There is no inconsistencyin the version tested by Christoph Benzmüller and Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo: — Tarskian

that Gödel's version of the proof is inconsistent — Lionino

More narcissistic manipulation and lying. I urge all honest persons to look up "taqiyya":

So, my sympathies are definitely much more Muslim nowadays. — Tarskian

One can also go to the "Mathematical proof is not orderly" thread to see how OP does not know what he is talking about, as other posters show.

If there is any such proof of God, it would not be the case that across the globe philosophers (outside of “philosophy of religion”) are overwhelmingly atheists, and that the more prestige a scientist in the physical sciences has the more likely he is to be an atheist. It is also not a coincidence that IQ is a useful predictor of atheism and religious attendance. But yet the crank thinks he has stumbled upon something that everybody else is ignorant of. Here we see how the religious crank manipulates information to push his pathological dogma:

So, even when the greatest mathematician of all times gives a proof, an atheist will still reject it. — Tarskian

In fact, there is nothing -- no argument whatsoever -- that could ever convince an atheist that God exist. — Tarskian

It is even more telling when the crank abuses the work of people who themselves do not think the argument even in its valid shape proves anything — the delusion that tautologies within one logical language among many others is able to prove something metaphysical.

He then pretends to be humble and be "participating" in a discussion he is thoroughly abusing and misuing:

the ongoing investigation and conversation on Gödel's proof. — Tarskian

If he cared about any investigation, he would not be spilling nonsense such as:

The rhetoric about "there is no proof for God" basically keeps ignoring Gödel's mathematically unobjectionable work. — Tarskian

He did not know that Gödel's proof is not consistent until I informed him of such. It is visible when he kept thinking of modal collapse when I used the word "inconsistency".

Then, we have more abuse and lies about scholars long dead:

That is the real value of Gödel's proof. In the end, he was not even trying to prove something about God. He was trying to prove something about atheists. — Tarskian

Being established that the sophist is doing exactly what I described or what he used for “no u”, and up to reasonable people to see through it, I am removing this thread from my browser to not provide any more ammunition to the crank.

You are merely haphazardly copying excerpts from the ongoing investigation and conversation on Gödel's proof. — Tarskian

Hilarious coming from the individual quoting Wikipedia to falsely claim "Godel proved God's existence" and realising only 5 posts in that I am not talking about modal collapse when saying "inconsistency".

You are desperately fishing for evidence that there would be something wrong with Gödel's work without being a constructive participant in any shape, way, or fashion. — Tarskian

Taking the accusation I correctly raised against you twice and putting a "no u" spin on it. Boring.

Secondly, Melvin Fitting's reformulation addresses this concern anyway. — Tarskian

It is not Fitting's reformulation that addresses that. Fitting's addresses the modal collapse, the inconsistency had been solved before people were ever aware of a modal collapse.

And the fact some reformulations avoid modal collapse and are valid does not matter for the crankery you are trying to push.

without being a constructive participant in any shape, way, or fashion. — Tarskian

There is no "constructive participant", the people providing solutions to Gödel's proof themselves do not commit to the argument.

You do not know what you are talking about.

Modal collapse is not an inconsistency. Who told you that? — Tarskian

Nobody, because I know it is not.

You still don't realise that it has been proven that Gödel's version of the proof is inconsistent. I am not talking about modal collapse.

Furthermore, Anderson has fixed the issue and removed the modal collapse. This is not essential at all. It is just nice to have and not more than that. — Tarskian

Anderson himself along with Gettings argued in 1996 that his version can be defeated using the same arguments as Gaunilo against Anselmo.

We suggest that the Gόdelian Ontological Arguer should simply admit that neither the possibility of God nor the truth of the axioms used to "prove" that possibility are self-evident. And he might just maintain that the less evident axioms, for example that a conjunction of positive properties is positive, is an assumption which he adopts on grounds of mere plausibility and is entitled to accept until some incompatibility between clearly positive properties is discovered. — Anderson and Gettings

This watch should be recommended for everyone in STEM. It helps bring so many concepts together.

None in particular. But neither is Jamal wrong — besides the condescendence in his message. You are talking about different things.
Besides that fortay is not how Italian forte is pronounced, it is not just that misusage can exclude the speaker from some memberships, but that misusage may undermine communication. Some patterns (which eventually become rules) in a language may develop to remove ambiguity or unneeded specification, settling for a golden mean. If speakers err towards not attending the rule that removes ambiguity, it becomes obvious how they may undermine communication (if they err towards the unneeded specification, they are, for one, seen as pedantic).
Wouldn't it be wonderful if Kant wrote in a way that would not allow for significantly different interpretations of his work and that his usage of terminology was fully regular? So much time and effort would have been saved.
Obviously, one does not need to attend to rules when speaking to friends in the same as they do as writing a textbook for university studies (pedantic), but one must also be careful not to excessively help popularise mistakes that may degenerate communication. At the end of the day, it is an ethical issue, and by that fact alone it requires common sense — no definitive catch-all answer can be ever given.

The oestrogenic hissy fits are always impressive. How did this respectable xir (xem?) ever become mod?

Someone at the level of cognitive decline is no longer responsible for oneself. Whether that is medically/legally ratified by a professional does not change that.

Who is forcing the poor old guy to do this? My grandma has an early-dementia diagnosis and she is awfully more coherent than Biden. He more than surely has something, likely dementia too.
This is elderly abuse and more.

That is classical non sequitur. Again some word-salad nonsense. — Tarskian

Me accusing you of not reading what you yourself linked, which you haven't, is a "non-sequitur" and "word-salad"? Are you a bot?

Godel flawlessly proved the equiconsistency between his theorem and the axioms from which it follows. Godel's proof is therefore mathematically unobjectionable. Of course, Godel did not prove the axioms themselves. But then again, he is not even supposed to. — Tarskian

Why are you using "equiconsistency" when referring to a set of theorems and their axioms? Gödel did not prove anything "mathematically" but using higher-order logic. Gödel's proof is inconsistent stemming from D2, it took other people to fix the inconsistency in his proof just to then generate further issues in these updated proofs. It is not "unobjectionable".
Who has issues with Gödel here is you, misrepresenting the work not only of Gödel but of the field.

Some thing that I noticed in the article is the trouble around "positive properties". A comment in K. Gödel, Appx.A: Notes in Kurt Gödel’s Hand, 144–145 says that "positive property" is to be interpreted in a moral-aesthetic sense only — which by itself is troublesome. Nonetheless, the argument may be rejected for other, better, reasons. Contrary to what the weekly sophist implies, choice of axioms is not arbitrary.

They are not inconsistent. There may be an issue of modal collapse but Curtis Anderson proposed a fix for that. It is not a major problem. — Tarskian

As previously stated, you have not read the article you yourself linked. Congrats.

1 I don't see this use of "metaphysical" has any strong relationship to the traditional meaning of the term, so the choice could be regarded as misleading. "New metaphysics" might work. — Ludwig V

Yes, the usage of the term falls out of the traditional. If we want to really go back, metaphysikē is whatever Aristotle wrote (catalogued as such) after his physics. The crux is that when we are talking about metaphysical possibility, it is not automatic that we are talking about possibility in metaphysics, but something related, though different altogether, that makes a noun by itself, metaphysical-possibility, or new(-)metaphysics as you say — likewise logical-possibility does not immediately overlap with possibility in logic, if such a phrase even makes sense immediately. Case in point, the arrangement of games, as described in Toulmin's article, seems to have nothing to do with 'metaphysics' as traditionally used.

2 If this is "synthetic necessity", I wonder how we might define "contingent" - the opposite of "necessary" in the traditional structure of these terms. — Ludwig V

"Metaphysical possibility" is sought as distinct from logical and physical possibility. Using the same Venn diagram I started the thread with, metaphysically contigent must also be logically contigent (Earth is the third planet from the Sun), but it doesn't inherently matter whether it is physically necessary (electric permeability ε) or contigent (kangaroos are digitigrades). Metaphysically contigent includes, at least, the set of all physical contigency. Strictly speaking, and using the definition I tried to work with, metaphysical contigency is everything where there is a possible world where X is not the case; those would also be synthetic contigencies — especially if we take analytic statements to be necessary, otherwise further definition is needed.

3 This is classified as "a posteriori" because it is contingent on the relevant rules existing and applying. But all analytic truths are contingent on the relevant definitions (rules of language) existing and applying, so does the term "a priori" have any use? — Ludwig V

Some philosophers make away with both the a posteriori / a priori and analytic/synthetic distinctions, Kripke gave a strong blow against the idea that a posteriori propositions are always contigent. I don't feel informed enough yet, if ever, to make a statement about it. I take the traditional view and accept all those distinctions.

For clarification, my quoting of your original comment is to add context to my post, not to agree or disagree with you.

I'm not following Tarskian's argument at all. — Banno

Because there is no argument. It is crankery and abuse of philosophy/logic worse than PL's.

No, I have not and it doesn't. That the conclusions follow from the premises can be said about every fiction book — and yet we can't cast Avada Kedavras. If you had actually read the "article" you linked, you would know that Gödel's original axioms are inconsistent — the solution to that exists, but I will let you scurry for it instead of giving it for sophists to abuse.

Instead of reading through some web article anyone can edit and that no academic uses for research for its extremely poor quality, I have gone through the original papers for the proofs. There are positive, non-arbitrary, reasons why we may want to reject the axioms of the argument, even in its consistent form.

You abuse every source you can get your hands on to support the conclusion you started with before researching the arguments, like a politician would. If it is not some dumb ontological argument from the Middle Ages or some toddler-ish question like "Uh where does the big bang come from", the religious sophists will latch onto whatever they can find next.
In that sense, I suggest you go spill your drivel somewhere other rather than a philosophy forum, which is not a debate forum, but perhaps the other users will be eager to waste time on your sophistry.

Gödel has proved the existence of a Godlike entity from higher-order modal logic. — Tarskian

He hasn't. Read the Reddit article you yourself linked.

Atheism is defined as a positive claim. — Tarskian

It is not. There have been some three threads in the past year about this very topic where this is debunked thoroughly.

Philosophers talk about whether p-zombies are metaphysically possible, but what a priori grounds do we have for ruling out the possibility that they're actual? — The Great Whatever

The a priori ground is our assumed metaphysics. P-zombies is completely a derivative problem of mind-body dualism:

Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. — 'Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible' – William Robert Webster

If you are a physicalist, traditionally, you will automatically reject the idea of zombies — there are only physical facts and two individuals with the same physical facts will both have consciousness or not. If you are a dualist, you may reject the idea or not depending on your flavour of dualism. If you are an idealist, I don't know, I haven't dropped acid yet.
Each will come with its own set of its issues (which the SEP article redundantly covers in every derivative problem), and the debate has raged on since Antiquity — pick your poison and accept you can't solve the conundrum.

You are interested in exploiting that to define metaphysics. — Ludwig V

I just found this when reading of p-zombies on SEP:

Still, many physicalists hold that what guarantees the impossibility of zombies is ‘metaphysical’ necessity. Typically they maintain that states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with physical states, and that these identities are necessary a posteriori as argued by Kripke (see e.g. McLaughlin 2005, and for criticism, Stoljar 2000). But the vocabulary of possibility and necessity is slippery. For example there is disagreement over whether logical and metaphysical possibility are different (section 3.1 below); when Kripke (1972/80) writes of ‘logical’ and ‘metaphysical’ possibility he seems to use those words interchangeably (Yablo 1999: 457n.), and some use ‘logical’ where others prefer ‘conceptual’ (Chalmers 1999: 477); compare Latham 2000, 72f.).

They hold there is an identity that is metaphysically necessary, and it is metaphysically necessary because it is a a posteriori necessity.

There are a few reading groups here — Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Kant, Descartes. But you don't see them unless you look for them because they get quickly taken over by dumb nonsense such as this and this.

Anyhow, any meaningful discussion to be had is covered 90% in the IEP/SEP page of the respective philosopher — whatever can be added by amateurs is going to be a connection between different sources or just factually wrong.

*sigh*. The more philosophy i do outside of this forum the less appealing smart-sounding, but un(der)regulated discussion becomes. — AmadeusD

For the purpose of learning philosophy, time spent actually reading the classics is more productive than arguing with idiots in the hopes of the occasional informative post.

Chromotherapy is unproven pseudoscience and the Sun is white, not yellow.

Besides the obvious point that they can't equated because they are different words which refer to different things, there is a strong relationship between the two. I will let Aristotle do the talking instead:

But not only are the vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame; while no one blames those who are ugly by nature, we blame those who are so owing to want of exercise and care.

so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them.

This relationship is why I voted yes instead of no.

Primeramente debo admitir que no tengo condiciónes de leer un libro (aúnque de solamente 150 páginas) todo para el propósito de un hilo.

Siguiendo su tesis, sugiere que la mayoría de nosotros tiene una noción básica de lo que significa real y se utiliza en casi todos los contextos posibles. No ocurre así con algunas palabras, como "sublime" la cual es muy ambigua, y rara vez comprendida por la mayoría de los interlocutores. — javi2541997

Bien. No me hago de tonto, entiendo muy bien lo que se quiere decir cuando se dice que una palabra no es ambigua o no crea confusión. Pero cuando hablamos en ese ámbito, nuestra jerga debe ser precisa, ojalá quirúrgica.

Esto todo se me revela como una tentativa de hacer semántica. La semántica es un subcampo de la gramática (es decir, la lingüística). La semántica posee términos específicos para diversas categorías — e.g., "polisémico", "hiperónimo", etc. Pero "ambiguo" no es uno de esos términos — la palabra "ambiguo" en verdad posee un significado muy preciso en la sintaxis (también parte de la gramática), pero no en la semántica.

Sobre 'sublime', la RAE dice "Excelso, eminente, de elevación extraordinaria. U. m. en sent. fig. apl. a cosas morales o intelectuales.". No me parece tan problemático, es solamente abstracto, como 'amor' o 'sociedad'.

Entonces, aún no me es claro que Austin quiere decir.

Alguno filósofos han dado a entender qué ciertas palabras como "real" sólo tienen sentido en un contexto metafísico — javi2541997

A partir del momento que podemos decir "El multiverso no es real", "real" no tiene solamente sentido en contexto metafísico, tiene sentido en contexto físico también.

sólo suelen preguntadas por personas que van más allá de lo básico — javi2541997

Bien, acá tenemos algo curioso.
— La palabra 'real' no crea confusión.
— Y por ejemplo [un de los casos en que crean confusión]?
— Bien, estamos yendo allá de lo básico.

¿Pero "ir allá de lo básico" no se aplicaría también a todas las palabras que son dichas "ambiguas"? Ese argumento me parece ser un chivo expiatorio.

El uso de las palabras, de la lengua, no es tan misterioso ni complejo. Palabras se refieren a cosas en la mente de las personas, a menudo dos personas no piensan la misma cosa con la misma palabra; pero eso está en el dominio de la gramática y de la psicología, no de la filosofía — la filosofía propiamente dicha, que es la metafísica y la epistemología, parte de las palabras refiriéndose a cosas sin mayores problemas así como lo haz la física o la literatura. Los anglohablantes aún están intentando comprender esa parte — o ni siquiera intentan, porque muchos creen que problemas filosóficos sean solamente problemas lingüísticos.

Yo, me pongo disponible para discutir gramática — psicología no — pero para hacer gramática nuestras definiciones han de ser quirúrgicas.

Entiendo que sin dificultad. Interesante. — javi2541997

Sí, como un poema cualquiera. ¿Se supone que es un trabalenguas o algo así?

Well, the first half of that is debatable, but let's save that for another time. — Ludwig V

I am not asserting that first half. It follows from wanting to adopt degrees of belief (which Manuel did), except for hinge propositions such as logical laws and such (the existence of God is no such proposition non-presups would agree).

On top of that, I think that they will not be able to explain what experiences might convince them. Certainly, I can't and I've never seen anyone try. — Ludwig V

What evidence or experience would convince you that (e.g.) "the God of Abraham" at least one personal God/dess (of any religious tradition) exists?
— 180 Proof

Some poeple would say if God came down from the heavens and announced himself. But many would just conclude that they went insane. And wouldn't they be justified in thinking so? Everything that they experienced so far comes in contradiction with that one event, it is one event against the constant regularity of their past.

For me to be convinced, it is very simple, the evidence that there is a god would have to overall significantly outweigh {the evidence for any alternative for god in each issue where god has explanatory power} and {the evidence that there is not a god} together.

But if God came down from heavens to announce himself, not only would that have to be an experience like no other — not just seeing lights in the sky or hearing voices like Saul —, but this newfound knowledge would have to not contradict my past experiences but in fact explain many gaps in them. — Lionino

There has been considerable debate about where the burden of proof lies. — Ludwig V

The debate happens when people concede to theists the definition of 'atheist' "explicitly stating the non-existence of God", instead of the normal "not believing because there is no reason to believe":

— Do you believe in a green donkey (it had copper poisoning) orbiting behind Jupiter in such a way that it is tidally locked with respect to Earth, that is, it is always behind Jupiter and we could never see it with a telescope?
— No...
— Well, do you have eViDeNcE it is not there though?
— I guess not.
— ThEn you can't discard the pOsSiBiLity of a green donkey behind Jupiter! — Lionino

Traté de hacer una comparación respecto del estudio de Austin en su libro "Sense and Sensibilia". Este autor trata bastante de la palabra "real" y en ella afirma que "siempre" tiene el mismo significado. Es decir, nos es ambigua, no da lugar a confusiones entre interlocutores. — javi2541997

No he leído "Sense and Sensibilia", o cualquiera obra de Austin, talvez puedas enseñarme; pero que "real" (en inglés) tenga el mismo significado toda vez me suena improbable. Para mí, el inglés "urrrial", o todavía el español "real", puede ser objetivo de polémica acerca de su significado.

Sin embargo, digamos que las palabras 'real' y 'desaparecido' son tal como Austin las describió. Si queremos decir que una palabra "no es ambigua", en el contexto de Austin, ¿qué significa exactamente?

Si las palabras 'real' y 'desaparecido' "no dan lugar a confusiones entre interlocutores", ¿qué significa eso?

No puede ser que los interlocutores imaginen la misma cosa inmediatamente. Porque, bien, un interlocutor A puede decir que "Papá Noel es real" y "Naves en el Triángulo de las Bermudas desaparecen", y mucha gente cuestionará "¿Pero real en qué sentido? ¿Es basado en una persona real, o es real como una idea, o real en el sentido ficticio?" y "¿Desaparecen cómo? ¿Desintegran espontáneamente? ¿O hunden en el mar?". Por tanto esa es una confusión que puede surgir.

Entonces, si no eso, ¿qué significa?

¿Cómo habéis seguido el poema vosotros? — javi2541997

Lo leí normalmente.

There's something about the terminally online which forces them to never be able to concede. They need to constantly lie, play word games or resort to semantics.

— Youtube comment.

This you?

But I applaud The Philosophy Forum for its toleration, allowing even the most incorrigible cranks to start thread after redundant thread, spewing disinformation like a crudely written bot. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I guess this is the confirmation I was not wrong when everytime I saw one of those threads I had the feeling it was a crackpot rambling. In my bouts of self-doubt, I wondered if it wasn't my ignorance of the topic that didn't allow me to follow the conversation.

Un sinónimo de desaparecido. — javi2541997

Lo podríamos preguntar sobre cualquiera palabra y la problematica sería la misma.

Que se halla en paradero desconocido, sin que se sepa si vive. — javi2541997

Un comentario sobre la definición de la RAE es que creo que la parte después de la vírgula sea accidental (extrínseca) a la palabra, mientras solamente la primera parte es esencial (la verdadera definición). Justifico mi afirmación a partir del principio de que una cosa causa la otra (luego la otra es consecuencia de la cosa), y, si no sabe el paradero de alguien, no solamente no se sabe si vive o descansa en paz pero se sabe nada sobre la persona, si todavía tiene piernas o si le gusta la matemática. Desaparecido significa alguien en paradero desconocido, las consecuencias no necesitan de ser mencionadas.
Aunque una persona podría muy bien objetar que la ignorancia sobre la vida o muerte del individuo es una consecuencia del paradero desconocido más importante que las otras consecuencias, luego se justifica inclúyela en la definición, pero yo diré que eso es verdad en un sentido (no significado) de la palabra en contexto criminal/policíaco.

Además, desaparecido, tiene siempre el mismo significado — javi2541997

Sin querer ser quisquilloso, la cuestión es menos sobre tiempo ("siempre") y más sobre posibilidad. Entonces, cambiaría la frase a "Además, desaparecido solo tiene un significado". Sin adentrar en una discusión sobre el significado de "significado", la frase convertida simplemente se refiere al concepto de polisemia (opuesto a monosemia).
No sé si es bien verdad que el adjetivo "desaparecido" sea monosémico. Obviamente, la semántica varía no solamente de acuerdo con la lengua (si estamos hablando italiano o alemán) más también de acuerdo con la edad (diacrónica), la profesión (diafásica), la clase social (diastrática), y la posición geográfica (diatópica). Por eso, no sé si es el caso de tu dialecto, pero creo que la palabra "desaparecido" no siempre denote solamente alguien "Que se halla en paradero desconocido", pero también una persona que no se ha visto y que no ha entrado en comunicación, como dices "...de que una persona no se sabe noticias suyas...", de donde podemos decir también a una persona que no hemos visto hay tiempo "¡Estabas desaparecido!".
No obstante, digamos que lo que decía no vale y que sea monosémica la palabra.

Es decir, es la palabra más comprensible del grupo de sinónimos ofrecido por la R.A.E. — javi2541997

¿Un hiperónimo?

¿Qué hubieses respondido tú? — javi2541997

Sin querer ser mucho rudo, pero aun lo siendo un poco, yo hubiera respondido que el profesor no ha llevado en consideración conocimientos básicos de gramática. Ni todas palabras tienen sinónimos, y las que los tienen, no pueden ser substituidas por sus sinónimos todas las veces, si no serían sinónimos absolutos. Pero, hubiera respondido también que no sabe lo que dice algunos gramáticos:

Hoy he venido a contarte un secreto: los sinónimos «estrictos» o «absolutos» no existen.

En todos los idiomas existen palabras parecidas entre sí. Un sinónimo es simplemente una palabra que tiene un significado igual o parecido a otra. Sin ir más lejos, podemos encontrar un ejemplo de sinonimia en la relación entre las palabras «profesor» y «maestro».

Sin embargo, el hecho de que dos palabras sean parecidas entre sí no quiere decir que sean intercambiables sin más. La sustitución de una por otra siempre conlleva un precio que el escritor debe pagar.

Sorpresa no es, es un conocimiento básico de la sección de la gramática llamada la semántica. De ese asunto lo trata la lingüística, que propiamente evolucionó de la filosofía del lenguaje.

Sin embargo, siendo lo que dije arriba no configurase una respuesta aceptable para una prueba, diré también ausente o aun perdido.

So, ser is an attribute while estar is mostly an adverb of time, place and situation. — javi2541997

Yo diría que el complemento del verbo 'ser' es algo intrínseco mientras 'estar' el complemento es extrínseco; ejemplo: "Soy rubio" y "Estoy rubio" significan cosas completamente distintas, y sabemos bien lo que significa cada — una es una característica innata y otra una característica adquirida. Por supuesto, hay excepciones, pero persiste la regla general.

I would question whether this is a particularly helpful or good faith way to pose the question. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Let's say X is decidedly not acting in good faith. How should we engage with X? With good faith or bad faith? Forget morality — we don't think about how to bring about the greatest amount of welfare when we discuss with someone, let's not pretend otherwise —, what is strategically more sound?

I won't even continue, what a load of crap. These barbarians who think Romans would feel anything but disdain for them go as far as saying all the absurd nonsense you see in this thread. That I have to argue with so much dishonesty and bullshit is well past limits now.

These people have no ancient history of their own, their history is a fentanyl addict who died of overdose during COVID curfews, cross-dressing parades, and insane orange politicians. In their insanity they will defend every sort of violation of common sense, "hur dur the weather is part of culture", "hur dur recipes are part of culture", "hur dur we wuz romans n shiet u knowamsayan?", "hur dur hay rabdos sou kai hay baktaria sou. autai me parakelesan". Just barbaric, barbaric all the way through. They don't even know how to use periods.

Those are the same people who defend that men can become women and that 2+2=5. So if such basic concepts bewilder them so much, to ask them a proper understanding of history is like charging a cat with doing the taxes of a company.

Sparing them with the slighest bit of culture and civilisation is throwing pearls at hogs. They were barbarians 2000 years ago and they are barbarians today and will be barbarians forever — uncapable of art and uncapable of philosophy (how can one do philosophy in a language that struggles with concepts as basic as "nation" and "woman"?).

But recipes are a part of culture. :roll: — Sir2u

Spare me your rhetorical diarrhoea.

But it is for at least these people
https://www.facebook.com/groups/harrypotterhungary/
https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g274887-d19126341-r934699361-The_MAGIC_Budapest-Budapest_Central_Hungary.html
https://grimmauld12.wixsite.com/alohomora/about — Sir2u

Nowhere there does it say Harry Potter is part of Hungary's culture. Again, spare me.

A lot of culture is based on things like the weather in the place you live — Sir2u

Elements of one's culture are determined by the weather, the weather itself is not part of one's culture.

:lol: :lol: :lol: Daring thread

How does putting the mirror on the floor not do exactly that (assuming x axis is vertical, usually it is y or z by convention). — noAxioms

Y axis is the vertical axis on the mirror. Put the mirror on the floor and you will see your head doesn't show up behind your back.

A concave mirror (on the wall, sufficiently distant) rotates the image 180 degrees — noAxioms

You are right, it doesn't flip vertically, it spins it 180º.

It seems to me that culture is the actual out of the possible that settles on some group, but that in the settling at the same time manifests its capacity to have settled on anyone. Thus undercutting any claim to any exclusivity except for the accident of the historical. — tim wood

This is 100% word salad, I think you are the one who is trolling here. Refer to the dictionary for the meaning of 'culture'.

How is that not flipped vertically? — Agree-to-Disagree

To flip something vertically means to draw a horizontal line in the center, and take everything in coordinate +1 and put it in -1, +2 to -2, and so on, now take -1 and put it in +1, -2 to +2, and so on. The feet being above the head had to so with the distance of the image, and it happens regardless of where you put the mirror.

There is no flipping vertically for flat mirrors, only for concave mirrors.

I think that the problem here is that in modern times, under the christian umbrella, people tend to see so many parts of sexuality as degenerate. The ancient civilizations had a much broader, more relaxed view on such things as shown in much of the writing and art of those times. — Sir2u

That is correct. A degenerate is one who does not live up to certain moral standards in their society. Romans and Greek generally had strong notions of honour, so it is not correct to say they did not care about abiding to their moral standards. A strong notion of honour is not something that I see in many countries that like to claim Rome and Greece — because they clearly don't care about their own moral standards.

Speaking of historical difamation, the "vomitorium". Ah, so wonderful, when people fabricated this fantasy that Romans had the custom of eating, then puking again to be able to eat more in feasts. This confusion stems from a kind of historical narcisism, where we take the word "vomitorium", which is indeed connected with "vomit", and transpose modern meanings to it. It turns out, the "vomitorium" that Roman writers spoke of had nothing to do with eating, it was just a kind of hallway in theaters:

Romans would have understood the moral messages contained in these anecdotes. A proper Roman man was supposed to be devoted to the gods, his family, and to the state – not to his belly. Excessive consumption of food was a sign of inner moral laxity. — https://theconversation.com/mythbusting-ancient-rome-the-truth-about-the-vomitorium-71068

And here again the spoor of the troll: when asked a question, or to clarify a point, they evade, avoid, attack. — tim wood

Yes, I am trolling, not the people who have no clue about history and anthropology who still feel comfortable to hurl nonsense at other people's cultures.

I don't know how to make brownies. I read a cookbook and learn how to make brownies. Now I know how to make brownies. Get the drift? — tim wood

I do. Culture isn't a recipe.

It is now — tim wood

So much sophistry. Go say that a Hungarian person, they will laugh at you. I don't even think you believe in what you are saying. "Harry Potter is part of Hungarian culture" is so absurd.

You would seem to understand "culture" as a kind of fixed artifact — tim wood

No, I don't, because that is a nonsensical view.

What I mean, most briefly, is that which is not me, that informs and instructs me as to what I may do/think, can do/think, should do/think, while leaving me room to do/think none of it — tim wood

That is wrong. The weather informs you as to what you may do (bring an umbrella), the weather is not part of one's culture (no it is not, drop the sophistry). The meaning of culture is clear, and it may be verified in a dictionary.

What do you mean by "culture"? — tim wood

Let's see if you can steelman me: what do you think I mean by "culture"?

I made it up. As for the letter η, if you have an English equivalent I should be glad to use it. — tim wood

If you don't know that, you don't know the very basics of Greek. Once again: people who have no clue about history and anthropology who still feel comfortable to hurl nonsense at other people's cultures.
If I tell you how to handle the letter, you will not use this newfound knowledge to properly deal with the language, you will use it to improve your sophistry.

This idea that Genesis came from African tribes does not have any foundation on facts and the only source on Efe's genesis are blogspot websites, the similarities are most likely due to contact with Christians.

It is obvious that critics who continue to bring up this issue of possible influence — https://stellarhousepublishing.com/garden-of-eden-originally-a-pygmy-myth/

These claims obviously stem from the so common "noble savage" veneration that is typical of the Anglosphere. They may make up their mythology — in spite of archaiological and anthropological facts, — that they are African, alright, but Christianity is not because there is no reason to believe so.

Don't mind us my people we just wrote the Bible. — BitconnectCarlos

My quote is aimed at whoever is trying to claim things that don't belong to them, the "you" is general, not targeted at you.

Hellenism influenced my people. — BitconnectCarlos

Jews may claim Greeks were a factor in their culture, that privilege doesn't apply to folks from other nations. Yet, a factor in a culture isn't the same as part of one's culture. Greece was an inextricable part of Latin/Roman culture, from its inception to the fall of the West, yet Latins saying "Aristotle and Zeus and Perikles are my culture" would be awfully weird, Augustine, Jupiter, and Scipio are their culture instead — Aristotle and Zeus informed their culture eventually.

Well then I think you missed the point, try again. — Sir2u

A: Inception of Efe culture, many thousands of years ago.
B: The inception of Hebrew myths.
C: The time the Hebrew myths were written down.
D: The time of contact between carriers of the Hebrew myth and Efe culture.

When B and C happened exactly is not relevant for as long as we know they are spread out between A and D.

So the Pygmies reinvented there whole oral history from thousands of years ago just because they heard something knew, very doubtful. — Sir2u

Romans reinvented lots of their oral history because of contact with Greeks. Many Greek gods were of foreign origins (eg Apollos). Hebrew itself likely borrows many elements from Akkadian and Sumerian culture.
It is not doubtful.
Now think about it, technologically advanded, tall, weird-skinned people who might as well be aliens tell you something about the creation of the world and they want you to adopt those beliefs.
The article I linked previously already says that many experts think the story was taken from Abrahamics. If experts think so, it can't be "very doubtful", in fact it is very likely given the great coincidences. Furthermore, even if you are right about Efe, your argument doesn't prove your case:

Even if such a fact could be established in comparative religion, they are still a distinct group from Eurasians, and the fact that the myths around the world have little in common with each other would not allow us to say with confidence that the connection between Hebrew and those African tribes is in fact from a common source instead of something that died out in the Eurasian branch and then developed independently again among the Canaanites. — Lionino

And they had contact with the Egyptians long before that. — Sir2u

This statement really doesn't go along with your claim that they have unmixed DNA (most likely not true)... Besides, where did you get this information that they had contact with Egyptians?

Again the question, "When did the Genesis version of creation get written down?"

Could it be that the story was already know in Egypt even before someone wrote it down? — Sir2u

Are you suggestion that Egyptians knew the Hebrew myths because they contacted pygmies? :rofl:

Oh dear, so now we are discussing modern times, I am getting confused by your time jumping — Sir2u

5 thousand years ago is modern times? I think you should give it a rest.