We go the way we are drawn. Absent a counter-veiling draw, no choice is presented, no preference is selected. — Arne

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here.

Say I have a preference for vanilla ice-cream. I don't choose this preference (at least not in the moment), it is simply there as a brute fact. So when I'm faced with two choices of ice-cream, I will either choose the one I prefer, because I prefer it. Or deliberately choose one I do not prefer (maybe to expand my tastes, or simply out of self-flagellation). But if I'm given two meals, one of which is prepared with vanilla, and one of which is not. I may be 'drawn' to the one that has vanilla in it, even if I can't determine why. It's still because I prefer vanilla, it hasn't become some mystic force compelling me toward one particular meal. All that's happened is, absent of any other reason, I choose the one which reflects my preferences. I might be well aware I'm doing that, or I might be doing it subconsciously. I'm not sure what significance the distinction between those two routes has to the OP. Perhaps you could lay it out a bit?

It's a defensible position because people defend it. I't just basic empiricism.

Why don't you defend it then? — tom

I don't believe it myself. I'm a fairly committed naturalist so I've no interest in defending it.

Yes, if God is the answer, then we have one extremely convoluted plan. Reminds me of the ways in which the villains would try to kill James Bond, they never just shoot him, do they?

We reject Solipsism and it's related theories because, if you take them seriously they reveal themselves not to be simplified world-views, but rather indefensible over-elaborations of Realism. — tom

You've slipped in the word 'indefensible' here without justification. What grounds do we have to suggest that it is 'indefensible' I believe there are a number of religious scholars and even a few religious philosopher who defend the idea, so it seems entirely defensible to me.

Then you have equated simplicity with the adoption of ideas. You might prefer simple explanations (I do to), but you have no grounds for saying that simple explanation are more 'right' than less simple ones.

It can't be difficult to agree that this is a two-way street. Linguistic communities create the general game. And individual players make creative use of the resulting space of free actions. Eventually new linguistic habits can emerge from those creative uses because they seem generally useful at the communal level (rather than just tentatively useful at the personal creative level on some occasion or other).

So any argument that tries to establish that only one side of the deal is in control - the community or the author - is a waste of breath. The interesting question is about characterising the dynamic in play. (Which is where a systems style constraints approach makes the most sense.) — apokrisis

Exactly. This is what I was trying to convey. The author selects from meanings which already exist (or are implied by existing uses) that will communicate the message. We keep using the word 'tree', but it's actually a terrible example considering the point of the OP which is to imply that some progress could be made in philosophical discourse if words were defined first. I opposed that by claiming that at no point in time would we become any clearer as to what vague philosophical terms actually mean by describing them in other terms. In this sense, the fact that meaning is use is the most pertinent aspect of the whole field of language. It makes the point that people will make use of the terms in an argument vaguely, even rhetorically, as place-holders for concepts that don't exist, as place-holders for concepts that might exist but with know idea how...etc. All sorts of uses, none of which are connected to some referential definition. I don't deny that the language user has a part to play in evolving definitions, but it's their part in the game that matters to me here.

Yep. So you are forcing the synchronic, history-flattening, view on the issue when the diachronic, or developmental, view is the one that is going to see the whole deal.

Actual human experience of society and culture tells us that games evolve their rules all the time. They are always fiddling with the rules of rugby, Wall St, or the highway code. — apokrisis

So, as above, the intention behind my ignoring the historical aspect was not to deny it a place in understanding meaning, but to suggest that it was unimportant in this particular argument. I'm trying to say that the mechanics of how a word comes to mean what it does in a particular language game does not help us understand why further definitions are of no use in philosophical discourse to clarify vague terms. I'm not suggesting it's of no use at all. The entire history of the use and evolution of the word 'rational' within the language game played by philosophers, for example, has been part of the rhetoric of philosophy. We couldn't go back over it's evolution to help us understand how it's being used in an argument that, say, belief in God is not rational. It's use in that proposition is entirely rhetorical, it's meaning here is determined by the game being played now, it's not been guided by some external essence, like the word 'tree', it's been guided entirely by it's function within the same sort of language game within which it evolved.

Talk of trees, and their treeness, isn't arbitrary. It is talk about some deep fact of the world - a fact about how the world plays its "games" of structuring form. The universe has actual "rules" - or rather, its universal forms, its simplest possible and so most widely observed constraints on random variety. — apokrisis

I think I've covered this above, in that what I'm saying applies more to words used within philosophical discussion that words sunsu lato. Even here though, it would be worth tempering your appeal to universal essences. The word 'tree' actually seems to derives from the root 'deru' which means strong and steadfast. So It was originally trying to get at the tree's firm and unyielding nature, not it's multi-branching form. The word has also been used (particularly in Middle English) to describe a number of things simply made of wood, regardless of their form. The use of the word tree to describe many things of a multi-branching form is very recent. So, I buy into the idea that authors use their creativity to come up with new uses of a word which are accepted on their merits, I also buy into the idea that the recognition of patterns guides people in that creative endeavour, but I don't see how the imposition by the world of these constraints tells us anything useful because we cannot see them in advance. All we can say is that all future uses of the word 'tree' will be somehow constrained by our preference for pattern over randomness. It is unlikely that a new use will arise which is not in some way connected to past uses, but we cannot possibly say in what way, so I'm not sure what use such an approach is.

While it is certainly possible to believe both, they are not equivalent beliefs. The former is not in conflict with fact or reason, the later is. — Rank Amateur

God created the earth in 6 days 6000 years ago and in doing so constructed it in such a way as to appear much older to our limited technology. What's in conflict with fact or reason in that account?

We choose certain words because those are the strings of symbols that we learned to refer to anything. — Harry Hindu

Right, so the word already had a meaning before the author writes it. It has to, otherwise the author would have no reason to select it. If the word had a meaning before the author writes it, then it's meaning cannot just be whatever the author intends. There is some property of the word 'tree' which already exists prior the the author's selecting it, which make it good choice for him to convey the idea of the tall plant in the woods.

The question of meaning is not about how a word comes to mean what it does within the language community, its about what it means already within that community, and we've just established, it must mean something already before the author uses it, in order for him to make a non-arbitrary selection. So your contention that the meaning of a word is whatever the speaker has in mind when they employ it, is simply wrong.

Instead, we always try to get at the intent of the user of those words. — Harry Hindu

No, we don't. If an author uses the word 'tree', I assume he means either the tall plant, or maybe some multi-branching diagram. I make absolutely no investigation of what the author intended beyond selecting from the established uses of the word in context. I don't ask them to elaborate unless I'm confused, I don't look to some published glossary of their personal meanings. I expect it to mean one of the things it already means within the language game I'm playing. So again, the meaning of the word already exists and the author must necessarily adhere to the rules of the language game or else he will not be understood.

If we could project our meanings, then how do we get anything wrong? — Harry Hindu

I've never suggested that we get to project our meanings any more than the author gets to project theirs. The meaning of a word is its use in the language game. It's determined by the interaction of both players and the millions of language speakers who have gone before them, and the nature of the language game being played.

How is the fact that it evidently doesn't work, despite 2000 years of trial, not an inherent flaw. If someone gave me a new phone and it didn't function, I wouldn't expect to have to find the exact diode that had failed before being entitled to conclude that the phone didn't work.

If you want an account of those flaws, you could read Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, even Heidegger(if you must), or any of the many ordinary language philosophers, existentialists, quietists, pragmatists, all of whom in various ways have found flaws in the process. But that's not the point. The point is that you personally would not find their arguments compelling. What they see as flaws, you would not, and how do you resolve that problem? You can't keep discussing it until one of you agrees with the other, that's the very method that's being examined so to continue already begs the question. You can't simply presume they're mistaken, they're at least as intelligent as you are and possessed of the same empirical and a priori knowledge. So you can only conclude that the truth of the matter is unobtainable, or you're some kind of unique genius. It's up to you which.

You seem to be missing out an entire, crucially important stage and that's what I'm trying to ask you about (and I think that's what Banno's trying to get at too).

Your process seems to go like this;

1. You have a sensation/thought in your mind which you convert to a sign (word) which somehow represents that sensation/thought.
2. You say that word or write it and I hear it or read it.
3. I then try to convert that word into a sensation or thought hopefully close to the one you had.

This seems to me to encapsulate entirely what you're saying about communication, and I don't think anyone's disagreeing with you. But none of that is what the philosophical discussion of meaning is about. Philosophical discussions of meaning are about how you know what words are good ones to use to represent your sensation/thought. You don't just pick some random word, so how do you know which one to pick? That is the meaning of the word, its the reason you chose it to represent the sensation/thought you wanted to communicate. Why choose 'tree'? Because it somehow is already the sound that is most likely to get the same image into my mind that you have in yours (that of a tree). So if meaning is whatever you intend, then what is that thing which is clearly a property of the word 'tree' which led you to choose it to do that job?

Doing all I can possibly do and then accepting I have done all I can possibly do is a good psychological outcome. — raza

So how is combining with others who feel the same and using whatever emotional means are at your disposal to influence those in power not one of the thing you can "possibly do"? You're saying it's reasonable for people to do everything in their power to retrieve what they believe is theirs, but then arbitrarily denying some of the methods by which they might do that.

Everyone can claim to be affected negatively by history. — raza

Not with equal veracity they can't. The poor are not definitively descended from other poor people. Black people are pretty definitely descended from other black people so their heritage (and therefore the effect history has had on them) is much more certain.

History may well have negatively affected me, but I've got no good reason to think it has. Some groups simply have a better reason than others.

So if I stole your wallet from you you wouldn't 'demand' it back, you wouldn't be able to utter the expression "give me back my wallet!" without feeling the need to seek psychiatric help?

Yes, so how does any of that change the fact that the treatment of slaves materially affected their descendants?

To simplify, if your father stole from my father such that now you are now rich and I am poor, how is my contention that my poverty is caused (at least in part) by your father's actions a psychological issue? Its quite a simple material issue. I now have less money than I would have had because your father stole from mine. If I'm excessively angry or upset about that I might need to address my psychological issues, but asking you to share some of the wealth you gained to redress the harm done is an entirely material claim. It could be done calmly and rationally or emotionally and bombastically.

There are many ways to address the psychological without necessarily seeing a psychiatrist. — raza

The point is, what in all of this is 'psychological'. People who have been affected by slavery as a consequence of their heritage tend to be poorer with fewer social and educational opportunities. How are they 'psychological'?

Yes, and slavery obviously had impacts on the descendents of slaves in addition to the slaves themselves. The first generation faced resentment and bigotry which made it harder to get earn money and limited social opportunity. The next generation faced prejudice resulting from the predominantly low social class of the first generation, resulting from slavery. The third generation suffer from low educational opportunity, low investment and prejudice caused by the previous generation's status, which in turn was caused by that of the generation before, which in turn was caused by slavery.

I don't understand what you're finding so hard to comprehend about this that you think anyone who feels affected by slavery needs a psychiatrist.

As I said in my original post, are you suggesting that it is not possible for historical events to have a continued real impact on people in contemporary society? At what point does the impact of events stop? Is it immediately after they have happened? Do events somehow only affect the people alive at the time? If there was a wildfire during one generation which destroyed a forest, would the next generation miraculously find the forest had returned because the event is only able to affect the generation alive at the time? I'm baffled by your logic here.

Yes, just not in an order which made any sense.

What?

As another example, those who relate to the black victim herd, can find a way to accept restitution for slavery, even though this all happened a century before they were born. Again, an attachment to that herd, extrapolates the ego beyond their own reality. — wellwisher

How does the fact that it happened a century before they were born prevent it from having a detrimental effect on their reality today? Are you suggesting that events are isolated and none have any influence on how the future pans out?

Put into your terms, the cause is (as you say) an idea in someone else's head, and the effect is an idea in yours. The spoken words are merely transport. — Pattern-chaser

Yes. Cause and effect. I think you might be getting it. — Harry Hindu

So how do you differentiate brain effects to decide which one is the 'meaning'? If you say the word 'tree' to me all sorts of things happen in my brain, audial signalling, random noise filtering, associations, conciousness flickering. I might be reminded of my coat which I left hanging on that tree over there, or my first garden with the big oak tree in it. If you said 'tree' very loudly to me when I was sleeping, I would actually be woken up by the word and all the chain of conciousness would be started by it. Which one of these 'effects' is the meaning?

Socratic Method: come up with a hypothesis definition of 'freedom'; test it against examples in the common language that use the term; repeat until it cannot be falsified; Bob's your uncle. — Samuel Lacrampe

So this leads to what I consider to be the most interesting question raised by your approach. What's wrong with all the people who disagree about the meaning of a word? Take a look at the torturous 61 page discussion on the meaning of the word 'Belief'. What do you think has happened here? Is it that despite the Socratic method being around for more than 2000years, no-one (except you) has thought to apply it to the meanings of words, or is it that they have but the process simply takes more than 2000 years to resolve (in which case I don't have much hope for the technique helping much on this forum), or is it, just possibly, that it doesn't work?

OP was prompted by a discussion I was following about "what happens after you die." Someone commented to the effect "we do not know if the soul is a material thing. it could be that it lives on after the body dies."

The comment was met with the one word demand "proof!"

I was struck by the rudeness of the response in light of the personal and intimate nature of the comment. — Arne

I think if you'd have started the OP with this, the discussion would have been very different.

Anyway, to analyse this particular exchange;

Firstly, the proposition was specifically about what we don't know and what "could" be the case, so any proof of such a claim would not be in the form of empirical evidence anyway. Proving that something "could" be the case is only a matter of demonstrating that there are no agreed on facts about the world which prevent it. So technically, this exchange has nothing to do with empirical evidence and I can see no reason to believe that the opponent meant empirical proof and not argumentative proof.

But let's say for the sake of discussion, that the claim was "a soul lives on after the body dies" (without the 'could be'. Then the person would be making a claim about the properties of an object (the soul) which they claim exists in the shared experience. In this case, a request (hopefully politely) for empirical proof would be entirely appropriate. The philosophical proposition here would have strayed into territory best covered by science. To use your analogy, it would the the proposer who was talking about pizza but measuring it by their musical judgement, the interlocutor is the one asking that pizza be measured by the taste of pizza.

What we talk of as 'real' has to be tangible, measurable, understable, at least in principle, by science - otherwise what are you talking about? (Which is basically what Pseudonym is asking.) — Wayfarer

This is why I do not personally find Scientism compelling, but I do find it's diametric opposite offensive, hence my preference that it remain a valid world-view. What we "talk" of should, of course, remain unrestricted insofar as it does not risk harm to others, but in discussions about Scientism vs Philosophy, what's at stake is not circumscribing what can be "talked" about, it is is defining authority and authority (in a positive social environment) comes from agreement (think democracy).

We can only agree on that which can be measured. A measure is a scale in the shared world which we can go to to find agreement. It has absolutely nothing to do with materialism or physicalism, as primary world-views, those are just consequences.

Even if we took something as entirely material as the height of objects. If we had no external scale, no agreed on measurements of height, then it would not make sense to talk about height either, despite it being entirely material. There would be not point in me comparing the animal I've seen which I describe as "quite tall", to the one that my friend sees which he describes as "very tall". We can gain nothing useful from that exchange because neither of us has any idea how tall the other's animal actually is relative to our own internal experience.

So, that which is measured on some external, agreed upon scale, deriveds authority from the widespread agreement on that scale. A scientists who measures the speed of light in the widely agreed upon scale of kilometres per hour is inviting anyone else to measure the same thing on the same scale. He is not claiming personal authority to make pronouncements about the real world, we all agreed on the scale, it's publicly available (kilometres and hours, that is), so any proposition using it has a fair and just authority.

With Philosophical and theological propositions, this is not the case. A spiritual experience of one person cannot be measured on a publicly agreed on scale, so has no just authority. St Paul may well "talk" about his life experiences, but he cannot claim any more authority of spiritual matter than my Grandma because his experiences are not measurable by something which has widespread agreement. It is this sort of talk which offends me. "In Leviticus it says...", "the Buddha said...", Kant proves..., "Plato shows us that..." etc. None of these things have any just authority to be considered above any other simply because the standards by which they are shared are not widely agreed on. It's not that we can't "talk" about them, but that's not all we do is it? We "declare" things about them, we Pronounce things, we pay tax-payers money to further the study of them, we make laws about protecting those who believe in them. And that's just in the modern democratic countries. Elsewhere we make laws condemning people to death simply for opposing them, make laws which force people to follow what they say no matter how much unhappiness it brings them. It's a hell of a lot more than just "talking"

I am rarely bothered by a reasonable counter argument that raises the issue of empirical "proof" in regard to a reasonably argued philosophical proposition.

But yes, I am always pained when a reasonably argued philosophical proposition is met with a "demand" for empirical "proof." — Arne

So your proposition is now just that some people are quite rude?

So you're claiming that those who respond to your argument by demanding proof are being disingenuous, but your own technique appears to be to simply write something and then refuse to explain it when pushed. I'm not sure I see the improvement.

I think you can safely assume that all parties are using the term 'proof' in the wider sense in which it is used in discourse rather than the narrower sense in philosophy of science. That's certainly how I've understood it in any case. I take it to mean simply that one should provide some measure of correspondence with repeatable inter-subjective sense data, not that one must provide the final and incontrovertible data that demonstrates something is the case.

If you want to argue with what I say rather than what you say I am saying, feel free to do so. — Arne

I'm having great trouble understanding what it is you're saying. As far as I can gather from your recent post, your argument is that some philosophical proposition are not amenable to the demand for proof, yet some are. You also seem to be accusing those who make demands for proof of disingenuity. This is where I'm getting lost. If you agree with the proposition that some philosophical propositions are amenable to demands for proof (the second half of your first proposition), then you are in complete agreement so far with those you seem "pained" by. They too evidently believe that some philosophical propositions are amenable to demands for proof, namely the ones about which you are debating.

A demand for "proof" is not a counter argument to a reasonably argued philosophical proposition. Instead, it is a red herring and you know it. — Arne

Whereas arguing that "... it is a red herring and you know it" is a much more reasonable example of a counter argument?

would it be unreasonable for me to suspect that you may be trying to make my position appear more extreme than it is? I sure hope you are not doing that. — Arne

You have said that you are always pained when you see a philosophical position met with a demand for proof. You have entreated us to "not demand proof", and when Wayfarer described you view as opposing the position "that philosophical views require scientific evidence" you responded affirmatively. Given this, and that the idea that "some philosophical propositions do not require empirical proof" is pretty much globally accepted already, I don't think is was entirely uncharitable of me to interpret your position as I did.

1. At no point did I say it was meaningless. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of my argument is that a demand for empirical "proof" is less likely (perhaps significantly so) to be valid within the realm of philosophy than in the realm of science. Consequently, there is reason to suspect the demand may be less meaningful in one realm than in another. So your claim that I said a demand for proof is meaningless is at best an unreasonable interpretation of my position. — Arne

So, if I understand this correctly, you're saying that some calls for proof may be less valid in philosophy than they would be in science. I think that's a fairly uncontroversial proposition, but I'm struggling to see then why you would be "always a bit pained when I see a reasonably argued philosophical proposition met with the simple demand "proof."", and entreat us "If you disagree with a reasonably argued philosophical proposition, then make a reasonable counter argument. But do not demand "proof."". These sound very unlike the conclusions one would draw simply from a realisation that some philosophical propositions do not lend themselves to proof. Surely the excersice here should be to take issue with each request for proof on its merits then, rather than damn the entire practice to purgatory.

I'm not sure what my countering with the majority parts of your statements as opposed to the entirety has to do with the argument.

As I understand it, you are taking issue with people demanding proof of philosophical propositions, yes? So, I'm saying, of those situations you are taking issue with, many fall into one of two camps, both of which can actually be defended.

I haven't, to my knowledge, made any comment whatsoever about your view of the division between philosophy and science nor on the totality or otherwise of your definitions thereof.

Are you suggesting that you hold no positions to be valid yet not persuasive to you personally? That every position you hear must be categorised in those which you either wholeheartedly support and those which you deny outright? That really is a more dogmatic stance than I thought even you capable of.

↪Wayfarer
You nailed it. "Scientism" is the word. Thank you. :smile: — Arne

I'm not a proponent of Scientism, but I am a passionate defender of it's right to be considered just as valid a philosophical position as any other, so I will try to make a defence of it here.

The problem comes down to philosophical statements about philosophy - meta-philosophy, my area of interest. What you're saying is that demanding proof of a philosophical statement is meaningless because it deals only with that realm which cannot be proven. This sounds perfectly sensible on the surface, but the problem arises in two main areas.

Firstly, the cry of "proof!" may well be levied in a philosophical argument, but what it often means is that the propositions has strayed into the territory of science. Consider as simple example of ordinary language philosophy. A counter-argument might run... "...but that's just not how we use the word 'x'". Here the ordinary language philosopher might either have cause to adapt their theory, but equally they might quite rightly cry "proof!". After all, language use is a thing in the real world, it can be measured. Dictionaries spend millions on research to work out that exact question, 'what does a word mean to the language users?', so a demand of proof to the counter-argument that the word is simply not used some particular way is not entirely unreasonable.

You can see how this extends in phenomenology, free-will, determinism, conciousness - in all these areas philosophers are very prone to making statements which rely on some empirical data which may or may not actually be the case, but is treated as if it is for the sake of the argument.

Second, there's the meta-position itself. Again, I think you might be misreading what the cry of "proof!" actually implies. In this second instance it's being used in the positivist sense that "if you cannot provide proof, then your statement is meaningless". Again, I wouldn't adopt this position myself, but I would defend it's right to be considered a valid position by the very token you're trying to use. On what grounds could you categorically dismiss the proposition that "all statements (except this one) about 'the way things are' without empirical proof of things actually being that way, are meaningless". You certainly couldn't dismiss it on the grounds of empirical evidence - you can't measure meaning. You could dismiss it as self-referential, but on what grounds can you categorically dismiss self-referential statements. The liar paradox, for example, can be solved for particular modalities (see Tarski) and that's a self-referential statement so they're not intrinsically impossible to analyse.

Basically, I think you mis-characterise Scientism. It's just saying that statements in public discourse about 'the way things are' should be empirically falsifiable. You may not agree, I certainly don't, but what you can't do is dismiss the position and yet still claim that those who hold it are unable to similarly dismiss other philosophical propositions as meaningless.

If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way. — Arne

Interesting. If your argument is that questions with yes/no answers are of little philosophical meaning and are rarely perused by philosophers (a position I'm inclined to agree with), I wonder how you justify your assertion quoted above. Surely it is just as possible that he will be entirely unmoved by an in depth analysis of Heidegger.

Philosophy seems ever caught up in this contradiction. Even such seemingly obvious ideas such as that I have a hand simply because I see one in front of me (per Moore) is considered up for debate and open to question, yet the idea that Heidegger (or similar) is saying something meaningful goes virtually unquestioned,by the same group of people.

Edit - "Either his ontology is correct or it is not." - Arne

That's essentially the distinction I'm suggesting is confused. I can't really conceive of 'intellugence' as a latent ability to deal with complexity. Both mathematics and music are complex in their own ways yet there are those good at one but not the other. Surely if they were possessed of some abstract ability they would be innately good at both?

It seems, at the very least, that latent abilities are more diverse than one measure can capture.

In addition though, I find the traditional distinction between intelligence and wisdom that you've outlined problematic. If we accept wisdom as being the ability to arrive at the 'right' answer to some problem, then 'intelligence' is left defining something that I'm not sure justifies any distinction.

If we say that an intelligent man will be able to solve a maths problem, but a wise man would be able to work out that the problem itself is a waste of time and instead simply enjoy his day, then all we're really saying is that intelligence is the ability to solve a fairly narrow and arbitrarily defined set of problems.

The problem "what should I do with my day?" is solved best by the wise man, the problem "what note should follow this one?" is solved best by the musician, the problem "which shape comes next in this sequence...?" is solved best by the intelligent person. This seems to describe how the words are used, but then not the wider meaning attached to 'intelligent',which is always something more than just 'good at solving a specific range of problems'.

the fact that we speak about intelligence in a discriminating way, prooves that at least the ones who do this have at least some intuitive way of quantification they believe to be true enough to talk about it. — Tomseltje

Not necessarily. This would require a presumption that the intention of the language user is to accurately communicate some fact. Given what we know of human psychology, I think that's probably unlikely.

Should have tagged you in to the above response. It's aimed at your comment too.

To be honest, I'm inclined to agree.

I think intelligence, in the way we use the word, must mean something like 'the ability to successfully (and perhaps also efficiently) carry out some task or other which is not exclusively learnt by muscle-memory'

Hence my conclusion that on this simple level, intelligence can be tested - simply set a mixed range of such tasks and the person who succeeds at most, the most efficiently is the most intelligent.

Its complicated by two things. The first is that intelligence usually must act on knowledge. We must do something with the known facts to produce the result. So if we're claiming to be testing something innate, the only way to do so would be to ensure all examinees have exactly the same knowledge. Pretty much impossible, I think.

The second complication (which the anecdote is really about) comes from the fact that acquiring knowledge, practicing problem solving (in whatever field from maths to music), and even taking intelligence tests, are themselves all part of the larger task (that of living life). So one could conceivably do well in any of these specific tasks, but actually doing well in any of them is not a particularly successful way of solving the overarching problem that they are just a small part of.

Its like an engineer building a really efficient aircraft engine which consequently is too heavy for the aircraft to carry. We would like to applaud his skill in creating such an efficient engine, but really putting all that time and effort into fuel-efficiency without considering weight wasn't very smart. Similarly, dedicating one's life to solving p vs np whilst neglecting to solve the need for companionship, family, sunshine, good food and physical excersice, would equally not be very smart.