Totally doesn't follow from what he writes. Not impressed. All that follows is that nothing thought of goes un-thought of, a trivial tautology. — noAxioms

His point seems to me that there are limits to our 'imagination' and our conceptual models. Our minds is not a passive 'recorder' of 'what is outside of us'. In fact, they actively try to interpret things according to their own categories. So, it's not obvious that 'the world we see' isn't a representation. And, in fact, the same goes for unpercieved objects.

I cannot agree. 1) An apple is typically presented as mind-independent, but it is intelligible. 2) (Caution: new word coming) The thing in question could be entirely intelligible, but lacking anything in any way experiencing, imagining, or knowing about it, it merely fails to go itelligiblated. — noAxioms

The question you should be asking is: why is the apple intelligible?

You mean independently, one not supervening on the other? Yea, then there'd be no precedence between those two. — noAxioms

They might depend on a common 'source', for example, or maybe they are aspects of the same thing. In both cases, the mental would not 'supervene' on the 'physical'.

Those seem to be the only valid alternative in QM. Even the consiousness-causes-collapse interpretation doesn't have mind doing anything deliberately. There's not control to it. All the interpretations exhibit phenomenal randomness. — noAxioms

Yes. Before QM, all physical theories were deterministic. With QM, we found out an apparent probabilism, the status of which is of course controversial. Assuming that such a probabilism is 'real', why can't we think that there are other possibilities besides determinism and probabilism?

Then we're wrong, being insufficiently informed. — noAxioms

In a sense, yes. But I would not even call newtonian mechanics 'wrong' tout court. Our physical theories give us incredibly precise predictions. They have to be at least partially right.

Those correlations might be widely separated, but never is there superluminal cause-effect. Thus is is considered a local thing, but not an interpretation. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. I just find bizzarre that a 'scientific realist' would prefer to say that there are 'unexplained nonlocal correlations' than saying that, perhaps, instead there are nonlocal interactions of some sorts. If we renounce to find an 'explanation' of those correlations, why not simply take an epistemic interpretation of QM?

No it doesn't. Time is experienced normally for all observers in both views. Under presentism, you simply abruptly cease to exist at the event horizon. The experience under eternalism is of being inside, also with time phenomenally flowing as normal. — noAxioms

Interesting, thanks. Not sure, however, how this address my point about relationalism.

Maybe you're not the person to ask then, as I'm also not. — noAxioms

Well, for the purposes of our discussion let us ignore that part.

We all have that impression, but as said, I give little weight to that evidence. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. And I am not in a position to tell you that you are being 'unreasonable' here. In fact, I find your motivations quite valid. I was just saying why I find that a problem.

I find my actions deterministic in the short run, but very probabilistic as the initial state is moved further away. So sure, given a deer crossing in front of my car, my reaction would likely be the same every time. On a longer scale, it is not determined in the year 1950 that i will choose vanilla today since it isn't even determined that i will exist. Under MWI for instance, fully deterministic, I both choose and don't choose vanilla, but under the same MWI, almost all branches (from one second ago) have me swerving (nearly) identically for the deer. — noAxioms

Ok, I get that. Also, despite saying what I said, I also recognize that perhaps we are less free than we naively think we are. But I still can't renounce that I have a 'little spot' of freedom that allows my choices to be neither fully determined nor probabilistic. YMMV.

There is dualism, which is something other. But immediate impression isn't good evidence for that one since the determinism and probabilism both also yield that same impression. — noAxioms

Good point. Perhaps, it is me that I should explain how my 'impression' isn't compatible with determinism and probabilism.

Don't understand this. This marble is red, that one is blue. How is that not distinguishing objects, and what the heck does lack of locality have to do with that? — noAxioms

If the two marbles, however, are in some way 'nonlocally entangled', you can't treat them as two separate objects but perhaps as two parts of an undivided whole. In fact, what is common between, say, most readings of de Broglie-Bohm interpretation* and Neumaier's thermal interpretation is that entangled systems do form an undivided wholeness. Perhaps this also means that two different 'objects' can occupy the same position (or limited region of space).

*There is also a 'Humean' reading of that interpretation that denies that there is a real interaction between entangled particles and/or they form an undivided whole. For that reading it 'just happens' that particles follow a nonlocal law of motion. Just as with the superdeterminists, I don't get these realists that do not seek an explanation...if you are interested, I'll link some sources.

It has immense pragmatic utility to be so deceived. Evolution would definitely select for it. — noAxioms

Fair enough. But I find the thing curious. I can accept that a limitation of our knowledge might be useful. But (self-)deception? I find it curious, but I admit that this doesn't refute your point, of course.

Granted. A torrid universe is a possibility for instance. Finite stuff, but no edge. I think a torrid universe requires a preferred orientation for the spatial axes. I wonder if one can get around that. — noAxioms

Right!

My investigation makes us fundamentally irrational, but with rational tool at our disposal. This is kind of optimal. If the rational part was at the core, we'd not be fit.
So for instance, I am, at my core, a presentist, and I act on that belief all the time. The rational tool is off to the side, and instead of being used to rationalize the beliefs of the core part, it ignores it and tries to figure things out on its own. But it's never in charge. It cannot be. — noAxioms

I respect this. But my view is that 'being rational' is a full realization of our own nature. So, for me, it is more difficult to accept what you say here. Perhaps, however, it isn't impossible. And, also, I have different reasons to say that unrelated to the topic of the discussion.

Suppose physics says that the next state is the square root of the prior state (9). Determinism might say subsequent state is 3, but randomness says it could be 3 or -3. Either value in the block is not a violation of the physics, but if there can only be one answer, it can't be both. It can be there, so eternalism isn't violated, but it can't be predicted from the state 9. — noAxioms

Well, I don't understand how it isn't violated except if both values actualize, i.e. a MWI-like scenario (not of the modified type I imagined before)

They don't make predictions at all. If they did, only one would be true. Hence falsifiability. — noAxioms

Yes.

Catholics believe humans are born cursed. — frank

Well, the Catholics have a document where you find the current 'offical' teachings, that is the Catechism. Now, of course, I don't believe that all Catholics follow the Catechism in every respect, but it is clearly the document which I would refer to if I were to describe the Catholic teaching.

For instance, this statement isn't a correct description of what the Church officially teaches now. In the relevant section of the Catechism, we find that:

405 Although it is proper to each individual,295 original sin does not have the character of a personal fault in any of Adam's descendants. It is a deprivation of original holiness and justice, but human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death, and inclined to sin - an inclination to evil that is called concupiscence". Baptism, by imparting the life of Christ's grace, erases original sin and turns a man back towards God, but the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined to evil, persist in man and summon him to spiritual battle.

And, also, the Catechism says that 'hell' is the consequence of 'mortal sin' (see e.g. paragraphs 1033, 1037), not the original sin. This doesn't mean that historically Catholics never said that original sin alone is enough for damnation. But nowadays the Catholic church doesn't teach that. So, at least your statement should be nuanced.

Note that I am not a Catholic BTW. But I believe that before making general sweeping statements it's better to read at least 'official' sources, if there are any (see also the link to the section of the Catechism that deals with Jesus' sacrifice, which doesn't seem to contain anything like the view that you attributed to 'Catholics' in the OP).

I also plan to read this, which I only skimmed: "Feminine-Maternal Images of the Spirit in Early Syriac Tradition" (the link directly goes to a pdf). Near the end the author mentions that (p.17-18):

As mentioned earlier, although the use of feminine gender images for the
Spirit underwent a change in Syriac literature after 400 c.e., these earlier pneumatological intuitions continued into the later period. Syriac mystical authors also
employed a maternal imagery of the Spirit and tried to relate it to the life-giving
function of the Spirit. For example, John of Dalyatha, writing in eighth-century East Syria, calls the Spirit “mother” (...) and “begetter” (...).[63] For
him, in the new world of redemption wrought by the new covenant of Christ, the
Holy Spirit is the begetter of Christians.

[63] Addressing God, John of Dalyatha writes in his Letter 51, 11: “You are also the Father of the
rational beings arisen from your Spirit. This one [the Spirit] is called ‘the Generator’, in the
feminine, because he engendered all to this world so that they too might engender children in
our world. But he is ‘Générateur’ (Yhwt Y) nYd )dwl Y)when he engenders in the world
living rational beings who will not engender any more. He is the ‘Generator’ as well because he
nourishes his children and thanks to her they are increased.” Text in La Collection des Lettres
de Jean de Dalyatha [The Collected Letters of John of Dalyatha], ed. Robert Beulay, Patrologia
Orientalis 39 (Turnhout, Belgique: Brepols, 1978,) 478–479. Brock, “Come, Compassionate
Mother,” 255 remarks that Dalyatha uses the word )tdl Y (mother; one who brings forth;
begets or generates) rather than ()M)) (mother). Thus, it shows that even when a masculine
gender is applied to the Holy Spirit, the function of the Holy Spirit is compared to that of a
mother and the Spirit is called a “begetter” ()dwl Y). In fact, we can see that the mystics of
all time compared the love of the Spirit to that of a mother. St. Catherine of Sienna (d. 1380),
for example, in her Dialogue 141, writes that the Holy Spirit is like a mother to the one who
abandons himself to the providence of God. She writes: “Such a soul has the Holy Spirit as a
mother who nurses her at the breast of divine charity.” Text in Catherine of Siena, The Dialogue,
trans. Suzann Noffke, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist, 1980), 292. St. John
of the Cross (d. 1591) in The Dark Night (Book 1:2), compares the grace of God to a loving mother
who regenerates the soul: “God nurtures and caresses the soul . . . like a loving mother. . . . The
grace of God acts just as a loving mother by reengendering in the soul new enthusiasm and
fervor in the service of God.” Text in The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, tran. Kiernan
Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1979),
298.

↪boundless The premise here is that the aim of justice is punishment. Why should we accept that? — Banno

One aim is certainly punishment. In fact, it seems to me essential to any concept of justice that it aims at reward the just, protect the oppressed etc but also to punish adequately the unjust. Of course, we can debate about the nature and the characteristics of punishment and what does it mean 'adequate'. But as a general principle it just makes sense. Also, it is quite a common idea found in basically most or all cultures, so I don't think it is particularly controversial.

Of course, perhaps the nature of the 'punishment' is related to the nature of 'sin'. And, even if we remain in the Gospels, we find different analogies for 'sin'. For instance, sometimes it is compared to a debt, as in the Lord's Prayer (Matthew 6:9-15). Other times, we are told that sin is like an illness or something that make us ill and in need for a physician (Luke 5:31-32). Also, it is compared to something that enslaves us (John 8:34). So, there are different analogies for the concept of 'sin' and, therefore, we have to reconcile them in some way.

The 'debt' analogy certainly supports a 'retributive' punishment. As financial debt requires repayment (in some form or in some ways), justice requires recompense of sins. This doesn't necessarily imply that God is wrathful in giving the punishment. In my previous post, I compared God to a just judge that sentences to a just punishment the criminal. In doing so, we should not conclude that the judge seeks revenge. In fact, maybe we can even imagine that the judge is, say, the 'loving father' of my first example who still loves the son but, being also just, sentences the 'son' to the just punishment. Possibly this happens after the judge offers mercy to the criminal but, of course, the criminal should cooperate in some way and make amends - if the criminal, refuses, it is obvious to me that it is simply 'just' that he has to experience the full sentence.

The 'sickness' analogy is also interesting. Here, instead, sin is something that makes us ill. We are in need of a physician. A medicine is offered but I can imagine that if we refuse it, we have to experience the suffering that is the natural consequence of the illness itself (and of our choice of rejecting the medicine). Again, the fact that we experience the 'punishment' given by suffering that is due to the illness. Clearly, we can't blame the physician who tried to help the patient that refused to take the medicine and, as a consequence, experience the pain.

Also, the 'slavery' analogy is similar. We are offered a chance to be free. But, again, if we refuse we remain stuck in the condition of slavery. IIRC, in the roman empire a 'manumission fee' had to be paid in order to free slaves. So, the 'ransom' analogy we find in e.g. Mark 10:45 for the action of the Jesus might refer to just this.

Another real life example is addiction. The problem with addiction is that the addict refuses to get help, often even if he knows that it is for his good. As time passes, it is more difficult to get cured from the addiction. Again, the suffering the addict experiences is not due to the revenge of someone. It is simply due to the fact that the addiction itself 'ruined' him and this ruin was also a consequence of his refusal to 'renounce' to the addiction itself by getting help and sticking with the necessary therapy.

As you can probably see, there is no need to literally believe that God seeks 'revenge'. It seems to me quite natural to think that one of the aims of justice is precisely to punish the unjust (at least, if the unjust doesn't repent, make amends and so on). Certainly, the fact that one of the aims of justice is also punishment (and there are different ways to understand 'punishment' here) doesn't imply the 'penal substition' model of atonement. It is perhaps a defensible interpretation but certainly not the only one.

Also, the 'official' Catholic view of Jesus' sacrifice doesn't seem to be the 'penal substitution'. See the relavant section of the Catechism.


As a parellel, consider the Buddhist doctrine of karma (which means 'action'). Also in that case, you find the idea that bad deeds deserve some kind of punishment as a consequence. But, interesting the actions that cause 'bad consequences'/'punishments' are called 'akusala karma', which means something like 'unwholesome action', which also suggests something a notion of illness.

You might interested in this study by the syriac scholar Sebastian Brock:"The Holy Spirit as Feminine in Early Syriac literature"

I didn't actually deny that. I said it was an unsound conclusion. I do not accept it, nor do I deny it. I just think that it is an assumption which has not been adequately justified to be able to make that judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, thanks for the clarification. I disagree, but I think I understand your view better now.

After death, we may be united with God, forever. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. But that future state would be a type of 'life', right?

The interaction problem was long ago solved by Plato who proposed a third aspect as a medium of interaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. Could you give me a reference, please?

Likewise, conservation laws are ideals which do not actually represent the reality of physical interactions, which are less than perfect with respect to conservation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this is a big claim. Conservation laws have been repeteadly confirmed in experiments. Of course, I can conceive that they might be wrong, but I have good reason that they are correct or at least point to some kind of constant order.

Regarding entropy, it's not the same thing. As @Dfpolis said, entropy has more to do with our ignorance.

Sorry. I didn't see how that discussion actually applied to what I'm asking. Mind independent existence shouldn't be confined only to things that have a certain relationship to a potential mind (intelligibility). — noAxioms

No worries. As I said, it didn't help that I used terms like observer and perspective in a rather liberal way. Regarding this point you are making now about intelligibility I see you but if there are non-intelligible things, can we know them?

As explored in my reply with Ludwig V above, perhaps the unicorn is a poor example, but it is difficult (contradictory?) to identify something that has no experience associated with it. — noAxioms

And here you raise a good point, indeed. Can we really think about things that are outside our 'experience'? Read what philosopher Michel Bitbol said:

As soon as you think about something that is
independent of thought, this something is no longer independent of thought! As soon
as you try to imagine something that is independent of experience, you have an
experience of it – not necessarily the sensory experience of it, but some sort of
experience (imagination, concept, idea, etc.). The natural conclusion of this little
thought experiment is that there is nothing completely independent of experience. But
this creeping, all-pervasive presence of experience is the huge unnoticed fact of our
lives. Nobody seems to care about it. Few people seem to realize that even the
wildest speculations about what the universe was like during the first milliseconds
after the Big Bang are still experiences. Most scientists rather argue that the Big Bang
occurred as an event long before human beings existed in the universe. They can
claim that, of course, but only from within the standpoint of their own present
experience...
Ironically, then, omnipresence of experience is tantamount to its absence.
Experience is obvious; it is everywhere at this very moment. There is nothing apart
from experience. Even when you think of past moments in which you do not
remember having had any experience, this is still an experience, a present experience
of thinking about them. But this background immediate experience goes unnoticed
because there is nothing with which to contrast it.
This was well understood by Ludwig Wittgenstein, probably the most clearheaded
philosopher of the twentieth century. One of my favourite quotes of
Wittgenstein’s is this one: ‘[Conscious experience] is not a something, but not a
nothing either!’

(Michel Bitbol https://www.academia.edu/24657293/IT_IS_NEVER_KNOWN_BUT_IS_THE_KNOWER_CONSCIOUSNESS_AND_THE_BLIND_SPOT_OF_SCIENCE_")

If we answer to this that, indeed, we can know something 'mind-independent' we have to assume that what is 'mind-independent' is conveniently intelligible, at least in part. If we answer in the negative, at least a transcendental idealism seems inexcapable. Note that even with the first answer we have to explain intelligibility.

I have existence supervening on mind, so that's pretty explicitly mind dependence. That hierarchy is a proposal, not something elevated to 'belief'. It seems to work pretty well though. — noAxioms

Ok, I see. What about a dual-aspect view though? If the mental and the physical arise both from math, perhaps neither mind nor the physical has a precedence.

It kind of is if it utilizes classically deterministic primitives, and I've never seen a biological primitive that leverages randomness. All the parts seem to have evolved to leverage repeatability, sort of like how transistors do despite using quantum effects. Sure, it involves a lot more chemistry than does a computer, so in that sense, it's not the same. It doesn't implement an instruction set, but a computer need not do that either. I have designed a few computers with no instructions and no clock ticks. — noAxioms

It seems that you assume here that the only possible alternative are either determinism or probabilism. But what if our knowledge of 'the world' is limited and, in fact, the regularities of nature make room from something else?

Superdeterminism is supposed to be local — noAxioms

Yeah, but ironically even it needs the existence of wildly nonlocal unexplained correlations that some how 'trick us' in believing that 'local realism' is false. One might, however, ask the superdeterminist how these correlations were there in the first place.

Yes, local realism has been falsified. Here, realism has somewhat a different meaning that what the realists mean by the word. — noAxioms

Yes, but there is a resemblance. In physics, the lack of realism means that physical quantities have no definite values unless they are measured (take your favorite interpretation of what a 'measurement' is, it's not relevant for what I am saying now). In philosophy, 'realism' strictly speaking not only means that there is a 'mind-independent reality' but also that it is knowable. Kant's transcendental idealism is not a 'realism' in this strict sense because it posit an unknowable 'mind-independent reality'. The resemblance here is that both claim there is always something 'definite'.
So, while I agree that that 'local realism' in physics is not really a metaphysical category, it seems to me that some metahphysical models - even 'anti-realist' in the philosophical sense - have been excluded. For instance, Schopenhauer's version of transcendental idealism was proven wrong.

There is a way to falsify presentism: Just jump into a large black hole. Presentism says it is impossible to be inside one since the interior never happens. No point in doing so of course, but you'll know for sure during what short time you have left to live. — noAxioms

Here I use relationism to defend presentism. Since there is no 'view from nowhere', when I jump into a black hole for me time stops. For you, it doesn't. So a global presentism is certainly refuted, but perhaps a local one?

What's the point of MWI if not to point out that all potentialities (valid solutions to the wave function) occur? Some do and some don't? That seems to make far less sense, a reintroduction of dice rolling for no purpose. — noAxioms

Well, the merit of such a 'MWI' would be to reintroduce a version of 'potentiality'. Also, if the world isn't deterministic, it makes clear that "things could have been otherwise". Of course, I don't think that such a MWI alone would be able to explain QM's results. But maybe it can be integrated in some ways.

Wasn't the question though. The question was, do you have an opinion about it? What's the most mind-independent thing you can describe, something as unlike an apple as you can get? Does describing it disqualify it? I'm still not clear where you stand with unicorns, or a better example than unicorns. — noAxioms

Funny thing is that, dependending on the context, I'll answer in different ways. In general, I believe that we can't know if there is something mind-independent. However, that there is some mind-independent reality is the most plausible asumption we can make. I would perhaps say that, in general, living beings are what is certainly mind-independent, they can't be understood as parts of any 'representation' of our cognitive faculties.

Also, I should add, however, that in a deeper sense, perhaps, nothing is 'mind independent'. As I mentioned before, I lean towards some of forms of 'ontological idealism' and theism, some forms of mind as fundamental. But such a 'mind' is not our own.

Sorry, I know it isn't clear.

One does not present evidence of a negative. One provides a counterexample to falsify it. — noAxioms

Well, for instance, I have the 'impression' that my actions are neither deterministic nor probabilistic. And that impression is quite strong for me. So, I consider that immediate impression as evidence that, perhaps, there is something other than determinism or probabilism. Prove me wrong.

Example: It evolves naturally in one and by chance in many others. — noAxioms

Or maybe they are different 'versions' or aspects of the same object.

You should have grouped the parentheses from the right, yielding a much larger number. Anyway, that number is the distance, in meters, between a certain pair of stars, given 1) an infinite universe, and 2) counterfactuals, the latter of which is dubious. Still, a distance between potential stars then. — noAxioms

Well, right, but if the universe is not infinite, then, you can conceive a natural number that hasn't a 'referent'. Note that even for a simple structure as natural numbers, then, it's difficult to find a 'physical support'. You already need an infinite universe!

Probably, but out experience is physical, the same regardless of frame chosen to describe it. This is sort of like the twin paradox, illustrating that while time dilation is a coordinate effect (frame dependent), differential aging (noting the different ages of twins at reunion) is physical: the same difference regardless of frame choice. — noAxioms

While I can't concede you that 'experience is physical' you make a good point here.

Why can't we spatially separate them? — noAxioms

I meant to write something like: "if local realism is wrong, is there a non-arbitrary way of distinguishing objects? If so how?"

Disagree. Change is typically defined as difference in state over time, and eternalism is not incompatible with that. The illusion of time flow is a gift of evolution, allowing beings to predict the immediate future and be far more fit that something that can't. — noAxioms

But from our experience of change, we get the a very convincing impression that the present alone is real and the future and the past aren't. Eternalism says that past, present and future are equally real. So, it is interesting that, if eternalism is right, we are favoured by a very deep self-deception.

Trust it. Just because it isn't rational doesn't mean that it isn't essential for fitness. — noAxioms

Yes, but note that if experience goes so wrong and it is the starting point of science even science itself has shaky grounds so to speak.

Science actually doesn't render much of an opinion, but rational logic does. Humans are by nature not rational. It takes effort to ignore the biases. — noAxioms

We are potentially truly rational beings. We can be rational but very often we either can't or choose not to be.

This sounds like MWI until the part of about partial actualization. Not sure what it is with that. MWI is a very deterministic interpretation, but with the partial actualization bit thrown in, it ceases to be. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. And I don't see it as a problem.

Disagree, per the examples I gave. Presentism vs eternalism is merely an ontological difference. If one is possible without determinism, then so is the other. — noAxioms

Honestly, I do not get how non-deterministic models are compatible with eternalism. I'll reflect on what you have wrote.

Having said that, and having floated the idea that ontology is a mental designation, it would seem to follow that presentism and eternalism are the same thing, just interpreted differently, an abstract different choice without any truth behind it. I hadn't realized that until now. — noAxioms

Well, I'm not sure how this doesn't imply something like either a form of idealism or a radical skepticism. The only possible way I can think of that they can both be 'true' is that they give good predictions and are useful.

They're life forms, so of course not. But they're bloody close to full automatons. Super close to what a herd of identically manufactured robots would be like, which admittedly aren't designed to work together. Maybe nanobots, which are. — noAxioms

Again, I believe that we have to agree to disagree here. Based on how experience my choices, I am open to the possibility that also ants might not have an 'algorithmic mind'. So, while robots can emulate the ants' behavior (becuase they are programmed to do so), I question that they would be the same.

To use a probably not very good analogy, it is like to compare a portrait of a human being to the human being. It well represents some features of the human being but certainly they aren't the same.

Reality is an interpretation of empirical data. That's what I'm calling an interpretation here. People interpret that data differently, so there's all these different opinions of what is real. If being real is no more than an ideal (a mental designation), then there's no truth to the matter. — noAxioms

...Unless, there is something that goes 'beyond' the representations that gives an independent criterion on the 'truthfulness' of the representations.

It wasn't a named quality back then. Nothing with the language to name it. So was it what we now call a thermostat? It's not like it was this funny isolated object, separate from what it controlled. It was spread out, integrated throughout what needed to have its temperature regulated. — noAxioms

By quality I meant 'what makes a thermostat, a thermostat'. If I negate the mind-independence of that, there is no mind-independent thermostat. Note that a 'thermostat' is dependent on the existence of the 'temperature'. But is 'temperature' a property of things outside our conceptual categories or is a concept we introduced to make sense of our experience?

So strong emergence becomes the emergence of a new level of topological organisation that imposes itself on the materiality that underpins it, and thus allows itself to be that which it is. Some globally persistent new state of order. — apokrisis

If I were to make a physicalist model of the emergence of life, I would think as a sort of 'phase transition', where we have the formation of 'systems', which as you say, are wholes that constrain and influence the 'behavior' of their parts.

So, you go from a situation where the wholes (except the universe) are reducible to a situation where there are structures which are not reducible and the 'world' becomes truly 'divided' into systems which are undivided wholes which are able to give global constraints on their parts and have a relative autonomy from what is 'outside'. But in order to explain such a transition in a model, you need to say that, in some sense, such a transition is a potentiality that, once the right conditions are met, becomes actual.

If such a potentiality is not to be found in the parts of these systems, then the alternative I can think of is that it is to be found in the order of the 'cosmos'. In this case, the emergence of life is a potentiality enfolded in the regularities of the whole universe which remains implicit until the right conditions are met.

I don't think that assigning a property to the 'whole' - indeed, the whole universe - is something alien to physics. In fact, the conservation laws can be thought as being properties of 'isolated systems', rather than a (weakly) emergent features of their parts.

Of course, I have no idea of how such a 'potentiality' could be 'expressed' in a theory. I don't know if it is even possible. But I would say that if the cosmos itself is a whole that can constrain the behavior of its parts, then it is more understandable how at least some features which we associate with life can 'emerge' or, perhaps, it's better to say 'actualized'. Does this make sense to you?

We disagree then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes!

I don't. And, I don't think anyone can. But I don't pretend. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I see, thanks. When I remarked about the 'refinements' I meant that IMO the arising of life is still partly unexplained. So, I sort of agree here.

Do you think that you apprehend inconsistency in what I wrote? If so, please point it out to me so I can address it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it seemed to me that you said that scientific theories are good for explaining the past but you also denied that there is a time 'before' the arising of life.

It still looks like death to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting. Why? I mean, I can understand having misgivings about a static state as being 'life' but a 'dynamic state' can be regarded as life. What do you find objectionable here? I think that it is also a pretty universal theme that the 'multiplicity' of goals we have in our life here is a detriment.

As you'll see from my reply to apokrisis, I believe in reduction, but not in physicalism. I believe that reduction is what ultimately demonstrates the necessity of dualism, which I believe in. The modern trend for physicalists is to turn away from reductionism, because it cannot succeed without dualism. At the base of material existence is the immaterial, as cause. So I think that this turning away from reductionism, is a mistake. The physicalists cannot bear the consequences, the necessity of dualism which reduction leads to, so instead of facing that reality, they retreat to a new form of physicalism, which, as it is physicalism, is equally mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. To be honest, I am torn. On the one hand, I am inclined to agree with you here. Given the success of reductionism, it is reasonable to think that the 'physical' is reductionist. I am not sure, however, if the 'physical' is necessarily reductionist.

I do agree with you that reductionism fails with life and mind and this is a big issue that physicalists have to face.

As I said before, I am not myself a physicalist. Dualism has its own advantages but it's not without problems. For instance, how can we explain the mind-body interactions if the mind and body are different substances? Would such an interaction 'respect', say, the conservation laws that seem to always hold?

Not really. I’ve heard his name here and there on the forum, but I don’t really know what his beliefs were. — T Clark

Ok, I think you would find his thoughts germane.

Are speed, distance, time, and force abstract ideas? Do they exist? How about goals, purposes, and intentions? — T Clark

I have a very clear experience of having goals, purposes, and intentions. Perhaps, I am deceving myself but I would take my immediate experience as a strong evidence for that.

Regarding forces, well, our understanding of them changed dramatically over the centuries. Clearly, one can't hold the Newtonian model of forces literally nowadays. That concept of force is without a doubt useful, but it doesn't seem a faithful description of something real.

Regarding distance, speed, time well, I would say we have to be carefule here. Our experience of change is as real as our experience of having goals, I would say or even more immediate. Notice however that perhaps 'time' in physics isn't necessarily the same thing of that. Honestly, however, it is difficult for me to imagine a physics 'without time'. How could one even think of a 'dynamics'?

Distances is a different business. In the newtonian model, space is absolute and distances are also absolute. But perhaps distances are more like relations between things. So, I guess this doesn't mean that are 'abstract ideas' but, still, it doesn't seem obvious to me what is the right way to understand them.

Anyway, in general, I think that it is difficult to pin down the 'right interpretation' of what physical quantities really are.

I don’t think there’s any serious debate among scientists. Philosophers? Among philosophers everything is always a matter of debate. — T Clark

Well, perhaps many scientists are simply uninterested in these topics. But, again, if you think of, say, relativity reflecting on what distances are have been fundamental for development of science.

That makes condemnation to Hell a little more horrifying. God has no feelings about it one way or the other. — frank

In one model of damnation, hell is not a consequence of God's wrath. God loves all but can't force people to accept that love. Hell is seen as the natural consequence of the sinner's rejection of that love.

As a human analogy, consider the case of a father that loves his son who decided to join a criminal gang. The father tries as best as he can to convince his son to abandon his ways. Out of his pride, however, the son rejects his father's love and, in fact, resents him. This despite the fact that, after all, the son is actually acting for his own detriment. As time passes, we can imagine that the son gradually becomes more and more entrenched in his ways and it becomes more and more difficult for him to change his ways - not because he is not offered the possibility to change his ways but it is because as time passes, the son becomes more and more entrenched in his evil ways.

In another model of damnation, hell is simply the 'just punishment' that a sinner deserves. Such a punishment is not made out of revenge. In this case, mercy from that punishment is offered from God but the sinner rejects that offer and, then, he suffers the just punishment.

An analogy here would be the following one. Consider a man that made a crime and he is offered the chance of have his penalty significantly reduced if he sincerely repents and cooperate with justice and law enforcement. This man, however, refuses to just do that and he is sentenced to his own penalty. Again, it's not that the judge sentences the criminal out of revenge but, simply, he gives him the right punishment.

Note that the two models here do not view punishment as due to revenge, hatred or indifference from God's part and perhaps they can be reconciled with one another.

For me also. There's no better way to understand what you believe than to bump up against something you don't believe. — T Clark

:up: Also, note that I am also conscious that sometimes I use terms in an idiosyncratic way. I try to avoid that as much as possible, but our discussion helped me to be more carefult about that.

For what it's worth, I don't call myself a physicalist, although you might. I call myself a pragmatist. — T Clark

No. From this discussion alone I would not have concluded that you are a physicalist or not. Furthermore, IIRC you also made some posts in the past about Taoism from which I would have said that your view isn't physicalist, i.e. a view that ultimate reality is physical. Taoism seems to assert that there is an ultimate reality that transcends conceptual categories.

[BTW, as an aside I don't know if you are familiar with David Bohm's philosophical views (starting from his 1957 book "Causality and Chance" onward). I believe that, perhaps, it's the closest you can get to Taoism among modern physicists.]

That said, it is also true that is some cases it is even difficult to classify metaphysical views in neat categories.

I doubt Feynman thought "he ontological status 'mass-energy' is a rather controversial topic." That's certainly not what he wrote in that quote you included. — T Clark

I quoted Feynman because he says that the conservation of energy is an 'abstract idea', which IMO implies that he also viewed that energy itself is an 'abstract idea', i.e. a concept that is useful to us but not necessarily something that 'represents' something external.
At the same time, you also find some presentations of the concept that give the idea that energy is actually a 'thing', especially when you hear someone explain how matter and spacetime affect each other in GR.

Until quite recently, it was perhaps quite reasonable to interpret 'mass' as 'quantity of matter'. But with the mass-energy equivalence even mass becomes quite elusive and is now regarded as a synonym of energy. It's also true that some now interpret the mass-energy equivalence in a way that, more or less, suggests that energy is a measure of the quantity of matter.

In any case, I believe that the precise ontological status of physical quantities like 'mass', 'energy', 'momentum', 'electric charge' etc is still a matter of debate among scientists and philosophers.

This is a great response. Wayfarer, @Metaphysician Undercover, @boundless, and I will all be able to say "See, Apokrisis agrees with me." — T Clark

Well, I also agree that @apokrisis made a good post but honestly, I need to re-read it. Many things are above my paygrade in that post. So, before commenting I need some time.

I notice nobody has really addressed the core question of this topic. — noAxioms

Not sure why you said that, after, for instance, the discussion we had about intelligibility and the 'perspectives'.

the question of this topic is not about the moon, but about the unicorn. If the unicorn exists, why? If it doesn't, why? Most say it doesn't, due to lack of empirical evidence, but if empirical evidence is a mind-dependent criteria. Sans mind, there is no empirical evidence to be considered. — noAxioms

Well, it is a rather difficult point, right? If our empirical knowledge was a perfect knowledge of 'reality' we would be certain that unicorns exist or do not exist. Our knowledge, however, is certainly limited even for a direct realist. On the other hand, a direct realist might say that, in principle, we could know that. But, again, their opponents would however raise the issue: "how can you be certain that the way 'physical reality' appears to you isn't filtered with your own cognitive faculties?". As I said, I believe that we arrive an antinomy here. On the other hand, you was pretty explicit that at the fundamental level of your hierachy we have mathematics and mind is after the physical. Ho can you claim that?

Perhaps, but then arguably neither does your brain. It's the process that does the understanding, not the hardware. For instance, if a human was to be simulated down to the neurochemical level (molecular level is probably unnecessary), then the person simulated would know what it's like to feel pain, but neither the computer, program, or programmers would in any way know this. — noAxioms

Well, denying that we can't understand meaning goes against the immediate evidence. It is a phenomenological given. It's hard to deny that and I would not unless I have a very strong reason for doing so. You also assume that the simulated brain is enough to have sentience. Even within a physicalist model, however, I would question that. What if, instead, that brain needs to be in a body which, in turn, needs to be in an environment and so on...?
Also, I believe that there is no consensus that our mind is algorithmical. So, before saying this, you would also make a case that our mind is, indeed, like a computer.

Hard to use 'intent' in the context of ants, but it can be done. — noAxioms

Agreed. Unfortunately, we do not have enough words to avoid ambiguity. Ants do not move and behave as stones do. They do not 'intend' as we do, either, but they certainly have goal-directed actions.

'Intelligible' is a relation, not a property, so X might be intelligible to Y, but not to Z. — noAxioms

Here I disagree. While, it can be the case that X is intelligible for Y and not to Z, I would say that this is due to the limitations of the agents. I believe that something is either intelligible, or not.

My opinion: mind independence has no requirement of intelligibility, but 'reality' does since it seems to be a mental designation. So I agree with your statement. — noAxioms

Well, you agree for different reasons, however. Not sure why you seem to label 'reality' what I would call a 'representation' or an 'interpretation' of reality.

Do the qualities of 'being a chair' and 'being a thermostat' exist independently of our minds'? I don't think so. — noAxioms

Agree with that. — noAxioms

Good! To me this means that those qualities are part of our representation/interpretation and not of the mind-independent 'reality'. I also happen to have a difficult time to say the precise 'cut-off' where we can safely say "this quality is, indeed, something that is outside of our representation. It is indeed mind-independent". Hence the antinomy.

Not by that name anyway. There have been thermostats long before humans came around and made some more. But that name is under 2 centuries old, and a human-made mechanical device serving that function is only around 4 centuries old. — noAxioms

How can a thermostat be there long before humans came around if the quality of 'being a thermostat' is mind-dependent?

There you go. What's the difference between calling something magic by another word (immaterial mind say), and just calling it 'yet undiscovered physics'. The latter phrasing encourages further investigation, but the former seems to discourage it, declaring it a matter of faith and a violation of that faith to investigate further. Hence no effort is made to find where/how that immaterial mind manages to produce material effects. — noAxioms

Ok, I would say I agree with this. But, in general, I would say "yet undiscovered phenomena" rather than "physics", but I am okay with that.

Of course. No metaphysical interpretation is falsifiable. The ones that are are not valid interpretations. — noAxioms

Yes. I believe that certain classes of metaphysical interpretations are falsifiable, but not broad categories like 'idealism' or 'naturalism'. For instance, a 'local realist naturalism' has been falsified by Bell's experiement (BTW, I believe that even superdeterminism is actually a form of nonlocality...).

Yes, as I tried to point out with my dark matter example. If something new comes along, the magic it used to be becomes natural, and naturalism is by definition safe. But it isn't a specific interpretation in itself since naturalism doesn't specify the full list of natural laws. — noAxioms

Yup!

Agree. There is for instance no 'state of the entire universe', only a state relative to say some event. MWI is quite similar except it does away with the relation business and goes whole hog on the absolute universe, a thing with the property of being real. Since there's nothing relative to which any state might be, there's no states, just a giant list of possible solutions to the universal wave function. It's still that one structure. One can extend MWI to include different possible states of an even more universal wave function, including different values for all the universal constants, but MWI itself seems confined to just this one set of values for those constants. — noAxioms

Right! BTW, as time passes, I am growing more sympathetic with MWI and MWI-like models if interpreted as describing potentialities. I believe, however, that the mistake of these models is to assume that all potentialities actualize, i.e. a belief that whatever can happen, will happen.

(Some time ago, I read that there is even a version of MWI where the universal wavefunctions never branches. Rather, there are simply parallel 'worlds' which evolve deterministically and independently from each other and the branching is merely an illusion due to a lack of knowledge of the existence of the other 'worlds'.)

What actually IS mind independent is super difficult to glean since it's a mind doing it. "Not only is the Universe stranger than we think, it is stranger than we can think.” -- Heisenberg — noAxioms

Right! This is in fact a point I was making with my reference to the 'antinomy'. To be honest, I think that you do realize that there is an antinomy but at the same time you are reluctant to accept the consequences of that. Your notion of 'reality' is quite similar to the notion of 'empirical reality', 'representation' and so on that you find in d'Espagnat view of 'empirical and veiled reality', transcendental/epistemic idealism and also some versions of ontological idealism and realism.
I accept the presence of the antinomy and I think that this implies that we simply can't be certain about what is 'mind-independent'. In contrast to what transcendental/epistemic idealists would say, however, I think that it is reasonable to say that we can have some knowledge of the 'independent reality' but we can't prove it.

Our understanding of it certainly is conceptual, but I have no trouble accepting that the mathematics in itself is not. — noAxioms

A little like my concept of the moon and the moon in itself, but that relation is quite different since I have a mutual measurement relation with the moon and it doesn't work that way with 3. — noAxioms

Interesting, thanks. Oddly enough, I would even say something similar about my view of math. Even if 3 is conceptual, this doesn't mean that we understand it completely.

Tegmarks MUH book spends a lot of pages doing that, but in short, if there is nothing doesn't see to follow mathematical law, then the proposal is valid.
There's problems with this. There are a lot of mathematical objects which include me in it, exactly as I am with no experiential difference, and yet the object containing me like that is so very different than the one we model. That is a super big problem with the view, that needs to be addressed. — noAxioms

Two points here. Regarding the first sentence, I believe that you have not presented sufficient evidence to say that.
Regarding what you say later, I might agree. It seems that the same 'object' can be found in different mathematical structures. If MUH was right, this would imply that the 'object' exists. But how can we make sense of the fact that the same object exists in different structures? In a sense, to me this shows that math perhaps isn't enough to explain 'things'.

That sounds like the 'fire breathing' spoken of. Not necessary. 2 and 2 add up to 4 despite lack of instantiation by any mechanism actually performing that calculation. Similarly, a more complex mathematical entity (say the initial state of the universal wave function) yields me despite lack of real-ness. — noAxioms

I guess that I would repeat what I said before. Interesting, but I don't find convincing.

Agree. That the universe is mathematical does not in any way imply that we can fully understand the mathematics, or far worse, understand something complex in terms of tiny primities, which is like trying to understand Mario Kart in terms of electron motion through silicon. — noAxioms

I agree. Also, mathematical structures are holistic. Take the natural numbers. The set of natural numbers can't be reduced to its components. Rather you define the set and then you discover the relations between the numbers. Of course, I am not denying that we perhaps constructed and learn the set of natural numbers by starting from concrete examples. But at a certain point the set is to be seen as an undivided whole and it contains things that do not have a 'referent' in nature. For instance I am not sure that the number ((10000000000^100000000000000)^100000000000000)^100000000000000 is instantiated in our universe, despite being finite.

Yea, that sign makes it not quite the same thing, eh? Both aspects of the same 'object', but different properties in that direction. — noAxioms

Oddly enough, time and space are present only if you specify the reference frame. If not, you have only the spacetime and its intervals. So, I am not even sure that they are aspects of spacetime and not, say, arbitrary way of carving it.

One does not travel through spacetime. Travel is something done through space. It's an interpretation, a mental convenience. Reference frames are definitely abstractions. — noAxioms

And yet are space and time are quite 'real', right? They are a phenomenological given, immediate features of our experience. Is there a relation between reference frames and our experience?

Intuitive maybe, but it's been demonstrated to be quite wrong. There is no valid locally real interpretation, and Einstein seems to argue for one.

He should have been around when Bell did his thing. He'd have to choose since the stance you describe is invalid. Locality or realism. Can't have cake and eat it too. — noAxioms

Yup! BTW, what I find powerful of Bell's theorem and the experiments that confirmed it is that some metaphysical views of reality have since been refuted.

One, however, might feel the plight of Einstein and ask: "Well, then, how can we 'carve' the world into distinct objects if we can't spatially sperate them??" And voilà we discovered that the problem is very deep and there is no consensus about this even among experts.

But there is no evidence one way or another, except eternalism is the simpler model, but then the simplest quantum models also don't mesh well with one's intuitions. So instead of needing more evidence (there isn't any to start with), you need to justify the more complicated model. — noAxioms

The problem with rejecting our 'intuitions' is when these intuitions are immediate aspects of our experience. The flow of time is probably the strongest example. If eternalism is right, change is merely illusory. But if our experience is so wrong about something 'obvious' like that, how can I trust it? Science, after all, is empirical. If our experience gets something basic like that so wrong, how can even trust science?

Quite right. If it's true, our experience of it is a lucky guess since the view makes not empirical difference. — noAxioms

Right! And the mystery goes deeper! If the alternative to eternalism is a presentism that, in fact, does even justify the very reason we went in search for a presentism...

boundless: Right! But without determinism, I can't see how a block universe is untenable. — noAxioms

Of course, I meant 'tenable' not 'untenable'

It's a kind of determinism, but not what's usually meant by the term. A block model with randomness just means that a subsequent state does not necessarily follow from some prior state. An atom might decay or might not. Bohm says that there are hidden variables that determine if it will or not. MWI says it both decays and doesn't. There is no state evolution at all under RQM since it's all hindsight, but RQM is not considered deterministic. Most of the rest are not. In a block context, that might mean that there's randomness in state evolution, but the history is all there. It's dice rolls, but equivalently all in the past so to speak. — noAxioms

Not sure if I understood. If the state truly evolves, you can't have a block universe. Unless you mean that potentialites are what is described by 'eternalism'.

In fact, this is quite close to how I see it. As potentialities, all 'histories' are 'there' and eternalism is right for them. They have a weird 'virtual' existence, so to speak. They aren't 'nothing' but they aren't properly 'something'. Not all potentialities actualize. What is actual is what is truly 'real'.

No, at least not the kind of determinism that QM is talking about. I actually listed 6 kinds of determinism, and block universe was only one of them, but the one the name talks about is a different kind. — noAxioms

My point was that you need to have determinism in order to have eternalism. If 'the flow of time' is illusory, in order to have consistency, you need to assume determinism. If determinism is false then the future isn't inevitable.

Yes, talking about that, and what it did was generalize an absolutist interpretation (LET) of physics. LET is the special case like SR, only applicable to zero energy situation. Schmelzer finally extended that interpretation to include gravity.

My reference is just the paper. Most of what I asserted about it comes from the abstract. Not like I read the rest of it. But it supports presentism far better, and it can be falsified similar to the way one falsifies the afterlife. Can't publish the results. — noAxioms

Ok, thanks for the clarification!

However, and this is something that I picked up from one of the sources I mentioned earlier, organisms try to persist - they try to keep existing. Inorganic matter has no analogy for that. — Wayfarer

Right!

Many decades ago, I had the set of six books by Swami Vivekananda on yoga philosophy. Vivekananda's concept of 'involution preceding evolution' is an aspect of his philosophical framework that bridges Eastern spiritual thought with Western scientific ideas. In this understanding, involution refers to the process by which consciousness becomes increasingly involved in or identified with matter, transitioning from subtle to gross manifestations. This is essentially the descent of consciousness into material form.
... — Wayfarer

Interesting, thanks. It seems more or less what Bohm said even if, I believe, the starting point was the opposite (however, I don't believe that Bohm's view were physicalist...).

Anyway, I believe that you can build a physicalist model that incorporates principles like potentiality, actuality and so on. I believe that some reject them because they believe they imply something transcendent, idealism or whatever. But it isn't necessarily the case.


I am not a physicalist myself but I respect physicalist models that are not reductionistic. I even believe that, once reductionism is abandoned, even a physicalist can make sense of many things associated with 'spirituality'.

I do have those reasons, and I mentioned some, the failure of science where the current theories reach their limits. These are issues like dark matter and dark energy in physics, and the need to assume random mutations and abiogenesis in biology. As I said, what these failings indicate is not that we need to extend conventional theories further, but that the theories need to be replaced with something fundamentally different, a paradigm shift. Therefore the current concept of "the universe" is a false concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

... And I don't beleive that questioning those things you mentioned is enough to abandon the concept of the 'universe' as a totality. Dark matter and dark energy give us testable predictions. We might not have a good understanding of them but this doesn't mean that we won't in the future. Abiogenesis is the consensual view among the scientific community. Unfortunately, I have not a training in biology so I'm not sure if there are valid alternatives. I believe that there is perhaps something missing in our current understanding of biological evolution. But evolutionary theory had an incredible success and it can't be denied. I believe that there are rooms for 'refinements', so to speak. In fact, I believe that problems occur when one wants to insist on a reductionist reading of evolution.

Anyway, if you believe that our understanding of the history before the arising of life is wrong, what do you think happened? How do you explain the arising of life?

That is the whole point. Evidence indicates that something does transcend what is known as "the universe", and what can be known scientifically. That is why the need for metaphysics is very real, and why physicalism must be rejected. Observation based knowledge is severely handicapped in its ability to apprehend the totality of temporal reality. All observations are of things past, and the future cannot be observed in any way whatsoever. This means that observation based knowledge, empirical sciences, are only accurate toward understanding half of reality, the past, while the future lies entirely beyond scientific apprehension. We can predict what will come to pass, based on observations of the past, but this in no way indicates that we understand the nature of what is in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do your points here about the past square with what you said before with respect to our understanding of cosmology, biology etc?

In any case, I would agree that our understanding of 'reality' is limited and, also, that the reductionist 'paradigm' doesn't help.
At the end of one of my previous posts I mentioned a quote by physicist and philosopher David Bohm: “It may indeed be said that life is enfoldes in the totality and that, even when it is not manifest, it is somehow 'implicit' in what we generally call a situation in which there is no life." (Wholeness and the Implicate Order, chapter 7, p. 246). Now, if life is understood as an implicit potentiality within the intelligible order of the cosmos - and not something to be understood in terms of the properties of the particles that 'make up' living beings - I believe that a physicalist model of life is possible. I believe that reductionism is wrong but reductionism is not the only possibility for a physicalist.

Of course, this might not be true. But unless there are convincing arguments that show that the 'potentiality for life' (or consciousness) requires a transcendent cause non-reductionist physicalist models aren't excluded, that is models where the 'fundamental reality' is the whole. After all, even, say, a star might be understood in a 'reductionist' way but, at the same time, according to our present cosmological model, the very coming into existence of a star is possible because the universe has evolved in a certain way.

Admittedly, what I am saying here is sketchy at best. But, again, all theories start as sketchy ideas.

I think death is what is implied by that statement of Augustine, where he says "rest in You". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't want to derail the thread to a discussion about theology but I just note that, apparently, 'death' wasn't what Augustine had in mind given that he was a Christian. Of course, you might say that, perhaps, if 'heaven' is a static state perhaps it is equivalent of death. I am not sure about that but I do think that it is an interesting point.
On the other hand, I believe that St. Gregory of Nyssa had a quite dynamic understanding of the state of the blessed (which he called 'epektasis'), where the participation of the blessed in the communion with God will forever increase. In a sense, this means that the desire for the Good will never be satisfied. But at the same time, the blessed do not fall away from the communion because they know that they can't find ultimate peace, happiness and so on anything except God. In a sense, however, I would say that even in this dynamic model the blessed yearning for the good is satisfied in the sense that they stopped to seek elsewhere the source of their happiness. Would you agree at least with this?

No the mass is not given by "the mass of the interactions", it is given by the force. This is the basis of the energy-mass equivalence. And "force" is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, especially if we remove the mass required for momentum, to conceive of a force without any mass, to allow that the energy-mass equivalence represents something real. If the energy-mass equivalence is real, then there must be a force, called "energy", without any mass. This force would turn out to be nothing but the passing of time itself. Since the principles of physics don't allow us to conceive of a force without some sort of momentum, in application the photon must be assigned some mass, to account for its momentum, this is "relativistic mass". — Metaphysician Undercover

Force and interaction are synonyms in physics. And nowadays fundamental interactions are understood in terms of exchange of particles. The best known example is the photon which is the mediator of the electro-magnetic interaction. The photon has energy, therefore it has mass via the mass-energy equivalence. It does not have 'rest mass' (or 'rest energy') because it travels at light speed. But a photon has a quantity of energy.
I am pretty sure that the mass of the nucleons is understood as due to the masses of the quarks and, also, of the masses of the mediators of the forces between them.

As I noted, you and I are just too far apart on this. — T Clark

Fair enough. Nevertheless, it has been an interesting discussion for me.

We've been through this. The physicalism you seem to be talking about is the reductionism you and I both reject. — T Clark

Yes! I think that reductionist versions of physicalism have serious problems. But this isn't the case for non-reductionist versions. After, 'physicalism' can be a very broad category.

For example, at the end of my previous post I mentioned David Bohm. I don't think that he was a physicalist but I do believe that his ideas of 'implicate order' and 'explicate order' are not incompatible with physicalism per se, only with its reductionist variants.

Mass is energy. Energy is mass. Your conception of what is real and what is not doesn't make much sense to me. — T Clark

Well, the ontological status 'mass-energy' is a rather controversial topic, I believe. For instance, this is how the famous physicist Richard Feynman introduced the concept in his Lectures:

In this chapter, we begin our more detailed study of the different aspects of physics, having finished our description of things in general. To illustrate the ideas and the kind of reasoning that might be used in theoretical physics, we shall now examine one of the most basic laws of physics, the conservation of energy.

There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing all natural phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law—it is exact so far as we know. The law is called the conservation of energy. It states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in the manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity which does not change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number and when we finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same. (Something like the bishop on a red square, and after a number of moves—details unknown—it is still on some red square. It is a law of this nature.) Since it is an abstract idea, we shall illustrate the meaning of it by an analogy.

I believe that our concept 'mass-energy' either corresponds or represent a property that physical systems have and which can be measured. I don't think it is a 'thing' or anything substantial. I'm not sure what you are taking issue with.
The points I was making do not rely on a particular ontological position about 'mass-energy', 'momentum' etc. If they are simply 'abstract ideas', as Feynman put it, nothing really changes.

In the same way, when Aristotle speaks of telos, he’s not always invoking a designer’s intention or a conscious goal. He’s pointing to the formative structure of things — the way they unfold, and what they tend toward in their becoming. The acorn doesn’t “intend” to be an oak tree, but neither is its development just accident and brute cause. — Wayfarer

I believe that this is a key insight here.

I wonder, however, that perhaps we can even think of an even more general notion of 'goal-directed action' or final cause. Before continuining with my post, I'll now make a distinction between 'laws of nature' and 'order of nature'. 'Laws of nature' are our theoretical descriptions of the regularities of phenomena. 'Order of nature' is, instead, the order that we might assume there is in nature as an explanation of the regularities themselves. I don't think we can 'prove' that this order exist but it seems a reasonable hypothesis to assume there is.

I believe that if one assumes the existence of such an 'order' there are interesting consequences here. Of course, we must assume that the 'laws of nature' allow the existence of life. We and other living beings exist, so we should infer that a supposed 'theory of everything' should not contradict this. But if the 'laws' reflect an 'order' and if we assume that such an order is intelligible, we have to assume that life has always been a potentiality in this order. If this is true, we can't really understand that 'order' without understanding life.

All analogies have a limited value but the analogy of the acorn seed and the oak is relevant here. When the right conditions are met, from an acorn seed an oak can arise and develop. In the same way, when the right conditions are met, living beings come into existence. If there was not a potentiality, however, the arising of life would not be intelligible and if we assume that nature is intelligible, this would imply that the arising of life would be simply impossible.

Of course, the reductionist might argue this alone doesn't prove much. For instance, he might argue that life might be a 'potentiality' in analogous way that we might say that 'pressure of a gas' is a potentiality. But 'pressure of a gas' is a property that can be fully comprehended by examining the properties of the particles that compose the gas. I honestly have never found a convincing argument that shows that life and consciousness can be understood in a similar way as 'temperature', 'pressure' and so on 'emerge' from the properties of the constituents of an inanimate object. The issue is contentious.

But, of course, even if it were right that life and consciousness do not 'emerge' in the same ways that pressure, temperature etc do, not even in this case we should conclude that they do not emerge. I believe that here the Aristotelian concepts of 'potentiality' and 'act' help. If life and cosnciousness can't be understood by solely pointing to the properties of the physical constituents of a living and/or conscious being, then, perhaps, the 'potentiality' might be understood as a property of the intelligible order of nature or the universe itself, i.e. the whole that 'contains' both the beings and their parts. So, perhaps, we can't fully understand life and consciousness without understanding the intelligible order of the cosmos itself.

Notice that even for the non-living things, we can understand their 'behavior' in reductionist and holistic terms. The pressure of a gas can be understood as arising - 'emerging' - from the properties of its constituents. But it can also be understood as a potentiality of the intelligible order of the universe. We can understand the behavior of a gas with reference to the laws of nature. Another example might be the evolution of the universe described in cosmology. We do have a model of how the universe* evolved, how the expansion, the decrease of temperature and so on allowed the formations of stars, galaxies and so on. These features can be understood in terms of the properties of their parts but also as features that emerged from the evolution of the cosmos. The same goes, perhaps, for life and consciousness. It seems unlikely, though, that this 'emergence' of life and consciousness can be understood in reductionist terms.

If life and consciousness can't be understood in reductionistic terms, then, reductionism is not a good way to understand things. This doesn't exclude all forms of physicalism, just the reductionist/mechanicist ones. Also the question "why there is the potentiality for the 'emergence' of life and consciousness in the first place?" remains. Perhaps, there is a transcendent reason for that potentiality. But I don't think that it can be 'proven'. But if reductionism is false and a non-reductionist phyiscalism were right, then I believe that 'telos', 'potentiality', 'act' should be considered something that pertains the order of the cosmos.

I hope to respond to the rest later.

*Edit: I think it's important to note that here I am saying that when we talk about the evolution of the universe, we talk about the universe as a whole. What is fundamental in the description is the whole, not the parts. Ultimately, features like stars, galaxies and so on 'emerge' because the universe evolved in such a way. This doesn't negate the fact that we can understand the properties of, say, a star in a 'reductionist' manner. But what I am suggesting is that reductionist picture is not the whole story. In fact, what is fundamental in the description is the whole cosmos, not the 'particles' or the 'parts' present in it. Perhaps, this 'holistic' description might help us to understand how life emerged. So, maybe, a physicalism that takes the whole cosmos as the fundamental reality can explain life. But such a physicalism is quite different from the reductionist/mechanicistic one. To summarize: ultimately, life arose because the universe evolved in a certain way and in that evolution at a certain point the conditions necessary for the arising of life were met. At that point, the potentiality for life, enfolded in the 'order' of nature, actualized.
Edit 2(final): a beatiful quote from the physicist-philosopher David Bohm summarizes what I was saying, I believe: “It may indeed be said that life is enfoldes in the totality and that, even when it is not manifest, it is somehow 'implicit' in what we generally call a situation in which there is no life." (Wholeness and the Implicate Order, chapter 7, p. 246)

It might be easier for you to say this, but that is a matter of avoiding the point. Instead of acknowledging that the concept which we know as "the universe" is a false concept, you are accepting it as true, and proceeding from that premise. Of course it's easier that way, because you have your starting point already laid out for you. However the falsity of it misleads you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps. But I still don't have enough reasons to say that 'the universe' is a false concept. Ironically, I believe that, despite the 'reductionist' reputation that physics has, perhaps a more parsimonious reading of our physical theories is that the 'whole universe' is actually the most fundamental entity (if there is something transcendent of it, it can't be known scientifically).

Actually, these "laws" you refer to are the product of human knowledge. Human beings have created these laws in their efforts to describe activities observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a sense, I agree. But we can create them because we undeniably observe regularities in natural phenomena. Of course, we cn be wrong that this intelligible order we observe really exists but I would say it is more reasonable to say that than the reverse.

Why would you conclude this, it makes no sense to me. To begin with, "God" is not defined as "the good". The good is what a human beings seeks, and we do not necessarily seek God. Further, if one does seek God, it is impossible for a human being to know God in an absolute way, so that person would always be seeking to be closer to God, never reaching the fulfillment you refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

How so? In all (or at least most) theistic religions and philosophies, it is assumed that God is what fulfills our deepest yearning. As St. Augustine said at the beginning of the Confessions "our hearts are restless until they rest in You [God]". It is natural to say that God is also the highest Good - or even Goodness itself, it that is true.
I don't think that 'being fulfilled' implies that activity stops. It just means that the will stops seeking fulfillment outside God. This doesn't imply that the will can't seek to deepen its participation in God's goodness. Perhaps we are using the word 'fulfillment' in different ways. To me it means that the will doesn't seek anymore satisfaction outside God. But this doesn't imply that the will can't deepen its participation in the communion with God. Same goes for knowledge: knowledge can be deepened but the mind doesn't seek knowledge outside God once it is in communion (or union depending on the theistic model).

But this method only works to an extent. If you divide a hadron into quarks and gluons, the hadron has a lot more mass than the sum of its parts. This is a feature described by the energy mass equivalence. The mass is a product of force, the strong force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with that. In this case, the mass of nucleons isn't just the sum of the masses of its components but it is also given by the mass of the interactions.

This BTW shows that in contemporary physics that mass can't be interpreted as a measure of the quantity of matter. In fact, I would even say that mass is an abstract property no more real than energy.

It’s exactly the same. This is not a scientific way of speaking, it’s statistics. This is how statisticians talk about distributions of data points. — T Clark

Ok, but then I question if there is a meaningful distinction between strong and weak emergence.

You and I have a different understanding of what the words “reductionism” and “emergence” mean and how the processes they designate work. I’m not going to change my understanding and I don’t think you are either. There’s probably no reason for us to continue this part of the discussion. — T Clark

Probably. I would say that we have a similar understanding, however. But certainly this part of the discussion can go too much off topic. In brief, I would say that I believe that perhaps a better reading of physical theories is that what is fundamental is actually the whole universe, i.e. it is an ontological precedence over its parts.

Another point is that, perhaps, in order to have an acceptable explanation of life and consciousness, physicalism needs at least to be 'expanded' or corrected in some ways.

Interestingly, I think that the tautology that physical laws allow the arising of life in this world is perhaps more relevant than it seems. Assuming that the world really has an intelligible order it this can mean:

i) there is a 'deeper reason' for that allowance that is transcendent
ii) there is no such a 'deeper reason' but the 'laws of nature', properties of the world, allow the arising of life

In both cases, life isn't a random accident. In fact, even if the second option is right, it still means that the allowance of life is a property of the 'fabric of the universe'.

Assuming the conventional "this world" is begging the question, because a time with no life is implicit within that concept. So once you assume "the world", the conclusion is inevitable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I see.

To me, philosophy demonstrates that "this world" is a pragmatic concept which serves our mundane purposes, but it is far from reality. The evidence that "this world" is a false concept s demonstrated at the limits of the conception. Where accepted science fails us, it comes to a dead end. The dead ends are not simply a case of needing to go further with more application of the existing theories, they are an inability to go further due to limitations of the theory. This is evidence that much of realty escapes the theories altogether, and cannot be grasped by them, indicating that "the world" s not what it pretends to be. This implies that the theories are wrong, right from the base. Examples are dark matter, dark energy in physics, and the reliance on random chance in evolutionary biology, leading to the acceptance of abiogenesis. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this seems too convoluted for me. It would be much easier to say that the universe is simply fine-tuned in a way that it either necessitates or allows the emergence of life. In such a case, life isn't an unintelligible accident that 'just happened' for no reason.

Why physical laws allow life? I don't know and I find it a fascinating mystery which isn't solved by the 'multiverse' either. Just saying that there are other worlds with different physical constants or even physical laws and our world just happens to be one that allows life isn't a good explanation to why life was even possible in the first place. Of course, one might say that there is no 'why' but it is undeniable that life is allowed by physical laws. This is of course a tautology of sorts. But it makes you wonder if there is some reason of this allowance. I don't think the existence of such a 'reason' can be discovered by science.

Regardless of the existence of the 'deeper reason', since life are allowed, in no way reductionism is implied. That is if the 'laws of nature' allow life and are a sufficient explanation of it, it would seem to me that properties of the entire world ('laws of nature') explain the arising of life. Hence, life would be explained in terms of the properties of the whole, in the same way as we can understand the behavior of the momenta of single particles as a consequence of the behavior of a whole isolated system, as I explained before:

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. Consider a very simple, isolated system of two particles interacting via a force. You can 'derive' the conservation law of the linear momentum by considering the second and the third laws of newtonian dynamics. Generally, the proof assumed those laws and derive the conservation law, after all. But, I think that, with equal reason, one can, instead, point out that one might regard the conservation law as fundamental. If one does that, the result is that the time variation of the linear momenta of the particles is of equal magnitude and opposite in verse. So, the laws of dynamics can be derived by the conservation laws. But conservation laws refer to global properties of a (closed) physical system. if they are fundamental, then, they 'influence' the behavior of the 'parts'. So, really, even Newtonian mechanics doesn't have to be understood in a mechanicistic way. — boundless

There are some very good arguments n Christian theology which indicate that human beings are incapable of apprehending the ultimate truth. In general, this is the difference between human beings and God, and why we can never consider ourselves to be in any way equal to God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but I don't think that there are Christian theologians that say that the blessed can fall away from the communion of God. Since God is the Good, whoever finds communion with the Good stops seeking fulfillment outside that state. This doesn't entail a total cessation of activity or that God is totally known by the blessed but that they do not fall from such a state because they find their fulfillment.

I agree, but the thing is that once we rule out the possibility of a deterministic physical cause, tthen we seem to be left with two choices. Either its random chance, or some other type of cause. We know that final cause, or intentionality, is another type of cause. Also, we know very little about how final cause actually works as a cause in the physical world, only that it does, from the evidence. Since we cannot actually see final cause in action, only the effects of it, and since our judgements as to which specific types of things are the effects of final cause, are completely subjective, why not consider the possibility that final cause is far more extensive than what is commonly believed? Once we allow that final cause exists not only in human actions, but also in the actions of other living things, then why not consider that the actions of the heavenly bodies, as well as atoms and subatomic particles, which are "ordered", or "orderly", are not also the effects of final cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's a possibility. As I wrote before, there is a possible a 'deeper reason' why physical laws allow life. I don't think that it is something that science can determine. It's not also something that it can exclude.

I don't think I agree with this. Knowledge is always being gained, but philosophy never ceases because there is always more to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are probably right. I should have added an 'if'. If doubt ceases, philosophy ceases.

You're making the idea that properties manifest as the number of elements approach infinity seem more exotic than it is. The term is just shorthand for the number of elements necessary so that it makes sense to talk about specific macroscopic properties. For example - it doesn't really make sense to talk about the pressure of one molecule bouncing around inside a container. In a container full of air at atmospheric pressure, however, there are trillions of molecules bouncing around and off each other and talking about pressure is reasonable. Somewhere between one and trillions of molecules it starts to make sense to talk about pressure. — T Clark

You're right, here, I was a bit overstating the case. But I would say that pressure is weakly emergent. It's perfectly understandable in terms of the properties of the particles. Same goes for temperature.

So, honestly, I am not sure that I understood how is defined the concept of strong emergence. If the emergent features can be understood in terms of the lower levels, it would be 'weak' emergence. In fact, pressure and temperature would be quite good examples for me to explain weak emergence.

This is true, but a bit misleading. At normal human scale velocities, say 100 mph, length contraction will be less than 1/(1x10^14). Calling a value less than 1/(1/10^14) from the actual value an approximation or imprecise is a bit of a stretch. — T Clark

Yes, but note that when the differences between newtonian mechanics and relativity become noticeable, the evidence favors the latter. But anyway the point I was making is moot.

I'm not sure he would agree with that. Then again, I'm not sure he wouldn't. — T Clark

Ok!

Newton's law of universal gravitation is specifically developed to address the gravitational attraction between massive objects. The physical properties considered - mass, distance, and time - are measured directly on those objects. There is no reduction. — T Clark

Yes, but it is assumed that the mass of, say, the Earth is the sum of the masses of its components. The distance between, say, Earth and the Sun is approximated as a distance between the distances of their centers, because being almost spherical, their gravitational effects are approximately like the one of a point particle of their mass. And so on. Also, it is assumed that the gravitational force of the Earth or the Sun is the combined effect of the forces that each of their constituents cause.

I don't understand this. How can the law of conservation of energy be more fundamental than the idea of energy? Conservation of energy is a phenomenon that is understood by observing energetic interactions among physical objects. How can it be more fundamental? How do you observe conservation of energy? By making measurements of time, mass, and distance in various combinations. — T Clark

Try to see it this way. You can define energy as a property of both an individual object or a system of objects. If you consider the energy of a closed system you find that it's conserved. And this constrains the behavior of energy of the single parts of the system.

So it's not that the law is more fundamental than the property. Rather, the law seems to show that the energy of the total isolated system is more fundamental than the energy of each part.

I believe that linear momentum is an easier example to understand my point. In a bottom-up picture of my original example, you need to justify why all forces follow the laws of dynamics. It seems an happy accident. Instead, if you take the total linear momentum as more fundamental than the linear momentum of each particle, you need only to assume that the total momentum is conserved to find that all interactions between the parts must behave in a certain way in order that the variation of the momentum of each particle is exactly the opposite of the other.

In my original response to this post, I wrote there are trillions of molecules in a container of air. That’s not right. When we deal with thermodynamic properties, we generally talk in terms of moles - 6x10^23 molecules. That’s almost a trillion trillion. Close enough to infinity for me. — T Clark

Yeah.

Interestingly, Einstein also relied on the idealist Schopenhauer in his rejection of quantum nonlocality despite being a realist. He took from Schopenhauer that spatio-temporal separation is the basis of ontological seperation. That's why he could not accept any kind of nonlocality. He believed that if one renounces to the idea that spatio-temporal separation is the basis of ontological separation then, the way we carve the universe in distinct 'things' becomes arbitrary. — boundless

Einstein made the point especially clear in a 1948 letter he sent to Max Born (from the SEP article about Einstein's philosophy of science):

I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold on to physical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the basic foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not among them; the field, in the Faraday/Maxwell sense, might be, but not with certainty. But that which we conceive as existing (’actual’) should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B. If a physical system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is present in B should somehow have an existence independent of what is present in A. What is actually present in B should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried out in the part of space, A; it should also be independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is made in A.

If one adheres to this program, then one can hardly view the quantum-theoretical description as a complete representation of the physically real. If one attempts, nevertheless, so to view it, then one must assume that the physically real in B undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in A. My physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.

However, if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to by a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts.

Admittedly, it's a very intuitive argument and prima facie it seems correct. It's also something that the epistemic idealist Schopenhauer was true: distinct things in the physical world (which is a part of the 'representation' aspect of his world view) could be distinguished by the 'principium individuationis', i.e. spatio-temporal separation.

Of course, we now know that quantum nonlocality is a thing and we can't use that criterion to distinguish things. I see the ER=EPR conjecture an attempt to 'resurrect' the Einstein's thesis of the centrality of spatio-temporal separation in the face of quantum nonlocality (which in turn would, however, imply that spacetime has quite a weird structure).

Probably. Traffic lights definitely are meaningful to a self-driving car, a straight-up example of information — noAxioms

Notice, however, that humans built those things in a way that they would react in such a manner. A dog would probably attribute a completely different meaning to traffic lights and signs than humans do.

Furthermore, self-driving cars perhaps perhaps do not find traffic lights 'meaningful' in a sense that is remotely analogous to our own finding it 'meaningful'. A computer perhaps doesn't 'understand' the calculations that it does more than, say, a mechanical calculator does.

Do you think that mechanical calculators find the input we give them 'meaningful'?

Ants leave information for each other, useless without their mental processes to detect it.
Trees communicate, also without what many consider to be a 'mind'. — noAxioms

I can accept these cases. I believe, in fact, that talk of 'meaning', intentionality and so on makes sense in the case of living beings (and perhaps even in something at the 'border' of life, like viruses).

Would a sufficiently independent AI device, one not doing what any humans made it to do, count as a sentient being? I've already given thin examples, but better ones will come soon as humans have dwindling roles in the development of the next generation of machines. — noAxioms

Honestly, I don't know. AI is doing incredibly interesting things. But I would say that perhaps they are more like incredibly complex mechanical calculators than living or conscious beings.
Will be able one day to actually build 'artificial life'? I don't know.

Are those two mutually exclusive, or just the same thing described at different levels? Does a candle burn or is it just atoms rearranging themselves? — noAxioms

My point was more like: is the intelligibility we find in the world a property of the world or a property of the world as it is presented to us? You might argue that it is both. If it is so, however, this means that we can understand features of a 'mind-independent reality', which to borrow from Bernard d'Espagnat, might be 'veiled' but partly accessible. I happen to think that the answer to that question is undecidable, an antinomy to reason. I think that the most reasonable thing to say is that the 'mind-independent reality' has an intelligible structure but it is also 'veiled' and it's not easy to 'disentangle' what comes from the interpretative faculties of our mind and what is truly 'independent' from them.

But at the same time, I am not sure if one can make irrefutable claim in one way or another.

Well it wouldn't have the name 'thermostat', and it wouldn't even have 'thingness', a defined boundary where it stops and is separate from all the not-thermostat. And given certain interpretations, it has identity or not, or has a less intuitive number of dimensions say. — noAxioms

Again, we call it a 'thermostat' because we observe it doing things that conform to a certain function we have built it to do. Does this mean that a 'thermostat' is a specific kind of 'entity'? Well, I would question that.

Just like we call a chair a certain arrangment of matter that can be used in a certain way but a chair isn't an entity in itself, we call a thermostat something that can be used in a certain way. Do the qualities of 'being a chair' and 'being a thermostat' exist independently of our minds'? I don't think so.

Independently form us, there are no 'chairs', no 'thermostats' and so on.

Gray line. Natural is whatever is not magic. Dark matter and energy were recently upgraded from magic to 'natural'. If it can be empirically demonstrated that there is some non-physical 'mind object/substance' that somehow can produce deliberate physical effects, then I suppose it would similarly be upgraded to the list of natural things. But until then, its considered taboo to look at the man behind the curtain. — noAxioms

Interestingly, despite having a reputation of being a skeptic for his questioning of causality, Hume was very convinced that of the existence of laws of nature. In fact, IIRC he denied the possibility of 'miracles' by implying that no violation of these laws was possible.
Similarly, Spinoza argued that 'miracles' were natural phenomena that, due to our ignorance we misunderstood as 'super-natural' or 'magic'.
This, however, makes the very critique questionable. For one thing it shows that naturalism is no more falsifiable than other metaphyisical theories. But even worse, the risk is that we equivocate the meaning of 'natural' in a way that it becomes empty.

It would much more helpful if, say, naturalism would simply forbid certain events.

Pointing out that 'natural' is a relation. Our 'naturalism' means natural to our universe. It means the laws of the universe in question, so each one might have different natural physics, if 'physics' is even applicable, which it probably isn't to most. — noAxioms

Ok. But notice my point above.

But you didn't answer the question. How is that not an example of a view without a perspecitve? There's no point of view since you see the whole thing, much in contrast to Wayfarer's subjective description of a scene without observers in it. — noAxioms

I retaliate that it depends on the interpretation you give of it. I'm not trying to be dense but if you interpret the 4d spacetime diagram as an useful tool, it doesn't matter that the model makes no reference to a perspective. In this lecture (starting around minute 5), Carlo Rovelli makes a distinction of 'cosmology' and what he calls 'totology', which would be a scientific study of literally 'everything without exception'. Remember that Rovelli is a relationalist, and according to his interpretation of quantum mechanics (which you also seem to like), the state of a given physical system is defined in relation to another physical system. So, it is difficult to justify a description of the 'whole universe' in a relational view. So, even from a RQM perspective, it is perhaps impossible to make truly perspective-independent descriptions. Of course, what counts a perspective is different here from an epistemic interpretation. But the point is similar.

It's always the latter from my perspective since the item in question has been described. OK, it's been described, but that description wasn't a requirement. 2+2 is still 4 even if nobody ever happens to notice that. — noAxioms

I would agree for mathematics. But I am not sure that in physics you can make descriptions without a reference for a similar reasoning that Rovelli made.

Grouping them into objects like that is definitely a mental thing, but the state of the system doesn't require that mental grouping to behave as it does in itself. — noAxioms

Ok. But, again, where is the cut-off where we can safely disentangle what is 'mental' and what is 'independent from our interpretative faculties'?
You seem to agree that carving the beach into distinct 'pebbles' is a mental imputation. So the description of the beach as a collection of pebbles is a mental imputation. But at what point we can safely say that a description is not the result of a mental imputation and is a faithful description of 'what really is'.

That would mean that my supervention list is totally wrong. Seems unlikely though since it can be independently gleaned by isolated groups, something contrasted by 'god' which does not have that property. — noAxioms

Honestly, I have a hard time to accept that mathematics isn't conceptual. Also I do believe that mathematics is independent from our particular minds. In order to reconcile these things, I accept a broadly ontological idealist view: mathematics is conceptual but our particular minds do not make up the totality of the 'mental'.

On the other hand, you seem to say that mathematics is the foundation of reality. But what is the relation of, say, your concept of 'three' and the number 'three'?

That's the cool thing about my heirarchy. No fire breathing is necessary at all. Only a realist view (which Tegmarks MUH is, BTW) has that problem. — noAxioms

How so? If mathematics is before the everything else in your view, you still have to explain how 'everything else' is derived from it. It's not obvious to me that a relational world - which you seem to accept - can be easily derived from pure math.

It apparently does, as demonstrated by the lack of example of something that cannot be thus produced. — noAxioms

You might say that math can describe everything or that everything exhibits regularities that can be understood mathematically (though I am not convinced by this, let's assume that it's true). You still have to explain how the 'production' is made.

(I am not saying you are necessarily wrong in your view but this is a problem IMO that your model should address...)

I would say that it says that space and time are the same thing, which, again, perhaps is just 'entanglements'. — noAxioms

Well, for instance in SR, inside the spacetime interval formula the time component has an opposite sign form the spatial. Also, you can travel in all directions of space but not backwards in time. So, I don't think that relativity makes space and time equal. It's either (i) space and time are aspects of the whole spacetime or (ii) space and time are useful abstraction in which we carve spacetime. I think that the more economical interpretation is (ii), as space and time are there once you specify a reference frame.

Actually, only Minkowski at first, who reinterpreted SR as spacetime geometry, which the SR paper did not. This led Einstein to note that he didn't understand his own theory anymore, but this new way of looking at it (geometrically) was essential to completing the GR work. — noAxioms

Right. Initially, Einstein apparently had an operationalist understanding of SR. But with GR he understandably had a realist understanding of spacetime. I recall that there was a dialogue in which Heisenberg pointed out to Einstein that he also reasoned in an operational way at the time he introduced SR and Einstein replied that if he truly did he was saying nonsense. Notice that Einstein was strongly influenced by Kant, Schopenhauer, Hume and Mach in his early years. It's no surprise to me that he reasoned in a operationalist way early on. But yes the more sensible interpretation of GR is actually a realist one (but, of course, we know that GR is not the whole story, so the point is moot).

Interestingly, Einstein also relied on the idealist Schopenhauer in his rejection of quantum nonlocality despite being a realist. He took from Schopenhauer that spatio-temporal separation is the basis of ontological seperation. That's why he could not accept any kind of nonlocality. He believed that if one renounces to the idea that spatio-temporal separation is the basis of ontological separation then, the way we carve the universe in distinct 'things' becomes arbitrary.

Eternalism was kind of new to the physics community at the time. There's no conflict. The experience is an interpretation put there by evolution. Without that, one could not be a predicting being. But the two different views actually have identical empirical experience, so the conflict is only between models, not anything that can be used to falsify one or the other. — noAxioms

I disagree here. If eternalism is true, it becomes quite clear that despite that the 'now' and 'the flow of time' are essential aspect of our experience they are in fact purely illusory. Honestly, I am not ready to abandon what is seems a phenomenological given as an illusion. I need more evidence. But I admit that GR makes a strong case that they are mere illusions.

But you don't know the QM is not deterministic. There are plenty of interpretations that are such, and even the dice-rolling ones do not falsify a block view. Don't confuse determinism with subjective predictability. — noAxioms

Right! But without determinism, I can't see how a block universe is untenable. Eternalism entails determinism (notice that the reverse is not true, however).
As you point out there are many deterministic interpretations of QM. So QM doesn't refute the block universe per se.

And I also believe that in GR one can even explain quantum nonlocality without much problems, given the fact that spacetime is not flat.

There is generalized version of LET. Took over a century to publish one, but it's a valid interpretation that is compatible with presentism. Certain GR predictions like black holes and the big bang had to be eliminated, but if you're ok with that, then we're good. There is an empirical test for black holes, but not one that can be published in a journal. Physics has a sense of humor sometimes I swear. — noAxioms

Are you referring to Ilja Schmelzer's theory? I read some discussions about ten years ago in physicsforums. If it is that version of LET, I didn't know that it is now accepted as valid.

Anyway, interesting. Thanks. Do you have any reference for this?

Notice that even if presentism were right, and, indeed, there is a real 'now' and an objective 'flow of time' it might still be the case that our 'now' and 'flow of time' is illusory. After all, our reference frame isn't the same as the preferred frame of such a theory.

So, I would admit that physics strongly puts into question the validity immediate experience. It's one of the most fascinating and disorienting mysteries for me.

More like I haven't seen anything that cannot. Sure, some things are too complex, but that doesn't demonstrate that is isn't math. Hard to describe Fred the butcher using just math. — noAxioms

I believe that life can't be understood in purely mathematical terms, but I acknowledge that there I can't give a compelling prove that it is the case.

Ok, I read the article. So, I can respond now.

All this is exactly right. Strong emergence is not compatible with reductionism. That's the subject of the paper I linked. Perhaps I was confused. I thought you used reductionism/weak emergence as the necessary alternative to intention/teleology without considering another alternative - strong emergence. Was I wrong about that? — T Clark

Well, I probably dismissed the concept of 'strong emergent' in a flippant way. My bad. I believed that strong emergence was actually a form of reductionism for some reason but I was wrong, of course.

I wanted to ask you your opinion about a point the author makes which I remember that also troubled me in my years at uni (I honestly don't remember if such doubts were resolved at that time and I simply forgot the answer). The author says that some (strongly) 'emergent properties', like violation of some symmetries, occur at the infinite limit of the number of the constituents.
So, the theory can explain the arising of those properties because they appear at that limit.

Of course, considering the limit cases is extremely important in physics. Newtonian mechanics is now understood as a limit case of relativity. And, in fact, one obtains Galileian trransformation by taking the limit where the velocity of light is infinite. But notice that there is a subtle difference here. The limit is taken to explain an approximation and to explain that, in fact, if you don't take that limit you actually get more precise results.
But in the case of 'many-body' systems, you need to take the limit in order to get better results. Honestly, I see this as an indication that the 'general' theory is at least incomplete, if not wrong - after all, literally speaking there is no system with an infinite amount of constituents and if the theory gives the right result only by taking that limit, there is a problem. I don't see it as a success of the theory in the same way, at least, the 'recovery' of the results of Newtonian mechanics is a success of relavity: in this case, you obtain better results by not taking the limit.

What do you think of that?

I guess that this would imply that 'strong emergence' implies that our understanding of the physical world is incomplete.

As I understand it, reductionism's focus is on analysis of the properties of higher level phenomena from physical principles at lower levels while emergence focuses on constructing the properties of higher level phenomena from lower level principles. The difference between weak and strong emergence is that, for weak emergence, it works but for strong emergence it doesn't. The thermodynamic properties of gases can be determined based on the behavior of the gases themselves but also on the basis of the behavior of their molecular components - both reductionism and constructionism. On the other hand, the properties of biological phenomena can not be determined based on physical properties alone. At least that is the claim. — T Clark

Ok, thanks for the clarification. That's why I think that weak emergence and reductionism are the same thing seen in different ways. Strong emergence is however something else.

I like this description. Apokrisis is a smart guy. When he says "non-reductionist physicalist model" I think he means one without reference to just the intentionist/teleological explanations this thread is about. Keeping in mind that I often misunderstand him. — T Clark

Yes, at least not in the sense that of this thread. But certainly, his worldview is far more sympathetic of intentionality, purpose, 'holism' and so on than a purely mechanicistic worldview. I happen to not be a physicalist myself but I respect that.

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity. — T Clark

I'm not sure of what you mean here. My point was that, in the case of conservation laws, you can understand them in terms of the properties of their constituents and their interactions (i.e. in a 'reductionist' way) but at the same time you can also understand them in a 'holistic' way, that is that the conservation laws are what is fundamental and they determine the behavior of the 'parts' of the isolated system. Newtonian mechanics itself is neutral about which of these two 'pictures' is better. But I think that a strong case can actually be made for the 'holistic' one, ironically. It's after all more simple and it does explain better why the newtonian laws are valid for all forces, without assuming that it is a happy accident of sorts.

That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what ↪Wayfarer called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that.

I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death. — Metaphysician Undercover

I used 'rest' in a more general way. Even if we remain active, we can rest. After all, when we truly rest, we are, in fact, active in some way.
I meant something like 'not agitated'. If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state.

I believe that there is a reason why 'bliss' and 'knowledge', truth and goodness are so often associated in religions.

The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I can agree with this. Yes, it's not pure chance or pure randomness.

It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, fine. Stand corrected. But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place.

Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up: Philosophy ceases when doubt ceases.

Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest? — Metaphysician Undercover

See before. Rest does not imply cessation of action. It certainly, implies, however a cessation of an agitated action that seeks fulfillment/realization.

Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment.

There is a vast difference between the experience of a human whose brain/body is functioning typically and the same human brain/body that is either dead or anesthetized. The dead and anesthetized do not have mental processes, thinking, information processing, feedback loops... The anesthetized does have some of these things to some degree, because the autonomic systems process information and give feedback, and I suppose other things. But there are no mental processes, no thinking. — Patterner

Ok, thanks. Do you think that there is an active unitary consciousness there? If so, is it the same consciousness that has undergone some changes?

A human being is a unit. The leg is separate from the head, both are separate from the lungs, all are separate from the finger, etc. However, they are a unit. And that unit experiences as a unit. Various processes taking place in the brain are experienced as awareness and self-awareness. But stepping on a nail is also part of our consciousness. — Patterner

I agree with this. I also would say that the 'unit' is a whole that can't be reduced to its parts. This is reflected in our conscious experience, which is unitary after all. (Some might argue that the 'unitariness' is just an illusion, but, again, it seems to me an undeniable phenomenological aspect of our experience)

I'm not sure if you're asking two different questions, or if you are asking the same question in two different ways. My answer to the second, and possibly both, is that everything experiences. When I step on the nail, my foot experiences with the damage. But I, as a whole, also experience it. My foot takes the actual damage, but it is not what feels the pain. It is not what remembered a similar injury from years ago. It is not what worries about tetanus. — Patterner

Yes, I think you answered to the second question. It seems to me that, for you, all composites have some kind of consciousness, with different degrees of complexity. Both the foot (which is a composite) and the whole human being have consciousness but the consciousness of the whole human being is far more complex that the one of the foot and it's a different entity from it.

I guess that a problem with this view is that composites can be arbitrary in some cases. For instance, the 'foot' is difficult to define in a non-conventional way. Let's say that one asks to you if the 'foot minus the ankle' has consciousness. It's still a well-defined part of our body. Does the 'foot minus the anke' have a different consciousness than the 'foot with the ankle', or not?
IMO, all living beings have their own consciousness (here I am using the word in the way you use it) but non-living composite do not. If non-living composite had consciousness, we would have an explosion of the number of 'consciousnesses' due to the fact that, in the case of non-living things, we can carve the world arbitrarily.

Regarding the first question, I had in mind something like Advaita Vedanta, if you are familiar with it. In that view, there is only one consciousness and plurality is illusory. In a more qualified form, you might say that there is only one consciousness but it's complex and each 'part' of that consciousness is in some way conscious. It seems to me that you don't subscribe to that view. Rather, it seems to me you posit a plurality of different consciousnesses.

No problem! I would also like to understand my view more. :grin: — Patterner

:up: same goes for me! And discussions are helpful in this regard.

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that?

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good.

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO.

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure.

Thanks for the reference, I'll read it. Anyway, I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. But given your response, I might be wrong, so I'll avoid to comment on this for a while (at least, I'll read the article before).

Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. Honestly, I don't think that there is a meaningful difference between the two positions. Rather the difference is on the emphasis on aspect (the undeniable 'apprearance' of the features for the emergentist) or another (the fact that the feature is totally explainable in terms of its parts for the reductionist).

Some time ago, I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way.

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. Consider a very simple, isolated system of two particles interacting via a force. You can 'derive' the conservation law of the linear momentum by considering the second and the third laws of newtonian dynamics. Generally, the proof assumed those laws and derive the conservation law, after all. But, I think that, with equal reason, one can, instead, point out that one might regard the conservation law as fundamental. If one does that, the result is that the time variation of the linear momenta of the particles is of equal magnitude and opposite in verse. So, the laws of dynamics can be derived by the conservation laws. But conservation laws refer to global properties of a (closed) physical system. if they are fundamental, then, they 'influence' the behavior of the 'parts'. So, really, even Newtonian mechanics doesn't have to be understood in a mechanicistic way.
Similarly, when one introduce the 'spontaneous symmetry breaking' to explain the phase transition, arguably, a similar thing happens. After all, IIRC the lagrangian refers to the whole system.
This doesn't necessarily imply that a reductionist reading of these things is wrong. Just that it's not the only possible 'reading', IMO.

Anyway, I'll read the article before talking about strong emergence...

It's true, life can't be explained using physics. The structure, development, and behavior of living organisms operate according to a different set of "rules" than physics - the rules of biology. At the same time, all biological phenomena act consistent with our understanding of physics. — T Clark

Notice that I wasn't saying that biology is inconsistent with the known law of physics, but I admit that I was unclear. My point was that properties like goal-directed behavior/intentionality isn't understandable in terms of the known physical laws.

I think that a non-reductionist physicalist can agree with what I was saying.

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science. It's not a question of certain chemicals happening to combine in very, very unlikely ways by the random action of molecules jiggling around. There are some who think life is inevitable given a suitable environment. I recommend "What is LIfe - How Chemistry Becomes Biology" by Addy Pross. It's definitely pop-sci, but it's interesting and thought provoking. — T Clark

Thanks for the reference! Anyway, I wasn't trying to reject abiogenesis or anything like that. But I am not sure if all the properties that we observe in living beings (i.e. behaving as a distinct 'whole', goal-directedness, striving for survival and so on) can be explained in terms of the known chemical and physical laws. I really can't see how such properties can be understood in a reductionist (or 'weakly emergentist'*) paradigm.

*BTW, I think 'weak emergence' is a form of reductionism. Nothing really 'new' arises in the case of 'weak emergence'. What 'emerges' is just a convenient abstraction that allow us to make simpler explanations.

I am saying consciousness does not cease when one is in general anesthesia. The experience is of an anesthetized person. Which is very different from the experience of a person whose brain is working normally, sensory input going where it normally goes, stored input from the past being triggered, information processing systems and feedback loops working, etc. It is not the consciousness that is different between the anesthetized and awake person. it is the level of functioning of the person's brain that is different. The key is is that the functioning of the person's brain does not create consciousness. — Patterner

I am not a physicalist myself but it's controversial to assume that an 'anesthetized person' has consciousness. Even more problematically, you also abscribed some form of consciousness to a 'dead person'. Let's concede that, indeed, in some sense there is consciousness in both cases. My question is: is the 'consciousness' of a 'dead person' the same entity of the 'consciousness' of the 'living person' before she died? Is the 'consciouesness' of the 'anesthetized person' the very same entity of the 'consciousness' of the person when she was in a normal, waking state? Do the 'dead person' and 'anesthetized person' have a unitary, private experience?
Or are different entities of the same type?

Notice that the 'privateness' of our experience, of our 'consciousness' is something to be addressed even in a panpsychist model. If all my constituents have their own 'consciousness', how does that explain the arising of 'my' consciousness, which seems separate from 'theirs'?
Going back to the 'anesthetized person', even a panpsychist might say that while in that state there is no 'consciousness' of the 'whole person' but only of its parts.

You say that 'consciousness is fundamental'. In order to have a meaningful discussion it's also IMO important to clarify what we mean by 'consciousness' and provide a clear model for it. Do you think that, for instance, there is one fundamental consciousness or that there are many distinct consciousnesses? Do you think that any composite object has its own consciousness or only some composites have consciousness?

Sorry for the many questions, but I'd like to understand more your view.

... we have no idea. — Patterner

In a way, I agree.

But we can make reasonable assertions IMO by analysing the behavior of inanimate objects and living beings. In the latter case, we do see that the behavior has charateristics that seem unique to living beings, which seem to point to the fact that, for instance, even the simplest life forms seem to behave as 'wholes' and in a purposeful way. This might be wrong, of course. But it does seem so. It seems to me a reasonable deduction.

Debates between adherents of different theories giving pros and cons of each, but not discussion about a given theory. I think it could be interesting. — Patterner

Yes, I agree. Also, theories that are presented are mostly vague.

The Bing Bang is just the conventional theory. It's just an aspect of the current model, or conception, which represents a universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. At the same time, however, I don't think that this necessary implies physicalism, let alone a reductionistic/mecahnicistic version of it.

But this conception is just a product of purpose.
... — Metaphysician Undercover

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question.

If the universe is prior in time to life, then potency must also be prior in time to life. It is a feature of time which would be necessary for the creation of life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? It isn't clear how can the intentionality which is present in life arise, in an intelligible way, 'out of' the inanimate, which seems to be without any kind of intentionality. So, either some kind of teleology was present even before the arising of life or it just 'started' with the arising of life. In the latter case, how was that possible? If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology?

I was going to suggest a thermostat, which performs experiments and acts upon the result of the experiment. I always reach for simple examples. But you'll move the goalpost no doubt. — noAxioms

↪noAxioms A thermostat is an instrument, designed by humans for their purposes. As such, it embodies the purposes for which it was designed, and is not an object, in the sense that naturally-occuring objects are. — Wayfarer

@noAxioms, try to think about this in this way. Let's say you see a street signal. It certainly contains meaningful information to you. This maningful information has a physical support. But does this mean that the 'meaning' of what is written in the signal is something that exist outside mind?

Perhaps the same goes for measurements. They are certainly meaningful. But meaning doesn't seem to be something that pertains to the inanimate but only to living beings or, perhaps, only to sentient beings.
The thermostat interacts with its environment in a way that produces something that is meaningful to us.
Do measurements reveal to us an intelligible structure of the world or, rather, are we that we mentally imputing an interpretation to the data we have, according to the cognitive structure of our mind?
The figure made by Wheeler IMO is quite useful here. What is being questioned here is not the existence of 'something' outside the mind. Rather, what is being questioned is the fact the existence of such an 'intrisically meaningful' structure of the 'mind independent world' that enables us to know it. Rather, perhaps, there is no such 'intrinscally meaningful' structure in the 'mind independent world' and we know it only through the filters of our interpretative mental faculties. Therefore, we can't claim knowledge of 'the world as it is'.

2) I disagree. Naturalism says that all of our phenomena have natural causes (obey natural laws of this universe) — noAxioms

Ok. But, again, what is 'natural', though? Also, we do not have a complete understanding of 'natural laws', so it is difficult to determine what might not be natural.
Also, if there was another 'universe' with different laws, would that be 'not natural'?

My example of one was a spacetime diagram which has no point of view. How is that still 1st person then, or at least not 3rd? — noAxioms

Those who interpret physical theories as 'useful models' would regard that diagram as an useful abstraction that has practical value.

Yes, it seems dualistic to assume that. — noAxioms

Ok, it makes sense. A provisional dualism.

Not directly. It having a requirement of being describable is different than having a requirement of being described, only the latter very much implying mind dependence. — noAxioms

Correct. But how can you know, from your cognitive perspective, that it's not the latter?

For instance, let's say you are on a pebble beach. It's certainly useful to us to regard different pebbles as 'different things'. But this doesn't imply that each pebble is a distinct entity. In fact, IIRC we agreed before that macroscopic inanimate objects do not seem to be 'real entities' but are more likely to be useful abstractions that help us to 'navigate' in the world. Perhaps the 'pebbles' are merely emergent features of their constituents and envinronment - so the 'pebbles' are mentally imputed and not real 'entities', and we can reasonably argue for that.

So, how do you tell the difference between something 'describable' and something that is 'of the description'?

Perhaps so. This is consistent with my supervention hierarchy that goes something like mathematics->quantum->physical->mental->ontology(reality) which implies that the physical is mind independent (mind supervenes on it, not the other way around) but reality is mind dependent since what is real is a mental designation, and an arbitrary one at that. There's no fact about it, only opinion. — noAxioms

But, again, can we reasonably speak of the 'physical' or even the 'quantum' without making ontic commitments? And what about the possibility that mathematics is conceptual?
The 'worldview' you are presenting here seems to me a sort of 'neo-pythagoreanism', where mathematics is fundamental and everything else is derivative. I prefer this worldview than physicalist ones. But as Steven Hawking asked “What breathes fire into the equations?” That is, how can mathematics 'produce' everything else?

Nit: A thing 'looking like' anything is by definition a sensation, so while a world might (by some definitions) exists sans an sort of sensations, it wouldn't go so far as to 'look like' anything. — noAxioms

Good point. Notice however that what you call 'sensation' is in fact an interpretation of the 'sense data', a model if you like. In the same way, one might say that our theories might be like perceptions (interestingly, David Bohm made this point).
If, however, 'reality' has an intelligible structure, it must 'look like' in some way...

It is related to sentient experience in that some sentient thing is conceiving it. But that isn't a causal relation. Objects in each world cannot have any causal effect on each other, and yes, I can conceive of such a thing, doing so all the time. Wayfarer apparently attempts to deny at least the ability to do so without choosing a point of view, but I deny that such a choice is necessary. Any spacetime diagram is such a concept without choice of a point of view. — noAxioms

Yes, both SR and GR taken literally imply a 'block universe', i.e. only the 4D spacetime is real and 'space and time' are abstractions. Interestingly, both Minkowski and Einstein himself read relativity in this way (Einstein even wrote a letter of condolences for the passing of his friend Michele Besso saying that physics has more or less proven that space and time are abstractions, IIRC).

But notice that the question is hardly settled. Einstein, despite taking relativity at 'face value', was deeply troubled by the 'problem of the now', that is how can we reconcile our immediate experience of the 'present' and the 'flow of time' with what relativity seemed to imply.
Personally, I don't think that QM supports the 'block universe' view. After all, if quantum events are not deterministic it doesn't seem the case that 'everything is fixed'.
If, however, the 'block universe' is not 'how things really are', it certainly make us wonder how to interpret relativity. There are operational interpretations of SR, which are quite similar to epistemic interpretations of QM, i.e. SR doesn't describe the 'how things really are' but it's an useful instrument for us to make predictions and applications. GR, however, is a different animal: it's difficult in GR to deny that spacetime isn't something 'physical'. So, yes, GR definitely supports the 'block view'. QM however doesn't. So what?

I don't consider this to be just a physicalist problem. The idealists have the same problem. It's a problem with any kind of realism, which is why lean towards a relational ontology which seems to not have this problem. — noAxioms

Ontological Idealists in the most general sense posit at least that 'the mental' is in some sense fundamental. So, it's really not surprising that the 'physical' has a structure that is analogous to the mental. Same goes for your view that mathematics is fundamental. It's not surprising that mathematics is incredibly successful in physics if it is the ultimate reality.

Anyway, do you think that everything about life can be described, in principle, by math?

This is the point I take, above. The existence of a physical world requires intentional being. This is because, as a physical world, is how things are perceived through a purpose based apparatus. Therefore it makes no sense to say that it is unlikely for intention to exist in this particular physical world, because intention is necessary for any physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about the objection, though, that life and consciousness arose in the world many billions of time after the Big Bang?

I believe that in some important sense, the potency (I am using this term in more or less Aristotelian sense) to give rise to life is a fundamental aspect of the inanimate world.
I don't think that strictly speaking this means that the actual arising of life was necessary for the very existence of the inanimate. But, rather, as a potency life is an essential aspect of the world. I don't think that this 'potency' can be captured in a mathematical model, which is essential for physics. This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world.

Ehen I die, there will still be consciousness. But there will no longer be any mental activity to experience. Just the physical body. No more interesting than a rock's consciousness. At least in my opinion. Others may think the consciousness of a dead body is more interesting than a rock's. In there timeframes of human life, there is certainly nore going on in a dead body than there is in a rock. A typical body will decompose much faster than a typical rock will erode. Both will experience their deconstruction, but neither will have any thoughts or feelings about, or awareness of, it. — Patterner

Interestingly, I have usually read that 'consciousness' is a specific kind of 'mind'. So, for instance, a bacterium has a very rudimentary 'mind' but it isn't 'conscious'. I'll try to use 'consciousness' in the way you are using it, in what follows (i.e. that 'mind' is a particular type of 'consciousness').

Let's call 'instance of consciousness' any kind of experience. So, any moment in which I am 'conscious of' something is an instance of consciousness.

I would say that, regardless the precise ontological theory one has, it's quite interesting to ask oneself if consciousness persists as instances of consciousness change. So, when I was born clearly I experienced something different than what I am experiencing now but, maybe, consciousness itself remains the same in time.
On the other hand, it might be the case that, instead, consciousness changes at every moment. That is, at each instance of experience there is a related consciousness and when experiences change so also consciousness itself changes. All these 'felt experiences' can be called 'consciousness' not because they are the same 'thing' but actually because they are different things but of the same type*.
Also, some would argue that when one is in general anesthesia consciousness temporarily ceases (I believe that those who experienced general anesthesia report a different 'feeling' when they 'wake up' than the feeling they have when they wake up from sleep. Also, even in deep sleep it seems to be that there is a level of attentiveness which is absent in that state). So, if consciousness can temporarily cease, when it 'restarts' is it the same consciousness or not?

And what about the 'privateness' of experience? I and you have, it would seem, different consciousness (or 'streams' of consciousness if the 'changing consciousness model' is right). Personally, I would believe that consciousness is, perhaps, precisely what establish an 'identity', i.e. the property of being 'an entity', which is truly distinct from other 'entities'. So, in a sense, I would say that perhaps 'consciousness' is really fundamental: it is what distinguish an entity from other entities.

*Interestingly, this problem has been discussed a lot among Indian philosophical schools. Buddhists generally take the view that consciousness is always changing like a stream (they use terms like the sanskrit 'citta-samtana' which means something like 'mental continuum'). Instead, their opponents argue that consciousness is something unchanging. The Advaita Vedanta school, in particular, argues that there is, ultimately, only one consciousness.

Thanks! I watched many of 'Closer to Truth' videos and I enjoyed a lot of those but somehow I missed that series.

Anyway, my point is that unfortunately the meaning of the term 'observer' varies between interpretations and this causes confusion when discussing QM.

Nor I, but that’s why I said that the argument is kind of a red herring - if you were looking for purpose in the abstract, what would you be looking for? But I’m interested in the idea that the beginning of life is also the most basic form of intentional (or purposive) behaviour - not *consciously* intentional, of course, but different to what is found in the inorganic realm. (The gap between them being what Terrence Deacon attempts to straddle in Incomplete Nature.) — Wayfarer

I agree. And the big question for a reductionist or emergentist model is how to explain the properties that are associated with life (and consciousness) in purely physical term.

'Weak' Emergence works very well, say, in explaining how a collection of particles can behave as a liquid or a solid. In a sense, you can say that 'liquidity' and 'solidity' are just conventional/provisional properties that are useful to us to explain things. After all, if they are completely understandable in terms of properties of the parts that constitute the solid and liquid objects, they can be rightly understood as useful abstractions that simplify the descriptions of what is going on. Even inanimate macroscopic objects themselves can be thought as 'weakly emergent' features from the microscopi world. I don't think it is particularly controversial to say that, ultimately, even the inanimate macroscopic objects themselves are useful abstractions.

The above is of course 'reductionism' and it works quite well outside life and consciousness.

The problem with life is, however, that even, say, an unicellular organism is difficult to understand as merely an emergent 'feature' of its constituents and its environment. Also, as you say, there seem to be a basic intentionality going on and yes intentionality is difficult to explain in weakly emergentist/reductionist terms. So, if physical reality is merely a 'mechanism', 'reductionistic' etc how can we explain life with all its properteis? Personally, I never encountered a satisfying explanation. So, perhaps, reductionism is false*.

Regarding the 'strong anthropic principle', I mentioned it because, after all, it's both a tautology and a profound insight IMO. Of course, physical laws must be compatible with life and consciousness - after all, living and conscious beings exist. But, again, this 'tautology' is, in fact, quite insightful. First of all, it inspires us to seek an explanation of how life and consciousness are possible in this physical universe. Secondly, it also highlights that, given what we know about physics, life is very unlikely.

Proponents of the 'multiverse' try to explain this by alluding that there might be a large (infinite?) number of (inaccessible) worlds and we happen to be in one that allows the existence of life (and consciousness BTW). There are, I admit, good scientific reasons to support that idea. But, philosophically, I find it very unpersuasive.
IIRC others also try to explain the problem by simply saying that even unlikely events 'just happen', which I guess is true. But, again, is the most satisfying explanation? I guess that if I roll 100 times a 6-sides dice and I obtain always '6' as a result, it is of course a possible result even if the dice is fair. But, perhaps, a more convincing explanation is that the dice is not fair and there is a, so to speak, 'hidden reason' to explain that very unlikely result.

A more convincing explanation might be that we know only in part our physical world and, therefore, the 'unlikeliness' is merely apparent, due to observation bias (like, say, that we are more likely to observe brighter galaxies and, therefore, we might understimate the number of less bright galaxies). So, maybe, if we study more in depth the 'arising of life' won't be as 'unlikely' as it seems. But this might imply that, indeed, a more deep study of our physical universe will eventually reveal that the reductionist/weakly emergentist paradigm is simply wrong.

It is understandable why some try to explain away the intentionality, 'holism' etc which seem to be present in life as illusions (i.e. living beings behave 'as if' they have those properties...). It is perhaps the only consistent way to account for these properties. Some, instead, try to explain these things in a 'strong emergent' model, which seems to be unintelligible. So IMO these difficulties point to the possibility that, indeed, the reductionist/emergentist models are wrong and we need something else.

1) boundless made no mention of life forms. An observing entity is indeed implied, but I personally don't consider 'observing entities' to be confined to life forms. — noAxioms

No worries about the delay! Anyway, I wanted to point out that I did in my replies use the word 'observer' in different ways and it certainly can create confusion.

Standard QM by itself is silent, I believe, on what is an 'observer'.

Of course, what is an observer is a matter of interpretations. So, in the future I'll try to qualify the word 'observer' with adjectivies when I'll make interpretation-dependent claims. Like, say, 'sentient observer' or 'conscious observer' for interpretations that need that specifications. With RQM, where every physical object can be an observer it's more difficult. Perhaps 'physical observer' - it is a bit awkward but I think in some way one must distinguish these views from standard QM which is simply silent on what an observer might be.

I'll respond to the rest in the next few days.

Good OP! I'll make some brief comments on your post.

I more or less agree with most of it. I would even say that 'purpose' is the hallmark of living beings. Also, I would add that living beings exhibit a 'holistic' character that isn't found elsewhere, i.e. they seem to be truly 'distinct entities' that aren't 'reducible' or even 'emergent' from their environment. So, other than 'having an end' they seem to be truly 'beings' in a fuller sense than inanimate objects are. And I don't believe that any of these things contradict the theory of evolution.
How can 'irreducible wholes' and 'purpose' arise from something purposeless is clearly a problem. In fact, as I said elsewhere, I think that this perhaps is an indication that the 'mental' is perhaps a fundamental aspect of reality in some way. Celarly, it is a problem for a reductionistic and mechanicist view of physical reality.

Regarding physics, I would not be so sure. I don't think there is sufficient evidence to say that there are 'purposes' outside living beings. And, in fact, even if one takes very seriously the 'observer' role - like epistemic interpretations of QM do - I believe that it at most poses a limit on 'what is knowable' rather than giving insights on how 'physical reality really is'. Perhaps one might argue that, along the lines of Anthropic principle, that the fact that physical constants have such values as to be consistent with life is something to be explained and taken seriously. I, for one, don't think that the 'multiverse' is a good response to this problem: I generally don't like explanations that assume the existence of a lot of 'unobservable worlds' in order to explain features of this world. Again, perhaps, life and 'consciousness' might be at least an essential latent potentiality in the inanimate. Certainly, even in this case the physical universe doesn't seem to be like a 'mechanism'.