I am optimistic about the present and future generations of people. 81% of Spaniards consider climate change, desertification, and CO2 serious issues, and we want to change the situation to better and live in a less polluted country. But I wonder whether we approached this issue too late or not.

As the climate in Europe becomes more unstable and intense, it is going to become increasingly more difficult to grow enough food to feed the population. Adaptation will be vital in fighting food insecurity. In the longer term it is much more serious, when AMOC collapses we will be in for a rollercoaster of unknown climatic changes.

I'm so envious! I listen to Max Richter at least once a week. Also Nils Frahm.

Yes, Nils Frahm too, of course.

I love his soundtrack for The Leftovers.

Yes, likewise.

I saw Max Richter in concert last night. He played the album, Blue notebooks, which he wrote 20yrs ago in protest against the Iraq war.
Sublime experience.

Which pill did they take, the blue pill, or the red pill?

Trump’s enemies have set the blueprint. The crying wolf and the hoaxes are one thing, but Trump’s enemies have also used the state to go after him. Now we have a discredited media, a two-tiered justice system, a political intelligence community, and a swath of activists ready to head the call. The lunatics are already here.

And Trump has stated that all these people will be sent to jail.
Basically, he is now waging war with the American state and if he were to win, he will be taking his revenge.

Who should be in jail, the whole US state, or Trump?

You didn’t answer the question. There is a reason why I asked it.

And if Biden were to halt arms shipments to Israel today. What would happen?
Or what do they fear would happen?

Evil is something that goes on in a person’s head, which is acted out. If someone failed to broker a peace deal a few decades ago, which was partly responsible for the situation as we see it in Israel. How can that be an evil person, when it had disastrous results, further down the line?

Both sides are scared of upsetting the Jewish lobby, or want them onside.
Isreal is a running sore, which previous administrations have tried and fail to cauterise. This isn’t so much evil as the result of repeated political failure.

Yes, the French bureaucracy, painfully slow. Whereas on the other side of the spectrum there are corporate giants like DuPont and Boeing over the pond.

I see now that I was misreading your OP. I was thinking about freedom, rather than morality. Morality is about social behaviour within a species. Whereas freedom is about autonomy within the restraints of the environment of a species/entity.

Presumably you are talking about freedoms within moral frameworks. So this is a discussion about morality, not freedom?

Yes, I see where you’re coming from now. However if you take a look at France, one of the most socialist Western countries. There are maverick’s studying and developing their own unique ideas everywhere. One only needs to look at their culinary diversity. Chefs strive to come up with new novel recipes, breaking the mould, pushing boundaries to win their Michelin star. Also in the arts, artists are given a stipend by the government allowing them to experiment and diversify to their hearts content. I travel around France a lot (I’m going there on Saturday, can’t wait), there are institutions, societies, venues, creative people everywhere. Often supported in their endeavours by the state.

If Thatcherism is socialist, then yes. But that’s not my reading.

Yes southern European countries are in a bind right now, I don’t think left, or right governments make much difference to be fair.

Socialist countries have capitalism and investment capital too. Or are you thinking of Communism?
Anyway I’m just saying they can do it too, just in a different way.

By relative, I mean not universal, but something happening in entities. Each species of entity is different, so the result of the inquiry will be different.
Also without knowing the goal, or purpose of humanity as an example of an entity, the consequentialism can’t be established. (I accept that in an isolated case, or circumstance, one could establish something that could be described as freedom)

Do we know the “role”, or “goal”, or “purpose” of humanity in the wider universe?

Freedom is relative and an attribute of an entity with agency. So there is no solution to the problem, but rather a series of compromised solutions dependent on the nature of the entity/s concerned.

But another thing people forget is that the vaccine was revolutionary. The massive pile of cash coming in to fund it from governments and rich guys was amazing. I really wonder what a socialist world would have done. I'd like to think the freedom to go with a crazy solution would exist there, but I don't know.

The AstraZeneca vaccine was funded by the U.K. government and charitable organisations. This would have been the same under a socialist government.
It’s true that research into RNA vaccines has been funded by investment capital around the world for decades. But that is just how the pharmaceutical systems we have, have developed. In a socialist world, there might have been more money invested in more cost effective ways rather than as a means to generate vast profits for shareholders etc.

Thankyou, you can always rely on Philip Glass to take you out of yourself.

Something to lighten your day.
https://youtu.be/YK_KTXb_Jrg?feature=shared

Guilty as charged.

One of my favourite albums. I like Tax Free Tax Free Tax Free. Do you have a link to this track? I haven’t been able to find one.

Here’s the full speech, people can make up their own minds about who speaks for the people of New York.
https://x.com/ArtCandee/status/1795475706979233917

Check out the comments too.

Sums him up nicely.

“ We New Yorkers used to tolerate him when he was just another grubby real estate hustler masquerading as a big shot. A two-bit playboy lying his way into the tabloids. He’s a clown.”

Robert De Niro

In this interview an Israeli soldier speaks out about what he saw fighting in Gaza.
https://x.com/Channel4News/status/1783179575310094524

Two things he said stood out for me. Firstly he said that lots of IDF soldiers would say if you don’t kill the children, then when they grow up they will return to fight us when they are adults. The people we are fighting now were the children from a previous war who have grown up and are now fighting us. They were justifying infanticide.

Secondly they would agree that everyone is Gaza is affiliated with Hamas, so in reality everyone in Gaza is a target.
They were justifying the killing of an entire population, because everyone, including women and children are our enemy.

This is cut and dry evidence of genocide.

Also to assess risks on hypothetical and counterfactual scenarios you need arguments or evidences to support them.

Quite, like words of agressors being backed up by actions.

To my understanding, the risk you are referring to is more specifically grounded on Western divisions, decisional weakness, and military unreadiness, than on Putin’s anger. If the West showed a united front, stable resolve and readiness to make the needed military efforts, Putin could have been and could still be very much deterred from pursuing a war against the West over Ukraine. And notice Putin frames this war mainly as a war against the West, but still Western public opinions are far from getting how existential this war can be to their prosperity and security. That’s why Putin can count on the possibility that the West gets tired of supporting Ukraine.

Of course, the complacency in Europe failed to act as a deterrence against Putin’s expansionism. But the EU along with U.S. attempted to appease Russia following the collapse of USSR and bring her into the fold. Which is something you were suggesting U.S. could do as an anti China policy(appease). An approach which has failed, at least while Putin is in office. Lending weight to my position that Europe will now pull back from cooperation and collaboration with Russia and with help from U.S. weaken Russia and strengthen the boundaries and defence of EU. Thus discredit Russia on the world stage.

The logic is analogous to the one compelling military units to destroy their own military equipment, for example during a withdrawal, out of fear it may fall in enemies’ hands. To the extent Russia comes out emboldened and empowered from this war, the West may experience a surge of anti-Americanism which could further weaken the US power projection and leadership in Europe. So the US, along with Russia, will be compelled to try to play such divisions on their favour at the expense of the rival.

Yes, something an idiot like Trump might do. We see now that under Biden’s leadership $60billion has now been provided to prevent it.
You provide a good reason there for why the U.S. and EU should now form a strong coalition.

Such a claim sounds overly bold given the available polls. I get that such polls can be wrong and there is still time for Biden’s campaign, but no chance of winning looks definitely as an overkill.

I’m thinking ahead to Trump’s name being dragged through the courts throughout the summer. He is currently sitting in a courtroom with a porn star every day for 6 weeks to avoid being arrested for contempt of court.

Non sequitur?! Doubt because...? These are the facts I’m referring to:

I’ve read your links, although apart from them being an interesting read, I don’t see a compelling case for squabbles between U.S. and EU being the cause of why Ukraine hasn’t yet joined NATO. What is often missed in such articles is the complexity of considerations of the political and economic conditions in the countries involved. So what appears as a protracted disagreement on the surface, may just be posturing following negotiations considering these circumstances. While beneath the surface the calculation had been reached and agreed between the players involved.

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria,

Perhaps, by international equilibria, you are talking about balance between superpowers. I’m not seeing it. The presence, or not of U.S. in the region would make a big difference, otherwise, who’s going to do what?

While Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are regional powers in the Middle Eastern area which are engaging in a hegemonic struggle in the Middle East. They are hegemonic because they are vigorously supporting military and economic projection beyond their borders to primary control the middle-east, but also in Asia and Africa

I don’t see anything out of the ordinary here. Most states are involved in escapades like this. Get back to me when one is about to invade another. If they did, it would risk them becoming a failed state like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Lebanon.

Iran is now military supporting Russia and pressing Israel with its proxies, related to two strategic regions which have compelled, still compel, and risk to compel further the US’ intervention at the expense of pivoting to the Pacific.

Yes, vocally Iran would conquer the whole region. It’s not happening though. Iran is a weak unstable country. The majority of the population would overthrow the regime if an opportunity arose.
As I say, what I see in the region is lots of small countries either in economic trouble, or wanting to hold onto their wealth, or controlling their countries through authoritarian control. All trying to keep quiet in the hope they won’t become one more failed state. They will be well aware of what has happened in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Lybia (this list would be a lot longer if countries in a precarious position were included) in recent years and watching Israel, perhaps becoming a failed state now.

We are talking risks, right? I argued for the risks I see through historical evidences (which you admit but downplay without any counter-evidence) and strategic reasons potentially appealing to geopolitical competitors (which you conveniently narrow down based on hopes).

Perhaps the difference is how we each interpret the available information.

Besides “hopefully” doesn’t mean “probably”, the point is that this wake up call is too recent to have set a stable and compelling trend in Western security.

Oh, so Europe might not rearm now, right oh.

Furthermore also non-Western and anti-Western powers had a wake up call at the expense of the West: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel are acting accordingly.

Yes, perhaps. The whole region is a tinder box, I doubt that will end well.

I didn’t reference that link to argue that desalination will produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. There may be more methods available to tackle water crisis depending on available and evolving technologies. I limited myself to argue that governments in the Middle East show self-awareness wrt climate challenges (as much as geopolitical challenges) and are already making efforts to deal with them. So it’s not evident to me that in the next ten years or so the Middle East will turn into a Mad Max style location because of a water crisis, and will stop playing any significant role in international equilibria.

I’m referring to a fresh water crisis, something which will be widespread in the future. There isn’t a technology that can replace it in sufficient quantities.

Notice that I do not need to argue for the emergence of a superpower in the Middle East. A dominating regional power can be already enough to contain the American power projection on the globe if the US' power projection is already offset by Russia and China's in Europe, Asia and in Africa.

U.S. is just protecting its oil interests in the region. No one is containing their spread in the region and they’re not spreading.

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

Yes, I have said that Russia might play games in the region and China is gradually spreading her economic involvement like an amoeba, like she has been across the world. These things are and will be perceived as a threat to Israel, not so much U.S.
Russia’s deal with Iran is Putin asking for help in a desperate attempt to salvage his catastrophic foreign policy failure in Ukraine.

We didn’t agree on how to measure geopolitical risks.

Well you just seem to be playing the devils advocate. I agree with most of what you say, I just come to a different assessment as to where the risks lie.

My arguments are based on my understanding of how threats are perceived and acted upon by the actual players. The US intervened in support of Ukraine and in support of Israel. And the latter even happened at the expense of the former. This is not what one would expect if the conflict in Ukraine was evidently of grater strategic importance.

It seems now that support for Israel didn’t come at the expense of Ukraine, now that the money has come through ( delayed for internal reasons in U.S.) A couple of days ago PM Sunak described the threat to Europe, NATO, from Putin as existential and that he is putting U.K. arms production on a war footing. Along with similar from Macron yesterday.

than Israeli-Palestinian conflict one can’t reasonable use the former to downplay the latter

I haven’t done this.

two reasons: there is a link between the two, and up until now the US never managed to disengage from both areas to pivot to the Pacific (and that, to me, doesn’t depend only on domestic factors like the pro-Israel lobby or the military-industrial complex)

I don’t subscribe to the pivot ideology. My position is that a pivot is not needed provided Russia is neutered.

Concerning your reasoning, as long as the West and the Rest runs on oil from the Middle East, the Middle East is strategically important for geopolitical developments.

Yes for the foreseeable, on this issue I am talking longer than 10yrs. The U.S. is providing stability here, I don’t see a change in that for now.

I think however that their importance goes beyond that since Middle Eastern’s power projection goes beyond the middle-east. So they can play a role on securing/controlling commercial routes (https://newsletter.macmillan.yale.edu/newsletter/fall-2010/american-grand-strategy-middle-east, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative), immigration trends and political networking (through Islamism, financial means, military aid, etc.). And not only in the Middle East.

Yes I’m aware of all these things and U.S. will continue to secure her interests in the region, namely oil and her coalition with Saudi. Isreal is giving them a headache atm. But it is becoming clear now that despite how provocative Isreal is, her neighbours are not going to be drawn into a wider conflagration, as I explain.

Some anomalies may be more than conjunctural events. See, also re-arming to face the Russian threat is an anomaly in EU foreign policy, yet it happened under the pressure of historical circumstances. And now you may wish to argue it will grow further into a stable, effective and comprehensive defence strategy. On the other side, the prospect of Trump running for a second presidential term suggests me the possibility that Trump’s political base may be wide, strong and persistent enough to survive him. As much as the burden of the imperial overstretch inducing the US to downgrade its commitments to global hegemony. Even more so, if the EU will remain structurally weak.

I have listened to a republican yesterday saying that they had not been prepared for how disfunctional Trump was in office and that they will be prepared now, as he is a liability. Also Republicans against Trump are quite vocal.

Here some more evidence for you to downplay (while you provided none as usual):

I’m not disputing this, European countries became complacement since the fall of USSR. Oligarchs snoozing with European politicians has been going on for a long time now. Again things are changing.

[wuote]
Dude, we clarified our different positions enough. At this point we seem to disagree so much on what constitutes an interesting, if not compelling, argument in support of some claim that I really don’t see the point of dragging this exchange further.[/quote]
No worries, it’s been fun.

Arguing that U.S. should, or may, throw EU to the wolves in some sort of power play with China was never going to end well.

If we’re serious about destroying all oppression we could all just kill ourselves. But in the meantime I say Hamas first - the aggressor and oppressor.

Hamas is like an amoeba, it can’t be destroyed, or removed. This is the legacy of the Israeli oppression of Palestinians.

That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:

People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here.

indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?

Again it’s about risks, probability.

Putin may attack NATO out of a more hawkish calculus though to the extent NATO countries show lack of resolve (due to economic dependency) and/or fear for escalation (for lack of readiness and will to fight for allies).

Yes, he might have a trick or two up his sleeve.

First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”

This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors?

Secondly, I argued that the conflict in Ukraine and in Palestine are straining Western public opinion and nurturing conflict of interests among allies, to the point that for example a US candidate for the next presidential elections like Trump dared to say “he would encourage Russia to attack Nato allies” if they do not comply with Trump’s demands.
Besides, I do not think EU governments and advisors are downplaying the gravity of such claims, or the US questionable commitment toward the Ukrainian conflict.
https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nuclear-warfare-detterence-manfred-weber-vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-war/
Poland's foreign minister on concerns the U.S. will abandon Ukraine, Europe 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHxjutEfhww)
If you do not see that, again do not bother answering me.

I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning.

If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?

That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU.

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.

When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East?

Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps?
As I’ve already said the only critical resource these players have to play with is oil. But the leverage this can exert is waning and I don’t see how this can be in anyway pivotal atm. Putin could play around with this perhaps, I don’t know.

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S.

It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too.

So this weakening you talk about, I agree has happened, but is well and truly now in the past(the wild card of a Second term for Trump excepted), Whereas you are suggesting it’s in the future and that it will deepen. I see a sea change, one in which Europe pulls together and strengthens along with a closer alignment with U.S. and a significant weakening and failure in Russia.
(Again there’s that word hegemonic, it would be useful to distinguish between hegemonic powers who are superpowers and those who are not.)

You seem to be grounding your arguments mostly on possibilities, but that’s not enough to assess likelihood. Sure it could be just a malaise that the West will manage to overcome, but it is too soon to see in Western re-arming a new stable trend that will succeed in building collective strategic deterrence, despite all persisting conflict of interests. While the decline of the US deterrence and leadership has just kept notably growing since 9/11.

Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now.

Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/

Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle.

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population

There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. Yes there are people’s who hate other peoples in the region, or call for their eradication etc. But this is just heated rhetoric. Of the states in the region, some are wealthy and benefit from international commerce travel etc, these states want to hold onto their comfortable lifestyles. There are states with authoritarian leaders like Iran, Egypt and Syria who are struggling with poverty and keeping power and extravagant lifestyles for themselves and their friends. There are poor countries who just bump along the bottom. None of these countries want war, or hegemony.

(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Yes, China does seek to work with many countries like this around the world. This is a risk to the west, because of what it could, but might not lead to.

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. But has its own fears of Islamophobia and terrorist attacks in Russia.

Clearly mine is just a speculation. But a principled one because I take into account strategic logic of geopolitical players and historical circumstances to assess likelihood. And the conclusion is that we have reasons to worry about how things may evolve in Ukraine but also in the Middle East given the current predicament.

Agreed, with the added emphasis that Putin has hegemonic designs on neighbouring countries and is actively invading them.

Your argument seems mostly about downplaying the evidence I bring, insisting on the need for the US to have a strong EU to counter Russia and China, insisting on the fact of European re-arming, and on the incumbent crisis in the Middle East due to climate change.

Close, I’m insisting on the importance of U.S. EU coalition and cooperation to counter China (this requires the neutering of Russia) and observing a change in EU to re-arm, which will deliver it.

I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling.

What I counter is:
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.

As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of important geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it)

2. Insisting that the US needs something doesn’t imply it will get it. Besides the pivot to China, may lead the US to appease Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe to turn Russia against China (which is the raising power, geographically closer to Russia than the US), as argued by various political analysts including Mearsheimer. Indeed, Trump's approach to Russia can be in line with such view (https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/24/donald-trump-s-plan-to-play-russia-against-china-is-fool-s-errand-pub-70067). Russia’s appeasement in Europe on the other side may be costly for EU/NATO/Ukraine, and also turn more destabilising than the US may tolerate (if not to Trump’s administration, to post-Trump’s administrations) , soliciting a hegemonic competition in Europe.

You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office.
Yes that route of appeasement may become U.S. policy, although I would say where it may have seemed rational before the invasion of Ukraine, now following the invasion, it’s is entirely irrational. It
essentially takes the deep trust and cooperation between U.S. and Europe, squanders it and then pretends to have trust in Putin’s regime. Only Trump would be so stupid. Putin would take them for whatever he could get, while winking to Xi Jingping.
Besides notions of turning Russia against China faded a long time ago and prior to the Ukraine war, the U.S. and EU had tried on many occasions to cosy up with Putin and it got nowhere, in fact it had the opposite effect. Now we have BRICS.

3. European re-arming is a recent phenomenon so it doesn't help much to assess the future and effectiveness of the collective European defence strategy (considering various strategic factors like defence industry, conscription, nuclear, etc.) given its controversial costs

I only need to refer to one event which in a moment changed the course of EU foreign policy. On the day of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the EU with nuclear attack, while invading a large country on its border. Putin’s legacy.

for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric

This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.

(and often pro-Russian)

Lol.

4. Climate change is definitely an incumbent challenge that concerns the entire world, and Middle East governments are aware of its risks and urgency, especially due to how exposed they are. That doesn’t mean they are doomed to succumb to a climate crisis or to geopolitical irrelevance, given how pro-actively and effectively they are already acting wrt climate change and evolving geopolitical challenges.

Climate change will result in oil becoming a stranded asset. Also these countries may become dependent on food imports, when the desert cooks.
Interestingly just last week Dubai experienced 18 months worth of rain in one day.

I’m sure that I’m “not sure if that’s relevant”.

It’s relevant if that anger goes beyond the point of rationality. But you take us back to the Chechen war, things have moved on since then. Putin’s megalomania has grown top heavy. The myth that the nuclear deterrent still works has been eroded. Putin may not invade a NATO country by conventional means( as you say yourself). I wouldn’t be at all surprised if Putin had attacked Ukraine if accession to NATO were in the pipeline.

So my counterfactual is not arbitrary.

Quite, however that alliance may have been on Putin’s mind from that time. Putin was around then, just not in power.

On the other side if we are talking about starting from the current conflict, it would be certainly problematic for political and strategic reasons wrt NATO and wrt Putin, still I think Putin would have big problems to start a war against NATO if the non occupied part of Ukraine was successfully fast tracked into NATO (like Finland), as Putin is even having problems to end the conflict in South and East Ukraine.

Yes, Putin is now in a weak position. Going back to where this line of thought started. That there are differences in foreign policy between U.S. and EU, such that U.S. would seek to keep EU down, or weak. Again I’m just not seeing it. The alliance between them is strong and in lockstep. The status of Ukraine, or the expansion of EU and NATO to the east is not a controversial issue between them.

I’m not sure the US will preserve its superpower status so defined in the next decades if certain strategic alliances are necessary for the US to keep its superpower status:

I repeat, I wasn’t talking about U.S. keeping, or not, it’s superpower status. That status is strong. The alliance with the EU is to counterbalance future threats from China

technological gap is already decreasing, military projection is already grown unsustainable, monetary dominance is challenged or worked around, and reputational costs are mostly against the US. So the US power projection as world power can be severely damaged in the longer run.

Yes and this is the threat to U.S. China is winning the economic war and U.S. needs friends, another powerblock in an alliance to shore this up.

Second, if the US needs a strong EU as an ally to sustain its power projection wrt rival alliances, I don’t think it will evidently succeed either because a strong EU will never materialise, and if it will materialise it still will at best balance not overwhelm rival alliances, even more so, if the contribution of Middle-Eastern regional powers can weigh in.

And the alternative? (I don’t need to repeat my comments about the EU in this regard.)
The Middle Eastern regional powers are small fry, Turkey is not far off a failed state and the Arab states just want to hold on to their decadent lifestyles.

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, Europe will turn into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

This is the flawed argument I was referring to.
I think the best you’ve got here is some sort of general malaise and internal collapse in the EU, or U.S. The EU is now rearming and stronger as an alliance due to the example of the U.K. (having left the EU). Also as I say if Ukraine joins, it will provide a considerable boost in numerous ways. The U.S. is in a more precarious position, (I see Trump more and more as a busted flush now) but is still strong militarily and can print money to pull itself out of the malaise.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Weak argument, unless we are talking of a world slipping into distopia. Climate change might deliver this though.

Concerning the Middle East, I find at least the leaderships of regional powers like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, enough aware of their geopolitical role and strength, despite rivalries and vulnerabilities. They are open to balance the US hegemony in cooperation with Russia and China. They try to develop their sphere of influence even beyond the Middle East in Asia and Africa.

I wouldn’t tell that to anyone in Saudi atm. Again more of a liability than an advantage, I would say.

And even though they will exploit their oil as a main source of revenues, they are already planning for a post-oil transition (https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/lists/the-middle-easts-sustainable-100/, https://www.dw.com/en/how-the-gulf-region-is-planning-for-a-life-after-oil/a-67067995, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-021-01424-x).

Yes, however there might be severe climate issues there in a few decades. Saudi has some dubious practices including building ski slopes in the desert and depleting water tables, something they’re doing to U.S. water tables too. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/16/fondomonte-arizona-drought-saudi-farm-water/

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.

Sounds more like a liability for China, Russia etc.. Also it would mean them getting into bed with these Islamists you talk about.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

The only way I see what happens in the Middle East playing anything approaching a decisive role is if it distracts the coalition of support for Ukraine enabling Putin to make more ground.

There is some logic into the 2 hypothetical scenarios you have described but given the current circumstances I’m less certain about their likelihood. And the end of the Ukrainian war may look more messy than an uncontroversial victory or loss.

Yes, of course, I was talking of the more easily defined outcomes. I would think that if it were not that clear cut, the perception of success, or failure of Putin as a leader would determine how the world see’s it. I could well see an iron curtain following close to the current front line, but I would see this as a win for the West and a failure for Putin. So my points would still hold.

Not sure if that’s relevant: Putin may have been furious and still deterred.

Are you sure about that?

Especially in the firs years of his Presidential mandate, imagine during the Chechen war.

That’s unrealistic, you’re taking it back to a point where Russia was weak compared to now. Putin has been agitating in Ukraine for a long time. If Ukraine had been fast tracked into NATO that would have blown up on the eastern front.

How am I conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”, if I’m intentionally stressing their difference, and what you wrote is again a paraphrase of what I just claimed to have understood from your views?

Your whole argument about U.S. looking to weaken the EU, rather than form a constructive alliance, (apart from it being a flawed argument) only makes sense from the assumption that the U.S. is in a unipolar position and doesn’t require that alliance.

I thought it was accepted knowledge that the U.S. isn’t in a unipolar position.

Other than oil, money, terrorism, control over commercial routes, criminal business, immigration, exporting islamism in Asia, Africa and the West, maybe nothing. That’s however may be enough to help a Russia-China alliance against a US and EU alliance, even more so with a weak EU.

Good luck (for this alliance) in holding all that together. Just more failed states. The only reason the Gulf states have their current prosperity and security is due to implicit support from the U.S. (the West) in return for oil. That oil will shortly become less important with the transition to net zero. By the way, Russia has the same problem with oil becoming a stranded asset.

It seems a good location for Mad Max style movies

Now you’re getting the picture.

Actually I’m more skeptical about the idea that whatever happens in the Middle East, it won’t play any decisive contribution in the power balance of major hegemonic powers.

So points 2 and 5, wouldn’t happen? Are you sure about that? Or that on the other side of the picture, that this could happen if Russia had lost in Ukraine and sleeked off with her tail between her legs?
(2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.)
(5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.)

All right, so it’s not that you do not see. You do not see anything new. Even though foreign policies can be inherently controversial, especially if motivated by aggressive hegemonic ambitions, maybe the Gulf War was the least controversial among them.

There have been tensions between the US and the EU about economics.
Now we are talking divergence about security needs, military alliance, wars, genocides on top of the economic tensions. That’s the reason of concern especially if power balance wrt aggressive competitors is at stake as you too pointed out.

Controversial enough to threaten the alliance, to threaten U.S. support for and trust in a powerful EU.

If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now.
— Punshhh

I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can argue that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did

How angry do you think Putin would have been if Ukraine had joined NATO a few years back?

I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.

You seem to be conflating “superpower status” with “the unipolar world”. I haven’t once mentioned a unipolar U.S. I’m working from the assumption that that is over now and we have competing superpowers. Therefore the U.S. will rely on a strong partner in the EU to fend off potential challengers and maintain the status quo.

Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance

I don’t see this. The Middle Eastern countries are incapable of reaching such a stature and control of the region is not of any importance In the power balance between U.S. and China. The times when gulf oil was of great importance are over, what else do they have to offer?(other than money laundering)

Still I expect the region to become an inhospitable wasteland of failed states once climate change bites.

So I wouldn’t discount this factor when talking about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Yes, I know, but I’m talking about changes, or pivot here, between superpowers. As you seem to dislike the notion that the Ukraine war is pivotal in Europe, Russia and by extension the U.S. and China.

We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other.

What’s new. This has been going on for decades with every conflict the U.S. has been involved in.

That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to.

So am I, the Israeli conflict won’t have big geopolitical consequences.
The Ukraine conflict will have big geopolitical consequences, but the direction of policy here hasn’t changed for decades. It’s the fallout from the Cold War and the U.S. and E.U. are pretty much in lockstep.

So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?

Not U.S. superpower status, rather the strength of the anti China alliance.

What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis with Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.

The partnership between the U.S. and the EU will have tensions, so what? If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now. Is that what the U.S. wanted?

if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?

At no point have I said anything about the U.S. superpower status. Its position as a global superpower is secure and isn’t going to change.
I’m saying if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will greatly weaken and threaten the EU (as opposed to EU status if Russia loses the war). This will leave the U.S. vulnerable on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Perhaps bullet points will help.
If Russia wins;
1, Russia strengthens, becomes a threat to EU on her borders.
2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.
3, Russia becomes strong re-establishes the Russian empire forms a strong alliance with China.
4, U.S. is vulnerable on two fronts from China and from Russia via threat to EU. While China and Russia are in strong alliance.
5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.

If Russia loses;
6, Russia is greatly weakened, may even collapse.
7, Putin is seen as a failure, pariah
8, Ukraine becomes part of EU, NATO.
9, EU becomes strong with no threat on her border.
10, EU forms strong alliance with U.S.

In both cases a strong alliance is formed between two large powers. In the first case between China and Russia in the second case between U.S. and EU.

Now going back to the Israel Palestine conflict.
There is no global shift in power, with either outcome in the conflict. Israel either becomes an isolated country bristling with weapons. Or Israel collapses and becomes another failed state in the Middle East. Either way it makes no difference to the geopolitical balance in the world.
Let’s say Israel goes to war with Iran. Again two more failed states with no change in the global power dynamic. There are other things that can happen in the region which could have geopolitical consequences, like oil, or conflicts between larger regional players. But they are not influenced that much by what happens in Israel Palestine.

I see the issues you raise and they will have to be grappled with by the parties to the coalition. Provided the U.S. doesn’t veer off in another direction, Trumpism, for example. I don’t see any major problems going forward.

American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really?

Yes, but I don’t see any controversial policies on the horizon. I say this because the foreign policies of the U.S. which have led to the majority of conflicts they have engaged in over the last period, since WW2, have now faded. Namely the struggle against the commies. Although I wouldn’t be surprised if an equivalent paranoia regarding China were to develop. Although I would expect this to be trade wars rather than land wars.
I’m in agreement with SSU that the so called Islamist threat, is rather over blown.

So, yes, the fact of the European rearming sounds good wrt the Russian threat, but this brings other political and economic concerns too, some of which are about the US leadership

I would think that this depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war and whether Russia can retain some sort of superpower status. Hence my description as pivotal.

On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe un exploitable to its hegemonic competitors too

Yes, this is a factor, I’m not up to speed on how this played into the Ukraine crisis since the collapse of the USSR. But I acknowledge it, although I don’t see any reason why the U.S. and EU interest would diverge much on this issue. I reiterate though that the U.S. seeking to weaken or exploit the EU, or NATO for some political reason does seem nonsensical here.

I limit myself to point out that Europeans can’t give for granted the U.S. partnership, if that means equal partnership, especially in matter of security, as history has shown, starting with NATO (“created to ‘keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’”) and all other examples of unilateralism in Middle East or toward Russia

Europe wouldn’t achieve equal partnership in terms of arms for a long time. It would take many decades to come anywhere near. The geopolitical shift here is towards the east. When it comes to China the U.S. needs a powerful Europe on its side. If they cut Europe loose and Europe becomes bogged down in wars with Russia, or collapses. It would leave the U.S. exposed on two fronts. The pacific front and the Atlantic front. With her being pulled into conflicts in Europe and in the pacific at the same time. The U.S. needs a strong Europe just as Europe needs a strong U.S..As I say, the post WW2 settlement is in the past now thanks to Putin.

This unilateralism for the U.S. has been undermined by the economic cue of China through globalisation. The U.S. economy is weak, the overstretch involved in policing the world is becoming to expensive.

Concerning NATO, the US is currently struggling between a historical intent “on preserving a 70-year-old framework that lets Washington call the shots and put its interests first” (https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nato-problem-defense-procurement-training-research/) at the expense of American tax-payers, represented by Biden, and Trump’s America first approach (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/) which arguably aims at preserving NATO but more at the expense of European tax-payers (while threatening to withdraw from NATO otherwise).

This supports my point, the U.S. needs to help the EU to become strong and strengthen NATO.

There is however a strategic issue here one may overlook: the problem is not just how much the Europeans spend for their defence and NATO, but how much they buy from the US defence industry at the expense of the European defence industry.

Yes this is something to guard against, but not for reasons of competition with the U.S. but for the economic benefit of the EU manufacturing her own arms.

I’ve also given my take on your take: “you didn’t clarify in a principled way what your very high bar is, nor offered evidence that ‘the deliberate starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens’ is a direct consequence of Israel’s decision”.

I’m deferring to the ICJ on this. However, I’ll eat my hat if the starvation of a captive population by restricting food and water turns out not to be genocide.

Sure. But maybe you didn't get the sarcastic intent of my comment.

I did find it amusing.

First, I doubt that it’s the more likely than a frozen conflict scenario where victory and loss remain uncertain, controversial and exploitable at the expense of Russia and/or EU.

I was talking about the stakes, big stakes. Yes the war could grind on, could result in some sort of negotiated settlement. I did point out earlier and in the Ukraine thread a while back that the big shift here, the ground breaking change initiated by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Is that Europe will now re-arm, the post WW2 settlement in which the U.S., the U.K. and to a lesser extent France would provide the security for Europe under the umbrella of NATO, has ended. Now the EU will re-arm and likely create a European army. What happens in Ukraine won’t change this and this will be Putin’s legacy.

Second, the US likely doesn’t want Russia to win (too much), but maybe not to lose (too much) either, because China could profit from Russia's weakness to increase even more its hegemonic influence in Central Asia, at the expense of the US.

Yes, I agree that a long drawn out war is fine for the U.S.
But I really don’t see this talk about the U.S. wanting to keep the EU weak. Or that she would not see the benefit of an alliance with a strong EU?

The isolationist trend in the US politics which Trump likely aims at representing doesn’t seem to worry much about the fate of the EU and NATO, even less motivated to push European hegemony. In this predicament, Europe can very much turn into an arena for hegemonic conflict. Better to not confuse expectations with wishes about the outcome of this hegemonic race. Meanwhile, France shows some intent or velleity to replace the US in safeguarding/leading the EU, we will see.

Trump is an idiot and a populist, so he will certainly destabilise the situation in his personal interest. But if you look at what he said about NATO, it was just him playing hardball to get EU countries to stump up their fair share to NATO funds. This is not an issue now, as these countries will be making these investments, care of Putin. Also he says he will end the Ukraine war in one day. I doubt he will succeed short of somehow handing Ukraine to Putin on a plate, something which isn’t in his gift. If he just withdraws U.S. support to Ukraine, he will be giving Putin a green light to move on Kiev. This will result in the outcome I was talking about where Putin will bring the war to Europe now, or in the future.

Anyway I don’t see Trump getting his hands back on power, he is currently drowning in a sea of litigation and sleaze, not to mention his signs of dementia.

even less motivated to push European hegemony.

Better to not confuse expectations with wishes about the outcome of this hegemonic race.

You are introducing the idea of a race to world domination, or something, we’re not playing a game of Risk here. Why would U.S. “push European hegemony”, more like U.S. would work with EU as a partner and friend.

So bombing and killing more than 30K Palestinians is not a genocide according to your very high bar, but the starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens is, right?

You seem to be shouting here, I’ve given my take on this.

Palestinians should surrender before they lose whatever they have left. What a shame it didn’t happen years ago. So many lives could have been saved.

Presumably you mean Hamas should surrender?

The West can "forget the issue", but the geopolitical shift with Arab nations aligning to BRICS and taking a bigger role cannot simply be ignored. Or rather one may ignore it at their own peril.

This equates to selling your soul to the Chinese, it may be a prickly relationship.

I get that the conflict in Ukraine is of primary importance for the EU and Russia, but if you are focusing on the swing of power between China and the US, I’m not sure that the difference between likely outcomes either in the Ukrainian conflict or in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would make a difference for China and the US. As you say “the struggle between the two is primarily elsewhere”. Besides the conflict in Ukraine still looks far from being settled in a way that is amenable to most certainly boost China's or the US's hegemony.

Well the difference in outcomes is enormous for the EU and Russia. It is important for the balance of power between the U.S. and China because if Russia wins, it will bolster Russia’s position on the world stage and become a serious threat to European security. This would weaken the EU and probably lead to another European war in a decade or so. Where as if Russia loses in Ukraine, it will likely result in Russian collapse, splintering of her client states etc, strengthen and clearly define the EU to include Ukraine. This will likely put the EU on course for superpower status and a strong ally of the U.S. The U.S. and EU working together in coalition through NATO would be a formidable foe for China.

with cascading dividends for world hegemonic powers (the US, China or Russia) because the US then would be facilitated in pulling out from the middle east and re-invest its military capital/troops elsewhere to contain China. Yet, as I anticipated, it’s not easy to pull out from the middle-east:

Yes if the U.S. were to pull out from the Middle East it would change things, but as you say it’s not likely any time soon.

I already answered that question. Russia and the US are the first ones to come to mind. Both may have strong incentives to play divide et impera strategies in Europe to preserve their supremacy.

Nonsense, the U.S. is most powerful working alongside a powerful successful EU. If the U.S. were to go down this line you suggest, it would lead to the break up of the EU, the advance of Russia, and a generation of wars in Europe, which would try to draw the U.S. in many times and which would guarantee China’s hegemony with Russia as her side kick. Regarding Russia, she has been trying to meddle in Europe for a long time, nothing has changed in that.

The prospects vary among superpowers. But only in the EU the situation looks so worrisome in all domains at the same time, at least now.

Yes, the EU is fragile as a fledgling Union, however I don’t see it failing any time soon. The mutual benefit to the member states is to strong a motivation to avoid collapse.

What act are you talking about? The massacre of October 7 is the act carried out by Hamas. This act can be accused of being genocidal: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_in_the_2023_Hamas-led_attack_on_Israel . Is such act genocidal or not, to you? If not, what DEMONSTRATES that it is not, to you?

Yes the supporters of Israel and the Jewish lobby etc will naturally claim October 7th as genocide. But if we set the bar so low it will bring thousands of small conflicts around the world into the definition. My bar is very high and I have heard numerous legal specialists on the media casting doubt on what is a genocide in this situation. As I say, for me it is the deliberate starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens, happening as we speak.

You have introduced the distinction between “pivotal” and “distraction”, without clarifying its implications, at least to me.

The implications are that in the case of the Ukraine conflict the difference between the two outcomes, 1, that Russia wins and incorporates Ukraine into Russia and 2, that Russia fails to win Ukraine and Ukraine becomes incorporated into the EU. Would have far reaching and profound implications for the geopolitics between Europe and Asia (and by implication between the West and the East) for a generation or more.
By contrast, the difference between likely outcomes in the Isreal Gaza conflict will not make much difference to geopolitics either way. I don’t see any significant wider geopolitical ramifications. (Please provide some, if I’m wrong). Any linking of these alternative scenarios to a swing of power towards China, or away from the U.S. is weak as the struggle between the two is primarily elsewhere. Russia and the U.S. have been playing proxy wars in the region since WW2. This is just another of those.

The first (Ukraine)is pivotal geopolitically, the second (Israel) is little more than a distraction for any big players in the geopolitics. I can’t see how more simply I can put this distinction than this, one is geopolitically significant, the other isn’t.

why the US looks concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict way more than about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The difference is that the U.S. has an interest in one and not the other.

For example the Middle East is pivotal to Israel and the Jews as much as Ukraine is pivotal to the Europeans, right?

The difference being Europe is an important world power, with geopolitical heft. Israel is a small Western outpost in an area in which there are no big geopolitical players(including Israel).

To the extant the pro-Israel community in the US (Jews and Evangelicals) is influential to the US foreign policy (and arguably it is), then the US can’t simply pull out from the Middle East just because Middle East is a distraction wrt the competition with China in the Pacific. To use your own words, since Israel is pivotal for pro-Israel Americans then, by extension it is pivotal for the U.S., right? If so, what was the point of invoking the distinction between “pivotal” and “distraction” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, again?

I meant a distraction in a general sense. In that it is a region in which the big geopolitical players throw something from time to time, have a proxy war, or play some games with oil, or something. Which may distract the voices flying across the world for a while from other concerns. But things settle down again after a while and the big players settle back to their established positions.
I agree that Israel is a unique case of U.S. involvement, which can draw the U.S. into proxy wars. But this has been going on for a good while now in one Middle Eastern country, or another, no change there.
Again Russia and her proxy’s and the U.S. and her allies in the region are having a spat, just like they have been for god knows how long. China will see it for what it is, a skirmish in an intractable situation in an unimportant region.

You sound more convinced than convincing. I understand that circumstances are motivating Europeans to think more strategically and re-arm. However geopolitical analyses sound more uncertain about the outcome of this wake up call.

Yes there are complexities to the situation, I’m simply describing the major shift, a profound development in European security planning. The majority of the member states of the EU are successful wealthy countries. Yes there is some economic turmoil around the world currently as a result of the pandemic and the Ukraine war. But they are quite capable of spending a percent or two of their budgets on this.

what are the “wide ranging resources including the longer term opportunities for growth” you are referring to?

Industrial, technological, innovative resources from a coalition of advanced Western nations. As I have pointed out, Europe has the opportunity to develop solar energy in its southern states to fuel the northern states, also wind farms in the North Sea. The economic activity of developing the accession states in Eastern Europe to similar levels of advancement is a big economic opportunity. Ukraine has great agricultural resources, which will be valuable with climate change.

Germany depending on Russia for oil and on China for export

Germany is making a rapid move away from Russian energy supplies, it will take a while to make the adjustments. Their trade with China is mutually beneficial. If China ceased trading with Western powers such as Germany, it would provide an economic boost and opportunity for whomever replaces the supply, markets would adjust. As I say, China undercutting Western countries with their manufacturing is the main drag on economic activity and growth in those countries. Not to mention China’s economy being dependent on such trade.

They can try to exploit European vulnerabilities AGAINST Europeans at convenience.

Who will be doing this?

So even if there is a potential for growth, there is also a potential for decadence. Indeed concerns about EU’s decline are persistent and widespread in all domains: population, economy, politics, technology. Here some related readings:

Quite, issues faced by many countries around the world at this time.

I know, I can’t see the EU failing to provide enough support.
— Punshhh

Most certainly not enough to support a Ukrainian offensive, right?

Imagine the response from European countries should Russia start to make substantial ground and look likely to occupy Kiev.

So you can scan “intents” directly from people’s heads now? If you dismiss evidences of Hamas’ massacre and declared intents against Israel, others can dismiss your capacity of scanning intents from people’s heads or even retort it against you: one can scan in Nethanyahu’s head he has no intent to commit a genocide and calling Hamas animals is just hot air.

I have said more than once that it is only for the specialist investigators who will testify to the ICJ to determine what is in the heads of these terrorist groups. Maybe I should get back to you in 10 years when they have concluded their work. In the meantime all we have is personal opinion, or judgement.

What’s the argument? Dude, I didn’t join this forum to make a survey about people’s opinions or to socialize. I welcome actual arguments if you have any. If you don’t, we’re wasting time here.

Ahh, Neomac’s requirement for in depth arguments again. I’ve given my argument. Let me give it again.

I think it is important to bear in mind that genocide is not the intent in itself, but intent and the carrying out of the act intended. So even if it can be demonstrated that Hamas had the intent, I don’t see it being demonstrated that the act, (according to the Israeli’s), intended was carried out.

In other words, it doesn’t matter what intent there is, it only becomes genocide when that intent, sufficient to meet the bar of genocide, is acted out on the ground. Hamas was not capable of acting out a genocidal act, all they were capable of was an incursion across the wall, to massacre anyone they found and return home for their evening meal. Doesn’t look like genocide to me.

There is within environmentalism a kind of despair which often afflicts one. Rather like the lightbulb moment when one first realises the full magnitude of the climate crisis. It is written about in the book, The confessions of a recovering environmentalist. However once one has passed the next stage after that of acceptance that it’s going to happen and one might as well enjoy life in the meantime. Rather than put it on hold, that an equilibrium can be reached.