a truth matters to any given subject matter to the degree that it has bearing upon it. — StreetlightX

Absolutely, I don't think anyone's denying that.

the index of any truth for any particular problem must belong to the problem itself: — StreetlightX

Again, I don't see anyone denying this either.

the radically stupid idea that anything goes, that anything is worth addressing, and that each and every mundanity is worth its weight in gold. — StreetlightX

Once more, I don't hear anyone trying to argue otherwise.


So, the bit you've glaringly missed out, which is where the rather sensationalist comparison to fascism comes in is the bit where you additionally claim that a certain group of people just 'know' which truths matter to which subjects, that they just 'know' what the index of truth is for each problem, that they just 'know' what is worth addressing and what is not. And not just know in the vague sense of someone clutching at some intangible feeling, not know in a collaborative sense where mutual agreement is sought, but know with sufficient certainty to dismiss out of hand, belittle, and occasionally just downright insult anyone who dares to think otherwise.

It sounds like you're asking how any judgment of quality of argument that's not empirically verifiable is possible. And then asking for an empirical verification to show that that's the case! — Baden

I did offer a structural option too. Basically anything other than just hoping it's the case. I'd expect to see either some empirical evidence that the judgement of the philosophical community (or any part of it) is more than just shared opinion, or some structural reason why you'd reasonably expect it to be.

But your criticisms of my argument already presume you're acting on the same presumption I am, and know the answer. The structure is at base, the structure of reason, which undergirds empirical verification in the first place. — Baden

Maybe, but if it's so, then it is at a level that is inaccessible to both of us to nor anyone yet in history. If arguments were judgeable by reason at a level we all had access to, then why would they literally all remain unresolved? If the discussion we're having now, the arguments we're presenting, could be analysed by reason, and one or the other found wanting, then would not all such arguments have submitted to such analysis by now. It is clearly either not something subjectable to reason or something the subjection of which to reason is far too complex for the human mind to do.

Well, I disagree. I think most people come to a philosophy forum primarily to do philosophy. — Baden

Well then you're far less cynical than I am.

And empirically based results, for example, a poll alone, won't definitively decide the answer. Theory, reason, and critique of thought would come into play. — Baden

How convenient. Another belief inpenetrable by empirical evidence.

you don't appear to want to explicitly accept regular terms of rational engagement which require us to critically analyze each other's posts in order for the conversation to be of any intellectual value. — Baden

I didn't say that. Claiming that chess serves no universal purpose is not equivalent to saying one does not wish to play chess.

The problem is simply that Psuedonuym has an incredibly blinkered view of not just philosophy, but - as it turns out - of basic argument in general, which he thinks can and should only be judged on the basis of truth - the 'empirically verifiable'. — StreetlightX

Not at all. I think the judgement of argument can be made on its effect. If I wish to argue that eating pigs is wrong, the success of my argument is clearly how many people stop eating pigs. Judging philosophy itself, however, (by which I presume you mean judging philosophical propositions, not the subject as a whole) has not similar consequential measure. I suppose if the purpose were to popularise one's idea, then it's popularity might be s measure of its quality, but you'd have to specify a timescale. What it seems most people within these fields want to do is measure it by some intuitive sense of 'rightness' held by those who've been taught to 'see' it. I have no problem with measuring things by their similarity to an intuitive sense either. This is how folk art is measured, and to a great extent ethics, even logic and maths, as Ramsey later argued. What I dislike is the second half of that proposition. That the judgement is only carried out by those who've been taught how to 'see' it. This creates nothing but a self-immunised system of judgment. Of course it will create the appearance of consistentcy because the membership criteria in the first place require that you agree with the very criteria by which you were admitted.

At this point I doubt it can be helped. He literally doesn't know what he's talking about. — StreetlightX

Guess I'm not in the group then?

That's a strawman. We all know there's a difference between science and the arts in terms of empirical verification etc. — Baden

The relevance of that division is not the empirical vetification (that is simply the definition of the division) it is who is doing the verification. The significance is that an aspiring engineering student, or a user of engineering can both see for themselves that their theories (or those they make use of) are better than those which are discarded. Only the engineer might understand why the bridge stays up, but anyone can see that it stays up and that it is intended to do so.

So what differentiates philosophy (of this sort, T-philosophy, as Horwich calls it) and fine art, is not that only the experts are able to judge why the theory works, but only they are considered able to judge that it works.

To reiterate (perhaps labour) the point. No one sane is going to accept a bridge which does not transport something across a gap without collapsing, they do not need to be told they are wrong to accept such a product, it is self evident. If someone wishes, however, to talk about the idea that we might be brains in a vat (the topic which, let's face it, prompted this latest version), they must be told that their ideas are 'transcendentaly stupid' it is not self evident because they simply don't work, so if they're not poor because they don't work, then why are they poor? All that seems to be left is that they do not fit an arbitrary set of judgements. I don't see the fact that this set of judgements had been long-ruminated on being a saviour of its authenticity.

Basically, I get that you're trying to describe a distinction between arbitrary personal judgement and critical identification of poor thinking which is not yet as objective as empirical vetification. What I don't get is what makes you think that. What structural or empirical basis are you using to determine that such a process is possible, because it sounds like just wishful thinking.

I don't see the attraction of a philosophy forum for you then. The interest for most people here is, I would suppose, in making exactly the kinds of judgments you seem to deem impossible. — Baden

One of my academic interests is in how people hold and defend belief, particularly in relation to group dynamics. I think my interest here should be obvious from that without me having to spell it out? As to the interest of most people here, I would say the empirical evidence on group behaviour very much opposes your view. Most people are here to reinforce beliefs which confer membership of the social group to which they wish to belong.

There's a fundamental difference between the "origin of fossils and the causes of climate change" and something like philosophical propositions. The theories about climate change or fossil origin are based on empirically verifiable evidence, they both ultimately rely on something which we widely agree on the measurement of and (if they're good theories) they will make predictions which we widely agree on the measurement of. The 'rightness' of a theory about bridge-building is attested to by the ability of a bridge built according to that theory, to hold traffic. No one watches it fall down and claims it a success, no one believes that bridges are 'supposed' to fall down, that being the aim all along. To be honest, teaching English as a language falls more into this camp, the ability to correctly use terms being somewhat widely agreed on. But no similar wide agreement exists for arts and philosophy. There are those for whom Shakespeare does nothing, there are those (Schopenhauer comes to mind) for whom Hegel wrote nothing but mystical nonsense). Any idea that someone can recognise quality thought in these fields by some universal metric is clearly nonsense.

I've no doubt at all that there is a body of work supporting the theory behind judging ESL success. Not having read any of it, I wouldn't presume to comment on it so will confine my comment to a theoretical example.

Who is it that will have developed and refined it, and by what measure will they have identified a need for refinement? What would it 'not working' look like such that it could be recognised as being in need of refinement? If any of these things involved some external empirical fact, then it falls into the camp of fossils and climate change, if all of these considerations are measures 'in house' by a group whose membership criteria consist solely of being judged by the very metrics they're supposedly refining, then the whole system is self-immunised almost by definition.

Why post then if your position is it's impossible to judge the difference between a good and a bad argument on its own terms? — Baden

Why I post is a long answer most would be entirely uninterested in, suffice to say it is not with the intention of persuading others by virtue of the universal quality of my argument. I'd have thought five minutes spent reading the threads here would be enough to convince anyone of the futility of such an enterprise.

But your argument is the one that's self-immunizing by continuously conflating any form of judgment with personal preference. — Baden

I'm not seeing how that makes it self-immunised, perhaps you could expand on this.

judgements occur in a context in which they are intregrated into a system that is standardized and monitored and based on educational theory not to mention the individual's experience in the field, so it's not simply a case of what seems right. — Baden

None of this prevents it from being simply a case of what 'seems right'. If you create a group of people, the selection criteria for which is agreement on a particular intuition, then ask them to collaborate on a standardised theory, you will end up with a theory which expresses exactly the intuitions the holding of which was a selection criteria for the group in the first place.

Get a group of people together who all like red and ask them to come up with a method of judging colour, they will collectively come up with a system which puts red at the top.

At this point I don't even know what your positive criticism is. That there should be no level of intuitive judgment at all with regard to so-called "transcendental stupidity"? In which case, for example, university essays could be marked by computers (and I can explain to you how that would be impossibly inaccurate and unfair if you like.). Or you just don't like the name? Or you don't think it exists at all? Or something like it exists, but not in the form described by Street, or what? — Baden

Yes, basically I do not see a method for discerning that which is not 'transcendentaly stupid' in fields such as art and metaphysics which does not simply reinforce the subjective views of a particular group.

No, I already gave reasons why it fit with my experience of pedagogy. — Baden

Exactly. It fit with your experience. Do you really believe that what you were identifying in those essays was something universal as opposed to your own personal preference. Your "evidence of a structure to thought" was simply evidence of a structure you recognised. Your "evidence of... organized implementation" was simply an organisation that you understood. Now obviously as an intelligent adult teaching children, that which you recognise as structure and organisation is quite likely to represent a greater level of consideration than your students, but this cannot simply be presumed to be true for anyone who's had the time to organise their thought, especially about subjects like philosophy and arts.

The word "democratic" doesn't apply exclusively to elections. I'm using it here in its senses of 'common/shared/available to all' etc. — Baden

But it's not 'common/shared/available to all' is it? That's the point. The point is Deleuze's insight isn't 'transcendental stupidity' itself. We're all supposed to sit up and take notice of his ideas, he's risen above the plebs with their uninteresting thoughts. Those of us who are teachers no longer are blind to the lack of insight suffered by the hoi palloi, we can 'see' what is organised and what is not. Its not the realisation that thought is messy if untrained that's undemocratic, it's the implication that a self-immunised selection process can identify the rare few who sit above such lowly vices.

Anyone who can think. — Baden

Back to the self-immunised selection. Who are those who can think? The ones who give the answers you think are right, of course.

integrated with our intuitive judgements (based on experience) — Baden

The idea that we judge simply on the basis of what 'seems' right or feel we are promoting some universal truth as opposed to everyone else's ideology is bizarre. — Baden

So what do you think your 'intuitive judgement' is other than what 'seems' right? How would you distinguish those two concepts, because they certainly sound similar enough to me not to be labelled 'bizarre'?

To claim that they can't would be analogous to claiming that we can't make sound and reasonable judgements concerning each other's posts here on this forum, and can just retort to every criticism with "well, that just seems right to you". — Baden

Yeah, basically that is what I believe to be the case absent of some specified utility to which the thought is put the achievement of which is empirically verifiable.

it's about as democratic a take on stupidity as you might find: a communi stultitia. — StreetlightX

Really? Are those thoughts determined to be 'transcendentaly stupid' being decided by vote now? I think I must have missed the opinion poll you circulate before declaring ideas to be fundamentally wrong.

I thought I had quoted the OP (or at least the Deleuze quote within it). It's pretty unambiguously saying that teachers find remarks which are uninteresting and that the lack of interest to the teacher has some significance beyond that teacher's personal preference. This fairly clearly raises the teacher's personal interests and their own systemisation to a level of universality without any evidence presented as to why this should be the case.

The fact that you find the idea "intuitively obvious" pretty much says it all. It 'seems' right to you, so it is right and anyone who sees things another way clearly must be wrong.

"a stupidity built into the nature of thought" could hardly be more democratic. — Baden

How do you see this as democratic. Who's doing the judging about which expositions express this base stupidity. Is it being done by vote?

if someone were to use this idea as a cudgel for an ideology, they'd simply be being hypocrites in an amusing way. — Baden

Give me an example of someone not using the idea as a cudgel for an ideology. Again, it's just seeing what 'seems' right to you as being obviously right in a universal sense. What you, and those who share your views, espouse is simply 'the truth' and everyone else is promoting an 'ideology'. Postmodernism is an ideology, relativism is an ideology, the belief in an academic system is an ideology, the belief that one can even 'teach' English is an ideology. None any more so than any other construct we create to define the world.

"... remarks without interest or importance", what a load of supercilious bullshit. — Pseudonym


Why? — Baden

It takes no account of the function of such thought to the individual. At best it's an honest mistaking of the personal certainty one's brain delivers about one's own structure of thought for some universally applicable structure, but at worst it's just another thinly veiled attempt to create a method of vituperating the thoughts of others in a way which itself remains immunised against criticism purely to maintain a social position.

Last week it was everything is just maps, none more true than the other, only judged by their own internally specified purpose. How judged? Well, anyone well-read enough simply 'knows' which ones are good and which aren't. Before that it was everything is just frames to view things through, none more true than any other only judged by how useful they are. How do we know how useful they are? Surprisingly again, it's just some mystical knowledge imparted to those allowed into the illuminati. Now, the new replacement for 'true' is interesting and organised. How do we judge what's interesting and organised? Oh, quelle surprise it's just something some of us 'know'.

These are all just methods of maintaining the social status of a group of people by creating an artificial membership criteria. We can allow in whomever we want and exclude whomever we want because the criteria themselves cannot be challenged. It runs through the arts, and most of philosophy. The positivist turn made a good attempt to weed it out, but look at the at passion with which that was put down. No philosophical movement has been so roundly condemned as the one which threatened to make it possible to to externally validate arguments. Support the Nazi party and you'll be forgiven, suggest that there might be an objective method for validating philosophy and you're excommunicated.

"... remarks without interest or importance", what a load of supercilious bullshit.

Jesus bloody Christ (to borrow a turn of phrase)

Any mention of the words 'brain in a vat' does not automatically and irrecoverably refer to to Putnam's Brain In A Vat Thought Experiment™.

presenting it as a theory doesn't magically turn it a theory. — Akanthinos

No, but it does turn it into a theory in a completely normal way, according to a perfectly understandable common usage of the term.

f Pattern-chaser can say with any semblance of rectitude that Putnam's brain-in-a-vat "theory" does not provide us any evidence to support either its conclusion or its contradiction, it is exactly because it did not even attempt at becoming an hypothesis. — Akanthinos

Pattern-chaser (to the best of my reading, apologies in advance if I've missed it) did not mention the name Putnam in his entire post. The only mention of the name I can find is actually your first post, so why would you think he's talking about Putnam's thought experiment? Why not Harman's original concept, or one of the many science fiction references before that? As I said, Putnam does not own the concept, not every reference to it is a reference to that which he had to say about it.

Putnam's BIV was never about what Pattern-chaser's want it to be. Not even close. — Akanthinos

Why are we still going on about Putnam's version when (as far as I can tell) no-one but you has even mentioned it?

...you are doing a serious disservice to philosophy by spreading this misrepresentation. — Akanthinos

This is the most interesting bit of your whole post. What service do you think I owe 'Philosophy' exactly? Let's, for that sake of this far more interesting point, presume Pattern-chaser had directly referenced Putnam's Brain in a Vat Thought Experiment by name, and called it a theory (in the scientific sense you're imagining), treated it as something designed to explain some phenomenon in a manner which could be falsified. In other words, let's presume he got it completely wrong, then I (or anyone else) come along and say "Yeah, he's right you know, it is a theory". What is it you imagine Philosophy is such that it would be harmed by that? Even if I managed to spread this 'misinformation' far and wide such that half the world believed it, I'm baffled as to what consequence you think that would actually have such that this level of indignation is required to stamp it out early lest it do...what exactly?

Jesus bloody Christ.

The brain in a vat scenario doesn't describe a theory — Akanthinos

Harman's Brain in a Vat scenario may well have been a thought experiment, but he doesn't own the concept, neither does Putnam. The idea that we might actually be brains in vats is a theory. It may not have been what Harman or Putnam were talking about, but it clearly is what @Pattern-chaser is talking about, so I think it might be reasonable to dial down the indignation a bit.

What makes an apple remain 'an apple' as if 'apple' is something anywhere other than in ones own personal representations? — Blue Lux

Community agreement between the players of that particular language game. If meanings we're all based only on personal representation we wouldn't have clue what each other were saying. An apple is called an 'apple' because a significant enough majority of language users agree that the fruit of the Malus genus (or something we empirically believe to be such) is referenced by that word. If you had your own personal definition for 'apple' you simply wouldn't be able to use the word in conversation with another in any practical sense.

You're confusing fuzziness around the edges of a definition for total relativism. If I was handed something which looked very much like an apple but had one flaw (say, it was blue) I would have to make a personal decision about whether to call it an 'apple' or not, but in order to converse with my language community about it, we'd have to come to some agreement about whether to refer to this new thing as an 'apple' or not. That agreement could be based on its shape, its origin, its taste even, but it can't be based on the way the object makes me feel, or how I personally identify with it, because those things are not available to other language users. We can't all agree on the a definition by those metrics and so can't converse communally about it. And if we can't do that, what's the point?

Yes, and a male-oriented brain running a female body might explain gender dysphoria as something other than a delusion. — Pattern-chaser

Yes, that would be the theory, but the science is a long way off. The point is that this still would not support the non-exclusivity that trans people are trying to include in their claims. This would make womanhood a matter of either having a woman's body, or a woman's brain (or both). Anyone with neither would not be a women no matter what they say about it.

'm interested then, given the proposal I formulated for speaker-oriented and addressee-oriented addressing, why you think one is better than the other. — angslan

Adressee oriented speaking requires that the meaning of a term used by one person is contained in the mind of another. This goes right back to the beginning. The way we use words describes, perhaps even constructs, our entire world-view, so I consider it vitally important that speech is allowed to reflect that (when that world-view is a morally acceptable one).

But I think the problem goes further with this specific form of adressee oriented speech. If we were talking about two definitions of 'woman' and asking whose definition should be used during a speech act, I would be very sympathetic to the idea of using the addressee's definition. But that's not what's being proposed. Here we're talking about exchanging the speaker's definition (based on commonly accessible information) for a definition which is inaccessible to the speaker. It's that which I find most offensive. Language is a communal excersice, it troubles me deeply that some people are trying to make it a private one. That I could be using a term incorrectly until you personally tell me how to correctly apply it is not respecting the mutuality of language.

I'm not sure I said that. — angslan

I mean that the only person who can correctly apply identity labels is the person to whom they refer. That's your entire premise isn't it?

Your argument requires a premise that only admit exclusivity - and ignores non-binary and spectrum concepts of gender. — angslan

No, the premise of my argument is the trans claim that it would be disrespectful to refer to them by a term other than their preferred term. The other steps are inferences or deductions from that premise.

I am convinced, at this point, that your philosophy on this issue is a rationalisation for how you already feel. — angslan

Everyone's philosophy is a rationalisation for how we already feel. Anyone thinking otherwise is deluding themselves. The trick isn't to try and derive reality empirically from what you see, it's just to make sure that any theories which are wildly untenable are discarded and your favourites of any which remain are as sound as you can make them.

What an intractable issue! If only there were some field like intersectional feminism that didn't treat all women as identical, and then this type of categorisation wouldn't be a problem. We can only hope, I guess. — angslan

Why would this type of categorisation no longer be a problem if we were careful not to treat all women as identical. Take, for example, a women's group who agrees that women can be very different from one another, different clothes, different experiences, different personality etc. Explain how that answers their question about whether to include people in their group on the basis of physiological or psychological features. Explain how that helps any decision they make avoid causing emotional harm to those who wanted it to go the other way. I'm not seeing how your comment is related at all. Unless a "woman's group" is going to exclude someone from membership, then it is just "a group". The people it includes can be hugely diverse, but they must have some things in common which are absent from those who are excluded. Someone's got to decide what those things are.

I critique the foundational point. — angslan

As far as I understand it, you said that there needn't be a single thing that all members have, but it could be a family resemblance type set of things. I said that didn't affect the argument because that set still needs defining and must exclude others in order to be a category. I haven't read anything from you countering that. The rest of the argument you had no direct counter to, so I'm left with no idea as to what grounds you dispute the argument on other than you don't like its conclusions.

Because it is relevant to the discussion of whether gender categories are exclusive. — angslan

But I'm not discussing whether gender categories are exclusive, I'm discussing the implications of the claim that it would be disrespectful to call a trans woman a man. I think one of the implications of that claim is that there are criteria for being a man which the trans woman does not fit. The claim by intersexuals would be a different claim. I'm not trying to make a statement about the way things actually are, I'm exploring the logical implications of the trans claims. It's an "if... then" type of argument if that's easier to understand.

if people disagree on definitions, address-oriented addressing means that both will compromise when addressing the other. — angslan

It's not just about addressing. The terms 'woman' and 'him/her' are not used solely for addressing people. They are terms within a community of language speakers used for all sorts of purposes. For whom are the 'women' s' toilets set aside, those who are physiologically women, or those who think they're women? At whom is a positive discrimination programme requiring 50% women applicants aimed at, those who are physiologically women, or those who think they're women? Which group of people is women's studies investigating, for whom do women's rights campaign, who may join a women's support group, who is included in "women and children first", who is being referenced by the expression "women were traditionally oppressed", who are biblical and other religious texts referring to when they mention 'women', at whom should the WHO aim it's excellent women's health initiative?

That doesn't mean that they are exclusive. I literally just wrote on this. — angslan

Yes, I'm disputing what you wrote. Both you and Willow seem to have this bizarre concept that if you state something is the case that's the end of the debate on the matter, if I still disagree I must have not read you clearly enough.

I disagree with your argument that it doesn't mean they are exclusive, for the reasons given.

I disagree with your argument that the nature of the trans claim exclude strict categorisation for the reasons I've given.

I disagree with your argument that addressee oriented language is mutually respectful, for the reasons given.

I disagree that identity is paramount and known only to the person to whom it refers.

You keep repeating these assertions as if they were arguments. I provided a seven point argument in logic with which you disputed only one point (which I later provided a counter argument to).

What logical argument have you got which takes you (in logical steps, without further bare assertion) for interpreting the meaning of the claim "I am a woman", as referring only to non-exclusory membership criteria? Not just as statement that it doesn't, an argument, in logical steps, one following from the other.

Did you reply about intersex people and gender identity yet? — angslan

I'm not discussing the claims of intersex people, so why bring it up? I'm discussing the claim, by a trans woman, "I am a woman". If an intersex person claimed "I am neither a man nor a woman" or "I am both a man and a woman" those would be two completely separate claims. Why would the trans claim be affected by them?

Did you show your principles of compromise? — angslan

Yes, trans people (and those who agree with them) use the term as they wish, others use the term as they wish. No one demands anything of any group who do not wish to speak that way. Each group gets to speak exactly the way they want. If a women's support group wants to allow those who think they're women to join, it can, if it doesn't, it can exclude them. Letting people act as they see fit in so far as it is possible is a pretty basic ethical stance.

Did you respond regarding your concept of what is more harmful in terms of denying identity? — angslan

No, I don't agree with your premise that identity is defined by the person to whom it refers, so there's no argument to refute. If people are harmed by externally applied identity labels which they don't like, then they need to at the very least provide a coherent argument as to why. "I don't like it" is not good enough. Certainly "no one should ever apply externally derived identity labels" is an argument I find frankly ridiculous as it undermines thousands of years of speech practice for no observable gain. I don't believe the arguments given so far are sound.

But just because one can reach a different conclusion rationally that doesn't mean that people do do so. Intolerance can be inferred just by the simple fact that trans persons are treated as lesser persons -- they are the butt of jokes, they are objects of violence, they face workplace discrimination, and sometimes families are churches are not as accepting as other communities. Coming out as trans can sever one from friendships or families.

It's one thing to have a question and come to a conclusion but still treat people more or less fairly, and quite another to punish them for their difference. That's intolerance. — Moliere

Absolutely. I don't want to poor cold water on such an impassioned exposition of how trans people are mistreated, but I said "it [others reaching a different conclusion about motives] doesn't make anyone intolerant", not "no one is ever intolerant about this issue"

I don't agree that it is implied that the sets are mutually exclusive from the trans claim. In fact, the claim requires that they are not, as I pointed out earlier. Just because someone identifies as a woman does not mean that they have no qualities associated with the set {men}. In fact, in many instances people who make claims that they are a woman have a penis, so this categorically cannot be part of the claim. — angslan

I didn't say the full set of membership criteria are mutually excuse. I said that membership of a set is mutually exclusive on the basis that being labelled as a member of the opposite set is offensive. People do not make random requests just so that they can be offended when those requests are not met, they request that things which they think will offend them are avoided.

Thus it is reasonable to presume that being called a man offends a trans woman for some reason that other than idle preference (that would be ridiculous, to set up a request just so that you can be offended when it's not met).

Thus, a trans woman in saying "I am a woman" is either also claiming "I am not a man" (and so will take offence if you call me one) or is making the frankly ridiculous request that they are not referred to as a man even though they are one simply because they don't like it for no given reason.

I mean, we're not. That is abundantly clear from the different and distinct uses that we have currently in discussions of various sorts. — angslan

The fact that uses are currently multiple on a discussion forum specifically about the multiple uses of the term really cannot be held up as evidence that the use is not changing, or will not change in future as a result of common usage in the media. This discussion is hardly an accurate reflection of the social mileau.

No you haven't, you have, at every turn, applied your own premises that ignore a fundamental part of trans claims - including the variety of trans claims (e.g. binary, non-binary, spectrum concepts of gender). — angslan

What premises have I applied which ignore trans claims?

I've repeated it several times, including in this post. At this point I cannot tell if you are receptive to what other people write, because I don't believe you've ever responded to this content in my posts. This is, in fact, quite infuriating. — angslan

I haven't seen an argument from you regarding relative harms that suggests one set of harms is greater than the other, so I really don't know where you stand here. — angslan

So, we both know how it is to feel like everything we've written is just being ignored then.

I've said that how we treat (and address) people can either respect their interiority/subjectivity/identity or treat them as objects (i.e. defined and categorised by the addresser regardless of the interiority/subjectivity/identity of the addressee). I've made an argument that addressee-oriented addressing preserves self-respect because it preserves that speakers can address themselves (either explicitly and externally or self-reflectively and internally) according to the concepts that they feel are appropriate. — angslan

Yes, that's one way. Where in any of that is there anything about the addressee's respect for the speaker? You've just written an entire argument which makes no mention whatsoever of anything the adressee had to do to respect the speaker and then claimed that this proves your idea of respect is two way. I'm baffled.

I think I've done a better idea of proposing a compromise. — angslan

So what have you given up from your original position that people should be addressed by the terms they prefer? You do know what compromise means?

I am trying to grasp the grammar of your first sentence as clearly as possible, and I am having a little difficulty. I think this is unfortunate, because this seems like an important statement. Is there another way to phrase it that might help me out more? — angslan

Let me try a metaphorical example. It is possible to be both a firefighter and a swimmer. There's nothing preventing you from being in both groups because the membership criteria are fighting fires, and being able to move efficiently in water, and these do not clash. It is not possible to be both a swimmer and a non-swimmer, because you cannot simultaneously be able to move efficiently in water and be unable to move efficiently in water.

It is traditionally held that whatever the membership criteria are for the group {women}, they are mutually exclusive to the group {men} (like swimming and non-swimming. Without even having to examine the nature of the membership criteria, we can tell that the trans claim involves this kind of mutual exclusivity because the whole reason for asking people to use a particular term of address is the upset it causes to have the alternative used. It is implied then, that choosing "woman" as the correct term, automatically makes "man" the incorrect one. The expression is "I prefer to be called a woman", but the implication (by your invocation of respect) is that calling them a "man" would be an insult or a harm. But the expression wasn't "don't call me a man" was it? It was "I prefer to be called a woman". The fact that not calling someone a man is implied in the request to call someone a woman means that the person is presuming the terms are mutually exclusive and so a request to be called by one automatically constitutes a request not be called by the other.

If I list my preferred title as 'Mr', it indicates that I would prefer to be called "Mr X", but if someone simply called me 'sir', I'd have no cause to mind. The terms are not mutually exclusive, I didn't, by asking to be called 'Mr', automatically preclude being called 'sir'. I did, however, automatically preclude being called 'Mrs', and may well take offence if someone does without reasonable grounds to do so.

Does that explain it?

I am surprised at the claim that no offence should logically be taken - you rejected that idea for feminists who claim that addressing trans people compromises or threatens their own gender identity. — angslan

Hopefully this is partly explained above. Once you've grasped what I mean above, I hope the fact that offence is reasonable in some situations and unreasonable in others is simple enough to be obvious.

I strongly feel that you should leave this part out of your arguments for the moment - this is a whole nother can of worms to debate whether this technically constitutes a delusion or not. The DSM does not consider gender dysphoria, for example, a delusion. What it does do it start to sound like some sort of attack against trans people, which I think is going to cloud your argument. — angslan

Yes, I agree. I originally got involved in this whole discussion because I didn't like the way people were being branded as intolerant bigots for holding positions which (whilst I did not personally agree with) were reasonable, rational positions to hold. As I said to another poster, there's nothing insulting about having delusions, a huge portion of the population suffer from delusions of one form or another at some point in time in their lives. It's in support of this as a rational possibility (rather than a bigoted intolerance) that I come back to it occasionally, but the conversation between you an I has moved a long way from that and it's a distraction to include it now, you're right.

This is why my argument engaged with respect in forms of address and not the universal application of words. None of these words are unique in their variability across times and places and people. — angslan

Two things; firstly, we come back to the (I think false) idea that respect is only one way, that respect constitutes only adhering to the way the addressee wants to hear a word, and not the way the speaker wants to use a word. I don't hold to that belief. Secondly, what I do think is unprecedented is the global nature of the social environment we live in these days. I don't think we can any longer rely on the "different words mean different things across cultures" argument. It is a legitimate concern that once a term is used in some way in certain environments, that it will rapidly come to mean that in every environment in the world. Global social networking makes it extremely difficult for one social group to maintain their own personal terms in any realistic sense. The world at large adopts terms as having a certain meaning and there is almost overwhelming pressure to conform. If 'woman' comes to mean {person who wants to be called a woman} in the workplace, the social networking sites, politics and media, then that's what it will mean, and the idea that any group who are offended by that meaning can just retain their own meaning within their own group is just nonsense. We are definitely talking about changing the universal meaning of the word 'woman', no doubt about that.

I don't think either group uses them generally inconsistently or incoherently, though they certainly do not agree with each other. And I think that any strict definition is going to land someone in a logical quagmire where some level of coherency falls apart when using strict definitions to make claims. — angslan

Yes, but I've presented an argument in fairly logical rational steps showing that the trans use of the term 'woman' is inconsistent and incoherent and you haven't actually refuted any point of it yet, so what I'm interested in here is not your opinion that neither group are using it inconsistently or incoherently, but your justification for that belief in face of arguments to the contrary. That's why this is on a philosophy forum. If you have a counter argument for any of the points I laid out, that's what I'd be interested to hear.

Is this discussion about language? Or relative harms? How to treat each other? Or whether trans people are delusional? — angslan

I think it's about all of them. Language use dictates and expresses a great deal (some would say all) of what we feel about the world and ourselves, including our identity. So language use is inherently tied to relative harms. I'm, broadly speaking, an ethical naturalist, so relative harms are intrinsically tied to how we treat each other (we should try to minimise relative harms). Where our desired treatment clashes, there needs to be some method of seeking compromise, and I believe that method should be rational thought. Delusions are beliefs held despite rational argument to the contrary, so the question of whether one set of beliefs might be a delusion becomes integral to the type of solution we arrive at to any conflict of interests. The only caveat, is that I personally have ruled out the possibility of trans people being delusional. You obviously do not think they are either, so you and I need not discuss that option. As I said, I only mentioned it because I think it's a legitimate theory to bring to the discussion and others seemed to want to just stonewall it, not because I personally hold it to be the case.

And while I think your explanation may fit for some people, I don't think it would fit for all the trans persons I've been in contact with. — Moliere

I understand that you need an explanation which fits with your experience. As I say, I'm not trying to push a particular explanation, I'm trying to argue against the insistence that one particular theory is adopted wholesale whilst there are some who quite legitimately disagree with it. Personally, my experience is limited to a friend's dad who, one day, was dressed like a woman and referred to as such. No explanation was given, and just referred to 'him' as 'her' like everyone else was doing, and still do. I don't mind at all. What I do mind is the insistence of one world-view on groups who do care one way or the other, for perfectly rational reasons.

I tend to believe in taking people's word at face value, absent any other sort of basis of inference. — Moliere

You see this is part of the problem. "...absent any other sort of basis of inference" is entirely subjective, and essentially ends up meaning that you believe only those people you choose to believe. You, like anyone else, will be guided by cultural expectations and group dynamics as to what to find acceptable inferences to the contrary. If your daughter (hypothetically) came up to you and said "I really need to go to the Justin Beiber concert, you don't know how much he means to me, I really feel a deep connection to his work" I very much doubt you would take her word at face value and fork out for the concert tickets above all other calls on your finances. You'd presume that this was nothing but teenage infatuation with the latest famous singer, you'd assume you had some 'other basis of inference'. If someone said they can read your future and you should not go to work tomorrow because something bad will happen, you do not take their word at face value, again, the fact that you live in a world without future-readers means that you think you have some 'other basis of inference'. I've just expounded a perfectly rational theory, supported by at least some evidence, as to why trans people might make the claims they do. A theory which you admit is at least possible. You definitely now do have some 'other basis of inference', but you've decided it's not good enough to dismiss the claims you hear, that's fine, in itself, but one has to then allow that others might reach a different conclusion because the matter is highly subjective. It doesn't make anyone intolerant.

I don't think these things defy definition. But I don't know enough about the biology involved even to hazard a guess. The fault is mine. I believe that human bodies are adapted to their sexual/gender differences because I can't see that one, er, configuration could adequately deal with both. Am I wrong? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

Well, I don't know enough about biology either. Personally I'm with you on this. My default position in the absence of evidence to the contrary is that it would require a slightly different brain to 'run' a female body than to 'run' a male one. But brains are so malleable I doubt this would do anything but provide general trends and could easily be overridden by culture, or even just other desires.

Yeah, definitely. I imagine that it what the trans experience might be like, something I simply can't understand because the feelings are outside of my experience. But I don't tend to see it as mysterious so much as just like some people want to be Goths and I don't understand that either. What I don't like is the deifying of it beyond that which there is good reason to believe it to be. People state strong desires to be part of social groups. Some of the stories I've read in my research about the extents to which people will go to be part of the social group to which they wish to belong are seriously shocking. And this applies to cults and gangs as much as religion, so I see absolutely nothing to dissuade me from the simplest explanation that trans women are simply men who want to join the 'women' group. I know some have argued that they've got to be taken more seriously because they're literally prepared to undergo surgery to become a woman, but people cut their own fingers off to join gangs, they mutilate themselves to be part of religious cults, the desire to be part of a group is hellish strong.

I don't assert any specific difference, only that these differences exist, yes? — Pattern-chaser

If they exist you should be able to assert what they are. How can something biological exist but defy definition?

We're close then, but I don't see how to concede that one could be mistaken about a wish to be part of a group the only membership criteria for which was 'wanting to be a member of that group'. I suppose one's decision would be made mainly on how much one wanted to be associated with the other members. I could conceive of someone wanting to be part of that group but later deciding against it, but they wouldn't be mistaken (at the time) just have changed their minds. I suppose if you were to take a view that our preferences are fixed and so if you think they are one thing one day and decide against it the next, one of those feelings has to be wrong, but you still wouldn't know which one.

But the main caveat, with respect to this actual thread is that I've seen no evidence at all that this is the claim trans people are making, so it's just a theoretical possibility, rather than an actual solution. Trans people (as far as I can tell) are not saying that they want to be part of a group whose only membership criteria is wanting to be a member of the group. They're quite clearly saying that they want to be a member of that exact group and for reasons which they are indisputabley born with but refuse to actually specify.

Just wanted to add in case it's of any use, that there is a possibility I can see that we have a set (let's call it {X}) for which the only membership criteria were 'wanting to be in set X'. This way there could exist a set with a publicly available meaning for which the statement "I am an X" would act both as statement of fact, and as its own justification. Someone could quite truthfully say "I am an X" for no other reason than they want to be, and no one could correctly refer to them without asking them first (or hearing about their desire from some other source).

Of course, the trouble with this is that the set would have to be voluntary (currently "women/men" is not, you are assigned one or the other at birth until you state otherwise). It could also carry any name at all, and that doesn't seem to be what trans people want, they specifically want the name of the gender that already exists, hence my doubting the sincerity of the explanation for their claims.

But since this is a philosophy forum, I thought I'd put it out there that I think such a set is philosophically possible.

Yeah... I thought by stating the argument in stages you might actually engage with it rather than just restate things you'd like to be the case as if they were actually the case.

What the statement does not claim is that anyone else belong to that set. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Of course it does. Where on earth did they pluck the word "woman" from? If it's not already defining a set what is it doing in common language use? How do they even know what the word means? Are you suggesting they've never used the word "woman" before? If not, then how did they use it without knowing what it means? This is really just wishful garbage. Trans women know exactly what the word "woman" means and they want to be in that group, that's why they're so precious about people using the right terms, because it confers on them membership of a very clearly defined group to which they wish to belong. It really is psychology 101.

Within this claim, therein nothing exclusionary because the womanhood they are referencing (if they have one/their feelings are accurate) is only their own. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I've said before, it's not about what they're referencing, it's about the correct use of the term doing the referencing. If you are referencing a feeling unique to you (your womanhood), then "I am a woman" is simply grammaticaly incorrect. "I am a..." Is a statement about membership of a set. You yourself admitted this clearly. So "I am a woman" is a statement claiming membership of a set {women}. That means;

1. That there must exist a set {women}
2. That it must be possible to not be in that set (otherwise the statement is meaningless, everyone is a woman).
3. That the set pre-exists the statement about membership of it
4. That the person making the statement has some idea of what the membership criteria are (otherwise their statement is just speculation)

So the womanhood they are referencing cannot be just their own. As you have already stated, they are making a claim about membership of a set and in order for them to do that rationally, both the set and it's membership criteria must pre-exist the claim. One cannot rationally claim membership of a set defined by the claim one is making.

In declaring themselves to be a women, they don't suppose any restriction or exclusion about who is a woman. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No. But they suppose a restriction and exclusion about who can be a man. Not them. If no such claim is being made (ie, their particular set of feeling could be those of a man) then there is no rational cause to take offence if I refer to them as such.

'm not 100% sure about this, but it might be determined by how you define sets. One alternative is the idea of a family resemblance, in which

things which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things. — angslan

Two things, firstly, the series of overlapping similarities is, crucially, a finite series. Wittgenstein is saying that no one feature is shared by all members of a set, but that all members will have one or more properties from a finite list of properties associated with the term. Secondly, the list of properties from which members need have only one must still be publicly available.

This is why I described the claim inherent in the expression "I am a..." as being only that your full set of properties are not incompatible with the set, not that you possess some property which is the essence of the set. Because the list of possible properties must be finite (in order for it to be a set at all (see 2)), a claim of set membership must imply the presence of properties for which it is possible to be absent and the absence of which would negate membership.

Basically, skip straight to 2) a set must exclude some properties which it is possible to posess otherwise it is not defining anything.

This is contested depending upon which conceptual framework of gender you subscribe to - there are binary, non-binary, and spectrum-based concepts of gender and sex, — angslan

OK, fair enough. If it is possible to be both a man and a woman, then it would be the case that claiming to be a woman would not (on its own) constitute a claim that such features as were being used to support such a claim could not also be the features of a man. But anyone who really genuinely believes that would have no cause to claim either and no cause to take offense if either term were used. Remember, taking offence (or any other strong emotional response) without rational cause is one of the psychological definitions of a delusion.

I mean, sure - but just as with a whole host of words, there is not one set definition is usage that all speakers agree upon at any one time. Language is constantly in evolution. There can be agreed upon meanings in certain circumstances that are strict (e.g. legal or academic definitions) but outside of that it is a bit fuzzy. I've seen a very elongated argument regarding whether a hotdog classifies as a sandwich or not, and a poll in which about half of respondents thought it was. — angslan

Absolutely. I completely agree, and this is the position that I've held all along. There are some language users who will define "woman" by physiological features, some who define it by psychological features and this is a normal part of language. The problem, for me, arises when one group tries to tell the other it's using the word 'wrong' and must change, or when one group has an inconsistent definition that it is impossible to use.

So I think you might follow where I disagree about this strict set membership concept that you set up early in point (1). — angslan

Great, thanks for looking through all that. It does seem like the whole thing hinges on 1) as everything else stems from there. I have to go out for a while and so will post a response to your comment on 1) when I get back.

if someone with XY chromosomes and a penis claims that they feel like a woman, it is inherent in this claim that these chromosomes and outward sex characteristics are not necessarily correlated with how people feel about their gender. If they did, then the claim would be impossible to make in the first place. So any part of your argument that attributes this to the transgender claim is incorrect. — angslan

This suffers from the problem that most replies here seem to me to suffer from in that it begs the question. You're starting from a presumption that the trans claim must be coherent and then arguing that because my conclusions do not match the trans claim I must be wrong. But this relies on the unproven assumption that the trans claims are coherent. If they're not (as I believe they're not) then it is perfectly possible for me to start with a claim they would agree with, end up with a claim they would not agree with and yet still be correct about their claim. If my logic is valid and yet reaches a conclusion they would not agree with, then the original claim is at fault, not my conclusion.

Oh, I see - if that is way you are perceiving it, then yes, this is the way I am suggesting to address people. — angslan

So how does the midwife address the baby then, or the parent address the toddler? If you're suggesting we address people on the basis of psychological traits, then how do we address those whose psychological state we do not have access to (for lack of complex language, for example)? Or whose report of their psychological state we do not believe?

- saying, "This woman is an idiot" doesn't say something about all women.

Of course if you say, "Women are idiots" you are going to be talking about all women - but the same is true of you say, "All Bills are idiots" about Bills. — angslan

No, this is just ignoring grammar. The claim in the expression "I am a woman" is not "I am this woman" so the equivalent use is not "this woman is an idiot" it is "women are idiots". Likewise, you don't say "I am a Bill", you say "I am Bill" so the equivalent claim is "Bill is an idiot" not "all Bills are idiots". You can't just ignore the grammar and claim that an attribute of the statement "I am a woman" applies to the statement "this woman is..." because the word 'this' changes the whole meaning of the sentence.

You think someone can only feel some way if there is a strict categorisation? — angslan

No, someone can feel whatever way they want. This is about language. It's about how they correctly describe how they feel, not how they actually feel. Maybe this is another fundamental point of disagreement, but I think there are 'correct' ways to use words. Using the word 'thin' to describe something wider than average is an incorrect use of the word. You seem to be arguing that "woman" is a special word which has no incorrect use, which anyone (when applying it to themselves) is simply automatically using the term correctly. I don't understand how a word can be of any use at all if it's correct meaning is held privately.

Let me try to simplify this on the off-chance that people are just not understanding what I'm saying (as opposed to simply ignoring it). Let me break it down into some individual propositions and maybe people could raise which part they disagree with.

1. Any statement which begins "I am a..." is a statement which claims membership of a set. It is, by necessity, claiming that whatever properties you have, they are not inconsistent with those of the set you are claiming to be a member of. A simple counter-example to this would be a statement of the sort "I am a..." which somehow does not make such a claim, but I cannot think what such a statement might otherwise mean.

2. Sets must exclude something in order to be meaningful. A set which contains all things, or one which contains all things already described by an existing set is not doing any job of definition. It has no more meaning that the other set which also describes it. The set {homo sapiens} had exactly the same definition as the set {humans} and as such the terms are interchangeable and one has no more or less meaning than the other (in terms of sets). The set {women} must therefore exclude something in order to be a meaningful set. In addition here, it is currently understood that men/women is a binomial set pair. One cannot be both a man and a woman. Maybe this is part of the trans claim, but I've not heard it expressed that way.

3. Words must have public meanings in order to be useful in discourse. If I use a word which only I know the meaning of, then no communication event can take place.

4. From 1), the term "woman" in common language is the name of a set since it is used in a sentence of the form "I am a..." and all such sentences are declarations of set membership.

5. From 2), the expression "I am a woman" must be making an exclusory claim about the membership criteria of the set {women} because all sets must have exclusory criteria in order to be meaningful and the claim "I am a woman" is logically identical to the claim "I am not a man" since the sets are mutually exclusive. It is therefore, by necessity, a claim that at least some properties possessed by the speaker do not belong (are excluded from membership of) the set {men}.

6. From 3), the term "woman" being a word, must have a public definition in order to be of use in discourse, since without a public meaning it conveys no information.

7. From 5) and 6) the statement "I am a woman" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {men} and likewise the statement "I am a man" makes a public claim about the membership criteria of the set {women}.

Now, if you disagree with 7), could you please explain which of 1) to 6) you disagree with and why?

Except, as has been pointed out, your argument is incompatible with trans claims. So it doesn't seem to be based on trans claims at all. — angslan

So what is the trans claim then? What is wrong with the definition of it that I provided in my last post. "it is proper courtesy for you to address me as a man because I feel like a man"?

The only problem I can see is determining which definition to restrict the existing words to (this may or may not be a similar debate to whether gay marriage is 'marriage'). But at the moment we don't have two different words, and I don't see that being problematic either. — angslan

You've completely lost me here I'm afraid. The first part of the paragraph opens "the only problem I see..." and the second part concludes "...I don't see that as being problematic either" suggesting that neither this, nor some other thing are problem. Yet there are only two subjects within the paragraph, one of which you've identified as a 'problem'.

No. This is a continual confusion of sex and gender. I'm not advocating people use physiological or psychological features, I'm advocating that people address others according to their own wishes on the subject, regardless of whether they even consider a distinction between the two. — angslan

So how are people's wishes not a psychological feature? Where are wishes contained if not in the psychology?

Because you have provided so much evidence that the term was only applied to outward secondary sex characteristics historically? At least if you are going to ask for evidence you would think that you would also provide some information on the historical use of the term. — angslan

The burden of proof is usually carried by the person wishing to prove the positive, not the negative. It's basic courtesy (which I thought you were fairly au fait with). All you have to do to prove your assertion that the term woman has been in use for "a few hundred years" as a term to describe something other than physiological appearance, is provide a single reference (but preferably a few). In order to prove my assertion that it hasn't, I'd have to provide hundreds and hundreds. Providing one single reference of the word being used to describe someone according to their physical appearance would be trivial matter even now, but could not count as evidence of a negative assertion.

Yes you can. Not all women feel the same. Not all women are the same. This is fundamentally, and trivially, true.

To use your example, if I say "she is an idiot", I am not calling all women idiots. — angslan

Why have you changed the word "woman" to the word "she" and then suggested that this proves something about the term "woman"? You do know they're two different words? You can't prove something about the word "woman" by showing how the word "she" can be used in a sentence. Substitute the word 2she" in your example sentence for the word "woman" (the word I'm actually talking about), and you have exactly what I just said. "women are idiots" makes a claim about all women. Honestly, this level of argumentation is really poor.

If "not all women feel the same" as you claim. Then how can someone 'feel like a woman'? There is not a feeling which being a woman is. There is not a small collection of feelings which, if you feel one of them, makes you a woman. There is not even a very large collection of feelings the sum total of which constitutes "womanhood". Women are not constrained in any way by feeling a certain way or a certain collection of ways. Absolutely any feeling at all could be constituted as 'feeling like a woman', and absolutely any feeling at all could be constituted as 'feeling like a man'. Which means that if someone currently a man says they 'feel like a woman' (and would be upset if other people did not acknowledge this) they have made an error. What they feel like cannot be necessarily 'a woman' because there is no cause to remove their feelings from those suitable for a man. They have no rational cause to be upset if others don't acknowledge this because it is not a necessary condition, so others are free to consider it one or not. Having an emotional response to something for which there is no rational reason to have that response is basically the definition of a delusion.

Well, I was using both the contexts of references to bodies in earlier discussion and the examples of both anorexia and phobias you raised. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The vague 'references' to bodies is materially different to characterising a claim as being bigoted because it presumes trans people are hallucinating a body which isn't there. Where is the actual claim you're basing this hugely significant judgement on?

The use of delusion I was referring to also differs from hallucination. It doesn't necessarily pose a phenomenalogical appearance. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Delusion usually implies some sort or misread phenomenological presence in the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Can you see why I got a bit confused?

Firstly, the truth of an identity isn't defined by a feeling. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so what does determine the truth of an identity? In what way is that truth publicly available?

Secondly, the point I was making about the individual was descriptive of a state of a person feelings, not a claim about if their feelings were right. It's point about who their feeling is about about, not whether it's accurate or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So how does this relate to the public meaning of the term "woman"?

A persons feelings about their identity reference them, not other people. In any case a person's feelings about their own identity only reference them. The feeling in question is only about them. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so the feeling is about them and them alone. I don't disagree with that point. So if I feel feel a thing which makes me cry, makes me want to remove the cause, makes me want to seek the comfort of my friends or just curl up into a ball, I lose my appetite, can't be bothered to do anything, lose interest in the world etc. Those feelings are just about me and no-one else but me, right?

So does that make me correct to describe my state as "joyfully happy"? No. Because the fact that the feelings are about me doesn't make a jot of difference to the fact that any words I use to describe them are part of public language and so must have a public meaning. If I use the word "happy" to describe feelings which make me act that way, I am misusing the word "happy" because the word "happy" does not publicly define a set of feelings which typically cause such behaviours. Still, no-one can see inside my head, no-one can determine the truth of how I'm feeling, but as soon as I decide to talk about it, I've agreed to the terms of the language game I want to play with the other people to whom I'm speaking, and rule number one is that the meanings of the words I'm using are publicly available.

They are feeling they are a woman , — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, they are feeling like something. When they want to describe that something to other people, they must chose words whose meanings are publicly available otherwise the description is literally nonsense. I'll ask again (since you've chosen to avoid the difficult questions (a common theme here), what is the meaning of the expression "I am an woman", or "I feel like a woman". What information does is convey to the person being spoken to?

I guess I would say to this proverbial Mary that there's nothing lost in including Jane. — Moliere

I can't really lay out Mary's concerns any more clearly than I have, so if you still think they amount to "nothing" then I guess we'll have to just agree to differ.

No problem.

Mary, when she uses the term "woman" means by it those with physiological attributes usually associated with two X chromosomes. She may not know this, to her it might just be a fuzzy collection of visual cues, she might not have even given any thought to moot cases in rare genetic circumstances. The important thing is that it means other people like her in a way that does not restrict what she can do. There's no chance of her being chucked out of the group {women} nor can anyone claim to know anything psychological about her simply because she has this label.

John (now Jane), when he uses the term "woman" is describing a feeling he has, at least a large part of which is the desire to look and behave like the people he sees in his community with two X chromosomes. He has a slight dichotomy to balance in that the type of people he's referencing when describing how he feels he wants to behave are (in the overwhelming majority) those with two X chromosomes, but he wants his definition to be about the feeling not any likely biological precursor to it.

So, when Mary and John/Jane have conversation, every time Mary refers to him as a 'man' it hurts him because it makes him feel like he is not 'really' part of the group to which he wishes to belong (my major thesis was on group dynamics so I apologise in advance for bringing everything down to that).

I think we're in agreement thus far (except perhaps my armchair psych evaluation).

What I'm trying to say is that if Mary were to use the word 'woman' to refer to John/Jane. She too would feel pain. She'd feel the anxiety that the more a word gets used one way the more it's standard definition becomes that. She'd feel anxious that, should the term come to mean {people who feel a certain way} by repeated use, people might consider they know how she feels when she refers to herself as a 'woman'. She's concerned that it's frequent use this way might lead to people considering that she is not really a 'woman' if she doesn't behave that way.

Remember, John's definition is not random, it's not personal to him with other trans men/women have a completely different definition. Almost all trans women behave like stereotypical women in their community. They wear dresses, make-up, have other female friends etc. This is not stereotyping, it's intrinsic. If a trans woman behaved exactly like a stereotypical man, he would not have anything to transition to would he?

So Mary's concerns are not outrageous. If she agrees to use the term 'woman' of trans women on the basis of how they feel, she will not be applying for the term to a random and diverse set of feelings. She will be applying the term almost exclusively to feelings about wanting to wear dresses, make-up, have female friends etc.

So how might people start referring to her (as a default) if she likes to wear trousers, no make-up, short hair and enjoys football and beer. She doesn't want people to start thinking she's not a woman because they have gotten used to using the term to describe people's feelings which, in reality, are by and large not about those things.
So using the term that way makes her anxious. Using the term her way makes John anxious.

It's a very difficult dilemma, but personally the only way out of it I can see is for each community to use the term as they see fit and just try and be tough enough to handle the anxiety when someone from one community tries to have a conversation with the other. Like I do when I try to talk to young people.

Delusion usually implies some sort or misread phenomenological presence in the world. Seeing something which isn't there. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, you're thinking of hallucinations. Delusions are false beliefs which persist despite evidence to the contrary but which cannot be explained by predominant social influences or low intelligence.

At least, that's the textbook definition.

I can't find the relevant section of Harry's argument which claims that trans people are hallucinating a body which isn't actually there. Perhaps you could help me out with the bit you're getting that impression from.

I would have thought the logical inference at play was obvious... we are speaking about an individual's feelings about their own identity. The very concept we are using is limited to a feeling about her own identity. She not feeling about other women's identity in this instance. The feeling is a sense of her own. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, this is where the problem arises, with this idea that an entirely private definition of a word can exist. A private definition of a word is meaningless. Read Wittgenstein (if you haven’t already), or any modern philosopher of language really. To have the word "woman" defined by a private feeling, not observable by any other language speaker is a nonsense. How would a person be able to tell that the feeling which one day they consider attaches to the word "woman" is the same feeling they experienced yesterday? How would they ever know they were applying the term correctly? And even if they did, if the meaning of the word is entirely private, what would be the point in using it in discourse. What would be the point in the phrase "I'm a woman" if the definition of 'woman' being used was not within the public domain but contained privately in the mind of the person using the term. It is literally nonsense. What possible information could the expression transmit, if the meaning of the term is known only to the one speaking it?

So to call someone a woman is equivelant to saying I am a woman? There is not a difference between the third and first person uses? Is that what you're saying? — Moliere

No, I said that if one effect was no greater than the other, not one effect is identical to the other.

I recognize that for some feminists it does not work this way, though I'd like to know why. But it's worth noting that for some feminists it does. — Moliere

Yes, I wouldn't claim to be speaking for all feminists, nor even the majority. I'm not trying to make a democratic argument, but a rational one.

Without reference to the bodies in this way, there is no longer a standard for their feelings being false in the claimed sense of delusion. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't follow why you're assuming that only the physical can be a delusion. Agrophobics feel threatened by large spaces. The threat is a delusion it is not a rational response. I don't see why delusions have to result from a false belief about something physical.

If a mistake about the body is not at stake, we no longer have a clear reason for saying someone feelings "are false." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again I can't quite see how you've got here. 2+2=5 is 'false' by common usage of the term. Someone convinced that 2+2=5 might well be suffering from a delusion. No physical object need be involved.

When someone sets out such an identity, they are only speaking for themselves. They are only talking about their feelings of sex and gender. If someone has feelings claiming to be a woman, said feelings don't act to report how anyone else is a women. Each woman has their own feelings which report (or do not report) the fact of their identity. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is just bare assertion. Do you have an argument demonstrating how this is the case, or is it just a statement of what you would like to be the case?

I mean, you're really not representing trans claims accurately at all. No matter what I've said to you, you've gone back to the same set of misinformation regarding trans claims. — angslan

I'm making an argument about what is logically implied by trans claims. I'm not trying to accurately represent the claim itself, nor am I presenting any empirical information that could even be 'misinformation'. It's an argument in logic (roughly), it's either valid or it's not. The only empirical information I'm basing it on is the claim that "it is proper courtesy for you to address me as a man because I feel like a man". If that is not the claim being discussed then my argument is not sound. If that is the claim being discussed then you have only to question the validity of my argument, further 'information' doesn't enter into it.

'm not sure babies have such complex thoughts that they can clearly communicate to a midwife (which is the context of this statement). — angslan

No, the point is that the midwife is using a term based on physiological features which, later on in life, you like us to use based solely on psychological features. Why on earth would you want to go through this rigmarole rather than just have two different words?

I feel that there is a clear decision here to ignore the things said in posts - you've heard my answer on this twice now. — angslan

Yes, only this time I'm asking you for some evidence to back it up (a request you have conveniently ignored). You're making an empirical claim here. That the word was used a certain way hundreds of years ago. You can't just say we're not going to get anywhere unless I simply believe you.

This doesn't present to me why it would be more difficult or more morally complex to learn someone's gender from them than it is to learn their name, however. — angslan

It is more morally complex because a category name implies other members of that category, a non-category name carries no such implication. I can say "bill is an idiot" and be referring only to a particular person called Bill. This is because although there are other people called Bill, Bill is not a category, the other people are called Bill entirely incidentally. There's is no equivalent with the term "woman" I can't say anything of women without implying that the same applies to all women. This is because 'women' (unlike 'bill') is a category name. Other people called 'women' are not called so incidentally (as other people called 'bill' are) they are called so because they are deemed somehow to share characteristics of others in that group. What is said to about that group therefore is deemed to apply to all in that group. If I said "giraffes are tall" you would not immediately presume I'm only talking about one particular giraffe. If I said Bill is tall, you would not presume I was talking about all people called Bill.

My point is the delusion story has nothing to do with bodies. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think anyone is suggesting it does are they? As far as I read it, Harry is stating his belief that people who think they feel like the opposite gender to the one traditionally associated with their body are incorrectly reporting this feeling. His argument for this is that the feeling of a gender is not a categorisable thing. People feel all sorts of different ways and it is false to categorise those feelings into two groups. Therefore anyone reporting that their feelings belong in one of these categories is doing so incorrectly.

Maybe I've misread Harry's argument, but that's what I got from it.