There are numerous different theories which model reality as waves. Objects are described as disturbances, and interference patterns. They are incomplete, as you say, and there are two directions of incompleteness. We have to account for the cause of the disturbances which we know as objects, and we have to account for the effects of the disturbances, which we also know as objects. The cause being described by forces like gravity, momentum, and such, and the effects being what is observed as actual particles. These wave models might account for seeing, as you say, but to account for hearing, and the other senses, I think we need real moving particles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed!

Yes that's the way I model it in my mind, with two "spaces". One type of space is described by fields and wave functions, while the other type allows for objects moving freely in space. Then I propose that we draw a continuum between the two types of space, connecting them, that they are not really distinct, but one transforms into the other at each moment. This is the change which happens at each moment of passing time, and is allowed for by the time which is orthogonal to our timeline. I like to say, that at each moment of passing time, space inverts. The physical objects, particles which come to be at each moment, have traditionally been modeled as objects moving freely in a static space as time passes, but they need to be represented as features of an active space. Then space is the thing, and the objects are an attribute of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in this model "objects" are not "active", but passive. It is space that "inverts" and causes the existence of objects. So, it is not that space arises from the interaction of objects (a la Leibniz) or that space is the static "background" (a la Newton), but space is an active agent in reality. Objects are therefore secondary ontologically. We know that Newton was wrong and now most physicists tend to accept the idea that space is "a product" of objects. Instead, it might be the other way around.

I suppose, it's not that the issue of "the subject" is completely irrelevant, it's a matter of determining the position of the subject, what the subject is doing, and how the subject is capable of doing that. All these points are tied together and need to be answered together. We've denied the pure observation point, and allowed that the subject interacts with the material which is being observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed!

I've placed the physical objects, particles, on the effects side of the "field". Now we would need to turn toward the causal side. In my opinion, the field representation is inadequate. That's where I'm disappointed with Bohm, because he leads us directly toward this conclusion, but does not speak it, nor does he present any sort of alternative. Let me explain my misgivings in this way. A physical object, particle, or whatever, must occupy space in order that it be a real object. This principle allows that a particle may be infinitesimally small, but it cannot exist at a non-dimensional point. So there is a need to separate "a particle" which necessarily exists at a multitude of points, from the non-dimensional points themselves, which must be referred to in an effort to describe the dimensional particles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I always had a problem with "point-particles". At best I always regarded them as a very useful approximation. In fact to me they cannot be real: they are simply a mathematical construct (that's way among other things I do not like Bohm's original theory - I mean: still those boring point-like particles :sad: )

It is implied therefore, that we need to give reality to the non-dimensional point, in a manner other than as a particle, such that the non-dimensional point may have causal influence over real dimensional particles. This is why we need to model time as the 0th dimension, rather than the 4th. Perhaps the speed of light could serve as the basis for the 0th dimension. We create a baseline, 0 time, which represents the precise "present", and this is a claim to the point of spatial inversion. On the one side is positive spatial existence, particles which actually occupy space. On the other side is negative spatial existence, and this is represented by mathematical formulae which determine points of causal influence in the positive space. The further step is to determine the activity within the negative space, which is not necessarily limited by the speed of light because spatial existence, and extension itself, is inverted on the other side of zero. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, in the "negative" space, there is no need to have a speed limit. After all we are talking about of potentialities and not real things (so, actually even defining a "speed" in this space is impossible). On the other hand we observe that (except maybe quantum entanglement) every interaction is local (it has a space dependence). So, in the "positive" space we need to take into account this "localization".

Perhaps the speed of light could serve as the basis for the 0th dimension — Metaphysician Undercover

This part is very interesting because speed of light can be both the limit speed of objects and be connected to time. However I have no idea how it might be related to the 0th dimension.

The difficulty with "the subject" is that the human being, in the form of the conscious mind, and free will, is active within the negative space. That is how we have the capacity of self-locomotion. So this refers back to the tinted glass problem, the subject doesn't really have the 0 time observation point, it must be created in hypothesis, and adhered to in order to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis. How the subject sees, or observes, an object is dependent on the type of object which the subject individuates, and this is dependent on the choice of a zero timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "knowing subject" of the trascendental idealists in fact lacks the ability to actively "interact" with its "world". Therefore the analogy I suggested with Schopenhauer is in fact limited.

In fact as you note here even the individuation process is dependent on the actions of the subject. But here we can IMO gather infromation about the tint. In fact we can study how the individuation varies, how the objects vary etc. So, in fact we are not "stuck" in a certain perspective without hope to know other point of views.

I read Bohm's "Implicate and Explicate Order" and I found that there was a deficiency in establishing a relationship between the two, implicate and explicate. If the explicate is what is evident to us, and this is proven to be illusionary, such that we must assume an implicate, then we need stronger principles upon which to found the implicate. So I find that there are two vague and deficient assumptions. The first is in the proposed illusionary nature of the explicate. There is actually a large amount of "reality" within what is taken to be representations or reflections, and this reality must be accounted for. The second, is that since the reality inherent in the illusionary explicate is not accounted for, then the implicate can be whatever one wants it to be, completely imaginary, because it does not necessarily need to relate to the explicate which is void of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can relate to your point. In fact to use the model of the five senses it only "explains" what we "see". In fact we are now saying that indeed there are "objects", which are not reflections. So Bohm's theory is incomplete in our reasoning.

Yes, I think you've understood what I was getting at quite well. That's the type of reality I propose. I may or may not be looking in the right direction, but this needs to be further developed to expose any deficiencies. I propose that the human consciousness straddles the divide between past and future, and that there is no crisp line of division. At this division between past and future, an inversion occurs whereby potentialities become actualities. The "space" of potentialities is entirely different from the "space" of actualities, so what is happening at the present is that space is changing in this way, from the space which accommodates potentialities to the space which accommodates actualities. I call this an inversion of space, perhaps the inside becomes outside. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am very glad to have not misunderstood, then. It can also be said that in order to know "reality" we must know both the spaces. In this view a lot of metaphysics is "trascended", so to speak. What I mean by this? For example there are those who deny the existence of the potentialities. Instead we are saying that potentialities are an aspect of reality. On the other hand there are those who deny actualities. Again they are wrong. Anyway, both views are partial and incomplete in this model. And in fact to know reality we need to study both aspects. And again we return to the problem of the tint: we need more "means" to study it to have a "right understanding" of it.

We've denied the non-temporal point of division between past and future as unreal, so we assume that the inversion requires time, and is not instantaneous. We have no observational access to this inversion because it occurs as an activity in a time which is perpendicular to our constructed flow of time. The constructed flow of time is a continuous present, whereas the inversion is constantly occurring across the present from future to past. We must therefore take observational data from each side of the inversion to create parallel timelines on each side of the inversion, and use logic to infer the nature of the inversion. So I suggest that we determine which senses receive data on which side of the inversion, and proceed from there. It appears like sight may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of potentialities, while hearing may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of actualities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if the analysis made until now is correct, that is the way to proceed.

The issue of removing the "subject" is not a real issue. It is a distraction. It is impossible to remove the subject, because this would be an act carried out by the subject, self-annihilation, and this would leave us with nothing, no perspective. If we imagine "no-perspective" then all time and space become one. there would be no individuation of one part of time, or one part of space. But the individuation and identification of objects, events, or anything, requires an individuation of a place in space, and a place in time. So it doesn't really make any sense to talk about these things as if there were no subject, because the existence of the subject is already necessarily assumed as inherent within us talking about these things. To ask questions about whether "the object" disappears without a subject is just to introduce contradiction into the discussion through the back door, because "the object" is something individuated by the subject in the first place. And introducing undetected, contradiction into the discussion, renders the discussion unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I was only wondering the implications of what we are saying to see if I understood correctly (in fact it is a bit tangential). If there is a subject then time, space and objects are "real". Subject and objects cannot exist "on their own", so to speak. Like in Schopenhauer philosophy all that things exist in relation to the subject.

Also let me explain better what I meant in these sentences:

..if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) — boundless

I was not thinking about an "annihilation" of the perspective or of the subject, but I was trying to make a connection wit what I think I understood of Buddhist philosophy and Schopenhauer. In that eastern philosophy the "subject" is not real. So if we have estabilished that individuation is possible where there is the "subject", then if they are right there is no individuation. Also space and time also are not "real", in this case. But I agree that it is not a part of the model we are discussing, since we are assuming that the "subject" is real to make a theory of knowledge. But I found interesting the parallel :wink:
if you wish you can ignore this part.

MWI says that the quantum states with non-zero amplitude all occur, so that is the level that is deterministic. As I've argued, our everyday ostensive possibilities don't all occur. — Andrew M

True.

Free will isn't incompatible with MWI (or deterministic theories in general). It is the dynamic systems themselves that are driving things, not the equations. The equations merely describe and predict (rightly or wrongly) what the systems will do. — Andrew M

Well, in my understanding "classical determinism" says that we have the illusion of "free will". According to classical determinism and for "Pilot-Wave" theories the future is "fixed" once a set of "initial conditions" are estabilished. If this is true, it is not possible to make "free choices" because in fact everything is determined by the past.
On the other hand we have MWI and we have two possibilities. The first is that "choices" are a "classical" phenomenon and therefore are determined as in the case of "classical determinism". The second one is that choices are a "quantum phenomenon" and everytime we choose the universe "splits". In this case we might argue that there is more room for a free choice but the problem is that all the possible occurence happen as I argued before.

I always had this problem with "compatibilism". Free will requires that the "choice" is not totally conditioned by the past events whereas determinism implies that when the "initial conditions" are fixed (or better: when the state of the system is fixed at a certain time) then all events are "fixed".
On the other hand we may argue that determinism is not completely right in the description of "things" at classical level and therefore, autentic free will can be "saved" (are you suggesting this?).

That’s pretty well how I see it. — Wayfarer

Very well :up:

You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for the reference :smile:

The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, we can also think that there is a qualitative change in behaviour between various scales. So, quantum weirdeness might originate from the properties of time (and space) at those scales.

(As a side note, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_interpretation the famed mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose held the view that gravity/space time curvature has a special role in the collapse of the wavefunction. I shared this because there is the idea of a "connection" between QM and the properties of spacetime...)

Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

This reminds me strongly of the "Implicate and Explicate Order" by Bohm (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicate_and_explicate_order): I discussed (maily) with Rich about it some time ago in this thread.
But also of "Advaita Vedanta" and Neoplatonism. Also this article https://phys.org/news/2015-05-spacetime-built-quantum-entanglement.html may be of interest.

In this view plurality arises in the "representations" rather than in "reality". In fact, the notion of "reality" itself is challenged. Time and space exist only in the representation. And outside it these concepts do not apply: "reality" is neither spatial nor temporal. And so since discernible objects are possible if and only if there is space, then if space is a representation, then objects must exist only as a construction (like in a "hologram").

Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.


Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2. — Metaphysician Undercover

And here with other senses "objects" return. So, we "see" the potentiality and with other senses we "feel" actual, existing objects. If this is true then our concept of "space" is mistaken because it is really the "space" of potentialities, rather than actualities. So "reality", thanks to the "two dimensional time" is both a sort of hologram of "potentialities" and a world of real objects. It is not that one is "more or less" real than the other but simply if we consider the totality of our sensations we see both "aspects" of reality. Very nice (I hope to not have misunderstood something... in that case, I am sorry). But...
I might wonder however to what "happens" if there is no "perciever". If all what we said is right then objects, time and space are all real if there is a subject (in some sense this is reminiscent of trascendental idealism, especially the version of Schopenhauer). But if this is true, then the "object is always in relation with a subject", therefore if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) :wink:

If I am to believe the Wikipedia entry on Model-dependent realism, it rather looks like a half-baked mixture of pragmatism and Popperian falsificationism. Putnam's mature pragmatic pluralism also is a form of realism, which he distinguishes from metaphysical realism. It is a realism that is essentially relational. It dispenses entirely with the idea of the world as it is in itself, which our models would only convey incomplete understandings or representations of. It is thus neo-Kantian and, likewise, not any more relativistic than Kantian epistemology is. While the elements of the open ended plurality of objective empirical domains, in Putnam's view, each are essentially related to definite sets of pragmatic considerations (or to ways of being-in-the-world), they don't constitute relative points of view on some fundamental reality that grounds them all. — Pierre-Normand

Thank you for the elucidation.

Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism. — Wayfarer

Hi Wayfarer,

I think that it is more a "perspectivism" of sorts. I mean it says that there is an objective reality but there are multiple descriptions possible. Whereas "relativism" denies that there are universal truths.

In some sense it is similar to "realistic pluralism" by Putnam.

But as I said to noAxioms I might recollect badly.

No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation. — noAxioms

Sorry for the misunderstanding. Anyway, I suggest you to check Rovelli's ideas and similar. (for a start you might enjoy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/)

Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested. — noAxioms

Yeah, MDR is very nice too (If I recall correctly, it has also a more "epistemological" streak, so to speak, rather than an "ontological" one. By this I mean that MDR is more interested on what we can know about reality, rather than what "is" reality. However I might be wrong :wink: ).

Well I am quite slow, too. So it is not a problem for me :wink:

OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below): — Andrew M

Hi, interesting. Have to think about it. This seems interesting: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/is-the-pbr-theorem-valid.924718/ . <a href="https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/</a>

I will read these threads...

Tank you for the objection!

Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI. — Andrew M

Agreed!

Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things. — Andrew M

Good point!

In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)

I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee). — Andrew M

Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.

Thank you for the insights!

Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms

Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms

Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms

Well this seems a "relational ontology", i.e. that everything exist in virtue of relation with something else. Nothing exist independently. Well, this is really a fascinating idea to me!

The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance!

Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed! If our POV is dimensionless then the "experienced world" would be a succession of static images and change is an artifact of memory, so to speak. If this is the case, we would not percieve change but rather we would only infer it (and also, our memory would "create" the illusion of continuity between the static images - which a-priori for us would be independent).

If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if we do not want to fall into solipsism or a sort of "Evil Genius" theory we have to assume that there are two "times". And the "real time" is not a part of our experience but a part of the "external world". But as I said some posts ago, this is only a "reasonable inference" for the "external world". And in fact "the sense of continuity" is a "creation" of our memory, which a-priori is unrelated to the "real time".

So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmmm, very interesting. In fact we started by assuming that the "static" view was the "natural" one and we ended up with three "times". The real time is "behind" both the external reality and the workings of our senses, the "static" is the perspective of the "soul" and finally we have the "time" that is created by memory (or other falculties) to "connect" the static images. So in fact our "perception" of time is completely artifical.

Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites).

This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, if our model is "right" then also spatial existence must be reconsidered. In fact as the "static image" is a construction also space is. We continue to recreate "space".

At the same time, however, like time we can think that there is a "real space". But like "real time", "real space" is beyond (in the sense that it precedes) our experience. If this is the case then the same ideas about the "multi-layered" represention applies also to space and therefore we have a lot of maps. And each map has its "space", its "time", its "objects" etc.

So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the only way to know (at least partially) the tint is to study all our senses and the relationship between them.

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah the relation between the various timelines is a very problematic issue. In fact as you say we even recreate space as we change the scale. So, yeah in order to avoid these issues we need to determine the tint.

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant.

Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself. — Andrew M

Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe


Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal. — Andrew M

Good point. BTW what I meant is that the universe becomes literally a "mathematical structure" also in "normal" MWI. To me saying that "the universe is" (nothing more than) "a universal wavefunction which never collpases" is reductionism. I prefer to use the much more modest epistemological view of Bohr, or something similar to that. I do not deny however that also his version of QM has problems.

Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".

Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI and before considering the ethical, let us now see what MWI predicts. According to MWI as time passes the universe continue to "split". The are now a huge number of "boundless adults" that "came" from "boundless child". With some I share the same memories. However we all have a distinct consciousness. Therefore while every "story" is in fact meaningful since can be traced back to "boundless child", the problem is that in the opposite verse of time there is a continuous splitting. I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things.

Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. Therefore, "boundless" is simply one of the possible actual outcome of the "universal wavefunction". Free will becomes meaningless because in fact "one" of the "boundlesses" always commits the "wrong action" (or the "right action"). In this case what "boundless" does is simply due to the fact that it is a possibility. But at the same time the other possibilities are, in fact, actualized. Therefore unless you add some "subsystems" in the structure of the universe MWI has the same problems of other determinisms in ethics. The "right" action becomes simply a possible (and therefore actual) occurence. In fact if there are two possible choices, then both in two different branches are done.

So all actions in reality have the same value since they are inevitable. If the universal wavefunction is all there is, then all stories are actual and our "illusion of free will" is due to the fact that we see a story. Note that IMO according to most ethical theories it is of fundamental importance that they can be broken. In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized.

Of course I agree. The problem lies with the interpretation of mathematics as describing the 'primary attributes' e.g. mass, velocity, and so on, and relegating the domain of the qualitative to the subjective realm of mind. This manifests as the attitude that science is the sole custodian of fact and that qualitative and ethical judgements, whilst they may or not have merit, are regardless a private matter. It is another facet of the modern 'mind-body' problem. (The subject of a classic text, E A Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.) — Wayfarer

I am in agreement with this. To be more clear: I agree that a part of both mathematics and ethics is "conventional" or a "creation" of humans. On the other hand however there is a very important part of both which is "very real".

Therefore I agree with most religions that there is a "moral order" in the universe. And sages do discover it in some sense (in fact it is not a case that on ethical matters there is a strong agreement in most religions)

Note that the apple also doesn't appear solid if I'm not looking at or touching it. Yet it doesn't follow that it's not solid. Properties of things are identified in experience, but are real independent of experience. That's the nature of language abstraction.

So, in normal usage, there is nothing wrong with saying that the apple appears green but is actually red (e.g., because of background lighting or filter glasses). Or that the apple in the dark, sealed box is red. Whereas it would be wrong to say that it appears red when no-one is looking, or when there is no light, since "appears" refers to perceptual experience, not the object. — Andrew M

Hi, sorry for the delay in answering (mainly due to the flu)...

By the way, I think that I agree with the above. Unfortunately expressing these concepts sometime creates a lot of confusion.

Yes, the problem is that that distinction doesn't arise in the mathematics - each relative state is treated equivalently. So why make such a distinction? As I suggested in another post, it seems like taking a heliocentric model and packaging it as geocentric. — Andrew M

I see what you mean. But at the same time, conflating the "actual" and the "potential" can appear to be inelegant in its way. In any case, if this perspective is used then one must accept MUH (Mathemaical Universe Hypothesis).

Feel free to write them - I'd be interested. — Andrew M

Yeah, I am very sorry but you have to wait a couple of days (the reasons being the aforementioned flu plus academic business :( ). I anticipate that it is a mainly ethical problem...

Even Everett viewed mathematical model as a fiction of the mind. It is a strange ontology that views symbols (mathematical, linguistical, or otherwise) created by the mind more real than the mind that creates them (for practical purposes). — Rich

Regarding mathematics, I think that a part of it is "real" and another of it is "conventional". But I still cannot see where there is the distinction...

Here my attempt to answer :wink:

I'm not convinced of the conclusion that if it is impossible to avoid the tint, then it is impossible to know how things really are. I think it just means that we have to take a detour in our proceedings, and work on determining the nature of the tinting. This is why we have numerous different senses to compare, we have logic, and we have philosophy. These are the tools for assessing the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agree!

Now assume that we've created a concept of time, duration, the flow of time, by looking across the emergence of the big objects. When the big objects are fully emerged from the plane of the present, this marks the moment when time has gone from future to past. So the non-dimensional plane, which is "the present", which we have created artificially, has been produced by looking across the moment when the big objects are fully emerged into the past. Now we look at the tiny objects, and these tiny objects must make a plane of "the present" as well. They emerge from the future slightly before the big objects, so we can create a separate plane of "the present" by looking across their emergence There are two planes of the present, and the breadth of the present is the entire area between. BY establishing a relationship between the one plane and the other, we can determine the passage of time at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some time ago, I actually considered an idea similar to this. I was wondering how "big" is the present. And in fact I arrived that if the "present" has some "thickness" change would be impossible. But interestingly, here you are giving an interesting perspective on this, i.e. that it is possible to accept both a "thick" present and change.

In the analogy, the tiny objects pop out from the future to the past, first. This seems intuitive, but it's not necessarily the case. To really understand the way things exist at the present, we need to look at the way we act in the world, and interact with it. There are some things, with large mass and inertia, which appear to be fully determined. And, we find possibility in small things, and this allows us to make changes which are actually very small in relation to the vast universe. If we assume that change only occurs at the present, then the large things must come out first, determined with mass and inertia, and by the time that the tiny human brain is out, and apprehends what is going on, it has no capacity to alter what has already come out into the past. So the human brain exercises the capacity of free choice only over the tiny things, because the big things are already in the past. This is consistent with the Neo-Platonist's principle of emanation, or procession. The One, which represents the unity of the universe is first, then the Soul, then the Mind.

...

In the past, we have produced a system for time measurement based on the motions of the earth and sun, so this is pretty much in the middle of the breadth of the present. Now we have produced atomic clocks measuring duration with tiny objects, so this would be (presumably) measuring time duration at the past side of the present. But we have established no real principles to determine the breadth between these two. How much behind the present, which is determined by the motions of the earth and sun, is the present which is determined by the atomic clocks? Both these clocks can keep time in a synchronized, accurate way, but according to the theory above, they represent parallel "presents", with time, breadth between them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reasoning is in fact, sound. The possibility of being more "presents" as the "scale" of observation varies is something that I have never encountered in physics (and in philosophy for that matter). But again, nothing tells us that there is only a "present". In fact, the tendency to hyper-semplify sometimes had its side-effects: for example the Newtonian "absolute" space is certainly simpler than SR, but it is not really effective.

In any case, if you are right then there is an even stronger relationship between the measures of distance and time: atomic clocks measure a "present" which is different than "macroscopic" clocks. If this is the case we need a "meta-theory" which must explain the relationship between all these clocks, i.e. a theory about the "interaction" between the "knower" and the world, or something in that direction. Such a theory certainly would help us to understand better the tint.

This is the tinted glass problem in a nutshell. The tint is the concept, "matter", which is the means by which we make the changing of the physical world intelligible in relation to the assumed static, eternal "soul". We look through the tint, and we know that it's a tint because it's a source of error, and we have figured out that it's there. Therefore we must conclude that there is a part of reality independent from us, which is unintelligible to us, because of the tint. It is the inversion of the tint, what the tint negates, which is unintelligible. Whatever we assume as matter, the concept of matter, then the deficiencies of this assumption, is what remains unintelligible to us. What is not assumed, but ought to be assumed creates the unintelligibility caused by the assumption "matter". So we have to approach the concept of "matter" in a kind of trial and error way, we produce a concept, like Aristotle did, and see if it works. The success was limited, and the concept was replaced by a more comprehensive assumption, "energy". Now we have to assess this assumption for successes and failures. It's a matter of assessing failures which are the result of improperly representing the tint, on and on, until we figure out the tint and represent it properly. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I see two possibilities, BTW:
1) We at best can have a "partial knowledge" of the tint. In this case our "trial and error" procedure allows us to know partially the "tint" by the "inside", so to speak. We can think that the "tint" actually has two "parts". One part is changeable by us: we can in fact use whatever concept we like and "test" it. However a part of the tint is completely "hidden", it is "a priori" in all our observations. We cannot "remove" it, so to speak. In this case we can never have the possibility to "see things as they are", but we can have a "partial knowledge". This IMO is quite a rational perspective.
2) On the other hand we can accept that we can "trascend", so to speak, all tinting. In this case the "tint" can be modified by our trials until we arrive to a "perfect" untinted perspective. Note that this is possible only if no "part" of the tint is "a priori", since in that case we could not even imagine "reality as it is". If there is no "a priori" part of the tint, then in fact we can infer how the untinted perspective is by studying the "behavior" of the results of our trials and errors.

Hi,

I think in this latest answer you have written really good points. Be patient but right now I cannot make a well-made reply due to the flu. I hope to be able to answer this week end.

The alternative which I was trying to lead our discussion toward earlier, is to assume that the tinted glass cannot be avoided. This is to deny the reality of the non-dimensional point at the present, and to deny the soul its immaterial view point, as impossible, unreal. That is the result of your objection earlier, which is a standard materialist objection to dualism, that such a point would disallow the possibility of interaction between the soul and the physical world. All of this lead me to the long digression concerning the nature of "matter". — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, ok :wink: When I said I was "defeated" I meant that I admitted that we cannot accept both relativity and "the immaterial perspective". Yeah, a solution might be admitting we cannot "go outside" all "tints".

So we assume that the soul is fundamentally united with matter, and cannot be separated the immaterial perspective is impossible. We assume that the glass through which the world is observed is tinted, and this cannot be avoided, the tinting of the glass cannot be removed to give us a clear perspective. Therefore we must determine the nature of the tinting and account for this. Now we're back to where we began the discussion, with a slightly different perspective. The soul "interacts" with the world, and this means that it is a cause and an effect. An observation cannot be pure because we cannot adequately distinguish cause from effect, and this is the tinting of the glass. So we must determine the nature of the tinting. The soul interacts with the world through the concept of "matter" (in modern physics, "energy"). Matter is the potential for change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if we cannot avoid all "tints", then we cannot have the "pure perspective", of course. So, our perspective will be always "conditioned" by some tint or an other. And even more importalntly all our observation cannot be "perfect" since our observations play a causal role.

So, in this view "the pure observation" seems nothing more than an useful abstraction, like, say, a "free particle". The problem is, however, that if there is not a "total pure point of view", then it is impossible to the "soul" to know "how things really are".

The illusion, which results in a failure to properly account for the tinting, is in the assumption that matter or energy is something physical rather than something conceptual. If the soul is fundamentally united with matter, or energy, denying the possibility of a clear perspective, then matter or energy is conceptual, of the soul. The soul observes the world through this concept (tinted glass), and when it is not diligent it perceives this matter, or energy, to be a property of the thing being observed, rather than as the concept (tinted glass) through which the world is being observed. The fundamental point being, that "matter" is a concept introduced to allow us to understand the nature of change in the world. There is nothing to prove that "matter" refers to anything real, independent of the mind (what Berkeley demonstrated). Aristotle simply assumed "matter" as a necessary assumption in order to make change intelligible. So it is something we assume "about the world", but it is fundamentally conceptual, therefor not really "of the world" — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed! In that case, the "reality" outside our mind(s) is simply unknowable to us. In fact even if we change our "basic concepts" we would still have the same problem. It would simply changing a tint with another one. In any case, the the tint through which we "see" reality is always arbitrary and therefore all "truths" we find are not "absolute truths", but truths that depend on the "tint" we use. We can still have "universal truths" (universal = shared truths by all members of a group), among who use the same "tint" but this ambiguity introduces a "pluralism" of "truths". This, therefore, undermines the possibility to find out, trough science how things are in themselves. Personally I have not a problem with this perspective (in fact I think this is exactly our "situation", so to speak).

Light is fundamental to the concept of energy, and the concept of energy relates light to matter and mass. As described above, the tinting of the glass is this concept, we interact with the physical reality through this concept. The extent to which this concept misrepresents itself, is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is not better to say that "the extent to which "reality", is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem"? If we rephrase in this wa the sentence then I agree. The problem, in any case, is that if we cannot avoid the "tints", then such a problem will never be solved.

What I suggest is that physicists are at position #2. The concept of matter, energy and mass, is the tint. The physicists know that they are looking at the world through this tint, but they do not actually know the tint, and how it affects the observations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed!

The appropriate metaphysical procedure is to recognize that we must determine precisely how the glass is tinted, before we can produce any accurate descriptions. However, the commonly practised metaphysics is to claim #3, that the physicists already know exactly what the tint is, they know what the concept of energy, mass and matter, "adds" to the observations, and therefore accurate descriptions are being produced. Adopting this metaphysical perspective amounts to, in reality, #1, that they are looking through a tint which they do not know is there, because they have assumed that all the tinting has been accounted for within the concept. This is why I say that if the concept represents itself, or is represented as, accounting for the tint, when it really doesn't, then there is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

In fact I think that many physicists simply ignore this problem due to some "aversion" to philosophy. It is undeniable that, for example, QM is a great theory which is in (almost) perfect agreement with experimental data. But at the same time, we do not "build" all the "fundamental concepts" that we use to create the theory by "observation". In reality, even how we observe is conditioned by our "fundamental concepets", which as you rightly say are, in fact, our tint. However, many scientists tend to forget this issue, due to the fact that no other "mode of inquiry" has produced such spectacular results. I agree with it. But at the same time I admit that it is "a mode of inquiry, not the only possible mode of inquiry". I think that many issued about the so called "scientism" is due to this kind of problem.

This is also one of the most important reasons (if not the most important one!) why I follow more or less Bohr's (epistemological) perspective on QM.

Thanks for the insights! :wink:

,


As I said, MWI-supporters take the correspondence between reality and mathematical formalism to an "extreme" level. Interestingly it is a MWI-supporter, Tegmark, who both holds the MUH (mathematical universe hypothesis) and gives a fundamental role to consciousness (which according to him is a "mathematical pattern"). But generally "mathematical consistency = actuality" is a very questionable tenet, even if in fact mathematics does a wonderful job to describe regularities in nature. But again I find this line of thought somewhat reductionistic: I cannot, simply, agree that our "existence" is described perfectly by mathematics.What about ethics, values, aesthetics etc? In fact I prefer Plato's view that if mathematical "ideas" exist then also the ethical, aesthetical "ideas", for example, exist. Regarding determinism, this is the main reason of my "break" with Spinoza and Schopenhauer. IMO while compatibilists disagree, ethics requires free will.

Anyway, according to them reality is the universal wavefunction. From the "bird's eyeiew" (an expression used by Tegmark quite often) there is nothing but it. We however cannot see the universe from the outside. Instead, what we are "bounded" to the "frog's eye view", where we see a particular "branch". So, from the bird's eye view, it is a perfect monism (in some sense similar to Adviata) whereas form the frog's eye view there are indeed "many worlds".

But even if we accept that "mathematics is a reality", this is very far from saying that "whetever is mathematical is actually existence". At best mathematics describes a potentiality!

I would disagree. Opponents take a distinction that arises naturally in everyday experience and then their conclusion generally involves denying that same distinction. For example, "How do you know everything isn't an illusion?" or "We don't perceive things as they really are, because illusions". — Andrew M

Ah ok! Yes, with this I would agree. In fact "illusionism" if we want to call it in this way, is a very peculiar form of "direct realism". But I was thinking about the "common-sense direct realism".

Perhaps so, but his "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" isn't a natural distinction. Trying to draw a line regarding which qualities the apple "primarily" has is to misunderstand the nature of language abstraction. — Andrew M

Yet, If we close our eyes reality is not coloured, anymore. So IMO if we want to avoid solipsism, a distinction between "how we percieve reality" and "reality beyond our perception" is necessary. In the case of Locke the second one was given by the "substances". Since the apple does not appear "red" if we close our eyes, then its colour is not a "property" of the apple itself, but of our perception of it (of course I accept that science explain why we percieve a red apple instead of a blue apple, but I am thinking about the "redness" of our experience!).

I find Rovelli's RQM very intriguing as well, but it is a realism of sorts. Its difference to MWI is that only interactions of other systems with the system in question define what is real for that system. So you can't compare accounts between systems until they interact, in which case their respective accounts will always be found to be consistent. — Andrew M

Agreed!

It seems only as many as is necessary. Note that the vast size of Hilbert space is the same under all interpretations. If it is not interpreted physically, then where do the unitary transformations happen? — Andrew M

Well, here is the contention! The problem is IMO that you are regarding the "Hilbert space" as something actual. Even if we accept "mathematical realism" we can think about different "levels" of reality: the other branches exist potentially, and not actually. I concur that this solution appears inelegant, mathematically. But as I said I find alla interpretations somewhat "lacking". In some sense I agree with Einstein. And because of this I find Bohr's epistemogical take as "the most correct".

In my view the universe just is quantum mechanical at base. If decoherence emerges from QM, then perhaps gravity does as well. For a possible explanation along these lines, see Sean Carroll's recent talk entitled "Extracting the Universe From the Wavefunction". The main idea starts at 29:49. — Andrew M

Yeah, I respect your viewpoint (and thanks for the video! I'll surely watch it...). You are maybe right. However, personally I find "many-worlds" idea quite "inelegant" (ontologically, so to speak). Also the idea that "what is mathematical is actually existing" presupposes that (1) our world is no different from a mathematical structure (2) that the mathematics we "use" is a perfect representation of the "actual existing". Again, while I respect that viewpoint, I do not think that (1) and (2) are correct. I know that, strictly speaking, is not a "scientific" argument, though.

There are several other reasons for my not acceptance of MWI. But in this discussion are quite useless, so I do not write them (unless one is VERY curious and VERY patient to read them, of course ;) ).



Hi,

I agree with you. There is indeed the splitting (we infer it because we observe a "classical" world). However all "universes" are in fact an "aspect" of the same "thing" in MWI!

To begin with, I find that there is ambiguity with "self" which I think I should try to expose to some extent... — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

Yeah, I noted the great ambiguity, here! I think that both "mind" and "self" can cause confusion, so I go with "soul" ;)

Special relativity explicitly denies that there is such a thing as absolute rest, and by replacing absolute rest with the constant, the speed of light, it produces a condition in which the "correct" way of representing motions is in relation to light. However light is itself a thing in motion, and this assumes that time is necessarily passing. The constant, or fundamental premise is the activity of light, and activity assumes that time is passing. So this is fundamentally different from the premise of absolute rest, which assumes the immaterial soul to be at a point where no time is passing. The difference being that absolute rest provides a viewpoint for the observation of time passing and therefore all motions, while special relativity ties "time passing" to the activity of light. So special relativity provides no viewpoint to observe the activity of light, and if there is any inaccuracy in the assumed relationship between time passing and the activity of light, then there is a tinted glass problem.

The consequence of this difference is that the premise of the non-dimensional point, absolute rest provides a position to view all motions in relation to each other, including the motion of light. The premise of special relativity does not allow this, because it sets as the viewpoint, the activity of light. So the soul's perspective, from special relativity, is as moving light, a photon or some such thing, and all other motions are viewed from this perspective. If we had a complete understanding of the activity of light, and how other activities related to it, then we could use this as an accurate viewpoint. But we do not, so we have created for ourselves, a tinted glass problem. We have assumed a perspective, the activity of light as a constant, without properly understanding that perspective, and what it adds to (how it tints) our observations. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point, now! Since we cannot define a particular reference frame for light, then we have still to resolve the tinted glass problem. After all light is still "physical". And the tinted glass problem seems to require that we must have a "reference" frame outside all physical processes. Right now I cannot find a counter-argument to make SR compatible with the tinted glass problem. (If I manage to find a solution, I will let you know BTW...). So I declare my "defeat" in this debate :wink: ... (for now :cool: )

However there are still two possible (very inelegant, but possible) solutions, maybe.

The first is this: "c" is the speed limit of relativity. Strictly speaking relativity does not imply that light moves as fast as "c". Interestingly you can read this article https://www.sciencealert.com/heavy-light-could-explain-dark-energy . This solution is very inelegant, especially due to Gauge symmetry problems. But IMO it is possible. If indeed no particle is massless, then IMO the tinted glass issue can be circumvented.

Another possibility maybe is Lorent ether theory (LET), which posits a preferred frame of reference. There is a serious attempt to explain gravity in this framework http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/.

What do you think about them?



Yeah, IMO an universe seen as an inscindible net of interaction is compatible to "panpsychism"!

So I'd say we agree on this point, and what would be left would be to work out finer details, such as the relationship between the self, and the flow of time. What I proposed, is that the self desires to position the flow as external to the self, and this would alleviate the tinted glass problem. It places the soul at the eternal, unchanging now of the present, with all change occurring around it, giving the soul the "clear" perspective of all material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This position reminds me the Sankhya school of Hindu philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/sankhya/

You can ignore to the sake of the discussion the following paragraph. It is only a tangential remark due to personal considerations...

To be honest I am also very drawn to Buddhism, which explictly denies the "existence" of this kind of "self" (interestingly there was a "Personalist" school in Buddhism which disagreed on this point with all the others. See https://www.iep.utm.edu/pudgalav/.) . But again the "tinted glass argument" or the similar "eye and visual field analogy" (i.e. the knowing self and the known world are in a similar relationship to the eye and visual field) are actually very strong arguments to the "existence" of some kind of self. In particular Humean-like arguments do not really apply (since of course we cannot find the "trascendental" subject as an object to experience). By the way Buddhism is not materialistic since it is very clear between the distinction between "vijnana" (consciousness) and "rupa" (matter). Our minds are often compared to "streams", without a fixed "center" - i.e. it seems that both the "knowing" and the "material" aspect of reality are viewed as "in flux". But again, Buddhism seems to be very "empirical", i.e. concerned with the analysis of experience whereas the "self" we are discussing is, in fact "outside" the realm of experience.

Special relativity however denies the reality of that perspective. It posits vagueness with respect to the division between past and future, and makes the point in time, which crisply divides one duration from another, unreal, inconsistent with physical reality. So special relativity adopts other principles which deny the soul this perspective, forcing us to look for another means to avoid the tinted glass problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I disagree. In fact I find a very strong analogy with the "immaterial" self we are discussing and the "observer" in SR. Both are not "part of experience": the "immaterial" self does not "participate" in experience, since it is in its timeless "realm", so to speak, whereas the "observer" is an abstraction (on the reality of which physics makes no claim). In any case if the observer of relativity is real, he certainly "knows" the "events" that are associated with its light cone. Therefore each observer has its associated "perspective" on the world (or even its own "world"). Again the "flow" is a property of the "changing world" and not of the observer itself. SR does however deny the existence of a "preferred" reference frame. But if we accept that every subject has its own experience on the world I do not really see how the immaterial self we are discussing is "questioned" by SR. IMO SR denies only that the events that one subject might take as "future" are "future" for all the subjects, but it does not mean that for each subject the above considerations we have made do not apply.

Again, relativity theory messes this up, because with relativity, the state at an particular point in time, is dependent on the frame of reference. Assumed states, are dependent on the non-temporal moment in time for their staticity, and without that required moment in time, the statements cannot adequately describe reality. So, the self desires to posit that moment of division between future and past, as the pure observation point of temporal existence, but relativity has stipulated that this observation point is unreal, and has forced the tinted glass problem back upon us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I disagree. The tinted glass problem simply states that the "self" to really know the "world" must be outside it, in a "timeless" realm. All selves have "their" distinction between past and future. But nowhere it is stated that this distinction must be unique. As I said above what SR denies is precisely this uniqueness. Even without considering relativity all selves must have their "own" experience of the world, SR only introduces the idea that each "world" correponds to the "light cone".

In my opinion, this concept which accounts for the underlying thing which does not change, "matter" or "energy", can be reduced to the passing of time itself. If we put aside special relativity, for the moment, we can assume that the passing of time is the underlying thing which does not change throughout all physical changes, and this provides the potential for change, the exact criteria for the Aristotelian concept of "matter". Once we take this step, we have the three aspects clearly individuated. The soul takes its observation point as eternal, and distinct from the passing of time. The changing forms of physical existence are apparent to it. The changing of those forms is made intelligible by noting the consistency in the passing of time. How we, as human beings interact with the changing forms, is now tied up with how time passes. This is how the eternal "now" relates to the changing forms of physical existence. This is the existence of the self, the interaction between the eternal now and the changing physical forms, which is the passing of time. How this is possible is the secret which will be unveiled when we discover the principles to unscramble the vagueness of the present moment which is disclosed by relativity theory, thus removing the tinted glass.

If you refer back to my earlier post I described this as objects passing a plane. And if we assume that bigger objects take longer to pass that plane than smaller objects, this necessitates the conclusion that the point, which is the now of the present, is not a point at all, but it must have some dimension, the plane has breadth. That is why there is a trend now in the philosophy of time, toward a two dimensional time, we must give the present breadth. Within this breadth, interaction can be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Very interesting ideas! So all selves aknowledge both the "flow" and the consistency of the "flow". This make them "self-aware" since as we both noted without the experience of change it is not possible to be "self-aware". At the same time all selves have a very clear distinction of "past" and "future". The passing of time is in this "model" the "result" of the aknowledgement by the "selves" of the changeable forms.

However until now I do not see how SR (and GR) can be used against the "selves". In fact the "phenomenal" world is what is directly visible to the self and one self cannot "take" the perspective of others, because of subjectivity. Considering this and considering that "space-time" can be taken as an "abstraction" there is no tinted glass problem, here. Simply because the "phenomenal" is simply the experienced world.

Regarding your last paragraph, thanks for the input. I will reflect upon it. In some ways it, in some ways, can be used in support to the idea that the "self" can be both "unchanging" and "active", i.e. interacting. You speak of a "trend". Could you please indicate some "references", links etc about this (if possible, of course)? :smile:

Yes, though this is a perfectly natural and ordinary distinction. For example, the straight stick appears bent when partially submerged in water. But it's something else entirely to say that the straight stick is itself merely an appearance. This kind of "Plato's Cave" conclusion was just what Aristotle rejected. — Andrew M

Agreed. IMO one of the reason that I always disregarded "Aristotelism" is actually its "direct realism". Plato on this was much more interesting. Anyway in the years I came to appreciate some other parts of Aristotelian philosophy. But here I am going too "off-topic" ;)

So I read it in the other direction. I see these philosophical innovations as a rejection of Aristotle's natural empiricism (where distinctions arise naturally in one's ordinary experience of the world) and instead as a reintroduction of Plato's dualism in different forms.

I also see the ordinary language philosophers as a corrective to that kind of thinking. For example, Wittgenstein's private language argument and Ryle's regress argument against indirect realism. — Andrew M

The problem of direct realism is that even an optical illusion can be used as a strong argument against it. At the same time however "indirect realism" tries to speak about a "hidden reality" which can be inferred from inference and our "percieved reality". IMO the problem of indirect realism is that we have no clue wether our "categories" do apply to such a "hidden reality". This does not mean we can make "reasonable guesses" as I said elsewhere. But in order to avoid skeptical arguments of all sort we have to speak og "reasonable guesses".

Regarding Plato, in a sense I agree. In fact Plato explictly denies the "reliability" of senses. But at the same time he regards "phenomena" as changing, without substance. Substances are to be found in the Forms. Locke instead thought, like Aristotle, that they are in the world. So I see Locke as an Aristotelean trying to defend Aristotelism (in some forms) from Platonic attacks.

What interpretations would you suggest should be preferred to MWI for that reason? Note that MWI requires the least number of postulates of any interpretation and is also a local theory (so is naturally compatible with SR). — Andrew M

Agreed that mathematically is the simplest, but not ontologically. I prefer Bohr's take of Copenaghen Interpretation. Bu anyway I find all interpretations somewhat "lacking". CI seems to imply really anti-realism, which I find very problematical. Rovelli's take is very intriguing but it seems to go towards a sort of "solipsism". MWI has too many "worlds". Regarding Bohm there is the explicit "non-locality" and the ambiguity when it comes to define "real". Even the "nomological" variant which asserts that the "wavefunction" is nominal seems to go against the tendency to see reality in a way free from our "pre-conceptions" (I find the "point particles" an outdated concept).

So, in my opinion this shows that "beneath" QM there might be a "subquantum" theory. Maybe even weirder!

Edited for clarification.

My view actually is that while we can say that even dreams are real, we have to make some "distinctions" between "the levels of reality". For example there is clearly a distincion between a "table" and an electron. And between an electron and a dream.

Edited because the response was incomplete. Sorry, Rich !

That is an insightful comment. What you’re touching on here is the relationship between ‘the uncreated’ and the phenomenal domain - the domain of sensory experience. Nowadays any mention of ‘the uncreated’ is categorised as a religious idea - which I suppose it is in some ways. But in the Western philosophical tradition the main source of philosophy about ‘the uncreated’ is the neoPlatonic tradition (as Metaphysician Undiscovered mentioned). And according to the Catholic Encyclopaedia, such philosophers are still categorised as ‘pagan’. — Wayfarer

Yeah, actually what we call "Catholicism" comes largely from St Thomas Aquinas. And IMO in Aquinas there are a lot of ideas that come directly from Platonism (both "old" and "neo"). These "pagan" philosophies ironically over the centuries helped to "define" the "orthodoxy".

Overall, ‘the uncreated’ is a very difficult idea to grasp. Originally, the intuition was that ‘the uncreated, unconditioned, unborn’ was understood as ‘the source of Being’. In the early days of Christian theology such ideas, originally from the Greek philosophical tradition, were assimilated into Biblical prophecy, although the combination has always been characterised by some tension; the wisdom of Jesus being described as ‘folly to the Greeks’. Nevertheless Greek-speaking Christianity thoroughly absorbed the neo-Platonic philosophy. The Greek reverence for rationality and mathematical reasoning was based on the intuition that mathematical reasoning was inherently more reliable than the testimony of the senses, because the objects of dianoia we’re inherently knowable and constant in a way that sense-objects were not. So they were nearer to the uncreated, in that they likewise weren’t as subject to change and decay as were sense-objects. They were lower than the Ideas, but higher than knowledge concerning particulars. — Wayfarer

Agreed! At first the "uncreated" was thought in a lot very ancient philosophies (see the "Apeiron" of Anaximander, "Brahman" of the Hindus, the "Dao"...) as the "Source". It was seen as a sort of "ineffably simple", so to speak, ground of being that "is" (rather than ex-ist). Interestingly in the Greek World, especially in Platonic philosophies the idea of "simplicity" reamined and in fact in neo-Platonism "the First" was seen "beyond being", simple etc. At the same time however Plato introduced the idea of a plurality of "uncreated" objects, the Forms. This appealed to those who believed in a "Personal God", since it was very simplet to identify them with the "ideas in the Divine Mind". For example human beings were seen as "particular" of the idea of "Human Being" in God's MInd.

But the relationship between the "pagan" thought and Christian orthodoxy was always a complex one. For example the view that "the pious is loved by the gods beceause he is pious" comes directly from Plato and IMO it is the reason behind the "primacy of conscience" of Catholic theology. At the same time however Catholicism aaccepts the "salvation from grace". Or the view that we can know God by His creation (an idea found already in the Pauline Epistles) but at the same time we cannot really know Him without the Revelation. So there are a lot of "paradoxes" raised by this issue.

I was trying to explain above, originally the intuitions of mathematics and rationalism were regarded in ancient philosophy as morally edifying, not simply for their instrumental value or technical power. But it was the association of mathematical and rational insight with mystical insight, typical of the Pythagoreanism, that differentiated Greek from Indian philosophy and was one of the major sources of the Western tradition of natural science. However, science has now basically abandoned the notion of the ‘uncreated’, perhaps because of its religious connotations. — Wayfarer

Yeah, the Greek emphasis on mathematics and quantitative reasoning is IMO the greatest break between Western and Indian (and Daoist) philosophy, according to which the only "reality" that was important to study was the experiential one (again Buddhism IMO is the most radical form of this type of "view"). At the same time however the notion of "uncreated" seems to be central to most of the major philosophical and religious system both of the East and the West. And also the reason behind the rise of science in the West rather than in the East.

Being myself interested in both "studies" I have a hard time in reconciling the opposing tendencies of the two types of philosophy.


Regarding the "uncreated", in contemporary science this notion is seen as "unnecessary". In fact to the scientific study the "uncreated" has no "quantitative" role. The problem is that to many scientists this means that it is either an "useless" or even a "superstitious" concept.

Apart from the consideration on Dark Matter, Big Bang etc I think that your objections are against how "scientists" present science itself. In my opinion, much of the concepts you are criticizing are either "speculative" or "metaphyisical". The problem IMO is that amongst scientists there are a lot "physicalists", i.e. who believe that only the "physical" is real. This is not my view, of course. But at the same time it seems to be the "metaphysical position" prevalent among scientists. This conditiones clearly how science is presented etc. For example many "materialist" use the term "phyisical laws" as a "figure of speech", i.e. they do not "reify" it. They use this term because it has less "metaphysical" connotations than "mind" (and therefore methodologically it is "more suitable" to use the term "phyiscal laws" than other terms - the contention is probably due to the fact that the "materialists" confuse the methodological with the ontological, so to speak!).


Regarding Aristotle, I admit that I was not clear. What I meant it is that Aristotle introduced a dualism between "the substance" and "the accidents" regarding "things in the sensible world". Of course Aristotle, as far as I know, was a direct realist and therefore he thought that we see reality as it is. The problem is that when epistemological concerns are appreciated, then there is another level of "accidents", i.e. how things appear to us in contrast to how things are in themselves. IMO Aristotle disinction between "substance" and "accidents" was the foundation of the distincion between "primary qualities" and "secundary qualities" of Galileo (and Descartes, Locke...). This introduced the "indirect realism" which then influenced Kant etc. For Plato the "changing world" was without substance, a world of accidents, so to speak. The epistemological concerns that began in the 17th centrury were due to Aristotle, rather than Plato (of course Aristotelism can be considered a "form" of Platonism, hence the saying of Whitehead "western philosophy is a series of footnote of Plato's philosophy").

Regarding Everett's interpetration. Yes in a sense I agree, it is a "issue" of "preference" on my part. But the same could be said for preferring SR (Special Relativity) over LET (Lorentz ether theory). Both give the same results and in their limits of validity can be considered two different "interpretations". But when GR came, SR was much more compatible with it (altough interestingly http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/ here there is a serious proposal to make an extension of Lorentz theory to gravitation*.). In the same way I believe that MWI is a less "reliable" description of reality than other interpretation. Of course this is a "metaphysical/interpretative" reason. But it is the same reason why before the introduction of GR, SR was to be preferred over LET.

*Actually the reason of this proposal is the "non-locality" of Bohm's theory. Bohm theory is compatible with LET and not with SR (in its usual form. See for example https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.4102), therefore the idea is to extend LET in order to make a theory of gravitation compatible with Bohm's theory.


Thank you for the insightful response!
I will reply as soon as I can ;)

Personally I agree that there are different levels of reality, and this is the reason of much confusion. For example if we interpret Plato as saying that "math" exists like a "material thing", then of course it is quite naive. On the other hand in "this world" we have a lot of examples of "layers of reality". For example chairs and tables "exist" even though the standard model does not mention them! The problem is when we conflate two types of "reality".

If we give to "existence" its etymological meaning, then what "exists" is "what" arises or what is "created". Whereas "reality" is a much more general concepts, for example even "dreams" are a "reality", in some sense. The "Absolute" of many philosophies instead simply "is", since it does not "arise". The same in some sense can be said to "truths" IMO, like mathematical ones (albeit there is also an element of contingency in mathematics: the language used etc).

So In my opinion the problem that our language is insufficient to express what we mean correctly and therefore confusion arises in philosophy. For example a chair does not "exist" in the same way of a "muon" but we normally use the word "exists" for both.

Hi,

there are IMO two things that we should be aware. One is the fact that the "flow" of time means that there is change. Change actually undermines our "preconceived" view that it is possible to "name" objects (I am thinking to Cratylus for example). With this in mind, it might be true that the application of logic on reality is impossible. In fact concepts and names are "fixed", stable (that's why Plato thought that if they existed they would be not in this world).

However in relativity particles are "fixed", i.e. do not change every moment. Therefore we can use "names" and "concepts".

Regarding being in the states H and N is not possible in relativity. The relativity of simultaneity simply asserts that two events that for us are simultaneous (say, I see an apple falling from a tree and at the same time my phone rings at the same time) are not simultaneous for other observers. Of course the two descritptions are different, but they are different because the observers are different (it is like seeing a lake from two different perspectives, the lake is the same but how we see it is different).

The reason of the impossibility of being in two opposite states is because in that case we (an observer) would observe a contradictory "event". So relativity at the level of a single perspective does not introduce contradictions. Contradictions arise when we think that our perspective is "absolute", so to speak.

I hope that I adressed your point ;)

In a way yes, and a way no. How much of it do they perceive, how they may articulate it, how much they can articulate it (considering they both depend upon academic careers) only they know. They, as everyone else lives within constraints. Just recognize that any academic or researcher is subjected to enormous, career ending pressures if they stray too far from the materialist lines that given academic funding. — Rich

Agreed. Of course we are conditioned by our education, environment etc. What I meant is that they knew that physics is based e.g. on quantitative predictions. And while they of course had a strong metaphysical component in their thought, they were well aware about the difference between the two.

"Science" had morphed into a huge money making industry that depends upon the supremacy of chemicals over mind. While "science" has no problem fabricated unprovable concepts such as the Big Bang, Laws of Physics, Dark Matter, Dark Energy, Multi World/Multi Universe, Thermodynamic Imperative, Selfish Genes, Space-Time, etc., they do have a persistent problem with the everyday ubiquitous experience of Mind. Fundamentally, money distorts and pollutes any and every endeavor. The more the money involved, the greater the distortion. One in a while something interesting comes out of the corners of scientific research but it is tough to find. — Rich

Well, again in some aspects I agree and in others not. "Multi World" for example is IMO metaphysics. For example in the string theory version the idea is that all that is predicted to be possible, happens. To me thinking that this is scientific is very problematic, to say the least. In some senses I agree with what you say about "Laws of Physics": of course there are "regularities" but at the same time we need not to thin them as "things". The "Big Bang" is simply the "beginning", i.e. we see that our measurements suggest that the universe had a "start time". So it is an inference of our theories. Of course not all physicists might agree, but it is a "scientific concept", IMO. The same can be said for Dark Matter and Dark Energy. Especially for "Dark Matter" we see that if GR is right at cosmological scales, then we have to admit its existence. Alternative theories are, to my knowledge, at least, inelegant (and also they have difficulties to "reproduce" the same results of GR where it works well). Regarding "Selfish Genes" I do not know much, but IMO it is a speculative approach, and even not so "well accepted" by biologists. I do not know anything about Thermodynamic Imperative, instead. Finally "space-time" is at least a very useful concept. However here I agree that there is some tendency to reify it.

All fundamental concepts of physics are unfalsifiable. Scientists just don't use the word Mind because that ends funding. They use substitute words such as the Laws of Physics in its stead. — Rich

Physicists do not use the world "Mind" because it is not a concept that can be treated quantitatively. I cannot even imagine a formula about "mind". But again, I am not saying that your view is wrong ;) By the way as I said before "laws of physics" is a meta-physical concept, not a physical one in my view!

Inanimate objects, other than the manifestation of decay, no longer have the vibrational capacity to create, though in their own way (a super nova for a example) they still do create. It is interesting. — Rich

Actually in a different way I wondered about the capacity of inanimate processes to maintain themselves. For example a star is a system that has a tendency to maintain its identity due to internal processes of energy production. Again, I might even agree that a latent form of "mind" is present in them, but it is not useful as science is concerned.

Science's alternative explanation is that there was this Big Bang (quite a comical concept if you meditate on it) and then Everything Just Happened By Accident. Even Erik Verlinde mocked this explanation.

Stephen Robbins provides a coherent explanation of perception, the "hard problem", in a Bergsonian framework here: — Rich

I wasn't familar with Verlinde view. Interesting!

Thanks for the video ;)

Actually memory and mind, which are aspects of the same. But I think you get the point. Science pretty much accedes to the memory/information part, they just can't get themselves to acknowledge themselves, that which is creating all like these theories and ideas. The rest of your summary it's pretty much on the mark. It is very holistic with a very precise ontology based upon memory, mind, and will. The only requirement is that one accept Mind as fundamental as opposed to the scientific explanation in which it magically appears out of no where, and is just an illusion created for no apparent reason or without any theory. — Rich

Yeah, I am actually drawn to "panpsychism" and related ideas (after having read Spinoza's theory of psycho-physical parallelism). For example the simple fact that the universe has regularities suggests that some "latent mind" is a reality, IMO. I agree that physicists nowadays tend to be too much skeptical or even "a-priori" contrarian to this sort of ideas. As I said elsewhere this is IMO a mistake. They tend to refute these ideas too quickly.

I'm not particularly familiar with Schopenhauer's position. However I tend to identify with Aristotle's position that the intelligible world just is the sensory world (as against the various two-world dualisms held by thinkers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant). We represent things from a point-of-view, but those things nonetheless precede their representation (as the existence of the Earth prior to the emergence of humans to talk about it attests). — Andrew M

Actually the term "dualism" has a lot of meanings. For example the Kantian version the "a-priori forms" are simply about how our mind works. Aristotle IMO it is still a dualist since he makes a distinction between the sensory world and "the real world" (again, it is not directly what Aristotle thought but it is heavely implied!). Schopenhauer's view ws very similar to Kant's. By the way only a naive realist would assert that the "percieved world" is the same as the "real world". I think that we are agreeing, and interestingly QM in its various interpretations seems to suggest the same!

Yes, they remain true. I see the bases in QM as similar to the reference frames of relativity. Just as descriptions are indexed to a relativistic reference frame, so they are also indexed to a basis (or a relative state within a basis). Any basis is valid and, if suitable language has been developed, can also be described (e.g., a particle that was detected at a particular position can also be described as having been in a superposition of momenta). — Andrew M

Again interesting! The problem I have with MWI is that there are too many worlds. I find it very problemtic. But again it does not mean that some ideas are very sound!

Cool! Although, as far as I'm aware, this is the mainstream Everettian view. For example, David Wallace says, "But emergent processes like [decoherence] do not have a place in the axioms of fundamental physics, precisely because they emerge from those axioms themselves."

The idea here is that things do not need to be fundamental nor precisely-defined in order to be real. Wallace often gives an example with tigers. They are real even though the Standard model doesn't mention them. — Andrew M

Yeah, I agree. They are not "real in themeselves", so to speak. But of course they are real (reality seems to have layers).

Anyway I also agree that decoherence is emergent, and in fact the "purest" MWI does not even have that axiom. But again, this does not mean that decoherence cannot be addes to the formalism (and adding decoherence is not as adding "particles" etc).

Yes, it's based on Carroll and Sebens' derivation which uses math from Zurek's envariance paper. Sean Carroll discusses it on his blog - here's a summary quote: — Andrew M

Thaks! I will read!

A wave can have different frequencies and shapes especially as it spirals. This is how the mind creates matter out of itself. It spirals, vibrates and spreads and in so doing creates perceived density. Perception is a sensing or feeling of the different vibrational and frequency patterns. Different life forms are tuned to different frequencies and waveforms all of which are embedded in the holographic universe. — Rich

Ok, but I do not think that Verlinde, Bohm etc arrived to such conclusions (as far as I know). Anyway such a "universal mind theory" IMO will never have a scientific "proof". I am not saying that is wrong BTW, but it is only speculative. It somewhat reminds me some "concepts" of string theory like the idea that particles are mode of oscillation of strings. But as physics is concerned there is no "mind" involved, simply because it is an unfalsifiable concept.

It is not that life depends upon complexity, life creates more complex forms by movement (action). An orchestra sound would be an analog for this process. Many minds (the musicians) play different sounds frequencies via their instrument to create more complex (our less complex) music (waves and frequencies). How is this accomplished? Via lots of practice that builds skills. This is evolution — Rich

Well, I guess what you mean by "life" ;) If panpsychism is true then what you say is obviously correct. But again except for "living beings" I do not see any "purpose" in the action of inanimate objects. In animals and humans I see it very clearly, of course. In plants for example there is clearly the tendecy to "live", albeit in a completely insentient way. In inanimate processes honestly I cannot say if there is a very subtle and latent "purpose" or not. IMO at this level we can only speculate. If there is, then it is so "subtle" that at the pratical level we cannot find almost a trace. Anyway again, your view reminds me the one of the stoics. They thought that indeed there was the "Universal Soul". So I concede that possibly in some forms your view can be right. However it is not scientific (but again as I said some time ago, we are in a Philosophy Forum!). Regarding the "orchestra" however I agree, it is "we" that collectively learn by our experiences and can in fact create complexity. Regarding instead the origin of "life" in general, however I only say that we cannot either prove or disprove theleology. It is a possibility that there is purpose, that the "Universal Mind" created everything, but in a way that there is no visible "purpose", at least as science is concerned.

Experiences would be a pattern of memory. Memory is created and embedded in the holographic fabric of the universe. Observe a holographic waveform embedded in the media. That is memory which is accessed by the mind via brain wave transmission/reception. — Rich

To summarize your view it might be said that all things are either information or minds. Minds learn information and act upon such information. Minds also interact to each other is some ways. And everything is the result of these "interactions", these acts etc performed by the minds. However those minds are not really many, but neither are "one" (since there is plurality of minds). In a subtle level they work also at the level of inanimate processes. It is much more evident as "complexity" arises, like in animals and humans. But the "ultimate reality" is mental and an active mental "substance" that continues to act, learn etc. Is it a good (basic) representation of your view ?

It may be that the most fundamental experience of time is as a simple now, but I don't think that is the case. I haven't read a lot of phenomenology, but I think the basic argument is that a conscious self doesn't not recognize oneself as being at the now, the present, until one already apprehends memories and anticipations. So recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future.

And recognizing a past and future is to already apprehend external change, the flow. So that argument concerning the "self of solipsism" is really not applicable, because the conscious self only shrinks oneself to a timeless point, without temporal extension, after already apprehending the reality of the past and future, and the flow itself. Producing a timeless point, as a point of view for the conscious self, is only deemed necessary in the attempt to understand, and make sense of the physical world, to avoid the tinted glass problem. Consider the timeless point which divides two time periods. Imagine if we didn't have a timeless point which divides yesterday from today. Suppose that at midnight, we had to leave a period of time, five minutes for example, to account for the transition between one day and the next. What would that five minutes consist of? Instead, we give ourselves a timeless point which separates one period of time from another.

So contrary to what you say, the self as a point in time without extension, is necessarily already self-aware. And this self-awareness is an awareness of the past and future, and consequentially the flow. This representation of the self is only produced after an apprehension of the past and future, and is produced only for the sake of giving oneself a position relative to the past and future; the past and future having been already apprehended. Once the self assigns itself this timeless point, it can project that point anywhere in time, to individuate particular periods of time, between this point and that point. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first two paragraph was actually my point. Especially "recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future". This is why I think such a "self" cannot be said to an "actual self". To be an "actual self" (and so to speak not only "in potentia" - I am using Aristotelian terminology) one must experience the "flow". What I meant is that without the "experience" of change, there would be absolutely no self-awareness - and therefore nothing that could be rightly called as "self".

With what you are saying in the third paragraph, I am paradoxically in agreement. In fact to be aware of oneself as a "timeless" point one must clearly have been before self-aware. But we saw that self-awareness arises when AFTER there is the awareness of change. So in this case, to be aware of the "static now" requires, paradoxically, that one has been aware of change. If there is a "substantial self" then maybe it could actually be self-aware "timelessly" only after having "learned" self-awareness from change. Hope it made sense ;)

Simply put, the observer, the self, is aware of the flow of time, as you say. Then it determines that in order to understand the flow of time (avoid the tinted glass problem), it must give itself a perspective outside the flow, and this is the now of the immaterial soul. So it is as you say, that the experience of change and flow is most fundamental to the experience of time, but the self sees within itself, that the capacity to experience the flow is even more fundamental than the experience of the flow, as necessary for that experience. Therefore the self seeks to adopt this position, the most fundamental position which is prior to the experience of time, as the capacity to experience time, in its most pure form, and this is to separate oneself from the flow of time, in order to fully understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I can agree. There is however IMO a problem with this theory. We assumed that in all this it remained the same. So I was wondering does it interact in some way with "matter", or is it only a "detached" observer? If it interacts however it can change, and therefore the self does not strictly remain itself as time passes. But conversely if it does not change, how can it "learn" to be self-aware and to search to find a "a-temporal" perspective?



Yeah, that is the paper I was referring to!

Actually I'm not suggesting an axiom for "mind" as such (that's too dualist for my taste), but I am suggesting that the human perceptual point-of-view is implicit in how we represent the world. The key distinction I'm making here is that interactions between objects (including those prior to human existence or far away from Earth) don't depend on humans or sentience. So there need be no preferred basis in the world itself, things happen (or not) in every basis but humans have evolved to perceive the world in the decoherence basis. I think this explains why humans have a basis preference without requiring additional structure or axioms in the quantum formalism itself. — Andrew M

Ok, In some sense this view reminds me Schopenhauer position that the world as an empirical object necessitates the "opening" of the first sentient "eye" in the world. It is certainly interesting. But how can, say, the cosmological model fit in such a description? Our "hypotheses" for the past are indeed in the "preferred basis". Do these "hypotheses" remain "true" in your view or they are a sort of "fiction"? (this point was never clear to me, I apologize if this question is obvious. But it is clear that all non-quantum theories work in the "preferred basis branches"... so if such a theory is correct how is the status of "predictions in the past"?) Anyway I think that your "solution" is a possiblity to avoid the rejection of "simple" MWI by Schwindt's argument. I concur, thereofore, that it is a valid "escape" from refutation!

In my view, the Born Rule can be explained. Briefly, in wave functions where the relative states have equal amplitudes, we would be indifferent to which state we would find ourselves measuring, so branch counting is sufficient. When they are not equal, the wave function can be transformed such that all the states do have equal amplitudes. For example, a superposition of two states with (non-normalized) amplitudes of 1 and 2 respectively can be mathematically transformed into five states each with amplitude 1. And then branch counting again gives the correct probabilities according to the Born Rule. — Andrew M

Mmm interesting! I cannot say if it is a valid counter-argument, but maybe it is. Just for curiosity, is it based on some papers?

Yes, I agree that the two cases are different, of course. And like you I prefer Bohm's and Bell's view over MWI. Regarding your definition of "life" and "matter" honestly I have a hard time in following you (maybe it is because I do not know almost anything about the authors you have named. I think I will read the thread about Einstein and Bergson). Rather than a frequency IMO it is the disposition of "matter" that counts. Our bodies are extremely complex "structures" of matter, so to speak. To make an analogy a very good concert is one where there is a perfect harmony between various instruments. So "life" depends on complexity rather than "frequency". Anyway in this view we are not of course "biological robots". Also, the experience of time is more related IMO to the immediate perception of change of experiences (see also my response to Metaphysician Undercover). But again it is also true that certainly this is only the "basic" aspect. On a more "complex" level there is also memory.


Hi Andrew M,

you might enjoy this paper by Max Tegmark who uses mind/consciousness as a defense to the criticism of Schwindt. However while it is an interesting defense, it posits a "fundamental role" of consciousness. Problem is that his theory about consciousness is highly speculative. Schwindt's criticism however applies to the "pure" version of MWI, i.e. one without "subsystems", like Copenaghist observer or Tegmark's mind. Positing a "mind" is adding an axiom to explain the efficacy of decoherence (which alone cannot refute Schwindt's criticism). But if you add additional structure, then the theory loses its simplicity and it is not more "simple" (mathematically) than Bohm's. In any case there is also the Born Rule problem.



Yeah, sorry I misunderstood the tinted glass argument. I never encountered it before, actually. But now I think is clear. Thanks, for the explanation!

I disagree with the idea that for the mind, time is "flow". I find that most fundamentally, for the mind, time is the division between past and future. But since things are changing, while the division between past and future stays the same, we posit a flow. Things were different yesterday from today, so we say that yesterday was a different time. Since we have different times, we conclude that time must be flowing. But this is a constructed "time", just like we have a constructed concept of "space". All that is immediately evident to the mind, concerning time, is that there is a past, and there is a future, and we are at the present. We can sit at the present, meditate, calmly removing ourselves from the flow, while the world changes all around us. And this just makes us more keenly aware of the division between past and future.

So let's look at this from your perspective of a distinction between experienced time and physical time. I say there is no flow in experienced time. There is an experience of being at the present, which is the experience of being at the division between past and future. This is the immaterial perspective which I claim that we need to understand material existence. What we observe is that all around us, material things are moving from the present into the past. we assume that they are coming from the future, and moving into the past. So the "flow" is part of the physical time, it is the physical objects moving into the past. The state which exists in front of you now will be in the past by the time you say "now". You are the immaterial observer, at the static, non-moving "now", independent from the temporal world, while the entire physical world moves past you as time goes by. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting view!! It reminds somewhat the "metaphysical subject" of the Early Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer etc. The most basic experience is possibly the "now" you are talking about. In this view the most fundamental experience is not even the "distinction between past and present" which already requires the cognition of a "dynamic" change. At this level the experience is to speak "timeless", there is no awareness of change (since "change" requires already the perception of the flow). Timelessness is like the "point" in space, a dimensionless object (In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein actually says: "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension"). The problem in this view is that such an observer cannot be "self-aware" and therefore it is quite inappropriate to be called thought as a "self", since self-awareness IMO occur in time. If the flow of time freezes, I believe, we can not have an "experience" of self-awareness (and a non-self aware soul can still be called a soul? ). To be a "self" IMO there must be some type of experience of change.

Timelessness is certainly like a dimensionless point but can we say that such an experience of "now" is an experience of a "self"? It sounds like the same "state" if there was a "stopping", a total "cessation" of the flow of "time". Maybe there would be some awareness but I am very hesitant to calling it an awareness of a "self". In timelessness there is no self-awareness. For the observer in fact to have a "feeling" of distinction between himself and "the physical world and other minds" IMO there must be some experience of change. So while maybe you are right to say that at the most fundamental level "time" is a "static now". But at the same time without the "flow" in my opinion the "observer" ould not be self-aware. This is why IMO for a "self-aware" subject the basic experience is in fact the "flow", the awareness of change. *

The "soul", as I use it, is the principle of life, what it means to be alive. So when I say that the soul has created the body, this is what has happened over time, in the process of evolution. Now the living human body is the perspective which the soul has created for itself, from which it observes the world. So if we consider that the soul is immaterial, and its body is its observation instrument, then we must understand what the instrument is contributing to the observation in order to avoid the tinted glass problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah ok... Again note that if the soul "acts"/creates, then it must be aware of the flow of time. But in this case the soul is indeed "interacting" with the physical body. So, in order to interact it cannot be "static" but itself a dynamic process, much like the "physical" body it uses as its instrument. So I still think that for such a "self-aware soul" the time is percieved as a "flow", rather than the "static now". Regardless, I think I agree with the tinted glass argument. I will ponder over it in the next days!

*@Wayfarer, maybe my response to Metaphysician Undercoverer is of your interest!

But this is unacceptable because we really need to respect the fact that the human being is doing something when it is producing sensations, and unless we can adequately account for what it is doing, and separate the procedure, from the observation, our observations will be inaccurate.

There is an age-old argument for the immaterial soul, the tinted glass analogy. It's simple, and self-evident that unless you determine that the glass you are looking through is tinted, then all your observations will be tainted. So the argument is, that if we want to understand all of material existence, then we must give the soul a purely immaterial perspective. This is why dualism is unavoidable if our goal is to understand all of material existence. It is required to accept dualism in principle, to get there, to assume the immaterial perspective, and if it is wrong, i.e. the immaterial perspective is impossible, then we will just never get there. But we will not know until we try. Therefore we need to assume the immaterial perspective if our goal is to understand all of material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that even sensing is an act. And in fact in classical mechanics the idea is that the "interaction" due to the measurement is negligible, whereas in QM the issue is of course problematic. I am not sure however how this argument helps to show that there is an immaterial soul. In fact even the emergentist would not say that "the mind" is a material "object" but rather an immaterial one (the closest analogy that an emergentist would give is that of a "phase" of matter, like say solidity. But even this analogy for the emergentist is very poor...). I possibly misunderstood your argument but if the "tint" is the immaterial aspect of reality, then you are saying that if we want to understand the glass (matter) we should verify if there is or not the "tint" (and therefore we need the concept of "tint" in the first place). But as I said before this reasoning can be used only against strict reductionists ("eliminativists") who argue that there is no absolutely anyhting that is not material.

The basic assumption which is required then, is that we need to find the immaterial perspective. That is why I suggested time as the 0th dimension. We take the division between past and future, which forms the passing of time, as the immaterial perspective of the soul. This boundary has been assumed, in the past, to have no temporal extension, therefore it provided for the location of the soul, because no material existence is possible at this point in time, which has no temporal extension. To exist is to have temporal extension.

Now, we find with modern physics, that this immaterial perspective may be illusory. Perhaps, the "change" from future to past is not absolutely instantaneous. Perhaps some types of objects move from future to past before other types of objects. If this is the case, then we need to determine the soul's immaterial perspective. So we need to refine our position, find out exactly what it means to move from future to past, to restore our hope of understanding all material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually "physical space" and "physical time" should not be confused with "experienced time" and "experienced space". If we accept that "consciousness" is something real (i.e. we reject reductionism), then the two should not be confused. For the mind time is the "flow" and "space" is given by sensations, proprioperception etc. The problem is when we conflate the two creating conceptual confusion. Saying that according to physics our "space" and "time" are illusory is IMO meaningless since in the first place the concepts were different. At best we can say that "experienced space" is a "mental construct" that is used to represent the external objects whereas "experienced time" is instead correlated to physical time. But conflating the two creates only confusion: our "time" is not an illusion... instead, so to speak, it is the pre-condtion of our experience. Our experiences "appear" in the percieved time. If there were no consciousness time would be merely physical, i.e. the causal nexus between events. But since there IS congnition our "time" is not reducible to the time of clocks, it is a different, albeit correlated thing.

BUT it is also true that the causal nexus itself appears dynamic (if we are not advocating the "Block Universe") and therefore we have to say that "material" past and future events are non-existent. But while for material objects we can think that time IS change (the causal chain...), for us time has also a cognitive aspect which is a precondtion of experience. But I think that maybe even the psychological/experienced time is "quantized" even if it appears to not be the case. But possibly we will never know it. Anyway calling our "perception" of time an illusion simply because, say, there is a temporal dilation effect between our head and our feet whereas for us it appears "the same", is a product of either a mistaken reductionism (our consciousness IS our brain) or a conceptual confusion (the percieved time MUST have the same properties of the "clock/physical time"). Nobody actually estabilished that it is so. So who say so IMO is only speculating and not using "scientific evidence" in the correct way.

Here's the problem I apprehend with the differential in time scales. For the sake of argument, let's assume the soul's immaterial perspective, at the point of division between future and past. Let's assume that when an object goes past this point it becomes observable to the soul. Going into the past is what constitutes observability. For a spatial analogy, consider a plane. Objects are crossing the plane and you see them only when they emerge on one side. This is what constitutes the object's existence from the perspective of the soul, its being in the past, across that line of division. Now let's assume some very large objects, and some very small objects. Suppose that a very large object, due to its size, takes a little longer to get into the past than a very small object which crosses the plane instantaneously. We can make a time scale by watching large objects go into the past, and, we can make a time scale by watching very small objects go into the past. But since the amount of time that it takes for a large object to go into the past has been assumed to be different from the amount of time that it takes for a small object to go into the past, then we need to determine this difference in order to properly relate these time scales. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah ok, a very creative thought 8-) Well... If you followed my reasoning about the difference between the two "types" of time, then I think you can rightly imagine that something similar actually happens. Our percieved time flows in a way that in principle is different than the "clock time". In our analogy, we might even think that instead of a plane there is a sort of "membrane" that has a small, but non infinitesimal, thickness. In this case the "crossing" might depend a lot also by the "orientation" of the objects. Or maybe the thickness might change during life and therefore the mechanism of "crossing" varies. What I want to say is that our "experienced time" might be very different from both our intuition and the "clock time" when analyzed carefully. But if we do not conflate the two "times" I think that we can accept this "weirdness". And if you believe in an immaterial soul, this should be more acceptable to you than an emergentist IMO. In fact the time of our immaterial soul in principle might be very different from the material/physical "clock time" when analysed in the details simply because we are talking about two different "substances". IMO even if physicists actually observe such small durations your reasoning can be still applied to our "experienced time". By the way your spatial analogy might apply also to "physical time" but I have reservation in accepting it because it is too complex. I prefer to keep the two times separate, since one involves a cognitive aspect (and cognition is immaterial).

With dualism we can extend this way of looking at things to include the entire human body. Not only does the soul create concepts which are the constructed map, the way of looking at the world, but the soul has created the entire human body first, as its way of looking at the world, its map. The map, the body, is the medium through which we are looking at the world. We need to account for all the elements of the medium, giving the soul the purely immaterial perspective, in order to avoid the tinted glass problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmm, to me matter is not created by mind/soul but mind/soul is not reducible to matter (regarding the pre-existence of the soul or the after-life I am agnostic by the way... simply because I have difficulty to think that it is possible to have a self-awareness without a body). But while I agree that the mind creates concepts and also participates actively in creating the "direct experience", I would not said that it creates the body. It certainly creates however a "map" of the body itself. Yet there is in fact a sense in which what you say is true: we never experience "matter" itself. Therefore our experiences about both our body and the external world are in fact a product of the mind. And as for our direct experience is concerned the "material world" reduced to the "map" we create about it. As I said "outside" the experience we can only make reasonable guesses. So yeah the immaterial part of ourselves is in fact what "is central to us" and certainly uses the body as its "medium" with reality. But I would not say that it creates the body. (The difference IMO is that you speak of creation in an ontological sense, while i think it is true at the epistemic...)

Hope to have not misunderstood your post! (also my exposition maybe was not very clear this time :( )



In a sense I agree. But what I meant is that we never "experience" or "observe" with lab instruments the splitting in MWI and therefore it is impossible to "visualize". This however is not a problem for MWI since we already know that this "uniqueness" is due to our ignorance. Maybe "illusion" gives the wrong impression. I would probably used "distorsion". According to MWI our perspective is distorted in a way that we cannot see "reality-as-it-is" but only a sort of "reflected image" of it. This idea is not very different from Bohm's idea that we experience the "explicate order" instead of the "implicate".

They are perfectly compatible. At least they are compatible in the absence of time travels. But since time paradoxes are IMO nonsense (it is not possible to change the past and so on), they are compatible.

The relative simultaneity at best say that descriptions of some phenomena of two different reference frames are different. But in "the big picture", i.e., tha mathematical framework of the theory they is no contradiction (in the same way that the measurement of velocity of a car measured in its rest frame and measured by a speed camera are not contradictory).

I think this is exactly the point I was making. I wouldn't say that being observed by instruments is being observed, in any unqualified sense. That is because the instruments gather information, and the information must be interpreted according to theories. So there is an extra layer of interpretation there which is dependent on the validity of the theories employed. Take your map analogy. Suppose we have instruments, satellites for example, which are observing the earth, gathering information. Then, with the use of theories, the instruments produce a map of what a human being would see on the earth. You might say that the satellites allow us to observe the earth, but the observations are only as accurate as the theories which are used to interpret the information. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok I see. In principle you are right. We cannot have a "direct experience" of what the instruments in the labs register, i.e. we have an additional interpretative level. Or rather two... Let me explain what I mean.

What we experience is that the instruments "do some stuff" (pardon the imprecise language) and we interpret it an "observation". However it is an assumption, albeit a "very reasonable" one. We do not oberve what the satellite are observing but only how the satellite is "behaving". This is VERY similar to Heisenberg/Bohr reasoning, minus the fact that even they assumed that the observation is an interaction between the experiment apparatus and the "thing" observed by it. To me this is also the reason why science cannot "prove" itself. We need philosophy of science, i.e. we need to explain what we are observing when we analyse the experimental apparatus. But in the strictest sense this is not science, anymore. It is philosophy of science. But even if we accept that there is still a layer of interpretation, i.e. we need to use some assumptions in order to interpret the "results" of the observations. In the case of the satellites it is simple (in fact we can see the Earth...). But with an atomic microscope we cannot be so sure: we have not a direct experience of the atoms, for example (in fact this was, more or less, the objection of Mach against the atomic theory). We need a theory that can account for how the observation, i.e. the interaction of the instrument with the "thing" observed, happens. Here I think you are right, our theories actually condition how we interpret even how we interpret observations themselves. And in fact Bohr, for example, was agnostic about "the nature of the quantum world" - except the fact that the "cause" of the observation is a sort of interation of the "quatum stuff" and the experimental apparatus. In a similar way we can say that in fact we cannot really know "what the quantum world is" by performing experiments. After all it was Bohr who said:
"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." and "We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. " https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr (however I suggest you to read https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bohr-correspondence/ and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/)

Yes, I think that all observations are ultimately reducible to constructs, and the accuracy of the construct is dependent on the theories employed. So even if you sit at your window, and describe what you are seeing outside, your description is limited by your language capacity. Your language represents the theories you employ in describing the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I think I can agree. Direct experience is after all in some sense both "pre-conceptual" and "beyond concepts" (Very "zen" X-) ). We use our constructs as a map (this is not to say that they are "false" or a "misconception"...). For example a "chair" is concept we "impose" on our experience. But our experience does not tell us that there is a "chair". Yet conventionally/practically it is very useful to use those concepts. As I also said about the "world outside our experience" we can be agnostic and make some "reasonable guesses". (That's why I am very interested in many "eastern" philosophies which are interested in the "direct/non-conceptual" experience!).

I think that the standard caesium clock measures a time period much longer than a femtosecond. Regardless, I think that the clock doesn't "observe" the time duration, for the reasons discussed above. The clock gathers information which is interpreted according to theory and this produces an "observation".. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ooops sorry, you are right. Atomic clocks arrive at "picoseconds", those who arrive near the "femtoseconds" seem to be "mode-locked" lasers.

According to what we have said, yes. But still I think that our present theories are so successful that we can say that it "observes" such a small temporal duration! But in principle you are righ, I think. And in fact this objection is even more justified for smaller scales

I look at "the cause of our experience" in a different way. I think of the biological systems of the human organism as the cause of our experience. Our bodies take information from our environment, interpreting it, and constructing something which is presented to the conscious mind, which interprets this, and constructs something again. So the causation is really within, in the act of constructing. — Metaphysician Undercover

But... our "biology" is conditioned by the external environment, as you say. So causation itself IMO is also "outised" us. The problem is how we interpret it. This in fact can be said to be "within". All our experience "arises" from the "contact" of our consciousness our biological systems and "something external" (unless one is a solipsist we have to admit that "the external world" co-causes our experience... but maybe a solipsist does not even accept the existence of the body). For example when we touch something, that "something" produces signals that are interpreted by our brain and our consciousness (brain and consciousness are not identical for the emergentist - let alone dualists or other theories). So causation cannot be said to be wholly "within", but at the same time our "description" of it IS "within".

It is necessary because the nature of free will, creativity, and all that "construction" which occurs within us, that I just described, which indicates that we need to assume something more than the "causal chain of happenings" to understand reality. As a free willing being, I see possibilities in the future. I can influence the future with my decisions, such that I can start a causal chain of happenings intended to bring about what I want. This ability to start a causal chain of happenings, at any moment of the present, needs to be understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so in our view time is in fact "within us"? I think I can agree: the "time" we "experience" is NOT the time "measured" by clocks. Are you saying this?



I agree that it is extravagant, but this argument is that it is even either more extravagant than Bell thought (i.e. there are "Many-Many" worlds) or describes a "universe" where literally nothing happens. In any case in MWI the "reality" is the wavefunction.

Of course even somehow we can "avoid" the objection raised by the article it is very "extravagant". We are in a sort of illusion, thinking that our world is "the reality". But even all "the stories" together cannot be said that are reality. The reality according to them IS the universal wavefunction which is eternally in a superposition state (the cat is always both alive and dead BUT we are inside the universe so we observe either alive or death). Interestingly both Bohm and Bell held that in PWT the wavefunction is as real as MWI, but according to them our "story" is "real" because there are also particles. This raised an objection to PWT itself (mainly by MWI-advocates) since if we hold that the universal wavefunction is real, then it never collapses and therefore there are, in fact, other stories but they are "empty" of particles. MWI-supporters see PWT as an unnecessary complication whereas PWT supporters raise the objection above and the (fatal IMO) objection that it CANNOT reproduce, without additional axioms, the Born Rule (the probabilistic predictions of QM). MWI-supporters (e.g. Tegmark, De-Witt, Deutsch...) hold that both are "resolved" or "not very important", but I never found a convincing "defense". Also some PWT no more treat the wavefunction as real, but as "nomological", i.e. a sort of physical law, because of the problem raised about the "empty stories".

Regarding your question about split... Well, no. But remember that according to MWI our world is not real as we normally think. To a well-written FAQ about MWI see http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html.

Personally I find too much "extravagant". I am more in line with Bohr and in a lesser grade Rovelli (but interestingly I am fascinated by also Bohm). MWI also would be very elegant (mathematically) but thetwo objections above IMO rule it out.

By the way Everett's original interpretation was a bit different, it was called "relative state interpretation", the MWI it seems is its most famous type. But I do not rember very well these things.

See also this for a "mental" interpretation of MWI: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation (this might of your interest!)

Thank you for sharing the sutra, very interesting and clear! So both the Mahayana and like the classical Theravada refute in a very expliciti way this type of "nihilism" (apparently however in different ways). Sadly it seems that reductionism influenced many Buddhist out there.

My view is that Nirvāṇa and the unconditioned is never an object of perception however the mind constantly tries to find or identify it as an object. Ceasing from that false effort is ‘the way of negation’. Actually it’s somewhat similar to the mystical approach ‘cloud of un-knowing’, except that it is not focussed on deity. — Wayfarer

Yeah that is also my interpretration. In fact the language is "apophatic" in order to not "cling" to a false concept of Nirvana. Regarding the "cloud" I agree the approach is similar.

But nihilism is nevertheless a pitfall for Buddhists. It comes from interpreting śūnyatā as merely nothingness or non-existence. In actual fact, śūnyatā refers to ‘conditioned existence’ i.e. all objects of perception, sensation, thought, etc are compound, subject to decay, and so on. — Wayfarer

Agreed! the "voidness" simply points to the lack of "fixity" * of the conditioned. It is a "no-thingness" rather than a "mere nothingness". It allows change and therefore also life. After all if we were "fixed" we could not have any chance of make progress.

*I prefer the term "fixity" rather than "permanence" since Buddhism refutes "annihilationism", i.e. the view that at death the "self" is destroyed (and therefore it refutes the view that "something" can remain "fixed/stable" for a while and at a certain point being destroyed).

Thank you very much for the insights! (Y) :)

Ok I think I understood your view. Thanks for the clarification.

And also thanks for the insights about Tai Chi and for sharing your experience!

Yeah I agree... If you accept that "ultimate reality" is the "Mind", then the "real" time is the "percieved/experienced" time. There is no distinction between the two. In this framework "life" and the flow of experiences (i.e. the "flow of time") are the same (except the fact that maybe the "Mind" is a "center of awareness", but I do not really know much about Tai Chi, so it is only a guess...). It seems interesting.

Do you know if there are some online resources about it? May you please give some links - if there are any?



Interesting! Regarding the first part I think I agree. I see it as follows: we "map" reality according to certain assumptions. The "validity" of the map, however depends on the map itself, its properties. So a-priori even the smallest "observable" scale depends on the particular "way" we "map" reality (however being a theoretical physics student I believe that it is the "best" map, until contrary evidence). This however raises as you say the question: how we a-priori distinguish the two "realities", i.e. the sensible and the "intelligible" ? Actually if by sensible we include also what can be "observed" by the instruments (i.e. the definition of "observable" in physics) of the lab Heisenberg and other Copenaghists would say that there is no difference. Others, like the Bohmians disagree.

As an example, imagine if we make a complete description of what is occurring right now, then use logic and theories, to deduce what must have been occurring five, ten, or twenty years ago. We cannot say that these past occurrences are actually observable. We do this with geology, various morphologies, to project way back in time, and with cosmology we go right back to the big bang. We know that we do not actually observe the big bang, it is a product of the theories. But for some reason, when we take theories in the other direction, to look at shorter and shorter periods of time, instead of longer and longer periods, we tend to fall for the illusion that we are actually observing these short periods of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmm, interesting view (I hope to have understand what you mean...). Ok, it seems a strict empiricism. In this case, however all our scientific pictures do not refer to observation but to a "construct" of it (apart of course theories that predict only perceivable results by our senses).

Let me ask a question. Suppose you have an atomic clock. Why do you think that they do not "observe" such small durations (femtoseconds for instance)?

In my mind "unobservable phenomena" is a self-contradictory statement. If we observe physical activity, and apply logic, to conclude that it is necessary to assume that there is something unobservable going on to account for this activity, then we cannot refer to this as phenomena because that implies something perceivable by the senses. If we allow that "phenomena" refers to things apprehended by the mind, as well as by the senses, then we would need to adopt some other principles to distinguish between what has real material existence, and what is a product of the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, I see. What about "happenings"? :) Well I speculated a lot about the issue wether it is even possible to think that something can exist, but it is impossible to percieve in any possible way. My "hypothesis" is that the answer is "yes", but we cannot know anything about such "things". We can only "guess" or "speculate", without any hope to really know. Therefore even the existence of "matter" is a convenient "guess": we cannot prove its existence in any way. Outside direct experience and inference about direct experience we cannot have any "certain", so to speak, knowledge. We can however IMO make some reasonable "guesses". For example I have not find any "proof" against solipsism, however it is not clearly true. But the fact that it is extremely difficult - if impossible - to reject shows something interesting: outside the "direct experience" we cannot have certain knowledge. So in a sense we estabilish the existence of a reality "behind the phenomena" as a reasonable "leap of faith", so to speak. Do you agree? Therefore the only principle that I can (at least for now) propose is the "causal" argument: the "external reality" is somehow the cause of our experience (to avoid solipsism). However we can only make reasonable assumptions and inferences about it (and even for its existence). Note that since the Copenaghen interpretation became the "standard" one, physics now is seen as dealing with what is "observable" by physical instruments (and therefore claims about what "there is behind it" are seen as either speculations or fictions).

If the goal is to understand, then we cannot say that this is "unnecessary". Since the goal of scientists is often to predict, rather than to understand, then so long as the mathematical equations are set so as to adequately predict, understanding is "unnecessary". But as we found out with the discovery of the heliocentricity of the solar system, real understanding opens up vast new opportunities which cannot be accessed by mere mathematical predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed! In my opinion the fact that there are many interpretation of QM means that we have yet to understand it. But it seems that many physicists do not agree, sadly.

The flow of the river is not explained by the water. The water is one element, there is also gravity, and the form of the solid ground. So if change is related to time, like flow is related to the water in the river, we still have the background existence (the riverbed), and the cause of change (gravity) to identify. The cause of change, is more properly associated with time, than change itself, just like gravity is more properly associated with the flow than the water itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. I think I understood... So in your view time is the cause of change. But why do you think it is necessay to posit it in the first place? In other words why the "causal chain of happenings" is not sufficient to understand reality, but need a "cause to exist"? :)
Personally I cannot see how such an "additional" cause might be required.


P.S. For those interested in interpretation of QM, I have found a nice criticism of MWI (many-worlds):
https://rekastner.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/decoherence-fail.pdf
Here there are no formulas and the argument is quite clear IMO: in order to explain the "split" we already have to know how the worlds must split (this problem is called "preferred basis problem" in literature). The problem is that according MWI in its most rigorous formulation only the universal wavefunction is real and a-priori by it we cannot know how the universe split. Therefore it becomes either a "many-many worlds interpetration" where there are many-many ways in which worlds split or "a no-world interpetration", where literally nothing happens.

For who is interested I give the link to two threads of "physicsforums":
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/many-worlds-proved-inconsistent.767809/

and the link to the pre-print of the paper where the criticism is found:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447

Another idea: if "time" flows indipendently, then is it not correct to say that in fact that time passes is itself a "change"? In fact if we try to "imagine" it, we think that it passes, i.e. there is some activity.

Mmm interesting... I try to give you a rapid answer (hope it makes some sense X-) ):

Yeah to give some "support" to your view, maybe the Planck time is a limit for our "ability" to measure duration, i.e. it is the smallest observable duration. But again, even if it is so short to be unobservable, maybe we can still imagine that the same can be said for physical changes. I mean we can imagine some phenomena might have a duration which is inacessible to our measurements.

The reasoning is somewhat similar to the idea behind the "hidden variables". According to these theories we do not observe "reality as it is" but we can still understand quantum phenomena as the "result" of unobservable phenomena (i.e. the movement of the particles etc). In the same way even when we will (possibly) arrive to a quantum theory of gravity, IMO we can still think that there is a "subquantum" world.

By the way the problem of your hypothesis (at a scientific level) is that such a time would be a sort of "unnecessry" since it is a sort of "stage" where phenomena happen. So it is not to say that it is wrong, but for a scientific POV it is "unnecessary".

Regarding a metaphysical level, I think that time IS the "flow of change". This does not mean that it is "reducible" to the "events" themeselves. It simply means that as there is no flow in a river without water, there is no "time passing" without change. However the "flow" does not of course coincide without water.

IMO if time is not the "flow of change" then it "exists" as a sort of indipendent "process". But if that is the case, how can exist such a process?

Scientifically speaking, however, I do not think that a "time apart of change" can be really useful. But science is NOT metaphysics and therefore if we do not adhere to scientism it is not a problem ;)

Well, thank you! Our approach seems quite similar. Curiosly, I have a deep interest in platonism, too (I am very inclined to beleieve that there are "eternal truths" - and I do not think that this is in contrast with Buddhism since truths are not necessarily "substantial", however I saw that many Buddhists would disagree as it happens*).

To clarify what I meant by "experiential", let me quote an excerpt of the Dhammapada (from: http://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/verseload.php?verse=093):
"His path [i.e. that of a liberated individual] ,like that of birds in the air, cannot be traced."
This suggests to me a total freedom from all designations. Regardless of the acceptance of the "doctrine" of a particular school, this "image" is one of an absolute freedom. This - united to the fact that the there is a strong emphasis on the "here and now" - is what attracts me to Buddhism. While I think that the "metaphysics" is also interesting, I think that this "experiential" part is even more important (I admit that this a somewhat "perennialist" approach, but IMO it is the experiential part that is important regardless the fact that the "doctrine" is actually true or not). This experiential, in fact, part suggests me an absolute "boundlessness" (and actually my nick reflects my interest on the concepts of "infinite, boundless, ineffable" etc X-) ) .

Meditation therefore for me it is meant to "see" really important aspects of our existence that in "normal" life we neglect. And I also think that in ancient times where lives were less "constructed", so to speak, meditation (and other techniques) were possibly more effective. And the "boundlessness" which I referred before. At the same time this "openness to the higher", so to speak, must be accompained by a reduction of the "ego". If there is not this "reduction" the danger is a sort of "vainglory" (which is a quite important issue according to a very large number of traditions).

P.S. (maybe too much OT)
In many Buddhists for example I encountered a sort of "fear of the eternal". But IMO while, of course, transience is of a fundamental importance in Buddhism, nowadays it seems to much "emphasized". I read, for example, opinions (even among very respectable and serious teachers and/or monks) suggesting that "Nibbana/Nirvana" is nothingness, an "absolute void". I find such interpetrations somewhat "off" (albeit sometimes very logical and rigorous), I cannot articulate the feeling but it seems that I am "certain" that they are "wrong" (maybe it is only "clinging" X-) ). Personally while maybe nowadays it is a common interpretation, it appears that in ancient times, in fact, it was not. For example it seems that the ancient Theravadins held that Nibbana was "permanent, eternal..." as you can see here https://suttacentral.net/en/kv1.6 (however considering it "something" is maybe inappropriate. But considering it "nothing" is even worse..., possibly "no-thingness" in contrast to "nothingness" ). Anyway, I also see that even before the beginning of the Common Era there was a wide range of views about many tenets. This, oddly, quite conforts me and actually motivates my "skepticism/questioning".

Thank you. You might be interested in reading https://phys.org/news/2012-04-physicists-abolish-fourth-dimension-space.html and Smolin's thoughts (he wrote a book called "Time Reborn").

Yes I think that time is not like the spatial dimension. However I have some difficulty accepting that time passes without "any change". But I find it a respectable view. I will think about it in the following days.

Thanks for the link about Wittgenstein (I knew about his "spiritual side" which IMO is often unrightly disregarder - however it is true that he sometime compared to both buddhist and daoist philosophers).
Regarding Watts I only read that book and I found it well written. I like in particular his "free" quest, outside any particular organisation (in this experientially I feel very similar to him).

Actually to be more precise Buddhism attracts me on the pratical side rather than the "doctrinal" (which from a buddhist point of view might sound "weird" since "right view" is the first step) due to both skepticism and to some "views" that I have that might be regarded as "eternalistic" in a buddhist community. Also I have a hard time to accept a particular doctrine since I still percieve that there is an immense treasure of wisdom in other traditions. Doctrinal problems aside, on the experiential level I am finding Buddhism the most "accessible" since it refers to the actual immediate experience (to practice it one simply can start from his immediate experience without taking "tenets" on faith). On the other hand however other "doctrines" fascinate me a lot (and above all the unexpected similarities between them!). So I consider myself still a (very confused) questioning "agnostic".

Regarding the obstacles, thank you also for this link! It confirms my idea that spiritual life is full of paradoxes.

By the way I learned to accept my limitations in the practice. At first I expected only immediate results. After some time I came to realize that the practice is gradual and it must be done, as you say, to the "sake of doing it". It required some time (and also some suggestions from a "online" friend). But IMO if one cannot come to terms with himself the practice becomes impossible. So actually meditation, if anything, even stripped of its "spiritual" connotations should IMHO be performed to the simple sake to come to terms with oneself, to have a better outlook on life etc. But there is too much "hurry" in the modern society as others have mentioned: deadlines, bureocracy*, part-time jobs, obsessiveness with productivity, "publish or perish" attitude in the academia etc. From the Tao Te Ching (Lau translation, https://terebess.hu/english/tao/lau.html):

20

The multitude are joyous
As if partaking of the offering
Or going up to a terrace in spring.
I alone am inactive and reveal no signs,
And wax without having reached the limit.
Like a baby that has not yet learned to smile,
Listless as though with no home to go back to.
The multitude all have more than enough.
I alone seem to be in want.
My mind is that of a fool - how blank!
Vulgar people are clear.
I alone am drowsy.
Vulgar people are alert.
I alone am muddled.
Calm like the sea;
Like a high wind that never ceases.
The multitude all have a purpose.
I alone am foolish and uncouth.
I alone am different from others
And value being fed by the mother.

Yeah with all this "hurry" even meditating for reduce anxiety can lead to a certain amount of isolation, sadly.




*the Italian one seems to be quite infamous (I am Italian BTW)

thank you for sharing your experience! Excellent post (Y)

Personally I studied a bit of eastern philosophy almost four years ago. I read the "Tao Te Ching" simultaneously with some insights of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and for whatever reason I found a strong similarity between them (I remember that for many days I had a sort of "intellectual excitement" that suggested that there was surely a connection between the two works). Then I began my quest to discover eastern philosophies motivated also by the fact that eminent physicists like Einstein, Schroedinger, Bohr, Bohm, Heisenberg etc were attracted too. So I started to digging in the net and at first I conflated Buddhism, Vedanta and Taoism thinking that "they were the same" (actually reading "The Zen and the Art of motorcycle maintenance" did not help with this error). Then I began to appreciate their difference and I began to be more attracted by Buddhism, especially Theravada. Anyway until last summer it was merely an intellectual interest, nothing more. However when I understood that my intellectual questioning (especially about the "Unconditioned/Nibbana" and the doctrine of "rebirth") was meaningless without the actual experience, I decided (actually after a suggestion of a friend) to start meditation (at the same time I also read the "Way of Zen" of Alan Watts). Now I am trying to maintain a constant practice of both vipassana and samatha. I found the effects of medition immediate but a mixture of intellectual skepticism, doubt, laziness, anxiety, horrible time management etc is interfering with my "actual progress". Still this living experience is actually confirming the benefits of spiritual practices. Anyway while I am still higly skeptical of many "supernatural" claims made by religions and ancient philosophies I have to admit that in reality in many ways they store a lot of pratical and intellectual wisdom, sadly unrecognized in contemporary society.

Also I found that - to my knowledge - most (if not all) forms of Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Daoism all agree about the importance of trying to be not self concerned (and at the same time however you become aware of the "higher perspective" (e.g. in Buddhism the realization that all conditioned things are impermanent leads one to detach and to be less concerned...) -another paradox).

"Spiritual" practice make possible to actually, so to speak, experience the "wise words" of the sages. An intellectual understanding can of course give a "glimpse" on them, but the practice in fact permits to actually "see" them.

Excellent ;)

Regarding the marketing... yeah sometimes I have the same impression!

You are welcome! And thanks you for the links about Bohm and Verlinde!

Interesting. Thank you.

Yeah, I agree that the term "surrender" might be misleading. In fact what I have in mind is only a "surrender" of a particular type of will. But not of the "will itself". So IMO our perspectives are very similar on this. On the level of the will itself there is only a "calming", a "stilling" etc, not a real surrender. But normally our actions are somewhat conditioned by the "will to power". In order to achieve the calmness this "will to power" should at least in part "disappear".

I think it is only a matter of perspectives. If I realize that I cannot "rule over everything" I will in some sense surrender and give up my expectations. Possibly then I can work for calming my mind etc. After that as you say the will is spontaneous.

Actually this perspective reminds me a lot of Chan/Zen Buddhism (other than of course Daoism) where spontaneity, free action is seen as a liberated action. In both traditions the goal seems to be a state with no more plans, chains etc only spontaneity, freedom - the same spontaneity found in the flow of a river (except of course that we are aware and the river is not :) ).

Maybe on Zen @Wayfarer can confirm (or reject) what I have said.

So what about rephrasing the issue in these terms: It is a "surrender" of a particular type of will, namely the "will to power". But when we consider the "will" in fact the process is not really a surrender but only a calming, stilling etc.