This part makes sense. :up: — praxis

:up:

This is IMO central. If it isn't just an intellectual understanding, motivations behind why one practices become relevant. Indeed, the goal we set to ourselves when we do something conditions the way we do a determinate action.

While I believe that nothing prevents a practitioner to practice even if they don't believe in rebirth, Nirvana and so on, it is still relevant that you have an immense amount of witnesses in the Buddhist traditions that tells you, instead, that believing in rebirth is something central. So, perhaps, they are right. Maybe don't, but you should have good arguments to show that someone that doesn't have the same motivations can get to the same state.

I'm not disappointed at all. Many people have beliefs of this kind that I do not share. You, in your turn, may be disappointed to learn that I have never been able to sign up to any doctrine of this kind - mostly because I find it too hard to make sense of them. For purposes of classification, I call myself an agnostic. I think we can co-exist. — Ludwig V

I was joking but it seemed to me that your use of adverbs like 'clearly' meant that it was impossible for you that I could be a panentheist :smile:

I don't understand what you are asking for. — Ludwig V

Consider this analogy. Alice every time that plays a lottery, wins. Let's say that this reapeats for 10 times.

Our instinct is: it can't be "just a coincidence". We want an explanation of "what is really going on". Perhaps, we discover that the lottery system is rigged in her favour, with or without her knowledge. And then we discover how it is rigged and we can make an explanation of why she is winning.
However, someone else might just say: "well, it is unlikely but it isn't impossible. The game works as it should, Alice is just very, very, very lucky.".

So, here's the point. If, for instance, the mathematical structure of our physica models doesn't 'reflect' an intelligible structure of the "physical world as it is", our success becomes difficult to explain. We might just be lucky: there is no intelligible structure but somehow we manage to make models that work. Or there is an intelligible structure which is 'reflected' (albeit imperfectly) into our models that allows us to make successful predictions.

"The physical world seems intelligible" means, to me, that we can understand the physical world. You use the word "seems" which suggests that you think that might not be the case. I agree that we do not understand it completely. Is that what you mean? I can't see what it might mean to say that our partial understanding is an complete illusion, as opposed to partly wrong. — Ludwig V

I agree with you here. However, notice that we have no 'guarantee', i.e. no 'absolute certainty', that we understand the world, even imperfectly.

However, if you agree with me and there is an intelligible structure in the physical world, things get interesting.

Conscious beings evolved in the physical world, and evolved the means for understanding that world. If those means had failed to understand the physical world, our species would likely have died out long ago. No? — Ludwig V

Yes, but why should a 'mindless world' be intelligible at all? If conscious beings - and even more rational beings - are completely accidental product of 'blind' processes of a 'mindless world', why would such a world have a structure that can be truly (even if imperfectly) understood by them?

Again, you seem to be afraid of crossing the Enlightenment line between Science and Religion. But Philosophy is similar to Religion only in its focus on the non-physical (mental, spiritual) aspects of the world. Philosophy has no Bible and no Pope. So each thinker can be a rogue priest. My childhood religion was antithetical to Catholicism, in that it downplayed rituals & miracles, and focused on reasonable verifiable beliefs. I still retain some of that skeptical rational attitude, even though I no longer congregate with those of "like precious faith". In fact, Faith is a four-letter word for me. — Gnomon

Not sure why you would say this. I am neither against religion nor philosophy. What I want to point out is to be careful to 'mix' them with science.

ut if I "go beyond" the bounds of materialistic Physics, my direction is influenced mainly by astro-physicists (cosmologist), such as Paul Davies, and Quantum physicists, such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Max Planck. — Gnomon

Sure none of them seemed to hold a 'materialist' view of things. However, someone like Schrödinger who was very explicit in his endorsement of a quasi-Advaita Vedanta metaphysics, never said that quantum mechanics suggested that. Rather, he interpreted all physical theories as statistical theories.
One can think that modern physics doesn't support necessarily 'non-physicalist' views and still have reason to support them.

Regarding quantum mechanics, in particular, there are many interpretations. So using it as 'proof' of any kind of metaphysical view is IMO problematic. At least, one should aknowledge that it is one's own interpretation and not what the 'theory' says.

Of course, the primitive philosophers 1500 years ago, did not have the detailed scientific knowledge of the 21st century. So, their concepts were more general & visionary than our modern technical details. — Gnomon

Or perhaps they are still right because they didn't refer to what we now refer when we speak about of 'energy' or 'momentum'.

Speaking of "physical" can you define Dynamics, Energy, and Potential in material terms --- without using abstract philosophical notions such as "capacity", "ability", "causal" & "essence"? What is Energy made of? Where can I find Potential in the real world? :wink: — Gnomon

Yes, you can. For instance, classical mechanics can be done without saying that 'forces' are real. Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches are a way to do that. In other words, it might sound strange but it is actually common since the 19th century to treat physical quantities as 'useful fictions', so to speak, rather than properties of the 'world out there'.

Another example is QM itself. If you take literally the basic theory of QM and interpret the wavefunction as a physical entity, you end up endorsing a lot of bizzarre claim. In fact, most supporters of a 'Copenaghen' interpretation nowadays think that the wavefunction is simply a way to encode the information we have about a physical system. Its 'collapse' is an update of knowledge. This avoids being forced to say that a particle is in two mutually contradictory states.

Again, you seem "careful" to draw a hard line between Physics and Philosophy. But, especially since the quantum revolution, Physics was forced, by the Uncertainty Principle and the indeterminacy of quantum phenomena, to resort to philosophical reasoning for descriptions & interpretations of the real world's ideal foundation*4. Physics is no longer purely mechanical, nor purely philosophical, but a complex adaptive system of both. :cool: — Gnomon

I sort of agree with that. I would, however, say that the 'revolutions' in 20th century physics made us more aware that we should be careful to be 'literalist' about our scientific theories.

To make an example, classical Newtonian mechanics has been 'proven wrong' only if it is interpreted as an ontological description of the world. If you interpret it as a predictive model it is in fact pretty good.

It's a bit contorted argument, so I'll try. Basically, the point is that while a person might intellectually accept the idea that "the self is an illusion", if such a person also believes that this is the only life, at a deeper level they IMO have more difficulty to develop non-attachment to this life. If this life is unique it seems to me that it is more likely that one might regard it as 'special' and if it is regarded as 'special' it is clear to me that this involves a concept of 'mine'. So, at a deeper level, the person still engages with the world with a convinction that there is a self and the the experience is 'theirs'. — boundless

I wanted to add this. Contrast the above situation to the scenario that is true if rebirth happens.

If one's 'succession of lives' spans so many different 'states of being' and one truly believes that, it is easier to think that one becomes less attached to the contingent circumstances he or she finds themselves in. There is nothing 'special' about any of them and it becomes easier to lose attachment to them. However, if one is convinced that there is only 'this life', then 'this life' becomes much, much more important. It isn't just an instance of an incredibly long succession of successive lives none of which is more 'important' than the other because, in samsara, none of those state is blissful and unending and none of them defines your identity more than any other. Rather it is the only life one thinks he or she has. Being the only life one has such a lifetime tends to be regarded very important for the person and much more apt to define one's identity.

In summary, it seems to me that it is much easier to let go of attachment to one's life if one is convinced that it is just an instance of a very, very long of succession of lives, none of which is of particular importance. Instead, if this lifetime is unique, it is clearly more likely to see it as 'special' and 'importan' and develop attachment to it.

Have you ever looked at the concept of Energy from a philosophical perspective? You ought to try it sometimes. It might broaden your understanding of Philosophy itself. — Gnomon

Yes, but I'm still convinced that you're reading too much into the concept. Note however, that this doesn't mean that your metaphysical outlook is 'off' or anything.

But modern Physics*2 imagined Energy as some intangible eternal property/quality of inert temporal matter that could be quantized (a quart of vacuum) for practical applications. — Gnomon

Nothing in here and in the reference you quoted go beyond the 'realist' interpretation that is admissible in physics. But despite the appearances it isn't like a 'potential' in the metaphysical sense.

Also, it isn't the only interpretation is admissible in physics. You can also think as a purely conceptual tool that is useful to predictions etc.

Ancient Greeks began to formulate primitive ideas about Causation & Change that would later influence modern physics. For example, Plato talked about dunamis (dynamics) and energeia (power). Even pragmatic Aristotle*3 characterized what we now call Energy, as un-actualized Potential seeking to become real in a process-of-becoming called Telos (purpose or goal). — Gnomon

I dispute the fact that these philosophers had what we label as 'energy' in mind when they talked about 'dynamis', 'energeia' and 'potentiality'. These concepts might have inspired later physicists to develop the concept of 'energy' but they aren't necessarily referring to the same thing.
Also, this doesn't mean that these ancient concepts are wrong.

Modern Physics uses the same old terms, but avoids any teleological or philosophical implications. — Gnomon

Yes, hence the confusion. Actually, I believe that physicists themselves should be more careful in how to explain the concepts they use.

For instance, one might try to say that a 'seed' has the 'potentiality' to become a 'plant'. However, in this potentiality the concept of 'energy' as it is used by modern physics has no role. Rather the Aristotelian concept is more similar to a controversial concept that has been advanced by David Bohm and Basil Hiley, which you might find congenial as it is more similar to how you think about 'energy': Active Information.

I say 'controversial' because it is unclear if such a concept is amenable of scientific research or if it still purely philosophical.

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that consciousness isn't fundamental in some sense. I was just asking in what sense you think it is fundamental. Obviously, you don't mean in the sense that it is the causal origin of the world. — Ludwig V

You might be disappointed by what I say now: I am a panentheist, so obviously, I regard the (Divine) Consciousness as ontologically fundamental (incidentally, I believe that 'classical theism' is a form of panentheism but honestly I'm unclear if my views are truly compatible with 'classical theism'). However, I do not believe that 'consciousness' is fundamental if by 'consciousness' we mean the consciousness of (finite) sentient beings.

Why do I accept the view that there is such an 'ontologically fundamental Consciousness'? There are various reasons but IMO the most pertinent here are the following:

• Laws of reasons and mathematical truths seems to be (1) conceptual and (2) timeless and not contingent. If they are conceptual, they cannot exist outside a 'mind'. If, however, we accept also (2), this leads to accept that there must be a timeless, non-contingent Mind.
• The physical world seems intelligible, which seems totally ungaranteed if the 'physical' was totally independent from consciousness. Also, such an intelligibility, IMO makes sense only in reference to an Intellect, at least at a potential way (i.e. intelligibility means that it can be understood). To me this is a clue that such an Intellect exists and is the reason why the physical world is intelligible. I find the 'Kantian' views lacking here. To me they seem that they can't give an account of why the 'mind' can 'order' experience if there is no intelligible structure in the 'outside world'.

So you accept that they do work. But if they work, they provide an explanation - that's what conceptual structures do, isn't it? — Ludwig V

No, merely stating and observing they work isn't an explanation. They could for instance work by pure 'luck'. Think for instance, about the problem of induction.

I don't understand the first alternative. If the world has an intelligible structure, then there is an explanation why things are the way they are. — Ludwig V

If intelligibility is a fundamental property of being, we might ask ourselves if there is a reason why it must be so. Again, merely stating that "intelligibility is a fundamental property of being" is an assertion but not an explanation.

As to the second, it happens all the time that we think we have an account of the world and it turns out to be wrong. We just set to work to devise another, better, one. — Ludwig V

What gives you a guarantee that the 'better' account isn't also illusory if there is no intelligibility?

This doesn’t make any sense to me. Can you explain? — praxis

It's a bit contorted argument, so I'll try. Basically, the point is that while a person might intellectually accept the idea that "the self is an illusion", if such a person also believes that this is the only life, at a deeper level they IMO have more difficulty to develop non-attachment to this life. If this life is unique it seems to me that it is more likely that one might regard it as 'special' and if it is regarded as 'special' it is clear to me that this involves a concept of 'mine'. So, at a deeper level, the person still engages with the world with a convinction that there is a self and the the experience is 'theirs'.

At the end of the day, it must be something more than a mere intellectual convinction. If it was just that, then, all people who believe that the "self is an illusion" would have some kind of 'enlightenment' in the Buddhist sense. It should be noted, also, that apparently the Buddha didn't go around and tell everyone that "there is no self" because such an assertion was at danger of being misunderstood by beginners (SN 44.10) and it seems that the Buddha when speaking from an ethical point of view didn't have any problem to speak about the 'self'.

Interestingly, there was an early Buddhist school, who at one time was quite popular, the Pudgalavada who affirmed the existence of a 'person' ('pudgala') while denying it to be like the 'self' (atman) rejected by the Buddha, perhaps because they saw the 'person' as something 'indeterminate' (and perhaps influenced some strands of the Mahayana - not all).

You believe that there are no unique entities? — praxis

I wasn't presenting my views. I'm not a Buddhist and I reject the 'non-self' doctrine, precisely because IMO it seems to me that there are individual entities. However, I am still fascinated by Buddhist traditions and I admire it.

Why does becoming a mendicant have to have anything to do with rebirth? — unimportant

You seem to have some familiarity with Buddhist texts. A great number of them speak about why Buddhists historically saw 'liberation from samsara' as their goal.

Of course, one can become a 'mendicant' without believing in rebirth. For instance, there are Hindu, Christian, Jain etc ascetics who clearly believed that such a life had a different purpose than Buddhists. You can find perhaps many analogies, but one can't overlook the differences.

So, you should ask yourself: why should I become a monk/mendincant or whatever? What is the purpose of such a choice?
For instance, one needs a very strong motivator and a very strong convinction to make a radical choice and remain committed to it. And, for instance, becoming a Buddhist monk is clearly a radical choice.

To be honest, I can't see why a secular materialist would make such a choice. Something like Epicureanism (as 180 says) seems more apt for a secular materialist. You are of course free to incorporate other practices but honestly I do not get why one would want to devote oneself to the life of a Buddhist ascetic without being a Buddhist.

Anyway...

The bikkhu gives insight for the lay person when the latter asks for guidance and the lay person gives the bikkhu food to survive. Nothing of that has to have anyhthing to do with supernatural explanations. — unimportant

Guidance for what?Only for the 'here and now'? Also it should be noted that most Buddhist traditions have believed that Nirvana isn't just a 'mere absence' of negative mental factors and/or experience (like the ancient Sautrantika school apparently believed and appararenly as various modern Buddhist teachers believe). Just to make an example, for a 'traditional' Theravadin perspective on this ('traditional' because it quotes ancient commentaries that are highly regarded in the Theravada tradition), read: Anatta and Nibbana by Ven Nyanaponika. Clearly, if one thinks that Nirvana isn't a 'mere absence' then the goal itself becomes incompatible with a materialist worldview. This is a problem of course. If the goal isn't something that is conceivable in materialistic terms, then a 'secularized Buddhist practice' becomes incoherent (it would be like practising Christianity without believing in God).

As to the 'no selfness' being contingent upon rebirth I again don't think it is necessary. Lots of neuroscience, and this is a point Sam Harris makes when discussing the topic, has confirmed there is no 'I' to be found and it is just a social or cultural construct. So it can easily be explained from an empirical standpoint. To actually have some huge insight just from that data is another matter. — unimportant

While I disagree that Neuroscience gave us a definite answer on the existence of a self, even if it did, the bolded part is crucial. If I believe that 'there is only this life' there is a high risk to never be able to shake off the deep-rooted convinction that we are an unique, distinct entity with defining characteristics. On the other hand, if I believed in rebirth the 'features' of this life would seem much less 'central' to me.
So, again, while you might be right that 'non-self' might be compatible with materialism, the belief that there are no future and past life actually increases the 'impression' that this life is lived by a 'real' self.
If 'Bob' can become a snake, a celestial being and then 'Alice' none of the things that defined these 'states' seem essential to 'the person'. It is quite easier if one believes in rebirth to become less attached to one's current identity, relationships and so on.

This then means that all the talk of reincarnation is not necessary to have such spiritual awakenings as the Christian mystics managed just the same and do not hold those same beliefs.

What should be done is to read through the different mystical experiences from each culture and religion and look for the common threads. — unimportant

Why you think that they reached the same experiences. What makes you so certain that the experience were literally the same (and not, say, 'similar')? Is comparing brain activity really enough to estabish that they are exactly the same?

Can the same states still be achieved if one only takes them as allegories rather than realities? — unimportant

This is an interesting question. Interestingly, while, for instance, in Christian history it is easier to find examples of 'allegorical/non-literal interpretatons' even in ancient times, I do not know anything like that in Buddhist history. In fact, 'literalism' about the content of the suttas/sutras seems quite important to Buddhists in antiquity. Again, I may be wrong about this, but I do not recall of any 'allegorical method' of interpreting Buddhist scriptures in historical Buddhist traditions.

Anyway, to answer your question, I don't know. The only way of knowing that, perhaps, is to personally 'walk through the path' and see where it leads.

It depends what you mean by "fundamental". Clearly, consciousness is not the origin of the physical world and does not exist independently of some physical substrate. That suggests that it is the physical world that is fundamental. So what do you mean by "fundamental". — Ludwig V

I disagree about the 'clearly'. Theists, panentheists, idealists etc would have a word about it. Even someone like Spinoza would disagree. For him the 'physical' and the 'mental' are two attributes of the one Substance - so to him neither of them is foundational to the other.

The fact that scientific evidence suggests that all individual sentient beings can't exist without a physical basis doesn't exclude all metaphysical models that posit consciousness as fundamental. One might think that scientific knowledge doesn't give us a complete knowledge about the physical world.

The physical world seems to have an intelligible structure. If consciousness isn't fundamental in some sense, how can we explain that?

You are right to think that our not knowing all about everything does not mean that we know nothing about anything. However, the reason why our predictive models work is that we test their predictive power. If they fail, we revise the model or abandon it. What more do you want? — Ludwig V

An explanation that explains why our conceptual models work that isn't reduced to a mere "they work because experience tells us they work". This kind of answer means either that:
(1) "it just happens that the physical world has an intelligible structure", i.e. there is no explanation, it's just so.
(2) "intelligbility is illusory". It appears that there the physical world has an intelligible structure but this isn't true.

What I am asking is whether the none religious person can go as far along the path as the religious 'believer' when they do not accept a large part of the 'canon', seeing it as fallacious dogma. — unimportant

Ok, I see. Consider the points I raised here:

You'd have to 'explain away' all these texts that used the belief in a potentially endless cycle of rebirths as a motivator to induce 'samvega' (a sort of healthy anguish) in the practicioner. For instance, all the discourses in the 15th collection of the Samyutta Nikaya. Note that this kind of 'contemplation' inspired renunciation. And renunciation of the world is indeed a BIG component of Buddhism. If one doesn't believe in rebirth, it is indeed strange to convince oneself, for instance, that it is 'good' to abandon one's social roots to live off alms and committ oneself to a hard practice.
You'd have to confront text like this according to which believing that there is no afterlife actually tends to favour a more relaxed approach or even bad behaviour and the clear affirmation that, according to the Buddha, there is an afterlife.
Also, I never encountered any Buddhist tradition that doubted the existence of the cycle of rebirths by appealing to cardinal Buddhist doctrines of impermanence ('anitya') and non-self ('anatman'). In fact, they rather held the opposite. It is precisely the lack of a 'static self' that allows such a capacity for change and rebirth. — boundless

The question becomes this: can one attain the same meditative status if one doesn't believe in rebirth? The traditional answer seems like 'no' for the following reasons:

• Believing in rebirth seems to have been traditionally considered a BIG motivator for renunciation and non-attachment.
• Believing in rebirth seems to have been traditionally considered a BIG motivator for also having compassion towards all sentient beings. For instance consider the Mata Sutta in which it is said that it is difficult to find a being which has not been your mother, your father etc in a previous life. Clearly, this kind of contemplation motivates you to be more compassionate to other sentient beings.
• If you believe that you only live once, can you really believe in the doctrine of 'non-self'? I mean, if you believe that you live only once, you perhaps tend to think that you are an 'unique' entity. So, I'm not sure that you can be convinced (not just intellectually but in a deeper level) of that doctrine if you do not believe in rebirth.

Can one practice in such a way to achieve the same attainments that are reportedly attained by traditional Buddhist practitioners without believing in the 'supernatural' beliefs of the religion?
I'm not sure that it is possible for the reasons I said above. The convinctions we have before engaging in a serious practice might condition the achievements we can reach.

Quite right. However, in order to diagnose the purported performative incoherence, Bitbol must presuppose universally binding normative standards of judgment (correctness, error, and order) that he then withholds from metaphysical inquiry. If the standards are universally binding, then reason has authority beyond any particular stance, and it becomes unclear why that authority should suddenly stop at metaphysics. If they are not universally binding, then Bitbol’s charge of incoherence loses its force because the diagnosis is only valid from within the (non-universal) scope of the framework from which it is made. — Esse Quam Videri

Good point. I would add that this also distinguish Bitbol from Nagarjuna. The latter only accepts the binding normative standards to show that, according to him, the metaphysical positions of his opponents are incoherent. However, he doesn't accept them as true for himself.

See this book by a Buddhist monk of German origin, which reviews both the traditional beliefs on re-birth and also current research. — Wayfarer

Thanks!

As I said - the background culture and beliefs of Buddhism are vastly different to Semitic (Middle Eastern) religious culture. — Wayfarer

Yes, I know. I wanted to just make an additional remark on the possible theological reasons of the condemnation of the belief in reincarnation in Christianity.

In any case, I believe that such a point is important. If rebirth is true, it weakens the 'reality' of personhood and it is a BIG reason to weak one's attachments in this life. On this point, Buddhists are completely right IMO.

Your comment seems to be implying that we should express units of Energy in physical Joules, instead of metaphysical meanings. However, I'm not a physicist, so in my philosophical thesis, I look at Energy from a different perspective*2. I take an abstract concept, which is invisible & immaterial --- known only by its effects on matter --- and represent it in concrete metaphors & analogies. That's the opposite of reification*3. Therefore, I am not denying that Energy has physical effects in the Real world*4. I'm merely noting the metaphysical*5 implications of that causal power in the mental meanings of human conception. On this forum, I do have to be very "careful" when I discuss distinctions between Physics and Meta-Physics. :smile: — Gnomon

You're free to use the word 'energy' in a way that is different from the way it is used in Physics. However, you might encounter a problem when you try to equate the two concepts or say that they are equivalent in some sense. I was just pointing to this.

Ironically, I actually believe that a 'non-realist' view of physical quantities actually is a problem for some forms of 'metaphysical physicalism'.

First, belief in reincarnation was declared anathema (forbidden) by the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 C.E. (in relation to Origen's idea that souls pre-existed in a spiritual realm before being born.) — Wayfarer

As an aside, in Christianity there are also theological/philosophical reasons to reject rebirth. First, if there was a 'pre-existence' of souls then our life in this world becomes a sort of punishment for sins we allegedly did before our coming into this life. However, there is no trace of that belief in earliest Christian scriptures and, indeed, the dogma of Incarnation tells you that Christ became associated with 'human nature' when he became human in this world. Second, belief in personhood is very strong in Christianity and the Christian life, arguably, is founded upon the idea of a personal relation between one and God. Clearly, if one believe that 'Alice' or 'Bob' can become 'Joseph' or 'Mary' or even non-human animals in a future life, it seems that such a belief would weaken the importance of the personal relation between 'Alice' and 'Bob' with God.

The second reason is that it is incompatible with the scientific understanding which doesn't encompass any medium for the transmission of traits, behaviours etc between different lives. (There has been published research, however, on children who appear to recall past lives.) — Wayfarer

Note that, however, even if one believes in those evidence, they still can't be considered evidence for the traditional Buddhist model of rebirth. By this I mean that according to the traditional Buddhist model one can be reborn into the animal, 'hellish', 'celestial' etc realms. I also read people claiming that NDEs 'prove' rebirth. Again, however, if one takes literally the content of NDEs - reported say in the book After by Dr. Greyson - one in fact finds that there is very little support for the afterlife belief of any religion. So, while I try to keep an open mind on these things, I wouldn't use them as 'evidence' for a particular religion (This is not a criticism of your points or your views on these issues. I'm just saying that one should be 'wary' to mix, say, 'Buddhism' or 'Christianity' or whatever with modern research on these matters).

Speaking of divide, have a read of Facing the Great Divide, Bhikkhu Bodhi. He is a Buddhist monk of American origin and a scholar and translator of the Pali Buddhist texts. Another is Buddhism Is a Religion, David Brazier. Finally Beyond scientific materialism and religious belief, Weber, published on Bachelor's website. (A lot of reading, I know, but they're big questions!) — Wayfarer

:up:

Is it still Buddhism without the extra natural elements? — unimportant

Why not try to have a 'secular approach inspired by Buddhist elements'?

You'll have a lot of difficulty to make sense of 'Buddhism' if you abandon the belief in Samsara. I'll just name a few problems you might encounter:

• You'd have to 'explain away' all these texts that used the belief in a potentially endless cycle of rebirths as a motivator to induce 'samvega' (a sort of healthy anguish) in the practicioner. For instance, all the discourses in the 15th collection of the Samyutta Nikaya. Note that this kind of 'contemplation' inspired renunciation. And renunciation of the world is indeed a BIG component of Buddhism. If one doesn't believe in rebirth, it is indeed strange to convince oneself, for instance, that it is 'good' to abandon one's social roots to live off alms and committ oneself to a hard practice.
• You'd have to confront text like this according to which believing that there is no afterlife actually tends to favour a more relaxed approach or even bad behaviour and the clear affirmation that, according to the Buddha, there is an afterlife.
• Also, I never encountered any Buddhist tradition that doubted the existence of the cycle of rebirths by appealing to cardinal Buddhist doctrines of impermanence ('anitya') and non-self ('anatman'). In fact, they rather held the opposite. It is precisely the lack of a 'static self' that allows such a capacity for change and rebirth.

So, there is no need to try to turn Buddhism into a 'secularized' worldview. It is better, in my opinion, if one doesn't belief in rebirth, to do Buddhist practice for the benefits that one feels it has. For instance, if you find that Buddhist meditation actually helps you to be more serene, content, at peace and so on, I don't believe that you're doing nothing wrong. However, the moment you start to say that belief in 'rebirth' - as well as other 'supernatural' beliefs - was a 'later addition', you need to confront the overwhelming evidence on the contrary. Then, again, I don't think that you can't associate to Buddhists and practice with them if you don't believe in the 'supernatural' ideas as Wayfarer said. You might put it aside for now and see later if it makes more sense for you.

:up:

Instead of talking about this ongoing intelligibility in terms of a mirroring , copying or representing of an external world of ‘things in themselves’ by a subject-in-itself, we can think of intelligibility in terms of the ordered, assimilative way the knower makes changes in themselves. — Joshs

But note that even within your own model intelligibility doesn't pertain to the subject alone but also to the 'world'. So, it would seem that the 'world' in which the subject exists also has a structure, an order that is somehow related to the changes the knower makes in themselves.

In other words, unless you admit that such changes are done arbitrarily, you need to say that 'what is outside the subject' has a structure, an order. And I'm not sure how this doesn't imply that the 'world external to the subject' is intelligible (at least, in principle).

Thanks for the thoughtful reply. — Esse Quam Videri

Thanks also to you for the interesting exchange.

Where I still want to push back is on the claim that, absent such an Intellect, intelligibility must be either brute or a matter of coincidence. From an Aristotelian standpoint, intelligibility is neither a coincidence nor an unexplained remainder, rather it is grounded in the very structure of being itself as intelligible relations (form, order, lawfulness) that do not depend on being understood in order to be what they are. — Esse Quam Videri

Intelligibility, however, implies the potential to be understood. At least at the level of potentiality, intelligibility does refer to such an Intellect. This doesn't automatically mean that such an Intellect exists, but it is a 'clue', as it were, that that Intellect does exist. Not a proof, but a clue.

Note that Aristotle himself, however, endorsed the idea that a Divine Mind exists. I know that one can make an Aristotelian model without reference to such an Intellect, but it nevertheless is interesting that apparently Aristotle himself thought that the two ideas are connected.

This is a philosophy forum, not a physics seminar. So why not reify that which is invisible & intangible? Energy is non-thing concept, it's a knowable-but-not-seeable relationship between things. Energy is unreal & unbound Potential or Probablity that temporarily takes on actual bound forms (matter), causes change of shape or position, and then returns to its unreal immaterial state as latent possibility. Matter dissolves as energy dissipates, but only the Energy is conserved, in its formless form. — Gnomon

It isn't a 'physics seminar', yes, but if one uses the concepts of physics, it is seems to me correct to point out if they aren't used well.
In the case of energy, I believe you're reading too much in that physical quantity.

Even if you interpret it in a realist way, i.e. if you interpret 'energy' as a real property of something in the physical world 'out there', you can't neglect the fact that energy is defined as a property of something. That is, energy is always defined in reference to a physical system. So, it doesn't seem the case that 'energy' somehow is more ontologically fundamental than physical systems. Being a property, it is difficult to understand in which sense energy could 'exist' without any physical system.

However, one can also interpret energy in a non-realist way, i.e. as an useful concept that we use to make predictions, just like we now do with classical forces.

Note that this isn't a direct criticism on your own metaphysical position. It is just an observation on how careful I think we should be in interpreting physical quantities in a metaphysical way.

Can you imagine the number 5 without reifying it as something concrete? — Gnomon

To be fair, I don't think that mathematical entities should be treated like physical quantities. For one, I believe that while mathematical truths are timeless and non-contingent, physical theories are, in part, human inventions. This doesn't mean that they do not give us genuine knowledge but we should be careful to not confuse the 'map' (the conceptual apparatus of a physical theory) with the 'territory' (physical reality).

And yes, Energy is not a physical or material substance, but a quality or property of the world that transforms & sustains the stuff we, and the world, are made of*2. Aristotle knew nothing of modern physics, but he inferred from his observations of Nature (Phusis) that the "stuff" of reality (hylomorph) is a combination of tangible Matter (raw potential : e.g. clay) and knowable Conformation (Platonic Form ; design pattern : sculptural intent). Therefore, Energy is the immaterial power (essence) that causes Matter to take-on different forms. — Gnomon

While I agree with hylomorphism (in a broad sense), I disagree with you that 'energy' is so special as a property. Why not, say, angular or linear momentum which are also important conserved quantities?
I wouldn't 'reify' energy as I wouldn't reify any other physical quantities.

And even if one accepts that there is a 'flux'* in events, I wouldn't say that what 'causes' this flux has been identified by physics as the physical quantity 'energy'.


*Note that Special and General Relativity even suggest, if taken literally (and the validity of General Relativity is a good argument to take it as one, even if I do not necessarily agree), that there is no 'flux' and time arises only when a reference frame is defined. What is real, is 'spacetime'. So the distinction between past, present and future would collapse. Personally, I believe that this view of time, 'eternalism', isn't 'proven beyond reasonable doubt' but I respect those who say that.

Happy New Year to all!

My worry, though, is that the antinomy only arises if we assume that intelligibility itself must be grounded in a conscious subject, rather than being intrinsic to being as such. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes that's a jump in my argument, I admit that. However, note that it makes sense as an hypothesis. If this is not so, we have no explanation on why entities are intelligible. It is again a 'brute fact' we have to accept. Personally, I don't see much advantage than accepting that there is no intelligible order in the 'in itself' and we just 'get lucky' in our attempts to understand things.

Following a more Aristotelian line, I would want to say that intelligibility is not something projected onto the world by consciousness, nor is it a mere coincidence. Rather, being itself is intelligible: it is structured, law-governed, and dynamically ordered in ways that can be grasped by intelligence. Consciousness is required for the act of understanding, but not for intelligibility to be operative in reality in the first place. — Esse Quam Videri

As I said above, I'm not sure that being 'understandable' ('intelligible') makes sense without any relation to an 'understanding' ('intellect'). I see this as an evidence of a non-contingent Intellect, i.e. a Divine Mind, but I agree with you that intelligibility alone doesn't prove that.

This is why I’m still inclined to think the force of the antinomy depends on collapsing two distinct explanatory orders. Questions about how consciousness arises in the world concern the order of efficient causality. Questions about knowing concern the structure and operations of consciousness as oriented toward grasping the intelligible order of being in-itself. The latter does not, I'd argue, require that consciousness be ontologically fundamental. — Esse Quam Videri

I agree with that. It doesn't force the conclusion but indeed it does point to that direction!

That is a penetrating critique of Nagarjuna's philosophy, and I think it exposes a major instability in his thought. I get the impression that this instability is by design, though, in the sense that Nagajuna's aim is not to produce a philosophical system, but to force the mind out of any such system. As such, his critique causes the mind to cycle endlessly between affirming and denying both conventional and ultimate reality, never finding a stable resting point between the two. On this interpretation, the generation of aporia is intended to work as a therapeutic device, kicking the mind out of it's attachment to representation and into...well, that's the question. Enlightenment? — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, I agree. The 'ambiguity' is intentional and, indeed, Nagarjuna seems to insist that what he is doing is to reject ontological theories, not affirming one. However, assuming that he indeed rejected definitively his opponents' theories, there is a big step from that to say he managed to show that all possible ontological theories are inconsistent. He seemed to clearly believe that and this belief is IMO also shared by the authors of the Prajnaparamita sutras.

However, he arrived at a point in which there is an unresolved tension. On the one hand, he cannot reject the world of appearances and its order. On the other hand, he claims that, ultimately, all ontological claims about 'reality' are inconsistent. However, the very fact that appearances 'appear' and show a structure 'cries' for an explanation. Perhaps, he is right and there is no such an explanation and the answer is 'silence'. I'm not sure of that. Anyway, I happen to think that if there is no metaphysical 'Absolute', his 'view' is in fact correct. However, I remain unconvinced that there is no metaphysical Absolute.

Like you, though, I think this approach works "too" well, as it undercuts any stable ground from which Nagarjuna can assert the "reality" of emptiness, nirvana, samsara, karma, or anything else. In other words, his (non)-doctrine of emptiness seems to be left teetering precariously on a precipice with nihilism on one side and naive realism on the other. Some might see this as a boon, but I'm not so sure. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed. Interestingly, in the seventh chapter of his Mulamadhyamakakarika, he writes:

33. With the non-establishment of arising, duration and destruction, the
conditioned does not exist. With the non-establishment of the conditioned,
how could there be the unconditioned?

34. As an illusion, a dream, a city of the gandharvas, so have arising, endurance
and destruction been exemplified. — Mulamadhaymakarika, 7.33-34, Kalupahana translation

So, his argument about that the unconditioned is 'illusion-like' rests on his conclusion that the conditioned is 'illusion-like'. To me this is a logical jump and, anyway, only makes sense if one already accepts that the conditioned is 'illusion-like'. It is indeed fascinating, maybe it is true. It also rejects any kind of 'reductionism' because there is no 'ultimate layer' in which 'provisional truths' are reduced to. Every entity is ultimately as unreal/real as the selves and this is quite different to what even other Buddhist argued (i.e. that the 'selves' are just arbitrary labels we impose on fundamental entities).

But I'm unconvinced. Perhaps, the existence of the 'unconditioned' is precisely the reason why the 'conditioned' isn't just an appearance.

I hear you! Obviously this is a deep and difficult question, but again, my orientation is shaped by my reading of Buddhist philosophy. You will recall that there is an unequivocal statement in the Pali texts, to wit, 'there is, monks, an unborn, unmade, unfabricated', and that if there were not, there would be no possibility of escape from the born, the made, the fabricated (reference). 'There is!' Of course, what that means - what precisely is the unborn, unconditioned - is beyond discursive reason. Probably also out of scope of naturalism, which puts it out-of-bounds for most here. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree with that. Also, even if the positive 'there is an unborn' is interpreted as Nagarjuna does, it is beyond the scope of naturalism. Indeed, Nagarjuna would reject all metahpysical position and naturalism isn't an exception. I believe that the naturalists that think that Nagarjuna agree with them do not appreciate how radical his views are. He doesn't merely think that there is no 'metaphysical absolute' but he goes all the way to think that all ontological theories must be false.

He does indeed. I'm also reading some of Bitbol's essays on Buddhism and he acknowledges this. That will be the subject of the third essay (if the next two are accepted by Philosophy Today.) — Wayfarer

:up:

BTW, I wish a Happy New Year to everyone.

Think of an intelligible order as a scheme or system of rationality. Within that order or map, things work a certain way, according to certain criteria.
... — Joshs

Sorry, perhaps I am missing something, but all I see here is an explanation of how intelligible models work but I don't see an explanation about why they do.
On the other hand, if we say that we do know (albeit imperfectly, in a distorted way etc) the 'things in themselves', the reason why they work is clearer.

The point is there is no one correct map, model or scheme of rationality that mirrors the way the world is. Our knowledge is not a mirror of the world. It is an activity that continually modifies the nature of the world in ways that
are meaningful and recognizable to us. There is no intelligibility without a pragmatic refreshing of the sense of meaning of what is intelligible. — Joshs

The fact that there is no 'perfect model' that mirrors the way the world isn't enough to say that we get no knowledge of the 'things in themselves'. In other words, my question is: according to all these thinkers is there a reason why our predictive models work? Is it just a 'brute fact'?

I don't agree that it suggests those things. If consciousness is not there from the beginning, then physical arrangements are evolving for purely physical reasons. If physical arrangements were evolving for purely physical reasons, then it seems rather bizarre that they one day found themselves in just the right configuration to produce consciousness. I mean, holy cow! :gasp: — Patterner

It does at least suggest that sentient beings came into existence, i.e. there is a first point of their coming to be. And it clearly suggests that the existence of each one of the sentient beings in this world isn't a necessary fact.

I do accept both things. However, this doesn't exclude the possibility that some form of consciousness is fundamental as it is suggested by the second 'horn' of the dilemma.

I am not @Wayfarer and I don't speak for him but as I see Nagarjuna goes beyond phenomenologists. Remember that most Buddhist schools IIRC say that the 'self' is illusion-like, a mere appearance. Various Buddhist schools affirmed that while the 'self' was such a 'mere appearance', there was a set of ultimate, irreducible 'entities' (dharmas) that were either 'conditioned' or 'unconditioned' (like Nirvana).
Nagarjuna went further and claimed, as I understand him, that even these purpoted 'ultimate entities' are in fact illusion-like, just like the self*. So, all conceptual models that we can imagine about 'reality as it is' (i.e. ultimate reality) inevitably fail. And, in fact, by analysing the claims of his both non-Buddhist and Buddhist opponents he concluded that all ontological theories about 'ultimate reality' are inconsistent. For instance, there is no coherent way, according to him, to explain the arising and ceasing of a 'truly existing' entity. This leads to the conclusion that the 'entities' that supposedly arise and cease in fact do not arise at all*. So, Nagarjuna claimed that in order to avoid inconsistencies, one should avoid to have any 'thesis', i.e. any metaphysical theory*.

However, Nagarjuna was also wary to point out that at a provisional level, there is an appearance that entities arise, cease, display regularities (e.g. 'dependent origination')*, there are selves that are subject to 'karmic' laws and so on.

The objection that I would personally give to Nagarjuna is how these two 'truths' can be reconciled. That is, how if there are is no indeed an intelligible ultimate reality we can even make sense of the appearance of an intelligible world of selves, 'dharmas' and so on, especially when we are told by Nagarjuna himself that we should take this 'apparently intelligible world' very, very seriously.

* I quote some citations from a work attributed to Nagarjuna, the 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning':

21

Since there is nothing that arises,

There is nothing that disintegrates;

Yet the paths of arising and disintegration

Were taught [by the Buddha] for a purpose.

22

By understanding arising, disintegration is understood;

By understanding disintegration, impermanence is understood;

By understanding how to engage with impermanence,

The sublime dharma is understood as well.
...

33

Just as the Buddhas have spoken of

“I” and “mine” for a practical purpose;

Likewise they spoke too of “aggregates,”

“Elements” and “sense-fields” for practical reasons.
...
48

“Who understands this?” one might wonder;

It’s those who see dependent origination.

The supreme knower of reality has taught

That dependent arising is unborn.
...
50

Those who are great beings,

They have neither thesis nor contention;

For those who have no thesis,

How can there be opposing thesis? — Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning

I entirely agree, although I expect our interpretations will differ somewhat. — Punshhh

:up:

Thoughts? — Esse Quam Videri

That's an interesting way to frame the antinomy. However, I feel like it divorces the 'epistemological' and the 'ontological' aspects in a too radical way. Let me explain why.

The dilemma consists of two 'horns':

1) The analysis of the empirical world (and here I include the inner experience of sentient beings) strongly suggests that the consciousness of individual sentient beings is not fundamental. It even suggests that these individual consciousnesses arose in time via an evolutionary process.
2) However, the above 'insight' assumes that the 'world' is intelligible. Assuming that this intelligibility is not a deception, it makes us wonder why it is there in the first place. Does it make sense to think of 'intelligibility' without any reference to a cognizing consciousness?

So (1) suggests that individual consciousnesses of sentient beings are contingent and perhaps derived from something that isn't conscious. (2) however seems to suggest that this 'not conscious ground' is somehow understandable by consciousness.

So, let's say one wants to take seriously both insights. Sentient beings are not 'fundamental entities' per (1). Ok, but (2) suggests that the 'external world' is intelligible. If it is true, then we have an ontological claim about the 'external world' that is 'outside' the consciousnesses of sentient beings.

If it is true, as I believe, that it can't be that 'intelligibility' makes any sense without reference to a cognizing consciousness, the most reasonable alternative that I believe we have is to posit a 'Consciousness' that is, in fact, fundamental. The apparent intelligibility of the 'external world' isn't a 'happy accident' that is unexplainable and that somehow by pure coincidence gives us the possibility to navigate into the world. Rather, intelligibility would be an essential property of both the 'sentient' and 'insentient' entities.

For Husserl, the nature of the order on the basis of which events cohere is not fixed but, as you say, pragmatic. It is an order of associative similarity (not associative in Hume’s causal sense, but association by relevance to an intending subject). — Joshs

Ok. But, again, if there is no a priori intelligible order, why our conceptual maps work?

If you dont like the idea of a pragmatic ordering of the world depending on the notion of an a priori subject, you can find accounts which follow the phenomenologists in their deconstruction of the natural empirical attitude without relying on subjectivity as necessary ground. Such accounts can be found with Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Karen Barad, Joseph Rouse and others. For these writers, we can remove human beings and livings things from the picture and show how materiality is agential or ‘subjective’ in itself, in that no object pre-exists its interaction with other elements within an already organized configuration of elements. — Joshs

Same as above. The problem is not which kind of 'entity' is to be taken as a subject. The problem is how to explain the appearance of intelligibility in a non-contrived way. Honestly, the only thinker I know with a certain familarity among the ones who cited is Nietzsche (I read a book of Deleuze many years ago).
However, those thinkers, in my opinion, even this kind of perspective can't given an account to explain why the empirical world - which I agree 'arises' from the interaction between the subject and the 'world' - appears to be intelligible. Are we merely going to say that it is a 'happy coincidence' that we can make conceptual models that work? Or is there a deeper reason that explain why they work?

Cratylus, a pre-Socratic thinker thought that the flux of becoming was so pervasive that 'entities' do not exist and we can only point our fingers to the changing 'reality' without any hope to get a conceptual scheme that actually leads us to an understanding of it. Let's say that Cratylus was right in saying that 'entities' are merely illusory. Yet, it seems that there are regularities in this 'flux' and even one like Heraclitus pointed out that the world seems like a 'kosmos', an ordered world. Are these regularities merely illusory? Are they mere superimpositions of our own cognitive faculties?

I’m not so sure about this, yes with the sensory apparatus we have, I would agree with this. But it doesn’t mean we can’t bear witness to it, or be hosted by a being who can know it. — Punshhh

Ok, perhaps 'direct'/'indirect' isn't the best way to put it. But I would say that our knowledge of the world is limited, imperfect, we can't deny the role of our mind in ordering the experience and so on etc.

Thanks for the answer, but I don't think it rejects what I was saying. Kant, Schopenhauer, Bitbol etc are, as I understand them, saying that there is antinomy between what we learn by analysing the events of the empirical world and what we learn by analysing the intelligible structure of the empirical world. In the first case, we are presented with evidence that strongly suggest that our consciousness began at a certain point of time, is derivative and so on. The latter analysis, however, suggests that the framework in which the former 'story' is intelligible is a framework given by consciousness itself. This clearly poses a problem, a tension with two seemingly contradictory accounts.

One is of course free to stop at the antinomy and accept it as unsolvable. We can't 'go beyond' it. That's where Kant, Bitbol and so on ask us to stop. The two perspectives can't be reconciled in a singular conceptual framework that explains both. As I said, I respect that. But I don't think the antinomy alone forces us to stop to seek some kind of way to reconcile the two 'perspectives' that generate it.

However, this is one of these situations where I can't help but remind myself that the 'puzzlement/wonder' it creates is a motivator for trying to go beyond that. So, as a way to solve the antinomy, I propose that we need to accept both stories and reconcile them. Yes, our consciousness is contingent, is ontologically dependent etc and it can't be the ground of 'intelligibility' of ourselves and the 'external world' (and also the 'empirical world', at the end of the day). But at the same time, I take seriously the other 'side' of the antinomy and I also affirm that intelligibility seems to be grounded in consciousness. However, in order to get a 'coherent story' that includes both insights, I acknowledge that I have to posit a consciousness of some sort that can truly be regarded as the ground of intelligibility. Panentheism is a way, I believe, to overcome and at the same time accept the 'main message' of the antinomy you are referencing.

At the same time, however, I am also inclined to agree with the antinomy in that it correctly shows that we can't have the kind of 'certainty' that pre-Kantian philosophers sought. We can discuss about the plausibility of 'worldviews' but I don't think we can 'certainty' about them. So I do not claim certainty about my own purpoted 'solution' but I think I have reasonable motivations to think it is plausible.

Do you recall that that blog post about Schopenhauer that you posted - how time began with the first eye that opened? — Wayfarer

Yes, and I still in some way I agree with that perspective, i.e. that consciousness is foundational to intelligibility.

However, we need to ask ourselves which 'consciousness' is foundational. The consciousness of any sentient being doesn't seem foundational. The consciousness of any given sentient being seems to be contingent and have arisen. Assuming that such an arising isn't unintelligible, these consciousnesses of each sentient being must have arisen in some way and this means intelligibility preceded each of them.

Anyway, I still agree with the blog posts in two senses:

1) Consciousness is foundational to intelligibility. Intelligibility is incomprehensible without a necessary relation to consciousness. However, I nowadays lean towards panentheism, so not problem for me.
2) There is a limit of what a given sentient being can know and this limit is also due to the particular perspective such a being finds itself in. So, an individual sentient being can't know directly anything 'in itself'. But this doesn't pose an a priori limit to speculations.

An order which makes intelligibility possible is not the same thing as an intelligible order, if intelligible order implies a fixed a priori form dictating a particular logic of intelligibility. — Joshs

While I agree with the wording, my problem here is that I don't see how these kinds of accounts are plausible. They appear to give to the subject the entire 'responsibility' of the 'ordering' of the empirical world. In other words, for all practical purposes, an epistemic solipsism.

There are no things in themselves, whether those things are objects outside the subject or an inner realm inside the subject. The subject has no interior since it is not an in-itself but the exposure to a world. It is also not a fixed perspective but the empty capability of generating perspectives. — Joshs

Does this mean that the only value of knowledge is pragmatic?

Intelligibility is a characteristic of being-in-the-world. — Wayfarer

The problem is that we have all reasonable evidences to conclude that we aren't necessary for the existence of the 'world'. While what Bitbol and others might say is true for the empirical world, I can't see how the same can be said for anything else.

If intelligiblity requires our 'being in the world', it seems to me that this can't avoid the claim that 'without us' the world is unintelligible. This is an ontological claim, not merely an epistemic one.

Maybe that's an antinomy of reason! Bitbol’s refusal to supply such an explanation isn’t evasion, but critical in the Kantian sense. — Wayfarer

I can see that. And I'm not completely against that. I just think that what Kant and so on achieved is that we can't have a certain/direct knowledge of 'how reality is' irrespective of our own perspective. I just don't see how this excludes any possibility of speculation beyond it.

Good OP and good summary of Bitbol's views.

I broadly agree with Bitbol's perspective and his 'phenomenological' approach. IMO it is a very valid path of inquiry to get some necessary epistemic modesty. Also, it is a very good way to introduce or re-introduce in us the 'wonder' that animates philosophical search.

My problem, however, is this. If we are so 'constrained' by our own perspective and we can't make statements about the 'things in themselves' - i.e. metaphysical statements - the problem I notice is that the apparent intelligibility of the world as we experience it remains unexplained. Yes, following the 'broadly' Kantian tradition that Bitbol supports, it seems to me that we are compelled to say that intelligibility should be explained in terms of the capacity of our mind to 'order' experience, to 'give it a form'.

However, the problem is that even the most radical follower of this tradition must acknowledge that the possibility of such an 'ordering' - unless one is also prepared to say that the whole 'form'/'order' of the empirical world is a contrived self-deception or a totally furtuitous event - it is rooted on some property of 'what is outside of experience' that makes it possible. But to me this implies that the 'things in themselves' have, indeed, an intelligible order at least in principle.

In other words, after this suspension of the 'natural attitude' one is compelled, IMO, to take one of these alternatives:

• The 'skeptic' alternative: all we can know is the empirical world, ordered by our mental faculties, and we can't say anything about about 'the real'.
• The 'veiled reality' approach: 'reality in itself' is not something we can be directly acquainted of. Rather, we see 'reality' in an indirect, confused way. To borrow a Biblical expression 'through a glass, darkly'. But however imperfect we can still have some knowledge of 'reality in itself'. This implies we can make 'reasonable inferences', 'reasonable speculations' and so on in a non-dogmatic or certain way.
• The 'illusionist' approach. The 'order' we see in our empirical world is simply a deception, totally unrelated to the world as it is itself. This is because either the 'reality in itself' is totally inintelligible, or its structure is totally unrelated to the one we 'see' in our empirical world. So our cognitive faculties might be pragmatically relevant but are totally unreliable epistemically.
• The 'exteme anti-realist' approach. This simply denies any kind of 'reality in itself', independent of our empirical world.

Of course, one is free to not make a choice about any of the above and remain content with a non-committal stance (as I think Bitbol does). However, such a 'cautious' stance to me it is simply excessively cautious. Before adopting it, I would want to be certain or reasonably certain that other pathaways are impassable.

However, I don't think that these kinds of insights forbid us to investigate further. The fourth alternative seems to point unhappily to solipsism. The first simply is a restatement IMO of Bitbol's position. The third would mean that our cognitive faculties are just screwed, unreliable etc. While perhaps this is a legitimate alternative, I don't take it seriously precisely because it would make any kind of metaphysical and epistemic inquiry pointless. Furthermore, it has no real explanatory power of how our cognitive faculties are 'pragmatically useful'. So, tentatively, I accept the 'second alternative' what I called the 'veiled reality' approach. The investigation of our empirical world ('the world as it appears to our consciousness') does give us some knowledge of the world as it is. However, we should also be aware that it is imperfect, indirect etc and therefore not being too dogmatic about it.

The problem with 'energy' is that it is defined in physics as a property of physical objects and physical systems. And while, for instance, in experiments it has been observed that energy is conserved while particles are not (e.g. an electron and a positron are annihilated and photons are generated), the same goes for electrical charge. The total charge remains the same but electrically charged objects can be annhilated and generated. However, despite this, nobody would say that 'charge' is some fundamental substance.

In the same way, energy is not a substance that composes matter. To make an analogy is like saying that coins (physical objects) are made of money (energy).

Perhaps the confusion is due to an interpretation of mass-energy equivalence. However, not even mass can be reasonably interpreted as a substance even if the concept is first presented in that way. Mass is best interpreted as either the resistence of an object to change its velocity (inertial mass) or a measure of how strongly interacts gravitationally (gravitational mass, which has an analogous tole to electric charge in electromagnetic interactions). So, the mass-energy equivalence doesn't 'prove' that mass or energy are underlying substance but it is an equivalence of two physical properties.

BTW, Merry Christmas to all!

Yes, this quite the conundrum. We’re either missing something, or have a perspective which generates these paradox’s. — Punshhh

I would also add that it also appears that some 'physical objects' are more like convenient abstractions that are useful for our purposes. For instance, arguably a 'chair' isn't a physical object but rather a concept.
However, it also seems that physical reality has a structure/order/form independent of us. Otherwise, arguably, our mental faculties could not make intelligible models of it.

I like the idea that mathematical information is innate in existence when it comes into existence. But it doesn’t solve the conundrum. Only suggests that the rational conclusion is that there never was a before before existence. But that leads to an infinite regress. — Punshhh

Given the seeming non-contingent character of mathematical truths, I think that they are aspects of the 'Ground of Being', i.e. aspects of that which makes existence of particular entities -which seem to be contingent - possible.

Marry Christmas!

you're right about the book, my bad.

Or does some of that information, like mathematical principles, remain and if it remains, where (and when) does it remain? — Punshhh

Personally, I don't think that it is even coherent to think of some kind of 'unstructured reality'. Clearly, their 'structure', which might be regarded as some sort of 'information', doesn't exist outside their physical instantations. For instance, the 'property of being an electron' (i.e. being a particle with a given mass, charge and so on) doesn't seem to be something that can exist without electrons.

Something like mathematical principles and 'laws of logic', however, don't seem to rely on physical instantations. This IMO is shown by the fact that any attempt to explain them assumes them in the first place.

The book I keep mentioning, Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter, is really helpful on this question. — Wayfarer

As you know, I am sympathetic with transcendental/epistemic idealists views. However, a problem that IMO is left unadressed is the problem of how can the minds of beings that live in the universe manage to 'ordain' their experiences if the 'things in themselves' are completely 'unknowable'.
Even someone like Bernard d'Espagnat would argue that we can know the 'physical world in itself' by studying the empirical world. However, such a knowledge is distorted, imperfect and so on (and, indeed, we can't neglect the role of the mind in organizing the experiences).

As I said in this very discussion, however, I am doubtful that an alogorithm-based machine can have qualitative experiences (e.g. it seems that in order to have some kind of self-awareness a degree of autonomy is needed and I doubt that algorithmic machines can get to that. I might be wrong of course). — boundless

I would here also add that in the case of algorihm-based machines, consciousness seems to be unnecessary. In our case, it seems that being self-aware allows us to evaluate, ponder, argue and so on in the case of algorithmic machines, an eventual consciousness doesn't seem to me to add any kind of 'functionality' that an 'unconscious' doesn't have.

Sorry if the following answer doesn't cover all the points you made. But I hope to clarify some confusion that I think I accidentally made.

• Regarding the issue of presentism and eternalism, I wasn't necessarily advocating for presentism. Rather, I was arguing against eternalism. Also, when I think about the word 'evidence', I don't think it means a 'conclusive evidence' or an 'convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt'. In philosophy, like in jury, some evidence might have less conciving powers but still have some importance. So, when I say that the awareness of change (or 'the flow of time') is an evidence against eternalism, I think that my language is appropriate. For an anti-eternalist, such an awareness can be taken at face value. Indeed, the 'obviousness' of it suggest us to do just that. Furthermore, if we can be so wrong in judging our empirical knowledge that something basic like it is wrongly interpreted, can we trust anything that is based on experience? This is a though question, I believe and honestly I rarely see it adressed with some depth by eternalists (Einstein did say that the problem of the 'now' was a mystery. He was apparently an eternalist but still recognized the problem). It is not necessarily a fatal objection but I believe that simply appealing to GR or other seemingly eternalist scientific theory isn't enough to conclude that 'it is an illusion'. One might ask how such an illusion can be explained in an eternalist framework. Personally, I would like an explanation of that before accepting eternalism.
• Regarding knowledge, instead, again I believe there are evidences (in the weak sense) that seem to point to the fact that machines can't 'know' in the same way we 'know'. When I learn something, I am aware of having learnt something. That is, in human beings, it seems that knowledge is a specific kind of qualitative experience. If it is true, then, is it possible that a machine can 'know' things? Yes, if a machine has qualitative experiences. As I said in this very discussion, however, I am doubtful that an alogorithm-based machine can have qualitative experiences (e.g. it seems that in order to have some kind of self-awareness a degree of autonomy is needed and I doubt that algorithmic machines can get to that. I might be wrong of course).
• Finally, on mathematics. It seems that here we agree more. I should note, however, that if you accept that mathematical structures can't be explained in purely physical terms, your 'physicalism' isn't a metaphysical physicalism. It might be a physicalism with respect to mind but you seem to accept that there is something that exists and yet isn't understandable in physical terms. So, you don't seem to subscribe to a physicalist ontology. Regarding antirealist MUH, I have the same reservations as yours. It seems to me that an anti-realist MUH is simply not MUH anymore.

Well, 'qualitative' apparently is a word reserved for life forms, and since non-living things can know stuff (see roomba example just above) — noAxioms

'Knowing' something seems to imply having an awareness of such a knowledge. My calculator can perform the operation "5+3=8" by processing the data I'm giving to it but it seems to me too far fetched to claim that it 'knows' the information it is processing. Of course, if 'knowledge' can mean merely 'storing data', then yeah, the calculator might be said to 'know'. But at a certain point, one should wonder if one isn't equivocating language.

Again, the experience of both interpretations is identical, so if it isn't compatible with eternalism, then it isn't compatible with presentism either. Both have you experiencing flow of time. I have a hard time with free will since there's no way to detect it one way or another. It also seems to make no predictions. — noAxioms

Yes, the experience is identical. But the interpretation is different. In one interpretation, the experience is taken as veridical. In the other it is taken as illusory. In both cases, however, one should be able to explain how the experience occurs.
Regarding 'free will', the evidence comes from my own immediate experience and, of course, the view that moral responsibility seems to require it.

Of course, both free will and the experience of 'flow of time' might be illusory. But I do not deem the grounds of taking them as such to be compelling. YMMV.

It's simply run by rules, none of which seem to contradict its operation. — noAxioms

One however might ask the ontological status of these 'rules'. If they are 'real' (and not just an useful 'construct' that *somehow* help us), what is their status? Can they be explained in purely physicalist terms? And so on.

Indeed, it seems that they are real (in some way). Otherwise, we would be unimaginably lucky in (falsely) believing that they are real.

If it was invented, it wouldn't be fundamental, but rather supervening on this inventor. So no argument here either. — noAxioms

:up:

2+3 sums up to 5. That works whether those values are real or not. Some disagree. — noAxioms

Not sure of your point. MUH asserts that all mathematical structures are 'real'. If the mathematical structure of 'natural numbers' is real, how is it possible that the numbers aren't real?

You mean you think those things require more than just 'particles'. You are incredulous about physicalism. I suppose MUH is typically spun as a foundation for physicalism. — noAxioms

Again, I believe that in this discussion we agreed that mathematical truths do not seem to be 'physical' as they seem to be independent from the existence of the universe (or the 'multiverse'). MUH asserts that reality is made of 'all mathematical structures'. So, I wouldn't call it a form of physicalism.

And yes, I believe that MUH errs precisely because it can't account for 'those things' in a satisfactory way.

The second two examples use "aware" in its other sense, which is simply to know a certain fact.
To be aware of a mosquito bite, aware of a sunset, aware of a feeling of jealousy, are all qualitative states. There is something it is like to experience each of these. What each is like is quite different. What unifies them is that they are all varieties of qualitative conscious states, they each have a felt quality. "Qualia" bundles this property of having a felt quality into a conceptual bucket. — hypericin

IMO I don't even think that we can say that one can 'know' something without a qualitative experience.

For instance, I don't think that my computer 'knows' the information it processes and stores. Rather, it seems to me that qualitative experience is a precondition of 'having knowledge'. So, while I think the distinction you make is relevant, I believe that we should say that 'knowledge' is a specific kind of 'awareness' (in the general sense of the presence of a qualitative experience).

But both interpretations of time involve that same experience, else there would be a falsification test. — noAxioms

The problem with eternalism is: are those experiences (i.e. that 'time flows', the appearance of 'free will' etc) compatible with eternalism? Again, eternalists seem content to say they are 'illusory' and leave at that. But to me it isn't a real answer. In fact, as I said before, if we deny those 'raw' experiences, can we trust empirical knowledge?

Probably, yes. Any axiom is by definition unprovable. If it could be proved, it would be a theorem (based on deeper axioms), not an axiom. — noAxioms

Yeah, that wasn't Goedel point, sorry.

IIRC, Goedel's theorems showed that even in relatively simple mathematical structures you get true yet unprovable (within the structure) propositions. So, you can't derive all mathematical truths by a set of arbitrary axioms.
This clearly suggests that mathematics isn't 'invented' IMO (although, to be honest, my own 'realist' view about mathematics doesn't depend on a controversial interpretation of Goedel's theorems).

He's a realist. MUH can also be a non-realist view. — noAxioms

Interesting, however I'm not sure how to conceive it.

It renders MUH empty (completely lacking in evidence) unless the problem is fixed, making it a modified MUH. I do believe that there have been attempts to do so, so maybe my protest has been addressed. But in a satisfactory way? — noAxioms

Ok, I see. If you take MUH as a scientific theory, then yes the criticism is important, I agree. But as a metaphysical view, I don't think it is shown as inconsistent.

I do believe that MUH is defective, however. Other than the problem of change, I also believe that things like consciousness, ethics, aesthetics and so on require more than just 'math'.

Your answer in the previous post was that you share similar incredulity, just about a different topic. This in no way lends evidence one way or another about the true nature of a pie. — noAxioms

But I explained why I think the two cases are different. Yes, I don't think that there is a model that can 'fully explain' the emergence of a cherry or a pie from fundamental physical objects. At the same time, however, I believe that consciousness has properties that can't be explained via emergence from what we know about physical reality. So, I think that in the case of consciousness the skepticism is more reasonable than in the case of pies and cherries.