Some scientists have lightbulb (eureka) moments too. Or what was Einstein up to when he came to his realisation about the speed of light and relativity?I was only referring to ordinary knowledge of the world. I think the kind of intuitive ideas you are referring to may or may not be knowledge, and that there is no way to
On the contrary, it is our most direct arena of discovery. Enabling us to escape our discursive tendencies.It enriches our lives, but doesn't tell us anything about what is the case, in my view.
Karma in so much as there is a causal thread of some kind. Karma is bound up in reincarnation and requires an entire transcendent cosmogony. We can go there if you like, but I tend to avoid such ideas here as it can be seen as woo woo.I don't know the answer to that—we are given what we are given. Are you suggesting Karma?
Yes, I do agree with this, but it becomes complicated because I subscribe to the idea that what we know can be radically altered by the addition of one new thought, like when we have a lightbulb moment. This one new thought can in a sense rearrange what we knew prior to the lightbulb moment, such that what we know has changed. A reorientation process within the mind. So we might know one thing one day and something quite different the next. (This is an important process for me, which I have developed quite a lot). So I do agree that we do know what it is we know, but we must as you say provide the caveat that we don’t know the thing in itself, or why we and the thing in itself are here. So we are in a sense blind, but can feel with our hands a world that we find familiar.I think we do know what it is we know.
We know the world non-discursively and that non-discursive knowledge is not separate from what is known. We always already do know the world non-discursively, it is just a matter of learning to attend to that, rather than being lost in discourse and explanation. Mind you, I'm not saying there is anything wrong with discourse and explanation, just that it needs to take its place alongside our non-discursive awareness, lest we lose ourselves in the confusion that comes form "misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead).
I have experienced that, where time is a dimension. But it raises some serious questions and invites in transcendent realities.Could be as the events of a Block Universe.
Yes, this is a big and long lasting change and Europe has woken up and will secure their own security and future.Yes, the US is a very divided country, yet Europeans won't forget that Americans have now two times elected Trump as President.
There is a cognitive dissonance in the U.S. when Trump sides with Putin. Remember the MacCarthy period, and the Cold War. Many people in the US won’t like the idea that the president, pretty much on his own has defected to the other side.Many will see this paper stating the US being the ally of Russia against Europe. That's not going to happen, there's a vast majority of Americans who do see the traditional stance of the US beneficial, yet Trump is the one who calls the shots.
In this sense we know about this domain, or arena we find ourselves in. But what is that? And is that the world, or effectively a mirror in which we see ourselves? The world giving us what is apposite to our nature.Even if we frame 'the world' as the 'in itself', forever beyond human experience (as Kant would have it) it seems undeniable that if we and the animals didn't know anything the world we would not survive for long, and it seems that that "knowledge" is not discursive knowledge at all, but is given pre-cognitively
Yes, we do know things about the world, but we don’t know what it is we know, or what it means, apart from what it is to us and means to us. So again, the mirror.So the conclusion would be that we do know things about the world, but cannot prove that we do. It is merely the inference to what seems to be (to me at least) the best explanation for what we do experience.
Yes, but firstly the child in question is either diseased, or has a disorder. So is a person with all the apparatus, but it doesn’t work properly. Animals with central nervous systems will rely on them for the experience of feelings etc. I’m talking of organisms which don’t have a disorder and will have alternative, or primitive feelings. Secondly, by feelings, I don’t mean like our feelings. With a central nervous system and an advanced bran. But primitive feelings, more like a state, rather than a subjectively defined state within an integrated person. Perhaps a tree knows in some way if it is not any more healthy, that it is diseased. Knows that there are other trees and plants in its environment and communicates with them. All this might well go on in what we would describe as an unconscious way. But perhaps that is our failing, that we think that consciousness requires sentience and other states that we see as normal.do you see the connection?
You wouldn’t want it to snap off, it could hurt (the tree).I probably wouldn't want to go out on a limb
Yes, I’m not denying that. I was emphasising the importance of mind as body and that different kinds of body have different kinds of experience, unique to them. I agree that rational intelligent minds can observe other kinds of bodies (minds), but it’s always an observation from the perspective of the experience of different kind of body, (third person) when it is done. Also, I think we can (we have the capacity to) as rational intelligent beings break out of our inherent perspective and develop understanding of other experiences.This is what is in question, I think. Nagel, in the passage I quoted in response to @Wayfarer, doesn't think this follows. And I don't see why it must, though no one would deny that we learn more about an experience if we're the ones having it.
But surely it has the experience of being a tree? Yes, I know we never be able to know for certain, but it has a shared presence with us is our physical domain. A domain where there is a common scale, a tree is approximately ten times our height and lives about as long, or a few times longer than us. Senses and reacts to stimuli in that environment which we sense and react to. If there is mind of some kind in the body of the tree as there is in our bodies, surely there are experiences being felt. Albeit so far removed from our kind of experience, that it may be inconceivable to us. For example, it is known that trees in a forest communicate with other trees. They may have a feeling of being in a group, chemical messages are being sent through the group. They may be detecting the presence of destructive fungi at one end of the forest and sending messages about it to other parts of the forest etc.Or at least they may be. Unless we stipulate a certain meaning for "experience" which we're not entitled to ("everything that happens to an entity is an experience"), I don't think we can know whether a tree has them.
This is the nub of the issue, there is an entire perspective, or vista involved in experience which is missing from the objective account. “What it is like to have the subjective experience”, “what it is like”, only hints at it, but is itself conceptual language, talking about concepts to other concepts. In order to understand the experience, one has to be the being experiencing it. And by being, I’m not talking of the mind*, I’m talking of a living creature. Also the use of the word subjective, is confining experience to thought and reflections on thought. Experience doesn’t at first include thought, that comes later, although thought itself is an experience, it is experience of a reflective activity in the brain following experiences.We should note that Nagel qualifies this in an important way. “Something will inevitably be lost,” he says – namely, what it is like to have the subjective experience. “No objective conception of the mental world can include it all.” But do we ask the objective viewpoint to include everything, or only (only!) to understand everything?
And this Reason can tell us that we, or the animals being discussed, don’t and can’t know anything about the world. Other than what is presented to us via our senses. Which necessarily includes experiences. That we can deduce some things about the structure of the world by experimentation. But that is all. And yes we can philosophise about it all to our hearts content, but those philosophical thoughts can’t get past the limits I’ve just pointed out.Reason has no authority beyond consistency, and must remain true to that which supports it, i.e. actual experience, or lose all coherency.
I quite liked the way the thread had become a peaceful, friendly, discussion about the topic. So I went off peste about the idea of a general theory of consciousness, or mind.I've lost track of what we were disagreeing about, or whether we were disagreeing at all.
Those differences don’t preclude what I’m suggesting here. Yes there are many differences even between individuals in a family. But these differences are on the surface, the world of surfaces that we know. I’m implying there is a uniformity beneath the surface. If we look at biology we can start to see the uniformity. If we list the organs in the body we will find that they are present in most animals without exception. This is even more so when we look at internal cellular structure. Cells as we find them now have changed little in their essential structure for over a billion years.I don't think we are one "hive mind" at all―look at the great differences between cultures, and the polarizations within particular cultures.
I’m only suggesting this in viewing the one being (our biosphere as one being), as a whole, this being lives in a solipsistic world in it’s interactions with the neumenon of the world. All individual animals and plants are living in different aspects of that whole experience. It is solipsistic in the sense that it is an isolated arena, that of a planet in space (the sun does exert some influence).and I don't think we are locked in our own little solipsistic worlds.
Quite, but not just unconsciousness, but a common arena of activity. A common landscape, scale, temporal manifold. Take two people sitting in a restaurant eating pasta. They may have different hair clothes sauce on their food. But so much of what is going on is a shared experience and circumstance, one which may well require an underlying unity of being for it to happen.I even think it is possible that we share some kind of collective unconscious, as Jung suggested,
None of this precludes what I am proposing. It is a diversity within an isolated arena of activity.I see Nature as endlessly creative and diverse.
It’s a bit like the idea that a fish in a fish bowl doesn’t know that it’s suspended in water. It doesn’t notice the water, the way that we don’t notice air, unless it’s windy. The fish can’t comprehend what water is, perhaps we can’t comprehend something too.Because part of the problem with experience is that it’s so close to us that we don’t even see it. And it’s only in contemplative practice that you really have to deal with it.
I don’t think this is such a big issue (although it may be a stumbling block empirically), yes it’s true that there is no way of making a direct comparison between minds. But it may be the framing of the question that’s at fault. Rather like what J said.And how all things in that context seem to me may not be how they seem to you―even though there will likely be commonalities due to the fact that we are both human.
This is what I was talking about in the other thread, (Cosmos created mind), I am interested in developing ways to break out of this straight jacket. But I don’t have the philosophical language to ground it in digestible philosophy. It just comes across as fanciful wishful thinking.The problem with trying to model consciousness itself is that it is the thing doing the modeling, and we cannot "get outside of it", so we seem to be stuck with making inferences about what it might be from studying the brain being the best we can do, or going with what our intuitions "from inside" tell us about its nature.
Yes, but the physical constitutions themselves are parts of the structures of the things themselves. Even the mind, via the brain, as used in our day to day thinking is shaped, framed by these structures. Sooner, or later we have to start considering something that isn’t shaped in this way, in consciousness, but is nevertheless shaped by other as yet unrecognised structures. This is usually described as the soul, although I prefer to describe it as the higher mind.*I don't find it plausible that how they present to us is determined by consciousness, but I think it is more reasonable to think that it is determined by the physical constitutions of our sensory organs, nervous system and brain, as well as by the actual structures of the things themselves.
That’s not surprising because I’m in agreement with most of what physicalism says. I was narrowing down what part of existence we know. Existence as a whole and the mechanism of existence is not part of that. So to say;Nothing you've described is inconsistent with physicalism.
Is to conflate that bit which isn’t part of it with the existence we know. The bit of existence which we experience isn’t all of existence and isn’t foundational. This is self evident because we have limited capacities to experience and know things.-that mind is foundational to existence;
Yes, but I’m saying something broader than that. For example in a thought experiment I can say the Earth is a being, Gaia for Gaia the physical world might be like a thin protective layer in her skin, that she is barely aware of and her family is made up of other planets and stars. In conversation what to her is the equivalent of a word spoken in a minute might in our terms be a few million years of seismic events and most of her life is an experience of transcendent realities entirely inconceivable to us. Rather like comparing our lives to that of an individual cell in our bodies. The cell could not comprehend, or understand anything about our lives and yet we share consciousness and there is a germ of being that the cell feels, which we and Gaia also feel in some way.This is a mereological issue. Just because objects are reducible to particles doesn't imply they are not actual, functional entities in the world. By "functional", I mean that they can be analyzed in terms of their interactions with other functional entities.
(I’m not speaking for Wayfarer, rather saying it how I see it.)I can't imagine why you would think physicalists necessarily have to deny the subjectivity associated with being human. But it's irrelevant, because you still have provided no justification for the ontological claims I highlighted:
-that mind is foundational to existence;
- that the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.
You speak a lot of sense.For me, all we are, all we do, all we know, is derived from our interactivity with the rest of the world. I suspect there's a lot we don't know about the universe, though, and that interaction may include aspects of which we're not yet aware.
What I’m getting at here is that by examining feasible possibilities, one can see the orthodox explanations in a different light. This helps to develop a broader context and develop ways of thinking outside of the orthodox paradigm. Add into the mix the extent of what we don’t know, then one can in a sense break free of the orthodox. This is how mysticism makes use of philosophy.My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning.
But there’s no reason to assume that it isn’t the case either. It’s a possibility, so having an understanding of what we don’t know helps us to not make assumptions, or broad brush conclusions about the world and existence. I’m not accusing you or any (with one or two exceptions maybe) of the posters here of doing this. As philosophers you are open minded about these ideas.But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.
Epistemic humility.It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?
Yes, but I was treating all minds on Earth as one group. I was asking about minds elsewhere.Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.
You see yourself standing, walking, listening and talking in the world, don’t you? So surely you can also see yourself not knowing much in the world too?I was not talking about the world. I was talking about me, and God. :)
I understand your parameters and approach to this question, which I agree with. However, what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance.I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.
I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:
Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind?
and not knowing much about the world you find yourself in.I can see me standing and walking, and hear me talking.
This is a pretty broad generalization when talking about a diverse population. I know indigenous people personally who would disagree with your statement, along with those who would agree.
Yes, I know. I was specifically referring to how they regard the ecosystem they live in, usually a forest.They also tend to engage in murderous cultural norms, sexual assault, xenophobia and plenty of other pretty ridiculous things.
Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve.What hole do you have in mind?
and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.
Yes, but we know it includes artificial things, so we will need to separate these out in some way. This is what philosophy is for presumably.That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.
Drinking the Kool aid again, I see.American presence there is the only deterrent Europe has ever had, and the only reason NATO stands any chance. The problem is you all have been taking advantage of the United States taxpayer for far too long without developing any way to defend yourselves.
Here’s the rub, it is the fall of man you are describing. When Adam and Eve left the garden of Eden, they were leaving their instinctive behaviours which had been shaped by evolution in their evolutionary niche. They had to develop new drives, motivations, goals to replace them. But what they didn’t realise is that those finely honed instincts and behaviours had been fined tuned for millions of years achieving a balance with their ecosystem and that it couldn’t easily be replaced. From that point on, humanity became destructive (this doesn’t include many indigenous societies who have learned to live in harmony with their ecosystem).Organisms, of which we are one, really, and, by that, I mean naturally, behave by evolved drives and conditioning. But for humans born into history (i.e., not prehistoric humans) our dialectical process--Mind/History--displaces our natures. We are born as a species, our drives are to bond and mate and survive together. Good and evil have no place. Mind displaces that with laws, the manifestation of those processes. And because yet another mechanism of that process is difference, not that but this, good and evil are inevitable; but not as a result of our natures.
The White man is the savage and the Indian is morally superior. The White man has subverted the truth, twisted it around and inflated his ego. While all he’s doing is ruthlessly exploiting and destroying nature for his own selfish ends.Why is the savage the better spiritual human being than the White man who comes with a gun and believes he is morally superior, and he needs to teach the savage about being saved and being moral? Is this justice of a god? Strange.
This might need tidying up a bit. You might have left a big hole there for other things to sneak in.and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.
Not a lot.If you say something is 'natural', what have you said about it?
Yes, I agree with your premise, but there are tendencies in our natures which appear to be there from birth for certain people to be disrupters, a tendency for psychopathy, sociopathy etc.While I do not dispute your points, I should clarify. As we inevitably have violence in our conditioning, the violence is not in our natures. Killing for food or territory, though evident in nature, is not the same as war, or murder. We cannot say lion's are murderous or evil. We alone have transcended nature
For me, nothing can fill that gap. No one will he able to give a characterization of the intrinsic stuff talked about in the Chalmers' quote of my previous post. And this is just the nature of how descriptions and explanations work in an information processing system like a brain, imo. There are inherent limitations such as described by the munchausen trilemma.
Yes, but we can’t go past “seems” here. This is an example of human thought coming up with what seems to make sense. We might be mistaken, or viewing the issue through some kind of prism (metaphorically).If what it is like to be something can be taken as a directly aquainted example of irreducible ontology, then it seems ontologies strongly emerge macroscopically.
Yes, it suggests that there is more to it, wherein the raw experience and the presence of being in that experience is always the primary objective in animal evolution and behaviour. Just how the body achieves this might be more complicated, or novel, than we might at first imagine.An issue is that if all our conscious behavior can in principle be simulated and reproduced from models of functioning brains, this emergent ontology seems not only epiphenomenal but also disconnected from our own reports about our own experience which would be due to the brains - this seems incoherent.
Yes, but that is admittedly a partial view. We should remember that we only have a partial understanding of our world, how it is produced, sustained and why it is here and why we are here. We are really in the dark on all these questions.For me, the most logical explanation is that any strong emergence is an illusion (and there is no scientific evidence for it anyway) and we actually have no intuitive, coherent sense of the fundamental "intrinsic" ontology of the universe, partly because of limits on how any intelligent system can work.
I would suggest a bit of lateral thinking, as a tonic.When I think about this stuff, it always invokes the imagery of the strange loop and munchausen trilemma that really be escaped from.
Yes, that is interesting and monism is being tossed around a bit in there. I don’t see the appeal in going too deep into these analyses. The people doing it are trying to find out something new and this is how they do it. I do similar things in mystical practice, it’s deep complicated and usually doesn’t produce much in the way of results. But it’s also a way of trying to find out something new.The closest kind of fundamental "intrinsic" ontology I would pick would actually probably be something like informational (e.g. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33286288/), but I don't even actually know what that actually really means; the generality of the concept is appealing, that is all.
