'm not begging any sort of question. I'm coming form a position which recognises the trans person cannot possibly be deluded in this way because their experience is defined in recognising the bodily states they have. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The begging of the question is in presuming that position when it is not a given. It is not a brute fact that people correctly report their feelings and identity. You may believe that, but others believe differently. So a person who reports that they 'feel like a woman' (despite being biologically a man) could be considered to be reporting in error. That the feeling they are experiencing is not correctly categorised as 'like a woman' and should instead be categorised as 'like a transgender person'.

We do not all share your world-view I'm afraid, no matter how much simpler that would make your ethics.

As though we haven't been able to have some sort of discussion regarding what people feel like or who they are? — angslan

No, we clearly haven't. If anything certain can be said of this discussion (and the wider debate in society) it is that no one is certain about the meaning of the terms used and no one quite understands what the others are saying. I'd say this type of discussion was an absolutely classic example of the sort of mess that occurs when terms whose correct application should be public are made private.

Only if feeling is external. It's not. You are actually begging the question here - this conclusion of yours is only possible is you necessitate a connection between chromosomes and feeling in the first place. — angslan

Explain how this is only the case if feelings are external. You haven't provided an argument here, just a bare assertion.

If this is really the basis of your claims, then you are not doing the listening (or the reflection) that you are asking of others. — angslan

Really, after the analysis you've put in so far the best you've got is "if you don't agree with me you must not be trying hard enough"? I obviously think that such a claim is implied. That's why I used the word 'implicit'. Therefore it's not about listening, it's about analysis. If you disagree with my analysis hen by all means present your argument. "that's not their claim because that's not what they say their claim is" is not an argument.

You say this as if other people have to label people - what we are talking about is people telling us their authentic feelings. They are not saying, "I can't be called a man because men don't think this way." They are saying, "I feel like a woman." — angslan

No, what we're talking about is absolutely and explicitly labels. I have never argued that a person should be somehow prevented from making the statement "I feel like a woman", have I? The entirety of my discussion on the matter has been about what label to apply to those making such a statement. Where are my comments about the value or otherwise of people telling us their authentic feelings. If you can quote me anything I've said on the matter then maybe I can understand why you think that's what we're talking about, but a cursory glance over that last dozen posts seems to reveal an awful lot of references on both sides to the correct terms of reference. I think it's pretty obvious that is what we're talking about.

The word 'Woman' was used to describe those people with particular physiological characteristics. That's just an historical fact without any judgement value. — Pseudonym


This is another fundamental misunderstanding - perhaps you did not read my post, or you haven't looked at the history of sex-gender terms and thinking? — angslan

Are you suggesting it's not true that the word "woman" was not, in the past, used to describe those people with particular physiological characteristics? As I said, I'm no historian, but I think such a eccentric claim should have at least some evidence presented. Can you provide me with your source material showing that two hundred years ago (or more) the word "woman" was being applied as a proper term of reference to people based on something other than their physiological characteristics.

Not to be nit-picky, but just to point out the fuzziness of these sets - not all people with breasts have a vagina, and not all people with XX chromosomes have either or both. — angslan

Did I not say the exact same thing in my recent post. Why do you feel I need to have the fuzziness of these sets pointed out to me given that I wrote;

The problem with simply using a list of physiological features is capturing the fuzziness. Someone with a penis would not be called a woman, but someone born, for some genetic reasons, without a uterus, but with breasts and a vagina would be. It's not that anything goes, just that the definition is not a simple list. — Pseudonym

But she may not be making a commentary on gender as much as on sex. — angslan

So if a girl (who thinks she is a boy) is addressed as "girl", that would be fine because 'girl' is a sex distinguishing term?

two women, with breasts and vaginas and XX chromosomes that they've had since birth and both of whom feel like women can feel completely differently to each other - and yet still feel like women. — angslan

No, they cannot, not according to the trans definition. According to the trans definition they cannot feel completely different to each other and still be categorised as "women", because if one of then feels a certain set of feelings they are a "man" and must be labelled as such.

The same way you learn someone's name. How is this harder, or more morally complex, than that? — angslan

A personal name is not a category. People called Bill are not claiming to be similar to other people called Bill. They're not claiming, based on private feelings to be part of the set {all people called Bill}, the only criteria for membership of the set {all people called Bill} is being called Bill.

The bigotry isn't a question of specific intention. It's in the very concepts Harry is using. In taking a position trans people are deluded, they's taken a position trans people are mistaken, trans identities aren't real and values they ought to be rejected in favour of "telling the truth." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes. Some people are sometimes deluded. You're begging the question. If you start from a neutral position that it is possible for people to be deluded about things (to believe things which are not the case) then you cannot argue that the possibility of a group being deluded can't be discussed because to do so would be to argue that such a group are mistaken.

Anorexics are deluded. They think they're fat when they are not. They are mistaken. They're not 'really' fat such that we should put them on a diet. They're 'really' deluded so we should help then realise a position which is more 'true'. Agrophobics are deluded, they think wide open spaces are threatening when they are not. Depressives are deluded, they think that their circumstances contain more negatives than they do.

I haven't read anything in Harry's comments which suggests that trans people do not have a legitimate feeling. Nor that they do not have a feeling which differentiates them from non-trans people. The issue is with the claim that they 'actually are' the opposite sex in some way. This is unsubstantiated. They might be. We might at some point in time find a set genes which controls certain areas of brain development which would demonstrate that some people in male bodies do in fact have female brains. But until that time, it is perfectly reasonable to hold any rational theory about the facts of the matter. Including the theory that men who think they 'actually are' women, are deluded in the same way anorexics who think they 'actually are' fat are deluded.

At the moment, there are two options for a man who 'feels like' he is a woman to the extent that he wants to change his body. 1) have surgery to make that change, 2) have psychological help to find ways of living with that feeling in the body he has. It's not an unreasonable position to hold that 2) is the better option. It may not be your decision, but it's not bigoted, it's just an evaluation of the situation.

What I do find bigoted (if I may say) is the slightly offensive way you seem to be insinuating that needing psychological help to deal with some delusions is somehow insulting. Lots of people need psychological help with minor or major delusions, many people suffer from depression or anxiety (both of which create delusionary realities) and they seek help with it all the time. There's absolutely nothing wrong with needing a bit of help with delusionary thinking and I'd rather prefer you didn't keep implying that it's some kind of insult.

respecting the interiority of others without compromising your own - or if you want to put it in terms of harm, that treating people like objects is inherently harmful. — angslan

If someone asked what species you were, would you expect me to ask you what species you 'feel like', or would you find it entirely satisfactory for me to answer that you're Homo sapiens? If someone asked what colour your hair was would you expect me to ask what colour you 'feel like' your hair is, or would it be OK to just say the colour it looks like to me? I don't raise these points to argue that gender terms are definitely observable things like species and colour, I'm aware that this is disputed whereas species and colour are not. I raise them to point out that using words which treat people as objects is not in any way inherently bad. For (hopefully) well-meaning purposes such a positive discrimination, we have a description of a person's race based on physiological characteristics. We don't accept a person as part of a black minority group despite the fact that they are white as driven snow just because they 'feel like' a person of colour. It's really important to actual people of colour that membership of that category (as I say for hopefully well-meaning purposes) is strictly based on actual physiological membership, not on what a person 'feels like'. Imagine trying to establish a positive discrimination programme to undo years of pay discrimination but allowing anyone who 'feels black' to join that category. Again, just to re-iterate because I can sense the ease with which this can be taken out of context, I'm not arguing that gender is definitely a physiological thing (in the way the skin colour is), I'm pointing out that labels based on physiological characteristics are not inherently harmful, if they are to exist at all. They can be used to undo the effects of years oppression based on those characteristics,

More importantly though, I think this is the basis of community language. Words are based (insofar as possible) on features available to everyone, because words belong to everyone. It's not that physiological features have primacy because they're more important than how you feel. It's that physiological features have primacy because they are most available to everyone and language is a communal thing. Basing language on private facts undermines it's community nature (more on that later).

1 - The trans claim is not that there is a definitive or necessary connection between chromosomes and gender-identity. The trans claim is not that there is a definitive or necessary connection between outward appearance and gender-identity. If it were, the claim would insinuate that there are no trans people - a self-defeating claim. I think we might both agree on this issue - I am not sure. — angslan

No, we do not agree on this one. The trans claim is implicitly that there is a connection between chromosomes and gender identity. If there were no connection, than a man (who feels like a woman) could still be called a man (based on his chromosomes) because there's nothing 'not man-like' about the way he's feeling. He wants to wear a dress - fine, there's nothing non-manly about wearing a dress. He wants to associate with other women in a platonic way - fine, there's nothing un-man-like about that. Whatever he thinks or feels requires no change to the label 'Man' because all of his thoughts and feelings are perfectly legitimate thoughts and feelings for someone with xy chromosomes to have.

But that's not what's being implied by the need for a new label. The need for a new label implies that there's something wrong with a man thinking and feeling that way. That a person thinking and feeling that way can't be a 'Man' they must be a 'woman', because that's one of the ways 'women' think and feel, not one of the ways 'men' think and feel.

Regardless of future intention. The word 'Woman' was used to describe those people with particular physiological characteristics. That's just an historical fact without any judgement value. A man who thinks and feels a certain way he calls "like a woman" has not chosen the term "woman" as his preferred label at random. He's chosen it because he wants to be considered as being in the same group as all the other people called by the same term. But all the other people called by the same term are those who have physiological characteristics of having two x chromosomes. He's making a very clear statement that he thinks his thoughts and feelings belong in the same group as those of people with two x chromosomes. Now why would he make that claim if he also wishes to make the opposite claim that there is no connection between thoughts/feeling and chromosomes? No connection at all would require a new word, one not previously used to describe those with certain physiological characteristics. A group which everyone could voluntarily join, in accordance with their preferences. But that's not what's being requested. Men who have these thoughts/feelings that they call 'like a woman' have requested that they be labelled by the term currently used as the default label for anyone with breasts and a vagina. This is not random. It's because they think there's a connection.

Basically when trans people want a label to describe their identity, they've deliberately picked a word which previously described the identity of anyone with the outward appearance of a certain set of chromosomes. They're specifically making the claim that their identity matches most closely that of this group. Essentially, the implicit claim is that identity and chromosomes are, in fact, tightly linked and they (being a rare exception) need to be re-labelled to more 'correctly' match this connection.

2 - The use of gendered language predates critical interrogation of the distinctions between sex, gender identity, gender roles, and the like. There is not one true, physiological etymology or definition of "woman" and "man" in use over the past few hundred years - this word is bound up in the fusing of sex, gender identity and gender roles. Thus, the word today is the child of this "de-fusing". The claim that it historically denoted physical appearance and that this is the "true, correct" or "objective" use of the term is a little blind to the history of sex and gender (and falls foul of the etymological fallacy anyway). I think we might be able to both agree on this - but perhaps we are not there yet. — angslan

Yes, technically, but I'm not sure I agree with the scope, or the focus. I don't think the last few hundred years is at all correct. I'm no historian so I won't stand firmly by this, but I'm pretty sure that there was no sense in which "woman" was used to describe anyone other than a person with (at least some of) the physiological characteristics associated with two x chromosomes until maybe forty or fifty years ago? Nor do I agree with the scope, even today the word is still primarily based on physiological features even though there is a strong movement to de-couple it. When a midwife says "it's a girl" she's not doing a psych analysis.

To (d) the objection is that A has special access to knowledge about themselves. This is two-pronged objection - first, that we believe people who make authentic statements about their identity, and two, that objective comparison of internal identities is impossible. — angslan

That would be fine if we were talking about psychological profiles, but we're not. We're talking about language. I'm guessing (from your presence on this forum) that you're familiar with Wittgenstein's private language argument? The problem is that language is a communal exercise. A private language simply doesn't make any sense, how would you know if you were using the terms correctly? You can't necessarily trust your memory of the last time you used them, and you have no external reference to check. (it's a bit more complex than that, but I'm hoping you're familiar with it already).

So a term within a community language, based on a private feeling is problematic. How can anyone check if they're using the term correctly? This is simply not how any other aspect of language works and you would be asking that we make an absolutely unique exception for gender terms. If I wish to describe myself as 'tall', the way I do it is to experimentally use the word 'tall' in reference to myself and check that other language users understand me. If they do not, I presume I'm using the word incorrectly, maybe I'm not tall enough to be generally considered 'tall'. This is the same for literally all words. Except, apparently, the terms "woman/man" and "him/her". here, you're suggesting. If I want to refer to myself as "woman" I don't have to experimentally do so and check with other language users that I'm using the term correctly. I merely state that I think it's the correct use and therefore everyone else has to agree with me when they talk to me. This is simply not how any other word works. To use words this way undermines the whole community enterprise that language is. There's no consensus seeking, there's no inclusivity.

I think that you have expressed that some feminists feel that applying the word "woman" to someone outside of their conceptual categorisation of "woman" is compromising, or inappropriate to, their identity as women. I think that to make such a claim requires a strict categorisation of "woman". It also requires a protective approach to that categorisation. Such a strict categorisation requires a conceptualisation of (i) how it feels to be a woman, (ii) the experiences and circumstances of women, (iii) the treatment of women, or some combination of more than one. The reason that categorisation needs to be strict is that there is a resistance to permitting new members to the category (in some cases, as you note, the chromosomes you were born with and not even the sexual organs that you currently have - very strict!). — angslan

I don't understand how you are distinguishing the categorisation of the two claims here. Yes, the claim that some feminists are making (that their identity is being undermined by people claiming to 'feel like a woman') requires that the category "women" be defined. But so does that claim "I feel like a woman". There must be something it is like to be a woman in order for someone to feel it. It may not be a tightly defined thing, but it must be a thing otherwise there would be no cause to require a new label than the one given at birth. So it's not about categorisation or not. Both approaches require a category. It's about which characteristics define that category. I'm arguing that because of the communal nature of language, the characteristics which define a term should be widely, and publicly available as far as possible, not private matters which cannot be verified.

What word(s) would you use to describe such sentiments? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

I simply would not try to assume someone's motives from something as vague as the tone of a few short thread posts. I get the sense from Harry's other posts that he's quite, shall we say, self-assured. But I think it's important in philosophical discussions to try and respond to the arguments as they are put, not the possible motive behind them. Most people do not remember each time to preface their arguments with "I think...", or "in my opinion..." sometimes that can come across as assertion (sometimes it actually is assertion) but it is the point that is being asserted that should we argue, not the fact of its assertion.

I'm far from perfect myself in that regard, so don't take it as criticism, just an explanation of why I took the position I did on the matter.

This is true of all types of people - this is in no way exclusive to trans people. The principle of respecting other people's interiority is that we respect them in the way we address and treat them. This doesn't mean we compromise the way in which we treat ourselves. — angslan

Yes, you keep restating this as if it were fact, but I don't agree. I've written in every post in every different way I can think of how the words you speak define who you are (your interiority, as you put it) as much as, if not more than, the words you hear spoken about you. Your response to this argument just seems to be "no it doesn't" without any reason why you think that way. That's absolutely fine, you're under no obligation to give me a reason, but there's not really anything more to say on the matter if you don't. So, if you can state relatively succinctly - why do you think that the words spoken to you can insult, and must be chosen carefully as a matter of respect, but the words you ask others to use have absolutely no emotional content at all and have no implications regarding respect?

To some. Is that the point that we were talking about earlier? I don't think so. — angslan

Well, it was the point I was talking about. Evidently not clearly enough.

I feel like I haven't heard the actual argument that you find convincing - just that you know that there is such an argument. — angslan

Really? I don't know how many more ways I can put it. Some feminists believe that to call someone a "woman" on the grounds that they feel like something they think is a woman and also call someone a "woman" if they have a the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes, it implies that those two things are related, they're in the same group. Obviously some people born with the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes do not want to feel like there's also a feeling which in some way defines them. They also feel solidarity with other people who have the physiology associated with having two X chromosomes because that group, not the group that 'feels like a woman' have been oppressed and to a great extent still are, in a particular way.

But I've said all this before, more than once, to have you still suggest that I haven't put forward my argument yet makes me feel like I'm wasting my time.

I would be very surprised to find out that the definition of "woman" popped into existence when humans discovered chromosomes and was not in use beforehand. If it was in use beforehand, then this definition you are supplying is a cherry-picked one for the purposes of your position. Why are you so focussed on chromosomes? — angslan

It's very difficult in a discussion over disputed terms to write out in full what you mean by the term you're trying to avoid using. I started out with 'appears to possess the features associated with having two X chromosomes' but got lazy typing the whole thing out each time I mentioned it. The point is that definitions are never clear, they're slightly fuzzy around the edges. I'm trying to get at the observable physiological features which, without a shadow of a doubt have been the properties used to define the category "woman" since the word began. The problem with simply using a list of physiological features is capturing the fuzziness. Someone with a penis would not be called a woman, but someone born, for some genetic reasons, without a uterus, but with breasts and a vagina would be. It's not that anything goes, just that the definition is not a simple list. Hence I went with the feature that underlies it all (having two X chromosomes) even though all categorisation is actually carried out by observing the features resulting from that basis. If I must, I could in future do as I have above 'physiological features associated with having two X chromosomes, but if I forget, you know what I mean.

(a) chromosomes are some fundamental component of gender or gendered words (such as "woman"). Criticism: Gender is separate, and the language-use of gendered words predates chromosomes - there is no primacy to the chromosomal definition as some etymological or factual truth. — angslan

See above. I really don't think there's an argument against the fact that physiological features have been the sole factor determing the use of the term "woman" for everything except the last fifty years. But I'm not hung up on primacy. It's just that at the moment "woman" is used to describe them too and some of them are upset about the association with a certain group of feelings. The solution to this problem you're advising seems to be just "put up with it".

(b) observable physiology has primacy over gender identity in forms of address. Criticism: If we consider that we are addressing a person (say, the inhabitant of a body) and not the body, then this seems odd. — angslan

I'm not saying that. I'm saying that people should be free to apply whatever primacy they feel comfortable with (which freedom includes freedom from undue social pressure). It's impossible to just address the inhabitant of a body that way. We are all different, the only way you could address the inhabitant of a body alone is to have a different term for each person. As soon as you use collective terms you are making a statement within your language community that you are more like the others in that group than you are like those outside of it. People wishing to be called "woman" are saying that in some way they are more like other people called "women" than they are like people called "men". If they're not saying this then the terms are meaningless as they don't define anything. Saying you are more like other people in a group than you are like those outside it is not only making a statement about you, it is also making a statement about the others in that group. It is disrespectful to ignore the effect one's requests have on others.

(c) there is only one way to "feel like a woman", which means that any use of gendered words implies the addressees necessarily feel the same as each other. Criticism: there is more than one way to feel like a woman. We admit as such when we talk about "trends" and look at the varied cultural mediation across not only the present, but also the past. — angslan

It doesn't make much difference to the argument if there is one thing it's like to be a woman or several things. The point is that it is a limited group. If it was not a limited group (and so neither was being a man) then there would be no problem with calling anyone a man no matter what they feel like because any set of feelings would be entirely consistent with either term. The claim that's implicit in a man demanding* to be called a woman is that the feeling they have is not one properly associated with the term "man". This necessarily means that a man who has those feelings is not a real man.

I don't think that someone who is confident in their identity is going to be confused about who they are by how they address someone else. — angslan

Yet you think someone who is confident in their identity will be upset by how they are addressed. This seems like an oddly arbitrary distinction to draw, especially considering I've already referenced parts of the feminist movement who quite evidently do feel like their identity is under threat by using words in certain ways, and there would clearly not even be a debate here if no one felt upset about having to use words in certain ways.

your description contains absolutely no change in straight marriage. A man and a woman who were in a union under God before gay marriage are still a man and a woman in a union under God after gay marriage - unless one of them changed sex or gender or the change in definition literally obliterated God. — angslan

It's not the people who have changed (or not) it's the meaning of the word. The word "marriage" used to mean (to some) {the state of Union between a man and a woman as specified in the bible}. Those people now find it much harder to use the term that way and still be understood. In 50 year's time I think it will be almost impossible to use the term that way. I think that is a good thing because the term set up an institution unavailable to gay couples, and the world-view it preserved was one where God ordained things and I don't think that's morally helpful. In the case of the word "woman" however, I'm more persuaded by the feminist argument that its current use causes less harm than an expansion/alterations might. I'm at least persuaded to the extent that I think people should have the autonomy to use it as they see fit without undue social pressure.

, the claim is not that chromosomes have a connection to the feeling. Such a claim, as I have said, is counter to the claims people with one set of chromosomes may feel the way that people with another set of chromosomes may feel. Clearly, then, the premise is that chromosomes and gender identity are distinct, and many of the problematic arguments you are raising become, as you note in this quoted text above, language issues. — angslan

Absolutely. I never have said that there is some connection between chromosomes and feeling. People with either set of chromosomes may feel any way. There are obviously general trends, some of which are mediated by biology (like hormones) and some of which are mediated by culture (like dress-wearing). But the very existence of the trans community (and the transvestite community), prove that these are only trends, not universal facts.

This is, however, the opposite of what is being claimed by the conflation of the term "woman". What this conflation implies is that there are some properties of having two X chromosomes which are intrinsically shared by those who feel like something they would describe as a woman. Deliberately asking that they be called the same thing is fundamentally making the claim that they share some properties. If I asked that tortoises were also referred to as 'cats' (in addition to lions and tigers and so forth) the very first question would be "Why? What have they got in common?".

Yes, there may be words which incidentally are used to describe two completely different things, but that's not what's happening here. The word 'woman' is being deliberately used to define both groups (chromosomes and feelings) which is making the strong claim that they are, in fact, related. That's the problem feminists have with it. They don't want the fact that they happen to have two X chromosomes to tie them to feeling a certain way. Yet if the term used to describe having two X chromosomes is deliberately also used to describe feeling a certain way, that's exactly what it implies.

Historically, sex and gender have been considered by many cultures as fused, and so one set of words only have persisted in language. This is also the state now. However, every day we are faced with words that have multiple, related or interrelated meanings, and yet we do just fine, so I don't think that this is primarily a language issue for you. — angslan

As I said above, words might be incidentally used for different purposes but that's not what's happening here. The word "woman" is being deliberately used to make a link between the sex and the gender, to validate the claim that what transgender people feel like is actually the opposite sex and not simply something which they think the opposite sex is like. This necessarily makes the claim that there is something it is like to be a "woman", which necessarily implies that someone who doesn't feel that way isn't a proper woman (despite having two X chromosomes).

If I asked you to refer to me as "he" or "she" - would you need to check out my physiology before you felt it appropriate to use the term? — angslan

Of course not, what I don't know won't hurt me. The harm is if you (as an obvious man) told me (a woman, (for the sake of this example)) that you feel sufficiently like me and everyone else with my biological sex to be addressed in the same way because we're basing terms of address on feelings not observed facts.

That's a strange, narrow way to think about insults - usually insults are used when they are going to be taken negatively by the recipient, not just because they are "alternative". — angslan

Why have you cherry-picked this one property of terms used as an insult and argued against it as if it were the only property I ascribe? I've talked about a number of other properties shared by terms used as insults (they're usually used by groups who hold a negative opinion of the group they're describing, for example). At no point did I even imply that this was the only, or indeed, most important property of insulting terms. I'm simply saying that that in order to constitute an insulting term there must be an alternative term available to describe that group. If there's no alternative how can the person using the term possibly be accused of doing so with the intent to insult. If the term "woman" is going to mean {anyone who has feelings they personally would describe as being "like a woman"}, then what alternative term is available to somebody wishing to define the group {people who were born with two X chromosomes}? If there is no alternative, then how can it be an insult to use the term that way?

What I haven't done is compare the relative amounts of harm. — angslan

You may not have done, but my original comments were not directed at you, they were directed at those who considered the matter settled, that we should definitely address people by the gender terms they prefer. That implies that the weighing has already taken place (or they just don't care about the harms to others).

If a woman calls someone a "she", in no way does it define the speaker. — angslan

How are you so sure on this? The way we use language defines us. As I said in an earlier post, many intelligent thinkers have concluded that it is not even possible to have advanced thought like identity and personhood without language, so it's completely unwarranted for you to simply assert that it has no impact on defining the user. Words 'mean' something, that's their whole point. That means they 'mean' something to the speaker, not just the listener.

This is akin to the argument that gay marriage somehow substantively affects straight marriage, even though none of the qualities of the marriage have changed at all. — angslan

Gay marriage does affect straight marriage. It means that 'marriage' no longer refers to an act of union under God between a man and a woman. That's a positive change in my opinion but its ludicrous to suggest it didn't change anything.

Transgender people are specifically suggesting that chromosomes and gender-identity are not correlated in such a way. — angslan

So why are they asking that a term previously used to describe {people who, by appearances, were born with two X chromosomes} now also describe {people who have a feeling they describe as being "like a woman"}. If they're not making a claim that the two are the same, then why would they want to use the same word to describe both. This is not common language use. We commonly group thing under the same defining word because they share characteristics. Or are they simply wanting to appropriate the word entirely to only mean {people who have a feeling they describe as being "like a woman"}? If so, how are we to describe babies or toddlers, are we to ask them how they feel before addressing them? And what alternative word is being proposed to describe {people born with two X chromosomes}?

Trans people may believe they're not making this assertion, that doesn't mean they're not.

You don't think people have provided an analysis of your arguments? — angslan

Not really no, I think people have just ignored the bits they don't have an answer to, stopped responding altogether when faced with a difficult questions and maintained their belief entirely without modification regardless of the arguments to the contrary, but I wasn't really expecting anything else. Some discussions I engage in to be part of the debate, but most I engage in to help sort my own ideas out (or just for fun) neither of the last two require anything of the other participants.

One set of people believe their social status is best improved by adopting the beliefs and mannerisms of one group while another set of people believe their social status is most likely to be improved by adopting the beliefs and mannerisms of another group.

A tiny minority don't care about their social status or recognise that its improvement is out of their hands either way, but this group is so small as to make no meaningful difference.

Or is that too cynical?

I can't help but note that this is a value-judgement that may not be shared by those using them, who might them appropriate terms. So I'm not convinced that this response is on target. It ignores, too, the fact that if someone addresses someone by a term that they know will cause upset or distress, then they are actively insulting them. So in either case, this does not seem to be a valid argument. — angslan

I've not denied its a value judgement, I've expressly said that society reaches some general consensus on the matter entirely because it is a value judgement. The point of labelling it an insult is to point out that it is an alternative term for a group already defined. No one is disagreeing about what defines that group. So, if the additional term is not necessary, and is used almost exclusively by people who have a negative view of the group it describes, is it really too much of leap to suggest that in the vast majority of cases it's being used as an insult?

None of these factors are true of calling a biological man a "man" as opposed to his preferred term "woman". There is no available alternative term to describe those born with two X chromosomes, so people using the term that way aren't obviously doing so with the intention to insult, they have no choice, there's no other term to use. The term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes is also not used by a group with universally negative views of transgender people.

So,in the case of "nigger" there is a clear alternative word and the term is used almost exclusively by those who hold negative views about the group it defines. Maybe not 100% proof, but certainly enough evidence to go on that it's probably an insult.
In the case of using the term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes, even if the person being addressed feels like they are a man, has no alternative word and is not used exclusively by those with a negative view of people who feel like they are a man. So there's very little reason to think its an insult.

Hence, there's good reason to ban the use of the term "nigger" (its most likely to be meant as an insult, and there are alternatives available to describe that group). There's not similar good reason to ban the use of the term "woman" to describe those born with two X chromosomes (its not most likely meant as an insult, and there are no alternative words available to describe that group)

I am not sure how you would go about quantifying that harm. — angslan

If you're not sure how to quantify harms, then how have you reached the conclusion that people ought to be called by their preferred term? If you've not derived the 'ought' from minimising harm, where have you got it from?

I did raise the harm of denying personhood and interiority and treating people as objects - I may not have described this as a harm (which I hope has not confused you) because it seems self-evident to me that this is a harm. — angslan

Yes, and you seem to have ignored my arguments that insisting on the agreement (by language use) that there is such a thing as something it 'feels like' to be woman is equally imposing properties of personhood on someone born a women who may not wish to have herself defined that way.

I assume by trans-man you mean male-to-female? Of course this is nonsense - such a suggestion obliterates the logical possibility of female-to-male. And that is only within a narrow scope that is causes such problems; any theory of non-binary genders beyond this is also rendered impossible by your argument. And yet, of course, you recognise that these claims exist (thus our participation in this thread). So I think you would have to note that this formulation is wrong. — angslan

I don't understand what you are saying here at all. I may have got the terminology wrong. By 'trans man' in the quote you cited I meant someone who is born a man but has a feeling they would describe as 'like woman'. Is that the wrong way round. If so, my apologies, please re-read the section with whatever the correct term is.

I'm simply saying that an appeal to discourse as a resolution is redundant, because that is what we are participating in. — angslan

You and I have different definitions of discourse. Mine involves a to-and-fro analysis of arguments. What we had here was one side declaring what is 'right' and dismissing anything the other side had to say as intolerant bigotry. That's not what I call 'discourse'. Fortunately we seem to be past that now, so yes, what we are currently doing is exactly what I mean, not that we replicate this with each individual.

Sure, and it might be part of someone's worldview that black people are lesser than white people, should fulfil an appropriate role in society as slaves, and should be addressed as "nigger" - but we don't always accede to the worldviews of others. I think that your line of thinking justifies all sorts of hateful or bigoted forms of address, whether that was your intention or not. — angslan

No, we assess the harms that such a worldview might cause and come to some appropriate social consensus on their expression. So can you point to the assessment that's being carried out here of the harms? Because all I read is an assertion that trans people must be called by their preferred terms, not a discussion about the relative harms. No-one has written a single word in answer to the issue I raised about the meaning of the term 'woman' to some feminists and the harm that taking away that meaning might cause them.

Calling someone a "nigger" is actively designed to insult them. It's not a noun passively describing a group, there's already several terms for that group "Black people", "Afro-Caribbeans". The term "nigger" is an insult and always has been. To liken it to feminists wishing to reserve the term "woman" to define that set of people who were born with two x chromosomes, is utterly ridiculous. "woman" is not intended to be an insult.

When we treat others as objects, we can treat them exactly how we perceive them with an ignorance of their personhood - an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them, and that our interiority is superior to theirs, so that our definitions of who they are is total. — angslan

This does not follow at all. What trans men (for example) are asking is that the same term applied to people born with two x chromosomes is applied to people who feel a way they would describe as "like a woman". It is exactly "an assertion that who they is totally defined by us and not by them". It is an assertion that the sets {those born with two x chromosomes} and {those who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman"} are the same, or similar enough to share the same defining term and most importantly, are so similar that they do not even need their own individual defining terms. How is that not imposing a definition on who women are? It is literally saying that all people born with two x chromosomes are in some significant way the same as all people who have a feeling they would describe as "like a woman". That is imposing a definition on all people who are born with two x chromosomes.

I think this confuses the type of discussion we are having now with the practicalities of everyday life - we expect that murder is wrong without requiring that assailant and victim have a philosophical discussion and some sort of compromise first, but we are fully accepting of philosophical discussions such as this one here to occur regarding the justification of murder in various circumstances. — angslan

I don't understand the point you're making here. We expect that murder is wrong because we all already agree that it is. All we might be interested in, from an ethical point of view, is why it's wrong. It is evident that we do not yet all agree that using a person's preferred terms is right or wrong, so that discussion needs to be had.

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions. — Dfpolis

This makes no difference. Exactly the same could be said of actions. What constitutes a single action determines entirely the count of 'actions' in any scenario. Is 'going to the store' a single action (count of one), or is it composed of several actions (get up, walk to the door, find keys...). How we define 'action' determines entirely how many such entities we count in any situation.

We know what is in our power by seeing (1) what were were able to do in the past and (2) knowing that we have suffered no debilitation or other impediment since then. — Dfpolis

Again, related to the topic, this depends entirely on what you define as an 'impediment' is not wanting to go to the store and impediment? If so, then we have in fact suffered an impediment since last time, we no longer want to go to the store. We have suffered the loss of our desire to go to the store. What if, in the meantime, I had suffered a debilitating phobia of stores? Would you say I was equally able to go to the store as I was before the phobia set in? No. So how much negative feeling about going to the store counts as an impediment? Slight fear? Minor displeasure?. It all comes back down to definitions.

This is a nonsensical claim. It misunderstands the nature of potential. Many contradictory outcomes may be possible, not withstanding the fact that only once can be actual. — Dfpolis

This is just a bare assertion.

I stand beside the author, trying to see what he or she saw and wants me to see. If you can't bring yourself to do the same, you're not entering into the spirit of dialog, only looking for sniping opportunities. — Dfpolis

No-one's talking about my trying to see what you see though are they? How on earth do you know what I'm trying to do. We're talking about your prejudicial presumption that I'm not trying to see what you see simply on the basis that I haven't agreed with you. That I'm not 'entering into the spirit of dialogue' simply because I disagree with your points. That's the arrogance that I'm referring to. The presumption that I couldn't possible 'see what you see' and yet still think you're wrong.

Also, in the manner you are describing here -- in the hypothetical -- you're making the dispute about meaning, it seems to me. Where the argument is over the proper, right, or true meaning of the term "woman". So what we have is two people talking past one another. — Moliere

No, that's not really what I'm saying. I don't think there is a right meaning of the term "woman". It means different things to different people, and probably different things in different contexts too. What I'm arguing about is very simply that the effect on your identity of having a word used about you (which is what the trans movement are broadly concerned about in this regard), is no greater than the effect of using a word about someone on the identity of the speaker. They both mean something about the identity of both the speaker and the one being addressed, and there's no acknowledgement of this in the debate at all, it's all about the feelings of the person being addressed as if the act of speaking had no effect at all. Since our entire world-view is constructed from (or at least contained within) the language we use, I find that position disingenuous.

So I'd say the question here turns on one, how do we determine the personal identity, like the case of the pluviophile, of others?, and two, what is appropriate in such determinations? In short form my answer is: by asking to the former question and listening to the latter question. And that naturally leads me to say that Jane, formally called John, is in the right above, whereas Mary is in the wrong. Mary can say "I am a woman", just as Jane can say "I am a woman" -- and if they listened to one another they would both be able to express their identity and understand where they are coming from. — Moliere

Again, this misses the point of language. No-one is denying John/Jane's feelings that they are "something he refers to as a 'woman'. The feelings are not in question. What's in question is the use of the word to describe them. Mary's meaning of the word 'Woman' does not describe feelings of any sort, it describe a chromosomal arrangement. It would be like if John said "I feel like 16 centimetres". 16 centimetres is a unit of measurement, not a thing one can feel like, but John can't be mistaken about his feelings, we must take them as being true (for him) so the only conclusion we can draw is that he feels like something which he describes as 16cm, but which we wouldn't describe that way.

To use your pluviophile example, it would not have anything to do with the validity of you experience of rain, and yes, we might well treat you differently on knowing your affinity for it. It would be the equivalent of you saying that you were rain, and we thinking well 'rain' to me is the wet stuff that comes from the clouds so you can't actually be 'rain' to me, you must in my language mean that you are like rain, or that you feel a great affinity for it, or something like that. I could ask you more about your feelings and get a closer picture, then re-describe it in my language as best I can.

Transgender individuals being treated in accord with their gender-identity does not erase the very real struggles of women, or the identities of women. — Moliere

Many feminists disagree strongly, and I understand their arguments. Women have been oppressed for hundreds of years on basis of nothing else but having been born a woman. Not on the basis of feeling like a woman, not on the basis of wearing dresses and having long hair, not even on the basis of sexual organs (since having them removed does not automatically confer equal treatment with men). On the basis of being born a woman. So what other people who are born a woman feel solidarity for and identify with are the group {people who are born a woman} and they have a name for members of that group - "women". It's important to them that they get to identify this group somehow, that they are allowed to give it a name. I don't suppose they much care what name they give it, just a name. Someone who would describe their psychological state as "feeling like a woman" is not a member of this group. A person born a man can secretly "feel like a woman" and still be treated as equal with other men. A person born a woman cannot secretly (or otherwise) "feel like a man" and be treated equally to other men. She is discriminated against solely because she was born a woman. I don't know how much you know about the psychology of surviving discrimination, but (I'll put this in bold so that it might finally get noticed) it is vitally important to the mental health of discriminated groups that they are able to identify with and show solidarity with other members of the same group. The group that is being discriminated against in this case is {people who are born a woman} and requiring that Mary use the term "woman" to describe anyone who "feels like" they're a woman, is taking away her ability to identify the group she feels most solidarity for. It really damaging to her mental health.

Not only that (although that would be enough). A massive part of the feminist struggle has been to have it recognised that being born a woman carries with it absolutely no further constraints or identifying features. That there is nothing more to being a woman that your chromosomes. Again, asking her to use the same term that is used to describe her to describe someone who "feels like a woman" is asking her to acknowledge that they belong in the same group, that's what nouns do, they identify groups by similarities. All things in the group "woman" must have similar features which define them. Mary does not want to be defined by anything that someone could feel, so why should she be forced to change her definition for the group she's naming "women". Her definition of that group is people born a woman (as in people born with XX chromosomes, or more likely those whose outward appearance would suggest such). John does not belong in that group, by her definition, and her definition is very important to her because it means no-one can tell her how she feels just because of the sex she was born. Calling John a "woman" deprives her of her term for this group, and so deprives her of a vitally important part of who she is.

You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? — Dfpolis

Yes, because it's 'one' decision. If I talked about multiple piles of sand, and you spoke of just one big pile, would that be absurd? Is it absurd to say that rather than several oceans, there's only one big sea? There's dozens of situations where cardinality is not clear due to fuzzy definitions. Is a 'decision' to have vanilla ice cream rather than chocolate, or is the decision to eat the flavour you prefer, or is the decision whether to be the sort of person who eats their preferred flavour all the time? Unless you have a complete map of every firing neuron, you have no way of determining what 'decision' is being made. In addition, we don't even know clearly what making a decision is. If I consider all the options and then act in accordance with that balance, have I made a decision, or a calculation?
The way we define 'decision' dictates how we go on to talk about determinism.

I am pointing out that this claim is unjustified by experience, and so we have no reason to believe that my decision is necessitated. — Dfpolis

But don't you see how your 'experience' is not the same as others? Are you really so hubristic as to think that the way you experience the world is exactly as it is and not filtered by your own framework (most of which is built by language).

Experience tells me that it is in my power to go to the store and it is equally in my power to stay home. So, based on experience, two (actually many more) possibilities are equally in my power -- which is my claim. — Dfpolis

No, it can't possibly tell you that because you only did one or the other. Experience tells you it was within your power to do whichever option you actually did. You can't possibly say whether it was in your power to take the other choice because you didn't try it. But this is not a discussion about free will. Sam has quite carefully asked to keep it on topic so I don't we should discuss this further (apologies if I've already taken it to far).

If, instead of standing beside me, looking in the same direction as me, and trying to see what I see — Dfpolis

When to stop is when the dialog partner is unwilling to try to see what one sees. — Dfpolis

Do you realise how arrogant this sounds? Like anyone who doesn't agree with you just isn't trying hard enough. No amount of words can define a thing so accurately as to be assured that what is in your mind is faithfully transferred to mine, so if there's remaining uncertainty, why is it my fault for not trying hard enough. What else am I supposed to try, mind-reading?

Harry has repeatedly denounced and condemned (I use those terms after careful consideration) trans-gender people as "deluded", and their feelings as "delusions". He has stated over and over his outrage at being 'forced' to pander to the delusions of others. I rather think it's this that brands him a bigot, don't you? — Pattern-chaser

No, not really. I've certainly no sympathy for his views in this regard, but I don't think anyone should be labelled a bigot for theorising that believing yourself to be a woman (despite being born a man) might be a delusion in the same vein as believing yourself to be fat when in fact you are thin. Men may well wish to wear dresses, or make-up, but again, no one, including Harry, is denying that. What concerns some people is that the conviction one 'is' something which requires surgery to realise might be a harmful delusion. I don't share that belief, but I don't see how it's bigotry.

Not because you're focusing on it, but because you're trying to break it. — Pattern-chaser

No, I'm arguing that it has already been broken by dismissing the concerns of feminists that the hundreds of years of fighting against being told they are some predetermined 'thing', might be undermined by pressure to use language as if gender was predetermined.

Social pressure is not reasonable or rational. It's red in tooth and claw, if I can steal a phrase from elsewhere. :wink: If we approve of it, we call it one thing, and if we don't, we call it another. In your case, mandation (??? :smile:) "by threat of ostracisation and insult". If we disapprove of the way our children are raised, we call it brainwashing, but if not, we call it education. It's the same thing. And social pressure is not subject to courtesy, sadly. :meh: — Pattern-chaser

Now you seem to be throwing up your hands to ethics. Which is it to be? Are we talking about they way people should behave, or they way they do? You can't argue that people should use the preferred terms of reference and then respond to my concerns about inappropriate social pressure with a shrug.

In this topic, we are (I think) discussing how people request others to address them in a particular way. It is not helpful to list possible objections that others may have, as you have done, and are doing. — Pattern-chaser

I really don't see anyone objecting to this first part, so we have almost universal agreement that people are entitled to make such a request. The part I'm concerned about is what happens next. When someone like Harry comes along and says, "no thank you, I'd rather not" and is labelled a bigot for doing so. The reasonableness of the objections of others to using the terms is the only point of debate.

When we are clear on how people should be addressed, and under what circumstances it is reasonable for them to ask to be addressed in a particular way, maybe then we can proceed to considering whether others might have difficulties with this, and whether this is reasonable of them? — Pattern-chaser

No, we can't work that way because the reasonable objection of some portion of the rest of the population surely must weigh in the decision about how people 'should' be addressed.

I probably wouldn't do it. But why do you concentrate so heavily on breaking courtesy? — Pattern-chaser

Because you said it was common courtesy to call someone by the term they prefer. You brought courtesy up and now your complaining that I'm focusing on it?

Courtesy is a two-way, co-operative, thing. — Pattern-chaser

Exactly, so why is your definition of courtesy that I call you by whatever terms you prefer without asking or caring how that might make me feel? That doesn't sound very two-way to me.

If I ask you to refer to me as 'she/her', it's not like I'm demanding or mandating that you must call me "Pseudonym-is-a-fucking-prick"! I'm not looking to attack you, only to reflect the 'real' me, as I understand it. Will you not do me the courtesy, the favour, of doing as I ask? I will try hard to accommodate your needs in return, if that will help you decide? This is what courtesy is about, and this, I think, is what this topic is about. — Pattern-chaser

No, that's not what's happening here at all. People are being told to refer to trans men as 'her', they are being mandated (by threat of ostracisation and insult), no one is asking how it makes them feel or listening to their concerns, no one is trying to accommodate their needs in return. None of this is happening in this discussion. The demand has been entirely that we should all refer to people by their chosen title and if we don't we're intolerant bigots. No one's even asked how it makes us feel or what they can do in return.

So we both use the term to denote a "particular rank (or similar)", as I wrote. :up: But you are no more God than you are a Lord of the land, so you would still be seeking to deceive or mislead, n'est ce pas? :wink: — Pattern-chaser

No, I'm using the term to describe someone who is deserving of that rank, not one who legally possesses it. So it remains possible for to request you refer to me as 'my lord' by my definition of 'lord'. Also, I note you still haven't answered the question about what you would do if I asked you to refer to me by a word you found deeply offensive. What about if I made up a new word with my own meaning, what about if I asked you to refer to my race as 'African' (I'm white, but I ultimately come from Africa), what about if I asked you to always describe me as very wise because I feel very wise and wisdom is not an objectively measurable thing? I could go on. The idea that I get to dictate how you use any language which refers to me is ludicrous.

On the one hand, we have the way someone sees themselves, and on the other, you introduce worldview, which is the way everyone else sees them. Two quite contrary perspectives, as I'm sure you agree. :up: — Pattern-chaser

Yes, so why do the conclusions from one dictate language use and the conclusion from the other must be ignored because they're 'unhelpful' ?

, lord describes a particular rank (or similar), and you don't hold that rank. It would not be offensive for you to ask to be called "lord", but it would be deceptive and misleading, and that's why it is unreasonable. — Pattern-chaser

But that's only according to your definition of 'lord'. Mine is someone who is lordly as in 'our lord Jesus Christ' and so if I claim that's the way I feel, why would you (or anyone else) not address me ad such. And you haven't answered my point about offensive terms either. There's no 'fact of the mattter' about offensive terms so, if I asked you to refer to me by some word you find horribly offensive would you do so?

It isn't helpful trying to use such a big term in such a small arena as this one. I'm not making a distinction, I'm arguing that the inclusion of worldview, something that applies to half the universe, in a small and contained discussion like this one, is unhelpful. — Pattern-chaser

Firstly, I meant 'that part of a person's world-view which relates to sex and gender' I just didn't feel it was necessary to write the whole thing out, but secondly I also note you've still not explained how it was unhelpful. What is the task we're trying to achieve here, and how does mentioning world-views make it less likely we'll succeed?

If you don't know the answer to your question, there's little point in my explaining. — Pattern-chaser

Seems an odd response. I'd have thought that my no knowing the answer was pretty much the only case in which there would be any point in your explaining.

Still, the question was aimed to get at your reasons, I'm not assuming there's such a thing a the universal reason. My reason would be that 'lord' means something important to some people and I am not that thing. It would therefore be offensive for me to ask them to use the term in my way. But the same applies to 'woman' and you're happy for others to dictate how that term is applied. Hence I'm wondering what your reason could be.

the topic here and now is gender/sex, not worldview. There is no agreement here on how worldview relates to gender issues, or whether it's helpful in discussing them. — Pattern-chaser

Beliefs about gender and sex are part of one's world-view. I don't understand the distinction you're making between the two.

Some people's worldview leads them to want to address people with skin darker than their own using terms that are universally accepted to be offensive. In this case, worldview does not decide the matter. Perhaps this is also the case for gender issues? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

No, the difference is that those people wish to use terms which even they agree are offensive. Terms which they themselves would be offended by if they were used on them. The very purpose is to offend. Its not the same at all.

when someone makes a request - such as "please address me as she/her" - which harms no-one, there's no reason to refuse, is there? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

But I've just given reasons to refuse, you've just ignored them without response. Why is it unreasonable to ask that I'm addressed as 'lord'?

But Bill and William are simply references, they have no other meaning, so the request is a neutral one. The meaning of the word William doesn't have any significant connotations, nor reflect any major world-view. This is not the case with - 'woman' or 'him/her', they are extremely loaded words with years of oppression, struggle and social demand packed into them. It is not a simple request to ask others to use them in the way you personally see fit.

John says "I'm a woman" - meaning that he feels like he is something which he would describe as 'a woman'. It's important to him that his feelings on this are respected because having other people acknowledge his feelings is an important part of being in a social group.

Mary says "you are not a woman" - meaning that the thing she associates with term 'woman' is something you're born with, it has meaning to her that womanhood is nothing more than your biological status because she (as a biological woman) wants to feel she can be anything she wants to be. She feels a bond with those previously oppressed for their biological status and its important to her to have her feelings about this definition respected.

How is one oppressed and the other a bigot?

The separation between the three being biological, sociological, and psychological facts and how we ascertain these things. There's nothing incoherent in applying different methods to determine different sorts of facts, though. It would be foolish to believe there was only one method for determining truth and to use other methods is inconsistent -- mostly because you'd miss out on the varied ways we do, in fact, determine the truth. — Moliere

This I agree with. One cannot dispute the psychological fact of feeling, but feeling 'like you're a woman' applies a meaning to the term 'woman' that is not universal. So the psychological truth is that they feel something which they describe as "feeling like a woman". To understand and to be sympathetic to these feelings requires that we understand their meaning of the word 'woman'. But being sympathetic to their use of the term does not (should not) involve us using the term as they understand it in all our conversations with them. Conversations are a two way thing. One party does not simply dictate the meaning of the terms used to the other, and they certainly don't get to label anyone as a bigot for not complying.

OK, I was in the wrong. My apologies. Please continue.

Bedtime, anyway. — Banno

I appreciate the respect in your apology, but I also respect the honesty in your original remark, so will back out. Thanks.

To respect the way an individual chooses to be addressed is common courtesy. And each individual chooses that for themselves (although their parents give them their names when they're born, as has been noted). That's how it works. I determine how I would like to be addressed, and you respect this. In return, you decide how you wish to be addressed, and I (and everyone else) respect your wishes in return. — Pattern-chaser

You're just reiterating what I've already discussed with Banno without actually addressing the arguments. It is definitely not a matter of common courtesy to address people how they would like to be addressed. If I asked people to address me a 'lord' because I felt I was a god, it would not be common courtesy to comply with that request. Absolutely no one would comply. If I asked to be called by some word other people found offensive, absolutely no one would comply with that request. I don't know where you're getting this idea from that normal courtesy is to use all words that refer to people in the way those people prefer. It's simply not the case.

Words like 'him' and 'her' are used in different ways by different people and their use reflects the world-view of the people using them. I think you're mistaking 'not helpful' with 'not agreeing with me'.

You are in the way of a conversation I am having with March. — Banno

Fine. I wasn't aware that this had become a private forum.

Cool. I have no access to the entire experience of time, and so I will have to take your word for it. — Banno

But you have access to your entire experience of time, no? Is any of it available to other people via their senses? Or does the entirety of it have to be constructed in language in order to be inter-subjectivly analysed?

After having bumped into a horse, I can place it in someone else's path and watch them bump into it. My physical response matches theirs and so I have understood something about horses (you can't walk through them) without the need for language. I can establish horses "exist" in such a way. I cannot do the same with time.

Of course experience is in one's mind. — Banno

Yeah, if you're not going to actually follow the line of argument but just critique half-sentences to sound superior then there's not a lot of point in arguing. The sentence here specifies the entire experience of time, not experiences in general, and it is in the context of explaining how the term 'exists' can be used of unicorns differently to the way it can be used of 'time'. The experience we would expect of unicorns is one which interacts with our physical world, the world we sense. When no such interaction takes place, a term "doesn't exist" seems appropriate. Time is not a thing in the sense that we would expect some empirical interactions with it, as such "doesn't exist" is a grammatical error. It's simply not the sort of thing which is described by the term "exists" because it is entirely constructed in our minds rather than directly observable with our senses.

Sorry, my wording was ambiguous. I'm not making a claim about the existence of time, I'm saying that the entire experience of it is constructed in our minds, we cannot point to it, or bump into it. As such any attempt at inter-subjective analysis relies entirely on language (ie there is nothing left to analyse after language has been taken away). With the horse, after we take away the language describing our experience of the horse, there's still the actual horse.

No, change is not in the horse category, because we cannot simply look at it to see it exists, we cannot point to change, we experience it, which leaves open the possibility that we simply think we experience it. We must therefore describe the experience, and there, language becomes the framework which determines that definition. As such, an analysis of language gets at how we have constructed the experience of 'time' in a more complete sense than it gets at the experience of 'horse'. After we remove all the subjectivity about 'horse' something (probably) still remains. Once we've removed all the linguistic construction of the concept of 'time' nothing is left behind.

The concept is of a thing in spacetime such that we can look and see it isn't there.

For starters, we say unicorns don't exist, but they do have a role in our language. But we do say horses exist, and they aren't simply a role in language, but are animals who don't need us to talk about them to be. — Marchesk

But this is already a grammatical error because horses and (the proposed) unicorns are both things, objects in spacetime which can either be there or not. To presume the same of 'time' is either to beg the question, or, as I say, make a grammatical error. The investigations of language can uncover that error.

It might be what you think of as courtesy but I can assure you it most certainly is not 'common'. Try it and see how many people comply.

It's a question of common curtesy to address someone as they prefer to be addressed. Mary's refusal to show basic respect for another person tells us something about Mary. Perhaps that she has far too great a concern for the contents of other people's underwear. But also a fear of people who are just a bit different. — Banno

No it isn't. If someone wishes to be addressed as 'lord' it is not common courtesy to comply with that request. If someone wishes to be addressed as 'bitch' it is not common courtesy to comply with that request. Language is a two-way process of agreeing how we should refer to things. The agreements we arrive a say a lot (some would argue, everything) about who we are and how we understand the world. It is disrespectful of autonomy for one person to consider they have the authority to determine language use alone in the exchange.

What tells us something is that you consider yourself to be sufficiently authoritative to suggest that Mary's 'concern' for the contents of other people's underwear is 'too great'. Maybe, in Mary's world-view, addressing people according to the contents of their underwear is an important part of how she sees the world, maybe not hugely important (that would be weird) but as significant as the clothes she wears or the style of her hair. It may be that Mary would prefer not to acknowledge the concept of 'feeling like' a woman, and for her, the only way to do this is to apply gender terms on strictly biological grounds. If that upsets people, then some kind of compromise is required, but this doesn't make Mary a bigot, it's just part of how we try to get on with one another despite our differences.

Perhaps Mary would have an issue if John preferred to call her Molly. Or Mark. I think in these circumstances that it is definitely the case that Mary's self-identification is preferred. — angslan

Not at all. One might consider it crucially important to one's world-view that proper names are bestowed by parents, not the person themselves. In that case, it would be imposing on that person's world-view for Mary to demand of them that they now refer to her as Molly. The clash would have to be resolved. Maybe by discussion, maybe by some compromise. What it wouldn't be resolved by is making it an act of violent bigotry against Mary simply to have (and wish to express in one's language) the world-view that names should be given by parents.

You're mistaking that fact that such a world-view is uncommon, and where present not vehemently held, for the fact of their being some ethical 'wrongness' to it.

The world-view that categorical 'genders' as a thing that one simply is, don't exist is not only a commonly held world-view, but it is very important to many people in defining who they are, particularly many feminists use the concept as a basis for their philosophy. To tell them that they are no longer allowed to express that world-view requires a discussion about relative harms, not a slagging match.

As ever with these threads the debate gets quickly moved to people's pet issues and I realise I haven’t actually answered your question.

I was involved for a while in social psychology, mostly environmental ethics and child development, and it was at that time that I read PI. What I took from it was what I later found out to be the 'therapeutic' interpretation (I know, a psychologist reading a book and presuming therapy, who'd have thought it?). The way it influenced my thinking was to see a whole different way of looking at discussions between opposing views. Instead of seeing them as processes designed to reach some idealistic end goal, I started to think of them as stone masons trying to carve likenesses of their ideas but all they have is sledgehammers. You can definatly rough out something usefully resembling a concept, but you have to know when to stop otherwise all you end up with is a pile of rubble.

Its particularly true of child development issues. You have to know when to stop asking the child to further define their issues, and simply accept the rough sketch. In my experience, it usually much earlier than many psychologists seem to think.

The question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? — Dfpolis

It won't. What it might do is get you to see that there is nothing further to be resolved. It's like one person describing the field as 'emerald green' and another describing is as 'like a sea of grass' and then you arguing with them assuming they therefore think the grass is blue. Both of you are describing grass, you're just picking out different aspects of it in your language.

You and the determinist are both describing the same experience of life. The determinist is not suggesting that it 'feels like' they are being controlled by the pre-determined forces of nature, neither is the non-determinist (of whatever persuasion) claiming that one's environment or history has no influence.

The point they disagree on is exactly the point at which actual experience ceases to provide any further data. It 'feels like' we have choices, but that's as far as we can examine it by self-reflection. The rest is just a more or less complex story of how we think that feeling might be generated by 'the way the world really is'. Like any story, different people will pick out different aspects, and like any description it is contained entirely in language, and is entirely a social act to communicate to another.

The point in highlighting the circularity of definition was not to undermine the concept of defining a word at all, but to emphasise how blunt a tool it is. The more synonyms you add to your definition, the more focus you bring to the concept, but you very quickly run out of words, the most you can do is take a vague concept and make it slightly less vague. The insight from Wittgenstein, for me, is to recognise the bluntness of language. It's not to throw out the whole project of trying to understand one another, it's to know when to stop.

The idea that any of this could have been resolved through supplying an appropriate definition, or impeded forever by supplying inappropriate definitions, is really far off the mark. It was mostly worked through by people hashing it out, and was enabled by the civil rights movements for people of colour and women. Political problems don't arise or go away through the analysis of language, they arise and go away through targeted change of social systems and behavioural change on a large scale. — fdrake

I don't know if you intended to address this point to me or Sam, but, given your range of "philosophical" problems not tied up with language problems, I'm guessing this is supposed to serve as an example?

The problem for me is that you seem to a) have a very wide definition of Philosophy, and b) have mostly picked examples from the very fuzzy edge of that definition.

From a sociological perspective, all that happened with the sub-groups of feminism achieving some of their goals was that they found a means of presenting their issues in a form which made those currently in power positions consider it expedient to their own agenda to resolve them (or stand aside and allow them to be resolved). It's a political game. Psychology, maybe; Game Theory, almost certainly (although probably not consciously so), but Philosophy? I don't see the function it served other than post-hoc rationalisation of that which was going to happen anyway as a result of the shifting power balance within the groups.

I'm looking for people who have given significant thought to the issues, but I don't want to keep people out of the discussion. I say this to give some guidelines for what I'm looking for. There is something to be said for studying these ideas at length and coming to a conclusion, but sometimes even then one wonders about the quality of the thoughts or conclusions. — Sam26

I understand, but surely you're not so hubristic to think that your version of 'significant thought' is going to be universally understood? That's why I was wondering if you were hinting at something more objective (like academic qualifications), but that's cleared the question up, thanks.

So tell me how linguistic analysis can help if nobody agrees on the meaning of the terms? — Marchesk

By shaking the certainty that there is a 'problem' out there which requires anyone's help in that sense.