If so then I'd have to find some way to deny both mostly because I don't think the implication itself holds. Since existence does not relate to identity, and implication is a relationship between propositions, I'm thinking that what's false is the implication itsel — Moliere

For an implication to be false, the antecedent has to be true and the consequent has to be false. Take a look at the truth table for conditional statements:



A conditional statement of the form "if p, then q" is equivalent to a disjunctive statement of the form "not p, or q". Here's the proof. With that in mind, premise FTI1 is equivalent to the following:

(FTI1*) Either God does not exist, or God is identical to Jesus.

And premise ATI1 is equivalent to the following:

(ATI1*) Either God exists, or God is not identical to Jesus.

Conditional statements ("implications") are not causal statements. They do not state that there's a cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Perhaps that's the source of your perplexity here. It's a common mistake.

At the very least I'm not tempted to say that Jesus is not God because God does not exist. I can set up the implicature, but it's not why I think these things -- and I don't believe either FTI1 or ATI1.

So how does one represent that? Is it impossible? — Moliere

Maybe. Can you elaborate a bit more on that point? Doesn't matter if what you say isn't accurate. Just freestyle it and see what happens.

I do get the feeling that you want to treat this case in a similar way to how Russell treats the case of the current king of France. Is that so? Or am I way off here?

I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ,
the Only Begotten Son of God,
born of the Father before all ages.

This part doesn't say that Jesus is identical to God, it only says that he's God's son.

God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,

This part does say that, if we read it literally. If we read it metaphorically, things are different. For example, when a father says that his son is "flesh of my flesh, blood of my blood", he's not saying that literally, since his son didn't emerge from the flesh and blood of his father, but from one of his spermatozoa.

begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father;
through him all things were made.
For us men and for our salvation
he came down from heaven,
and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary,
and became man.

What does "consubstantial" mean here? Are the Son and the Father different substances? But if so, they can't be identical, because if they were identical, they would be the same substance.

For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate,
he suffered death and was buried,
and rose again on the third day
in accordance with the Scriptures.
He ascended into heaven
and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
He will come again in glory
to judge the living and the dead
and his kingdom will have no end.

This part could be saying that Jesus was simply a good person, the best there ever was. A "god among men", if you will, in a metaphorical sense.

Afaik, philosophy of religion examines concepts of religion (re: worship) in contrast to theology which speculates on the nature of god (re: transcendence); where these inquiries possibly converge or overlap is on implications for human existence (e.g. values). — 180 Proof

Could be. Yet the SEP entry on Philosophy of Religion begins with the following words:

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the themes and concepts involved in religious traditions as well as the broader philosophical task of reflecting on matters of religious significance including the nature of religion itself, alternative concepts of God or ultimate reality, and the religious significance of general features of the cosmos (e.g., the laws of nature, the emergence of consciousness) and of historical events (e.g., the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake, the Holocaust). Philosophy of religion also includes the investigation and assessment of worldviews (such as secular naturalism) that are alternatives to religious worldviews. Philosophy of religion involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, value theory (including moral theory and applied ethics), philosophy of language, science, history, politics, art, and so on. Section 1 offers an overview of the field and its significance, with subsequent sections covering developments in the field since the mid-twentieth century. These sections address philosophy of religion as practiced primarily (but not exclusively) in departments of philosophy and religious studies that are in the broadly analytic tradition. The entry gives significant attention to theism, but it concludes with highlighting the increasing breadth of the field, as more traditions outside the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have become the focus of important philosophical work. — SEP home page Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Something about that doesn't seem right to me -- couldn't we reject both arguments on the basis that

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich


Could both be false? — Moliere

Nope. These statements can only be false if their antecedent is true while their consequent is false. In this case, the antecedent in FTI1 is "God exists", and the antecedent in ATI1 is "God does not exist". By the principle of Non-Contradiction and the principle of Excluded Middle, they can't both be false.

What God is identical to isn't the same thing as whether or not God exists, even treating it as a first-order predicate. So we could deny the implication as true in either case, saying that the existential predicate has no relation to the identity relationship. (or, perhaps, that the existential predicate is actually quantification, and the identity of something is different from quantification) — Moliere

Perhaps.

I'd be more inclined to say that "In the Christian Religion God is identical to Jesus", or something along those lines, so as to avoid mixing up description or identity with existence. — Moliere

Then you might be interested in accepting the non-Christian argument and denying the Christian one, specifically premise FTI2.

Hmm, well I think P1 would be the potential issue. Is "Jesus" referring to the Son/Logos or the Incarnation? It does not seem that the Incarnation should be necessary. Likewise, God's essence would not be defined by God's immanent acts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

All of that is for you to decide. It seems like it would be in your best interest to accept the Christian argument, and to reject the non-Christian one. Specifically, it seems that it would be in your best interest to deny premise ATI2.

Fun fact: springtails are six-legged arthropods that are not insects. They're an example of how morphological classifications are not quite reliable. In other words, not every arthropod that has six legs is an insect.

Yet morphology can be a useful way to classify species. Biological species are very complex, so we should not be surprised if there are many useful, correct ways to classify them. But what they are, their existence, does not seem like it should depend on our classifications. Otherwise, they would undergo a fundamental change whenever we reclassified them (although note that, if all predication is per accidens, then what something is does change when we speak of it differently; mapping the coastline changes what it is, reclassifying animals might cause fish to vanish from history, etc.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. Morphological classifications tend to be more useful in botany, for example, or in microbiology. They're not that useful in zoology nowadays. But I agree that insects, fish and whales existed prior to the emergence of human beings. In that sense, it doesn't matter if we call a whale a fish. Its existence, and what it is, are independent of our conceptual schemes, language, thoughts, etc. Sometimes we get it right, sometimes we get it wrong.

Except for 's reply, I'm a bit disappointed with the overall quality (or lack of thereof) that his Thread has received thus far in the other replies. My presentation of the Christian argument and the non-Christian argument, together with the possible options for rejecting them, are consistent with Korman's presentation of anti-conservative arguments in the metaphysics of ordinary objects. I understand that not everyone in this forum is a professional philosopher, but still.

Ad hominem (Latin for 'to the person'), short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments that are usually fallacious. Often currently this term refers to a rhetorical strategy where the speaker attacks the character, motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than the substance of the argument itself. This avoids genuine debate by creating a diversion often using a totally irrelevant, but often highly charged attribute of the opponent's character or background. The most common form of this fallacy is "A" makes a claim of "fact", to which "B" asserts that "A" has a personal trait, quality or physical attribute that is repugnant thereby going off-topic, and hence "B" concludes that "A" has their "fact" wrong – without ever addressing the point of the debate. — Wikipedia

I'm not inclined to debate the issue. — frank

Then I can simply deny your statements.

This is such baloney. You just like to rouse the rabble. Bad philosophy. Nuff said. — T Clark

That's an ad hominem fallacy. And it's also trolling.

No, it isn't. It's a theological issue. — frank

Issues in Philosophy of Religion and issues in theology are not mutually exclusive, at least not necessarily. Can you prove that they are?

"Standing" is a legal term that I've shanghaied for use here - "Standing, or locus standi , is the capacity of a party to bring a lawsuit in court. To have standing, a party must demonstrate a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action being challenged." Basically, it means you've got no horse in this race. — T Clark

But I do indeed have a horse in this race, since I accept the non-Christian argument and I deny the Christian one.

Your opinion is irrelevant. — T Clark

No, it isn't. My opinion as an atheist is relevant to discussions in Philosophy of Religion.

I didn't say you are a bigot, I said your post is bigoted. When I was a Boy Scout I learned the Scout Law - A scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. The explanation for "reverent" is "A scout is faithful in his religious duties and respects the convictions of others in matters of custom and religion." As an atheist, you have no religious duties that I know of, but that doesn't change the requirement that you respect others convictions. — T Clark

You're assuming that my post isn't respectful of other's convictions. And I disagree with that assumption. My post is indeed respectful towards other's convictions. What is it about my post that strikes you as disrespectful? The fact that I'm atheist?

This is a virtue that is rarely practiced here on the forum - just one example of the rampant religious bigotry here. — T Clark

I fail to see how my post is an example of religious bigotry. Could you elaborate on that point?

No, it isn't. — frank

Yes, it is.

It's a theological issue related to fact that some early Christians were Neoplatonists. — frank

It's Philosophy of Religion.

Who is a Christian who makes such an argument? The Trinity is usually said to be a revealed truth, and I don't think I've ever seen anyone claim that Jesus being God is anything but a revealed truth (i.e. not something demonstrable from reason of from general evidence). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Doesn't matter, the arguments have been stated in the OP, by yours truly, if no one else. As such, they can be accepted or rejected, on whichever grounds you choose.

So, the argument would instead be something like:
P1: The Bible and traditions of the Church and its saints are revealed truth.
P2: The Bible and the traditions say Jesus is God.
C: Therefore, Jesus is God.

Straightforward enough. P2 is clearly true, so people who disagree will almost always disagree with P1. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd deny P1, sure. But the denial of P2 is a live option. Perhaps the Bible and the traditions don't say that Jesus is God, at least not literally. Perhaps only metaphorically. But this would be to my point on literalism: things can't be metaphors all the way down.

There were Christian sects that didn't believe that Jesus was God, the Arians, for instance. — frank

In that case, their position is consistent with the denial of premise FTI1 in the case of the Christian argument.

There are Christians today who don't think Jesus is divine, like the Jehovah's Witnesses. — frank

Those groups would also deny premise FTI1.

So it's a sectarian issue, not a philosophical one. — frank

It's Philosophy of Religion.

Doesn't matter, your reply is consistent with the denial of premise FTI2, which is the same premise that I deny as well.

Insofar as "God" and "Jesus" are fictions, yes or no depending on each author (make-believer). — 180 Proof

So, I take it that you accept the non-Christian argument, and you reject the Christian argument. And it seems that you deny the second premise, FTI2.

Can Santa Claus beat up Batman?
— T Clark

Nope, I think it's the other way around.
Batman can quite clearly whoop Santa Claus' ass. — Arcane Sandwich

:strong: :lol: — 180 Proof

I mean, it's not hard to visualize. Batman is a billionaire vigilante that knows martial arts and has a lot of technology. Santa Claus is old and out of shape. Plus, his use of reindeer as animal traction is, in my view, unethical. So yeah, I'd bet on Batman, if those two had a fight.

As a non-Christian, you have no standing to address this issue. — T Clark

What do you mean by "standing"? And why wouldn't I be able to talk about it?

The fact that you have is a sign of the religious bigotry endemic here on the forum. — T Clark

What is it about me or my post that makes me a religious bigot, in your view?

Let’s look at a question where your opinion might matter more — T Clark

Why doesn't my opinion matter, in your view?

Can Santa Claus beat up Batman? — T Clark

Nope, I think it's the other way around. Batman can quite clearly whoop Santa Claus' ass.

Sticking to the example, which isn't a great one, insects have six legs. Now will we count that as a bit of ontology, in that having six legs is a special feature of insects, or will we count it as a bit of language use, as in it's not correct to say of something without six legs, that it is an insect? — Banno

Well, that's morphology that you're talking about there, as in, the phenotype. It's not the most reliable way of classifying living beings. It used to be, in the past, before genetics and molecular biology.

The name? Just nonsense. — Apustimelogist

I'm curious about it, since it sounds like a real word. That's why I looked it up, it sounds like a real word that I've never read or heard. Is it a combination of other words? Or is it something that just occurred to you?

Ok.

First of all, with the Sámi, we are talking about really a small group of people. — ssu

It seems to me that their small population is due to the fact that their ancestors were forcefully assimilated into the nation-states of Scandinavia, but I could be wrong.

Sámi became reindeer herders only in the Middle Ages. — ssu

You say that as if it happened last Monday or something.

But yes, the Sámi activists have to adapt to the dominant narrative of the indigenous/native people being the victims of the "white colonizers", because that's the only narrative which people use about these issues. Hence you end up with totally white Europeans calling other white Europeans "whities" and having to claim they aren't so white. Bit awkward when you have pale skin, blue eyes and blond hair. — ssu

It doesn't seem that the issue here is about having white skin, blond hair and blue eyes. From what I can understand about this issue (which is admittedly not much), it's a cultural issue. The Sámi have a culture that has been deemed primitive or inferior in some sense, in relation to the modern nation states of Norway, Sweden, Finland, etc., which is why those countries carried out policies to assimilate them in a cultural sense. That seems like fascism to me. Bundle of sticks with an axe and all of that.

Your essentialism is showing. — Banno

Anti-essentialism can only get one up to a certain point. "Essence" might be an ugly word for an analytic ear, yet Kripke argued that the essence of a gold atom is the property of having an atomic number of 79, which is the number of protons in the nucleus of a gold atom. Kinda hard to argue with that, even if one isn't an essentialist.

Could be. Metaphysical permissivism is a serious contender. It sounds less crazy when one takes a look at their arguments, but it still sounds insane from the point of view of common sense. And I'm not one to throw out common sense out the window just because it's not infallible.

What does your forum name mean, by the way? I googled "Apustimelogy" but there were no search results for that term.

a sheep broken in half is a corpse. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is it still a sheep, though? Are there such things as scattered objects? If there are, then this is the slippery slope towards affirming that there are indeed such things as fouts. Unless the inference from split sheep to fouts can be blocked in some way.

I'm tempted to agree with Korman when he says that some artifacts, at least, can exist as scattered objects. What is a bikini if not a scattered object, composed of two disconnected parts?

It's not that interesting when you figure out the game is "say the weirdest thing you possibly can get away with" — Moliere

Welcome to professional philosophy. The next step is to use first-order logic to give more credibility to whatever nonsense you feel like saying, such as "the existential quantifier has ontological import."

Then I'd say that your intellectual honesty as a philosopher is commendable. Some philosophers seem to say crazy things just to see who can say the craziest thing.

Then I don't think I'm going down that path — Moliere

I mean, you could, if you wanted to. It's not like philosophers haven't been saying crazy things for the past two or three millennia. What is Parmenides saying, when he says that nothing changes, if not something outrageous and crazy? What is Heraclitus saying, when he says that no one can step twice in the same river, if not something outrageous and crazy?

What about "not-ordinary, and conservative"? — Moliere

If you're asking if there could be a fourth position, "only extraordinary objects, none of the ordinary ones", then I would say two things:

1) Yes, it's logically possible to defend such a view.
2) No one actually defends such a view.

Why not? Because you would be saying that there are fouts, but no dogs or trouts. There are incars, but no cars. There are snowdiscalls, but no snowballs.

It would be the most insane position of all, even crazier than permissivism, and that's saying a lot.

All I can say is I hope it awakens some private initiative instead of metastasizing a reliance on the corrupt and wasteful public initiative. — NOS4A2

"It's complicated", is what I would say here. Argentina has a strange history.

Seems like "Some of them" is the easy way out? — Moliere

It's actually the hardest position to maintain. Eliminativists and permissivists seem to think that their positions are far more consistent, which is why they mostly duke it out between themselves.

"Some" in a logical sense, at least. — Moliere

Yes, from a mereological point of view, conservatives tend to be particularists. Eliminativists are usually nihilists about composition (or exceptionalists, like van Inwagen and Merricks), while permissivists are usually universalists about composition.

"Ordinary" seems sus — Moliere

Then you have two options: eliminativism or permissivism.

There's three options:

Eliminativism: none of them (neither ordinary nor extraordinary). Or at least almost none of them.
Conservatism: some of them (only the ordinary ones). Or at least most of the ordinary ones and almost none of the extraordinary ones.
Permissivism: all of them (both ordinary and extraordinary). Or at least almost all of them.

I guess we’ll have to see about all that. — NOS4A2

Suffice to say that I sincerely hope I'm wrong. I hope Trump's administration benefits the people of the USA. I'm just skeptical about it, and I think that my skepticism here is warranted.

Argentina, was it? What do you think of Milei? I’m watching his rule with great interest. — NOS4A2

I didn't vote for him. That being said, the inflation rate seems to be showing some signs of improvement, as well as other economic indicators. However, his reduction of so-called state bureaucracy has meant less funding for (what I believe are) key areas for the further development of Argentina, such as science and technology. Currently, only a 0.2% of Argentina's gross domestic product (GDP) is invested in S&T. By contrast, in the United States, in 2022 the investment in S&T represented 3.4% of that country's GDP. Investing in science and technology is crucial for the development of any nation. At least that's how I see it.

:100:

All I can say is that 20th century philosophy has been overly preoccupied with our access to objects, in the form of language and thought, instead of being preoccupied with the objects themselves.

I think you’re right that popular sovereignty would eventually be fascism’s downfall, but they literally did create a democratic fascist state in the form of the Italian Social Republic. You can read in their Manifesto of Verona that a leader would be chosen by citizens every 5 years, not to mention the adoption of plenty liberal and socialistic “devices” in order to further the fascist state. So fascism has veered into “left-wing populism”, after all. — NOS4A2

But those devices that you mention actually weaken the fascist state instead of strengthening it. At least that's how I see it. Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro also became the heads of state in Venezuela through democratic means. But once they got there, the democratic means that they used began to show their limits. It's not possible to fully democratize Venezuelan politics and still have an (arguably) socialist regime. It would weaken it. It's the same reason why you can't have full democratic means in today's China: it's simply anathema to the very existence of the CCP. It's the same reason why you can't democratize North Korea: it's anathema to Kim Jong Un's Juche-based regime.

Trump is a right wing populist, as far as I'm concerned. He's not a fascist in the same sense that Mussolini was. Yet there is a real danger (to my mind, at least) with some of the policies that his administration wishes to carry out. Even if I were to grant, for the sake of argument, that his administration "means well", I would say that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

Here's an example of a permissivist argument against metaphysical conservatism:

Let us now imagine we come across a community with a very strange metaphysical view. Members of this community think that tables exist, but chairs don’t. Under dialectical duress, the Tablers are very stubborn: “It just strikes us that way,” they say. “Our perceptual systems make it seem that when particles are arranged tablewise, they compose an object, but when particles are arranged chairwaise, they don’t.” When asked for general metaphysical principles to corroborate their beliefs, they demur: why should you expect our views about what exists to be undergirded by general ontological principles? We don’t go in for that kind of theorizing. You are like anti-particularist ethicists who tell us that we are not able to say that an act is bad unless we have a fully general theory about the principles by which badness is determined. — Fairchild & Hawthorne

Permissivists are realists. Conservatives and eliminativists are also realists. This tripartite discussion is a debate within the realist camp. It has nothing to do with language or thought.

Here's a really good defense of permissivism by Fairchild and Hawthorne, titled Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.

I think that permissivism is far weirder. And it gets even more insane once you realize that their ontology doesn't stop at strange mereological fusions such as fouts. There are objects that have extraordinary modal profiles as well. For example, there are curlterpillars: caterpillar-like objects that begin to exist when a caterpillar rolls up into a ball. There are incars: vehicles that look like ordinary cars, but that can only exist when they're inside a garage. There are snowdiscalls: snowball-like objects that can continue to exist when an ordinary snowball is flattened into a disc, etc.