For one, I distinguish mathematics being objectively real, and mathematics being objectively true. The latter seems to hold, and the former I thought was what mathematical Platonism is about, but you say it's about being true. I am unsure if anybody posits that the truth of mathematics is a property of this universe and not necessarily of another one. — noAxioms

Well, platonism asserts that the mathematical truths are objectively real, so you aren't wrong. The problem is, however, that if mathematical truths are independent from both our minds and all the contingencies of the world, it would seem, indeed, that they are, in some sense, objectively real.

Mind you, not as 'things'. Plato himself for instance argued that they reside in a different level of 'reality', the reality of intelligible objects, accessible only from reason. I believe that many theists would say that mathematical truths are concepts in the mind of God and we are able to understand mathematics because our minds have a structure that is able to understand them. In recent times, Penrose popularized the idea of the 'three worlds', the physical world, the world of consciousness and the 'platonic realm'. All these worlds for him both transcend and relate to each other.

I believe that mathematical platonism is right because it seems to me that mathematical truths are objectively true and independent from both the world(s) and our minds. They can be known, so they are not 'nothing' (or figments of our imagination because they are independent from our minds) - they seem to have some kind of ontological reality.

Being objectively true (and not just true of at least this universe) does not imply inaccessibility. The question comes down to if a rational intelligence in any universe can discover the same mathematics, and that leads to circular reasoning. — noAxioms

Well, yeah, right. And also, this objection seems to miss the problem. The point would be "can a rational intelligence of any kind learn mathematics as we know it?". For instance, I read that some propose that a rational being that lives alone in an undifferentiated environment would not coinceive numbers. But the scenario presented here is made in terms of concepts that accessible to us and, even if that inteliggence could not conceive numbers, our arguments would be still correct.

Only a simulation of it. The things in themselves (all different seed states) are their own universes.
Funny thing is that our universe can be simulated in a GoL world, so it works both ways. — noAxioms

Well, you are assuming that our world can be simulated. That's a big assumption. Anyway, if our world were a simulation, I would not consider it a separated world from that which runs the simulation.

Totally agree here. — noAxioms

Good!

A perspective seems to be a sort of 5 dimensional thing, 4 to identify an event (point in spacetime), and one to identify a sort of point in Hilbert space, identifying that which has been measured from that event. All these seem to be quite 'real' (relative to our universe) — noAxioms

Interesting take, thanks. But maybe here the risk is to conflate the 'map' (the mathematical description) and the 'territory'.
But as far as descriptions go, probably one can describe a 'perspective' with a particular division of space time in 3d space, one dimension of time and a point in Hilbert space.
An interesting question would be what is the relation between spacetime and the Hilbert space.

If they are invented, not objective, then wouldn't 2+2=5 be an equally valid invention? — Patterner

I believe that formalists and, in general, mathematical anti-realists would say that "2+2=5" would not be correct because it would be coherent with the system of definitions, rules of argumentation and so on in which the operation "2+2" is found. But for them, mathematics is like, say, the game of chess. It's an invention where you can establish 'objective' rules (i.e. rules valid for all), but it's still an inevention.
On the other hand, if you invent a different 'game' where "2+2=5", that would be just fine.

Right. I don't know a whole lot about mathematical Platonism, being unsure about the arguments for each side, and why 2+2=4 perhaps necessitates it or not. — noAxioms

Well, the general term is matheamtical 'realism'. There are different variants. Platonists assert that mathematical truths are both independent from our minds and also from the world. The main argument is that mathematical truths do not seem to rely on any kind of contingency. So they seem to be eternal and independent.
Opponents of platonism question the possibility that such a 'realm of truths' can be known by us.

I personally lean towards platonism. But I don't think I can make compelling arguments about it.

Well, a plurality of worlds that don't depend on minds at all. — noAxioms

Well, they might not depend upon minds. But if each of them is dependent on a 'perspective'.

I came up with a world from Conway's Game of Life (GoL), which is very crude, 3D (2 space, 1 time), and arguable has 'objects'. Does an evolution of a given initial GoL state exist? It certainly is a world. That's what I mean by questioning where the line should be drawn (from what does it stand out?) Nobody has answered the question. I have only vague answers, none supported by logic. That's a great deal of the reason I'm not a realist. — noAxioms

Well, to me it would be a subset of 'our world', wouldn't it?

So I'm using 'perspective' here in the same was as 'measure', just meaning physical interaction with environment. I confine 'observer' to something with mental interaction. I'm not asserting that a perspective is that, I'm just using the word that way. — noAxioms

Ok! Sorry for the equivocation. In fact, you have already said that and I insisted to use the word 'perspective' in a way that would be compatible with both the cases. It inevitably lead to confusion.

Anyway, the point I am making would be that the division into 'objects' might be a conceptual division, i.e. something that makes sense in the context of an 'observation'. There is no guarantee IMO that outside the 'observations' it is indeed possible to speak of such a division. The relationality of physical propoerties for instance suggest to me that the way we carve the world into objects is in large part a mental construct. So, describing the world outside the context of observations with concepts that are being introduced to make sense of observations would be a leap that might have to be justified.

Thinking about stuff rather than giving a quick knee-jerk response is always a good thing. I'm often delayed in replying precisely because I'm looking up sites relevant to the response. It's not like I think I have all the answers already. I certainly don't. — noAxioms

Thanks! Here's an idea. Maybe the 'change' of my perspective is just an useful abstraction. 'My' 'observing perspective' is the same even when the description changes because I moved in my worldline. So, maybe any kind of perspective that physics tells about is an useful abstraction, which doesn't necessarily connect to something truly real.

Forms of idealism might be more unified in covering certain aspects of quantum mechanics or QFT but they most definitely do not make such notions more easily dwelt with.

Forms of realism require tons of fine tuning to get them to fit and leave lots of free variables but once those issues are settled in our eyes we can quickly move one. Foundations are set and we can start building from something that our consciousness can work with amenably. — substantivalism

Interesting point. That would seem an antinomy to me. There seems no way to decide one over the other with purely rational motives. Note that I say so because I don't know how you can explain consciousness by something totally unconscious.

Classical theism has always distinguished God's antecedent from consequent will (or else has drawn other divisions that amount to the same thing). That said, the body of literature on foreknowledge or predestination and future contingents is very large. — Leontiskos

Ok, I'll try to check.

I think my example of the opium addict contradicted this idea. Empirically speaking, it seems that it is not always possible to reverse direction. Doctrinally speaking, we do not foreclose hope for the living. But here we are talking about the "logical" point, and that is what I was questioning. That is what seems tautological. — Leontiskos

Yes, sometimes it's just seem hard to change direction even in this life. I can agree with that. But sometimes, religious literature itself make some incredible examples of redemption in cases of people that seemed beyond any hope for that (both inside Christian traditions and outside... if you read the case of Angulimala, in the Pali Canon of Buddhist scriptures, you find an incredible case of 'change of mind' of a criminal that occurred during the encounter with the Buddha).
In any case, I believe that experience is indecisive here. Given these extreme cases, I would say, however, that we have good ground to believe that the 'change' can always happen (and that's one reason why I think that, say, death penalty is incompatible with Christian beliefs).

Based on what argument? It seems like you want to assume that the afterlife is no different than earthly life, and I can't think of any reason to assume that. Almost everything we do in earthly life is changed by death. Why think the ability to repent is different? There is nothing else in earthly life to which we would be tempted to say, "I'll save that for after I die," and yet you seem to think that repentance could be saved for after we die. That cuts across the grain of all our earthly experience, and I think Christianity is being deeply rational when it says that repentance too cannot be postponed until after death. The urgency found in Scripture testifies to just the opposite. — Leontiskos

Well, I don't think that if there is a future life, it will be like this one. My point was based in these assumptions:

• God's salvific will is universal (God loves and wills the best for everyone)
• If a sinner sincerely repents, then God will show mercy
• Having committed a mortal sin by itself doesn't imply that sincere repentance is not possible

If one accepts these propositions, the simple logical conclusion (whether or not one thinks that God's salvific will will inevitably be realized) is that repentance will always be possible, unless in the after life some kind of fourth proposition is true. Like, say:

• God decreed a 'time limit' to repent, after which it is not possible to do so
• God decreed that dying in an unrepentant state deserves an unending punishment and this punishment will continue even if the sinner sincerely repents
• After death, at least in some cases, it is not possible to sincerely repent. At this point the sinner is incurable even for God.

I believe that the second propositions here would contradict the second proposition in the first series. In the case of the first here, it certainly would raise the question on why God would place a 'time limit' if He truly wants the salvation for all. The third would remain. Here, one must assume that one can be incurable even for God, so it's logically impossible even for God to save the irremediably obstinate (I believe that St John of Damascus had this view). If I am not misunderstanding you, you would choose the third option here. After all, you do not view this matter in a legalistic way (in which case, you probably would have reasoned like in the second option here).

While this possibility doesn't contradict the three propositions of the first series, it is difficult to me reconcile it with the properties of God that classical theism abscribed. For instance, how can God's ominiscence allow the possibility that God wants the salvation of a persons even if He knows that that person will not be saved? But I'll probably need to do some readings on this topic.

Right, and as I've said, the logical contradiction is more pronounced than that. The universalist can say that Z is inevitable, that Z cannot occur without Y, and that Y cannot occur unless we do X. But this is a contradiction. — Leontiskos

Out of curiosity, do you believe that being evangelized is a necessary requirement for salvation? What about those who never heard the gospel, are they beyond any hope?

Okay, sorry, I must have misread you. — Leontiskos

You're welcome.

Where does the illness come from? It comes from the universe that God set up. So it still looks like the universalist God "sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in."

If suffering tends to produce a certain outcome, then infinite suffering will necessarily produce that outcome. On this view there are some people who decide to love God freely, and there are others who are forced to love God after an extended period of suffering pushes them into that outcome. Even on Manichean dualism this looks like a problematic view, namely because it is coercive. — Leontiskos

Well, I see it more like an education. That's why I mentioned the substance abuse thing.

Let's say that in order to live in a true communion with God, one must sincerely accept God. For any person, the communion with God is the highest good, so any person will find true satisfaction only in communion with God (something like even St. Augustine would say...I don't think it is controversial for you). However, God let us the possibility of rejection, because if there were not such a possibility, we would not be able to freely accept God's grace. However, if one rejects God, such a person would act against one's own nature, after all, and would experience painful consequences (like, say, deciding to do a substance abuse and experiencing the consequences associated with that). The more one rejects God, the more one deprives himself the highest good for him. The experience of painful consequences of these rejections (whether in the form of remorse, the experience of exclusion and so on) could lead to a 'change of mind', precisely because the sinner here finds no ultimate satisfaction elsewhere and might become aware that his or her rejections were, after all, mistakes and then choose the good (also, if we accept that evil is privation, it would seem that it isn't inexhaustible).

So, in a sense, yes, I would say that it is the assumption that God's salvific will is universal and created people in a way that their heart is restless unless in communion with God that seems to provide an 'apparent determinism'. If you don't think that this is compatible with free will, then, the reasoning above definitely supports the idea that nobody will be beyond hope (unless one can be indeed 'incurable' even for God).

If, however, one assumes that God's salvific will is universal and created people in a way that their heart is restless unless in comunion with God and someone will never be saved, at a certain point God's salvific will is not realized and so one might ask why God allowed that possibility.

Because that's what reason tells us. It's also what Scripture tell us. Death constitutes a finality. That's the reasonable position. It is far less reasonable to hold that things can be postponed until after death than to hold that things must be done before death. The position that repentance can be postponed until after death can be logically possible and highly unreasonable at one and the same time. Perhaps we have been focusing too heavily on logical possibility. On purely philosophical premises, everything apart from a formal contradiction is logically possible, which means that almost everything is logically possible. — Leontiskos

Ok, I see. It is just difficult to me to reconcile there can't be 'other chances' after a life of finite and uncertain duration with the idea that God's salvific will is indeed universal and God created us in a way that our hearts cannot find any ultimate satisfaction outside communion with God, assuming at least that immortality will be given to all.

Yep — Leontiskos

Ok, thanks!

All we need to ask is whether it is more plausible to affirm or deny universalism, given some text. Whether the text pushes us in one direction or another. What someone finds "compelling" is fairly subjective. — Leontiskos

I hope that I clarified thay my difficulty is that I can't seem to able to reconcile the traditional doctrine of unending hopeless torment with other various traditional doctrines (all of them, I suppose can find support in Scripture). It's difficult to me that one can sincerely believe in something that finds incoherent or in a group of ideas that seems difficult to reconcile with each other. So, I don't think that I would be persuaded by an 'exegetical debate' if I am not persuaeded that, indeed, the traditional doctrine of hell is indeed compatible with other traditional doctrines.


Edited for clarity (I hope)

Realism can be relational. You can talk about it either way. 2+2=4 seems like an 'ultimate truth', but who can say for sure? — noAxioms

Do you think that '2+2 = 4' is a mind-independent truth? I actually think it is. But I can't be sure of it. That's why I lean toward some form of matematical platonism. It seems that mathematical truths are discovered, not 'invented', at least in part. But I guess that I can't give compelling arguments about it.

Take away that preference and it becomes mind independent, but it also drops the barrier to all those other worlds from equally existing, leaving open the question if there is still a barrier at all distinguishing what exists from what doesn't. — noAxioms

I think I see what you mean. But then all the worlds would be mind-dependent. Not dependent on a particular mind. So we would have a pluarality of worlds that depend on their respective 'minds'.

To exist means to stand out. This world stands out to us, making it a mind-dependent standing out. From what do these other worlds stand out? — noAxioms

Either to other minds or, if RQM is correct, they stand out to physical objects.

Only if a perspective requires a mind, which I often emphasize to the contrary. — noAxioms

Correct. I disagree, in the sense that I don't see convincing reasons to say that. It would be quite a coincidence that the world 'in the perspective of a pen' is describable in the same terms as it is 'as it appears to me'. But, I think we can discuss about this forever without convince either of us of the opposite :smile:

As you quoted Rovelli saying, he knows the other observes the same elephant. — noAxioms

I am not sure that Rovelli meant that. I think he meant that each observer when asks "what did you see?" to another will get an answer which is coherent with his observations. I don't think that Rovelli meant anything more than this.

I'm not sure what it would mean to go outside one's own perspective. I have a lot of perspectives (any moment along my worldline), but those are all mine. Nothing prevents anybody from imagining what another observes, which is exactly what's being done here with Wigner's friend. Almost all thought experiments leverage imagined perspectives. — noAxioms

That's a good point, indeed. I need to think about this to give you a proper response. Hope you don't mind.

I think we have to establish a proper methodology if we are to avoid begging the question in these matters. — Leontiskos

Well, I believe that some universalists would argue that that passage on Judas means that it would be better if was aborted. Not sure I am find it convincing - after all, it is undeniable that it does seem to suggest that he would be better for him to have never coming into existince. Assuming that you are right and it disproves even 'hopeful' universalism, it's hard to get a coherent theological picture from the Bible*.

What you say about that 1 Tim 2:3-4 is also true. Even if we accept that 'everyone' really means 'all human beings without exception', the text merely says that it is God's desire to save everyone. To make another example John 3:17 taken at face value would imply that God's intention is to 'save the world'. This of course doesn't by itself imply that, indeed, everyone will be saved.

But on the other hand, IMHO the Christian tradition has been insistent to describe God in classical theistic terms. God is omnipotent, omniscent, God's will is changeless and so on. How can God desire the salvation of the 'world' if He already knows that some will not be saved? If God is omnipotent, can God's will be frustrated?

So, it would seem to me that a classical theist way to understand the passages that seem to indicate God's universal salvific will is to simply deny that God's will is to 'offer the possibility of salvation' to all or something like that. Otherwise, the loss of someone would be a tragedy, a frustration of God's changeless plans.

* There are, indeed, some Biblical passages that seem to indicate that God 'changed his mind'. In Exodus 32:7-14 we do find a passage like that. Taken literally, it says that God changed his mind. But a classical theist would find such a literalist way to interpret the passage unacceptable. So, it would seem that nobody takes literallyeverything that the Bible says about God. Interestingly, if Moses' prayer did change God's plans, this would actually reinforce give an additional argument to the universalists. 1 Tim 2:1 says that we shall pray for everyone because it actually helps them. Anyway, a classical theist reading of the passage of the Exodus is clearly 'on surface' against what the text 'literally' says.

It seems to me then that a 'exegetical debate' doesn't give us compelling arguments.

That was our first step. I pointed to Matthew 26:24 and you pointed to 1 Timothy 2:3-4. At this point in the theological discussion, both of us having presented one pericope, I think the universalist interpretation is less plausible. I think the Matthew text has more anti-universalist weight than the Timothy text has pro-universalist weight. — Leontiskos

Probably you are right. But then, if we want to really have a theological debate, we need to get a coherent picture of God, it would seem.

So it is odd to look for someone who you think made a bad argument (e.g. Augustine or Chrysostom), isolate their bad argument, and then infer that the oppose conclusion must be true. This is a form of invalid reasoning. I could also find people who made (putatively) bad arguments for universalism, but this would not disprove universalism. Better to actually try to make an argument for universalism from Scripture. — Leontiskos

Yes, sorry for that. Anyway, I didn't want to 'prove' universalism by questioning their arguments. I just wanted to point out that even in those times there wasn't a consensus on how to interpret some ambigous passages.

Anyway, point taken, I should have at least clarify why I 'invoked' St Chrysostom's thoughts.

And again, at some point we have to wonder whether your term "logical possibility" has a specific meaning at all. It looks a lot like a tautology, "If everyone can repent forever, then everyone can repent forever." — Leontiskos

Yes, that's a tautology, but it is a tautology that follows from what we have been saying and agreeing upon. We agreed that in this life it is said that it is always possible to repent, even if we can fix in sin our own will. So the possibility of repentance can't be excluded by the claim that we can make 'mortal sins'. Arguably, this is also true in the afterlife, unless either it is seen as an extrinsic punishment of God or God doesn't give them other chances to repent. But why would God not allow the possibility of a sincere repentance at a certain point?

Does God change His mind? Did God decide from the start that the possibility of salvation is offered during life and after death there is no chance?

Asking these questions is important to understand the picture of God a doctrine is making.

I think that if our ultimate goal does not require evangelization, then evangelization is not ultimately necessary. The goal is salvation, not avoiding unending torment. Nevertheless, try to make sure that your arguments rise above a mere emotional appeal. — Leontiskos

Frankly, I am not sure why you think I am making 'emotional appeals'. I'll just ignore this insinuation.

The point is that an universalist might still say that evangelization (in some form) is needed for repentance. Of course the universalist says that salvation can happen after this life, so evangelisation is this life isn't strictly necessary for salvation. But it is certainly a cooperation to God's salvific plan (which is the salvation of all in the universalist view).

As has so often been the case in this conversation, you keep saying "maybe" when your conclusion requires that you say "necessarily." — Leontiskos

In philosophical discussions I use always terms like 'maybe', 'it seems' and so on because I recognize that I can be wrong. I can't exclude that I might miss something in my reasoning, so I'll say 'it seems to me', 'maybe' ans so on.

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in. — Leontiskos

You seem to have missed the point here. In the analogy it isn't God who tortures but the illness. If you like, remove the word 'illness' and think about, say, a substance abuse. Arguably, the torment of the patient would be caused by free actions of the patient himself or herself, at least initially. The compassionate doctors will try always to heal the patient. Assuming that the doctors will try forever to heal the patient, will the patient at a certain point be irrecuperable.

Sure, and that's why the Church keeps at it. — Leontiskos

And yet, at a certain point, it seems that God and the Church simply stop to do that. Is it because the sinners at a certain point will be irrecuperable? If so, why?

Yes, correct. — Leontiskos

Good!

If the "hard" universalist says that at a certain point the patient will be convinced to take the medication, then the traditionalist says that some patients will never take the medication. — Leontiskos

Yes, I agree.

But note one thing, however. Let's assume that the illness is caused by the patient's free choices (like in the case of substance abuse). That is, the patient is actually responsible for his or her ill-being.
In both the 'universalist' and 'traditionalist' cases, the doctors want to save the patient. Only in one case, however, the doctors' will is realized. In the other, it won't.
In the form case, the end is the hoped one.
In the latter case, the end is tragic. Of course, it is not a refutation of the latter scenario, but it is interesting to note that.

That is because realism is a mental perspective which cannot be proven or disproven. . . only HELD or NOT HELD. Whether you hold to a particular form of realism or idealism will probably not impact much of anything as the direct nuts and bolts pragmatism of advancing science requires. — substantivalism

Up to a certian point, I'll agree. From a pragmatic perspective, in fact, realism is probably preferable than 'idealism', if by the latter we mean that anything outside the mind(s) doesn't exist. But conversely, a broadly 'idealistic' perspective actually helps in a practical sense.
For instance, even the most consistent physicalist nowadays is ready to admit that reality is not like it appears to us. That is, a suspension of disbelief about 'common sense' is needed to accept the counterintuitive facts that scientific theories sometimes require us to accept. The common sense view that we have about the world is, indeed, for a large part mind-dependent. So, I would say that even if 'idealisms' are wrong they are still useful pragmatically.



Well, thanks for your thoughts. Unfortunately, I am not well-versed to that philosophical perspectives, so I am sorry if my answer isn't satisfying.
I believe that in these kind of discussions we have to remember the historical meanings of terms like 'realism' and 'idealism'. I believe that realism is more like an epistemic position rather than an ontic one. If by 'realism' one means that there is a 'mind-independent reality' outside minds, it is pretty rare to find 'idealists' that flatly deny that (Plato or Kant for instance would be realist in this sense). But realism is more a claim that we can have knowledge of that 'mind-independent reality' and it's where things get murkier.

If I am not mistaken, ontic structural realism is the position that, while we can't know the intrinsic properties of mind-independent reality, we can, at least in principle, know some structural aspects of it. For instance, conservation laws, symmetries in physics and so on are probably the most general laws we can discover. Probably it's the least 'speculative' form of realism there is. It doesn'r require that we can describe 'faithfully' the world but just that, in principle at least, the mathematical/logical structures of our theories might mirror the structure of the mind-independent reality. In other words, it's merely the claim that mind-independent reality is partially intelligible by us.

I would say that it is a reasonable stance to hold. After all, the assumption of the existence of a mind-independent reality has much more explanatory powers than the denial of it. So, it would also seem reasonable to assert that we can have some knowledge of it. But then, if we accept that 'mind-independent reality' is intelligible, we might ask ourselves how is that possible. That is, why that mind-independent reality is intelligible in the first place. To me this is a strong argument to some kind of 'platonism' about mathematics, logic and so on: after all, if mathematical, logical truths and so on are not merely creations of our minds but in some way properties of mind-independent realities, then the partial intelligibility is easily explained. Paradoxically, then, the 'mind-independent' reality would be something that is not wholly 'different' from the mind, in a sense.

Can we have certainty of this, however? I would not say so. After all, if our knowledge is inductive it can't be certain. On the other hand, though, as you say it would absurd to deny that, say, newtonian mechanics makes correct predictions. The empirical knowledge that science gives us is undeniable. But, in a sense, we can't 'prove' in any way that this means that we do know the structure of 'reality as it is'. So, here we are in an antinomy. On the other hand, basically everything seems to tell us that we can know something about a mind-independent reality. On the other hand, however, there is no logical compelling argument that we can. It is a fascinating mystery IMHO. And what is even more interesting is that if we do accept that we can know (part of) the mind-independent reality it is because it shares something with our own mental categories. So, it would imply that, say, mathematical platonists are in some sense right to say that mathematical truths are mind-independent, eternal and so on.

The problem with Wittgenstein's tractatus is that if the 'ending' (TLP 6.53-6.54) are taken at face value, Wittgenstein at the end argued that no metaphysical position is tenable and even the Tractatus itself at the end of the day is inconsistent (a conclusion that makes sense, after all. If one believes that in order to be meaningful, propositions must be about some empirical facts, the Tractatus' proposition have no empirical content, then...).

What Wittgenstein seemed to argue in the 5.6s sections is that while the 'world' is presented in a particular perspective, the 'self' doesn't appear 'in the world' and so anything we say about the self would be nonsensical. To me, the early Wittgenstein had a very idiosyncratic idea of what realism means.
To put in another way, the 'world' for Wittgenstein is the totality of what can be known. The knower would be outside 'what can be known' and, being outside, the knower can't be known and, therefore, nothing can be said about the knower, because anything we could say would be meaningless.

Given that Wittgenstein speaks about the world in empirical terms, can what he is saying help us to understand 'how the world is outside experience'. I don't think so. For him it would be what can be known/said.

In the right reference frame, it is what happens, but it's still a provisional truth in that frame. I don't think what you call 'ultimate truths' are frame or perspective dependent. — noAxioms

Right! Can we talk about a 'realism' without 'ultimate truths' or the possibility to know them?

The bolded bit is such a perspective reference, and illustrates the point of this topic. — noAxioms

Sorry, I am not trying to be dense. But I'm not sure about what you are getting at. I would say that usually realism involves that the world can be known, at least in priciple, as it is independently of any perspective of any subject.

The friend is almost immediately entangled with the spin-measurement device, so he's going to match that every time, whether or not Wigner has measured the friend yet or not. — noAxioms

Yes. But this doesn't deny the fact that Wigner and the Friend's perspective are different. And neither can actually 'take the other's perspective'.

Interesting that Rovelli phrased it that way, but if it were not true, the view would be falsified. The statement is true of quantum mechanics and not just any subset of interpretations. — noAxioms

Yes. Some interpertations however claim that they are 'ontologically interpretable' (to use a phrase by d'Espagnat), in the sense that they can be read as providing a correct description about the world as it is in itself.

Rovelli is saying that each 'observer' can't go outside 'his' own perspective. 'He' will never find any inconsistencies because all data 'he' will be able to find will be consistent 'for him'. But if 'his' knowledge is limited by 'his' own perspective, then, he can't actually know what 'others' observe. He just can verify that when 'he' asks 'them' what 'they' did 'observe', 'he' finds no inconsistency. (I am using the scare quotes because I want to allow the possibility here that the observer might be a physical system).

RQM (like almost all ontic interpretations) doesn't treat any person different than another. It doesn't even treat pens differently than people. — noAxioms

Fine. My point above would still stand.

The syntax suggests that this world exists to the exclusion of any other, all because it's the one we see. A far less mind-dependent wording would be 'a world' which doesn't carry any implication of being the preferred world.
My whole topic contrasts 'the world' with 'this world, among others', with the former implying mind-dependence. — noAxioms

Ok. But oddly enough I would say that if there are 'as may worlds as perspectives' then the presence 'mind-independent reality' is more difficult to defend.

Sorry, but I'll respond to you in the next few days.

Thanks for the links.

Yes, that's basically right. But the key is that what is chosen is in fact a good, albeit a lesser good. It is not evil simpliciter. — Leontiskos

Ok.

There are various reasons why Roman Catholic praxis tends towards legalism, but the theological undergirding is not really legalistic. — Leontiskos

Ok, I get that.

I said that Hart's position is not secured, not that it is rejected. Indeed, if Balthasar's position is secured then Hart's conclusion can't be rejected. The securing of Balthasar's position entails that Hart's conclusion is possible, for we cannot hope for the impossible. — Leontiskos

I see, thanks for the clarification.

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible. — Leontiskos

I see what you mean. As I said, however, it's difficult to harmonize what the Bible seems to say in various places. For instance, 1 Tim 2:3-4 seems to say that God's will is that all people shall be saved. St Augustine in Enchiridion, ch 103 tires to harmonize this passage with the belief in eternal damnation by saying that the 'all/everyone' in an exclusive manner and he proposes two possible readings: either 'all people' should be understood as (I paraphrase) 'God wants to save the people that will be saved (but some will not be saved)' or 'God wants some people from all classes of people to be saved'. This is because St Augustine assuemed that God's plans will be realized and that some will be eternally damned. Another example is St John Chrysostom's reading of 1 Cor 3:11-15 in his Homily 9 on 1 Corinthians, where he identifies the 'fire' mentioned here with the fire mentioned in Mark 9:47-49, where St John says that the 'salvation through fire' actually means 'damnation', because the damaned are saved from annihilation, but it's not true salvation (note that Mk 9:49 says that 'everyone will be salted by fire' and St. Paul in that passage doesn't mention a third group. So, I do understand why St John felt he had to harmonize the verses in the way he did... I know however that the passage in Corinthians is generally understood to refer to Purgatory, but I found interesting that St John read in that way. After all, it is interesting that St. Paul simply didn't mention a third group there).

Of course, one can accept, say, St Augustine's reading but it is a contrived way IMO to save the appearances. If one says that God actually wants all people to be saved, then, one must admit that God's will might not be realized if one will never be saved.

I also believe that St John Paul II said that despite what that verse you cite about Judas, the Church never made any definite pronouncements on people who are forever in Hell and this includes even Judas.

Personally, as I said, I do not know what to make of all this ambiguities I see in the Bible. I do not see it as clear as you see it.

Right, but it is broader than addiction. It is 'habit' or even 'phronema'. Humans mold themselves into definite shapes, and as far as we can tell, those shapes are not reversible (after a point). Minor moldings can be reversed, but even that can be quite hard. I think these discussions tend to overlook the empirical data that molded patterns or phronemata have a telos of stability or fixedness. Once this is seen universalism looks more and more like a deus ex machina. — Leontiskos

Empirically, reversals do happen, and they often happen in the way that you illustrate. Also empirically, reversals do not always happen. — Leontiskos

Ok, but anyway as I see it, if you allow the logical possibility that one can repent, then the logical conclusion is simply that no one will be beyond hope of repentance (assuming that they will exist forever). The conclusion is inexcapable.

So either the damned - or some of them - will lose the ability to repent or even if they do, they will not be given mercy from God. If we assume that they will lose the ability to repent, it seems to me that, based on what we have said so far, the damned will either not given the possibility to do so or they will not be allowed to do so. So, in other words, it is either an active punishment of God or a complete 'abandomnemnt/desertion'.
But it it is so, then, we have to think eternal damnation as an extrinsic punishment again.

But what traditionalists do not seem to allow is the possibility that experiencing the painful consequence of having remained in sin might not lead to repentance. — boundless

I think you probably included more negatives in this phrase than you intended. — Leontiskos

Yes, thanks for the correction.

As I've said, the universalist has non-necessary reasons to evangelize, but no necessary reasons. That's a big difference from the traditionalist. It also contradicts the urgency with which the Gospel is presented in revelation. — Leontiskos

I doubt that a Christian universalist would say that evangelization or repentance is unnecessary. They do allow that both can also happen after death. Also, I believe that universalists would say that God's help is needed for salvation.

But anyway, do you think that the main reason that one should have to evangelize, do good etc is to avoid unending torment?

So on your analogy the most significant universalist motivation is avoidance of pain, whereas the most significant traditionalist motivation is avoidance of death. What's worse? Pain or death? I don't think there is a real comparison here. And the urgency with which revelation presents the Gospel is apparently not compatible with a mere lessening of pain. The analogy is apt given the way that revelation speaks about the ultimate stakes as death, not pain. — Leontiskos

Let's say that the illness is actually fatal. The doctors try at first to convince the patient to take a painless drug. The patient refuses because of, say, pride. Then, the patient's pain worsens, the doctors then try to gove the patient a more heavy medicine but the patient refuses again. Then the patient's pain becomes intolerable, the doctors try to convince the patient to take a more serious medication. Maybe at a certain point, the patient will be convinced by his painful experience to take the serious medication, which will cause itself pain but it will lead to his or her healing. So, maybe, one can say that while the illness is, in fact, fatal, at a certain point the patient will be persuaded by the pain from the illness itself to take the medication.
Or maybe the illness is not fatal but leads 'only' to agonizing pain but the patient refuses to take the medicine. If the pain could go along forever, will the patient simply forever say 'no' to the medication if he or she will suffer agonizing pain?

Furthermore, the doctors here merely do not want to avoid death or pain but want that the patient will heal and be well. So the motivation isn't just to avoid pain/death but also to give the patient well-being.
Assuming that the medicines are necessary for the patient's well-being, compassionate doctors will try to convince the patient to accept them as long as is possible for them to do so.

The 'hard' universalists would say that at a certain point the 'patient' (sinner) will be convinced to take the 'medication' ('salvation') possibly by the painful experience (where the pain might be regret, a painful experience of loneliness and so on). The 'hopeful' universalists would say that there will be always hope that the 'patient' will be convinced. The traditionalist would say that the 'patient' at a certain point is beyond hope or is actively condemned to not take the 'medication' or even to not desire it.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to respond in the following days. I hope to come back by mid or the end of next week.

OK, I think I worked it out. You're talking about Wigner's opinion of what the friend has measured while the friend is still in the box. That's a clear counterfactual, and unless an interpretation is used that posits counterfactuals, there is no 'truly' about it. RQM does not posit counterfactuals. — noAxioms

No, I was thinking also about what the Friend measured after he exited the box. Rovelli actually brilliantly paraphrased his views like this: "More precisely: everybody hears everybody else stating
that they see the same elephant they see. This, after all,
is a sound definition of objectivity." (source: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0604064, pag. 7). Wigner hears his Friend stating he saw the same thing Wigner observed. But this is not a way, for Wigner, to go outside Wigner's perspective.

No, not at all. Existence of anything is relative to that which has measured the thing, and so far, our 'perspective bearers' have not been measured. They will momentarily, but then they're not the perspective bearers anymore, they're the observed. — noAxioms

Not sure if I understand you. When Wigner and the Friend meet, their interaction is (also) a measurement. So, the state of the Friend is 'measured' by Wigner. Does this mean that the Friend loses his status as a 'perspective bearer'? You can't define a perspective of the Friend?

Quite the opposite. Where are you getting all this? — noAxioms

If I say that my knowledge is restricted to my own perspective, how can I claim there are other perspectives and there are no perspective-independent things?

According to RQM, their ontology relative to Wigner is a superposition of states. According to other interpretations, the ontology is different. Ontology seems to be a mental construct, a function of say one's choice of interpretation, but it also might be a physical mind-independent status, depending on which (if any) interpretation is actually the case. — noAxioms

Ok

Are you suggesting that Wigner isn't sure that the friend is like himself? That Wigner cannot discard solipsism? I suppose that's correct, but it's not considered a valid quantum interpretation since it leads to zero knowledge of anything. Ditto with superdeterminism, a loophole in Bell's proof, but you still don't see it included in the interpretations list. — noAxioms

More or less, yes. Note that my point isn't about only RQM. But all models who claim that knowledge is perspectival.

But also note that our knowledge seems to be perspectival. Wigner can't 'see' the world from the Friend's perspective in order to confirm his belief that, indeed, the Friend is, as you put it, like him. This is so precisely becuase Wigner's knowledge is limited by his perspective. So any claims that he makes about anything outside his perspective can't be confirmed. And yet, as you say here, this 'epistemic solipsism' seems to be self-refuting for various reasons. So, he has good reasons to believe that there is something outside his perspective, that there is a real intersubjective agreement (in a sense we do really see the same elephant albeit possibly in a distorted way, and we don't merely hear others say that they see the same elephant) and so on. But IMHO this 'certainty' is IMHO grounded if we assume that there is a 'mind-indepedent reality' or, in general, 'a reality independent of any perspectives'. But we can't verify this assumption.

I see this as an antinomy.

Yes. I am not using any of those words as something requiring a human or other 'observer' to be involved. — noAxioms

Ok! Don't think my points would change much anyway.

I don't understand that problem enough to have an opinion about how problematic it is or to critique any solution proposed or counter-critique.
I said I don't buy it for different reasons than it offending my delicate sensibilities (the argument put forth in the Bell paper linked by the most recent post by Wayfarer. — noAxioms

Ok, thanks!

Calling it 'the world' is already an observer bias. — noAxioms

Why?

Terminology granted, but both seem to contrast 'objective' with 'subjective', as opposed to objective vs relational.
The first means it relates despite not being seen (like say the far side of the moon, at least until the 60's). The latter is more of a property: It's there period vs it's there relative to something else. 37 exists, vs 37 is a member of the set of integers. That's different than 'we both can count to 37'.
I kind of irks me that 'objective' has two distinct meanings here, both quite relevant. — noAxioms

Yes, both terms contrasted objectivity with subjectivity. Not sure about the distinction you make here. Are you saying that a better distinction would be between "what is independent from any relation" vs "what is relation-dependent"?

I think the disagreement is that what you are attacking is some kind of unique objective description of the universe (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, falsely speaking). However, from the beginning of the conversation, I have just been talking about information about the world we gain from perception or observation. And we may put boundaries around objects in perception in different ways if we really want to; but, nonetheless, what appears on our retinas and other sensory boundaries are patterns that map to events or structures out in the world, mostly in a consistent manner. And this kind of consistent mapping (at least in some restricted relevant context) I think is actually the minimal requirement for pragmatism and use. — Apustimelogist

IMHO philosophical realists assume that we can describe the 'mind-independent world'. For instance, Galieleo and Descartes assumed that while the 'secondary qualities' of the objects (colours, sounds, tastes etc) are mind-dependent, the 'first qualities' are intrinsic properties of the physical objects.

If you say that even in principle, we can't have a 'faithful description' of the 'mind-independent world', then, one can't be a 'realist' in most meanings of the term*. Bernard d'Espagnat used the term 'open realism' to denote the minmal position where a mind-independent reality is assumed but without any claim of descriptive knowledge. Not just pragmatic one.

*Generally the term realism refers to the views in which we have at least the possibility to make a description of the world.




Some time ago, I mentioned the distinction of the 'two truths', which is prevalent in Indian philosophies but actually also appears in western philosophy.

On one hand, we can talk about 'provisional truths', which are pragmatic. For instance, "The Sun rises in the east and sets in the west" is true in a provisional sense. But it also isn't true, right? We know that it is not a correct description of what 'really happens'. It's certainly useful and it correctly describe our observations. But we can't take literally this statement.

On the other hand, 'ultimate truths' would be correct statements that in some ways describe how the world is 'in itself'.

So, if we allow that the knowledge of pragmatic truths is indeed 'knowledge' then of course we can talk about knowledge. But if by 'knowledge' we mean unmistaken knowledge, or the knowledge of how the world truly is in itself, I am not sure that we can have this second kind of knowledge.

I believe that one has to take seriously his discussion in the whole section. He uses the example of the eye and the visual field to explain why there is no 'subject'. Nothing in the visual field suggests that there is an eye. So, in the same way, nothing in the 'empirical world' suggests that there is a 'self'. The 'self', according to Wittgenstein, would be 'outside' the world. But if it is outside the world, and if meaningful propositions are about the empirical world, then, of course, one can't make any meaningful proposition about the 'self'.

Still, yes, Wittgenstein says that solipsism comes to coincide with 'pure realism'... but the 'world' in the Tractatus is the purely empirical world of fact, which is 'seen' in a particular perspective, which means that it is perspectival. So, I am not sure that the 'realism' LW had in mind is the realism most philosophers had in mind.

IIRC, if I recall correctly, the later Wittgenstein rejected the early Wittgenstein's assumptions that (1) meaningful propositions must have an empirical content, (2) there is a structural correspondence between the structure of (ideal) language and the structure of the world and (3) there are atomic propositions, which correspond to the 'atomic' facts. Also it is the later Wittgenstein that rejected solipsism by alluding that language can't be private. He also arrived to an interesting notion of 'certainty' which seem to very different from the earliest views, i.e. the notion that certain 'hinge propositions' can't be doubted if we want to function. We do not doubt them becuase, if not, we could not make sense of our experience and we could not function (for instance, when I go to sleep, I do not have the doubt that I wake up on the other side of the world) even if strictly speaking we can't have a 'indubitable certainty' about them (in my example, I could be kidnapped while sleeping and taken to other side of the world... still, I don't doubt that I'll wake up in my bed. If I did, I could not think about my future in a functional way).

The later Wittgenstein notion of certainty, however, doesn't seem to be what most earlies philosophers had in mind when they thought about certainty and knowledge. It's a provisional kind of certainty.

You're welcome. If you are referring to the thread on a different forum, beware that it may be a bit hard to follow. I was tailoring it to individuals rather than to a general audience. In any case I think a thread like that would shed more light on justice than a discussion of Hell. Hell is a hard case, and it is better to begin with easy cases ("Hard cases make bad law"). — Leontiskos

OK, thanks. Anyway, yes, probably using hell to make a discussion about justice isn't the best idea.

That's fair, and I appreciate that you are taking care with this conversation. — Leontiskos

Thank you!

Sticking with Aquinas, to fix one's end in sin is not to form an intention towards evil (or in an extreme case, an oath towards evil). For example, adultery is a sin, but when a man commits adultery he is not doing it for the sake of evil. He is doing is because he desires the romance and sex, and chooses to pursue it. He values the romance and sex more than he cares about not-committing adultery. — Leontiskos

But one should have the sufficient awareness that is making is wrong, right? Maybe not an explicit 'oath to evil' but still a deliberate decision to be 'faithful' to a lesser good.

The problem that I see with how the notion of 'mortal sin' is formulated is that it is legalistic. The view you presented here isn't.

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

I did read Balthasar's book BTW. But I could have missed the reference about post-mortem repentance (if I am not mistaken, in a quote of St Edith Stein there is that suggestion, however, but I have also read that she later expressed reluctance about the 'hope for all'...).

Anyway, I still am not convinced that 'universalism' proper is rejected if the necessity of repentance is affirmed. Maybe, the direct encounter with God triggers a response in the hearts which makes repentance inevitable and/or maybe it is the suffering itself that does at a certain point. Of course, however, if one still says that in any case freedom involves the power of 'contrary choice' then, yes, the 'hopeful' position still stands and the 'universalist proper' doesn't.

BTW, I do find weird that among Christians the 'hopeful' position is quite rare. Either some are irrevocably damned/annihilated or all will be saved. The 'middle way' seems not to be accepted.

Sure - I think you are technically correct. But I don't find the psychology and anthropology convincing. To make the point quickly, we could say that a man who has been addicted to opium for 70 years is logically permitted to stop using opium, but this is undue "logicalism." Although it is logically possible, that's just not how reality works. Human acts form the habits and the soul towards an end. There may be creatures who do not move towards fixity in an end, but they are certainly not humans. I take it that these claims are much more empirically sound than the idea that reversal of one's fundamental orientation is always possible, no matter what has come before. — Leontiskos

Ok! The more one is addicted, the more is difficult to heal from the addiction. I also believe that addiction is a very good analogy for evil/sin.

But what traditionalists do not seem to allow is the possibility that experiencing the painful consequence of having remained in sin might not lead to repentance. In a sense, we see it even in this life. It's much more difficult to change their mind for those who do not experience painful consequences of their choices. So, I don't agree that experience suggests one outcome over the other. I get your point, but again I am not persuaeded by it.

The universalist has no more ultimate reason to evangelize than the man has a reason to buy a ticket to Brazil. Buying the ticket is irrational. I think this argument actually destroys the notion of universalism in the Christian context, hook, line, and sinker. Folks who accede to universalism literally act this way, and that's perfectly logical. They become uninterested in pursuing the inevitable end. The Unitarian Universalists are a great historical example of this. — Leontiskos

Well, here you seem to assume that the 'ultimate reason' is necessary for evangelize. But as I said before, a universalist has many other reason to share his or her views.

Also, your example of the travel to Brazil is misleading IMHO. A better analogy would be that if I don't buy the ticket, I can't take the plane and I have to go there without a plane. The point is that you seem to neglect that most universalist would still say that there is very painful process for the damned which while finite it's presumably far worse than one can imagine.

A better analogy is one of an illness where you are presented two choices. If you take a painless drug now, you are healed without much suffering. But if you wait, you have to undergo a very painful treatment, where both the pain from the illness and the treatment is hard to bear. So, even if the final result is the same (being healed), the process might be very, very different. In this case, the doctors would have a very good reason to try to convince the patients to take the first medication.

It's just like how drunkenness might explain crimes but need not absolve them, since people generally choose to impair their judgement in this way. We still hold drunk drivers accountable in a way we do not hold people accountable if they have a stroke while driving. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed!

But to me, this suggests that motion must also stop in the other direction. Eventually there is nothing good left to impel motion and one has stasis in nothingness, which would seem to me to track with a sort of annihilation, a will and intellect oriented towards nothingness, and so contentless. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I see it, the classical notion that evil is 'privation of the good' and not a substance seems to lend itself in a universalist or annihilationist direction.
Evil is parasitic on the good, and evil can't exist without the good. Being a corruption, without the corrupted substance it can't exist, just like a parasite can't live if the host dies or if it is eradicated from the host.

If someone destroys the good in itself in an irrevocable way (as Pope Benedict put it in the case of the damned in hell), it seems that there is a kind of annihilation as you say. The 'imago Dei' is destroyed. But if it is destroyed, how can evil remain if its existence is parasitic?
On the other hand, even the universalist can use the annihilationist language without much problems: the sinner is destroyed and the 'image of God' is healed.

That the "Outer Darkness" is a place of wailing and gnashing of teeth suggests an appetite for Goodness though. Talbot reads this as the maximum withdrawal of God from the creature, leaving them to experience the absence of Goodness as a final (but in his view remedial) chastisement. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I remember that part. If God is truly omnipresent, however, there can be no situation where God is absent. Maybe it should be understood in this way: in their refusal to acknowledge God, the damned try to ignore God and seek the good for them elsewhere. But once finite goods end and each damned is totally alone, there is an intolerable feeling of loneliness and privation that impels a response in their heart.

Also the universalist could use the view of St Isaac of Niniveh that 'hell is regret' to explain repentance. The definitive encounter with God removes all kind of ignorance and mistaken beliefs one had. The damned, then, acknowledge their errors and experience a painful, but remedial regret that eventually leads to their healing. The direct confrontation with the truth can't be resisted, maybe.

St. Maximus is sometimes read as a universalist (it's really his grand metaphysical vision that most suggests this IMHO), but some of his work suggests that the damned are reformed and at rest, but not deified. From Questions and Problems: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting, thanks. But if they are at 'rest', I would argue that they have lost their innermost desire for communion with God. Are still, then, the same entities after this 'restoration'?

As St. Augustine put it, if our heart is restless until is united with God, it would seem that the damned should be restless.

Whether St. Maximus was a universalist or not, it would seem that St. Gregory was. IIRC, he even speaks about a 'universal feast' after the purgation is complete and other statements that all beings do not fall out from the Kingdom of God. It would not make any sense to call a 'universal feast' something were a part of the participants is actually suffering.
But maybe the term 'apokatastasis' doesn't necessarily mean 'salvation' and Maximus was only making a lexicographic point here. TBH, I did not read the works of St. Maximus, only secondary literature.

This makes more sense if we recall that in the Ad Thelassium Maximus says that experience of God (union with God) is beyond knowledge (building off I Corinthians 13), just as St. Gregory Palamas seems to have direct experience of God occuring above any sort of separation of intellect and will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, thanks. Probably the universalist reading here is that the 'direct knowledge' would trigger a repentance.

You don't really need to think about the brain in a vat scenario. You just need to concede the possibility that the 'independent reality' might not be be describable by using our conceptual frameworks, mathematical structure and so on. The structure of our mental models might not 'mirror' that of reality, even in principle.

On the other hand, yes, I can agree with you that pragmatic knowledge is knowledge. But it's not a knowledge that most realists would consider as 'true knowledge of the world'.

You think it can be useful without having any correspondence to reality at all? Note that correspondence isn't like direct realism. You can say "my experience corresponds to things in reality" without saying "I'm experiencing reality raw, as it truly is, without any intermediary processing". — flannel jesus

Probably there is correspondence, but I don't think that we can know how the correspondence is. So, if the indirect realism you are positing is true (which I have no problem with), I am still in no position to know how the world appears to me relates with how the world is in itself.

If we can't go outside our perspective, we can't know how the world seen in my perspective relates to how the world is independent from it.

Yet, I also believe that there are good grounds to posit an independent reality as I explained in my posts. What I am questioning is how we can make claims of knowledge about it.

No argument here since I did a whole topic on that (2 topics ago). But similarly, you, as 'a thing' is also just a mental imputation. — noAxioms

I disagree, from my immediate experience I recognize that I have a private experience. Having a private experience strongly suggests to me that I am differentiated from the environment enough to be considered a distinct entity. I still do not see convincing arguments that refute this immediate phenomenological intuition.

Again agree. While there are some objective constants, physical quantities and units don't seem to be among them. — noAxioms

Note that constants are objective because their values are valid in all perspectives. They are not 'beyond' them.

Lock is unimportant. The hypothetical lab needs to be a box from which zero information can escape. We presume this, but in reality, and such box would kill its occupants. — noAxioms

Ok, point taken.

The friend, as described here, seems to serve no purpose since he simply reports what the device does, and the device alone would have sufficed. The friend perhaps only serves a significant role in the 'consciousness causes collapse' interpretations. — noAxioms

'Consciousness causes collapse' is to be interpreted as a phrase though. If collapse is merely an epistemic oupdate of a conscious agent, I don't see anything controversial. Of course, if consciousness causes a physical change, then things are different. So, let's not confuse these two distinct interpretations.

You can always put another observer outside, perhaps outside a box containing Wigner and the inner box. What is demonstrated by doing this? — noAxioms

That according to the external observer, let's call her Alice there is a superposition of Wigner, the Friend, the experimental device and the physical system. Not sure why you made this point however.

I don't know what you mean by 'truly' here. This is a relational view. There is no objective truth going on anywhere. Nobody notices anything weird. — noAxioms

I think that this view is problematic, however. For instance, the relational view expressed here still has to make the assumption that the 'perspective-bearers' have their existence independent from the perspectives. Also, it makes the assumption that its truth is perspective-independent. If my knowledge is restricted to what I can know from my own perspective, how can I know that?

The friend who notices spin up has a perspective, as does the friend noticing spin down. Those are two perspectives in superposition (relative to Wigner). Wigner knows this. What he doesn't know is which state things will collapse to relative to him when the box is opened. That part is a counterfactual. — noAxioms

Ok. But what about the ontological status of the two Friends? Also, he can't go outside his perspective, so what he can know is that he will never find inconsistencies. He can't in any way know that the Friend has his own perspective.

That I will agree with. It is an epistemological statement, not worded in an ontic manner. RQM is not about epistemology. — noAxioms

I agree with the first part. I do believe that RQM leads implicitly to an epistemology that is in tension with its ontology (I am not sure it is a contradiction, but still I am not sure it isn't for the reasons stated above).

I'm not. The pen has no awareness of that which it measures. The interaction definition has nothing to do with consciousness or people at all. — noAxioms

But you are still treating the pen as a 'perspective-bearer', i.e. something differentiated and something relative to which one can define a state of 'everything else'. And the state of 'everything else' is described via concepts that have practical usefulness in our perspective. Both these assumptions are not 'obvious'. Futhermore, if one adopts a relational standpoint, one can't never know that they are valid.

Those are straight out of wiki. The former has arguably been solved. The latter as well, but arguably less so. Copenhagen doesn't derive it: It is just postulated up front. MWI could have done that.
Objective collapse interpretations also seem to do this. I can't think of one that derives it.
Apparently any counterfactual definition like Bohmian just postulates an initial state compatible with the Born rule, and from there it has foundational principles that preserve this distribution property. — noAxioms

Ok, good point. But I am not sure that the 'preferred basis' is truly solved in a non 'for all practical purposes' way. Just like decoherence IMO isn't enough to explain collapse. But anyway the problem is tangential.

That's a valid reason to prefer some other interpretation, but not a valid critique of it. The critique I quoted just above are valid critiques, and are or are not solved, depending who you ask. — noAxioms

Ok! I can agree with that!

We always build internal models, and while my model in some ways has correspondence to states in my world, I don't call my model 'knowledge' like it is some kind of accurate representation.
There is matter near me in my world and I cordon off a subset of that matter and designate it 'chair' despite the fact nothing in the physical world is a function of that subset.
Look at a person, which changes its component parts every second. Nevertheless, I designate a boundary to what I consider to be that person — noAxioms

A person is differentiated in a way that a chair isn't. I, as a conscious human being, have a private conscious experience that strongly suggests to me that I am differentiated enought to be a distinct entity. I would say that other humans are like me in this respect. This is also probably true for animals, assuming that they are conscious beings.

A chair, however, doesn't seem to have a degree of differentiation to be considered a distinct entity.

Everything (not just humans) does this. It has pragmatic utility. — noAxioms

I am not sure everything builds internal models.

There's no exact match, and there's no check if by insane chance you got one actually right. The purpose of the model is not to be accurate. The purpose is to be useful, and to be useful, it merely needs to be accurate enough to predict what will actually be observed. — noAxioms

Agreed.

The intersubjective agreement seems compelling enough. — noAxioms

Bernard D'Espagnat distinguished two senses of objective. 'Strongly objective' is something that is independent from any cognitive perspective (a property of the 'world in itself'). 'Weakly objective' is something that every cognitive agent can agree upon. Nothing weakly objective can be assumed to be strongly objective.

I do believe however that intersubjective agreement leads to the assumption that, indeed, there is a world-in-itself.

Well, my reply would be that if this were not the case, then it would suggest a picture of the world and metaphysics which is much more inflated than I currently believe, where there is some kind of conspiratorial aspect of nature that deceives our senses. Even though this could be the case, I don't see any positive evidence to believe this over a simpler story of how the world works and how we relate to it like the one that has been built up through physics, biochemistry, neuroscience, etc. — Apustimelogist

Actually the conspirational nature is not to be invoked here. One might still assume that our cognitive functions are useful, i.e. have a pragmatic goal. Practical usefulness does not lead to accuracy.
The problem I see here is that one can't claim knowledge about the 'mind-independent world' if one doesn't make some assumptions that can't be proven empirically.

I don't think that anyone believes that newtonian mechanics gives us a literal picture of the world nowadays. Still, it is still immensely useful and in a sense a source of valid knowledge, if knowledge is interpreted in a pragmatic way.

I think Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may offer a solution here. That is in order for us to make sense of the world, that is to avoid speaking non sense, our language, mental construct, and the world must be isomorphic. This is not an outcome of empirical verification but of logic analysis. — Richard B

Ironically, Wittgenstein's Tractatus can also be invoked to support the view that one can't go outside one's perspective (see TLP 5.6-5.641...here a link). And in fact, one can cite the later Wittgenstein's view that sense can be pragmatic in nature. Even if my picture is wrong, then, if it still has pragmatic use, I don't see why it would be 'nonsense'.

I would say that it would be rational if this man is reasoning in accordance with Reason’s principles; and it is a ‘rationally free choice’, to use your term, if this man’s rational choice is in accordance with what he sincerely believes. None of this per se negates the possibility that one sincerely believes that killing innocent people at the exchange of their well-being is the best option. I agree it would be ‘irrational’ in the colloquial sense of the term, but it meets the criteria you set out for ‘rational freedom’. — Bob Ross

Yes, we can say that one can be rational and evil, in the sense that if one sincerely believes that evil actions are 'right', then doing them is consistent.

BUT if one believes in an objective morality, then one must assume that here the 'rational evildoer' is mistaken in their belief.

So, if 'rational choice' merely means 'act according to one's belief', this would mean that one can do evil acts rationally if he or she is mistaken about what is good and what is evil. So, there is ignorance here that might decrease the culpability.

I see what you mean. But my point is that even if one allows the possibility to make and commit to a 'definitive oath to evil' this alone doesn't preclude the possibility of repentance after death (and salvation if one accepts that God would still save the repentant). So, my point is that even if one accepts that view, one would still have to assume that no one would be beyond hope unless either the possibility to repent is denied or the salvation for the sincere repentants is denied at a certain point.
So, yes, I agree with you that even if that assumption is true, one would still invoke some extrinsic constraints to explain perpetual damnation.

Futhermore, if one assumes that evil is not infinite, one might say that at a certain point the 'restless state' of the will, will exhaust the 'resources' of evil and then turn to the good.

Thanks for the response and the link, I'll read.

As a short premise, I didn't change my mind. I just see more subtlety in the 'free will' defence of semi-traditional hell view. Although I don't consider them convincing, you did make good points.

Anyway, let's say that the sinner does, indeed, have the ability to make a 'oath to evil' (or 'mortal sin') and the ability to commit to it perpetually. Let's consider the following propositions:

• One can make an oath to evil and has the ability to perpetually commit to it
• One can always sincerely repent from the 'oath to evil'
• God saves everyone who sincerely repent

Given that this life is finite, of course, the actualization of the first proposition here cannot be realized in this finite life. But if we assume that after death, life will be infinite, it might be reasonable to make. Anyway, it seems a traditional theological assumption that all three the above propositions are valid in this life.

So, it seems clear to me that the abilities of the first proposition cannot logically exclude the other two propositions. So, the ability to repent is not excluded by having made 'oaths to evil' (or 'mortal sins'). Let's say that Bob dies unrepentant and goes to hell. There are no logical reasons to assume that in the after life he can't sincerely repent and, assuming that God would still save anyone who sincerely repents, Bob can be still saved after death.

So, here at least from a logical standpoint, it seems to me that if some are beyond any hope for salvation, for them, after this life, either the second proposition or the third. Let's John is in this category of the damned. Either John lost the ability to sincere repent or if he still has it, God would not save him even if he sincerely repents.

I believe that there are two problems here.

First, Bob and Jack are given different chances for salvation. If Bob can still repent and be saved, why can't Jack also be saved? There seems to be a lack of impartiality here.

Second, in the case of Jack, if we assumed that the second and the third propositions are valid in this life, this means that repentance and salvation are possible even if one makes an 'oath to evil'. And making an 'oath to evil' doesn't by itself lead to perpetual damnation. Perpetual damnation is possible only if either one at a certain point is not able to repent or if after a certain point God doesn't save someone who makes a sincere repentance. Assuming that God would always save the sincere repentants, this would imply that some cannot make a sincere repentant if there is no hope for salvation for them.

Hence, it seems to me that if 'perpetual damnation' is not an extrinsic punishment but a possible result of our ability to make 'oaths', then no one would be completely beyond hope. Repentance would still be a possibility.

So my contention here is that the hopeless state of (some of?) the damned cannot be explained solely on terms of their ability to make oaths.

BTW, I didn't know that Balthasar allowed the possibility of post-mortem salvation. Interesting.

Regarding your points about evangelization, I think we are talking past each other at this point. I am not really sure why you think that believing in the traditional view of hell is so fundamental for evangelization, if you also agree that universalists would still have their valid reason to evangelize. But it is a tangential discussion.

BTW, I believe that the discussion we are having is also a very interesting way to explore what some concepts of 'justice', 'punishment' etc might imply, a reflection of what abilities we human beings really have and so on.

So, even if we are discussing under these kinds of things in the particular context of a religious doctrine, our reflections can give us interesting food for thought that can be applied in other contexts.

Sure people talk about objects like televisions and cars, but when push comes to shove I think the way people engage with reality is far more fluid and flexible than the idea that we uphold some fixed ontology with lists of well-defined objects. Now you can say this is kind of an anti-realism about objects, which couls be true to some extent, but its also kind of vacuous in a way because ultimately we are talking about different ways to effectively point at arguably veridical information about the world. — Apustimelogist

A problem here, I believe, is that you are assuming that there must be some kind of correspondence of our mental constructs of the world and the world in itself. The structure of the model must somehow reflect the structure of the world. But how can we verify this assumption?

If the assumption here were false, then we would not have knowledge about the structure of the 'mind-independent world', but only of phenomena. In fact, we would not have just ignorance but, in fact, we would be mistaken.

I don't think that scientific knowledge alone can give us a definite answer about this question. This would imply that we have to 'suspend judgment' about how our models can 'reflect' the structure of the world and admit that, in fact, we have no way to make sure claims about our own cognitive perspective.

...
To fix an end of any kind does not entail that one will never change their mind, but it does entail that one can pursue the end without changing their mind. Hence my point about "can" rather than "must." — Leontiskos

Thanks for the clarification, I think that I understand better now.

Well, as I said, "if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition." Truth does not contradict truth, but not all philosophy and theology is true. — Leontiskos

Ok.

I think you are committing logical errors here, primarily modal errors. If one can promise lifelong fidelity then one must be capable of lifelong fidelity. If one is clearly incapable of lifelong fidelity then one cannot promise lifelong fidelity. You actually agreed to this earlier when you agreed that the person who does not think couples can fulfill the marriage vow do not in fact believe in marriage. It doesn't make any sense to say that the marriage vow is impossible to fulfill and nevertheless promote marriage. — Leontiskos

Suppose you make a promise that you know you can't keep. Are you promising or lying? I'd say it is merely lying. — Leontiskos

Good points here! To me this raises an interesting question, though. I believe that most (?) Christians assume that one can't be righteous in an inerrant way without God's help. Our will and our knowledge is impaired and we need God's grace to avoid falling (and not just 'stumbling'). If I am convinced by this thesis how can I make a vow to be rightheous or even to be faithful to God if I am myself aware that I am unable to follow perfectly this vow?

Regarding the couples, I also believe that the couple can ask God's help to be able to commit the vow. So, they might believe that with God's help, they are able to respect the vow even if they themselves are not.

In what follows, I'll concede however that you are right here.

On what basis? Theologically, it is assumed that we can repent in this life. It is also theologically assumed that we cannot repent beyond this life. So I don't see the argument.

Or we could just reify C. S. Lewis' imagery and say that repentance is always logically possible, but some will never repent. That is an orthodox position. It may or may not be a tenable position within Catholicism, but I don't really want to research that minute question.

The broad stroke simply says that humans are eventually capable of definitive decisions. I don't find that claim problematic. — Leontiskos

I see what you mean but even if we assume that we can make definite decisions, the traditional thesis that there is no possibility of repentance after death raises the inevitable question of why it should be so.

If despite being able to make definite choices even in this life we can still repent in this life, it means that having make a definite choice to fix one's will in sin and being able to repent (at least in principle) are not mutually exclusive. Section 1861 of the Catholic Catechism says explicitly that repentance for a mortal sin is possible during life.
If committing a mortal sin is making a definite choice and this doesn't logically preclude the ability to repent, this would mean that in the afterlife the damned are not granted the possibility to repent (either by active punishment by God or by 'desertion' in St. John of Damascus' view).

If, even in principle, the damned could repent, then why we can be sure that some will never repent? If repentance after death is a possibility, then we can't exclude the possibility that all will ultimately repent. Both eternal (self-)damnation of some and repentance of all are possible scenario and we can hope for everyone. This would mean that we can legitimately hope for everyone. So, to me, the view you are expressing here is not logically inconsistent with a hope of universal repentance.

On the other hand, if the damned can't repent, this would imply an infinite retributive punishment of sorts. And in this case, the main question of the thread would arise (how a human being can merit a punishment of unending suffering...)

I don't understand your argument. Are you saying that if the universalist doesn't evangelize someone then that person won't be saved in this life? Hasn't your whole point been that there is no reason to limit our actions to this life? If nothing changes at death then who cares whether they are saved in this life? — Leontiskos

I believe that among the universalists there is no consensus about inclusivism vs exclusivism, for instance. So, I would imagine that on this point there is no agreement.

What I said is that a universalist that believes that 'being evangelized' is a necessary condition to avoid post-mortem purification then the universalist has of course a very rational motive to evangelize.
But even this is not necessary to have a rational motive. An universalist might simply think that 'evangelizing' is a good thing to do, that it can help to avoid the temporary punishment both for him/herself and for others. There are plenty of rational motives that I can see.

Consider, for instance, a patient that suffers from a disease that causes to him suffering but doesn't lead to irreversible damage if left untreated. A doctor sees him and knows that a drug can help him to recover from the illness and to stop his suffering. I highly doubt that anyone can claim here the doctor has no rational motives to prescribe the medication.

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent. — Leontiskos

Note that even if the argument were true, this would not exclude the possibility of the redemption of all, if the damned can still repent.

Anyway, if the damned retain their rationality, if they are aware that they can only find peace in God, they would understand that repentance is the better, more rational option. I would say that there is a reason that might explain this apparent determinism and still affirm the necessity of a sincere repentance.

I'd say we are most concerned with the first question, and I am not yet convinced that either of you would be willing to answer that question in the affirmative. If we agree that the answer to (1) is 'no', then it's not at all clear what we are arguing about. — Leontiskos

It depends about what you mean by 'philosophically demonstrable'. I believe that here we are discussing if the traditional view of Hell is consistent with a proportional retributive model of justice. Also, we are discussing if the view that the damned are beyond hope after this life is consistent with a 'free-will defence' of the traditional view of Hell.

As I explained in my posts, I do have my own doubts that there is consistency in both cases.

Considering that Christianity isn't the only theistic religion, I also believe that the discussion we are having here has a wider scope than being a discussion about a specific doctrinal aspect of Christianity.

There's no mind at the JWST, yet it has a perspective that no human has, especially given its far wider range of light sensitivity than our paltry 3 frequencies. — noAxioms

Yes, but you are still thinking within a conceptual framework which has been devised to explain the phenomena of our perspective. For instance, can we truly speak of the JWST as a separate object from its environment? Maybe individuating the JWST as 'a thing' is a mental imputation.

Yes, any selection of units implies a relation to a standard. Physics seems to work without units, so unit selection would qualify as an abstraction. Charge is quantized, so the units there are arguably physical. — noAxioms

Note that my point is that physical quantities are defined in a relational way from the start.

Charge serves as a measure of how much a given charged object interacts with others. Hence, I am not really sure that it can be considered as an intrinsic property of a given object. The same is true for mass.
Both inertial mass and gravitational mass (which appear to be the same) are defined in a relational way. This seems to be the case for all physical quantities.
Hence, a 'particle' (or really any purely physical object) seems not to be understood 'in itself'. You need to consider 'something else' to understand it. And this might imply that the 'division' of the 'external world' into truly existing physical objects is conceptual, not 'real'.

Also think Heisenberg. — noAxioms

Also Boh'r 'indivisiblity of the quantum of action' (note that David Bohm admired the 'relational' aspect of Bohr's interpretation. In fact, when one looks at it, even in the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation relations are very important. Also, Bohm himself abandoned a too 'literal' approach of his own interpretation.).

Nothing beyond seems worded as a positive claim about a counterfactual: it being empty, as opposed to simply unmeasured. I don't approve of that wording. — noAxioms

I am not sure if I am following you, here.

Let's consider the Wigner's friend scenario, where the Friend makes an experiment in a lab which is locked from the outside. Wigner asks to his friend if he saw a definite result and the Friend says 'yes'. According to Wigner, the Friend and the physical system are in a superposition and knows that when he will enter the lab, the Friend will report the same result as he can observe.
Note that this a very weak 'intersubjective' agreement between the Friend and Wigner. When Wigner asks his Friend (who we assume is not a liar) which result he obtained, Wigner can check his claim and verify that, indeed, the result is the same. But all of this happens in Wigner's perspective. Wigner is not 'entilted' to go outside of it and ask himself what the Friend, in the Friend's perspective is seeing.
Assuming that the Friend also has his 'perspective', he would find out that Wigner agrees with him about the experimental result.
Still both of them do not actually know what the other truly observed. Only that, in their own perspective, there are no logical inconsistencies. For Wigner it is as if the Friend sees the same as he sees. But it cannot say what is truly seen by the Friend. This also means that under RQM (and, really, QBism and similar) Wigner can't even say that there are 'perspectives' other than his own with certainty.

Only positing something beyond the 'perspectives' can ground intersubjective agreement.

This implies that one cannot know what is 'beyond' one's perspective.

Y measures Mars, 20 minutes ago. While [the current state of the space where Mars should be, simultaneous with Y] is unmeasured, it does not imply that there's a reasonable probability that some subsequent measurement Z 30 minutes hence, that includes a measurement of Y, would find Mars to not be there. RQM has to support predictions in a way since predictability is something measurable. — noAxioms

As I see it, there is nothing in RQM (and, really, also in QBism and similar) that 'Mars in the perspective of Y' and 'Mars in the perspective of Z' are the same thing. Y will never find inconsistencies.

I personally have no problem with a pen state as something defining a perspective. — noAxioms

The problem with this IMO it is that we are 'anthropomorphizing' the pen. In our own perspective, of course, the conceptual frameworks we use to make sense of our experiences make sense. But how the world appears to a pen is something we have no possibility to know. Even assuming that it makes sense to attribute a perspective to a pen is questionable.

Regarding MWI, I see what you mean. And yes, I share (at least some of) @Wayfarer's qualms about it. To me the idea that at each interaction the universal wavefunction truly 'splits' into two or many 'branches' seems to weird to accept (all these 'branches' being 'worlds' or 'timelines'). Also, I am not sure if the 'preferred basis problem' (i.e. how to explain in MWI that the wavefunction can be decomposed in a way to explain the appearance of the 'classical world') has been solved and, also, it's not clear to me how the Born Rule is explained in this interpretation.

But, yes, in a way the first 'objection' is not perhaps 'scientific' but simply philosophical. I believe that I need more evidence to accept the picture of the world MWI gives us.

Still, I have to say that it is often mis-represented. Oddly enough, it is actually the closest physical theory to a 'ontological monism' that has been proposed (the universal wavefunction being only 'real thing' and subsystems being like appearances...a bit how the Substance and the modes relate in Spinoza's philosophy if you are familiar). Also, I find interesting MWI if it is taken as a way to speak about 'possible alternative histories', i.e. an useful way to reflect on the meaning of 'possibility' (but MWI claims that all possibilities are actual...).

Maybe. He didn't have Bell's proof, restricting what can be demanded of a satisfactory interpretation. He definitely expressed a preference for locality (relativity leans on it so hard) and determinism (the 'God does not roll dice' quip), but he probably didn't want to let go of his counterfactuals either, but you can't have your cake and eat it too. Einstein might not have known that. — noAxioms

Probably, yes.

I would say that said division is a conceptual construct. It being that does not make the world mind dependent, on the division into objects is so dependent. — noAxioms

If the division into physical objects is conceptual and doesn't reflect faithfully the structure of mind-independent world, how can we claim that we do have knowledge of the 'world beyond' our perspective?

No, talking about a weaker assumption, that it corresponds to something in the physical world, not that the concept is an accurate portrayal of the thing in itself. — noAxioms

But this still is based on some assumptions you make about the 'world in itself'. Assumptions that do not seem to be justified in light of scientific knowledge only.

I see no antinomy identified, no contradiction in this description. That there is a mind independent world, and a description of the nature of it (however poorly matching) seem not to be mutually contradictory. — noAxioms

How can you check that the description of the 'mind-independent world' actually matches its structure? It seems a reasonable inference, yes, but can we have compelling reasons to assert that there is this correspondence?

Looking fwd to it. Your answers have at least got me thinking and re-assessing. — noAxioms

Many thanks for this. I hope that this post didn't change your mind:yikes: I also find your anwers very useful

Thanks for the answer. I hope I'll be able to answer you back tomorrow.

What do you think it means to "fix one's end"? Or even to fix an end? Are you familiar with this language? — Leontiskos

To be fair, no. But I think that your example of the wedding made it clear. It is like making a oath. Am I wrong?

One could argue for annihilation from philosophy, but not, I think, from Scripture/theology. — Leontiskos

I see. But can philosophy and scripture/theology contradict each other? If, say, a given interpretation of a scriptural claim is found to be inconsistent with other important doctrines, can we still accept it?

Just to make an example. If one accepts that God doesn't punish people for the sins of something else, can we accept the notion of 'inherited guilt' (I am not going to make a biblical case for the premise, as we in a philosophical forum)? I would say that the latter notion is inconsistent with the former. Philosophy is also helpful to find out these kinds of things.

Again, if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition. That's why universalists like Hart try to prove such a thing. — Leontiskos

Ok.

What you say is of course true, and there is no incompatibility here. The doctrine of Hell does not entail that everyone goes to Hell. You require a much stronger thesis, namely, "One cannot have the will to sin everlastingly." — Leontiskos

But there is a problem, here, I believe. You still have to explain why there is absolutely no hope of break the fixation of the will in sin. I might concede that logically it might be possible for someone to everastingly confirm the choice to sin. But here in this life, it is assumed that we can repent.

If someone makes an oath to be faithful 'as long as he lives' to a terrorist group, he might still break that oath even if when he made the oath he was convinced of the cause. Of course, he might not and we can imagine that the more time he remains faithful to this commitment, the more difficult is for him to renounce it. But he can still change his mind (i.e. repent) at any time and hopefully he does.

So the mere possibility to orient one's view in sin doesn't necessarily imply that the orientation is irrevocable. But if I am not mistaken, it is assumed that at a certain point, this orientation becomes irrevocable.

At most it seems that you are claiming that 'everlasting fixation of the will in sin' is a possibility. But, unless, one is not allowed to repent, then repentance is also a possibility.

If you don't think we have the power to be faithful to oaths then you presumably don't believe we have the power to make oaths, just as the person who does not believe that a couple has the power to be faithful to their marriage vows does not believe in marriage. This goes back to my point that some don't think humans are capable of much (e.g. oaths, vows, eternal consequences, etc.). — Leontiskos

I assumed that it is normal to say, in Christianity, that we 'by ourselves' cannot be morally impeccable, at least without the help of God.

In the case of marriage, I don't see how 'making a sincere oath' necessary implies the ability to remain always faithful to the oath (in fact one can ask God's help to remain faithful precisely because of this). It certainly expresses the sincere intention to respect the oath, but failing to mantiain is also a possibility.
I didn't know that this is controvarsial thing to say.

In general, I don't think that an ability to make a oath implies an ability to remain faithful of it.

I don't see a problem with any of this. I think what you are saying is, "Salvation couldn't possibly depend on human choices," and the Judeo-Christian tradition just disagrees with you on that. — Leontiskos

Sorry, but I think you misunderstood the point I was making. Let me try to explain it again. Let's assume that God desires the salvation of each human being.

Let's assume that 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation. Let's say that a given person fails to be evangelized because those who could evangelize him or her for some reason could not. Then, this 'missed evangelization' would be a decisive factor in the eternal destiny of the person we are considering, even if he or she did nothing to avoid being evagelized. So, this 'missed evangelization' is the product of external circumstances out of control of him or her. But if 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation, here we have a person that lost salvation becuase of something that could not control, outside his or her power of choice.

So, if 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation, it would follow that the salvation of a given person can depend on the choices of others, their abilities or even on circumstances that no one can control. Here it seems that we have a case that one can miss salvation due to factors outside one's choices.

Waht do you think about this? Note that even a proponent of a 'free will defence of hell' (of any kind really) would not accept that one can lose salvation for factors different from one's choices. That's why I believe that this is a problem to at least some 'traditionalist'.

If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. — Leontiskos

But universalists still might say that repentance is needed for salvation. One might say that conversion is needed either in this life or after death and being evangelized might be necessary to being able to convert in this life. Not sure why you are insisting that the belief that everyone will be ultimately be saved implies that one can't find rational motives for evangelization, especially if one believes that it is a necessary condition to be saved in this life (I don't believe that all universalist agree on this point, but even if one doesn't believe that being evangelized is a necessary condition for being saved in this life, I would still say that there are rational motives to evangelize...).

In fact it seems downright sinful to mislead someone in that manner, namely to try to persuade them—via an omission—to labor for something that requires no labor. — Leontiskos

Again, not sure how this follows. See the paragraph above. If one still believes that repentance is necessary, them 'it's not something that requires no labor'.

Anyway, I agree with you the pastoral argument is the strongest one. But maybe it is not fatal for universalists.

For me, i think one might be able to say that even though we view the universe from different perspectives, they arguably all procure information about the world that is still mind-independent. If I view a tree from one angle then another, then through a microscope or through infrared goggles, through the echolocation of a bat, through the chemoreception of an insect on the bark; all of these perspectives produce information that maps onto the world consistently due to the way the external world is. It just happens there is a plurality of ways one can engage with the world and extract consistent information about it. — Apustimelogist

I see what you mean, but IMO isn't enough to reject what I am saying.

Consider, say, a chair. A chair certainly appears to us to be a distinct individual phyiscal object. I can look at it from various angles, I can measure its geometrical properties and so on. Those views and measurements are certainly compatible with my mental construct of the chair as a unified object.
Of course, it can be broken and we know that the chair is, in fact, a composite object and as we study it more deeply we do find that its boundaries are not even well-defined and so on. Furthermore, its properties can be explained by studying the properties of its parts and their interactions.
On analysis, the 'chair' seems to be a 'weakly emergent' feature. Labeling it as a chair and considering it as a 'unified thing' seems to be a cognitive mistake. In an important sense, the chair's existence is imputed, a mental construct (note, I am not denying that I can feel pain if my toe hits it...).

This is to say that having a consistent map of different views doesn't necessarily imply that the objects in which we divide reality are 'truly there'.

Again, the importance of some behavior is a projection of your mind and some goal you have — Harry Hindu

Perhaps, but it's one of the cases that the difference is actually relevant.

How is a human more than its parts? Is not a human an emergent feature of its organs and how they work together? Is not a society and culture an emergent feature of a large group of humans and their interactions? You're not making any real distinction between these things — Harry Hindu

Unless you can conclusively show that you can explain consciousness in virtue of the physical parts of our brain in a way that is analogous to how we explain, for instance, the liquid state in terms of how particles move, interact and so on, yes, I believe that there is a difference here.

Regarding human society, I actually believe it is more like the 'weak emergence' of the states of matter (for example).

It seems to me that the ability to strive for self-preservation is an emergent property of the entity's parts. — Harry Hindu

The point is that the hurricane, as far as we know, doesn't strive for self-preservation as a living being does. The way that living beings behave are suggestive of some degree of 'intentionality'. I am not claiming that bacteria are conscious but maybe do have intentionality in some rudimentary forms.

In the current philosophical jargon, I believe that hurricanes, chairs etc are 'weakly emergent'. To me being 'weakly emergent' means that they are actually more like features rather than entities. On the other hand, the degree of differentiation that a human being or even a bacteria has suggests to me that they are not 'features' (yes, I know that this is a controversial claim, but seriously I don't think one can reduce biology to the 'hard sciences').

Where is the "private experience" relative to the the living being itself as seen from the "outside"? — Harry Hindu

This question is IMO problematic. Private experience is an undeniable fact and since it is private it is to be expected that is not 'seen' from the outiside (one can infer, for instance, that someone is in pain by observing the behavior, but it is an inference we can make because we ourselves are conscious or we suspect that that person is conscious). Also, I am not sure how qualitative experience can be explained in purely physical terms. The properties we encounter in physics do not seem remotely like what we know about our conscious experience.

The distinctions are not illusory, they are either relevant or not depending on its integration with goals. The distinctions are there, whether we observe them or not, but which ones are relevant (the ones we focus our attention on) at any given moment is dependent upon the goal. — Harry Hindu

They might no be 'illusory' in the sense that can be discerned by a mind. But these distinctions can still be called 'illusory' because they do not exist in the way they appear to exist, i.e. as separately existing entities. A chair is a mental construct ultimately. This doesn't mean that if I hit its leg with my toe I don't feel pain, of course. But the 'chair' is not an entity - as an 'individual object' seems to exist only as a mental imputation.

(I was just writing this post...so I include it as an aswer to your question)

In general, I think that it should be noted that I don't think here anybody is questioning the existence of a mind-independent reality. The issue here is if we can describe something that is completely independent of our cognitive perspective with concepts, models and so on that were made to understand our experience ('our' in both the individual and in the collective sense).

That's why I keep asking about if, say, a hurricane, a chair etc is really a true physical object, i.e. a separately existing entity that truly is a part of a 'mind-independent physical world'. If these things are more like emergent features rather than objects, this would mean that the division of the 'world' into them is more like a conceptual construct that should not be taken literally. Assuming that it actually 'corresponds' to 'how the physical world' is 'in itself' is a strong assumption - a very useful one but it is questionable. It's very useful to us to make distinctions, divide the world in distinct entities and then assume that is 'truly so' but epistemically it isn't truly justified, I believe.

It's seems obvious to me that this 'assumption' or 'move' is something that is not obvious.

On the other hand, also assuming that we have no access to a mind-independent world seems wrong. After all, what grounds the intersubjective agreement if there is nothing outside our perspectives that is 'somehow' connected to the world as-experienced-by-us?

So, maybe, we are encountering an antinomy here: on the one hand, positing a mind-independent world seems necessary to make sense of our experineces. On the other hand, however, there is no epistemic guarantee that our cognitive faculties can step outside from our perspective and give us a non-mediated knowledge of the mind-independent world. So, it seems that we are stuck in an antinomy here.

So, I guess that the question is: can we really assume that we can make a description of a mind-independent world when we are 'inside' our own perspective and it is not obvious we can really step outside of it?

Ah ok, I think I see. But there are alternative realistic interpretations other than MWI (I doubt that any of them would satisfy Einstein, however)

Let me ask you, if MWI is the solution, then what is the problem? — Wayfarer

Well, I believe that the point made here is that in MWI there is only one physical object which evolves deterministically. In a sense no interpretation of QM enjoys a similar simplicity at least here.

I believe that MWI has its own problems, though. For instance, one can well argue that yes the above simplicity is true, but at the same time the universal wavefunction is an extremely complex object and most of its 'structure' is completely inaccessible to us. The same goes for the incredible number of versions of 'us' that are of course inaccessible. To me this erases the 'simplicity' of MWI but I do understand why others may see the theory as simple. I do disagree with them, though.

Most of this discussion is getting off topic, going on about frame dependency instead of mind-dependency of ontology. — noAxioms

Sorry, that wasn't my intention but I realize that I took the discussion too far. However, I do believe that discussing about 'what is perspective-dependent' and 'what isn't perspective-dependent' can be useful to the main topic of the discussion. The reason being that I actually don't believe it is meaningful to assign a perspective outside the mind. I won't answer to all your points in order to not go too off-topic.

As a starting point, consider how we define and conceptualize physical quantities. Even those which seem an intrinsic property of a physical object is defined in relational terms. Inertial mass, for instance, is defined as a measure of the resistence to be accelerated. Electric charge is a measure of how an object 'contributes' to an electrical interaction and so on. Certainly, you can make all these definitions more subtle. But IMO the point remains. All physical quantities are measurable and this means that they are about how a physical object interacts with other physical objects.

If the above is true, then, this means that all physical quantities are relational, defined in a particular context and, ultimately, are not properties of only the given physical object. In a sense they are properties of the context in which the object is found, interacts and so on (I believe that one of the merits of RQM is actually to point this out in a very explicit way...). Change the measurement context and you change the description (I think I am in full agreement with RQM here...).

But now, consider. We have said that physical quantities are defined when a determinate context is specified. This means that they are perspectival. RQM asserts that any physical object defines a 'perspective', a context in which it is meaningful to make a description of 'the physical world' according to its perspective. And it also asserts that, after all, there is nothing beyond these 'perspectives'. I find both claims problematic TBH.

The second one implies that we can actually 'go outside' the perspectives, and 'check', so to speak, that there is nothing beyond. This would IMO contradict what RQM actually says. Denying something implies that it would be possible to affirm that thing. So, if according to RQM we have to define a perspective to make a description, we can't go 'outside' of it. RQM should be silent on what can or can't be beyond the perspectives (or even asking the question...). MWI hasn't this problem because it explicitly says that the universal wavefunction is what is beyond 'perspectives' from the start (it has its own problems IMO other than the explosion of perspectives, but let's not diverge...).

Regarding the first problem. Note two things here. I concur with Bohr that our physical concepts are way we try to describe our own experience. And, furthermore, while have direct access to our own 'mental' perspective, we can't have the same access to the perspective of, say, a pen or a proton (assuming that they have one). Furthermore, if physical concepts, physical quantities are actually concepts that we have introduced to order our own experience (i.e. our 'perspectival world'), there is no guarantee that they are valid outside our experience.

To make clearer what I am saying here. Consider a hurricane. It certainly seems a separately existing entity. But, in fact, it's more like an emergent feature, completely reducible to its parts. We might certainly say that 'the hurricane is moving from east to west at 15 knots' but in an important sense this is a useful way of describing our experience.
Is the hurricane a real 'object' or the 'hurricane' is more like a construct (or a 'model', if you like) that we use to make sense of what we are observing.

The division of the world in discrete physical objects, the assignment of physical quantities to those objects and so on seems to me something valid to order our cognitive experience. But it's not necessarily something we can safely assume that is valid outside of our cognitive perspective. So when, say, RQM claims that we can speak maningfully of the 'state of a physical system with respect to a pen' I don't think that it is a straightforward move.

I think they do capture mind-independent information though. When you see red, it is generally related to actual structure in the world that is being communicated to. Same with sound or smell, albeit there is probably a lot of nuance. And if toy think about it, all I see is color, or "shades" so in some ways I think color an't be any more remarkable subjectivity-wise than anything else we see. Its more difficult to articulate a deacription about color though, which I think may be part of why it often gets special attention philosophically as a kind of paradigmatic example of qualia. — Apustimelogist

Yes, 'qualia' might well be about mind-dependent objects but they are certainly not mind-independent objects.

Anyway, there is still the second sense of 'mind-dependence' which we are discussing here. In your example, are we to consider the toy as a distinct entity? Or is it an emergent feature which appears to be an entity on its own?

If it's just an emergent feature, completely understandable in terms of its parts and its interactions, separating the 'toy' from 'what is not toy' is a convenient fabrication of the mind. After all, it this is true, why positing a 'toy' at all? Ultimately, there is no 'toy'.
So, in a sense, objects can be as 'subjective' as 'qualia' are and in a sense, they are qualia.

Every thing behaves differently than other things. This does not make living beings special. We are merely talking about degrees of complexity, or causes, of some behavior of some thing. There is an "inner" and "outer" to everything. Open an box to see what is inside. Peel an orange to get at what is inside. Open a skull, and well you get at what is inside - a brain, not a mind. It would seem to me that you, as a living being, would subjectively think of yourself as special, which is a projection of your self-preservation. — Harry Hindu

I disagree. Yes, things behave differently. But how they behave is important.

A washing-machine certainly has a behavior different from a car. But neither of them seem to me to be 'more' than their parts, at least when you consider the interactions.
A hurricane is certainly an impressive feature that is 'identifiable' for various days, can cause a lot of damage and so on. But it's an emergent feature in the atmosphere.

Striving (with awareness of not) for self-preservation implies that there is a meaningful distinction between the 'living being' and 'what is different from it' and that the living being behaves like a separate entity from the outside in a way that a hurricane doesn't.
To me living beings are the best candidates to be individual entities. They are certainly composite objects but their overall behavior suggest to me that they are 'more than the sum of their parts'.

Living and especially conscious beings do not seem to be reducible to their components in a way that other emergent phenomena are. With conscious beings you also have the fact that each conscious being has its own private experience, which strongly suggest that there is a real difference between 'it' and 'everything else'.
In both cases, they do not seem to be 'weakly emergent', to use the usual philosophical jargon.

This seems to coincide exactly with what I am saying. Any individual entity or system it is part of is dependent upon arbitrary goals in the mind. One simply changes one's view by either looking through a telescope or microscope, or by changing one's position relative to the object being talking about. When on the surface of the Earth, you are part of it. You are part of the environment of the Earth and actively participate in it. Move yourself out into space and the Earth becomes an individual entity because you cannot perceive all the small parts and processes happening. They are all merged together into an individual entity, but only if you ignore that the Earth is itself influenced by the Sun and the Moon. The question is, which view is relevant to the current goal in your mind? — Harry Hindu

But if this is true then I do not see any solution outside an ontological monism in the sense that there is one real entity and distinctions are ultimately illusory or that there is no 'entity' at all (there are only appearances of beings, distinctions etc but ultimately, there are entities). In both cases, all distinctions are cognitive illusions.

While I can concede that this might be true for non-living objects, I think that living beings are not completely reducible to their components.

Right.

Very nice joke! :lol:

Mind-independence’ has two levels of meaning. In one sense, of course the world is independent of your or my mind — there are countless things that exist and events that happen regardless of whether anyone perceives or knows them. That’s the empirical, common-sense perspective. — Wayfarer

Well, I believe that some properties we assign to 'external objects' are not mind-independent even in this sense. I am thinking about colours, sounds, smells etc in the way we percieve them.

But in another, deeper sense the very idea of a mind-independent world is something the mind itself constructs. — Wayfarer

Yep! Aye, there's the rub...

We tend to think that the 'physical world' is divided into discrete, separately existent physical objects. But how we 'carve' the world and divide it into separate objects does seem to be at least in part a mental construct.

A chair is of course an individual object... except that when you think more deeply it's not clear that it should be considered that. It is certainly a composite object which seems to be reducible to its parts. In that case, does it make sense to consider it as a 'entity'? Furthermore, when one takes into account, for instance, the fact that it is composed of atoms and so on, the 'boundaries' between the chair and 'what isn't a chair' become fuzzier and fuzzier.
I believe that a chair is more like an emergent pattern, an emergent feature. It's a bit like a whirpool in a current of water or a vortex in the air. Their status as 'entities' is questionable. There is an appearance of a separately existent entity, but not a true entity.

Our minds certainly pre-reflexively seem to percieve discrete objects even when there aren't. It certainly helps us to navigate in an otherwise chaotic world, but we shouldn't take everything literally.

But what about living beings? In this case, it would seem that they are, indeed, individual entities. After all, as I said in another post, they behave as wholes, they strive for self-preservation etc. So, maybe, in their cases their 'distinctivness' isn't a perceptual, but convenient mistake.

And yet, we can never know what that world is in itself, only how it appears under the conditions of our sensibility and understanding. So paradoxically, even the idea of ‘what is independent of mind’ is an idea we arrive at only through thinking about it. That's why he makes the paradoxical remark, 'take away the thinking subject, and the whole world must vanish'. — Wayfarer

I do see this more as an aporia. How we can establish what is 'mind-dependent' from what is 'mind-independent' in the more 'deep' sense, if our knowledge is of course given by a particular cognitive perspective?

Furthermore, when I asked to noAxioms "how does your house look irrespective of any perspective?" that question was a way to ponder about the possibility to make descriptions independent for any perspective ? (although in that post 'perspective' had a different meaning that in this post, I believe the question is pertinent)


BTW, Good Easter to everybody.

Good point. The problem though is why are living beings distinct entities but rocks and chairs are not. If perceive living beings the same way I perceive rocks and chairs then why make a special case for living beings? — Harry Hindu

Living beings, even the simplest ones, behave quite differently from non-living things. They demarcate the 'outer' and the 'inner' space, they have a metabolism, they strive for self-preservation and so on.
So, I would say that in their case, it seems reasonable to assert that they are distinct entities (instead of, say, distinct patterns, emergent features or whatever).

I think that the boundaries are defined based on our goals. It is useful to distinguish humans from other animals and inanimate objects. It is sometimes useful to distinguish individual objects or group them together. Which cause or which effect one focuses on is dependent upon the goal, or intent, in the mind. — Harry Hindu

Is this true in all cases, though? I don't think so. In the case of living beings as I said before, it seems that we can treat them as individual entities.

In the case of a chair, we can of course distinguish it from a table. But maybe they aren't distinct entities as much distinct emergent features that appear to be distinct entities. But is this true for all non-living things (at least if they are composite)? I'm not sure. But I do believe that it is more difficult for inanimate objects to have a level of differentiation from the environment to be considered separately existing things.

Anyway, as an aside, probably the main reason why Albert Einstein was dissatisfied by QM (even by the realistic non-local interpetations like de Broglie-Bohm interpretation) is that the non-locality in QM to him meant that the division of the world into sub-systems (i.e. distinct physical objects) become arbitrary. In a 1948 letter to Born he said:

I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold on to physical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the basic foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not among them; the field, in the Faraday/Maxwell sense, might be, but not with certainty. But that which we conceive as existing (’actual’) should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B. If a physical system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is present in B should somehow have an existence independent of what is present in A. What is actually present in B should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried out in the part of space, A; it should also be independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is made in A.

If one adheres to this program, then one can hardly view the quantum-theoretical description as a complete representation of the physically real. If one attempts, nevertheless, so to view it, then one must assume that the physically real in B undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in A. My physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.

However, if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to by a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts. (Born 1969, 223–224; Howard’s translation)

(source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/)

That is spatiotemporal separation could not anymore be taken as a way to 'carve' the world into separate objects (maybe, ironically, he took the idea by the 'idealist' Schopenhauer who called the principle 'principium individuationis'). I sympathize with him. At least in the case of non-living things, it seems to me that spatiotemporal separation would be a reasonable way to distinguish a thing from another.

Given an interpretation with collapse upon measurement, yes. QM theory doesn't say anything about it, and some interpretations don't require any measurement, such as ensemble interpretation. — noAxioms

Ok for the ensemble. And yes, many interpretations do not involve collapse. I had to be more precise. Anyway, I would say that 'standard QM' has collapse but it is completely silent on how to interpret it.

Agree and disagree. Sure, lots of perspectives, and I don't mean just hundreds. RQM says 'real' is a relation to any one perspective event, none of which is itself real. That makes a lot of sense to me. MWI says there is but the one closed wave function, and it is real, not in relation to anything. That's a lot of real perspectives (more than just the infinite perspectives of the Newtonian world where there is no bound to the number of places/events from which an observation can be made. — noAxioms

The problem I see in RQM is that it doesn't seem to have a 'unifying' ground for these perspectives. Each physical object defines its own perspective and there is nothing in the theory that is assumed to be beyond that. To say that there is nothing outside these perspectives is, in fact, inconsistent with the RQM claim that the world can be described only by assuming a certain perpsective. In other words, one of my problem with RQM is that it seems to make a claim that goes against its own epistemology.

Regarding MWI, it is in fact more consistent on this than RQM IMO. There is the universal wavefunction which is the unifying element (and in a sense the only real 'physical entity').

That's because some have tried to rewrite it as an ontic interpretation from its roots as an epistemic one. So I urged going with the epistemic roots and not what came later. All of science, and the theory itself, can be expressed as what we can know and predict, and to hell with how it actually works under the covers. — noAxioms

I think that Heisenberg himself actually had an ontic interpretation of Copenaghen. At least, he talks a lot about interpreting the collapse as a way to actualize potentialities. And yes the act of observation 'actualizes' these potentialities. Not sure how this isn't a causal explanation of the collapse and how can it be interpreted epistemically. Bohr was more careful. I guess that 'Copenaghen' was a quite diverse field of interpetations even in the earliest days (which is of course normal).
Not that I am against metaphysics tout court, but it goes beyond what QM says.

Maybe it's just showing us that our intuitions are what's being shown to be stranger and stranger. How it really works has no obligation to be something we're comfortable with. — noAxioms

I don't disagree with that. It might well be that our intuitions are completely wrong. In fact, I find the 'trend' of physical theories as becoming 'more and more counter-intuitive' as fascinating: that is the physical reality looks more and more mysterious. While this can be frustrating, it is also awe-inspiring for me.

I have developed a quite 'pragmatic' or even 'phenomenological' view of physical theories, where I think that interpreting them as attempts to make a 'literal description' of 'how the world is' can be a problem. I tend to think that they are first and foremost very powerful tools for predicting observations and describing the regularities in phenomena (and also incredibly useful for practical applications). 'How the world is beyond the curtain' is probably something that physics cannot 'reveal' to us. It's a reason for awe to me as I said before: even physical reality is 'richer', in a sense, than what we can imagine.

Careful. A reference frame is just a coordinate system, an abstraction, and requires neither any object nor observer to be stationary in it in order to be valid. No coordinate system foliates all of spacetime (it can under Newtonian), so any theory that posits an frame that is physical (and not just abstract) necessarily must choose which parts of spacetime are not part of the universe at all. — noAxioms

I had newtonian mechanics in mind. But IMO even in relativity a similar point can be made IMO. The entire spacetime cannot be foliated in a unique way. But still, the world we see with its frame-dependent values of physical quantities is perspectival, frame-dependent, yes?

And I am not sure that reference frames are 'just' coordinate systems. For instance, it can be a way of trying to describe "how the world would look like to an observer in such and such situation". They can also have a clear practical, phenomenological meaning (although I believe that some coordinate systems in relativity can't be interpreted in this way).

No. The experience of any observer is not dependent on an abstraction, and is identical from frame to frame, even under non-relativistic theories. These different frames only cause different calculations of coordinates to be made. — noAxioms

Yes and no. To make a trivial example. Let's say that Alice is in a train that moves at constant velocity and Bob sees her from the station. The velocities that are relative to the 'reference frame at rest with the train' are actually the velocities that Alice would observe. With respect to the station, velocities are different from the ones that those observed by Alice. Yes, you can calculate them even from the station's reference frame, but to me the reference frames here have also a clear phenomenological interpretation.

Don't get you. You mean why does my house look different from the back than it does from the front? Should it not? — noAxioms

No, that's not my point. My point is more like asking: how your house look irrespective of any perspective?

If I may enter in this debate about rocks, there is also the problem of how to define a 'physical object'.

Yes, one can distinguish a rock from a chicken, but how can one assert that the rock is an 'individual entity'?

With living beings, I suppose that one can consider them as distinct entities, but with inanimate composite objects the distinction seems more difficult to make. So, in a sense, no, the rock isn't an idea. But in an important sense, I would say that it probably is an idea, indeed. The way we 'carve' the world into physical objects seems to be in part mind-dependent.

Is a chair an unique entity? Are the parts of the chair distinct entities from the chair? Or is the identification of the chair or its parts as different 'things' a mind-dependent construct?

I am not sure how this is supposed to correspond to "every knee bowing," "all praising God," and "God being all in all," though. It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. Whereas visions that involve more extrinsic punishment have knees bowing and lips praising, but only through coercion not sincerity. I suppose God might be "all in all" here, but God is beatitude in some and torment in others (sort of what Pope Benedict says). The difficulty here is that this direct contact with God, experienced as torment, seems incapable of improving the sinner. Hence there is this weird thing where contact with a mortal evangelist might reform man right up to the moment of death, but eternal (painful) union with God Himself is insufficient to ever bring about such change. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed, it seems implausible. But, of course, those who insist in the non-universalistic readings of those passages mention that there are other passages in St Paul's epistles which affirm that some categories of sinners will not enter in God's Kingdom (if we want to restrict ourselves to St Paul's writings, where most apparently universalist statements are to be found). Of course, these can be read as not implying that they will never enter in the Kingdom, but such a reading is already a harmonization.
That's why I don't think one can rely only on exegesis in these kind of discussions.

I do believe, however, that maybe the point you made about equivocation leads to the strongest arguments that one can make regarding this kind of discussions (and one can also support it with various scriptural passages, I think). To make just an example, if one says that any kind of acceptable meaning of 'justice' involves the fact that people cannot be punished due to other people faults, then St Augustine's position of the 'massa damnata', where everyone inherits guilt, is automatically ruled out as a correct description of how divine justice operates. Also, if one says that a 'just judge' must also take into account the capacities of the transgressors when deciding the punishments, then St Anselm's view that any sin is justly punished with an unending punishment is also automatically ruled out or seriously modified (for instance, the current Catholic Catechism explicitly says that in order for a sin to be mortal one has to commit it with sufficient intent and awareness).

Of course, if one insists that divine justice can punish people for the sins of their ancestors and we have no right to question that idea, then any discussion becomes impossible.

Maybe, although Lewis' vision doesn't seem inconsistent. His damned spread out in space more and more over time, moving further and further from others as they become folded more inwards and become more spiteful towards all others. Hell is in some ways an education in vice (although some do leave it, and all are free to leave it). People sit around moping all day in a world much like ours.
... — Count Timothy von Icarus

interesting, thanks. The point you make about the ever expanding space is very good (and BTW yes Poincare's recurrence argument is valid for finite, closed systems). But IMHO it doesn't preclude the possibility of post-mortem salvation. So, my point that nobody is ever 'beyond hope' I think remains valid.

Regarding, Talbott, yes, I would suppose so. But I don't think that defenders of free-will models of hell would find it convincing. Still, if they are consistent they must leave open the possibility of post-mortem salvation. I didn't know that Lewis allowed that possibility for some of the damned.

That seems fair to me, since I have never seen a good argument for why the will must necessarily be fixed in this way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Same. At the end of the day, most supporters of the traditional view of hell have adopted a retributivist model of some sort where eternal punishment is deserved.

I mentioned Dante avoiding the problem of repetent sinners earlier because he does have souls in Hell (Limbo) who do seem to have repented and live in "hopelessness" despite this. His ultimate vision is somewhat unclear though, because he ultimately makes appeals to divine justice being unknowable, even to the beatified (a voluntarist problem perhaps), but provocatively includes some Pagans in Purgatory and Paradise. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for that. Despite being an Italian I never read the whole Comedy, only some famous excerpts (I have some difficulties to read poetry, actually).

Regarding the first kind of souls, after all, if one accepts a form of unending torment as a deserved punishment, post-mortem repentace can be irrelevant. If after repentance one is still being punished, one can argue that the punishment is still just.
Of course, if God gives mercy to the repentant and delivers them from the deserved punishment, but the punishment is deserved, so God could refrain to do that and remain just. Of course, if God's mercy requires to deliver the repentant sinners and God's justice requires to punish them eternally, then one has a conflict between God's mercy and God's justice. So, I suppose the 'simplest' way to resolve this problem is to say that the damned can't repent after death.

On the other hand, if one doesn't accept that unending pain can be a deserved punishment for human beings, then things change (IMO the contention about the possibility for humans to justly deserve a punishment of an infinite amount of suffering is the central one in this debate).

Regarding, Dante's choice to include Pagans in Purgatory and Paradise. It's very interesting indeed.