— Matripsa

Seems like it assumes the thing it's meant to prove. Seems circular to me. — flannel jesus

Then i think you missed the bolded word.

But are you satisfied that it demonstrates the experience is non-physical? How would we demonstrate that conscious experience reflects a non-physical reality? Isn't it an inference based on a lack of data or knowledge? — Tom Storm

You're essentially asserting a no true scotsman here(which i note you do acknowledge at the end of this passage by suggestion). The only way I could agree with you, is if I believed that it was always likely further discovery would invalidate my current position[/i]. While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation.
It would be true for all but modal claims. Is that the case? Or can we - demonstrate - that certain things are almost certain, despite further discovery clearly being able to debunk that position?
I do not find that an appealing concept, or a valid way to approach claims. I believe we can demonstrate that something is not the case, only. I think this has been done, in the terms I've set out.

what is your explanation of consciousness? — Tom Storm

It seems clearly non-physical, to me. Otherwise, I don't think anyone saying they have a clue is being honest with themselves so i largely refrain from even speculating.

. Therefore, denying one (saying it's false) does indeed allow us to conclude that the other is also false, which is a valid form of reasoning in this specific context. — Pierre-Normand

This is clearly wrong. I'll leave it there.

Agreed. But that philosophy should be provided by the scientists. — jgill

Any bumper sticker you can provide for why? It seems odd to me. Like saying hydrologists need provide the engineering know-how for hydro-dams.

Is anything we experince non-physical? Can we demonstrate there is anything outside of brain states, physical processes? Asking for a friend. — Tom Storm

I don't really understand the question. The entire point is that we cannot demonstrate the physical-ness(sorry, there's not a better word I know) of certain things such as memories (no, nothing in neuroscience changes this position at the current time) or desires. They are non-physical properties of experience, even if there is a correlated brain-state. This does not demonstrate that the experience is physical. It is patent that some experiences at non-physical. A change of opinion. Being awake/being asleep (in the phenomenal aspect).

That is, unless you take the entirety of phenomenal experience as an evolutionarily-required post-hoc sense-making program. This seems wrong to me on plenty of levels but it does seem plausible, for sure. IF that were the case, I'd be able to take your inference fully. It seems obviously that if this is hte case, the only possible information is physical states to inform the 'sense making' apparatus/i. Given I find issue with the theory i unfortunately cannot take that as sound.

It strikes me as bizarre that you're not aware not responding is better for both of us at this point.

Parfit would be disappointed :snicker: Ah well. I'm here to talk philosophy. Do whatever you want i guess.

But he was a true artist of a writer. He said many wise things. These refute his exaggerations, to me, and allow me to still cherish what he did for these discussions. — Fire Ologist

This is a incredibly lucid take on Nietzsche to my mind. Nice.

You'd be a lot cooler if you weren't too cool.

Ah well. Horse to water and all..

or even conscious thoughts about a bike, being involved. — wonderer1

It just becomes a less conscious belief. — AmadeusD

;) I agree with what you're saying, but maintain this indicates you have retained the beliefs required to ride a bike.

Furthermore, I could point to the inroads that embodied/enactive/situated paradigms have made into psychological and neuroscientific research in recent decades and how they have made theses fields of inquiry, and some of their applications, more effective at accomplishing their aims. — Pierre-Normand

For everything preceding this: Yeah, good. Thank you. There are parts there I would have trouble answering without a sufficiently formal attempt, which I wont make.

The quoted: I don't deny the effectiveness you're talking about. But it is reasonable effectiveness. Results we would understand, from the first, would result IFF theory is true, as an example.

These do not explain to Subjects how their experiences come about. We don't have any working empirical theories for this. Nothing has brought us 'closer' to it, so far. This is because, I think, the aims there are not the aims my 'effectiveness' are aiming at. I do not think the success of neuroscience has much to say about ID/DR because I think both positions are able to explain the data. I don't see any daylight. It's not an empirical problem, apparently. The sciences are explaining what is. Not trying to figure out what to investigate. A thread here recently expounded this very well, imo.

I could just say "non-physical properties" and that's a complete answer but I think that avoids the issue. Qualia are experienced as non-physical.

this is true, yet doesn’t change my point.
Our hardware obviously all differs - but in ways which do not appear relevant to this case. In other cases, other differences may be relevant. I suppose you could convert this concept into that the hardware is doing the same thing, rather than is some fuzzy version of physically close-enoigh (as I wrongly intimated in the above quoted passage )

unreasonable effectiveness.

I could have chosen not drink anything at all, or could have drank a cola, but I chose to drink water because I wanted to. — Corvus

You wanting to is determined. This ignores the objection.

I could have gone to bed instead of reading your post in English, but I decided to read it. — Corvus

No, you couldn't have. It was not open to you to decide anything but what the preceding history of hte Universe determined you to decide.

As I am also attempting to explain, it is the indirect realists who are facing a challenge in explaining how the inner mental states that we enjoy can have intentional (referential) relations to the objects that they purport to represent that are apt to specify the conditions for those experiences to be veridical. — Pierre-Normand

Are you sure? The IRist doesn't seem to be obligated to account for this at all. Merely take it that they are approximations. These can be as-good-as-veridical for practical purposes. The inner mental states (though, are you referring to 'an experience' or valences associated with experiences?) are causally linked to the objects, indirectly. This relationship holds even if there is no 1:1, truth-making correlation between the two.

Yeah, that was badly worded - i'm at work.

I mean to say that, Parfit and others claim that any plausible Moral theory, must have, contained in it, an aim toward the happiness of sentient beings. I think this begs the question. They assume morality relates to the increasing happiness (and then, weirdly, reject S-theory and Hedonism...)

I'm not sure which two you're referring to, or what disconnect is being pointed out.

For example, consider the bi-conditional proposition: "If it is raining, then the ground is wet." — AmadeusD

"The bi-conditional statement "if it is raining, then the ground is wet" is true because it goes both ways. — AmadeusD

Are about the same quote. In any case, I don't defend or criticise it.

I've adjusted my query, and had another version of it's defence, though:

"Yes, the statement "if it is raining, then the ground is wet" is a biconditional statement because it can be written as "it is raining if and only if the ground is wet." This means that if it is raining, then the ground must be wet and if the ground is wet, then it must be raining. Both conditions are necessary for the statement to be true."

Are you implying that certitude is never warranted? — creativesoul

For future events? Depends. In a practical sense, sure it's warranted in that not assuming (to the degree needed) would prevent action.
But I do not think it right that past events can warrant certainty about future events, in the strict sense. Constant conjunction and all..

I wouldn't know. I'm leaving formal logic for institutional learning rather than as a hobbyist. For thoroughness though, The full response was:

"The bi-conditional statement "if it is raining, then the ground is wet" is true because it goes both ways. If it is raining, then the ground will be wet. And if the ground is wet, it must have rained at some point. Therefore, the statement can be expressed as "it is raining if and only if the ground is wet," making it a bi-conditional statement."

This was the relevant AIs response.

the statement can be expressed as "it is raining if and only if the ground is wet," making it a bi-conditional statement.

One can be certain of what's going to happen. Those things can happen as expected. After they happen, one knows.

That doesn't seem right. — creativesoul

One can have certainty, as an attitude. I don't think it's right to say one can be certain, without a Crystal ball. I don't think it's right to say that the occurrence being in-line with the expectation amounts to knowledge. That couldn't be true for someone convinced they've got the Lottery numbers right, and wins. They didn't know. But they were certain, and right, in the event.

Capitalism is based on a 'free miracle' in reasoning, that profit is the (couched in their terms) objective goal of Business practices. From there, Capitalism is almost inarguably 'good'.

Similar for the inverse for Socialists etc... There's nothing that supports the idea that equal treatment is 'correct' or equal ownership or whatever. It's just the miracle they use to support the subsequent, hard-to-defeat arguments.

Morally, the premise that 'happiness' must be attained within a theory for it to be Plausible is a common refrain from moralists. It's one I find to be pretty question-begging.

Via three AI models:

"No, it is not logically sound to deny the antecedent in a bi-conditional proposition because it does not follow the rules of propositional logic. In a bi-conditional proposition, if both the antecedent and consequent are negated, the proposition as a whole is not necessarily true or false. It is important to consider both sides of the proposition in order to determine its truth value."
====
"No, denying the antecedent for a bi-conditional proposition is not a valid form of reasoning. In a bi-conditional proposition, if the antecedent is false, then the consequent must also be false. The only way to deny the bi-conditional proposition is to show that both the antecedent and the consequent are false."
=====
"Denying the antecedent of a bi-conditional proposition is logically unsound because it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the consequent is false. In a bi-conditional proposition, if-then both directions are linked together, meaning that if the antecedent is true, then the consequent must also be true, and vice versa.

For example, consider the bi-conditional proposition: "If it is raining, then the ground is wet." Denying the antecedent would result in saying "It is not raining, therefore the ground is not wet." However, the ground could still be wet for reasons other than rain, such as someone watering their lawn or a sprinkler system being turned on.

Therefore, denying the antecedent of a bi-conditional proposition does not provide valid grounds for concluding that the consequent is also false, making it logically unsound."


Creepily relevant.

I may know that my friend regularly arrives late to appointments, but I need not necessarily do anything with that knowledge.
— Janus
Interesting. A good reply. Could you be said to know this if no action at all followed from it - including saying "You are always late!"? I think one could. So know-that extends past know-how, if only marginally. — Banno

I think he claim only extends to instances in the past. Any application to future appointments would be speculation, and couldn't amount to knowledge, I don't think.
You can only know that your friend, has previously consistently arrived late to appointments. You may know that it is likely he/she will do so again.

Well, it implies belief in Bicycles and riding. — Banno

:ok: Agree. I think this is being ignored in many comments here. The belief is actually required for the 'know' part to exist, I think. It's implied, very strongly, that you must hold the belief to know.

This is because it would be perfectly possible that one needs to believe while learning, but once they are an adept practitioner that belief ceases. — Leontiskos

I don't think so. It just becomes a less conscious belief. I don't suddenly not believe the ILAC method of legal writing, simply because I now use it as a pre-recorded framework for writing certain types of advice. I still believe ILAC is credible, that I know how to use it, and that it will fulfill the instruction I've been given (if applicable). Trust might be a better word, as it's been relegated to thre pre-or-sub-conscious at that time (and similarly with the Bike examplar viz. you must still believe that the rotational pressure of your peddling will move the bike forward, to bother with the act).

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" — Matripsa

I agree. But if receiving a certain exact wavelength (termed Red, rather than the valence of it's presentation to an S being termed Red) causes a different phenomenal experience in two individuals who do not differ in their hardware (colour-blindness) then I think the argument is still live.

As it seems Apustimelogist below (above - I was still typing when he commented) has noted, it's not as if this wouldn't, from their perspective, mean one is 'right' and in line with the experience of those others without a physical aberration, and one is 'wrong' in the same way. This would mean the language would respond to the scenario, rather htan the other way around, over time. I think this is true, and why we have a very specific idea of Red globally.

However, I think this speaks to a point that will get very quickly political:

There are objective facts about colour. They are constructed, linguistically, but that to which they refer is objectively xxxHz or some such designation which is independent of experience or observation (it is hte same observation, however it is noted by the S observing it - the langauge is not important to this element).

Do we rely on these objective 'core' facts of perceivable objects to denote when, and where someone has deviated from the 'norm'?
I think its the only sensible way to deal with data. Others don't, and it gets aggressive quick. Apparently, noting that someone failed in being on-time, chronologically, is bigoted.