A decision is a commitment to a course of action based on a consideration of alternate courses of action. — Dfpolis

You've just replaced 'decision' with 'commitment', how do the two terms differ in this context?

A "line of action" is a continuous sequence of events. — Dfpolis

I'm really not going to carry on like this, but can you define an event? Where does one event end and the next one start. This is important because if you can define a single event then you can't say that existence is not one single event which undermines the argument against determinism somewhat.

To be possible means that the contrary is not necessary. — Dfpolis

More definition by symonym (or antonym in this case). What is it for a thing to be necessary? Necessary for what?

And you're sure what an 'essence' is? Have you read no debates on the meaning of 'subjective?

But I don't think this is actually the case for every problem in professional philosophy — Marchesk

Is that just wishful thinking, or do you have some reason to think this? If you could provide an example of some philosophical terms whose meaning you think is widely agreed on (with a rough idea of what that agreed meaning is), that might help.

OK, so if you actually want to do this. Define 'decision' without begging the question. Define a 'line of action' without assuming cause and effect. Define what it means for something to be 'possible' without presuming either determinism, or some arbitrary constraints.

We each understand our terms in the same way. — Dfpolis

I don't think they do. I don't think we even agree what it is to 'understand' a thing.

I would like to get feedback from those of you who have a solid philosophical background, or who have a solid science background. The reason I ask this, is that I would like to keep the discussion on a higher level of discourse. — Sam26

Just hoping I haven’t joined in without proper qualification. Presuming you yourself intend to take part in this 'higher level of discourse' perhaps you could let us know what level of qualification you are so that we know the target we're aiming for?

'm of the opinion that the majority of philosophical problems are not primarily linguistic in nature. — Marchesk

If you can describe a philosophical problem and then define each word you just used in a way that will gain even a substantial minority of agreement then I'd be prepared to concede this. Thus far, I've not found such a thing to be possible. In health problems one can resort to pointing at the condition (or a photograph of it) and observing the remedy. There's no such resort with philosophy, hence it is entirely wrapped up in the understanding of language.

So now long-established conventions are what determine right behaviour? You can see where that leads in respect to transgender issues surely. For the sake of your own argument you'll need a better justification than that.

Notwithstanding the above, the form is asking how you would like to be addressed. I've already agreed that such a request is harmless. The form doesn't go on to make it a social or legal duty for everyone to comply with that request does it?

The thing that's being restricted is the act of speaking, the very personal construction of the world that is encoded in one's grammar. Language is what defines our species, it plays such an important role in constructing our world-view that some intelligent people have even argued that such advanced thoughts are not even possible without it. To dictate to someone how they must use their language is to dictate how they must form their world-view. It's no trivial matter.

It's the difference between John choosing the title she is addressed by, and Mary choosing the title by which John must be called. — Pattern-chaser

What is that difference? John would like people to to refer to him a particular way. He would like everyone to use the terms 'Mr' and 'Mrs' to refer to the way people act and feel. Mary would prefer to use the terms 'Mr' and 'Mrs' (or perhaps 'him' the and 'her' would be better examples) to refer to the biological sex of the person. Why does John's preference about how words are used trump Mary's? There are no other examples I can think of where this has been the precedent. If I was tall but would rather people refer to me as short, I don't get the final say on the use of 'tall' and 'short', just because they refer to me.

Because Mary's choice of how to apply terms is her choice, it expresses a part of who she is no less than John's choice of hairstyle or dress. Why would you accept that it is meaningful to John to have words spoken to him in a particular way, but then deny that it is equally meaningful to Mary to speak those words in a particular way?

Does it matter at all if I, biologically male, ask you to address me as she/her or Ms? No. Not in the slightest. There is no issue to discuss here. How I identify, and how I request that you identify me, are choices that can be safely left to ... me. With no resulting harm to anyone. :up: — Pattern-chaser

But that's not what's happening with the transgender movement though is it, and it's slightly disingenuous to paint it that way. What actually happens is John (a biological male) asks to be called by terms previously associated with biological females, he asks to use the rest-rooms previously reserved for biological females, he asks to have his notion that he "feels like a woman" accepted etc. Nothing at all wrong with any of that as you say. John's hair, title, dress and make-up are an important part of who he is so why should he be restricted in that?

The problem arises when Mary (a biological woman) answers "no thank you" to that request. When she says that her manner of speaking is an important part of who she is and would rather not be told how to apply 'Mr' and 'Mrs' but would rather the autonomy to apply them in the way that best expresses how she feels. When Mary politely says that in her world view there is nothing that it 'feels like' to be a woman so she'd like to politely disagree that John feels like woman. All this should be fine too, but it's not, she gets called an intolerant bigot.

I have no issue with a very strict responsibility on society towards its children, one of my professional areas of interest was in child development and I strongly believe that children's rights are being undermined.

Where I take issue is with the notion that there's no moral duty, or justification to having children.

I think a significant number of people agree that we have a moral duty to take good enough care of our natural resources to ensure a reasonable standard of living for future generations. Thus we have established that it is possible to have duty towards a person who does not yet exist. Your approach would also require this (you claim we have a duty not to cause suffering to the not yet existing child).

Duties are social. We have a duty to others because they have a duty to us. It follows then that those yet to be born can be understood to have a duty too, at least their potential existence can be said to have a duty.

So, when society is doing well, bringing a child into the world is right because they will, on the whole, experience happiness. When society is not doing well, we have a duty to future generations to make it better. But that duty might take more than one generation. You have a duty to make the world a better place for your great grandchildren (or those of your neighbours), but in order to carry out that duty, you will need to bring into existence a child, who immediately has a duty to do the same (grow up, make the world a bit better and have child to carry on the process).

Of course no one gets a choice in the matter, but that's not how duties work, we don't choose them, they result from the relationships within society.

You might think you can opt out, but who's going to look after you when you're older? Who's going to build your roads, fix your car, defend your borders? It'll be someone else's child. That creates a responsibility on you to look after them now.

There's simply no way anyone with any familiarity with Wittgenstein could make this kind of argument with a straight face: as if the metagame is here an act of interpretation. As if every act of philosophy - and hence language - doesn't carry its own metagame on its back in the mode of the practice of that self-same act of philosophy itself — StreetlightX

Ah, so now the conclusions of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations have become universal truths, the ignorance of which renders any related proposition philosophically incompetent. And I thought they were all just maps, "none more true than any other".

I was hoping someone would try and persuade me why it is ethical, desirable or a right to have child. — Andrew4Handel

It depends what meta-ethical framework you're working from. Ethics can theoretically be debated within a meta-ethical framework, but it's difficult to raise arguments to persuade someone when you don't know what their criteria are. What is it that you measure the 'rightness' of an action by?

That's not the only thing that W. seems to be doing though. He certainly criticises certain linguistic practices (philosophical theories). I think that Horwich, with whom I took you to agree, agrees with that: — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, but the point Horwich (and indeed Popper) are both making, is that any theorising is done, not in a exclusive sense. Wittgenstein is intending to unsettle us, to show that language is something other, not what it 'must be'. There may well be (indeed are) normative implications of this description, but it is not a normative theory. That's why the motivation is described as normative, not the theory.

So the difference, again, is between some theory which says "all things in this set must be defined thus", and a description whose normative effect is to ask "are you sure all things in this set belong here?"

To be clear. A theory of metaphilosophy which says that philosophy is a bit like map-making, is of this latter kind. It gets us to question any investigations we might have discarded as not showing any contours when we realise that may not have been the intention. By itself, it does not force human activity into artificial categories. Where it become T-philosophy (or T-metaphilosophy) is when it then says that because philosophy is like map-making, it must then be constrained by the same set of necessities as cartography.

My objection is simple.

Philosophy is like cartography - each investigation reveals the aspect of human experience that it is interested in, and its utility is judged by it's being put to some use or another. This is a metaphilosophical position.

Metaphilosophy is an act of philosophy (as your second quote describes).

Therefore a metaphilosophical investigation is also like a map, drawing out those aspects of the field that the cartographer is interested in, and measured by its being put to some use or another.

Therefore it must be the case that the metaphilosophical theory that philosophy is like cartography and so similarly constrained, cannot itself be normative.

if my comparison stands, shouldn't you allow SX what you seem to allow W. with regards to his language-games? — Πετροκότσυφας

This goes back to the distinction I made in my previous post to you. A description of 'what is' aims to be inclusive. Wittgenstein is trying to describe what language is, and so there is no issue with his using language to do so. Its not a judgement, its a description. My issue with the metaphorical linking of cartography with philosophy is not the comparison itself (which I think is fine) it's the manner in which it's exposition goes on to distinguish, rather than define. It sets edicts about what 'must be', what is 'necessary'. This becomes theory, not description. Theories should be open to testing. If something 'must be' the case, then it should be possible to attempt the opposite and demonstrably fail, yet no criteria are set for this.

If a philosophical investigation is akin to a map, crucially (as specified in the OP) one whose utility is only that it be put to 'some use or another'. Then an investigation which serves some use is an act of philosophy no more true than any other. But the author then reserves the right to claim to be an authority on such philosophical cartography, to know with certainty what constraints this sets on the nature of the mapping. What investigations led them to this certainty, and where are the other maps showing different aspects of that same investigation measured only by the use they're put to?

How is "well-founded" a criteria for assessment? How is "meeting a challenge" or being "well articulated" criteria for assessment? You've not specified what would qualify as success in any of these measures. What distinguishes a thing which is "well-founded" from one which is not, what identifies a thing which has met a challenge, what marks something out as being "well articulated" as opposed to poorly articulated?

It's these assumptions that I take issue with. I doubt the honesty with which they are applied. Does it really seem impossible to you that I (or someone much more qualified than me) could not similarly come up with an arbitrary list of 'criteria for assessment' which would render any philosophical investigation a roaring success?

Any work of philosophy that qualifies as such furnishes its own criteria of assessment — StreetlightX

Also, who determines what the criteria of assessment are in the case where there is disagreement? Is it again the case that philosophy at large, who can't even agree on the meaning of the first sentence of most philosophical texts nonetheless miraculously come to a unanimous agreement as to what the criteria of assessment contained therein truly are?

So, if I decide the criteria of assessment contained within a work of philosophy are one thing, and you disagree, how is it that I'm wrong?

Any work of philosophy that qualifies as such furnishes its own criteria of assessment — StreetlightX

Fine, what were the criteria of assessment contained within your OP?

Sufficient to the problem as articulated: the physiognomy of our problems, — StreetlightX

That doesn't seem to make any sense. You said that the measure of the substance of an issue (substance you claim is lacking in my critique) can be determined once it is sufficiently articulated. I asked you how one judges whether an issue has been sufficiently articulated and you've replied that it should be "sufficient to the problem as articulated". This just re-states the assertion. What is it to be sufficient? What distinguishes an articulation which is sufficient for you to judge it's substance from one which is not?

... Unable to be decided in advance of the issue's being articulated and its implications laid out. — StreetlightX

What difference does this make. I obviously think I have articulated it and laid out it's implications (within the very tight constraints of a short forum post), others have certainly done so in book-length detail, it's not a new approach. You're just shifting the subjective judgement, now it's whether the issue has been sufficiently articulated. Sufficient to whose satisfaction? And how do we judge the sufficiency of the articulation?

I see. I misunderstood the implications of the way you asked the question. I took your "What's the difference between..." as a rhetorical assertion that there should be one, not an observation there there wasn't.

The difference is, as Horwich discusses, between an observation of what the subject is, the objective of which is to be as inclusive as possible, to capture as much of what goes on as one can; and a edict about what the subject must be, the aim of which is to be exclusive, to reject that which does not fit the theory. One of Horwich's issues with T-philosophy is this tendency to simply reject that which does not fit the theory, rather than adjust the theory to that which is found.

Would it be that you had anything of substance to offer as an 'issue thereby raised'. — StreetlightX

So, we're back to this again. And the measure of the substance of an issue is...? Let me guess, something any competent reader automatically knows? Something any level of education beyond first year magically endows you with? Or could it just possibly be that your measure of the 'substance' of an issue has something to do with the degree to which you agree with it?

I don't understand the link you're making. Chapter 2.8 is about why seemingly theories about philosophy do not necessarily suffer from the same problem as T-theories of philosophy. I don't see how this links up to what you quoted, perhaps you could explain a bit more?

But alchemy, on examination, turned out to be, not the study of transmutation, but a complete misunderstanding about the difference between elements and compounds. Phrenology turned out, on examination, to be just a misreading of statistical anomaly. The overreach of neuroscience, psychology even physics have all been heated topics of discussion here. I'm sure the alchemists and phrenologists were mightily pissed of to have their subjects revealed to be something other than they thought. I'm sure the neuroscientists, psychologists and physicists have occasion to become riled at having the reach of their investigations circumscribed. The offense taken at the examination of the presumptions in one's own field is not an adequate defence against any issues thereby raised.

I don't personally support anyone having children. — Andrew4Handel

So you're suggesting that we just let the human race die out? That seems a rather oblique conclusion from your original post.

I'm a little loathe to get into the middle of an extended debate on this forum between two members, especially when it seemingly supports one side of that debate. — John Doe

Obviously you must feel free to engage (or refrain from engaging) in whatever way you see fit, but isn't it rather the point of a public Internet forum, that you get to take part in a debate between two members on one side or another? It would be a poorer forum I think, if we all withheld our input in these circumstances, so please do get into the middle of extended debates. Your input has certainly been interesting here and I'm sure would be equally so in other such debates.

That said, you seem to straddle both sides of this one, so perhaps you might have some insight into those areas about which I'm still in the dark.

The interest for me here is the psychology and how it interacts with philosophy, how people hold and maintain ideological beliefs. In this instance, it's in how the belief about what philosophy is (and crucially how it's quality is judged in the face of such seemingly extensive relativism). So StreetlightX is wanting to put that judgement at a second order of heirachy it seems. Within the set {all things which are philosophy} each investigation is to be judged by its own standards, whether it achieves what it set out to, but an investigation's membership of that set is judged by some objective (or at least widely agreed on) measure such that certain investigations can be readily dismissed with a waive of the hand, easily spotted by first years, or 'any competent reader'. The trouble is that the questions "what is philosophy for, what does it do, and why do we do it?" seems to have no place other than in the set {all things which are philosophy} and so must be judged by its own objectives, yet that judgement relies on an answer to its own question.

So how do we judge the merits of an investigation into the means by which we judge the qualities of such investigations as this one? I hope its not too much of a leap for you to understand from a social psychological perspective, how difficult it is to avoid the obvious conclusion that this construct is simply created to help people support belief systems. Half the structures in society are created for that express purpose and this looks exactly like one of them, so I don't think it's excessively cynical of me to at least start with that explanation as my default?

Ah, thanks, that all makes perfect sense now. It was the 'autopoietic self-establishment of aesthetic becoming' I was stuck on, but now you've explained it in terms of 'pathic subjectivity' which 'continues to self-actualize through energetico-spatiotemporal coordinates' that's cleared things up beautifully.

It's generally something most people learn in the course of an education.

What examples would you give of such 'failed philosophies'? — Pseudonym


Oh, philosophical 'therapeutics', say. — StreetlightX

Well that's odd. Paul Horwich, for example, is a strong advocate of therapeutic philosophy and yet has held tenures at UCL, MIT, and New York University, institutions one would have thought made up of reasonably 'competent readers'. But then I suppose any 'competent professor' knows which universities are good and which aren't?

... any competent reader can assess how well it goes about doing that, and if cashes out those stakes well. — StreetlightX

How do you know that to be the case? Competent readers are the ones whose judgement you agree with and incompetent ones are the ones you disagree with?

philosophies fail at this all the time. — StreetlightX

What examples would you give of such 'failed philosophies'?

The idea that what I'm saying renders anything immune to criticism is another silly contention. — StreetlightX

It's not the immunity from criticism that bothers me, it the simultaneous relativism within philosophical investigations but certainty verging on fundamentalism about what constitutes such an investigation and what does not, and how to judge how well those lucky few who pass your test have done.

Great, well why don't you enlighten me now then. The universally agreed on purpose of philosophical investigation is...

Any good thesis clearly and convincingly sets out the stakes upon which it turns; that they may not be stakes that you - or anyone else in particular - are interested in is, of course, entirely irrelevant. Is this something that really needs to be explained to you? — StreetlightX

I wasn't talking about 'interest' I was referring to the claim that they are useful insofar as they are used for some purpose or other. We're not talking about theses about how to build bridges here, where the purpose is well-established. A prospective engineering student could make no reasonable claim on producing a failed bridge design that he 'intended' it to fall down all along. The purpose to which his thesis is to be put is obviously to carry traffic. No such purpose exists for philosophical investigations and as such if any map is useful to the extent that it is put to some purpose, then it's utility cannot be external judged can it?

Any cartographer knows that map making is driven - absolutely - by the necessities of what is being mapped, along with what is aimed at by such mapping. — StreetlightX

I'm questioning the applicability of the cartographic metaphor, so your claim that it is obvious to any cartographer that Map-making is constrained by some necessities is irrelevant. You haven't demonstrated how philosophy is similarly constrained by a similar set of necessities. That is what I'm disputing.

Even the most basic understanding of necessity recognizes that it can operate at varying levels of generality that leaves plenty of room for creativity and pragmatics - which in turn operate according to constraints appropriate to their own orders. — StreetlightX

The fact that necessities exist at different levels of any hierarchy does not constitute a proof that the necessities within a proposition exist at the level of heirachy claimed, only that they could. You've yet to provide any justification for the claim that philosophical investigation is constrained by some particular set of necessities sufficiently well-known to yield universal judgement. Arguing only that necessities can exist at different levels is like arguing that I am six foot tall because some people are six foot tall.

As usual you've failed to examine the meta-philosophical assumptions behind your position. You're presuming that some new map (last time it was a new 'frame') or whatever alternative is next, is equally legitimate and so immune from criticism, but in order to preserve your antagonism to those world-views you dislike, you set up this second order certainty. Any philosophy you wish to promote becomes just a 'different map' and immune from analytical critique. Any philosophy you don't like can be safely dismissed by reference to this second order 'what philosophy really is', about which there is apparently so much certainty that even second years student all agree on it. A remarkable achievement considering 2000 years of debate among seasoned professors has yielded not a single agreement on any other subject.

One's judgment related to this project cannot be separated from one's movement generated by a creation of the new cartography, and this movement is similar to autopoietic
self-establishment of aesthetic becoming. — Number2018

And in English?

None of these maps are more true than the other, and maps are useful to the extent that they are used for some purpose or another. — StreetlightX

So, as with other vaguely relativist meta-philosophies I fail to see how this integrates with any form of judgement. If a philosophical investigation can be considered a kind of map, no more true than any other and no less valuable than its specific utility, then how does one go about judging such an investigation? How could a professor say of his student's thesis anything other than "Well, it's not of any terrain I recognise, and it has no utility to me", which is hardly the level of critique philosophy aspires to.

Also, how would this approach apply to meta-philosophy itself. The phrasing in the section you quote does not sound very "none of these maps are more true than the other" with regards to meta-philosophy. "A system must be defined by...", "it is necessary to move from a static, abstract concept of a system...". These do not sound like maps of meta-philosophy which are no more true than other maps, they sound like absolute edicts about what must be, what is necessary.

If philosophical investigations are themselves maps no more true than any other, then what is it about the investigation of philosophy itself which places it apart from such relativism into the camp of things which 'must be' a certain way?

So I want to know
Why thought it, necessary, morally acceptable, why they thought this was a good world to bring a child into and so on. — Andrew4Handel

You've answered your own question;

There are already some thresholds upon which governments or societies deem people to be unfit to have access to children. — Andrew4Handel

If the government does not take your child away (or prevent you from having them) then it seems a reasonable presumption that you've met the thresholds society thinks are appropriate to bring a child into the world.

If you disagree with that decision and wish to debate that, you'd need to explain where your thresholds are so that we can discuss the reasons and consequences of having them there.

redefining what I see as a current plague of social dogma on our species is important to further understand the difference between the current social dogmatic approach it'self and the nature of the "omnipresence" it references. — Lif3r

Why is it important? If we call The CTMU theory 'God', what is it you're hoping will happen that will be beneficial? Your explanation here is limited, but my understanding of "... to further understand the difference between the current social dogmatic approach it'self and the nature of the "omnipresence" it references." is that you're suggesting that this CTMU theory might be what religions were getting at all along and if they could agree then that would remove some of the harms caused by religious dogma. Is that something like what you're saying here?

If so, then I think you have a very generous and unjustifiably homogeneous view of religion. I think that the history of religious war and persecution shows us quite terrifyingly clearly that getting to the core of what all religions might have in common is very much not the point of religion.

So the problem is at best you have have come across an interesting idea which is sufficiently well thought out that it could be the case, but since you have no way of demonstrating that it is more likely to be the case than any other competing idea, nor any argument that things would be better if we acted as if it were the case, then there's no discussion to be had really. It's like so many of these extremely speculative metaphysical theories, the only real response is "yeah... maybe..."

I don't know what you mean. Homosexuality is natural but it has been heavily restricted and forced underground and punished with prison and death. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, that's a good example. People considered that they could have sex with whomever they like, a government decided they could not do so, so they intervened to prevent it. It wasn't prevented in abstract. Reality did not change to make it such that homosexuals no longer had the right to have sex with whomever they wanted. An authority actively prevented them from doings so and that action is what constituted their lack of rights. What action would constitute a lack of right (or restriction of right) to have children?

The government can intervene to enforce a right but in general a right means someone is allowed to do X unrestricted. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, but we don't enumerate those rights that are no at risk. I don't talk about my 'right' to wear a green shirt on a Thursday because no one is talking about restricting my ability to do so. It is the act of restriction (or threat thereof) which makes it necessary to define a right in order to defend it. As procreation is not currently under threat of restriction, I don't understand what purpose referring to it as a 'right' serves.

I am looking for an explanation of why people feel and act entitled to have a child. You don't need legal rights for someone to exhibit a sense of entitlement. — Andrew4Handel

No, but you need a threat to those legal rights for someone to claim 'entitlement'. You're 'entitled to do absolutely everything that is not restricted by some authority. It's the default position. The answer to the question why do people feel entitled to have children is simply, no one is stopping them. People feel entitled to do that which no one else prevents them from doing. What you're referring to is people's decision to actually go ahead and do what they feel entitled to do. I'm definatly 'entitled' to keep all of my money for myself (after tax). I'm entitled to because no effective authority prevents me from doing so. I don't actually keep all my money for myself, because I don't think it fair to, but I'm definitely 'entitled' to.

How do suggest we allow all children a reasonable education? — Andrew4Handel

Children educate themselves quite happily if given the opportunity, but that's a separate discussion.

I could give a large list but here are a few. — Andrew4Handel

I didn't just ask for the considerations, I asked specifically for the thresholds. Unless you are advocating having no children at all then presumably there is some threshold level of having met these concerns above which it is reasonable to have children. So how do you know people haven't already considered these issues and decided they meet said threshold?

The Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe is way beyond my full comprehension, but it's creator made a verbal statement on God that I interpreted essentially as this:

God is everything in existence, including any potential. — Lif3r

If you've got a new concept to reference, you need a new name to do so with. 'God' is already taken, why re-use it here?

You are taking an unwarranted fatalistic attitude. — Andrew4Handel

No, I just don't understand what you are saying. A 'right' is a legal protection meaning that an authority is obliged to ensure that you have it. People can already have children, their ability to do so is currently unrestricted. If you're suggesting that they should not have that right (or at least not automatically) then that is necessarily in the form of some action by some authority. You can't just restrict a naturally unrestricted right in abstract.

It sounds to me more like what you mean to say is that you'd like fewer people to choose to have children for moral reasons. You're trying to make a case that having children is, in some cases, an immoral thing to do? But this would have nothing to do with rights. That's where I'm misunderstanding you.

The school does not act like parents or baby sitters or replace the authority and affection of parents. Sending someone to school does not prevent child abuse in general — Andrew4Handel

On the contrary, I think sending children to school very often actually constitutes child abuse. To take a child with autism and force them to sit still for 6 hours in a room full of 30 other children is a minor torture. The point is, the German government clearly think it is the most responsible way to bring children up. Presuming you're not advocating a complete absence of procreation you need to have a system for determining in which situations it is appropriate to have children.

You keep alluding to, but never quite describing, exactly what considerations you think people should be taking into account (outweighing their spontaneous desire to have children) and what threshold they should meet before concluding that they are morally right to do so.

I don't understand what you're saying here. What sort of intervention in the free ability of prospective parents to have children are you imagining?

Having children is not a 'right' in that it is not someone's responsibility to ensure it. A private family life is a 'right' (in the UN declaration of human rights) meaning that it is the signatory government's responsibility to deliver that 'right' to its citizens who might otherwise find themselves bereft of it.

There's no threat to the ability to have children (except perhaps infertility) so if it were a 'right', what would a government's responsibility to ensure it entail?

It sounds to me more like you are arguing for either some restriction on the ability of prospective parents to have children, or more rights for the resultant child.

The reason why neither of these has been further implemented is pretty straightforward I would have thought. If you prevent people from having children there will be revolution because people love having children, it's about as basic a bit of biological programming as it gets. Resource scarcity and pollution would also be halved if we shot half the population (more than that if we carefully chose which half), but we avoid such an intervention because it clashes with people's will to remain living. How is clashing with their will to procreate any different?

As to the second part, there is literally only one positive right in the whole of the UN declaration of human rights (a positive right being something naturally absent which must be supplied, rather than something naturally present whose removal must be mitigated) and that is primary education of children.

The government already intervenes more in the upbringing of children than it does in any other area of life. In Germany children are forceably taken away from their parents for 6 hours a day to be raised entirely in a manner the state sees fit. What greater application of government to the rearing of children could you possibly be asking for?

Damn, my brilliant and incisive counter argument was on the verge of converting him to a thorough-going Marxist. Oh well.

My argument is that it's an unexamined assumption - it's not something you proclaim, because it's obviously so stupid. But it's the logically necessary premise on which your house of cards must be built, otherwise you'd be bothered by the question of which unequal outcomes you observe are the result of differences in natural endowment, and which are the result of oppressive human action (and therefore a matter for justice to sort out) - because obviously you wouldn't want to accuse people of oppression if they're not actually guilty of it, right? — gurugeorge

What is it that makes you think the assumption is "unexamined", as opposed to "examined, but not reaching a conclusion you agree with". You seem to be mistaking the ability to quote 'scientific' research and statistics, for a conclusion which would be reached by any rational person who examined then. Scientific studies do not show things to be conclusively the case, they derive theories, try to falsify them and then upon failing to do so, present the theory to the community. Statistics are even more vague and routinely misinterpreted.

I don't see any reason to presume the left has not examined the extent of natural endowment.