Using an omnipotent god as an example is quite a stretch — Harry Hindu

Well, I'm questioning if the sum of two and two is objectively four (a priori truth), and I need to stretch pretty far to do this. The god isn't the point. The point is the possibility somewhere different where that sum is seven or something, or better, a universe utterly devoid of 'quantity', thus reducing 'two' to a meaningless thing where any sum of two and two is at best not even wrong. That's still a stretch. 2+2=4 is sort of a symbol of a priori knowledge, even if humans would probably not figure it out without experience.

So it seems to me that any benefit to the species is also a benefit to the individuals

This gets back to my suggestion that 'reproduction is beneficial' might be a lie. Sure, reproduction makes a species fit, but is being fit beneficial? So say smallpox goes extinct (just to pick something the extinction of which you personally are not likely to mourn). On the surface it would appear that it would not be beneficial for the smallpox species, but only if smallpox actually has a goal. It's evolved to be fit, but doesn't actually have a goal to be that way. Is any purpose actually not served by its extinction? Nature doesn't care. No smallpox 'individual' cares in any way we humans can relate.
Smallpox also doesn't have a belief/instinct that reproduction is beneficial, so maybe my example reached too far away. It doesn't reproduce to fulfill an irresistible urge. So maybe I need to illustrate with a more relatable pestilence like a tapeworm or something.
I usually take a relational view of almost everything, so I'd ask: What is the goal of a given species? Reproduction seems only a means to that goal, but the goal itself seems missing. Extinction is inevitable, so the goal is somewhere prior to that. Did any species now extinct ever meet its goal?

What is the difference between an individual and a self? Do individuals exist?

"Oh, I wish that I could be Richard Cory" -- Paul Simon
The 'I' in that line is the self, and 'Richard Cory' is an individual. The line only makes sense if they're different things, and the self wants to 'be' a different individual than the impoverished employee in the factory. The related question is: "Why am I me?". It seems baffling. There's so many other things you could be like a bug or perhaps even a dust mote. There's so many more of those other things, so why am I not only a human (top of most food chains), but one with the leisure to be pondering philosophy on a forum during the 2nd gilded age of Earth. What sort of lottery have I won?

Anyway, the 'I' in that question is the self again, and the improbability goes away if you deny the existence of it. Nothing won the lottery. Of course the gilded human would ask this and the bug would not. There's no improbability occurring. It's why dualism makes so much sense to my lying intuitions, but makes zero sense to my rational thought.

Does the individual (Richard Cory say) exist? That's a question of persistent identity, which gets into all sorts of trouble as described by Parfit. But he also says it is unimportant. Our sense of identity (not the sense of self this time) is very pragmatic and allows us to function. Anyway, the current Richard Corey doesn't seem to be able to demonstrate to my satisfaction being the same individual as an hour ago. The law of identity seems open to violation, rendering it a mere language convention and not something real.

The hard problem of consciousness is resolved by abandoning dualism and physicalism.

Well I'm neither, so perhaps I'm doing something right.

Y'all seem to be in a sort of chicken/egg thing with the bridge subject. I assure you that the bridge came before the first one purposefully created by humans, and any preconception of the creation of the first built ones most certainly drew on the experience of prior bridges.
Even ants engineer a bridge when there isn't one already there. It's hardly a unique human accomplishment.

I think maybe you're overusing the word "instinct." — T Clark

Maybe so, but besides the point, which is: there are falsehoods which we believe and find intuitive. Some are deep enough that I know they're wrong, yet still believe them, which sounds oddly contradictory.

[2+2=4] would be true in any universe in which there are categories and a quantity of things within that category. — Harry Hindu

OK, but if it was an a-priori truth, it would be true even in a universe without meaningful countable anything. I mean, imagine the sum of 2 and 2 was 4 because an omnipotent god said it was, and had it decreed that the sum was seven instead, then it wouldn't actually be four. I mean, what's the point of being omnipotent if you can't do stuff like that? Would the sum be actually 7 then, or only 7 because 'the god says so'?

Again, what is beneficial and comfortable is dependent upon the goal we're talking about.

Being fit, probably as a species. If a species is not fit, it gets selected out. It's not a purposeful goal, but being fit is definitely an emergent property of things that evolve via the process. As an individual, reproduction is arguably optional. The species often benefits from the members that are not potential breeders. Yes, the individual benefits one way or the other depending on the goal via which the benefit is measured, but for a species, it's being fit, and little else. I don't thing the human species is particularly fit, but that's just opinion.

At a much deeper level, one's feeling of personal identity is fantastically instinctual, and yet doesn't hold up to true rational analysis. It is probably a complete lie compliments of evolution (over 650 million years ago when it was put there), and it makes us fit as an individual, a pragmatic benefit at best. Assuming being fit equates to a benefit over not being fit, this makes the truth of the matter harmful, and the lie beneficial.
— noAxioms
Nah. I don't think that alpha males and females and the individual in which an DNA copy "error" occurred that provides the benefit from which is then propagated throughout the gene pool is an instinctual illusion. Those are real things. If not there from where do beneficial genes come from if not individuals within a gene pool?

I'm sorry, but we seem to be talking past each other. This doesn't seem to be a relevant reply to my comment, which I left up there. I'm talking about one's sense of self. The lie makes you fit, but the analysis of the belief seems to lead to all sorts of crazy woo to explain something that was never true in the first place. It leads to the hard problem of consciousness, something that is only a problem if you believe the lie, which everybody does, even myself.

It seems to me that reasining itself is instinctual and only realized through experience. — Harry Hindu

Well yea. You brought up the 2+2=4 thing, but I'm confident that a human would never figure that out in the absence of experience. Humans are exceptionally helpless at birth, but several instincts are there, like the one to draw breath despite never having the experience of needing to do that before.

I actually question everything, even 2+2=4. Is it objectively true, or is it perhaps only a property of the physics or mathematics of say this universe, and doesn't work in another one? I cannot think of a reasonable counterexample, but that very issue seems to be one of the weakest links in my goal of finding a self-consistent view of how things are.

For something to be beneficial, or useful, there must be some element of truth involved, or else how can there more or less efficient ways of using something - like intuitions? — Harry Hindu

I can think of several exceptions. On the surface, how about "reproduction is beneficial"? It certainly doesn't benefit the individual. There are plenty of humans living more comfortable lives by becoming voluntarily sterile, but for the most part, reproduction is quite instinctual which is why the above goal can rarely be achieved via just abstinence.
At a much deeper level, one's feeling of personal identity is fantastically instinctual, and yet doesn't hold up to true rational analysis. It is probably a complete lie compliments of evolution (over 650 million years ago when it was put there), and it makes us fit as an individual, a pragmatic benefit at best. Assuming being fit equates to a benefit over not being fit, this makes the truth of the matter harmful, and the lie beneficial.

Intuition is often not about knowledge. As my handle implies, I attempt to question everything that most find 'obvious', and it turns out that most obvious truths lead to self contradictions. Our intuitions are not there for the purpose of truth. That's a pretty easy one to figure out if you think about it.

One question about intuition is whether or not it is based on experience or reason. My strong opinion, based on introspection, is that it is mostly, maybe completely, based on experience. — T Clark

Agree. I find that intuitions are almost never based on reason, but rather instinct or experience. Many of those intuitions are not true, but don't confuse truth with beneficial.

Creation usually implies an object contained by time being caused to come into existence: The object is nonexistent at an earlier time, and then something happens that causes the existence of it, for a while at least. The depression on the cushion doesn't meet the definition. It may be caused by the ball, but if it was always there, it was never created.
As another example, the universe (by most definitions anyway) probably isn't an object contained by time, but rather is something that contains time. So it seems a category error to suggest it is a created thing.

Physics does allow temporal loops and backwards causation. They're valid solutions to the equations, so in theory, something could create itself, but there's the loop then. In a loop, while the arrow of time might be defined, all moments are both before and after other moments, so it is unclear what comes before what else.
As for backwards causation, that's one of the interpretations of experiments like the quantum eraser setups, some of which have been interpreted as having caused effects arbitrarily far (years) into the past. But while effects might occur in the past, information cannot be thus passed, and usually the creation of a thing involves information transfer.

I touch particular keys and lo! the corresponding character appears on the screen (to take only the most simple of examples). It appears seamless but in reality the appearance of those characters is the result of predictable causal chain which generally operates with extremely high degrees of consistency; I don't press P and get Q, not unless there's a fault or configuration error. — Wayfarer

Just a side note, since I am perhaps personally involved in that P getting to the screen. The engineering of those tiny computer components needs to go to substantial lengths to get that P consistently on the screen. It takes what is essentially a random process (say electrons tunneling across a barrier) and walks the tight wire between sufficient dice rolling to get a consistent behavior, and reducing the number of dice rolled to get sufficient performance. It has to work all the time, but not more than that. This is sort of an effort to hammer out hard predictable causal behavior from randomness.
Just saying that the seemingly causal behavior of your machine is not necessarily the result of any fundamental causality, but rather a lot of effort to make it so. Per Wittgenstein quoted in your OP, it is useful for hypothesis.

I can see saying that my finger caused the P to show up — T Clark

It's arguably one of the many causes. I mean, the thing probably wouldn't have shown up there just then had your finger not pressed that spot just then. But per my comment above, fundamentally the two are not directly connected. It's just really useful to make that connection.

In any physics, a force is required to change a state.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite a ridiculous assertion. A thrown rock (in space say, no significant forces acting on it) is just beyond the reach of the hand that threw it. A second later it is meters away, a changed state. It is also likely facing a different direction after that second since it's really hard to throw a rock without any spin.

From Wikipedia: "In physics, a force is an influence that can change the motion of an object." So, in physics, a "force" is what what would change the state which exists at "a given moment". .

Changing the motion is not the same as changing the state. The thrown rock is still heading in the same direction after a second (unchanged motion) and has the same spin (unchanged motion) but has a different location and orientation (both changed states). Yes, force is required to change its linear and angular momentum, per Newton's 2nd law, and is that to which your wiki quote refers), but no force is required to change its location, orientation, temperature, etc, all of which are part of its classic state.

This has absolutely nothing to do with the falsification of deterministic physics. Why are you going on about this?

It (the squirrel) eats when it's hungry. We can resist the urge to eat even when we're dying of hunger — Agent Smith

That's just an example of something having a higher priority than eating, straight up cause and effect, not an example of free will. And you're wrong: Other things have done this as well, starved in the presence of food due to prioritizing something higher. I can think of one species in danger of extinction because of it.

I do think we have free will, but only because I define it more sensibly. I find nothing distasteful about my decision making mechanism being a product of physics, hence my initial reply in this topic.

[A hard-determinsitic QM interpretation such as Bohmian mechanics] is easily falsified, as you request. A "state at a given time" cannot by itself determine any future activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not follow from any hard-deterministic physics. Quite the opposite in fact, by definition.

This is because a state is static, without activity, and any future activity of the thing in this state is dependent on what forces are applied to it. Therefore it is clearly false to say that the future action of a thing is "completely determined" by its present state, because it is also dependent on whatever forces are applied to it.

Perhaps you should give an example where the forces are not a function of the state at a given moment. The above quote uses the word 'clearly' to justify a statement which cannot otherwise be backed, a tell-tale sign that either you don't understand the subject, or simply refuse to accept the premises.

Hey, I don't buy Bohmian mechanics either, but I'm not so naive to assert it is wrong because it 'clearly' doesn't do something that it in fact does.

Your argument also seems entirely classical, not referencing QM at all. Classical physics is deterministic, but you suggest otherwise.

At the end of stage 2 the person might reach for the ciggy or not reach for the ciggy. Therefore the person's will is free.. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the law of excluded middle, that's true of anything. A rock will reach for the ciggy or not, every time, just like the human. OK, you probably don't mean it that way. You probably mean that there's a finite probability of reaching for it or not, which may or may not be true depending on how the statement is interpreted.

If the person was a deterministic robot there would be only one way which the person could go after stage 2.

OK, you seem to be interpreting it as a statement of determinism. Under a completely deterministic interpretation of QM (such as Bohmian mechanics), the future action any robot, human or squirrel is completely determined by the state at a given time. Unless you can falsify such an interpretation, your statement above is a mere assertion, not any kind of evidence that a human can in any way do something other than what is utterly determined.

If on the other hand the statement is not about determinism but instead about predictability, then I can trivially create a device that reaches for the ciggy with far less predictability than the human who has made a rational decision to never do it again. All you need is a quantum amplifier, something not evolved in any biological creature since it holds no benefit. There are creatures which utilize pseudo-randomness such as a moth that chooses its flight path far more randomly than does the path chosen by a human. By a predictability definition, the moth has more free will than you do, but you seem to be using the determinism definition, not the predictability one.

A squirrel feels hungry and immediately starts foraging. — Agent Smith

Nonsense. It usually forages whether it is hungry or not, and only if it passes phase 1 first where it might prioritize another task due to time of day, weather, danger, or being horny or something. But it certainly isn't a straight hunger-causes-foraging relationship.
I brought up the squirrel in case you included it in your list of things with free will. Apparently you don't, which is what I wanted to know. This tells me you're not one of those 'biology is special' types, but instead take an anthropocentric stance. At what point in our evolution do you suggest that the change from deterministic animal to free-willed creature,and more specifically, what distinguished the one physiology from its immediate predecessor? Or are you in denial of evolution?

However, they seem to be beside the point as far as I can tell. — Agent Smith

The last several posts have indeed be well besides the point. The point I thought concerned free will, and not how decisions are made.

Please bear in mind that there are two stages when it comes to making a choice:

Stage 1. Deliberation on the available options
Stage 2. Actually making a selection

Probably less than 1% of all choices are made by such a cumbersome and formal mechanism, including the smoking example. But as you say, besides the point of free will. The older chess playing programs made almost all their decisions exactly as you describe above, and they hardly have what most people like to qualify as free will, so a decision made this way (by virtual choices as you put it) is not necessarily free, by your definition.
I have a different definition, but I'm trying to reply to the OP, not my own ideas.

In stage 2, all the choices have been processed and the one that we like is selected. It's in this stage, our preferences come into play, preferences we had no hand in determining i.e. we're not free now.

So in stage 1, you examine the options and rightly conclude that quitting smoking would be in your best interest, and in stage 2, the immediate-gratification-monkey (a waitbutwhy term) totally ignores the output of stage 1 and reaches for the ciggy. Still not an example of free will or the lack of it, and not anything that cannot occur with a deterministic robot, a supposedly not free-willed thing.

So my point is: what distinguishes a supposedly free willed human (or squirrel if you want) from something else that isn't free willed?

I'm a chain smoker, a nicotine junkie, can't go 10 minutes without lighting a cigarette up. So, as I lit one death stick, I had to, I saw myself (in my imagination), throwing away all my coffin nails, my smoking paraphernalia (my lighter, my matches, etc.). In effect I had quit smoking albeit only in my imagination. Isn't that amazing? — Agent Smith

This has little to do with free will though. I've had similar struggles, and have found that I have multiple parts to my mental functions, and the one that humans have (the rational part not nearly as developed in most other species) is probably the one doing the imagining, and the willing to quit, but it is the other part, the more primitive animal part, that actually makes the decisions, and those decisions are no more rational than decisions made by a rabbit. Free will has nothing to do with it. It's just that the part of you that wants to quit is not sufficiently in charge in this instance.
It isn't a deep instinct, so it can be done. The rational part can, with effort, exert its will upon the situation, but its often extremely difficult and beyond most people, myself included. There are some things that no amount of rational will can overcome. (Almost) Nobody can commit suicide by just holding their breath. The primitive part will override this. It is the boss after all, however much we like to think otherwise.

Free will: One possesses it when you make a choice that is yours and not part of a causal web with causes external to and beyond your control. — Agent Smith

This definition begs the mutual exclusivity of a decision being 'yours' and it being a function of causality. A good definition should pick one or the other:
1: Decision is mine vs it being made by something else, sort of like an autonomous robot and a remote control drone. Free will is the former.
2: Free will is action not part of a causal web external to control. By such a definition, a nucleus has the free will to decay at no time that is determined by any cause. Kind of thin: free yes, but not exactly 'will', is it?

Determinism: Your choices are effects of causes external to you and are not in your sphere of control.

Again the begging definition, assuming that caused choices are somehow not your own.

My typical example is two people wanting to safely cross a busy street. The first guy uses causal physics, and waits for a gap in the traffic and chooses that moment to cross, apparently without free will by your definition.
Second guy ignores all input and takes his marching orders from, um, apparently somewhere else, essentially crossing blind at a random moment. Second guy is naturally selected out as not being fit. That kind of free will is not beneficial.

Now consider the fact that, given a choice node (the point at which we're offered a choice), we judge the pros and cons of each possible option, something people say is essential to making the right choice.

Gosh, that sounds almost like you're utilizing the causal web, input that is out of your control...

How do we do that? My understanding is we make virtual choices. We imagine thus: If I select x (a choice), this is what'll happen; if I go for y (another choice), this'll happen; and so on.

So far, nothing a completely deterministic robot can't do. If you want to feel special, you need a description of some decision the robot can't make, preferably a moral one.

I think you're right, cause is classical mechanics if it has any meaning at all. I've purposely stayed away from quantum mechanics in this discussion because I think it muddies the metaphysical water. — T Clark

OK, so we keep it to classical since cause is a classical concept, but just keep in mind the earlier comment about making the example so simple (billiard balls) that it hides the deeper analysis, preventing thorough investigation.

At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation.
— Banno
That's what this thread is about for me. — T Clark

How can the interrogation take place while avoiding the more fundamental level? There seems to be a disconnect between what you say the thread is about and where you're steering it.

I had pointed out that cause is something subject to interpretation and one is not likely to come to a conclusion without making some assumptions, the soundness of which cannot be demonstrated.

Here’s what Wikipedia says about philosophical causality — T Clark

Wiki gives a very classic definition of causality, and I'm willing to concede that the whole cause-effect relationship is a classical one that doesn't necessarily carry down to more fundamental levels.

Different quantum interpretations have different definitions of causality. The ones that hold to the principle of locality would probably put cause before effect like wiki does, but counterfactual interpretations (Bohmian in particular) does not, with delayed-choice experiment blatantly putting effect arbitrarily amounts of time before cause,. They've demonstrated it with millions of years between cause (a choice made on Earth) and effect (which direction a photon is emitted at the distant emission event).

So sure, you kept it simple and classical at first with the billiard ball example, but when one gets down to the fundamentals, the definitions become interpretation dependent, which is the point I want to convey.

3. If some evidence is not improbable under A but very improbable under B, then that evidence provides strong evidence for A.

The Prime Principle of Confirmation is premise 3 in the above argument. — SwampMan

I googled 'Prime Principle of Confirmation' and found no reference to the principle outside of any page related to ID arguments, leading me to believe that the ID folks made up this principle.

Big edit: My first reading was that it started with "if 'A' is not improbable", but no, it says evidence is not improbable under A, which simply reduces the principle to a non-sequitur.

Finding money under my pillow is not improbable if the tooth fairly exists, and not probable under 'B' where teeth left under a pillow overnight self-transform into random objects, possibly currency, via quantum tunneling. That this is strong evidence for the existence of an actual tooth fairy does not follow, but the fallacious principle above says it does.

The main premise of the Doomsday argument: There's an upper limit to how many humans can live — Agent Smith

No, that's not the premise. It does not presume any such upper limit, which would be sort of a fatalistic premise.

The premise is that in any population that undergoes exponential growth, the vast majority of the individuals will come into existence near the end of that exponential growth. Think of a bacteria culture in a petri-dish of nutrients that are very slowly replenished.

There are two kinds of arguments for god(s). — Agent Smith

which apparently you group into scientific and non-scientific, but I think they're all non-scientific since any model that posits such a thing is outside of the methodological naturalism under which science operates, and under which the bulk of its progress has been made.

All the arguments I've seen claiming the necessity of god or the necessity of not-god are fallacious. OK, some don't claim proof but only evidence, which is better at least.

As for the OP, my main point was that it supplied only two possibilities, the one favored (an intentional supernatural creator) and only one other possibility which was deliberately chosen to be improbable. The implicit premise is that these are the only two possibilities, without which the conclusion (high probability of deliberate creation) does not follow.

(also for the sake of the example assume they are the only two possibilities) — SwampMan

I notice this appeared in the puddle example but not the original one. It's like saying option 2 is "friend melted into a puddle and there's not a leak in the roof above", which makes the option deliberately unlikely for the purpose of 'proving' option 1.

Perhaps the fallacy of the argument would be more clear if you removed the single-universe part. My conclusion from the premises in the OP is that the single-universe premise (not clearly defined) is unlikely. There is more than one roll of the die. That's certainly what science says given the evidence.

Another note: Atheism is not an assertion of lack of a deity. It is simply a lack of belief in it, no different than a lack of belief that my mailbox will spontaneously explode tomorrow, despite lack of hard evidence that it will not. Not sure what the official word is to describe a belief in the unreality of a god.

I apparently failed my own Turing test. My car can distinguish between me and an actual human.

My car's emissions computer has a bunch of tests the results of which are lost every time minimum voltage is lost due to a changed battery. I failed my test, having 3 tests that still registered not-ready, despite the battery being nearly a year old. My driving habits are apparently sufficiently non-human that my car cannot ready these last tests.

So I drove to a city an hour away, trying my best to drive like a normal person. Well, one of the three is ready now, but that leaves two, and two un-ready still fails. The only way to get my car inspected seems to be to let somebody else drive it.


A little more on topic: I love all the biased posters that assert an AI cannot be whatever they don't want it to be. Guess what? You're just another 'AI' yourself, albeit probably more wet and gloppy. I cannot convince the squirrels in my yard that I'm a squirrel, but that doesn't mean I'm less intelligent than a squirrel. AI's will surpass humans in capability long before they can convincingly pass for one.

The PSR: Everything has a cause.

1. Uncaused

2. Self-caused — Agent Smith

Which is which? There very much is precedent for events without prior cause, so the principle seems already on shaky ground. Perhaps we simply need to reject it.

Stack two perfect spheres, an unstable equilibrium. The top ball will eventually roll off after a predictable half-life of time, even in classic physics (*). But it isn't self-caused. There's already a ball there. There's already some atom waiting to decay, even if the decay event itself doesn't have a prior cause. There's no carbon-12 atom popping into existence ex-nihilo.

* Classically, it doesn't actually work for spheres, but rather special shapes designed among other criteria to eliminate the need for bouncing.

2. A first cause has to be self-caused unless you reject the prinicple of sufficient reason (PSR). — Agent Smith

Well, its not a rejection of the PSR, but an amendment. — Philosophim

Self-cause is a rejection of PSR, not an amendment to it. If self-cause is allowed, then the PSR reduces to a non-principle: Nothing requires an reason or cause since it can always be self-caused.

Adding this loophole is admission of failure. It means try harder. It certainly is causing me to think in different ways, but my reply probably deserves a new post rather than a mere reply to this narrowly confined and aging topic.

I think you misunderstand. A first cause means there is an existence which can cause others, but has no cause itself. — Philosophim

You need to clarify your terminology. You defined ‘exists’ as something an object does, or rather something that is done to it. A smiley exists because something caused the coins to be arranged in a recognizable pattern, and it ceases to exist later when the coins are returned to a purse.
Existence on the other hand typically refers to ‘all of reality’. I’m not sure how you distinguish ‘existence’ and ‘universe’ from each other. Maybe you have totally different definitions of these things than what I’m guessing.
Your statement above (coupled with others) seems to imply that ‘existence’, reality, or something at least, suddenly was, uncaused, when before that there wasn’t existence, reality, or anything. Well, there was time at least, but not sure how time is in any way meaningful without a reality to change.
You say ‘there is an existence’, like this first cause thing still is around, and didn’t disappear like all the other causes. A storm causes my lawn to get watered, but later the lawn is wet and the storm is gone, no longer existing, at least not over my lawn. But your wording says that there is (not was) an existence that can cause (not caused) others. So you’re obviously defining ‘existence’ in a different way than ‘exists’, which is great, but I’m hoping I got close to the mark when guessing at your definition.

Mind you, I’m trying to keep any opinion of alternate views out of this for now, since I’m pretty obviously not understanding what you’re trying to convey.

Also, don't forget the very important part, "at least one".

A bunch happen at the same time, or a bunch of them happen after a while, but with only one earliest one? You seem to define ‘first cause’ as any event lacking a direct cause, and not ‘comes earlier than the others’.

Further, this is not an argument about "the formation of the universe". The argument is that in any chain of causality, a first cause is logically necessary.

There are circular solutions, so this logic doesn’t follow. The infinite regress is also a valid solution, but you conclude otherwise. Hence 180’s trivial retort (first reply) about the first integer. Yes, they can be counted, but they can’t be counted in order.

If you have time, you have a prior state, a current state, and a potential future state, which is in line with the OP. — Philosophim

Non-sequitur.
If you have time, some of the events can be ordered (X is before Y), but that doesn’t make any one of them ‘current’. The B view does not make any reference to the present since it denies any meaning of the concept.
I say ‘some of’ because any pair of events that are separated in a space-like manner are ambiguously ordered and neither can be the cause of the other if locality true.

If I posted a B series interpretation, this topic wouldn't have reached many people. That's not the goal here.

It’s actually quite easy to word your OP concept using B-series language, without obscuring its meaning.

There is no claim that everything interacts with everything and everything is the cause of everything else.

I didn’t say there was, but had I not put that clause in there, my statement would have been wrong, and I don’t like making wrong statements.

You need to directly show how your argument applies to the OP.

From your OP then”

Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.

This seem to allow only infinite regress, causal-turtles all the way down. There cannot be a first cause of existence (your definition) since existence would be the effect, meaning that which caused it was something that didn’t exist, being prior to existence. And the eternal (cyclic say) models of the universe make different empirical predictions than those we see.

My view gets around this by not asserting your statement above, by not making the assumptions it implicitly makes.
There’s another thread going on (in the religious section of all places) about Rasmussen’s paradox. The OP shows Rasmussen’s argument, which proceed much along the same lines as I do.

I do not state the universe needs to be caused.

But that’s how I read the above quote. Either the universe has a prior cause for its existence, or there is one first cause of existence, which sounds like the same thing: existence being caused, but perhaps that cause is not ‘prior’.

And here I agreed at least that I’m fine with an initial state. Plenty of temporal structures have them.

Again, where in my OP am I explicitly demanding A theory?

You explicitly asked my to give reasons why B seemed better to me, and I answered. Conversation would be impossible if nobody could address any subsequent post of yours because it wasn’t posted in the OP.

That sounds pretty contradictory to me
— noAxioms
It doesn't to me. Neither eliminates causality, which is all I care about. — Philosophim

They might both describe causality to your satisfaction, but that isn’t sufficient for the two interpretations to not be mutually exclusive. If one says ‘M’ and the other says ‘~M’, they can’t both be right.

B theory also does not eliminate time. There is still clearly a past state, present state, and future state. — Philosophim

B theory indeed does not eliminate time, since it is essentially a dimension in that view. It does explicitly deny past, present and future state, so that assertion about it is wrong. Really, read up on it if you want to digress from your OP and actually present a valid objection to the view.

The past state causes the present state, and the present state causes the future state. To counter the argument you have to eliminate causality, and I don't see B theory doing that. If you think it does, please point out how. — Philosophim

Causality would say that any given state (Y say) is caused by some prior state (X, per your example), and causes Z, all without any of those states being past, present, or future. There is only the relation of one event being prior to another, or ambiguously ordered. If two events are ambiguously ordered (frame dependent ordering), then the principle of locality says that neither event can be the cause of the other. There are interpretations of QM that deny that principle and allow situations where effect is in the past of the cause.
Point is, all that can be described without reference to any objective state of said events. There is only relative ordering (this before that, but not this has happened but that has not yet happened).

There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity.
— noAxioms
Sorry, its been a while since I've read the specific vocabulary of relativity. I generally remember relativity from years ago and many of the consequences of it. But I did not see how it countered the OP's points. — Philosophim

The scenario shows how two events, say months apart but in the same approximate location, are nevertheless both simultaneous to this one event on Earth (the event of my greeting my friend in passing). There cannot be two present moments a month apart in Andromeda, so it is contradictory if both my friend and I are correct about what’s going on over there currently. That’s where the original major suggestion supporting B theory originated. All of relativity theory is based on B premises.

Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example?
— noAxioms
No. If it doesn't have anything to do with the OP, I'm not concerned. — Philosophim

and yet most of these posts are about this topic, and not causality. I tried to clarify the point in the paragraph above.

That's been my point. I don't see how it counters the arguments of the OP. — Philosophim

It was brought up to a different post of yours in this topic. It is relevant to the OP, because according to A theory, the universe itself, or at least the initial state, needs to be caused, which is the something-from-nothing connundrum. What caused the rules by which uncaused events are legal in the first place?

My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime.
— noAxioms
Reading up on B theory again, I did not see how B theory ignored parts of spacetime. — Philosophim

It doesn’t. It’s A theory that cannot handle this problem. That’s why I posted it when you asked me why B is better.

All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence
— noAxioms
I do. That is a change in spatial location. When one state is different from the next, that is change. — Philosophim

I’d have said change over time, but that’s not the point. If you read the comment, it was non-existence to existence that I was discussing. Then again, it very much depends on one’s definition of ‘exists’, which in turn is dependent on ones interpretation of time. So the time discussion really turns out to be relevant.
B-theory says the coin-smiley exists. The rearrangement of the coins over time doesn’t affect that at all since all events (coins in smiley pattern, coins in different pattern) all exist equally. So the change over time was caused, but the existence wasn’t affected. And that’s not even using my relational definition of ‘exists’.

If you're claiming your premises contradict mine, I don't think they do. Meaning, they might be able to co-exist without issue. — Philosophim

’A’ claim: All events are objectively in one of three ontological states of past, present, and future. The A-theorist might or might not apply the property of existence to past and/or future states. The universe is 3D only if past and future states are nonexistent.
‘B’ claim: Events share equal ontology, with no moment that in any way is meaningfully objectively special relative to another moment.
That sounds pretty contradictory to me, despite the lack of an empirical test to directly falsify either.

. . . If there is a current moment over there at Andromeda, then the fleet cannot be in a current state of having been launched and not launched.
— noAxioms

Basically Einstein's time dilation.

There’s no time dilation in the Andromda example. It is an example of relativity of simultaneity. Dilation is better illustrated with the twins 'paradox' rather than the Andromeda 'paradox'. While we're at it, the barn-pole 'paradox' illustrates relative length contraction. These things are only paradoxical under A theory.

Dilation does illustrate that clocks do not measure the advancement of the present. If time is defined to be that advancement, then neither clocks nor any other device measure time.

Y is simply the current state we are looking at.

To put it in a non-interpretation-specific way, Y is simply the state at (or immediately prior actually) the time of the measurement.

The Andromeda argument has nothing to do with Y, or anything measured or caused for that matter. Do you understand what is being illustrated by the example?

Taking your time dilation example, we just have to examine the state properly.

Nobody is examining any state, and there’s no dilation example. What’s going on simultaneously with Bob and I greeting is outside both our light cones and is entirely unmeasurable by either of us. Measurements were not the point of that example.

In isolation to each other, each state does not consider the other state. Which is perfectly fine if the other state is unimportant to what we are considering. If however, we took the state of both together in relation to each other, then the state must be described as such. Meaning we would say on Earth, the time is 2 hours behind the time on Andromeda. No contradiction there, just a measurement of state that notes the relative time difference.

Fortunately, I'm not using a coordinate system.

Or you simply don’t know you’re doing it. OK, so you don’t understand the second argument either. The A theory demands one preferred coordinate system, and all the other ones are wrong. My argument against that is that there is no coordinate system that meets the requirements, forcing the interpretation to deny the existence of parts of spacetime.

Thirdly, and most importantly, how did time get going,
— noAxioms

That would be subsumed in the OP. Lets call the existence of time Y. If there was something that caused Y, that answer would be X.

That makes it sound like X occurs before Y, which is a contradiction if there’s not yet time until event Y.

Why can self-explained states exist? There is no answer, because they have no reason to exist.

Agree

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows.
— Philosophim

I had responded directly to that one in an early post with the coin example. All the prior cause did was change the arrangement of the coins over time. I don’t consider that a change to anything’s existence, hence I think it a category error to speak of existence being something caused.

I feel like I understood your points much more this time, and I hope I followed up adequately in my answers.

Besides clarifications on my arguments about interpretations, I am actually trying to get the train back on the original track. Mostly with that last comment...

No, my point is that just because you make an assumption, it doesn't make them valid or right. — Philosophim

No argument there, so point taken.

These are not claims in a vacuum, they are claims that are a counter to my claims.

Are you claiming that your premises are in fact correct or at least better?

If you think other assumptions are better than the OP's, then you need to show why.

OK, since you asked:
I’ve done that with some examples, the Andromeda scenario being one of them. I greet Bob as we walk past each other. Relative to me, the Andromeda generals have currently (as of the present) not yet decided to launch a war fleet. Relative to Bob, the war fleet is currently in flight, having already been launched. If there is a current moment over there at Andromeda, then the fleet cannot be in a current state of having been launched and not launched. That’s the contradiction that suggests a different view (that of relativity and spacetime, instead of Newton’s notions of absolute space and time.

That’s not a disproof by any means, but perhaps a good reason why the 4D model is more descriptive of the situation. Nobody does the mathematics using the 3D model since to do it, the identity of the correct foliation of space and time must be known, and it cannot be known. There are other factors that also prevent a coherent model such as lack of reliable tools to take measurments.

Second bit of evidence. There is no coordinate system that foliates all events in all of spacetime, which means that there are events that are not ordered (are neither past, present nor future) relative to any time say here on Earth. That seems a contradiction to me.

Thirdly, and most importantly, how did time get going, and if it was always going, how did the universe suddenly ‘happen’ when there wasn’t anything before it. How does one explain the reality of whatever one asserts to be real?

If you think that all assumptions are equally valid and logically and factually correct

Don’t be silly. Different interpretations of a thing usually contradict each other, so they obviously cannot all be factually correct.

If one assumes that X is true, and one assumes that X is false, only one can hold.

Presuming that ‘X is true and false’ in the same sense, that’s a self contradictory set of premises, trivially falsified. It is therefore not a valid set of premises, by definition.
Without that presumption, both can hold.
The fleet has launched relative to Bob (fleet-launched = true). The fleet has not yet launched relative to me (fleet-lauched = false). Both true and false, yet not contradictory since it’s not true and false in the same sense. For details, google ‘law of non-contradiction’.

If you are holding assumptions contrary to the OP's, then only one of us can be right.

But I’m not asserting the rightness of any particular interpretation. You seem to be, since you talk of being right or not. To me, an assumption is just that, a potential thing, not some truth to be believed with certainty. One should be open to alternatives.

so you have the concept in your head about something "likely more valid".

I suppose so. I find it more difficult to talk ones way out of some of the problems listed above than problems listed for the B view.
First issue is not really a problem. Bob and I are probably both wrong about which moment is actually current in another place, and Einstein’s simultaneity convention is simply wrong, as are both premises of his special relativity theory from which that convention (and pretty much all of modern cosmology) follows.
Second issue is a problem, but one that can be circumvented by asserting that events no foliated simply can never exist, meaning one cannot fall beyond the coordinate singularity of a black hole event horizon. This can be empirically demonstrated otherwise, but only to ones self, not to the outside observer.
Third issue is a problem I’ve not seem resolved by anybody.

To me, the entire abstract is about selecting a state, and noting that a prior state could exist for the current state to be. In my view, this is a relative state comparison of causality. Why does state Y exist? Because of a prior state X, or Y has no prior state X and exists without any prior explanation.

Sounds like Y is explained by an X or not, making X fairly irrelevant to explaining Y.
Yes, I would agree that if there are two causally ordered events X and Y, the ordering forms a relation (X before Y in this case). If there’s no X, then there’s no relation. If X and Y are not within each other’s light cones, then their ordering is ambiguous, and neither necessarily exists in direct relation to the other.
I might disagree that X is a prior state of Y. X might have contributed to the state at Y, but the wording makes it sound like X and Y share an identity, which is just an abstraction added by common language.

”If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.”

True, my mistake, that was one sentence, not two. Despite this, I made no logical fallacies in concluding you, who has typed a reply, exist. — Philosophim

Given the above quoted premise, I agree. I just don’t hold that premise to be necessarily true, or even meaningful for that matter. I also don’t assert the premise to be false. I’ve never said it was wrong.

I am going to assume your points are to the OP, and not extra asides.

Well, the replies are typically in response to the quoted comment, wherever the conversation seems to have gone.

Lets minimize what is extra, and only focus on what is necessary for the discussion please.

But you asked quite a few questions in your last post that are a response to my comments, and not directly related to the OP, such as why I suspect the A interpretation of time is questionably valid.

I said pretty early on that I have no problem with uncaused events. You speak of chains like a given occurrence has but a single linear set of causes before it, when in actuality there are probably countless factors that came together to cause the occurrence in question. Some of those prior states might be uncaused themselves, but that’s rare.

How can there be any time without the existence of motion? — Kuro

Traffic lights make a nice example of time without motion. Just the regular color changes are enough. And yet time itself is not defined by change, since the air pressure changes with altitude, which is change without time.

But so far as time is concerned we see that all with one exception are in agreement in saying that it is uncreated

I don't see an exception. The process of creation is temporal by definition, so while I have no problem with time being bounded, it seem a contradiction to apply the concept of creation or destruction to time. There are valid solutions to Einstein's field equations with bounded time, such as white and black holes.

It is appealing to define the world in such a way that all definitions and assumptions are valid, because then you feel like you can never be wrong. — Philosophim

Assumptions are not right just because they’re valid.

The problem is, it breaks down because you arrive at a glaring contradiction. I can claim, "No, some definitions/assumpsions are more valid than others," which is a direct challenge to your viewpoint.

That sounds hokey. Assumptions are valid or they are not. There’s not much more-or-less to it. You might make an argument about more or less likely to be true. Apparently the flying spaghetti monster is a valid argument, but not likely a true one.

I've shown you hold a contradiction …
I've claimed your viewpoint is invalid

Where’s this supposed contradiction in ‘my view’? I mean, I haven’t really expressed ‘my’ view, just a different and very valid one.

just because you can propose an alternative definition or assumption, it in no way means its existence challenges or defeats another definition or assumption.

I would say that the existence of a valid alternate view very much poses a challenge to what might otherwise be an unchallenged view.

That did not show how my two sentences begged the question.

Sorry, but I only remember one sentence, which was:

If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.

That doesn’t follow (non-sequitur). In order for it to follow, one must posit that “Something must exist to type a reply”, my words, but begging exactly what you’re trying to show. So I illustrated how to go about demonstrating that premise, which is by presuming the negation, and driving that negated premise to self contradiction. But instead, all you wrote way this:

If something does not exist, then it cannot type a reply. Since you typed a reply, we've concluded you exist

which is just a mild rewording of the original non-sequitur, not any kind of logical demonstration of the correctness of the assertion.

Stating what a definition entails is not begging the question.

That’s an assertion, not a definition. A definition would be more along the lines of what you mean by ‘exists’ or ‘reply’ or some such.
Perhaps a real definition would help. All I see so far is a property that something has and something else doesn’t have, and sans any meaning to the word.

I tried to consider the assertion as a definition instead of an assertion, but it leads to silliness like Bob was extremely ill such that it rendered him nonexistent for a week.

According to your logic, you proposed a definition for existence which does not follow English.

Yea, duh. English language gets in the way of an awful lot of physics and philosophical definition. For instance, in English, velocity is a property synonymous with speed. But in physics, it is defined as a vector change in position relative to an explicitly defined frame.
We’re going for the philosophical definition of ‘exists’ here (of which there’s more than one), not the street definition.
The English language is built around a great number of biases, many of which are questionable. Those biases were put there for good reason, but truth seem not to be one of those reasons.

To exist, is to have the property of interacting between other existences/entities.

Ooh, that sounds so much closer to my definition, where existence is only meaningful in relation to other entities.

To be an entity, is to exist.

That sounds more like the standard definition of existence as a property, but the requirement of this property in order for a pair of entities to interact does not follow from this definition.

You need to re-read the OP. The entire OP is about relational existence.

Funny, because the word ‘relation’ or ‘relative’ does not appear anywhere in the OP. It seems instead to be about first cause.

Its been a focal point of the discussion. If you assume that "current" is not anything more than an assumption, then you'll need to demonstrate why your assumption that this is the case, is real.

No, since I made no claim of its correctness, only a claim for the validity of the interpretation that denies a current moment. So you need to demonstrate the self-contradiction that invalidates it.

… I don't understand how the B series revokes the OP

It wasn’t a comment about the OP, something to which I agreed if you remember.
It was a reply to your “Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state”, about 472 posts into this topic. I wish the site would number the posts.

I was arguing the opposite, that the numbers need not exist for the sum of 1 and 1 to be 2.
— noAxioms
Ha ha! Well done! I mean this genuinely and not sarcastically. — Philosophim

There was no sarcasm in any of the above conversation.

Always question and poke at "generally accepted knowledge". My point was that we can't take the standpoint that they're merely assuming what is generally known.

What is ‘generally accepted/known is a matter of mere opinion. If there are multiple valid interpretations, it cannot be knowledge. That’s just a basic rule of being open minded.

We can give credit that theirs is the societally reasonable stance

Absolutely. But the topic under discussion is not about social issues.

if we are to challenge it, we must given evidence that it is wrong.

That’s not the scientific way to go about it. If one is to assert the alternative view as wrong, that’s what needs the evidence. That’s the scientific method: falsification. I’m not asserting anything is wrong. I’m just saying it isn’t knowledge because there’s an equally valid (and likely more valid) alternative view.

Its just that you need to demonstrate why they have merit, and why the show the OP to be wrong.

But I didn’t assert that the OP was wrong. I just pointed out that it made various assumptions, and thus the conclusions might not follow if different assumptions are made.

It begs its conclusion.
— noAxioms
Can it be falsified? Yes. If something does not exist, then it cannot type a reply. Since you typed a reply, we've concluded you exist. — Philosophim

You honestly don’t see begging in that answer, do you? You’re invoking the premise “Something must exist to type a reply” to demonstrate the premise. The statement is a positive example, which falsifies nothing. To do the latter, one must posit the negation:
P1: Property of existence is not necessary for the interaction between entities.
P2: Two entities X and Y interact.

Now prove that X and Y necessarily have the property of existence without begging your premise. Then you’ve falsified it.

I drive at this point because there are valid interpretations of the world that don’t give any meaning to ‘property of existence’ since ‘exists’ is not defined as a property but rather as a relation. You’re asserting that such an interpretation is necessarily wrong, despite the growing support.


Concerning the alternate interpretation of time:

The alternate view might say that on Feb 5, 2022 we all observe the state of the world of Feb 5, 2022 (at least the nearby stuff), and not some other state. That date is no more or less 'the past', 'the present', or 'the future' than any other date. They all have equal ontology.
— noAxioms
No, that's incorrect. By using dates, you are stating that there are states that are not "current", and states that are "prior to the current state".

I didn’t make any mention of ‘current’, so I stated neither thing. The statement was carefully worded in B-series, which forbids implied references to the nonexistent present since any such statements would be begging a different view. Please read up on this and actually understand it before asserting that it is wrong. If you can’t understand it, then don’t argue against it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_series_and_B_series
The B theory (term coined last century by McTaggart) (or eternalism) is at least as old as the 11th century where it was first called '4 dimensionalism'.

If you're just throwing out "Maybe its this," without any type of assertion to its validity

Oh I assert its validity. But asserting the necessary truth of any interpretation of something kind of goes against an open minded attitude.
The B-view on time pairs very well with the relational view on ontology since it doesn’t have the problems inherent in any view that defines existence as a property.

No, they just measure the rate of time from future potential to relative past. A second for example is X number of electronic cycles

I’ve not heard of counting electron cycles, but fine. Since one electron might cycle thrice as many times between events A and B (events where both electrons are in each other’s presence), it isn’t measuring ‘the rate of time’ between those two events, it is measuring something specific only to each electron.

Keep in mind that I'm not one of those guys that says "this view is the way it is, and if you take some other view, you're wrong". I'm about exploring all avenues rationally, and identifying biases that I didn't even know I held, and perhaps coming up with a logically self-consistent view in the process.

I admittedly usually presume that my sensory input is not a set of lies. If I assumed otherwise, there's nothing to trust about the nature of anything.

That's like if I said 1+1 = 2, and you came back with, "You assume 1 exists". — Philosophim

That's funny. I had pretty much had that line thrown at me (by an actual physicist) and I was arguing the opposite, that the numbers need not exist for the sum of 1 and 1 to be 2.

Anyone with basic education knows what "current" and "1" mean.

I know what the word means. Not everybody assumes the existence of a preferred moment in time, and the alternate view (that all events in spacetime share equal ontology) is used by most physicists, albeit not the average guy on the street who has little use for framing things that way.

Its up to you to demonstrate why the regular and assumed use is broken.

I didn't say anything was broken. I said it had implication for the idea of an alpha cause.'

We clearly exist currently don't we?

My name implies that I assume nothing. So I'd say that it depends on the definitions of those words. I often take the relational view where the phrase "X exists' is meaningless since it is not expressed as relation.
So no, since I cannot think of a test for the property of existence that doesn't beg its conclusion, it isn't clear to me.

Of course, you can take the intuitive view and not explore the alternate ideas, but then you're just rationalizing answers that you've already decided on. In other words, feel free to bid me a good day if I'm not helping. I make a point of ignoring my intuitions, which just get in the way of actual objective analysis.

Let me help you out. If you don't exist, you won't type a reply.

No, I don't buy that. It begs its conclusion. Thought experiments would be impossible if they only worked for things with the additional property of 'existence' tacked onto them.
The unicorn has a horn, which by the above logic it cannot because the horn doesn't exist. I told you the unicorn would come into play. I just saying there are valid alternative views (non-realist ones) that don't presume objective existence. The relational view of which I spoke defines existence only as a relation. I exist in relation to you because you read my posts, so you've measured me.

If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?

If one assumes a view where that statement is meaningful, then yes. If one doesn't, then the statement is simply not meaningful. The alternate view might say that on Feb 5, 2022 we all observe the state of the world of Feb 5, 2022 (at least the nearby stuff), and not some other state. That date is no more or less 'the past', 'the present', or 'the future' than any other date. They all have equal ontology.

This is suggested by relativity of simultaneity. The presentist view (the one you're taking) says that there is a current moment here, there is also a current moment elsewhere, but there is no way to determine it. Suppose there's a clock we can see in Andromeda. OK, what we see was emitted before the time it gets observed, but if the distance and velocity of the clock is known, one can compute what the clock says at the same time as when we observe it, except the distance and velocity of it is frame dependent, leaving no way at all to empirically determine what the remote clock says at the same time as when our local clock says time T.
Look up the Andromeda paradox on wiki. It's all about this. Understand it before just dismissing it by your incredulity.

So you're assuming an unproven suggestion.

I assume nothing as any kind of asserted truth. Physics is not in the business of proving things, but I do definitely work with the view preferentially for the ease of understanding. There is no working theory of the universe that assumes a current moment. The mathematics is orders of magnitude more complicated. It's much easier to do assuming spacetime.
There is no device that measures the rate of advancement of the current time. Clocks measure proper time along a worldline through spacetime. If they measured the advancement of the present, they'd not get out of sync when they move (twins paradox) or change potential.

Also, if 4D spacetime contains time, then we as as 3D objects would be able to measure it. And if we're able to measure it, we can say, "This moment now is current". Imagine an X Y graph. I can measure the X, the Y, etc. Just because that 2D plane is on my 3D desk, doesn't mean I can't use the X Y graph. Same with time.

So your assumption, which isn't a given, doesn't really refute the idea of "currently existing", causality, or time.

I never claimed any of those things are refuted. I'm just pointing out that there's a different view out there, and one used preferentially by physicists. The B-view does not deny time, it just defines it differently. In the B view, time is what clocks measure, which is the temporal length of a worldline. Two different worldlines connecting events X and Y might have different temporal lengths (as they do in the twins 'paradox'), so the clocks don't match when reunited. That's impossible if they accurately measured the sort of time you're talking about.
And no, that doesn't in any way prove the presentist view wrong. I've put a couple proofs out there against it myself, and I've also done a topic defending it against what I saw as fallacious arguments against.

And even beyond that, I just have one question. Why is reality 4D spacetime?

We don't know that it is for one. Physics doesn't answer 'why' questions too well. Philosophy does sometimes.
If you're asking the purpose of the universe being the way it is, it doesn't seem to have a purpose.

The fine-tuning argument has a clue. There is a suggestion that there are a lot of universes with all sorts of random different values for constants, different dimensions (like two space and three time dimensions) in which all sorts of crazy things go on, but rarely can complexity form from simple beginning. This universe has one of the rare set of variables that allow the formation of complex structures from simple primitives. By the weak anthropic principle, given this insanely large set of possible configurations, only in one like ours can observers evolve to note the universe and the rules that govern it. So it's simply not possible to see the other ones because those are not observed in the way that people observe.

This makes the presumption that there is a current state.
— noAxioms

Please clarify. Are you implying there is no "now"? — Philosophim

No, I said that you're making the assumption that there is one. The assumption has implications to the topic at hand, which is why I'm dredging it up.

Do you not exist at this time?

That question also presumes it.

We clearly exist currently don't we?

I can think of no empirical test that falsifies the alternative, so no, it isn't clear.

If we observe something currently, then that state is current as well correct?

That statement also assumes (begs) it.

Why couldn't the big bang just happen? — Philosophim

There's where the implication comes in (bold above). The assumption has the 3D universe contained in time: The universe wasn't there at some time in the past, and at some point in time, the alpha event 'happened', and thereafter the universe was there. It makes for a larger container that contains the universe (itself a container of space, but not a container of time).

Physics suggests (doesn't prove) that the universe is 4D spacetime, and is not something contained in time, but rather something that contains it. In that view, time is a dimension and not a preferred moment that flows. The big bang isn't something that 'happened'. It's just part of the whole structure of all events, each of which are part of the structure equally.

Causality is also an explanation for why there is a current state. — Philosophim

This makes the presumption that there is a current state.

What are A, B, C theories of time? Be as concise as possible. — Agent Smith

A, B: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_series_and_B_series
C: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Unreality_of_Time

but the C page seems to have fallacious reasoning

If something applies to "everything that is real," then it also applies to any of its subsets like objects. — Philosophim

Probably poorly worded on my part. I'm speaking not of 'all things' (despite saying that), but reality itself, the container of the objects, which in this case is spacetime.

I think you misunderstand, if there is no cause for the decay of an atom, than that decay is the "alpha", or the first cause.

Right. So the existence of an alpha isn't a problem. There is a time before the decay event, but there isn't a time before say the emission of material from a white hole, so time can be bounded.
I'm agreeing with you about the alpha thing, just not about the universe (the container) having been caused or created. I'm not sure where your opinion lies on that account.

No, it literally means the fact that the first integer is 1. :)

But there is an integer before it, by any standard (not just counting) ordering of the integers. It's still only a semi-applicable example (180 came up with it I think) since the set of integers is unbounded and time isn't necessarily unbounded.

I'm not addressing what you believe is a first cause. I'm addressing that logically, there must be a first cause.

A lot of them apparently, since there are plenty of sets of events, none of which share a common cause, at least not one in our spacetime.

Big question that's more about epistemology. I have an entire other thread where I cover that. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

It wasn't really a question about your knowledge of the subject. It was a question about the unicorns.

In short, if we're talking my personal definition of a unicorn, it can be anything. If we're talking about a societally agreed upon term for a unicorn, I would say the essential property that most people agree on is that its a horse with a horn on its head, and followed slightly less with "magical".

Close enough. I mostly agree: Horse-like, but not actually a horse. The horn was what I was after.

Perhaps we'll come back to that, but for the time, it appears that pursuit of the unicorn thing goes in a different direction than where you're obviously trying to confine this topic. It's your topic, so I don't want to derail it with ontological illustrations.

C theory, which rejects temporal directionality. — Kuro

Nobody took this bait.
I cannot find a difference between B and C. B-theorists define directionality based on entropy levels. If the C-theorist denies this, it seems they are in denial of thermodynamic law.

Most of the literature I saw concerning C-theory mistakenly uses A-references in describing B-theory, which is a straw man.

As for the title of this topic "Why does time move forward?", I can only say that it is a problem only for those that posit that time is something that moves, forward or otherwise.

I might have a unique take on the subject if you're interested. — Philosophim

I thought it was abandoned. So I posted something to it, given the invite.

OK. Having been invited, I can take a crack at this. I haven't read most of the posts, just some of the early ones.

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

Causality is the idea that a snapshot of existence is in the state that it is because of some prior state. — Philosophim

You seem to be using a two different definitions of 'existence', one that applies to objects (things that are contained by space and time), and the other 'everything that is real'.

For example of the first one, suppose I have 7 small coins and a couple larger ones, and I arrange the little ones into an arc and put the bigger ones above. The coins now form a crude smiley pattern.
I have, in a way, 'caused' the existence of the smiley despite the fact that all I did was change the arrangement of the already-existing coins, and designate the latter arrangement as meeting the requirements of 'a smiley' whereas the prior arrangement did not.
But that definition of 'existence' is applicable only to objects, that is, some state of affairs contained by space and time (and is thus a relation with that space and time), which is a state that is in a certain required condition at such and such location for such and such duration. It is a category error to apply that sort of definition to 'all of reality' which isn't contained, but rather is the container.

To say that there is a first cause is probably no more than to say time (a dimension of the structure that is the universe) is bounded. Bounded time is not new. It occurs in white holes, and black holes, all without contradiction. It does imply a sort of 'initial state' at the boundary if it is bounded like that, but only if the boundary in that edge is considered 'before' the others, which isn't necessarily true. There are unbounded cyclic models, but these for the most part predict different observations than those we measure, and have been effectively falsified.

a. There is always a X for every Y.

True only in classical physics. An easy example is the decay of an atom, which occurs uncaused. That Y has no X, and as such there is precedent for an 'alpha' as you call it.

4. Alpha logic: ... Plainly put, the rules concluded within a universe of causality cannot explain why an Alpha exists.

No, they don't, but no rules are violated either. The usual rules don't apply where the rules are singular, which they are say at the big bang.

There can be no underlying reason for why the universe is. — Philosophim

This is the second category, not the same thing as 'why the smiley is'.

First integer? Sure, that would be one. — Philosophim

That's like saying the first moment in time is now, or that space begins here on Earth. OK, I don't buy that time isn't bounded in the past direction. It certainly seems meaningless beyond the big bang singularity, even though there are hypothesis that discuss the physics beyond it. Whatever's beyond it, it isn't measured in 3 spatial dimensions of meters and a single dimension of time measured in seconds and such.

As an aside, can you answer a question: What is a distinguishing characteristic of a unicorn? I mean, one legend has it that it blows rainbows out of its butt, but I don't think that one is universally agreed upon.

You were in communication with Mr Tegmark, did you accuse him of 'asserting his own private physics' regarding his level I to level IV multiverse? — universeness

That isn't physics since it makes no empirical predictions. It's just a system of categorization of different kinds of multiverse that falls out of standard physics theories and interpretations, with the fourth level being his own philosophical addition, but again, nothing that was asserted as any kind of necessary truth.

To quote Tegmark: "I don’t think it’s my job as a scientist to “believe” in particular theories, and prefer being quantitive and discussing the probability p I’d estimate for something being correct."

Do you think Roger Penrose is doing the same with his 'bouncing' Universe? or Carlo Rovelli with his 'localised' wave function collapse?

No I don't. They're more professional than that.

He like many others are convinced they know exactly what the basic workings of the Universe are and they know what its basic structure is.

If you 'know' something for which the evidence is yet to be found, then it's blind faith, which I find unprofessional.

If you want to encourage new thinking, you need to welcome any attempt at new physics.

I never said I didn't. But new ideas (especially ones that are contradicted by empirical evidence) shouldn't be asserted as truth, just 'because I know'. Proper new thinking is presented in the form of hypothesis. That's how the scientific method works.

I don't think humans are rational beings (rationalizing yes, rational no), simply animals with a rational tool at their disposal. I suspect an actual rational being would be unfit, and perhaps there lies an explanation for the Fermi paradox.
— noAxioms

This is a more negative view of a human than the one I hold myself but I do respect your right to hold 'your own private humanism viewpoint now.'

I don't find that comment negative at all, just my best assessment. Declaring something fit (or at least more fit than the alternative) seems a positive trait, not a negative one.

It's just that hidden variables make the same predictions as standard QM, except in a domain that's difficult to access experimentally (but it is in principle). — EugeneW

But no such experiment has been identified, even an impractical one. If the experiment has not taken place, how is this assertion known?

It's not Bohm who says a particle hops from one path to another. It's me. An electron travels on parts of all possible paths, directed by non-local variables. This actually happens. — EugeneW

OK, you're asserting your own private physics now. I don't think you're the best for trying to educate another.

Hidden variables give almost exactly the same predictions as the standard. But not totally. — EugeneW

By definition, all quantum interpretation must make the same predictions as quantum theory. If it doesn't, it isn't an interpretation of that theory. So by saying this, you're asserting that all quantum physicists are wrong, and you alone have sole access to some kind of special truth, and not just a deluded belief.

Kind of arrogant, no? I'm just saying that your claims are unbacked and waaay over the top.

I think we have three. The RComplex(me), The Limbic system(myself), and the Cerebral Cortex (I). — universeness

Well, I don't label them me, myself, and I, but sure. I notice that the authority hierarchy goes left to right in that list. The cortex is the slowest and least in charge, but that's where the rational part of us is. Not being in charge, I don't think humans are rational beings (rationalizing yes, rational no), simply animals with a rational tool at their disposal. I suspect an actual rational being would be unfit, and perhaps there lies an explanation for the Fermi paradox.

As a matter of fact, experiments can be done to discern if [hidden variables] exist or not. — EugeneW

This is false. One would need to assume certain unprovable postulates (*cough* biases *cough*) to demonstrate this.

You see hidden variables as classical variables? — EugeneW

I don't. I see an interpretation that attempts to get as close as possible to classical intuitions at whatever cost in additional complexity. I prefer the simpler ones (Occam's razor and all), but I am not so naive as to assert any particular interpretation as 'the truth'.

Confusing indeed! Let's say the electron just explores all possible paths to reach for other particles to interact with. It goes through one slit and during this transgress it hops to the other. — EugeneW

You say this stuff like it is fact, when it is only your personal opinion, which is misleading when replying to one who is trying to learn. Last I checked, Bohm does not suggest that the electron goes through one slit and then hops to the other. It takes one path in that interpretation.
The interpretation suggests that the electron detours to the side a bit to migrate to the next positive interference concentration, but it never doubles back and 'takes both paths'. From wiki:

"Trajectories of particles under De Broglie–Bohm theory in the double-slit experiment."

Note that the picture is not entitled: "Trajectories of particles under Quantum Mechanics theory in the double-slit experiment."
Note also that none of the paths double back and pass through more than one slit.

Bohm was mocked — EugeneW

But has anybody proven him wrong? The pilot wave tank thing died a horrible death, but the interpretation lives on.

So Feynmann suggested that each single electron passes through both slits and effectively 'interferes with itself'. — universeness

That's like saying the cat is both dead and alive. It isn't. The electron is said to be in superposition of going through each slit, and the cat is in superposition of being dead and alive. Even then, the latter is wrong since superposition requires a coherent state: the electron states in superposition can interfere with each other and produce a measurable interference pattern. The live cat cannot measurably interfere with the dead cat, and so it not a true superposition.

They done the double-slit thing with buckyballs, which is a huge molecule which they've nevertheless managed to get to interfere with itself.

Physics makes predictions of the results of a particular experiment but it then accepts the actual results as what is. — universeness

If I am looking for my coffee, and see it sitting on the counter, that's a measurement. That I infer that the cup is actually over there is a metaphysical conclusion, but one that works very well for me, so it's second nature in everyday life. Physics says that if I actually go there and reach for the cup, I'd expect it to be measured by my hand when I do that, but physics actually says that that expectation can be made regardless of the metaphysical overhead.

It's a thin distinction, but an important one to me. I named myself 'noAxioms' precisely because there's nothing I refuse to question. I've a long list of things that pretty much everybody believes (including myself) which are nevertheless lacking in hard evidence. The result is a conflict: I believe some things that I know to be likely false, as if there are multiple entities in me with conflicting ideas, and only one of them can be in charge.

They're galaxies, and separate galaxies might merge into bigger ones, but they hardly just cease being there after only several billion years
— noAxioms
Well, it might have been more accurate for me to say that the print in my room of that area of space looks nothing like that anymore.

What something looks like is what you see if you look at it. Galaxies are huge and take ages to change. I assure you it that it still looks like that now from here. Sure, you move a few billion light years in some direction and point the telescope the same way, the view will look different. The picture is definitely dependent on point of view and looks different from significantly elsewhere.

I have mixed emotions when it comes to the term 'metaphysical.' Definintions like 'after physics' or 'beyond physics' don't help but I normally do find some value when I read/view 'metaphysical' discussions. — universeness

Physics concerns what one expects to measure. Metaphysics concerns what is. So a quantum interpretation like Bohmian mechanics or RQM make zero empirical predictions, hence are not part of quantum mechanics physics theory.

Some molecule of Napoleon's dying breath interacts with the rock, changing the state (the momentum perhaps) of at least one particle of the rock. The rock is now different than it would have been without that measurement, thus Napoleon exists relative to that rock
— noAxioms

I may have garnished more value from this if you had typed something like 'Some molecule of Napoleans consciousness (not his dying breath), as his physical body starts to disassemble, after his death...interacts with a rock.

That breath was made of atoms, and electrons and protons and such. Those particles are still around to this day. They'd be somewhere else had Napoleon never existed, so they constitute a measurement of him.
To phrase it in MWI terms: It is not possible that there is a world that contains you (now and in your current state) and does not contain Napoleon.

I personally think this idea is nonsense and that such an interaction would leave the rock completely unchanged.

Hey, whatever floats your boat.

I think it's much more likely that disassembled component parts of a dead human consciousness

I don't think human consciousness is an assembly of components. More of a process that takes place, like combustion, involving not necessarily the same matter at any given time, just like a candle flame's atoms are almost completely different than the 'same flame' a minute later.

I base this on a comment made by a physicist on Quora:
"the worldline of light behaves as ligtht-like curves in spacetime"

Not to say anything against that particular quote which seems accurate, but I find Quora to be one of biggest sources of misinformation on the web due to the lack of mechanism to promote correct answers to questions. Physics.StackExchange is far better in this regard and I usually look there first. I'm not a registered user on either site.

Yes, so the picture of hubble deepest field image (I have a very large framed print of it in my bedroom) mainly contains objects which probably don't exist anymore.

Depends on your definition of 'exists'. They've been measured, so they exist to us by that definition. They're galaxies, and separate galaxies might merge into bigger ones, but they hardly just cease being there after only several billion years

There are no hidden variables in RQM, and humans do not play any preferred role.
— noAxioms
How do you know there are no hidden variables? — EugeneW

I didn't say there are no hidden variables.

That's exactly why hidden variables are invented! How can a particle have a probability to be here or there? Where is it then? — EugeneW

You seem all over the map with your 'facts', but without framing them with a specific interpretation, and almost all of them are interpretation-dependent 'facts'.
You seem to mix bits from RQM, Copenhagen, and Bohmian mechanics, only the latter of which actually suggests that a particle has a location even unmeasured. Bohm's efforts seem a desperate attempt to explain quantum mechanics in classical terms as if classical physics is the more fundamental of the two.
The interpretation (and only one other that I know of) holds to the principle of counterfactual definiteness: that any given particle is in fact in some defined state at any time even in the absence of measurement. In doing so, he discarded the principle of locality (that cause must precede effect), a principle I find harder to sacrifice. No valid interpretation holds to both principles.