Or one might argue that, for instance, you cannot have a well-defined concept of information without relating it to some form of consciousness (not necessarily human, in fact). — boundless

I am definitely very ignorant about Information Theory, but I believe that the status of 'Shannon information' is somewhat controversial. The point is that there is a disagreement e.g. whether it is objective or subjective etc.

On this issue, maybe some might find interesting this paper by Basil Hiley (who collaborated with Bohm for many time): https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bb05/2740074f3e6b19f685315c9ddb994b563e29.pdf.

Thanks for the links! I had a quick skim. I find Rovelli's approach more natural than either of those. Bitbol's approach seems overly metaphysical and Kastner's approach is non-local. — Andrew M

You're definitely welcome.

I can understand the unease with Bitbol's approach. But note that consciousness in his interpretation does not 'do' anything, in fact. It does not affect physical reality. It simply define the 'perspective' of the 'observer'. In a way analogous to Kant, Bitbol in fact IMO says that the 'quantum world' is indeterminate. But it is not a denial of it and neither he claims that it is 'modified' by consciousness. But as I said, I can hear your unease because I share it (even if I do like Kantian-like philosophies).

Regarding Kaster's approach I am not sure to call it 'non-local'. In the paper, Kastner et al explain (page 5):

As one of us (SK) has observed (Kauffman 2016, Chapter 7), we might plan to meet tomorrow for coffee at the Downtown Coffee Shop. But suppose that, unbeknownst to us, while we are making these plans, the coffee shop (actually) closes. Instantaneously and acausally, it is no longer possible for us (or for anyone no matter where they happen to live) to have coffee at the Downtown Coffee Shop tomorrow. What is possible has been globally and acausally altered by a new actual (token of res extensa).6 In order for this to occur, no relativity-violating signal had to be sent; no physical law had to be violated. We simply allow that actual events can instantaneously and acausally affect what is next possible (given certain logical presuppositions, to be discussed presently) which, in turn, influences what can next become actual, and so on. In this way, there is an acausal ‘gap’ between res extensa and res potentia in their mutual interplay, that corresponds to a form of global nonlocality.

[Footnote 6]: While ‘acausal’ in the classical sense of efficient causality (wherein one actual state causally influences another actual state), in the quantum mechanical sense of causality wherein potentia are treated as ontologically significant, the actualized state is understood to ‘causally’ alter the probability distribution by which the next ‘possible’ state is defined. For further discussion of this distinction between classical efficient causality and quantum mechanical causality, see Epperson (2004, 92-93; 2013, 105-6). On the other hand, under certain circumstances and at the relativistic level, where decay probabilities are taken into account, the relation between an actualized state and the next QP state may itself be indeterministic (see, e.g. Kastner 2012, Section 3.4 and Chapter6).

Shimony's take, instead, seems definitely 'non-local'. But maybe he meant something like Kastner et all above (as did maybe other proponents of an 'Aristotelian-like' reading of CI).

First, as with Rovelli, I think that quantum mechanics is local. Second, as with Aristotle, potentialities don't "do" anything, only actual systems do. — Andrew M

I feel I am in agreement!

Instead, the term "potential" provides a natural way for Wigner and his friend to describe the scenario from their own perspective and also to describe the scenario from the other's perspective.

So when the friend (Alice) measures spin up, that actualizes (i.e., realizes) the particle's spin potential for her. But she also knows that both the spin and her subsequent measurement of the spin are only potentials for Wigner until Wigner measures the friend's system in that basis.

The actual/potential terminology combined with RQM's relationalism provides an ordinary language abstraction over the underlying mechanics. That abstraction preserves locality, factual definiteness, freedom of choice and, crucially, a referent within the universe that provides a view from somewhere (i.e., the system's reference frame). — Andrew M

:up:

To be more complete, in fact I lean towards RQM and CI. The problem I have with RQM is that 'information' maybe is not something well-defined in relation to all physical systems. But as I said in my previous post, this is a quite controversial point. If 'information' is something that can be defined in relation to all physical system, then RQM is IMO the best choice.

If not, maybe something like Bitbol's interpretation (with maybe some elements of 'actuality/potentiality' dualism) would be best.

I am simply undecided.

There is an ambiguity in 'Copenaghen Interpretation' (CI) that creates endless debates like this one :smile:

In CI, measurements are explained via the 'collapse' of the wave-function. The problem is, however, that CI is simply ambiguous on it. In fact, I would say that there is no 'Copenaghen Interpretation' at all. It is rather a 'class' of very different views that are, so to speak, 'grouped' together.

But where is the ambiguity? The problem is that the formalism of the theory alone does not identify what is the 'observer'. Yet, in order to explain the wave-function collapse you need to posit an 'observer'. If not, we cannot explain why our 'everyday world' looks classical, so to speak.

Anyway, let's see the proposed solutions to this intrinsic ambiguity of CI.

Firstly, one might try to say that, indeed, there are physical objects that count as 'observers'. For instance, objects that are able to store and process 'information', like e.g. computers, registering devices, brains etc. If I am not mistaken this is the view of Wheeler. The 'universe' is 'participatory' in this view because each of these 'observers' can 'modify' reality by 'collapsing' the wave-function.

Secondly, another possible way to deal with this is to go with RQM (Relational Quantum Mechanics) as Rovelli et al do. Here, all physical systems can be 'observers' and the 'measurement' is simply a physical interaction. This is because, according to Rovelli, there is nothing special about computers, etc:

In order to prevent the reader from channeling his/her thoughts in the wrong direction, let me anticipate a few terminological remarks. By using the word “observer” I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other manner special, system. I use the word “observer” in the sense in which it is con- ventionally used in Galilean relativity when we say that an object has a velocity “with respect to a certain ob- server”. The observer can be any physical object having a definite state of motion. For instance, I say that my hand moves at a velocity v with respect to the lamp on my table. Velocity is a relational notion (in Galilean as well as in special relativistic physics), and thus it is al- ways (explicitly or implicitly) referred to something; it is traditional to denote this something as the observer, but it is important in the following discussion to keep in mind that the observer can be a table lamp. Also, I use information theory in its information-theory mean- ing (Shannon): information is a measure of the number of states in which a system can be –or in which several systems whose states are physically constrained (corre- lated) can be. Thus, a pen on my table has information because it points in this or that direction. We do not need a human being, a cat, or a computer, to make use of this notion of information.

(Source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609002.pdf ; emphasis mine)
But Rovelli's RQM is, in fact, not classified as 'CI'. Why? Rovelli claims that QM is complete, whereas for CI you still need to consider something as classical.

Or one might argue that, for instance, you cannot have a well-defined concept of information without relating it to some form of consciousness (not necessarily human, in fact). And you end up with the 'Consciousness causes collapse' interpretation

Or a Kantian-like interpretation like the one proposed by Bitbol and others (and possibly of Bohr at least for some parts of his life, if Bitbol is right...) if you do not like the idea that consciousness really 'modifies' reality (but it is nevertheless necessary to have an 'observer').

Of course, if one is really pragmatic one can simply choose to ignore the problem (but maybe this is not satisfactory for someone philosophically inclined). Finally, one can choose other interpretations of QM.

It seems not to be. It would probably violate SR if it was. — noAxioms

Same impression!

Doing these sorts of measurements is how they determined the acceleration of expansion in the first place. You can't measure what is now, but you can measure how it appears now. — noAxioms

Ok, thanks! I think I'll revise GR and cosmology. I admittedly do not know very much about both.

All of relativity seems to depend on locality, while QM interpretations might have other ideas. It is why I resist interpretations that discard locality in favor of counterfactual definiteness. I just don't see how relativity can make sense without locality. One can blatantly change the past, not just events outside one's future light cone.
That and the fact that counterfactual definiteness has all sorts of seemingly paradoxical philosophical baggage that goes away if you don't accept the principle. — noAxioms

:up: I agree! I would add the 'no signaling' theorem.

Don't get your Dutch names wrong... I've got one myself. — noAxioms

Ops! Sorry!

The Andromeda thing and the Rietdijk-Putnam thing are pretty much the same, and are only paradoxical if you try to combine assumptions from both interpretations of time. All that proves is that they are not both correct. — noAxioms

Right :smile:

Presentism demands an objective ordering of events (although no particular one), but a preferred folation does not demand a preferred moment in time. — noAxioms

Maybe dBB requires a preferred moment in time and not just a preferred foliation, then! (alternatively, a preferred foliation without a preferred moment in time and retro-causality.)

Way to kill an afternoon, eh? — noAxioms

LOL, yeah!

Thank you for the link. — noAxioms

You're welcome :wink:

Not sure how much I'm interested in sinking an interpretation that I've already listed as low probability. I'd rather see them sink RQM. Always best to have ones own cage rattled once in a while. — noAxioms

I see! That's perfectly reasonable :smile:

Actually, I admit that dBB (in some forms*) is my third favorite interpretation. After all, it is still somewhat 'odd' but at the same time counterfactual definiteness is very intuitive. But as I mentioned before I find (among other things) this 'oddness' as an indication that some kind of 'paradigm change' is required. Also, it seems that, in general, there is a trend to more and more 'counter-intuitiveness' in physics...Hence, I lean towards RQM and Copenaghen.

*(I do not like the purely 'nomological' view where there is no physical explanation of the movements of the particles - I prefer the 'dispositionalist' version. Also, I think that I am in the minority but I find the 'quantum potential' formulation interesting - after all, the 'classical limit' becomes quite intuitive if the contribution of the wave-function is seen as additional force.)

Thank you very much for the transcription!

So we can see Rovelli's reasoning in the above exchange. For Alice on Andromeda, Carlo on Earth only potentially exists until a local interaction (say, a telescopic observation at light speed) brings him into her present (and then past). Similarly, for Bob the superintelligent being in the future, Carlo is only potentially at the conference until a local interaction decoheres the superposition (say, Bob talks to Carlo). — Andrew M

:up:

A further thought here is that I think this allows a representational interpretation of the wave function for RQM in terms of what is actual and potential for any given observer. What is locally entangled with an observer is actual (the past and present, measurements and interactions), what is not is potential (the future, spacelike separated regions, superpositions). — Andrew M

Yeah, I'd agree. Both the representionalist and the non-representionalist views are possible. Rovelli himself wrote against a 'realistic' interpretation of the wave-function: https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.05533.

Actually, this interpretation of the wave-function is also held by some Copenaghists. For instance, Abner Shminoy wrote in the older version of the SEP on Bell's Theorem:

There may indeed be “peaceful coexistence” between Quantum nonlocality and Relativistic locality, but it may have less to do with signaling than with the ontology of the quantum state. Heisenberg's view of the mode of reality of the quantum state was briefly mentioned in Section 2 — that it is potentiality as contrasted with actuality. This distinction is successful in making a number of features of quantum mechanics intuitively plausible — indefiniteness of properties, complementarity, indeterminacy of measurement outcomes, and objective probability. But now something can be added, at least as a conjecture: that the domain governed by Relativistic locality is the domain of actuality, while potentialities have careers in space-time (if that word is appropriate) which modify and even violate the restrictions that space-time structure imposes upon actual events. The peculiar kind of causality exhibited when measurements at stations with space-like separation are correlated is a symptom of the slipperiness of the space-time behavior of potentialities. This is the point of view tentatively espoused by the present writer, but admittedly without full understanding. What is crucially missing is a rational account of the relation between potentialities and actualities — just how the wave function probabilistically controls the occurrence of outcomes. In other words, a real understanding of the position tentatively espoused depends upon a solution to another great problem in the foundations of quantum mechanics − the problem of reduction of the wave packet.

The link is to the section 'Philosophical Comments' of the article - Shimony lists other possible positions.

There are different takes. For IMHO a very interesting Neo-Kantian non-representionalist reading (among the 'Copenaghists'), check this article of Michel Bitbol (I already quoted it in this thread - I quote it again here for convenience): http://www.bourbaphy.fr/bitbol.pdf (according to him, Bohr's epistemology was close to Kant's views...). Or, if one prefers the video of the talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYRLapWBqJY.

Another instance of interpretation of the wave-function in terms of potentiality-actuality can be found in this paper by Kastner et al: https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.03595.

I actually thought about it but, unfortunately, I did not arrive at a satisfying conclusion.

The expansion of space is uniform only under one foliation. It isn't absolutely uniform since it seems resistant to local mass, but only under one foliation does the expansion switch to accelerating everywhere at once. Essentially, only the the frame that corresponds locally to that foliation has the property of isotropy both in what is and in appearance. — noAxioms

Ok, that's right. Maybe the point is that the foliation is not directly observable. As you say, we can observe only a "frame that corresponds locally to that foliation has the property of isotropy both in what is and in appearance". Just a guess. As I said, I am quite at loss.

AFAIK, there are attempts to reconcile dBB and SR that use a preferred foliation (which is not prohibited by Lorentz symmetry) but I think that this does not satisfy many people because it goes against the 'spirit' of Relativity. — boundless

It apparently goes against the spirit of SR, and it pained Einstein to not keep that in GR. Physics is different in other frames since non-local observations are allowed in GR. — noAxioms

I see...but if this does mean that non-locality is compatible with GR (as it is usually understood) why people consider non-locality problematic?

Of course. One objectively orders any pair of events, and other may or may not attach an ontological status to each event (has or has not yet happened). A preferred foliation has no such ontological status. There is still spacetime with all events having equal ontology. Presentism has no spacetime, only space, with only current events existing (happening) and not any of the others. That sounds like a huge difference of reality to me. — noAxioms

Well, yeah, you are right.
But IMO this leads either to the 'Andromeda Paradox'/Riedtjik-Putnam argument scenario or some form of retro-causality.

I'd agree with the objection you are making. But IMO what you are saying is also a clue that one cannot make an absolute simultaneity (or rather, it is possible but would be 'hidden'...). — boundless

No, there would still be an absolute simultaneity... — noAxioms

OK, I also agree with you on this.

Anyway, Antony Valentini proposed that cosmological observations might help to solve interpretational problems in QM. The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation actually makes the same predictions of QM only if the 'quantum equilibrium hypothesis' is satisfied, i.e. if the modulus square of the wave-function corresponds to the actual probability distribution (this assures that dBB satisfies the Born Rule). However, in general, this might be not true. Hence his proposal: maybe at the earliest stages of the evolution of the Universe, that hypothesis was not satisfied and - as a consequence - we should see empirical evidence against the Born Rule.

Here is the link to his talk (at the same conference): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYZV9crCZM8.
Here the link to the Q&A session: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qnuNLB61RA.

I suggest these videos also to @Andrew M.

According to the 'no signaling' theorem, if predictions of QM are satisfied there cannot be any direct evidence of violation of locality. Hence, it just seems that there is a sort of 'conspiracy' if there are non-local influence. This is actually one of the reasons I do not think dBB is true. But, interestingly, according to Valentini, this might be a clue that dBB is, instead, right: the fact that the world seems 'local' is due to the fact that the 'quantum equilibrium hypotesis' is true. IMO, his proposal however makes perfect sense in the light of dBB.

[Another reason for which I do not accept dBB is its 'strange' ontology. dBB is, in fact, characterized by both particles and the wave-function. In my understanding, particles have no role except moving in a way 'dictated' by the wave-function*. The wave-function seems to do all the job. Furthermore, the wave-function is not a field in real space but lives in the 3N-dimensional 'configuration space' where N is the number of particles. This prompted some proponents to adopt a 'nomological' view of the wave-function. But IMO this is still odd: laws are generally understood to not be dynamical objects and if the wave-function is merely a law, it just seems that there is no reason why particles move in that way. In fact, some think that the wave-function is better understood as representing dispositions: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.1371.

*This is not true if one introduces the 'quantum potential' AFAIK. But even in this case, you still have a weird ontology where you have to make sense of particles living in our usual 3-dimensional world and an equally real field that lives in a 3N-dimensional world. And also some dBB supporters are critical of the 'quantum potential' formulation, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#QuanPote

Also, I am a bit puzzled by the asymmetry between position and other observables. QM is perfectly 'symmetrical' with them, i.e. it treats them equally. For dBB, instead, position is somewhat 'special'. The counter-argument that is found in the SEP article on 'Bohmian mechanics' does not convince me. ]



Good find! I'll read it :smile:

Thank you very much!

Actually in the article I linked, there is in it a link to a paper by Wigner himself: https://jawarchive.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/informationquantumphysics.pdf.

I did some further research on Wheeler. I found this article: https://plus.maths.org/content/it-bit - it quotes a paper by Wheeler himself.

He certainly IMHO thought that 'information' (which he believes to be 'immaterial') plays a central role and is more 'fundamental' than matter.
But he did not seem to give a 'special role' to human observers (he seemed to have a more general idea of observer).

I am still not sure about the 'participatory anthropic principle' thing.

You might be interested in the following article that addresses this issue:

But it didn't take physicists long to realise that while the Wheeler-DeWitt equation solved one significant problem, it introduced another. The new problem was that time played no role in this equation. In effect, it says that nothing ever happens in the universe, a prediction that is clearly at odds with the observational evidence.
— Quantum Experiment Shows How Time ‘Emerges’ from Entanglement — Andrew M

I forgot to say that I actually read the article and I found it very intriguing :smile:

Thanks for the very informative answer! I need some time to think about all of this :smile:

I do not understand your point, actually.

On one hand, I agree that pop-science is not always reliable. On the other hand, in this case, it seems that you are saying that John Wheeler never proposed the idea of the 'participatory anthropic principle' (or 'participatory universe') even if there are a lot of sources that claim otherwise. Am I right?
Or you're suggesting that is their interpretation of the 'participatory anthropic principle' problematic? If so, what did he really mean?

Thanks in advance!

Nice find with the PF article and I fully agree with it. I was going to mention the Andromeda paradox and the idea of potentiality in relation to it in my previous post. So we seem to thinking along similar lines here. — Andrew M

Great. Interestingly, I discovered that the same point is made by Carlo Rovelli to defend his 'relational' view, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbYeAaCloiM. At 4:55, Valentini makes the same question that he made in the other video (namely that different observers might disagree about what happens) and at 53:52 Rovelli answers by citing the Andromeda Paradox - so we are in good company :wink: . It is a very good discussion, BTW (other than Rovelli and Valentini, also Saunders and Wallace (and others) participate in the discussion). This might also be of interest to @noAxioms.

It also reminds me of Aristotle's future sea battle example where he contrasts potential and actual: — Andrew M

Very interesting, thanks!
In fact, some time ago I read a philosophy of science paper that tried to use the potential-actual distinction in SR in order to avoid situations like Andromeda Paradox. Unfortunately, I do not remember neither the title nor the author :sad:

Yes, I agree - it's just what quantum mechanics predicts will happen and so it's not contradictory (or unexpected) at all. But it does challenge objective collapse theories since they modify the standard formulation. — Andrew M

Unfortunately, I know very little about objective collapse theories. Anyway, I agree with you. It would be interesting to see how these theories deal with this experiment.

Not defining something undetectable (in SR) is fine, and I suppose the standard presentation of SR is that there isn't one. But GR, to the embarrassment of Einstein, had to admit to an apparent preferred foliation (which is not an inertial frame), so SR would actually be sort of wrong if it asserted that no preferred local frame can exist, and SR has never been shown to be wrong. — noAxioms

Do you mean that some geometries in GR require such a foliation (rather than simply allow)?

AFAIK, there are attempts to reconcile dBB and SR that use a preferred foliation (which is not prohibited by Lorentz symmetry) but I think that this does not satisfy many people because it goes against the 'spirit' of Relativity.

A preferred foliation is one thing. A preferred moment (presentism) is more of an offense to relativity — noAxioms

But is there a real difference between the two? I mean, If the structure of space-time requires such a foliation, IMO I can define a frame where all these events are present. For such a frame, there is an absolute simultaneity, which is precisely the reason why AFAIK Lorentz aether theory is criticized.

If presentism is true, what is the rate of advancement of objective time? Equivalently, by how much is say a clock that tracks GMT dilated? It isn't moving very fast, but it's the depth of the gravity well I'm interested in. I thought of this when I tried to look it up. The absolutists sort of group together like the flood geologists and put out all this propaganda against Einstein, but none of those denial sites quote this absolute dilation factor, which you think would be one of their flagship points like the absolute frame. But they evade the topic. Why is that? Must be embarrasing... — noAxioms

I'd agree with the objection you are making. But IMO what you are saying is also a clue that one cannot make an absolute simultaneity (or rather, it is possible but would be 'hidden'...).

The one from GR is not enough? — noAxioms

I don't know!

Yes, I know about the superdeterminism loophole. I also dismiss it enough to state that Bell eliminated locality and counterfactual definiteness from both being true. I see none of the listed interpretations hold both to be true, utilizing the superdeterminism loophole, so it seems the world agrees with that assessment. — noAxioms

:up:

BTW, I think that the idea of a 'special role' of consciousness in QM is not really so rare among physicists themselves.

See the article on Wikipedia about 'Von_Neumann-Wigner interpretation' (there is however a nice discussion about Von Neumann's ideas on physics forums: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/where-does-von-neumann-say-that-consciousness-causes-collapse.884128/.)

As I already mentioned, a separate (but somewhat analogous) strand is 'Many-minds interpretation' (a form of MWI where the 'splitting' occurs in the minds of the observers). See also the 'Everett plus minds' section in the article 'Everettian Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics' in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[Edit: after some reflection, I am now not so sure that 'Many minds' can be said to be a form of 'idealism'. Still, mind does have a 'special' role. Sorry for the late edit!]

Note that I do have some reservations about these ideas myself (well, maybe I fall in the 'transcendental realist' camp according to Kant...). But I find very interesting that these idealistic or quasi-idealistic ideas now are taken seriously among physicists (and philosophers of physics) themselves. I believe that is something that is worth of serious attention.

This pre-print by d'Espagnat might also be of interest: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.4545.pdf.

P.S.

A 'strong correlationist' might say that it appears that ionic bonding would exist before the advent of sentient beings. I believe that Schopenhauer is a 'stronger correlationist' than Kant, because he says explicitly that you cannot even think about the universe where no sentient being exist and the previous story of the universe is actually related to the opening of the 'first eye' (i.e. the appearance of the first conscious being) and he also believed that the 'thing in itself' was singular. — boundless

For those interested in Schopenhauer's views, the passage I referred to is quoted here: https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2015/05/01/schopenhauers-idealism-how-time-began-with-the-first-eye-opening/

Don't know what simultaneity has to do with it. Relativity seems to work fine with a defined preferred present, even if there is no way to determine it in SR. I suppose that with spooky action at a distance, a preferred foliation would unambiguously label one event as the cause and the other as an effect, but as the experiment that Wayfarer linked shows, there is no spooky action. The distant person (Alice) can make the measurement and Bob (local) know it because it was a scheduled thing. And yet Bod can measure his half of the pair and verify it is still in superposition. QM demands this, so it is not an interpretation.thing . The OP sort of disproves and spooky action at a distance. Alice knows that Bob will take a measurement in one second, and knows the result she will learn tomorrow when Bob reports it, and yet Bob verifies continued superposition, and then an hour later he actually measures the polarity. The superposition doesn't go away due to Alice's action. Therefore there is no spooky action at a distance. No? — noAxioms

Well, I agree that a preferred frame is not actually incompatible with the predictions of Relativity. So, in this sense we can say that SR is not incompatible with such an idea. But, I was referring to the 'standard presentation' of SR, so to speak, where you do not define a 'preferred frame'.

Anyway, I'd agree with what you say here. But IMO problems with locality arise if you introduce hidden variables.

The table says it denies locality. OK, I see the note [15] which seems to claim a sort of loophole in Bell inequality. I do suppose that relativity has an implication of locality since without it, events with cause/effect relationship are ambiguously ordered. Not sure if relativity theory forbids that explicitly. A nice unified theory would be nice. The sort of 'weak' non-locality required by dBB interpretation claims to be Lorentz invariant, so that means causes and effects are unambiguously ordered, no? Not an expert, but if Alice and Bob both measure their entangled polarities fairly 'simultaneously', it seems the order of events is hardly Lorentz invariant. So maybe I just don't understand that note. — noAxioms

Well, AFAIK in dBB you need to somehow define a way to define an 'absolute simultaneity'. Lorentz invariance is not the real problem. In fact, I read that you can define some form of 'absolute simultaneity' and at the same time not violate Lorentz invariance. But IMO that's a bit agains the 'spirit' of Relativity, so to speak (I am not saying that this is necessarily bad, of course...).

But in any case, non-locality is inevitable in dBB IMO. To avoid it, you either need 'retrocausality' or 'superdeterminism' but I find both ideas untenable.

Thanks - that would be my reading as well. — Andrew M

:up:

As I see it, the decompositions that are of interest are those that are robust to interactions with the environment. So the ordinary objects of our experience, by virtue of being persistent and observable, are robust. That physical structure has emerged through an evolutionary process (as underpinned by decoherence), it's not a priori.

In other words, as you say above and Rovelli mentions in his talk, we start from the structure that we observe in our experience and work from there. It's not a Platonic endeavor. Now RQM is not solipsistic. It generalizes from individuals, to humans, to things, and ultimately to all systems and composites of systems that can interact. I think that MWI just takes that one step further and sees the universe itself as a system with a reference frame and a quantum state that can be described. So you don't need an excursion through arbitrary decompositions to take that final step. — Andrew M

I see! Yeah, you are right. Schwindt's paper only refutes the idea behind something like 'pure MWI', that is Hilbert space without any structure is the only reality [edit: I meant a version of MWI where you start from the 'universal wavefunction' alone].
If one introduces a substructure (as dictated by experience) and does not have any problem with that, then you are right it seems that those problems do not apply.

But on the idea that nothing happens in the Everettian universe, I think that is true in one sense. If one person is pulling on a rope from one end and someone else is pulling with equal force from the other end then there is a high-level abstract sense in which nothing is happening. But there's obviously a lot going on at lower levels. If the universe is itself in superposition then, similarly, in that frame of reference, nothing is happening - there's no time, no dynamics, etc. But it doesn't follow that under the hood, in the reference frames of subsystems, that nothing is happening. — Andrew M

Interesting analogy, thanks! I'll read the paper.

Maybe a related idea here is to regard values in non-interacting systems in terms of potential. So, for Wigner, interference indicates that the friend has made an actual measurement in their reference frame but the measurement only has a potential value for Wigner until an interaction actualizes it for him (in accordance with the principle of locality).

That is distinct from a hidden variable theory that supposes that the friend has made an actual measurement that is merely unknown to Wigner, with the Bell inequality issues that that would entail. — Andrew M

Yeah, that's a nice way IMO to avoid issues with relativity.

And BTW, as I said to NoAxioms a similar problem arises in Relativity, if one wants to avoid the 'block universe idea' as suggested by Rietdijk-Putnam argument(here's the link to the Wikipedia article). There is a very nice 'insight article' on Physics Forums that gives a counter-argument (which is reminiscent of the reasoning on which, for instance, RQM is based): https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/block-universe-refuting-common-argument/.

Speaking Wheeler, it's always fun to remember his unequivocal stance for all those who like to misinterpret him on this point, that: "Consciousness' has nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum process" (Wheeler, “Law Without Law”). — StreetlightX

Thanks for the quote! That's interesting :smile:

Well, I actually one who apparently misinterpreted him (and I am very sorry for that if he never embraced that idea)...

But what about the idea of the 'Participatory Anthropic Principle'? Maybe he just changed his mind during his life? :chin:

Actually such an idea is also attributed to him by his critics. So, it seems strange that he never endorsed it. For instance, in 'Why information can't be the basis of reality', John Horgan writes:

We live in a "participatory universe," Wheeler suggested, which emerges from the interplay of consciousness and physical reality, the subjective and objective realms.
...
The idea that mind is as fundamental as matter—which Wheeler's "participatory universe" notion implies--also flies in the face of everyday experience. Matter can clearly exist without mind, but where do we see mind existing without matter? Shoot a man through the heart, and his mind vanishes while his matter persists. As far as we know, information—embodied in things like poetry, hiphop music and cell-phone images from Libya--only exists here on Earth and nowhere else in the universe. Did the big bang bang if there was no one there to hear it? Well, here we are, so I guess it did (and saying that God was listening is cheating).

Part of me would love to believe that consciousness is not an accidental by-product of the physical realm but is in some sense the primary purpose of reality. Without us to ponder it, the universe makes no sense; worse, it's boring. But the hard-headed part of me sees ideas like the "it from bit" as the kind of fuzzy-headed, narcissistic mysticism that science is supposed to help us overcome.

and also in 'Do Our Questions create the World' :

Wheeler was one of the first prominent physicists to propose that reality might not be wholly physical; in some sense, our cosmos must be a “participatory” phenomenon requiring the act of observation--and thus consciousness itself. Wheeler also drew attention to intriguing links between physics and information theory, which was invented in 1948 by mathematician Claude Shannon. Just as physics builds on an elementary entity, the quantum, defined by the act of observation, so does information theory. Its “quantum” is the binary unit, or bit, which is a message representing one of two choices: heads or tails, yes or no, zero or one.
...
But Wheeler himself has suggested that there is nothing but smoke. “I do take 100 percent seriously the idea that the world is a figment of the imagination,” he remarked to physicist/science writer Jeremy Bernstein in 1985. Wheeler must know that this view defies common sense: Where was mind when the universe was born? And what sustained the universe for the billions of years before we came to be

Had also John Horgan misattributed such a view to Wheeler?

Yes, the relationship between empirical exteriority and transcendental interiority is exactly what this kind of argument challenges. — fdrake

Yeah, I should have specify that :smile:

Ionic bonds happened before the advent of humans, yes or no? Ionic bonding would have occurred even if humans never existed, yes or no? — fdrake

I am not Wayfarer, but I try to give an answer from a 'Kantian' or 'quasi-Kantian' viewpoint.

A 'moderate correlationist' (i.e. neither 'weak' nor 'strong') might say 'a la Kant' that while humans (or more generally sentient beings) do not 'create' reality, the 'world as it appears' to us is just our representation. In other words, it is given by the sum of the 'noumenon' (which is unkowable) and our mind. So, to your questions he might answer: for the first 'yes' in the sense that 'things in themselves'* exist independently and 'no' for the second in the sense that 'Ionic bondings' are 'empirical things in themselves' (and hence part of the 'representation'): see the fifth note here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/notes.html (these are the notes to the SEP article on Kant's transcendental idealism).

*Note that Kant used the plural and hence he allowed the possibility that the 'noumenon' could be made of a plurality of things (and hence, this would put him quite close to the 'transcendental realist' camp). Schopenhauer denied that plurality could be a feature of the 'thing in itself' (hence, he used the singular), claiming that it is a category of our intellect.

A 'strong correlationist' might say that it appears that ionic bonding would exist before the advent of sentient beings. I believe that Schopenhauer is a 'stronger correlationist' than Kant, because he says explicitly that you cannot even think about the universe where no sentient being exist and the previous story of the universe is actually related to the opening of the 'first eye' (i.e. the appearance of the first conscious being) and he also believed that the 'thing in itself' was singular.

BTW, similar remarks have been made by e.g. John Wheeler with his idea of 'Participatory Anthropic Principle' (check the 'Variants' section in the article on Wiki about the anthropic principle, which also mention Schopenhauer) and this interview with Andrei Linde (especially after minute 6). So, it seems that some physicist do embrace this sort of idea (there is also the 'Many-minds interpretation', a version of the MWI where minds have a special role).

In any case, what is common in Kantian-like philosophies is a sort of paradoxical situation of 'external objects'. Since they are regarded the cause of our sensorial experience, they must exist independently by us as the 'empirical things in themselves' (hence 'empirical realism'). At the same time, however, they are still 'inside' the representation. Check also how Kelley L. Ross deals with this issue of 'empirical realism': http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm#idealism.

Sounds like if H is also factorizable into H3 and H4 instead of just H1 and H2, H3 and H4 'exist' as much as the other two, and yet cannot exist in different worlds from H1 and H2, only in different worlds from each other. I think I got the gist of your explanation in your post, but it seems that RQM might suffer from some similar issues. — noAxioms

I'll answer to this now. I try to answer to the rest of your post ASAP.

Anyway, as I said also to AndrewM I think that the problem is even deeper. Consider now that you want to identify H1 as the Hilbert space of physical system that is measured and H2 as the Hilbert space of the 'environment' (that is 'the Universe minus the system').

In MWI, you just have H. The theory itself does not tell give you any way to decompose H a-priori. Of course, we observe that something happens and, therefore, we need a factorization/decomposition (but note that the basic ontology of MWI is simply H, which is a-priori without any structure). But here we have two problems:

1) if we factorize, we note that the factorization is completely arbitrary. And in some factorizations you get into a 'situation' where nothing happens. No measurement, no interactions etc. So it just appears that the measurement is due to a sort of illusion due to a bad choice of 'decomposing' the universe.
2) even if you accept the above, then you have to accept that all factorizations/decompositions are actual. So you end up in the situation you mentioned: a Many-Many world situation where all decompositions and all histories related to each of them 'exist' like the one you are living.

As I (tentatively) said to AndrewM:

Now, I do not know if a version of this problem might appear in RQM (which AFAIK does not even use decoherence). The reason is that in MWI you regard the entire universe as the single 'real system' and you need to add an 'additional structure' in order to decompose the universe into subsystems. In RQM, the subsystems are the 'primary' because they are given by experience (in MWI, instead you try to derive experience from the universal wavefunction).
In other words, factorization is something that you do not need to justify simply because it is so to speak given by experience. (Also the comparison between RQM and Everett's theory in the SEP article about RQM might be interesting here...) — boundless

Check also this discussion on physicsforums: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/

Thanks boundless - they're excellent videos and well worth watching for anyone with an interest in the philosophical aspects of QM. Fun quote from Rovelli at 36 mins: "When I told Max (Tegmark) that he was a relationist, he told me that he is going to convince me that I'm, without knowing, a Many World believer. — Andrew M

Yeah they are very good and the quote is very funny :wink:

1. Is this just a semantic difference with Many Worlds? (That is, there are nonetheless many physical branches, but there are only deemed to be facts relative to an observer's branch.) — Andrew M

I believe that Rovelli himself treats the wave-function as not descriptive. So, he would not say that there are 'many physical branches'. I am inclined to agree with this but I understand that it is somewhat problematic. As I said elsewhere, honestly I am a bit averse to the idea behind 'Many Worlds' (i.e. that "whatever can happen, does happen"). But that's subjective.

Anyway, even if one accepts the 'existence' of 'many physical branches' there is still a crucial difference IMO between MWI and RQM - and this is a more 'technical' objection if you will. In MWI, the 'only real thing' is the quantum state of the universe. This leads to some problems as I mentioned to NoAxioms. Check for instance this paper by JM Schwindt: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447.

Here Schwindt says that even if one accepts that decoherence solves the 'preferred basis problem' once a factorization of the Hilbert space is done that allows for instance to 'decompose' the universe into the measured physical system and its environment (BTW, as I understand it, decoherence solves this 'for all practical purposes' in fact but let's assume we are content with it). But as you might have noticed, decoherence is based on the assumption that a factorization is already made. The point is that Hilbert space by itself is structureless and this raises a lot of problems. Firstly, why we would make a factorization in the first place? This is a need that, of course, we have but it is an a-posteriori requirement based on our experience that a propri is not needed in the theory. Secondly, assuming that we do not regard that a problem, we need to factorize. What happens, however, is that factorization is arbitrary and in some factorizations 'nothing happens' (no interaction etc). Hence, even if we do the factorization the theory itself does not justify that we experience change and so on. So, to avoid this, it seems that we need to accept all possible factorizations: MWI becomes a Many-Many World Interpretation where all histories of all factorizations 'exist' (like the one we are 'experiencing').

Now, I do not know if a version of this problem might appear in RQM (which AFAIK does not even use decoherence). The reason is that in MWI you regard the entire universe as the single 'real system' and you need to add an 'additional structure' in order to decompose the universe into subsystems. In RQM, the subsystems are the 'primary' because they are given by experience (in MWI, instead you try to derive experience from the universal wavefunction).
In other words, factorization is something that you do not need to justify simply because it is so to speak given by experience. (Also the comparison between RQM and Everett's theory in the SEP article about RQM might be interesting here...)

Check also this discussion on physicsforums: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/

Honestly, I do not know if MWI-supporters have found a solution to this problem.

2. If not, then what is the substantial physical difference and what explains physical interference effects? (Many Worlds would explain it as physical interference between branches.) — Andrew M

Well, yeah I honestly do not know how you can explain that if you assume that the wave-function is not 'real'. So, I unfortunately cannot give you a response.

If the wave-function is taken as 'real', then the situation is still different from MWI IMO (as I explained above, hoping that it made some sense LOL...). Mauro Dorato apparently tried to explain RQM in terms of dispositions, check: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1309.0132.pdf

Regarding the fact that cosmology is not a 'theory of everything', I suggest this nice talk about Carlo Rovelli: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzmykSv6OBY (especially around minute 7 - it is a hour-long talk).

Also the response to the first question in the Q&A section of that talk is interesting since it gives the idea of how much 'perspectival' is RQM, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiXzq4G10mk (the first question ends around 2:30). Anyway, the whole video is very good.

Maybe also @Andrew M and @noAxioms might find the above linked videos interesting.

Thank you for emphasizing that!

The relevant question about our networks of inferential knowledge is whether they are vindicated solely by virtue of being intersubjectively validated or whether a knowledge claim's intersubjective validation tracks how nature behaves. Scientists don't produce theory or experiment, usually, for the purpose[ of intersubjective validation, they validate claims about the world using shared methodologies. Even repeating an experiment is done to assess whether a claim is true, consistent with the available evidence, or neither of these things. — fdrake

I agree with you here. And IMO the 'weak correlationist' does not have a problem with it.

Even when all properties are relational, we can still be in the state where Alice agrees that Bob sees X, Bob agrees that Alice sees not-X, or that one was in a superposition or whatever. The general logic here is about as banal as Banno portrayed it outside of the QM context and @Andrew M portrayed it within the context of the paper in the OP. Collapse is observer dependent, great, we have established something about nature. — fdrake

Well, I agree again :wink: I mean, 'perspectival knowledge' about something is still knowledge about that. BTW, I agree that objective reality is redefined...when you specify the 'perspective', that is when you give the appropriate context then the statement becomes true for all.

[On the other hand, there might be the problem of how can we talk about objects that do not have any intrinsic property. It seems that a defining (i.e. 'essential') property of an object (i.e. the property that makes an object that object) is intrinsic, not relational...but maybe this is off-topic...]

I would remind any reader that a view from somewhere is a view of something. The context dependence of the production of a theory; through whatever intersubjective validation mechanisms you like; does nothing to diminish the truth of well established claims using methods consistent with the theory (or theoretical context). — fdrake

Agreed!

Yes, the calculation of the age of the universe is done with respect to a reference frame in which its expansion is isotropic. But:

You can still make ancestral statements within the frame — fdrake

Yeah! And I agree with you that such a knowledge does tell you something about the object of knowledge. Still, however, you cannot completely remove the fact that it is 'perspectival'. In fact, I cannot think that it is really possible to deny it.

BTW, cosmology is also not the study about 'the universe' in the sense of 'everything'. In fact, in cosmology you neglect small-scale perturbations.

What this argument reveals is that the conditions of possibility for the sense of ancestral statements require us to be able to think of a world indifferent to any given; any conditioning sensibility or emergent system of intersubjective validation. The meaningfulness of ancestral statements requires us to adjust our sophisticated intuitions about the a-priori nature of the correlation between thought and being to include the ability to interpret, since we inhabit, a world radically indifferent to any conceptual distinction. Nature becomes a curmudgeonly gainsayer who can refuse to yield to any determination of theory or sensibility; it will shout "NO!" whenever it bloody well likes and may not speak our language. — fdrake

Again, I think I, in fact, agree with you. And I believe that the 'weak correlationist' does not deny the validity of ancestral statements. Rather, as you said before he only says that ancestral statements are made within a frame. Of course, this does not make them invalid!
I really do not think that 'weak correlationism' is more (or much more) than this.

[Also, I believe that the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' that I made in my previous post knowledge is apt. This should not be taken to mean that knowledge of e.g. what is observed in other perspective is devalued (unless one wants to become an epistemic solipsist of sorts) but only that it is indirect...]

In summary, I agree with the 'correlationist' is right in believing that all our knowledge being with our 'situated' lived experience (which is changing and conditioned by the 'external world'). I agree also with him that we cannot neglect completely the 'contribution' of our mind. So, 'direct knowledge', i.e. immediate non-inferential knowledge, occurs within this aforementioned perspective.
But I disagree with him if he denies that we absolutely cannot know anything except the world as it appears to us. In fact, I believe that we can be reasonably sure that we can have a (partial) indirect, inferential knowledge of what is 'outside' our situated experience.

But, interestingly, it seems that a 'perspectival' reasoning (somewhat analogous) to the one of the correlationist can be applied to science. And one wonders if there is a link :chin:

Thank you for giving this excellent counter-argument! :wink:

I am too reticent to accept completely what people like Bitbol, d'Espagnat etc are positing (and in some sense even Rovelli). In fact, I share your concerns. But IMO correlationism says something really 'deep' about our knowledge, so to speak. Meilassaux's argument is very strong but IMO it does not really refute the 'correlationist' argument. I am not trying to be difficult (I am sorry if I am giving this impression) but IMO Meilassaux's argument refutes the strongest form of 'correlationism', that is: there is no mind-independent reality.

IMO, a weaker form of 'correlationism' is, in fact, right. Let me explain this briefly. First, let's define 'direct knowledge' as a form of knowledge that is not based on inference but it is immediate. I believe that for this form of knowledge the 'correlationist' is right. We cannot 'neglect' its 'perspectival nature'. On the other hand, there is another type of knowledge, based on inference that is necessary for science. For instance, if we accept the reasonable assumption that we can know by inference, it seems hard to deny. We can say that we cannot be 'absolutely certain' about it, but it is difficult to think that all our inferences about something independent from our own perspective cannot give us knowledge.

Now, let me give a longer answer (I hope that isn't too unclear)...

Let me begin again from Rovelli's Relational interpretation (it is a somewhat long answer, sorry!). According to Rovelli, there is no truly 'absolute' perspective. But here whatever physical system has its own 'perspective'. So there are no 'observer-dependent' states. A 'perspective from no-where' or 'God's eye view' is impossible. Rovelli writes in his pre-print 'Relational Quantum Mechanics' (p. 1 and p.15):

The notion rejected here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system; equivalently, the notion of observer-independent values of physical quantities. The thesis of the present work is that by abandoning such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion of state –and values of physical quantities– relative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense.
...
Let me summarize the path covered. I started from the distinction between observer and observed-system. I assumed (hypothesis 1) that all systems are equivalent, so that any observer can be described by the same physics as any other system. In particular, I assumed that an observer that measures a system can be described by quantum mechanics. I have analyzed a fixed physical sequence of events E, from two different points of observations, the one of the observer and the one of a third system, external to the measurement. I have concluded that two observers give different accounts of the same physical set of events (main observation).
Rather than backtracking in front of this observation, and giving up the commitment to the belief that all systems are equivalent, I have decided to take this experimental fact at its face value, and consider it as a starting point for understanding the world. If different observers give different descriptions of the state of the same system, this means that the notion of state is observer dependent. I have taken this deduction seriously, and have considered a conceptual scheme in which the notion of absolute observer-independent state of a system is replaced by the notion of information about a system that a physical system may possess.

If the above is true then we simply cannot have a 'perspective'-independent knowledge. Rather all knowledge is 'perspectival' by necessity. Does this mean that there are only 'perspective' and nothing else? That is: can we still speak about 'absolute' properties of things? For instance, can we speak of an intrinsic property of an object O? Or all properties of O are relational, i.e. defined only in relation to other objects?
I believe that if Rovelli is right, then we simply cannot know intrinsic properties of objects (or maybe even that there are no intrinsic properties...). I honestly do not know if this 'makes sense', so to speak. But in my opinion this is quite interesting*.

Given the above, how can we make sense of the sentence: 'the universe is 13.8 billions years old'? If we accept Rovelli's interpretation, IMO we cannot even speak of 'the universe as a whole'. Why? Because, there is nothing outside that can be used to define a relation (this is very reminiscent of Kant's antinomies about the universe). So, fine! But as you say cosmology is very effective so it is hard to think that even such statement is perspectival. On the other hand, we should not forget that even that statement is made according to a 'perspective', the reference frame where the Cosmic Wave Background is isotropic, that is the 'co-moving reference frame' (check: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_the_universehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_time ). So, strictly speaking it is still 'perspectival'.

Even Relativity itself seems to suggest this, if we want to avoid the 'block world'. In the 'insight' article 'Block universe, refuting a common argument' on physicsforums, the 'block world hypothesis' is criticized because the assumption that the 'present' of each 'observers' is 'fixed' (in fact, the 'block universe' would follow if you accept relativity of simultaneity and this assumption). The reason why such an assumption is rejected is because of the velocity of light speed limit: no information is available outside the light cone, so only events in the past light cone are really 'fixed'.

So, ok, let us now accept all of this reasoning. Does all of this suggest an absurd form of relativism? The point is that although there are perspectives, one can still speak of 'shared truths'. 'The universe is 13.8 billions of years old in the 'co-moving' reference frame' is true for everyone, because it specifies the appropriate context. Also, from the reference frame of the Earth we can know the age of the universe in that reference frame. So, we actually can know other 'perspectives'. Hence, despite the fact that we cannot have a 'view from no-where' we still are able to make statements valid in the various 'perspectives'.

OK. Now let us bring our consciousness inside all of this. We have accepted that we cannot speak of 'perspective-independent' states. Our consciousness arguably gives us another perspective. So, we actually see everything from this 'perspective'. If the above is right, we can know by inference what is true according to other 'perspectives'.

But Kant reasoned that 'the world that appears to us' is (in part) conditioned by our a-priori forms, categories etc and, therefore, we cannot neglect the contribution of these a-priori forms. Hence, So, even if the 'correlationist' position seems absurd it cannot be really rejected. Statements about other perspectives become 'hypotheses'. How all of this escapes the charge of being 'epistemic solipsism' is unclear to me - it is IMO an 'aporia'. (It is epistemic because Kant accepts that we do not create the world but at the same time we cannot know it independently by our own a-priori forms, categories and so on)

We might try to say that our perspective is itself conditioned by the 'external world'. I'd agree. But still IMO does not actually overcome all of these difficulties. Rather, we have a changing perspective rather than an unchanging one. But still I cannot see a real refutation of the 'correlationist' view.

It might be said, however, that taking very seriously 'correlationism' is due to a sort of 'excessive skepticism'. That is, while it is true that we cannot completely neglect our 'situatedness' we can still say that statements about the world independently by our minds are reasonably true (after all, your concerns are well-justified IMO). But again, I do not see a true 'refutation' here so to speak.

What is fascinating however is that it seems that all this reasoning is suggesting that we should take into account a perspectival thinking. That is, it seems to suggest that all 'true statements' we make are context-dependent, so to speak even if we do not accept the 'correlationist' position. We are always 'forced' to specify the context in which a statement is true. (And also we should not neglect too easily our own perspective!)

As I said, maybe, however, we can accept a weaker form of the correlationist position by distinguishing something like 'direct knowledge' and 'knowledge based on inference'. The correlationist position is applicable to 'direct knowledge'. But he is wrong if he is too skeptical about 'knowledge based on inference' (which enables us to say, for instance, what happened during the evolution of the universe...).

[*As an aside, I find fascinating that David Bohm already by 1957 - only five years after the publication of his 'deterministic' interpretation of QM - arrived at a similar conclusion with the concept of 'qualitative infinity of nature'. According to him, all our knowledge is valid only in a specific context. For instance, classical mechanics is not 'wrong'. Rather, it has a limited validity. And according to Bohm [i]all[/i] physical theories must be of limited validity. The difference with Rovelli's view might be that Bohm assumes that there is a perspective-independent reality but it is unknowable. Rovelli does not. But I am not an expert on both. So, I won't digress any longer...]

Information and probability are dual notions; wherever you have a probability distribution you have an entropy. The connection between the two is particularly intimate for discrete random variables - like when there is a given probability of being in one of countably many eigenstates of an operator. Quantum entropy measures the degree of mixing in a state; how close it is to behaving in a singular eigenstate (unless I'm misinterpreting, I am both rusty and mostly uneducated here). Information measures are derivable from probability distributions, but the process of mapping a distribution to an entropy value is not invertible - so the two notions can't be taken as inter-definable. As in, if you have an entropy, you have a single number, which could be generated from lots of different quantum states and probability distributions.

I'm sure there are problems, but I think there are good reasons to believe that information is just as much a part of nature as wave functions. — fdrake

Well, yeah this more or less what Rovelli says. In his pre-print 'Relational interpretation of Quantum Mechanics' (see here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609002.pdf), he writes (p.3):

Also, I use information theory in its information-theory meaning (Shannon): information is a measure of the number of states in which a system can be – or in which several systems whose states are physically constrained (correlated) can be. Thus, a pen on my table has information because it points in this or that direction. We do not need a human being, a cat, or a computer, to make use of this notion of information.

This certainly avoids the problem of introducing a 'special' role of consciousness. In fact, the 'observer' in RQM is not really different from a 'reference frame' in classical or relativistic physics, i.e. any possible physical system.

But, interestingly, for all practical purposes Rovelli's position is not very different from Bitbol's proposal, in the sense that Bitbol does not think that consciousness has an 'ontological role'. It does not 'change' reality (as IMO actually say the 'consciousness collapse interpretation' held by Von Neumann, Wigner, Wheeler etc). Rather, it just says all our knowledge is 'situated', in the sense that it comes from a certain perspective and we cannot neglect this. So what I observe is the universe 'seen by me' and from that perspective I am indeed sort of special: not in the sense that I am the 'creator' of what I observe but simply because 'I' am the 'point of view'. So, at least for what is observed in the 'perspectives' of human beings the two models are indistinguishable.

Note, that, however Bitbol's view goes a bit ahead than Rovelli's (note that Bitbol is strongly influenced by Kant and phenomenology). According to Bitbol, knowledge starts from conscious experience. This means that consciousness itself defines automatically a perspective. Hence, each of us 'observers' reality from a precise viewpoint. Note that, in this case, the 'perspective' is easily identified. We do not know how 'reality' is 'seen' from the viewpoint of 'a pen on my table' (in fact, we cannot even know what if such a perspective makes sense).
As I said, however, Bitbol does not claim that we 'create' reality. Rather the situation here is much like in Kant. We cannot know how reality is independently from our perspective. We just cannot 'neglect' it completely. Why? Because, conscious experience is the starting point of all inquiry.

To summarize, for Bitbol and Rovelli, QM tells us that knowledge is perspectival. But Bitbol sees a link between this and Kantian philosophy and phenomenology which (in a different context) also say that 'perspective', which, in this case, is conscious experience. So, according to Bitbol this is also true for QM: we cannot know the 'world as it is', but only from our 'situated' experience.

I do not know if Bitbol is right here but IMO he raises very interesting point. Also, Bernard d'Espagnat has a similar view, see: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.4545.pdf



Yeah, I agree. Bell's theorem then implies that one between predictions of QM, counterfactual definiteness and locality must be abandoned. Most physicists believe that it is counterfactual definiteness that is to be abandoned. Hence, the 'claim' of this experiment is not really different from the implication of Bell's theorem.

The wiki table on interpretations lists Copenhagen as a non-local interpretation, and I don't understand that. My knowledge of a system doesn't change due to an event that happens elsewhere. But I suppose that my knowledge of a distant system (like the distant half of an entangled pair) changes immediately upon my measurement of its local sibling, so maybe that's why they list it as a non-local interpretation. — noAxioms

Well, I think that probably different 'Copenaghists' would give different responses (after all, there is no agreement among them about the right interpretation of the wave-function). But, I suspect that this problem might be avoided using the same argument that (IMO) is used by RQM, that is, reasoning with 'perspectives'. After I make a measurement, I am sure about the outcome of the other measurement. But until I actually receive the confirmation of it, such an event (the measurement) is outside my perspective.
I do not know however if this argument is really enough to avoid non-locality.
(Note that, more or less, this is the reasoning that is employed to avoid the 'block universe' interpretation of Relativity. In that case, the point is that each 'observer' can define 'its' own plane of simultaneity, i.e. its own present. But if we believe that all these events are 'actually real', then it is not too hard to show that it would imply that we are in 'block world': https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk–Putnam_argument).

As an aside, a note in that table says that the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is compatible with relativity. This is IMO wrong. The point is maybe that we cannot observe any violation of relativity via the transmission of faster than light signals. But this does not mean that dBB is actually compatible with it (BTW, non-locality is not the only reason (or even the main) that dBB is not my own favorite interpretation. But I would digress too much here).

I actually don't know the terminology that well, in particular 'factorization'. — noAxioms

Ok! I'll try to give an explanation.

In MWI, there is only a quantum system, the universe itself. Its quantum state is a vector in a Hilbert space.

Now, consider a complex quantum system, that is a quantum system like, say, a pair of particles. Let us call them P1 and P2. To each particle is associated a Hilbert space, say, respectively, H1 and H2. To the total system we associate the Hilbert space, H, which is the tensor product of H1 and H2. So, the quantum state of the total system is a ray in the Hilbert space H, which is 'factorizable' into H1 and H2, the Hilbert spaces related to each particle. Here, the factorization is well-defined by the two particles themselves.

In the case of MWI, however, the only real system is the universe itself. Without additional structure, you can't speak about subsystems. So, you need a factorization, i.e. a decomposition of the Hilbert space related to the universe (which, however, we can argue that is needed a-posteriori because we observe subsystems. A-priori, there is no reason to even do a factorization). But even if we make a factorization we see that such a factorization is arbitrary and in some factorizations literally nothing happens (I suggest to read Scwindt's pre-print. I do not claim to have understood it completely, but IMO it explains well the point...). Since, however, in principle, the factorization is arbitrary, we can choose such factorizations where nothing happens.

The point is that people claim that MWI is more elegant than other interpretations because there is only one real thing, the wave-function of the universe, which never collapses. On the other hand, this is a moot point because in order to explain the multiplicity we observe you need to factorize/decompose the Hilbert space associated with the quantum state of the universe in a given way. MWI by itself however simply cannot do that (as I said, I do not know if MWI supporters have offered a counter-argument).

The only way 'out' seems to introduce an additional structure in the Hilbert space of the universe. But, at this point, how is MWI really 'simpler' than, for instance, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (which is an example of 'way out' offered in the paper)? In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, you still have the universal wave-function but you also have the particles that define the factorization/decomposition (that is, the theory itself offers you the actual subsystems). The other 'way out' that offers the paper is the Copenaghen interpretation. Of course, there are others but the paper offer these two.

To summarize, MWI claims that the only real thing is the 'universal wavefunction'. But without introducing additional structure it seems that there is no way to explain the 'multiplicity' we observe - to do that we need actual subsystems that introduce a factorization/decomposition.

I'm an RQM guy myself, and yes, nothing is just 'real', things are only real in relation to something else, so how can the universal wave be real when there is nothing to which it is real in relation? The view would be self inconsistent if it were to be otherwise. — noAxioms

Yeah! Speaking of myself, I lean towards either RQM or (some versions of) Copenaghen.

So, according to the article, the notion of objective reality has not been unequivocally undermined, as your headline asserts. It might be the notion of freedom of choice or the idea of locality which have been undermined; the article only claims that it must be that one of the three is wrong. — Janus

Well, here 'freedom of choice' does not refer to 'free will'. Rather, it is a denial of Superdeterminism (the link is to Wikipedia article), that is the idea that choices were pre-determined at the beginning of the universe. It is actually stronger than 'simple' determinism (like the one that de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (dBB) accepts), because the 'history' of events in the universe is 'already written' at the beginning of the universe. Superdeterminism is a known 'loophole' of Bell's theorem.

According to Bell's theorem, one cannot accept the predictions of QM, counterfactual definiteness (the view that we can speak meaningfully of experiments that have not been performed) and locality (assuming that superdeterminism is not true). dBB does not accept locality.

Note, however, that even if one does not accept counterfactual definiteness, one can still accept an 'objective reality', hence the article is mistaken in that claim. For instance, MWI accepts an 'objective reality', which is the quantum state of the entire universe but does not accept counterfactual definiteness. Objective collapse theories accept an 'objective reality' but do not accept counterfactual definiteness because results of experiments are seen as random (according to these theories, wave-functions are real, physical objects that 'collapse' at the measurement).

Agree. MWI says there is an objective reality, but it is entirely in superposition, and measurement just entangles the measurer with the measured thing. It does not collapse any wave function. Hence there is no defined state of anything (like dead cat), and hence no counterfactual (or even factual) definiteness. — noAxioms

Yeah! BTW, I believe that other than the very problematic concept of 'many worlds', MWI has a serious problem, check: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447. The usual claim that the 'preferred basis problem' is solved by decoherence. But it is not correct. Decoherence solves the 'preferred basis problem' (in fact, 'for all practical purposes' in my feeble understanding) only if you already assume that there is a well-defined factorization in the Hilbert space (which is the only 'reality' in MWI, AFAIK). Without well defined subsystems, the factorization is completely arbitrary (also, it should be added that, in fact, one has no, a priori, reasons to do a factorization in the first place).
I do not know how MWI-supporters handles this in a non-circular way.

I also add that MWI and RQM are close. The difference being that RQM does not accept the reality of the 'universal wavefunction' because, in RQM, wave-functions are well-defined in relation to a specific physical system (the 'observer' in this interpretation).



Very interesting quote by Bohr, thanks for sharing! At that time, he seems to have held a view similar to Carlo Rovelli (who believes that you can define a 'perspective' for every physical system).

Nonetheless, the main problem with this view is that if the wave-function is considered to be information or a 'mathematical tool' (as in my understanding Rovelli does), then it is difficult to understand how we can speak of 'information' related to a non-conscious observer. This is, in fact, Michel Bitbol's point.

Apparently, however, Bohr changed his views over time. Check, for instance, this paper by Bitbol that I linked before:

http://www.bourbaphy.fr/bitbol.pdf — boundless

In other words, according to Bitbol, Bohr's views are similar to Kant's philosophy. While RQM is right in saying that QM is about 'perspectives', according to Bitbol these perspectives are well-defined only for conscious observers.

However the point of the article is the claim that what was previously only a thought experiment has now been experimentally realised. — Wayfarer

Right! And this, if confirmed, would a wonderful thing :wink:

However, since all interpretations of QM give (almost) the same predictions, we cannot use that experiment to falsify or verify one in particular.

I have been reading those papers from Bitbol, and this is the interpretation that makes the most sense to me also. A point that Bitbol makes is that there is an ineliminably subjective aspect to knowledge, generally - measurements are always made from a point of view or perspective. But scientific philosophy doesn’t want to acknowledge that, it wants to believe that it’s seeing reality as it is in itself, as Boundless notes. This the conceit that is being exposed by these conundrums. — Wayfarer

Correct. The point of Bitbol is that in the case of Wigner's friend experiment, Wigner's friend sees a definite experimental outcome, whereas according to Wigner there is a superposition (which includes his friend, too).
But the point is that you cannot really make this comparison until Wigner asks to his friend to tell the precise outcome he has seen. The two perspective are different and they are both 'right'.

Each observer has her own perspective. When they communicate the two perspectives are not separate anymore. At this point, we can make a reasonable comparison.

Rovelli's view is similar, but according to him we can define a perspective with all physical systems. In Rovelli's view, communication is replaced by a physical interaction.

In fact, in both cases before the communication (in Bitbol's version of CI) or the physical interaction (in Rovelli's RQM), a comparison is impossible.

Hi all,



iI my opinion, as others have said, this experiment, by itself, does not disprove the existence of an 'objective reality' anymore than QM does. After all, Wigner's friend is a well-known feature of QM, so it is not really prove anything new.
For instance, an interpretation like the de Broglie-Bohm theory can explain that experiment.



I agree that QBism, Copenaghen interpretation (CI), RQM in their own ways reject 'realism'. But how about MWI. In MWI, the only 'truly real thing' is the universal wave-function (UW). The UW never collapses in MWI. It rejects counterfactual definiteness. But the UW is still objective.
Also, the 'objective collapse' theories like the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model or Penrose's interpretation claim that the wave-function is real IMO. But during measurements, the wave-function localizes to a definite position. AFAIK, these theories all predict that this 'localization' occurs at some length scale (even if they differ in the precise way that occurs) spontaneously - another name for these models is 'spontaneous collapse' theories. Hence, I would not say that 'counterfactual definiteness'='objective reality', strictly speaking.

There are different 'flavors' of CI. For instance, see these papers by Michel Bitbol: http://www.bourbaphy.fr/bitbol.pdf and https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/148348264.pdf. In brief, in my own understanding, Bitbol thinks that the wave-function is not a 'description' of reality, but it is a tool of the experimenter that enables her to make probabilistic predictions. In other words, QM, according to Bitbol is perspectival: it makes predictions of what the experimenter herself will observe. This does not mean that the observer creates reality but, rather, that the measurement is made by a peculiar perspective, namely that of the observer's. According to Bitbol this was also the position of Bohr himself. Note, however, that this interpretation does not take an ontological position on the 'objective reality'. In some sense, CI, in this 'flavor', is a statement on the limitations of science. Science cannot give us knowledge of 'reality as it is', but in its relation to the observations (in the first paper Bitbol compares Bohr's views on QM with Kant's philosophy).
This is rather similar to Rovelli's RQM. The difference is that according Rovelli each physical object has its own 'perspective'.

Interesting anedocte :up:



I think I mostly agree with you on this point.
Removal of hatred, violent tendencies and so on from our minds is indeed a good thing. Yet, sometimes, even non-violence seems excessive!

Only the utterly resolute can attempt absolute pacifism (this is different than conscientious objection to war). Those who are not so resolute will have to define what is necessary violence and what is not. One might decide that violence in defense of one's self, one's spouse, and one's children (maybe pets?) is legitimate. But then, "How much violence is necessary?" Where between a slap on the hand and death does one draw the line? — Bitter Crank

Well, I think this is the point. Rigorous pacifists would answer that violence is never necessary. But, frankly, I find such a position quite extreme.

After all, if by doing nothing we know that others might get harmed, are we "in the right" if we abstain from action when by acting we know that we can save them?

Violence should, I think, be used when all other possible solutions are ineffective and even if violence is employed, it should be done without the intention of killing (but rather for saving) and without cruelty. If possible, violence should have the purpose to change the mind of the aggressor. But, of course, I am speaking of the "ideal".

If one is willing to defend one's self, spouse, and children, perhaps one should extend one's protective circle to the neighbors' children... You can see where this ends. One is prepared to defend one's interests, which is a much broader permission to be violent than merely defending one's self and one's spouse or children. — Bitter Crank

I think that I partly agree. On the other hand, however, I think that one should try to extende as much as one can good-will, compassion etc (by wanting to do too much, one risks to cause more trouble than anything else).

I did at one time, but I I can not now defend pacifism. I am not willing to accept any degree of abuse without defending myself IF I CAN. If I am unable to defend myself, then I will have to accept whatever happens. "Accepting whatever happens" is not "loving one's enemies". And calling in the categorial imperative, if I claim my own right to defense, I can't deny someone else defending themselves. — Bitter Crank

I am quite conflicted on this point, actually. As I said, one should try to defend oneself and others by non-violent means. If that does not work, one can try to use some coercion trying to stop the aggressor trying to cause less harm as possible.
In the "real world", however, this is really hard to do.
If we consider "harming" as bad and "saving" as good, then, IMO, we can see that harming for self-defence (or to save others) is a very particular "kind" of violence. If we look at intentions involved, for example, we are very likely to find an intention to "save" simultaneous to an intention to "harm". So, even to a pacifist, it might be regarded as a "neutral" (or rather, so to speak, "mixed") action.

(P.S. As an aside, the Biblical quotes you provided are from the first letter of John. Yet Paul himself says something similar "14 Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse" and "17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. 18 If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone." found at Chapter 12 of the Epistle to Romans, link)

It would entail abstaining from all violence so long as we assume that love can never be expressed through violence. Because remember, to love one is different than to do what they would want you to do. — Agustino

I might agree with that, if we make a clarification (well, I am not sure of what you mean here).

I highly doubt that having the intention of harming or killing are expression of love. Rather, I can see "violence" motivated by compassion when one tries to save others or oneself by violent actions. At the best, there is the case when you want to stop them with the intention of "saving" them (and hoping that they later ). But, for example, I doubt that you can "express" your "love" to your aggressor by killing him or her. So, a bit of coercion might express love (like in the example of cocaine), but I cannot easily see how one can express love to another by seriously harming (intentionally) or even klling (intentionally) him/her. At best, such actions can be done for benefit for others (or oneself), certainly not for the one seriously harmed or killed (except, maybe, the case where one seriously harms another to avoid that he/she will be killed).

Anyway, I am not really sure that the Gospels allow violence as an expression of love. I mean, in the same discourses where love to enemies is mentioned, it is said to who do evil, to turn the other cheek, to not resist to an evil person etc (the same is said more or less by Paul "14 Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse" and "17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. 18 If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone." Chapter 12 of Epistles to Romans, link). Personally, the "pacifistic" reading is strongly supported by these passages.

Actually, a pacifist might say that it is not possible to "resist evil" and "express love" at the same time. But, at the same time it is true that doing nothing can, for example, cause a massacre in certain situations. The issue is extremely controversial and I think that many Christian thinkers struggled on this point and allowed violence only in some cases. Yet, I cannot see how a literal reading of such passages can be reconciled with violence.

Also, another problem here. Even if it could be possible to do violence with a loving disposition, this is not the case for everybody. Some might not be able to do that. In this case, if one seeks to always act lovingly, then s/he will abstain completely from violence.

EDIT:

"Preferential love" is another way of saying that there is a hierarchy in love. In this case, Abraham's love for God is prefered relative to Abraham's love for his son. A man's love for his wife is preferred over his love for his neighbour. And so on so forth. So when one comes in conflict with the other, the preferred one is chosen. But it's important to note at this point that preferential love is always built on top of non-preferential love. — Agustino

Thanks for the explanation. Maybe next week I will be able to ask to that my friend about the interpretation of this biblical passage. In that case, I will let you know his interpretation of the passage!


P.S
I inform you that I will not be able to answer until Tuesday, I think.

Yeah, sorry that remark was not adressed to you :-)You are right, there are indeed affinities (and thank you for the suggestioni)! I had other people in mind who take the similarities to imply that Buddhism suspends judgement on everything.

This isn't meant to suggest that God doesn't love all men, but rather that God loves all men as individuals, one-to-one. So God's Love is both preferential and non-preferential at the same time. In front of God, each human being is the chosen one. And at the same time, this does not stop God from loving all men, even though he prefers each one as individual. — Agustino

Good point!

I would say so - every man has a preferential relationship with God. — Agustino

Well, another good point.

But there are cases where sacrifices are required, since we cannot please everyone as human beings. We are not God - we are finite creatures, and as such we cannot love the way God does. So it's true, that we should love all men. But what do we do when the love of all men, comes in conflict with the love of our wife, or our child, etc.? — Agustino

Sure, I agree that we must love all men. At the same time, it is evident that our preferential love will sometimes come into conflict with our non-preferential love. My position is that, in such cases, one should choose their preferential love. This is similar to Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac when commanded by God. — Agustino

Well, I think that here there is some controversy, both in Buddhism and in Christianity. Taken literally, the passages quoted above about "love your enemies" imply that Christians should abstain from all violence. Yet, it seems that violence is sometimes even necessary. A Gandhian approach might be effective with some enemies but if the enemies are the nazies, then a Gandhian approach would be equal to an assured massacre. In Buddhism there are differing views on this point, too. The first precept is to abstain from killing. And, you find passages like:

Monks, as low-down thieves might carve one limb from limb with a double-handled saw, yet even then whoever sets his mind at enmity, he, for this reason, is not a doer of my teaching.

(MN 21 I.B. Horner translation)

which are extremely similar to the "turn the other cheek" in the Gospels. But what about the case a loved one, say a son/daughter is in peril? Is it "right" to not act? Or in order to save others one should act? (maybe as an act of compassion). Personally, I agree with you. Sometimes, sadly, violence seems impossible to avoid. Yet, maybe most Buddhists might disagree. For example, among the Theravadins, check the view of Bhikkhu Bodhi (which, however was criticized by other Buddhist figures like Thanissaro bhikkhu).

On the other hand, I cannot understand the example you give of Abraham. In my understanding, it seems the exact opposite, i.e. that Abraham was seen as "righteous" by being faithful to God even to the point of sacrificing his son. Yet, last year a catholic priest made a point that this was not the correct reading of the episode. Unfortunately, I cannot remember his reasoning in saying this. So, why do you think that this episode is an example of the importance of preferential love?

Okay, yes I see. I see your point, and I agree. However - potentially - we could have "right intentions" forever if we are awakened. So given two lovers who both become enlightened, what will happen to their love? Their love cannot fail to be eternal - that seems the only plausible answer. It is true that in Buddhism, because of ignorance, we cannot act rightly 100% of the time. But what happens if we dispel the ignorance? — Agustino

Good questions! In "non-Mahayana" schools (i.e. Theravada and other "early" Buddhist schools) I think that their love cannot continue forever, simply due to the fact that Nirvana without remainder also implies the cessation of "good qualities". On the other hand, in the Mahayana the situation is much more complicated. If the mindstreams are really endless, they continue forever even when purified by ignorance and other "defilements". Providing that this is the case, however, I think that the love is "non-preferential".

But still, you have that the arhat Sariputra went to save his mother just before his death. So, I am not even sure that preferential love is absent in awakened ones.

I agree with this difference. We start out in life in the unenligthened state, where we mostly react, instead of respond, to what is happening around us. We are the slaves of our instincts, and so on. But, as we approach enlightenment, we cease reacting, and start responding more and more. When we finally become enlightened, we no longer react, we are no longer part of the stream so to speak. Everything we do becomes a response, that is freely chosen, and not compelled. — Agustino

I mostly agree with this. However, you need a qualitative and irreversible change, meaning that in order to achieve that state you need to get awakened/enlightened.

Well, is it really the case, or not? Does the metaphor bit suggest that this is a "relative" truth? — Agustino

Yes, I meant that. And I think that in order to understand what it means, we should fully know the relation between the relative and the ultimate truth. Which in turn means that we should be awakened :lol:

Thanks, I will look into it! — Agustino

I found it very interesting. Most comparative studies are devoted to Mahayana, and many of them rely only on Meister Eckhart writings. I find it extremely interesting because it is a comparison between the work of a saint, St. Theresa of Avila, with the "traditional" Theravada commentary by Buddhaghosa. I never found anything similar to that.

I would say it depends on the means one has at one's disposal. I would say that it's fine to use a degree of coercion in order to prevent a greater evil in this case. What coercion would consist in, depends on the circumstances. It could be some form of financial pressure, not giving your son something else he desires, etc. — Agustino

Well, I agree with all this!

Hmmm... but in a love relationship wouldn't what is good for the other, also be good for you? — Agustino

Yes :wink:

(That is why, by way of a footnote, that Madhyamika is sometimes compared to Pyrrhonian scepticism, to which it is sometimes compared, as it amounts to a 'suspension of judgement' or radical un-knowing. See Sunyata and Epoche, Jay Garfield, and Pyrrho and the East, Edward Flintoff. However in our cultural context, it is very difficult to understand such religiously-oriented scepticism, as we're inclined to equate scepticism with [scientific] realism.) — Wayfarer

Another point to be stressed here is that this "un-knowing" limits itself only at the "ultimate" level. In the relative level, I would be VERY hesitant to call Madhyamaka a "Pyrhonism". As an obvious example, there is the belief in rebirth, karma, that dependent origination is the best relative truth and so on.


As an example of the "reverence" idea among Theravadins, check this writing of Buddhadasa bhikkhu, ABC of Buddhism. Also, I forgot to mention the comparative religion article about that I linked to Agustino yesterday, i.e. http://www.academia.edu/4364149/The_stages_of_Christian_mysticism_and_Buddhist_purification.

I forgot to anwer to these questions, sorry!

Okay, but how far should one go to stop their son from consuming cocaine? — Agustino

Well, independently of Buddhism or Christianity, I cannot give you a precise answer on this. To be honest, I tried to give you a response here, but I failed. So, please do not take it as due to a lack of effort.

Well, just for curiosity, how would you answer to your question?

What do you mean for "good will"? — Agustino

IMO "good-will" means willing to do what is good for the other. Being faithful is doing what is good here.

But, if, as you say, everyone could be mother, father, etc. then your current mother and father are, relatively speaking, devalued, aren't they? In other words, it is no longer a preferential kind of love, is it? If you expand the object of preference to include almost anybody, then you cannot claim to have a preference anymore - it defeats the purpose. — Agustino

I believe that here we should consider the duality between the "relative" and "ultimate" truth. At the "ultimate", love is non-preferential. But, at the relative level, we have special relationiships :smile:
I think that Buddhism suggests us to love everybody, have "metta", "karuna" etc for everybody. Yet, I do not think that it devalues special relationships. Maybe it points to the fact that we should not neglect who are "outside" our preferences. We should also be "good" with our enemies.

But the Gospel passage quoted is Jesus's answer. The message is that God's love is not preferential - or rather, that God's love is more than merely preferential. To further unpack this, God's love for each person is of the same intensity as the preferential love a father has for a child, but this does not, in any regard, diminish God's love for others. — Agustino

Now, let me ask you, in turn this question: is "preferential love" present in Heaven?

43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. 46 If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? 47 And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

(Matthew 5:43-48, source)

35 But love your enemies, and do good, and lend expecting back nothing, and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked. 36 Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful!

(Luke 6: 35-36, source)

I see a parallel between the "divine love" and "boundless heart" (see the "Metta Sutta") related to the "ultimate" in Buddhism. You are right that Christianity praises preferential love more than what Buddhism does, yet, I believe that Christianity too aspires to arrive at both and encourages people to strive to "imitate" God. What do you think about this?

I find this notion very strange and unclear. Do we have free will? If we have free will, then presumably, we are able to control some things, such as who we love. So if love is such a choice that we make, it doesn't require our selves to be unchanging, but rather merely our choice to remain unchanging. It becomes, once again, a matter of the will, doesn't it? — Agustino

I think that we have free will. And choices are a matter of will. And, maybe, Buddhists might agree on this point. Yet, I have reservations that our choices are unchanging (see below).

It's also not clear to me what an "unchanging self" would even be. Buddhists reject the Hindu notion of atman. But what exactly is rejected still remains mysterious. I mean, phenomenologically speaking, what is the difference between an unchanging self, and a changing one? We live life, and sometimes our preferences change. Does that mean our self has changed? If the phenomena are anatta (empty of self), then there can be no question of our self changing when phenomena (thoughts, desires, etc.) change. — Agustino

BINGO! Well, we know that Buddha denied that any of the five aggregates (consciousness included) could be taken as "me, mine, my self (atman)". He also denied that "Nirvana" could be the "atman".

Personally, I think that he even denied an "impermanent" self. There were "ascetics and brahmins" that thought that "the body is the self". The body, of course, is impermanent, subject to illness, uncontrolled changes and so on. Therefore the Buddha, IMO, denied a "changing" self, too.
I think that he denied all possible "objectification" of the self, i.e. he denied that we could say that "my self is this", or even "my self is indescribable" (the position of the Pudgalavadins, apparently). At MN 2 (Ven. Thanissaro translation) we find:

“This is how he attends inappropriately: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?’

“As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self … or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self … or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self … or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine—the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions—is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

Hence, all "definitions" and descriptions are to be "transcended". Note the paradoxical language of this sutta. I think that Buddhism points even beyond the position that "there is no self". In fact, it stops completely identification. I read somewhere that "shunyata" is nowadays translated as "openness", meaning that "anatman/anatta" points to have no "self", i.e. having no reference point.

What would you say is the relationship between anatta and will? — Agustino

Difficult question! Personally I believe that there is free will (I never saw a convincing argument for the view that moral responsibility is meaningful without free will). If anatta is true, I believe that it is a sort of "undeterminate question". In fact, I think that it is very puzzling (tha author of the blog post you linked here, indeed, has a point!).

I disagree. The events could lead to the two lovers becoming separate, for example. But this cannot affect their will, all by itself. Love is anchored in their will. Is their will not under their control? — Agustino

Maybe not. In fact, I think that this is one of the important points of the anatman teaching, i.e. that, if unawakened, we cannot even have the "right intentions" forever (if that was possible a perpetual succession of blissful rebirths would be possible). It is IMO an important point. Our "fallen" nature (see also the quote provided by Wayfarer in his latest post) prevents us to control forever our will. Isn't it reminiscent to the Christian tenet that we need God's Grace to save ourselves from sinning? Of course, in Buddhism, one "gets free" from this fallen nature by "awakening" rather than Grace. But, here, I think we have a similarity.

Can you detail what you mean? — Agustino

I would have put it differently, being a wild speculation of mine (of course everything I write is a wild speculation, but that was especially the case). Anyway, what I meant is that if mindstreams continue forever AND if such mindstreams are full of "positive qualities", for example the "loving" quality, then mindstreams will radiate love forever, so to speak. So, in some sense, mindstreams of awakened beings will always love. The "metaphor" part was meant to include in what I tried to say, the Buddhist tenet of anatman. I hope that it is clearer now. But, I admit that it might be not XD

So you do have a nature (or a self)? — Agustino

Yes! Maybe it is not as "real" as I take it to be :yikes:

I agree. — Agustino

Excellent!

You might like "The stages of Christian mysticism and Buddhist purification" by Lance Cousins, a very rare comparative study between Christianity and Theravada Buddhism.

As an aside, on the "everything is impermanent" view, check Ven. Yuttadhammo's answer to this question on Buddhism stackexchange (also, I found useful his youtube videos on meditation).

Thanks for the reply and further details! Good point about the “family resemblance” between mystical experiences. They do seem to cut across traditions and epochs. To me, there is a unmistakable similarity (not identical of course but similar) between Sufis, Christian mystics, Taoist sages, and even animist Aboriginal tribal shamans. They are not reducible to each other nor interchangeable. But there seems to me to be a thread that connects them all. It is probably the whole exoteric vs esoteric topic.

And thanks for the Tricycle link. Will check it out. — 0 thru 9

Well, in those traditions you mention the idea of "union with the Absolute" is central (well, I am not very familar with Sufism and I do not know anything about Aboriginal spirituality but I trust you!). The "unity motif", so to speak, is very widespread around the world. Buddhists are generally cautious in speaking of "unity" or "oneness", but the idea is IMO far from being absent, especially in East Asian (Mahayana) Buddhism. For example, there is a school, the Hua-yan (known as "Hwaeom" in Korea and as "Kegon" in Japan) that teaches that all phenomena "interpenetrate" (I think that I already linked in this thread the IEP article on Fazang, the third patriarch of this school). But it is also present in the Tiantai (in Japanese Tendai) school as you can see in the SEP article about that school. But I think that the teaching of interpenetration is present also in Chan/Zen Buddhism (the modern teacher Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh speaks of "interbeing" which is related to interpenetration and interdependence). Maybe this "flavor" of Buddhism may be very interesting for you.

Another family resemblance is that of the "ephemeral" vs "permanent" (both in the sense of everlastingness and timeless). Again, many Buddhists are reticent to speak of the "permanent", but I think that this "ephemeral"/"permanent" thing is also present in early Buddhism. Check, for example, the Dhamma-niyama sutta which seems to suggest that the "Dharma" is a "truth" that stands all times, yet no every Buddhist agrees on this (also there are some texts of the Theravada schools that seldom refer to "Nirvana" as "permanent" but you find some controversy here. Even in the article about Tiantai that I linked before you find that, according to the author, Early Buddhism says that everything is impermanent. But IMO it is only the interpretation of the author [see, for example, the link to the answer of Ven. Yuttadhammo that I provided at the end to my answer to Agustino in this very post]).

Then, we have the "experience" of a "relationship", i.e. being loved. Again, it is pretty widespread, especially in religions that believe in a Personal Deity.

Thanks for the reply. I will answer back tomorrow.

Also, thank you for the links. Very interesting site, indeed.

BTW, there is a scholar, prof Alexander Wynne that makes similar criticism on the "orthodox" "no self" doctrine. See e.g. these two articles (maybe also @Wayfarer is interested in reading them):

The atman and its negation. A conceptual and chronological analysis of early Buddhist thought and Early evidence for the "no self" doctrine? A note on the second anatman teaching of the Second Sermon

Well, personally I do not believe that the "anatman" teaching was misunderstood in the last two thousand years. But, both the link you provided and these articles are very interesting.
My view about "anatman", however, is that in some sense it is true that it means that there is no "self" (and also that in some extent Buddhism can be said to be reductionistic). However, I think it is a teaching that can be easily misunderstood as implying that there is no free will, that we do not exist at all, that the private experience is illusory, no "real" moral responsibility etc (I think that the teachers quoted in the articles when they denied the "self" they did not imply that we do not exist at all). Anyway, maybe there is too much emphasis on the "no self" thing (after all, as these links and Wayfarer noted previously, "anatta" is mostly used as an adjective. This makes sense, considering that "anatta" is a property that is to be investigated in analytical and meditative experience).

Why do you say that in a certain sense, "love" is eternal in Mahayana? Love has different aspects - largely, we have two kinds of love: non-preferential love, and preferential love. Preferential love is the love you feel towards mother, father, children, wife/husband (and even here, love breaks down into multiple categories). Non-preferential love is the love of neighbour, the love of God, etc. Above we were talking about the kind of preferential love mentioned - I'm not sure if Buddhism talks positively about this love. For example, Buddhism often emphasises allowing the loved one to be free, but, for example, is allowing one's child to be free equivalent to allowing them to snort cocaine? Or is allowing one's wife/husband to be free the equivalent of allowing them to be unfaithful? How are we to draw the boundary? How does Buddhism propose to manage such cases, where the stock answer "compassion, letting go, etc." isn't a clear cut answer? — Agustino

You are right, to some extent. Buddhism emphasizes much more the "non-preferential" kind of love. At the same time, however, I do not think that it speaks negatively about the "preferential" one. In fact, in the paper I mentioned, if I recall correctly, the contemplation that "it is not easy to find a being that was not a mother, a father etc" leads to both non-attachment but also to the devolepment of compassion etc for all sentient beings because they might have been our father, mother etc in the long time of samsara. It sounds, actually reminiscent of this passage of the Gospel:

48 He replied to him, “Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?” 49 Pointing to his disciples, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers. 50 For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother.”

(Matthew 12:48-50 source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+12%3A46-50&version=NIV)


The problem is that the “love” you describe requires essential selves: “I will love you forever”, taken literally, sense implies that there is an unchanging “I” that will love “forever” an unchanging “you”. This is true if and only if there are “permanent selves” in the two lovers or if there is a Higher Power that is able to render them permanent. In both cases, according to Buddhism we have an “eternalistic view” (a “partial eternalism” in the second case). So, I think that the “eternal” romantic love you have in mind is incompatible with Buddhist notion of anatman also because it requires an ability to control forever the events, whereas anatman denies that. I think that in some Mahayana schools the mindstreams never cease and so in a “metaphorical” sense the promise might be justified.



Regarding the real-life examples you are providing, I think that, in order to be compassionate, one should try to stop his son for consuming cocaine and for “good-will” a wife/husband should try to be faithful!

Do you think that not everyone can have faith? Faith, is really the will to believe. It's not a matter of intellect. You will not gain faith by more study, and more reasoning. The faithful know exactly the same as the unfaithful. But the faithful focus on the glimmer of light, whereas the unfaithful focus on the larger darkness.

Faith is fundamentally a movement of the will. It's the will that must be changed, the will that must want to have faith, to cling onto God. — Agustino

I agree that faith is a matter of will. One chooses to believe. Problem is, however, that people are Christians (or Buddhists, or whatever) for various reasons. Some, like Saint Paul converted because of a mystical experience, some remain attached to their tradition, some convert to the religion of his/her lover and so on. It is a matter of will. Personally, I am trying to see which religion looks to me more reasonable, so to speak, since I chose to “question everything”, to be skeptical, problematic, and so on. But this choice actually reflects my nature (or at least I think and hope). Hence, probably in my case for both “natural” and voluntary reasons I have more diffiulty to “have faith” in whatever religion. Maybe it is only egoism on my part for refusing to choose a tradition, but I think that it I am following my “nature”. Again, I choose to see it in this way. So, the answer for your question is “no”, everyone can have faith. Yet, at the practical level, for some having faith and believing is much more simple than for others (in my case, of course, it might be simply egoism).

Do you think Love extends beyond Samsara? — Agustino

I think that for Mahayana Buddhism the answer may be “yes”. Buddhas are already “outside” (in the sense of being “trascending and immanent”) and yet they are full of compassion etc. The "mindstreams" of the awakened beings are always present to help countless sentient beings in countless eons. If samsara will be completely emptied, I think that there are at least some schools of Mahayana that do not accept an end of the "mindstreams". Since, the mindstreams of awakened beings are full of "positive qualities", then you can argue that some kind of relational love is endless.

Since I am agnostic (but actively seeking to "find out the truth") about "Samsara", I can only say that I recognize that our world is "fallen" and some kind of "Love" (which I have no problems to call "divine") transcends the this world.

Of course, becoming a Buddha means that one "transcends" the human condition. On the other hand, in Christianity there is no need to do that (in fact, and I agree with it, Christianity teaches that there are serious risks for those interested in "transcending" the human condition. After all, it is very easy to get conceited in the process)

Thanks for your reply, as well as your other contributions to this thread. — 0 thru 9

Thanks! I am happy that you have appreciated. Anyway, thank you for yours! :wink:

I completely agree with your statement about mystical experiences and the interconnectedness of the body and mind. And I would say that likewise the faculties of the mind are intertwined. Lately, I’ve been wondering what the difference and relationship between one’s intellect and one’s awareness is. A mystical experience seems like it would be pure expanded awareness mostly (for lack of a better term). Some call it non-dual consciousness. Any intellectual sorting and naming would come later. Which is to be expected; no problem there. The intellect is an indispensable part of us. — 0 thru 9

I do not think that all mystical experiences are the same, but I think that there is some affinity between them. To borrow an analogy used by Wittgenstein, I think that there is a "family resemblance" between them. However, a very common element, IMO, even more common than "non-duality" is that of "something higher", that inspires respect and reverence. Non-duality too is widespread that there are many traditions where it is absent, or at least not very emphasized.
Regarding the distinction between intellect and awareness, well, I agree. Immediate awareness is nonconceptual, one simply is "cognizant". Concepts arrive later, but conceptual knowledge is mediated, not immediate. I think that immediate awareness comes into degrees. Maybe, "mystical experience" are at the "high-end" of the scale, so to speak.

You might like this article on "Trycicle". It is about the Tibetan Buddhist position that "cognizance" and "emptiness" are fundamental qualities of the mind.

If I may go out even further on this limb... One could compare a mystical experience to unexpectedly seeing a herd of wild horses up close. They seem to come out of nowhere into your area. And they exude a strong life force that is hypnotic. In this example, this mostly would fall into the category of “awareness”. Where the intellect (and mostly the ego) might enter the picture is if the person then decided to capture all of the horses, either to keep or sell. Not judging the morality of such an action, but there is a clear difference between the experience and decision to possibly capture the horses. — 0 thru 9

I agree, at least for some mystical experiences.

So I guess what I’m saying here is that awareness can be expanded. You would certainly agree with that, I imagine. There seem to be many practices in collective Buddhism that do so. And do so while perhaps temporarily “putting the brakes” on the intellect, the emotions, the ego, etc. Just giving the awareness a chance to grow by tending to it like a garden, watering it and pulling some weeds. The intellect and all the other mental powers we have are valuable. And any cautious approaches to such would be with the intention to make them even more valuable and useful to us. Like you said...

I like the apophatic approach because gives me a sense of awe and reverence. It is also true that, unfortunately, I have a somewhat compulsive need to philosophize about the "ultimate". Anyway, I think that is very useful to find peace. — boundless


Completely agree. I think that as long as the “need to philosophize about the ultimate” is counterbalanced by awareness and the sense of awe you mentioned, one can proceed both cautiously and confidently. There is a verse from the Tao Te Ching that might be related:

You can do what you like with material things. But only if you hold to the Mother of things will you do it for long. Live long by looking long. Have deep roots and a strong trunk. — 0 thru 9

I completely agree (as it happens, I really like the early Taoist writings! They really give inspiration, awe and a sense of freedom rarely found elsewhere. I say "early", simply because I am not very familar (not even by readins secondary literature) with more recent writings than the Liezi).

And do you mean to say that it is not possible to communicate this discovery to others? — Agustino

Well, I think that it cannot be fully communicated. Of course, as @Wayfarer says, it is partially communicable. However, "insight" is a transformative experience and therefore one must see "it" for onself (that's why there is so much emphasis on practice).
For example, in the "Dhamma-niyama sutta (AN 3.137)" the "Dhamma" is described as a sort of "Law of phenomena" that is valid whether or not there is the arising of Tathagathas. The Tathagathas are said to "awaken" to it. IMO, it is implicit that the "Dhamma" goes beyond what can be said verbally. See also the [url]http://"Garava sutta SN 6.2"[/url], where it is said that all Buddhas dwell "revering" the "Dhamma". I think it is another implicit reference to the fact that the Awakening is an experience of something that is "bigger", so to speak.

To be complete, the sutra that Wayfarer quoted is not included in the Theravada Canon. It is a Mahayana sutra included among the "Tathagathagarba" sutras.

The apophatic approach mentioned by boundless seems to be most helpful here. A useful device to have in the mental toolbox. At least to me, it is like the eraser for the blackboard or the brakes on a car. Going back to the uncarved block... at least once in a while. — 0 thru 9

I like the apophatic approach because gives me a sense of awe and reverence. It is also true that, unfortunately, I have a somewhat compulsive need to philosophize about the "ultimate". Anyway, I think that is very useful to find peace.

We as humans may get glimpses of “unfiltered reality” or pure gnosis or the like. I think the (arguably) widespread view of mystics or maybe theologians is that we can’t handle it for very long. Which is completely and totally OK. — 0 thru 9

Well, I think there is some truth in this view (even if I do not think that it is universal, despite being widespread) because, after all, our minds are accustomed with ordinary reality. On the other hand, "mystical experiences" can be very extra-ordinary, so I imagine that they can affect even our physical health somehow since I do not see mind and body as completely "separate".

I think the purpose of belief is to snap you out of an habitual mode of understanding and awaken you to a totally different relationship with your fellows and with the world. But the point is, for that to happen, you really do have to commit to it; it can't be just a hypothetical question. You need to have a commitment, 'skin in the game', so to speak. And obviously the Christian faith can provide that - if you take it seriously, if it really means something to you. — Wayfarer

Agreed!

Another quote, I think from Joseph Campbell (could have been quoting someone else): Life will grind you, there’s really no escape from that. But depending on the angle we choose to take, life can either grind us down, or make us sharper. — 0 thru 9

I think that, for example, Christianity here has a good point. Suffering is very hard to bear if you consider it meaningless. But, in Christianity you can live suffering in a meaningful way, i.e. by loving in a way where your "suffering" can even become a sort of "gift" you give to yourself and to others. For example, Jesus felt abandoned at the Cross (Luke 22.42), he did not "endure" suffering in an equanimous way. However, through suffering Jesus was able to give us the "gift" of Love. In this sense, as @Agustino says, Christianity can be life-affirming and even give meaning to suffering itself: one can follow Jesus' teachings even without following a rigorous and ascetic spiritual practice (like the case, for example, of Buddhism, especially Theravada).

Why not? How is "original sin" different from the beginningless Avidya (or Samsara) in Buddhism? The presence of evil in the world makes it most clear that the world is fallen - something is not right. — Agustino

I agree in a sense! I think that our condition is "fallen", but I do not know what this "fall" is!

Now there are multiple interpretations of Original Sin. The Eastern Orthodox view is that while we're not "guilty" of the sin of Adam and Eve, we are born in a corrupt world. So while we are a clean mirror at birth (free of sin), it's very easy for dirt to get stuck on us, since we're born in the mud so to speak. So there is always a very strong tendency towards sin.

https://oca.org/questions/teaching/original-sin — Agustino

Thank you a lot for this! I did not know that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox held such different views about original sin. When I said that "I cannot accept" the original sin dogma I had in mind the Roman Catholic version, i.e. that we are born "guilty". The Eastern Orthodox version is much better!

Bingo. That's the point, Osho raised the same point too. But the point only resonates with one who does have such memories. The fact that nature wipes away the memories makes Samsara bearable, so to speak. One does not feel any urgency to escape. — Agustino

Well, yes, I feel more or less the same. I am fascinated by Buddhism but I do not feel a strong urgency to "escape" from Samsara. So, I am trying to use Buddhists teachings to have a better understanding of my experience, to live a more "ethical" life (sadly, I am not very good in this) and also I think that Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana, has at least some understanding of the "ultimate". That's why I like it.

I agree with you. There is another important point of difference with regards to love I think. In the Christian approach to romantic love (between a husband and a wife) and the Buddhist one. Kierkegaard writes very well with regards to the Christian POV in his Works of Love (an amazing book). — Agustino

Never read it. But it seems indeed a very interesting work (I add it on my list!)

Namely, the love between a man and his wife opens up an area of Being that is otherwise closed. It brings up some unique problems that one cannot use the same stock answers against. For example, ever lover, as Kierkegaard states, needs to proclaim that their love for the beloved is eternal. Now the question is, how can such a proclamation be made in good faith? Because if it can't, then the lover is doomed from the very beginning. And Kierkegaard answers from the Christian side that this proclamation and vow is made in good faith when the two lovers swear their love not by themselves, but by the third, God. It is only when their love is anchored in the eternal, that it can take on the character of the eternal. — Agustino

Indeed a very good point. Indeed, in Christianity this is possible, because it is emphasized that "love is eternal" (e.g. the famous "Hymn of love" of 1 Cor 13). If love, as Kierkegaard, is anchored in the eternal, then, as you say, the proclamation can be done in good faith. Again, it shows the importance of Faith!

Also, in Mahayana, in a sense, "love" is eternal. But, again "anatta" makes that proclamation impossible.

This is one issue. Another issue is how Buddhism and Christianity would deal with things like "becoming one flesh". It is clear that in a romantic relationship, two people form a spiritual bond - indeed, in some regards, they become one, where the distinction/boundary between the one and the other starts to vanish. Christianity would claim that each one has authority and ownership over the other.

The wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband. Likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife. — 1 Corinthians 7:4 — Agustino

I see. Same as above. On this point, however, I would like to note that a somewhat similar idea is found in Buddhism. I think that in a sutta it is said that a husband and a wife, in order to live again in a future life, should both behave virtously, be faithful to each other and so on. So, the idea of the "bond" is IMO present, in a more limited sense, in Buddhism.

And yet, Buddhism I think would be unable to negotiate this kind of relationship to achieve this level of intimacy or merging of the two together. The common answer, it seems, is that because of anatta, any such merger is a form of attachment, that will surely bring about great sadness. To me though, this seems something that again would block some important, life-affirming possibilities. What's your take? — Agustino

You indeed have raised very good points and I agree with them. And also, I think that you showed also that these "life-affirming" possibilities depend on being "anchored" in the Eternal, and hence they depend on "faith". If there they are not anchored, such proclamations and vows of an eternal "bond" risk to be tainted by bad faith. Unfortunately, not everyone has faith :sad:

I think that regarding the importance of Love, Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism share many similarities. The greatest difference is due to the different views about Samsara and the self.

So what is left after the extinction of ego? — Agustino

The Mystery, Unknown etc :wink:

It really depends on what you mean by "self". Do you think the "self" is always something negative? I mean, as far as I see it, lots of things in life require a STRONG self. Going on the example below, romantic love, for example, requires a sense of self who is relating with another. Without a sense of self, how can you even relate to another? Who is relating to who? — Agustino

I think that this is another interesting point, isn't it? In a Mahayana context, for example, how I can reconcile compassion (e.g. work for the benefit of all sentient beings) with the idea of anatman? I think that this is another "mystery" in Buddhism. In the Mahayana, I think that in a sense "bonds" are very real. You might find this article interesting. I think that in Buddhism, it is important to note that there are two truths, not one. Probably only an "awakened" one can really know the answers of your questions. But, I think that from a buddhist point of view they are very useful answer in order to avoid to fall in a nihilistic trap.

Also, there is the idea that one need to cultivate a strong self in order to "let go" ("take yourself as your refuge")!