I think the scientific method does employ 'inference,' 'rigorous conceptual analysis,' 'distinctions,' 'explicit disputation,' 'argument rebuttle,' etc. This will be based on many many, rigorously controlled
experiments, but scientists will still interpret the results gained in different ways and project implications. — universeness

Well yes, but conceptual analysis is not what natural scientists generally do. At least they do not bring it to the foreground. That generally does not hurt natural science, the scientific method was a big leap forward for the sciences. It does lead to mishap sometimes when scientists start writing about metaphysics and think it can mean anything and everything and that how it is used colloquially is of equal value as to how the concept is used in the philosophical community, like the concept of metaphysics. To illuminate that concept, the scholastic method is of more use than the scientific method.

Not 10,000 laypeople no, but perhaps you will garnish the opinion of a few of your experienced colleagues to build confidence in your own direction of thought. This is akin to the scientist trying the same experiment or different scientists trying the same experiment more than once to attempt to confirm results or find anomalies in interpretations of results already gained. — universeness

Well, I might consult them informally, indeed to garner their opinions and see if they can spot flaws in my reasoning. Asking a few learned colleagues is not a very scientific way to go about the question actually, from the point of view of the scientific method. I would not know if the answers can be extrapolated to what society generally feels if I just ask a couple of people in the same circumstances as myself. A social scientist will shoot that approach full of holes. She will tell me that to answer the question what commonly accepted conduct is in this case, you would have to leave the books and see for oneself. She would advice me to set up a survey use this case as a 'vingette' and garner the responses of a statistically valid representative sample.

A lawyer would tell me that my learned colleagues are not sources of law, although it depends a bit on how learned they are. She would advice me to take a trip to the sources of law first, legislation, case law, treaties, jurisprudence, and custom and maybe then 'the doctrine', the communis opinio of learned scholars as found in the hand books. What counts as a source of law though differs in different jurisdictions and is, on the edges still a matter of some controversy. Legislation and case law though are considered most important.

Do you think all 'philosophers,' would agree with you here? — universeness

Yes, although I do not know what you mean with 'philosophers'. Ontological questions may be metaphysical questions of course. There was once, centuries ago, a debate in metaphysics whether non material creatures, creatures of pure form could exist. I do not know anyone who does metaphysics nowadays that wonders about this question anymore. What is wondered about, is for instance the ontological proof of God, but it is a squarely logical proof, it has nothing to do with whether God is indeed a man with a long beard or something.

Which is part of our disagreement. To me, you are suggesting that insisting all knowledge and all future knowledge belongs to the label 'natural science,' is problematic and insufficient. I disagree and insist that the label 'natural' is sufficient for all knowledge that passes scientific scrutiny and any proposal or idea that does not pass such scientific scrutiny should be refused the label 'knowledge.' — universeness

That is fine but do note that you are then using your concept of natural science in a very stretched way, which leads to misunderstandings. If I say that I am a natural scientist because I am a lawyer, people look at me in a puzzled way. They would be right, law is not generally considered, nor considers itself, a natural science. Yet, me knowing that you will have to pay indemnification when you leave open a tap and it harms the goods of others, is knowledge. Legal knowledge.

Then they might make better choices in their day-to-day lives.
If we keep providing them with very bad examples of 'applied knowledge,' such as swearing to tell the truth by placing their hand on a book of fables.' Then they might feel they can waste as much water as their mood dictates, regardless of the cost to another. — universeness

I do not think so, swearing an oath does not need to be done on the bible. I once did it, just by saying 'I promise' before somebody competent to take the oath from me. I think it is also not knowledge. It is in fact a legal device, for instance you are subjected to penalty when you break a properly administered oath. It is not knowledge at all, just like saying 'I do' at your wedding ceremony is not knowledge.

They can always claim god commanded them to 'let its glorious waters flow freely into the thirsty Earth!!' Who are you to judge the will of the supernatural? Metaphysically speaking of course. — universeness

It is not a metaphysical question :) It is a legal question. If I am the judge of the case, I am competent to judge the will of the supernatural. The metaphysical question would be what grants the judge this competence. That is a question of legal metaphysics and a question of the philosophy of law.

Sounds like a valid version of the scientific method as applied in the legal profession, to me. — universeness

Ohh, no, it is everything but the scientific method. It is a version of scholasticism. I will briefly explain. To this case I would apply the standard of 'commonly expected reasonable conduct' from article 6:162 of the Dutch civil code. In a number of judgments which does not render a very clear line, but at least a reasonably one, we can deduce that one has a standard of care for other people's goods which states that if it is foreseeable, in your control and easy to fix, you are liable for damages if you did not prevent the accident from happening. Leaving a tap running foreseeably causes damages, is in your house and easy to fix without giving you any trouble. It is actually very clear cut. (it used to be different on the 1890's from which this case stems ;) )

However what I will not do to substantiate the common expected reasonable conduct norm, is to ask 10.000 people what they think in this case reasonable conduct would be, plot it in SPSS and find some sort of statistically significant number to say with confidence "this is what is commonly expected". The funny thing is we are actually only minimally interested in what is commonly expected at all. We, the legal community, the learned scholars fill in this norm.

But this is the kind of definition/application of the term 'metaphysics' that I support, although it's probably more 'metajudicial, or metajurisprudence.' I notice you didn't mention god once or any other supernatural source, that you might consult, to help you with your decision-making. — universeness

No of course. But metaphysics as a term for 'the search for the supernatural' has really nothing to do with philosophy. Whatever metaphysics is, it is not that :D What I use the example for is to show you made a metaphysical move, namely reduce all our knowledge to physical knowledge and all 'science' to the positivistic natural sciences, whereas in law we deal with a normative science (or art, the judgment is still out) which is not (and arguably cannot be) conducted with the same natural scientific concepts.

I don't see how that follows from what you describe above?
You are considering 'guidelines,' in what sense are guidelines or suggestions based on the similar experiences of other legislators not 'physical.' These other examples really happened, they are not merely based on the fabled decisions of Solomon in the old testament! or the fabled judgments of god via Moses when he came down from mount Sinai! I would be a lot more concerned for your position if they were. — universeness

Certainly they happened. But law tries to establish what the normative import of such a fact is. A left the tap open and B's goods stacked in a wherehouse below got damaged. It is a fact and I can describe exactly how the damage came about in physical terms. Nothing supernatural needed, nothing normative too. However, what I can not establish is whether we should reproach A for the fact that this state of affairs came about. The judgment that we o ultimately displays the metaphysical assumptions inherent in law, that people have a choice to open or close the tap, that if they possess a modicum of rationality, they should figure out the concsequences, that the world is not a deterministic place because otherwise it would not make sense to hold people morally culpable on normative grounds, but only on utilitarian grounds etc.

(I am indeed an asst prof of 'metajurisprudence', 'metajuridica' as we say :) )

Yet your struggle with the issue continues and you will make a decision.
This will show your brain is up to the task. Mainly because it sounds like that's what your current job is and what you are paid for. Many justice systems have appeal systems in case the judged feel utterly wronged by your decision. I am sure you can consult with the legal records of similar cases. If you are the final arbiter for your 'water tab,' case then have faith in your training. Consult and make the call!
As long as you are not relying on the supernatural to send you a decision, you will be fine. — universeness

Yes, but that one decision does not come about williy nilly. It is not solely my decision. There are procedures I follow. I check the legislation, I check jurisprudence and I read up on the opinion of the authors in cases alike. If I am feeling very meticulous I might even look up the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions. I read up on the state of the art concerning standards of care and try to gauge the meaning of the legislators behind the article at stake. I present my opinion not as my gut feeling but as informed legal judgment, the steps of which everyone can follow.

There are however metaphysical assumptions made in law. For instance that I should follow the supreme court's judgments. (Not mandatory in NL though, but still often done) That I should care about what learned scholars had to say about such a matter. That the goal of the legislator can be deduced from the parliamentary documents. Moreover law also assumes people have a choice in doing what they do and so are liable for tort when they make a choice that harms others. Those are a lot of assumptions revealing the rationalistic metaphysics behind law.

Yet... reformulating the problem in physical terms brings me nowhere. That shows that metaphysics cannot be reduced to physics. There is more to 'being' than mere particles moving about. The humanities may not be capturable in your physicalist metaphysics. That is: what a thing is, is perhaps not ultimately decided upon by the matter it is made of.

Not individually no but as a collective, yes. The full detailed neuroactivity that happens in your brain when you make a decision/ruling based on earlier information/evidence is not fully understood but it certainly does involve neurons firing and accessing information previously stored in your brain and 'processing' it using your previously developed reasoning techniques.
Computers are mimicries of the human brain and computers contain operating system software as well as application software. In computing science, we call the equivalent software contained in the human brain, 'wetware.' — universeness

It is all well and good but it still does not solve my case on the water tab, collectively or individually. Those reasoning techniques are also not individually developed but collectively. Such knowledge of the brain may have an impact on law, but they do not prescribe what the impact should be. That is again a matter for a normative science to deal with. The physicalist reduction simply does not help me.

To be fair, it is part of the common meaning of "metaphysics." It goes back to what you said about the word being overburdened. — Clarky

I do not know by whom it is used for the supernatural... in popular tv shows maybe... Sure metaphysics studies the nature of reality and therefore also the existence or non existence of God. It has studied angels... but that is something else than witchcraft or ghostbusting.

Legal knowledge is a product of human endeavours. It what way is legal knowledge not part of the physical world? All human thoughts are products of physical brains! — universeness

Well yes, but knowing that brain activity is neurons firing and all kinds of cellular activity simply does not tell me whether I should rule that Mrs S needs to compensate Mr P for the damages she has caused by leaving a tab running.

If you have a counter-source, I'm interested. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Hmmm, I always learned it that way and accepted it as a given it seems. I must have gotten it from somewhere because I was quite certain, but well pssible you are right. I thought they were the two branches of metaphysics. Maybe it is Collingwood actually. It does not make much of a difference to me though. Let's treat them as separate then...

Epistemology is usually classified as a sub branch of metaphysics. Metaphysics includes the nature of reality, ontology and the nature of knowledge, epistemology.

The scientific method is epistemology. Epistemology is often included within metaphysics. I believe that's appropriate. — Clarky

Well, I side here with the people that make a distinction. Methodology, is the way one gets results i.e. the way one goes about investigating. Epistemology concerns the question what we may know and what the appropriate standards for knowledge are. It is quibbling, but I think there is a point to it. The scientific method is predicated on an epistemology, namely that by empirical demonstration one may come to knowledge. This is contrary to for instance the scholastic method that tells us that one comes to knowledge by referring to credible sources of knowledge, the revered scholars or religious leaders.

I think different methodologies may rest on the same epistemology, for instance qualitative and quantitative methodologies might both rest on an empiricist epistemology. I also wonder if 'the scientific method' as is often mentioned on this forum actually exists as such. It seems to me to be a cluster of research methodologies, based on empiricist empistemology and perhaps heeding Popper's methodological constraints.

Science describes physicality, the movement of particles. It is descriptive. It does not say why or if those movements are meaningful. — Jackson

No it does not, but it does not describe just willy-nilly. It is guided by questions that are considered to be important questions, that is the point. That is why it is not fundamental.

So why combine them? Is that not like saying metadata has nothing to do with data or metacognition has nothing to do with cognition? I think the scientific method employed by physics is fundamental as the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge and testing its validity. — universeness

The scientific method employed by physics is perhaps the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge of the natural world, but I would not call it fundamental. It rests on the questions that are considered meaningful. Your post for instance contains hidden assumptions, for instance you equate knowledge with the physical world. However when I want to enlarge my legal knowledge, physics does not bring me much. I have nothing against physics, but it rests on what one might call an economy of truth, a field of assumptions about what is worth knowing, what 'knowledge' is like and how knowledge should be tested. Those assumptions are metaphysical.

This is the problem with the physicalist approach. When adhered to, it leads to some form of panpsychism by logical necessity, because ultimately, matter cannot be given logical priority. But placing the principles of life, experience, consciousness, intention, as inherent within matter leaves them as fundamentally unintelligible because "matter" is the concept devised by Aristotle to account for the reality of the unintelligible aspect of the universe. So consciousness is rendered as unintelligible in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great post. Indeed.

Posted double

↪Xtrix

Censors throughout history have pretended words have the sorts of causal effects you pretend they do, and used it as justification to murder and maim. It’s no surprise you are of that ilk.

↪Tobias

If I was a lawyer I wouldn’t show my face, especially with any sort of pride. — NOS4A2

Yes, the question is, why not? Lawyers act as a bulwark against state power, one of the very few we have. They are generally opposed to censorship as it deprives lawyers of the information they need to accurately defend or judge their case. Especially a libertarian or a conservative, like Antonin Scalia was, should favor the law. You are neither, I guess you are a populist for lack of a better word. You seem to hold on to the maxim "what my gut feeling says is the truth, is the truth". That mentality leads to the same censorship and the perversion of justice you criticize.

I picture NOS in court as a defense attorney in a war crime trial.

Prosecutor: Did your client order his troops to train their guns on the innocent villagers and did he then utter the words "Shoot! and spare no one"?
Attorney: Yes he did, that is exactly what he said.
Pro: So, your client is ready to rescind his not-guilty plea is he then?
Attorney: Oh, no on the contrary! My client wishes to join the families of the victims in asking for indemnification from the soldiers! Yes, he uttered those words, but how could he foresee that these depraved men would actually train their guns on the innocent villagers and shoot them, sparing no one? If we look at it from an energy perspective, the amount of energy dissipated is similar to saying "Give each other a group hug!". My client relied on the good sense of his soldiers, but became bitterly disappointed in them, bitterly your honor! Those sound waves themselves do not do anything, they are interpreted by the men in question and they did interpret his sounds in the most heinous of ways. Obviously my client simply needed not imagine words could have the influence to cause otherwise upright men do such a thing! Acquittal I say, Not guilty I say. Do make sure you proclaim your not guilty verdict loudly your honor, especially the 'not' part. Otherwise, the similarity in energy is just too big. Those words get misinterpreted and who knows what might happen. My client has suffered enough from this kind of mishap as it is!

Guys, if you ever have a bad run in with the law. Do not consider NOS as your defense attorney. I do hope these words manage to reach you well, because after all they are just blots of ink, stimulating your retina... maybe you interpret those words as "please hire NOS"... We just learned that what words mean and do is solely up to your discretion my dear readers.

I guess it’s a good thing I don’t respect your opinion. — NOS4A2

That really made me laugh! :rofl: See, NOS, words do do something after all! :party:

All that soundwaves trigger is the delicate biology of the inner ear. After transduction it’s all you. The biology—you—does all the work. It causes your hearing; and if any aspect of the biology is messed up along the way, it doesn’t. — NOS4A2

Yep, so there is no crime of instigation or conspiracy. A totally new take on criminal law by none other than our very own NOS4A2.

People act upon words. We hear them, read them, learn them, write them, speak them, use them. They do not affect us more than any other sound from the mouth or any other scribble on paper because they are hardly different in physical constitution and energy. — NOS4A2

Hmm, if it is all energy, then why do different words do different things? Hell even the same word does different things depending on context. The yes in respect to the question "does it rain now", is a very different yes from the 'yes' in response to 'will you marry me?'. It is not only legally bollocks it is philosophically quite untenable too. I should not be surprised though.

↪Tobias While one might be hopeful, my suspicion is that there is a tendency for much of what is considered nowadays as "metaphysics", to be little more than physics without the maths - that is, not physics. If one were generous one might call it speculative physics, but more often it is nonsense physics.

We see the detritus of this tendency in the many "physicists" who kindly drop in here to "fix" philosophy. — Banno

As I said before, for me, reality is puppies and chocolate chip cookies, not essences and properties. That isn't to say I don't believe what physicists say about what happens at subatomic scale, just that it isn't sensible to think that's all there is to reality. — Clarky

I agree, but neither is puppies and chocolate chip cookies. At least, not when one is asking metaphysical questions. When you eat the chocolate chip cookie for instance one might ask when the chocolate chip cookie ceased to be, or whether there is something of the cookie remaining even after eating it, or whether there is something that chocolate chip cookies and puppies have in common. We are very much on the same page I think. Indeed I too hold that it is silly to elevate what physicists say as the whole of reality. Metaphysics is a bit of a rabbit hole.

But intentionality, aboutness, embodiment, what-is-it-like, qualia; is completely different than the language I use when I talk about my own or other people's experience gained through introspection or empathy. — Clarky

Yeah, but that is just jargon. I can deal will aboutness, embodiment etc. but I am lost when it comes to qualia. Jargon is just a tool, right a short hand. Heidegger started to write his own when he found the jargon of his day lacking. Now what he wrote in turn became jargon. There is nothing more irritating than people spouting jargon at each other and I do not think that one cannot do phenomenology when one is lacking in jargon.

I'm with Collingwood - metaphysics has no and makes no truth claims. — Clarky

I am very much with Collingwood too.



I am not 'hopeful' or 'hopeless'. I am actually rather feeling anxious. This new materialist metaphysics seems to bracket any form of identification in favour of some form of existence in 'thousand plateaus' where we extend in rhizomic ways. The subject must be decentered and they see in the metaphysics of the past (subject and object, master / slave) an enormous potential for violence. I see in their type of thinking an enormous potential for violence too. Two days ago I argued for the necessity of an 'idealist moment', a moment of self overcoming in the sense that we need not be content with a description of ourselves as essentially an assemblage of things without rhyme or reason.

This is what I find troublesome. To me, reality can only sensibly be what normal humans interact with on a day to day basis. What a few scientists and philosophers know or believe doesn't change the essence of reality. It would be absurd to say that reality is somehow inaccessible to most people. — Clarky

Welcome to the phenomenological school of thought! ;) I am not sure though. We do not interact with the ground structure of reality of a day to day basis. At least even us do not consider being, nothngness, essences and properties as our daily fare. I tend to look at this sort of questions historically and I think we are in an epoch in which our metaphysics is indeed changing. Just like the metaphysics of the middle ages held that the truly real was a transcendental power that is infinitely above us and barely comprehensible, we may soon hold that the truly real is an immanent power (nature) that is infinitely stronger and richer than we may fathom and who's workings are purposive but ultimately ineluctable to us puny and destructive humans. I am an anti-metaphysical metaphysician though. Ultimately all such truth claims are speculative and the only thing we can do is trace the historical, social and political processes of their emergence. In that sense I still hold on to the Kantian admonition that we cannot know the thing in itself, we can however trace the historical movement its conceptualization and re-conceptualization (Hegel, maybe Rorty)

I think maybe we do disagree. For me, the ontological nature of reality is a presupposition. — Clarky

I agree... so I truly do not think we disagree, but hey, it needs two to agree, so if you still disagree, then we disagree! :D

That's fine, as long as we recognize that use of "entanglement" in any context beyond quantum mechanics is metaphorical and not literal. Quantum mechanics does not manifest at human-scale. — Clarky

Well, the 'new materialists' are concerned with 'more than human worlds'. It is actually about decentering human experience and human agency from metaphysics. The term purports to do exactly what you intuit, postulate that what occurs on a different scale than that of humans, is what is actual. I do agree with you though, in a human context - and metaphysics in my view happens to be a human endeavour - it can only be metaphorical. That is exactly my critique, the mistakes the metaphorical for the real and jump from the level of presuppositions to the ontological nature of reality. We are not in disagreement.

Entanglement itself is a physical, not a metaphysical, phenomenon. Metaphysics is how we look at things, not what we see. I have thought about what changes in metaphysics are required in order to deal with quantum mechanical phenomena. I don't know the answer. — Clarky

We do not see the entanglement of existence. It is a judgment about what the real looks like; a conceptualization about the whole of existence is metaphysical. Those concepts might be derived from empirical sciences, but if employed to describe what 'existence' itself is, they are put to metaphysical use.

I am actually wondering if we are not seeing a new metaphysical turn. One indeed based around 'Quantum entanglement'. At least I discussed a book today that almost started from the proposition that 'existence is entangled'. It referred to 'the ontological turn' in philosophy. I do not know enough about it, I am curious but I am also skeptical. This new metaphysics seems to forego any phenomenological analysis of actual existence and offers a third person account of matter in motion. I believe it misses something, but I really need to delve deeper into it. I am not in favor of eliminating metaphysics, however I do get to see the possibility that ethics precedes metaphysics, in that one's ethical commitment seem now to determine one's metaphysics. They were of course always... entangled.

Nice one 180 proof. I never listened to it from that angle, but indeed. It makes me think of an interesting quasi theological concept: parousia, an always present manifestation of the divine. Which I would explain immanently as the feeling of being in love or of longing for a certain someone. Our metaphysics is built on the experience of a concrete other.

Essential is both scientific thinking and good moral judgment that is based on knowing truth, universal/nature's laws, and good manners. This is not materialistic but intellectual and that is the pursuit of happiness. It is the path to raising our human potential and it is worth defending. The men who understood this ended our relationship with monarchy and the Biblical kingdom of kings, subjects, and slaves. Technology can greatly benefit us or put us back to being subjects.
I am saying education for technology is making us subjects rather than free citizens. Education for technology has always been the education of slaves. Liberal education is for free men. — Athena

Essentially I agree with you. I see a number of tenets in your post that would be important when we want to change things, please correct and me and fill in the list further:
1. The focus on technology should make way for ctizenship and reflection
2. The ideals should be democratic and inclusive
3. The teaching should be secular, though good manners and love for other should be instilled
4. intellectual progress should be emphasized over material progress
5. Virtue should be taught like in ancient Athens but without institutions like slavery.

This is what I got from your posts on the subject. I agree with this general inventory, but there are a number of questions and tensions that needs to be resolved.

1. Contrary to Europe the US could do without education for technology. People could live of the land as there was plenty. Europe was a continent densely populated with warring states vying for dominance. Now, also in the US let alone in Europe it is not possible to live of the land. Neither are people satisfied anymore working on conveyor belts in taylorist and Fordist fashion. Technology is needed to make modern urbanized society function and maintain the level of wealth people are accustomed to. So what would be the role of technological education in the reformed education system?

2. The cultural model is still very Western oriented and also rather idealized Western. It refers back to the Greek times like we imagine them to be. However we live in a pluriform society now. How do we incorporate African, Asian, Islamic and native American traditions in an education system that is inclusive an democratic.

3. What is the relationship between community an independency/ autonomy? The ethical outlook you describe to me makes me think of American values as independence and autonomy, providing aid to each other in the spirit of fellow travelers on a road to prosperity. That image is appealing but in our densely populated cities with high crime and poverty rates, a sense of community is necessary. How and to what extent do we incorporate that?

4. intellectual progress should be valued higher than material progress, but there are many people in dire material circumstances. The intellectual can only thrive when material needs are met. Moreover in our current day and age, material gains a seen as a measure for success. What measures for success might be adopted and will have an appeal to compete with material wealth?

5. What virtues should be taught. You refer to Aristotle, but Aristotle defended slavery and the subjugation of women. That has of course for a large extent to do with the age in which he lived. However, his philosophy tends to favor a certain style of dominance. He emphasized the active formative principle, over the passive material principle. Form determined matter. That division can still be seen today in how we deal with nature with nature for instance, leading perhaps to 'education for technology' . Moreover, earthliness and femininity were over the ages considered as connected, leading to the skewed vision of men being rational and in charge and women in the care of the household and fertility. We can therefore not simply copy Aristotle's virtues. What virtues do we teach?

Those are some consideration I have when reading your ideas. It is not meant as criticism of them, but to chart out some avenues to take them further and make them more concrete.

I think you are right. The superman is not of this earth. It is a vision of the future, something that will be. What the passage indicates is that the future should be embraced, that we cannot go back and keep to the certainties of the past. Nietzsche lived in an astounding age, an age of progress and change, maybe only comparable to our own. Nietzsche fathomed that it would change what it is like to be human, but not how or what exactly, only that something new will come. He did caution against trying to keep the age old certainties. That is the noble way to do things, the autonomous way. At least, that is my take on it,

I agree with you for a very large part. I guess the erosion happened before the onset of the Reagan/ thatcher years and maybe before the onset of the sixties. These phenomena would then be symptoms of our technological age. It is still a thorny issue though. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger had a very similar critique of technological society as what you give. We have eroded our ability to ' let things be' and came to see them as resources, as objects with which we could wield power. I think his critique holds water. The problem is it drove him straight in the arms of the Nazi party because he thought both the US and Russia were ' metaphysically the same' i.e. overtaken by the wish to produce.

Therefore, even though I really like your critique, it is always tricky to point out where it exactly began. Heidegger had these views in the 1930s... The uncorrupted society and nature has been a theme in 20th century Western consciousness. All too often it is forgotten that that society, in which we taught for citizenship was hardly inclusive. Only in todays mass society do we have really a mass citizenry. Hitherto citizenship was only for the happy few, the well to do and in the US the White Anglo Saxon and Protestant. The dark side of the coin of the old days is easily overlooked. What you call 'culture' another class of people might call oppression. Culture was only homogenous in tribal societies. A monolithic culture in a country that is a melting pot of peoples can only be sustained by domination of a certain class who determines what 'culture' is.
Nonetheless, I share much of your critique. I am also thinking of ways a new 'metaphysics of culture' that is, a binding force drawing people together, might emerge. I think it is indeed not around technology or technological education. I also o not think a return to the past is the answer.

I will not fault you for calling into question whether Mr. Rasputin was indeed involved with the Tsarina, but I take issue with your implication that he was not Russia's greatest love machine. True, we might quibble over the greatest. I am sure Russia harbors many a great love machine, however, he must be ranked among the greatest, love machinery wise that is.

You mean like e.g. "the Absolute" (re: Introduction, Phenomenology of Mind) or "Thought", "Being", "Nothingness", "Becoming", "Essence", etc (re: Science of Logic), they are not "metaphysical objects" – really? — 180 Proof

I think 'concept' is a more apt definition than 'metaphysical object'. Metaphysical object has connotations with 'objective' things like a soul, angels, God, etc. The concepts referred to in this post are, if I understood correctly, what Hegel calls "Gedankending", "thought-things", or maybe thought constructions. These 'thought things' are the tools with which we determine our world, or, and I think therein lies Hegel's idealist moment, they determine our world, as all thought is conceptual and what cannot be articulated cannot be an object for thought, and no object (Gegenstand in German) altogether. At least, indeed Jackson, in the way I would read Hegel. Of this idea you also find an echo in Marx when he says we are the products and producers of history.

David Bowie's translation of the best song every written about my home town. Well one of the best written songs ever if you ask my totally unbiassed ;) opinion. so here is the original too...



And here is a version in Dutch from a local folk band:

I recently had a disagreement with a friend, a teacher at university, who not long ago ran a course on Hegel, when I said I don't see Hegel as a "progressivist" thinker meaning I don't see the idea that the sublation or synthesis is somehow "better" than the idea it grows out of as being inherent to his thinking, and she thinks I am simply wrong about that and have a "quirky" reading of Hegel. Anyway, in light of that I liked your invocation of Heraclitus' "flux". — Janus

Thanks Janus! Well, I do think that, even though the insight is minimal in this reading of Hegel, there is an insight nonetheless. In Hegel the new view does seem to accommodate the previous 'simpler' views into something richer. In the end we learn it is movement, but not movement willy nilly. It is movement towards subjectivity, (substance becomes subject) which is truly realized in freedom. So I would have to side with her in that respect, it becomes richer, more transparent to itself...

Movement willy nilly, just a from somewhere to somewhere seems to lead to what Hegel calls the 'bad infinite' just something leading further and further but to nothing concrete. I think that would be more Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. I do find it difficult to reconcile with his otherwise Hercleitian leanings though. I read an article which claimed that this 'end point' is nothing other than this moment in time and place now. The realization that it did not come about irrationally, but can after all be logically explained. Anyway, still struggling.

I do envy you... why do I not find a woman to discuss Hegel with...? That is a sidenote, and a silly lamentation, maybe she is just behind a dialectical corner somewhere...

It sounds relevant enough to me, and relates to 180's proof's apophatic metaphysics, the thought of determining that there is always something 'more', something missed or lying outside its scope. It reminds me of Heidegger actually who tried to retrace the steps of the old thinkers to determine what was 'not thought' in them, not what they 'missed' but what they could not think because of the assumptions they tacitly adopted. I think many postmodern thinkers actually adopted such an approach. In different variations it seems to me to be central to all the thinkers of 'difference'.

I always wonder though, but that is maybe because I cannot wrap my head around it, if it does not come down to the same thing. An inclusion can never be complete, there is always an exclusion. I hold that to be an insight of dialectical thinking. Hegel's absolute knowledge in my view comes down to the realisation that only continuous moveent is real, that there is never rest so always 'otherness'. I have been criticized for that view though as taking too much liberty with Hegel.

I just relish in the love hate relationship you have with the WWF philosophical favorite Merciless Martin Heidegger! The Ultimate Champion of Being!

I have to listen to something funny while grading papers.... Guilty pleasure... I admit it.

Ahhh you mean like this? :D

Almost every so called bad word we use is related to sex and the body, so that a person growing in this society must in some way feel or consider the sexual stuff to be bad and naughty. — Razorback kitten

Well, those and God, his son and what they might do to us, hell and damnation, often feature in swearwords. My hunch is that they are connected with both the holy and the unholy. Compare what these body parts are often called in the sex act, they are referred to with their profane names. Using them in a swear word means literally that you do not care about their intimate, private, perhaps holy nature. What has happened to you is so severe and upsetting that you forget all decorum and use them. By doing so you let the world know how severe the situation is for you. Through use they devalue and become commonly used in every minor incident and even common language, indicating you do not 'give a damn'...

↪Tobias Oh, fair. I certainly don't mean to present myself as an expert I should say too -- and I'm sure you're being too modest :D -- you did reference the slave/master dialectic after all! And I'd say that's, like, the key passage from Hegel that is easy to see how he influenced Marx. — Moliere

First off,, a noob question, how do you get this ↪ ? I have to use @ if I want to point to someone, but this is far more elegant...

Anyway, yeah the Master slave dialectic is a key passage, also in its own right. I was always struck with the fact that later continental philosophy such as phenomenology or existentialism had so little concern with 'togetherness'. I am sure I will incur the wrath of a host of Hedeggerians, but his 'Dasein' seems very lonely as does 'l'etre' in Sartre. Nietzsche's overman is a lonely figure too. What I like a lot in Hegel is the idea of 'being the same in difference', one remains a true individual but always within a conceptual network of indviduals, genus, society and history. Not 'thrown into it' as Heidegger would have it, but 'growing up' in it, with all the pain, conflict, scepticism and heartache that entails. For me that is something very modern in Hegel actually, so modern that current thinking completely seems to negate it and only focusses on difference. .

What struck me as well is how similar Hegel and Marx seemed to be appreciating the nature of 'work'. In Hegel working and working together are key as well in order to form a society that is wat once guided by law and held together by a certain moral substance.

Hi @Moliere I am not an expert on the relationship between Hegel and Marx. I read a bit of Das Kapital. I think Marx is much more 'social' than Hegel. Hegel represents a step in a much more sociological direction as he uses praxis as a critique of Kant, at least in my view. Marx is concerned with the society he is in. His philosophy is also a political critique. I am not that familiar though with Dia-mat as it has been developed since Marx or by Marx as a method. What I do find interesting is that immediately following Hegel a circle of left Hegelians and right Hegelians emerged. The left highlighting the revolutionary conflictuous potential and the right hailing its totalitarian, conservative outlook. His own thinking contains hidden tensions apparently that, when thought through, lead to conflicting interpretations.

We are no longer teaching national values when we enter wars and I am afraid the culture we had will be completely lost to the US when my generation dies. — Athena

I do not now your age exactly, but culture is no monolithic entity. My mother is born directly after the second world war. She grew up in the 60s and lived in the 70s... there were so many cultural strands, the rise of the left, flower power, pacifism, conservatism, militant anti- communism... Which 'culture' would it be when your generation is gone? I think the culture you refer to has been taken down already by a double punch: flower power from the left and chicago school shareholder capitalism from the right...

If every idea is in conflict with itself, perhaps you meant "badnight"? — Janus

Here we see the dialectic in full flow. Wishing someone goodnight is at face value a happy wish. However, it also has the connotation something is over and may therefore revert into its opposite, the meaning of "this is done" reverting 'good night' into an angry slam of the door. :wink:

Thanks @Janus, for your wonderful summaries. :cool: :sparkle: I wanted to write something similar about the concept of 'aufhebung'. Being Dutch we have the same word, "opheffing" and indeed it has these dual connotations of 'to lift up' and to 'negate' or maybe 'dispel'. I will just refer to your summary though.

@180 Proof :smile: Thanks!
@180 Proof @Jackson@Moliere@Janus and at every other reader interested...
On the notion of ideas being complimentary or in conflict and on there being one idea containing inner tensions, I always read it as follows: I tend to use the term negation over complementarity. The reason is that Hegel uses negation himself. He also approvingly cites Spinoza: "Omnes determinatio est negatio". He also quite some conflict laden language and emphasizes conflict. The idea seems at a higher stage to be able to accommodate this conflict, and is even enriched by it, but nonetheless the conflict is real. I think it is important because when the ideas are applied for instance in Marx, you see the emphasis on conflict as well. I think it is also one of his most insightful contribution and opened the 'avenue of thought' into conflict theory. The idea of a body politic not as a homogenous 'one' (Leviathan) but as a unity within which fault lines criss cross each other has been very fruitful. When he applies his thought himself and makes the turn from consciousness perceiving the world by itself to consciousness dealing with others, he comes to the master / slave dialectic, also a conflict ridden approach.

edit: Maybe in my enthusiasm I gloss over the notion of complimentarity too soon. Clearly, the idea, broken within itself, also needs that break. The master slave ddialectic for instance cannot arise without the notion of master and slave and these notions are not only in conflict. The relationship between master and slave is one of subjugation and conflict but at the same time they are complimentary, because to be master the master needs to slave. This instability in the institution of slavery could only be (temporarily) resolved with the notion of law and contract, transforming (sublating) subjugation in reciprocity (temporarily!).

As far as the movement itself goes, I also shun the idea of thesis antithesis synthesis, as it gives the feeling of there being two ideas, the second idea arising out of nowhere, or just 'called upon' in some sense. I do think Hegel sticks to the image of there being one idea that is internally strained, but that strain only comes to the forefront when the idea is being absolutized and presented as a final answer. For instance being is not opposed by nothingness because of some sort of intervention somewhere, it arises because one considers being. When being is considered, the question arises from this consideration, what about nothing. Hegel in this regard speaks of 'the movement of the concept', not concepts being opposed to each other. So here I would side with Jackson.

I do not know whether Jackson and Janus are far off though, because here Janus gives this great example:

But this idea contains the seeds of its negation(s): anti-realism, idealism, indirect realism, which arise by taking what is observed to be the case about the human perceptual organs and their processes as simply true; i.e. that they "filter" or "distort" the "real" objects we encounter so that we "see through a glass darkly". — Janus

The seeds of the negation can be found in the original naive realism. If naive realism is considered a final answer, questions arise about the distortions our perceptual organs cause, leading to a 'break' or dualism in our view, between thins as they are perceived and things in themselves. The duality then is resolved in some higher idea, but not totally resolved the break is still there, just not efficacious anymore, it does not 'work' anymore. It is no longer 'wirklich' as they say in German. Wirklich has the connotation of being both 'real' (Wirklichkeit means reality) and active, working.

I do not like the word synthesis much either because it gives the impression of a state in which all conflicts and internal breaks are resolved. Rather we get a conceptual framework that is itself inherently unstable, only held up by this continuous movement. The movement from 'negation' to 'negation of the negation' keeps it from breaking down in my view. (This is all my view by the way and I have been criticized for having a too ironic and de-absolutist reading). I think that is why Hegel calls himself a Heracleitian, movement is the only thing remaining. It ends there, that is the absolute insight Hegel offers, but nothing more... It is akin to Wittgenstein's ladder, when you are through with it, you think 'what now'? Well now history is just beginning... it is not the end of history ;)