I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken. — Dan

We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient.

Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy. — Dan

The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general?

My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices.

This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone. — Dan

This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan.

Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. — Dan

You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do.

But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles.

I see what you mean. Your explanation shows the argument to be invalid though, because it puts a second instance of the same fallacy, in the second part. And that fallacy is required to carry out the procedure.

I'm not sure why the inversion fallacy is considered a separate fallacy from the fallacy of denying the antecedent. It only seems to differ in the assumption that if "If P, then Q" is true that therefore "if not P, then not Q" must also be true. But you get there if you analyse it as denying the antecedent as well. — Benkei

I think it actually is the same, just different names for the same problem.

The quote I took from Wikipedia concerns what happens when the problem is carried into inductive premises which are naturally probabilistic. It throws a skeptic's curveball at the problem, by making the relation not "necessary" in either direction, because there is not the required relation between the two, in either direction. I think that's what says. In reality, there is no necessary relation between God's existence and prayers being answered, in either direction, because "fate" might answer the prayers, instead of God, and God could choose not to answer prayers. That's where freedom of choice throws the curveball at cause/effect relations.

If not P, then not Q (if R, then S)
Q equals if R, then S
Not R
Therefore, not S
Therefore, Q (through double negation)
Therefore, P

But not "R" therefore not "S" is denying the antecedent in the secondary argument "if I pray, then my prayers will be answered". So this is still invalid if you ask me. — Benkei

Thank you, that's a very nice, clear explanation as to why it is a case of "denying the antecedent", sometimes called an inversion fallacy. The issue is that the assumed necessary relation does not carry in both directions, and this is very significant in cases of cause/effect. We see that A causes B and we establish the necessary relation "if A then B", assuming A does not have freedom of choice in the matter. But we might be fooled if we do not allow that B could be caused by something else, therefore to prevent that possibility of being misled by the inversion, we cannot say if B then A.

So the issue here is that there is an assumed causal relation between God and prayers being answered, such that God causes prayers to be answered, The necessary relation is that God is the cause of prayers being answered, if G then PA. Where the fallacy lies, is in the assumption that this can be turned around, to say that if prayers are answered, then God must exist. We must maintain the possibility that the effect could have another cause. So the fallacy inheres within the claim "if God does not exist my prayers will not be answered". That primary premise, as an inversion of "God is the cause of prayers being answered", already has within it, the fallacy. According to the nature of cause/effect relations we must maintain the possibility that the effect can occur without the known cause.

The myth is concerned with decision making and I think the big issue is the relation between possibility and necessity, and the role of each in the art of decision making. Each soul is free to decide its own destiny by choosing the life which it wants, from the vast multitude of possibilities. However, the drawing of the lots is the necessity which forces the decision.

The premise states a conditional concerning "if God does not exist". We cannot proceed logically, from that premise to make any conclusions about what would be the case "if God does exist". Such a conclusion would be an "inverse fallacy".

Here's Wikipedia:
"Confusion of the inverse, also called the conditional probability fallacy or the inverse fallacy, is a logical fallacy whereupon a conditional probability is equated with its inverse; that is, given two events A and B, the probability of A happening given that B has happened is assumed to be about the same as the probability of B given A, when there is actually no evidence for this assumption."

In other words, once you understand the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, in this type of conditional, as a relation of probability, you will see the argument in a completely different way. The relation between "if God does not exist", and "my prayers will not be answered" is a relation of probability.

I am going to be slow to respond to the other parts of the Er story because I am a slow reader. — Paine

You might notice the basic principle of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean at 619a:

"And we must always know how to choose the mean in such lives and how to avoid either of the extremes, as far as possible, both in this life and in all those beyond it. This is the way that a human being becomes happiest."

This section deals with the art of decision making. And, it's interesting that those who have had a good life are portrayed as being bad decision makers because they are rash in thinking that they already know what's best, but those who have had to suffer take their time to deliberate, grasping the importance of avoiding a repeat of suffering.

Sorry, sloppy mistake, or a strange sort of typo, in my last post. The question was meant to be, how do you proceed from the premise "if God does not exist..." to "therefore God exists" without an inversion fallacy?

If God does not exist, then it is false that if I pray, then my prayers will be answered. So I do not pray. — Banno

How do you conclude "God exists" from this? Since the premise is "If God exists..", doesn't the conclusion of "God exists" involve an inversion fallacy?

The myth is excellent for bringing out the juxtaposition of necessity and possibility, and ultimately how this relates to choice or selection. The assumption is that there is always some sort of necessity behind every act of selection, but the necessity is often veiled so that the selection appears as chance. This is the hidden nature of intention, and Plato's assumption that what appears to be random chance, is really guided by an underlying, unveiled necessity. That is the principle employed by the fixed lottery proposed as the selection lottery for breeding, and the use of the noble lie. Selection appears like random chance, an idea propagated by the lie, but only to those who are not privy to the reality of the underlying necessity.

Now, apply these principles to Darwinian natural selection as juxtaposed with Darwinian artificial selection in husbandry, and go have some fun.

Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible). — Dan

OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events.

I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). — Dan

I would not make the distinction in this way. What I described earlier, is a difference between choosing and acting. I would say that "free will" involves choosing freely, and "freedom" involves acting freely. Notice that this distinction is necessary to account for the reality of cases where people choose to do something, and it ends up that they cannot do it, or they fail for some reason. So for example, if I choose to steal your car, that's a freely made choice, of my own free will, but if you shoot me, or if I'm arrested, then obviously I did not have the freedom to carry out that act.

Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). — Dan

This seems to be similar, to what I said, but I think you really need the distinction between choosing and acting. We need to recognize that distinction because choices are made within one's mind, and the factors which restrict one's choice, lack of education, inattention, rashness, desires, and all sorts of emotional things, are completely different from the factors which restrict ones actions. The things which restrict ones actions are those things which are expressed by the laws of the physical world, the activities in that world.

Because of this difference, one can choose all sorts of fantasy things, which might never come true. So there is often an inconsistency between what one chooses and what one actually receives from the world. But this facet of free choice is very important to theoretical thinking, like pure mathematics, and the creation of scientific hypotheses. The physical world is full of things which appear to us as restrictive, but our ability to transcend all those restrictions, with our minds, allows us to dream up ways around the apparent restrictions. That is the essence of problem solving. This ability to "dream" is what lifts us beyond things which appear to us as physical restrictions to our freedom, but which we may ultimately find a way around because the free will of our minds, to choose, is not restricted by those "apparent" restrictions. Here we have technology.

When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is. — Dan

I believe this distinction between "free will", which which refers to the capacity of the mind to understand and choose, and "freedom", which refers to the capacity of the human being to act in the world, is very important to maintain in moral philosophy. Once we clearly define this boundary, we see that "freedom" is inherently restricted in many ways which "free will" is not. And since in moral philosophy we must start from the most base level of restriction, the restrictions to free will, as restrictions to the mind's capacity to understand and choose, we need to start with those things I've mentioned, education, deception, and even genetic disposition which is a form of restriction more base than learning.

The most base restrictions are the strongest and most influential restrictions. After this, we can move to the higher levels of restrictions, the restrictions to our freedom. And, the reason for maintaining a distinction between the two, is to allow for interactive relations between them, as a true model needs this separation to allow for reciprocation. These interactive relations are well exemplified by the process known as "trial and error". The mind comes up with an idea (a choice) and has to try it out in the physical world. In science, this is experimentation. Notice how this is representative of different types of free will choices, ones which are based in untried and very uncertain speculations, and ones which are based in proven and very certain principles.

Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably. — Dan

The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another.

However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way.

Therefore you propose that "force" has a different meaning. This is a type of meaning which allows that a freely willed choice can actually be caused, "forced", by another person. But it's really nothing but contradiction. The free agent's choice is not caused, and cannot be caused. That's what being a free agent means. The proposed use of the word "force" is to signify a cause, which does not qualify as a "cause" because that would negate "free agent". So the word "force" is used instead of "cause", because if you said that a person could cause another person to do something, the contradiction between this and the principles of libertarian free will would be blatant.

This I believe is the most significant problem you've shown to me, in your principles, the above inconsistency. You dismiss all sorts of communications, teaching, deceiving, etc., as not able to have any causal effect on another's choices, because people have "libertarian free will", which means that their choices are not caused. However, then you allow that one person can "force" another to do something. But this proposed type of "force" is nothing other than persuading or coercing through teaching or deceiving, and it's really just an instance of communicating with another.

The glaring problem is that you deny the moral relevance of all sorts of communicative activities, saying that the agent is free, and these activities are not causal. Then, you cannot help but notice the reality that communicative activities really obtain the highest level of moral relevance, so you give this a special name "force someone", and separate it off, as completely distinct. Then you argue as if there is no similarity, no continuity between them, not allowing for some sort of scale of degrees of difference, between teaching, deceiving, and "forcing", all being activities of the same category. This is because of that above mentioned inconsistency. You really want "forcing" to qualify as "causing", and the others not to qualify as "causing". But "causing" cannot be provided for by libertarian free will, so you give it a different name, "forcing", and you speak as if it is something in a completely different category, when really it's nothing other than a matter of influencing a person through the means of communication.

I understand that there are many specific notions and fictions tied together in different books of the Republic. And yes, it does lead to confusion. — Amity

I believe, that it is this way of looking at things which is what leads to confusion. Instead of looking at the work as one united fiction, parts tied together in unity, building a cohesive conception, you are looking at a number of different fictions, which are somehow, supposed to be tied together.

This way of looking, which you describe, removes each section from the context of the whole, understands that section on its own, then attempts to establish a relation between it and other sections. Since the separated section cannot be adequately understood on its own, out of context, it is misunderstood. Then the attempt to relate it to other sections is very confusing, filled with the appearance of incoherency and contradiction between the distinct sections, due to that misunderstanding of the sections.

The proper way to understand a work of philosophy like this, is to take the whole as that which gives context, and then understand each section according to the context it is in. This will assist greatly in preventing you from giving a faulty interpretation to an individual section, i.e. an interpretation which does fit with the rest of the whole. That type of faulty interpretation is a great cause of confusion.

Please point me to where it tells of the 'selection process' in this fiction.
The males don't go through the travails of repeated pregnancies. — Amity

In Bk 5, the males are subjected to a false (fixed) lottery to determine who gets to breed. The true selection process is not revealed by the rulers. The males go through the travails of repeatedly losing the lottery.

Pregnancy is a fact of nature, which is irrelevant here. Since Plato was strongly into eugenics, I'm sure that if he could have conceived of a way to have laboratory babies instead of having women pregnant, he would have jumped on that opportunity.

At this point, I think the class system as imagined by Plato is a fiction within a fiction tied up in a bow of confusion and contradiction. — Amity

The entire proposal is imaginary, that's pretty clear. To say that one particular aspect is a fiction within a fiction is not really meaningful. You are just isolating it as a separate part of the overall fiction. It's generally not very helpful to attempt to completely separate aspects of a conception like this, because the various aspects tie together, and rely on each other for meaning. Analyzing a specific aspect, in isolation, usually will lead to confusion, because the ties, associations, required to develop the intended meaning are dropped.

Given that one of the roles of women is to have sex with select males on a temporary basis, it's clear that they are seen as baby producers. — Amity

If you consider the selection process, you'll see that the men are selected as "baby producers" just as much as the women are. This selection process is known by us as eugenics. In agriculture it is a very important part of what is called husbandry. Notice, Plato compares the guardians to dogs, and makes an analogy with the breeding of dogs. Advances in science have brought us into a new realm of husbandry known as GM.

I am not convinced that many women of wisdom would be happy or healthy in such a state. — Amity

Health ought not be a problem. There is nothing to indicate that a person would be less healthy in Plato's type of state. In fact, Plato describes the means to physical health through gymnastics, and mental health through music. And happiness, in relation to the breeding program, is ensured by the "noble lie".

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe. — Dan

I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like. — Dan

Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will.

First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things. — Dan

So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large.

I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom. — Dan

You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe."

Now, when we analyzed your example, of when a person uses "force" on another, by locking one in a room, there is no significant difference between the restrictions applied by the forces of the universe, and the restrictions applied when someone is locked in a room. In each case, the restrictions are the same, and it is generally insignificant that in one case the force is intentional imposed.

Now that we seem to agree (somewhat) about the nature of restrictions, and "force", we might be able to go back and start from the principal restriction I mentioned, that of the passing of time, and the nature of the past. Do you think so? I'll wait until I see how you define "free will", and "free agent". This might give me an idea of how you understand "free". Your ideas seem totally foreign to me.

At what cost are they regarded as equal? What are the criteria? Temporary sexual relations to perpetuate the guardian class. Children to be cared for, communally. Equality is based on abstract political principles. — Amity

The guardian class is the middle class. Philosophers are the ruling class. Do you think that the ruling class is supposed to be male only?

Unlike the poetry that Socrates criticizes, the purpose of the story of Er is not to bring pleasure to the listener. (607c) It may bring hope to some, but fear to others. It may not be the truth of what happens in death but it could be considered leading rather than misleading, for:

What’s at stake is becoming good or bad, and so we should not neglect justice, and excellence in general (608b) — Fooloso4

Or, as mentioned above, it may be typical Platonic irony, taken to the extreme, the boundary of hypocrisy.

Found the reference to Homer's muse, a little later, but alas it's the "pleasure-giving Muse" (607a-c), not the "true Muse -- that of discussion and philosophy" (548b).

Not question-begging at all.

Carry on. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's an important point. Plato was not advocating an all out ban on the creative arts. Music actually plays a very important role in his proposed state. But the reason it plays a very important role is that it has a certain power over the soul. This type of power can do both, culture good character, or corrupt character. That is simply the nature of "power". As is explained earlier in the book, the person with the capacity to do the most good, has also the capacity to do the most harm. The "power" in and of itself is neither good nor evil, it is how it is used which is good or evil.

Plato grasps the power of the creative arts, and understands that art can have a good influence or a bad influence over the culturing of human disposition. The problem is, that due to the nature of human intention, and free will, the specifics of this type of influence are very hard to get a handle on. So Plato approaches with a very general attitude, starting with the very broad principle, that all imitative type art, which is presented by the artist in a way that makes it appear like it is telling a true story, in the mode of narrative, ought to be banned, because it is actually not telling a true story. That's why Plato deemed it deceptive, it appears to be representing truth when it is not.

However, Plato is very heavy handed in his use of irony. You'll notice that right after he gets finished explaining how this type of art needs to be banned outright, he proceeds into telling such a myth, to end the book. There's irony all through Plato's work, and much of it is quite humorous to the prepared sense of humour. But this particular example is probably better described as hypocrisy, the division between irony and hypocrisy being the seriousness of the intended message.

At the end, 621c, Socrates says, "But if we are persuaded by me, we'll believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and every good, and we'll always hold to the upward path, practising justice with reason in every way." If the myth presented is meant in seriousness to be believed as "the truth", if Socrates is actually intending to persuade anyone with that story, then Plato is practising what he say's ought to be banned (that's hypocrisy). But if it is presented as obviously false, a humorous presentation of irony, Socrates knowing that he's not going to persuade anyone with that story, therefore it's not meant as an imitation or narrative of any real occurrence, then that story is simply presented as an ironic way of exemplifying what he is talking about. Which is it, irony or hypocrisy? Could it be both?

But this is just denying that divine inspiration is a thing. It was already clear what your view on the matter is.

And maybe it's Plato's too. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I was trying to clarify Plato's argument. If you don't agree with it, maybe you could provide an argument for the other side, attempt to refute Plato or something.

But it's not the Forms that would matter here, but the Muses. And he doesn't seem to mention them. Maybe I overlooked it.

But as near as I can tell no one is bothering to present an actual argument against the efficacy of the Muses in the production of Homer's poetry.

Your incredulity is not an argument. — Srap Tasmaner

I've explained the argument. It's you who has not provided a counter argument. I suggest you go back and read what I wrote. But here's the gist of it:

Now, to understand how this relates to good and bad, and Homer's representation of the divine, we are guided to take the analogy one step further. So, consider the following. The carpenter makes a physical bed. This physical bed is a copy of the carpenter's idea (form) of a bed. The carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the ideal bed, the divine Form of bed or best bed. The carpenter attempts to produce the ideal form of bed. Notice how the carpenter's material bed suffers the same problem of "imitation" that the painter's bed suffered. Rather than being based on the divine Form of bed itself, it is based on the carpenter's representation of what he believes is the divine Form. So it's an imitation produced from a perspective, and therefore lacking in truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't. — Dan

That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic.

A free agent is one that has free will — Dan

This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means.

Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. — Dan

Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.

And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free".

I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room. — Dan

The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense.

And if the poet is inspired? — Srap Tasmaner

Being "inspired" does not equate with being able to represent the divine. The principal force of Plato's criticism of Homer is related to how Homer represents the divine. He uses the argument concerning "imitation" to attack Homer's credibility on the subject of the divine.

Are these two claims the same:

(1) The poet expresses his ideas about the divine.
(2) The divine expresses itself through the medium of the poet's ideas. — Srap Tasmaner

No, clearly these two are very different. In (1) the poet is the active agent. In (2) the divine is the active agent. The improper assigning of "activity" is what Plato demonstrates to be the deficiency of the theory of participation. By the theory of participation, beautiful things partake in the Idea of Beauty. Notice, the beautiful things are active in partaking, and the Idea is passively partaken off.

So Plato grasped a very difficult problem, which was the question of how forms, or ideas, could be causally active in the creative process. In modern days we have a simple representation of this problem, known as the interaction problem. Plato introduced the idea of "the good" as a causal principle, and Aristotle provided the term "final cause", defined as "that for the sake of which". This is provided as the means toward understanding how ideas are active in the creative arts.

But what if it is not the poet reaching out toward the divine ("Ah, but a man's reach must exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"), but the divine taking hold of the poet? — Srap Tasmaner

The whole point is that this, "the divine taking hold of the poet", is the false representation which Plato wants to rid us of. What Plato points out is that the human mind is a medium between the divine and the poetry produced by the human being. That's the point of the three layers. Further, the human mind provides only one perspective, and therefore truth is lacking. And instead of being guided by "the truth", the human perspective is guided by "the good". This renders the human being, with one's own free willing mind, as the agent in the creative act, the good is the object aimed for. So the claim that "God has taken a hold of me" and makes me do such and such (He came to me as a burning bush, and gave me this tablet of ten commandments, for example), is the deceptive claim. Would you accept "the devil made me do it" as an excuse for acting poorly? Why would you accept "God made me do it" as an explanation for the quality of one's poetry? The human being is a medium, an agent with free will, and is really speaking one's own opinions about the divine. The divine is not appearing to others, through the medium, no matter how the divine appears to the medium.

He viewed it as a critical part of Plato's philosophical argument, particularly regarding the relationship between reality, imitation, and the nature of truth. — Benkei

I agree with this. What Plato's describes here is the logical procedure toward the separation between human ideas, and the separate or divine Forms, which Aristotle and Aquinas followed up on, to a much more significant degree. This is the means by which traditional "Platonism" or Pythagorean idealism is dispelled. The principal issue is the deficiency of the human mind, in its attempts to grasp "the ideal", as the best, most perfect, divine ideas. The human mind naturally comes up short, and this creates a separation between human ideas, and the divine, perfect, ideal "Truth".

The separation extends throughout all of humanity's mental enterprises, from the most vague ideas about beauty, good, and just, to the most precise ideas about numbers and logic. The cold hard reality is that the human mind cannot produce perfection in any of its conceptions, therefore there is always a separation between human ideas, and any supposed "independent Forms" such that Platonism, which holds human ideas to that high esteem, is necessarily incorrect. This separation, through its development by Aristotle and the cosmological argument, is fundamental to Thomism.

Again, to be a free agent is to have free will, even if your freedom is restricted. — Dan

OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.

I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant.

If someone has locked you in a room, that is not a restriction inherent within you. — Dan

That's a good example. What you signify is that something has happened to the person, "someone has locked you in a room". This past act has created a describable situation now, the person is locked in a room. No one can change the past, so as much as "you" dislike the situation you are in, you cannot change it. The restriction is a feature of time.

However, going forward in time, such restrictions can be dealt with. "You" can pull out your phone and call someone. "You" can look around the room for a tool to get you out. "You" can look at leaving through a window. "You" can try to kick a hole through the door, or wall. These are all possibilities, choices which the person who is locked in the room might consider, and many others depending on the particulars of the situation.

Now, notice that all the choices reference the future. They all concern what the person might do in the future. Also, notice that in this specific example, what is indicated is a desire to be rid of a particular restriction. That is a key point in relation to freedom, as much as we premise that the agent is not free, (is restricted), there is a desire for freedom. This desire is reflected in the agent's intentions. So, having a desire for freedom, the agent makes choices from a multitude of future possibilities, with the intention of ridding oneself of various restrictions, in the quest for freedom.

The other significant point is that most thoughts about the past, "I wish I hadn't done this or that", "I wish so and so hadn't done this or that, are completely useless in relation to this desire for freedom. This is not to say that they are all useless, because a few select ones are extremely useful. These are the ones that indicate something important about how the restrictions were applied to the restricted person. Therefore another selection process is required from the agent. From one's past experience, memories etc., the agent must select from a vast multitude, a very few select thoughts which are applicable to the present situation, and the quest for freedom.

That is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you. — Dan

This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom.

Socrates makes a three-fold distinction:

1) Beds and tables as they are by their nature, the singular forms.
2) Beds and tables as they are made by the craftsman with an eye to the form
3) Beds and tables as they are made by a maker of images, whose model is the beds and tables made by the craftsman. — Fooloso4

I believe the best representation of this three-fold distinction is like this.

The basic example consists of three beds, one made by God, one made by a carpenter, and the third being a painting of one made by the carpenter. You can see how the third is an imitation, and not even a real bed. So artists, poets, and playwriters who imitate (sometimes translated as narrate) like this are frowned upon, for producing something less than real. The point is that there are different perspectives, and the artist's imitation is from a perspective, therefore lacking in truth, and inherently deceptive.


Now, to understand how this relates to good and bad, and Homer's representation of the divine, we are guided to take the analogy one step further. So, consider the following. The carpenter makes a physical bed. This physical bed is a copy of the carpenter's idea (form) of a bed. The carpenter's idea of a bed is itself a representation of the ideal bed, the divine Form of bed or best bed. The carpenter attempts to produce the ideal form of bed. Notice how the carpenter's material bed suffers the same problem of "imitation" that the painter's bed suffered. Rather than being based on the divine Form of bed itself, it is based on the carpenter's representation of what he believes is the divine Form. So it's an imitation produced from a perspective, and therefore lacking in truth.

This is how we are instructed to look at Homer's representation of good, bad, and the divine, as opinion. There are three levels, the divine, the poet's ideas of the divine, and the poetry. We are inclined to believe that the poetry is a representation of the divine. But this leaves out the very important medium, which is the poet's own ideas of the divine. So the poetry really only represents the divine through the medium, which is the poet's ideas.

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.
11 hours ago — Dan

When someone forces someone to do something, they are using the physical forces of the universe to their advantage. So from the perspective of the person who is said to be forced, the two are the same in principle. In the first case, the person being forced by physical forces has to understand and deal simply with those forces of the universe. In the other case, the person has to deal with the forces of the universe being directed by another's intent. This makes the latter type of force more complex, therefore more difficult to understand and deal with, because intention is an integral part of it and intention is difficult to understand.

This is why I say that you need to look closely at the relationship between the free agent, and force, to understand that force cannot actually restrict the free agent. And this is regardless of the type of force. So if the free agent is restricted, this is a feature of the agent itself, making it not truly free. And this feature creates challenges for the agent in dealing with forces (that includes all types of forces, including physical and the intent of another). It is not the case that a specific type of force restricts the agent, it is the case that the agent has restrictions inherent within (making it less than free), which renders it vulnerable to specific types of forces.

But if this is the case, then we must drop the premise that the agent is free, and adopt the premise that it is inherently restricted. Then we would need to analyze the nature of the agent to see what sort of restrictions inhere within.

In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. — Dan

That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good.

No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does. — Dan

Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".

Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom.

What I suggest, is that if you look closely at the relationship between force and freedom, you will first see the inherent contradiction, (which I referred to earlier), inhering within the idea that force restricts freedom. "Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free. Therefore, if our primary premise is that the agent is free, we need to assign freedom to the agent, and then develop the relationship between the agent and forces from this premise.

That the agent is free implies that it is impossible that forces restrict the agent, because this would contradict the agent's freedom. Therefore we must conclude that the free agent's response to forces, (which create the appearance that the agent is being restricted by the forces), are really free choices made by the agent, decisions made as to how deal with the forces.

See how the contradiction is resolved? The agent remains free. Forces surround the free agent. The agent responds to the forces freely. The free response of the agent to a force creates the appearance that the agent is being restricted by that force. This is the first lesson from Plato's cave allegory, to learn how to distinguish appearance from reality. The sensible world which we observe is the realm of appearance. We need to look into the mind to access the real.

I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. — Dan

Final cause is defined by Aristotle as that for the sake of which. The example given is that health is the final cause of the man walking. Why is he walking? To be healthy. The reason he is walking is to be healthy, he is walking for the sake of his health. That really seems like "intention" to me. It's what Plato called "the good".

It seems we're very far apart as to what moral philosophy is. I think its principal function is to teach, you think it's principal function is to learn. I suppose it must involve both, because learning is necessary for teaching, but until you recognize the importance of teaching, there's not much for us to discuss.

In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher escapes the cave out into the sunlight, and recognizes the sun. The sun is analogous with "the good", as that which makes visible objects visible, in the same way that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible. After seeing the light, the philosopher does not just sit around and bask in its glow, he must return to the cave, and teach the others what has been revealed to him. That, I believe is the position of moral philosophy.

I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does. — Dan

The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere.

I think the principle of plenitude actually is important to Aquinas' version of the cosmological argument. Basically, if all existence is contingent existence (coming into being from a prior possibility), then it would be possible that there was a time with no existence. By the principle of plenitude, an endless amount of time prior to now would necessitate that there was a time prior to now when there was nothing. But if there was ever nothing, nothing could ever have come from that, so there would still be nothing. However there is something now. Therefore not all existence is contingent existence, and necessary existence is real.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood. — Paine

I didn't see any need to comment on the Aquinas quote. He was explaining what you and I both agreed upon, that Aristotle said we understand the meaning of actuality in its relation to potentiality. The aspect of the passage from Aristotle which I was interested in, what I would call the content, or substance of that chapter, was the distinction between the two different senses of "actual". This is what I said is the key to resolving the problem you indicated earlier here:

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

I replied, that the way to resolve this issue is to understand that Aristotle distinguishes two senses of "form". "Form" is understood as "actual", and in Ch 6, Bk 9, Aristotle is clearly distinguishing two distinct senses of "actual". Understanding this is the way toward resolving the problem which you quoted from SEP.

The passage in question is not claiming that result. — Paine

That's right, as I said, after finishing that chapter, with the clear conclusion and distinction made between "movement" and "actuality", as the two types, "movement" being related to the type of potential known as "potency", and "actuality" being related to the type of potential known as matter, he proceeds from that conclusion. So the result which you refer to follows later in Bk 9, when he demonstrates that actual is prior to potential in an absolute sense.

There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. — Dan

We can take this as a true proposition, that the consequences of our actions are caused by our actions, and apply it as the foundation for a moral philosophy, but that would produce an inadequate moral philosophy. This is because of the gap between efficient cause and final cause, which I've been referring to.

There are causes of freely willed actions, which are "not wholly caused by preceding factors". We understand these causes as intentions, or in the classical terms, "final cause". Since these causes, final causes, are the principal causes, the most significant causes, of a freely willed act, they are the subject of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy seeks to induce good actions, therefore the subject matter of moral philosophy, is the cause of those freely willed actions, which we know of as intentions, or final cause.

In your portrayal of consequentialism, you describe the consequences of an action as the subject of moral philosophy. From an examination of the consequences, one can make a judgement as to whether or not the act was good. Notice that this is a judgement of something which has occurred, in the past, a fact, what "actually is". From this perspective, there is nothing to induce us, persuade us, or even force us, to do what is good. It simply provides the means by which we can judge actions as good or bad. Because of this, it is not a moral philosophy at all, it is more like a science of morality. There are theories concerning what constitutes good and bad (such as your principle of protecting one's own choices), and there are principles provided, by which actions can be judged according to consequences, but there is nothing to incline or inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good. To incline and inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good, is the goal of moral philosophy.

This is why consequentialism is not a moral philosophy. It offers us no way to shape or form a person's disposition, one's character, attitude toward actions. And that is what defines moral philosophy, it's capacity to provide us with formative principles, upon which we educate human beings so that they are inclined to act in the way that we believe is proper. The difference between moral philosophy and consequentialism, is that the former has as its subject, intentions and final cause, while the latter has as its subject, the consequences of actions, and the efficient cause relation of the consequences to the actions.

Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc. — Dan

This is how the focus on efficient causation, which is taken for granted as the principal form of causation by consequentialism, completely misleads us into misunderstanding. Since the "necessity" which is required for a judgement of of "cause" by the concept of efficient causation, is not present in the case of final causation, due to the fact that the will is free, then we cannot allow final cause, or intention, to be a valid cause. This is an issue with the "scientific" approach to morality, as science focuses on efficient causation. On the other hand, moral philosophy apprehends intention or final cause as a valid form of causation, it seeks to understand this type of causation, and work with it to inspire goodness in humanity.

So for example, you state here, "you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information". In this statement, you simply exclude final cause as a real form of causation when you say "you can't really cause other people to...". However, when I have a specific goal, or intention in my mind, and I communicate this goal to you, so that you carry out the means to that end for me, (I may offer to compensate you, or we may just have a friendly relationship), then I have caused you to do something. That's plain and simple, if final cause is accepted as causation. However, restricting causation to efficient cause, and not allowing final cause as a real form of causation, induces you to say that this is not "really" a case of causing.

Now there is a serious hole in your moral philosophy, which I will call it "the abyss". Your scientific approach to morality has inclined you to exclude final cause as a real form of causation. However, your common sense, and intuition, allow you to temper your scientific approach with an appeal to "libertarian free will". Your real, lived experience, 'forces you' to accept the reality of freely willed choices. Now, your adherence to the idea that efficient cause is the only real type of causation, makes libertarian free will completely incomprehensible. People influence the choices of others all the time. However, this cannot be "causation" or else your idea of libertarian free will would be excluded. That reinforces the belief that all real causes are efficient causes. But it also renders a libertarian free will choice as nothing but random chance. You see, you have no way to account for the supposed "influence". Libertarian free will excludes the possibility of it being causation, and so it is morally irrelevant to you. A person still chooses freely, despite being "influenced", so the "influence" is not morally relevant.

The abyss is this "influence". The scientific approach denies that it is causation, because it's not efficient cause, and the libertarian free will approach endorses this scientific approach, by saying that it cannot be causation or else free will would be negated. But that renders the "influence" as completely unintelligible, and dismissed as irrelevant. It doesn't fit into the scientific approach of efficient causation and consequentialism, nor does it fit into the libertarian free will side of things. So it's discarded as not morally relevant, and dismissed, even though it is what moral philosophy considers as its subject. Therefore you loose the entire content of moral philosophy into this abyss you have created by rejecting final cause as a real form of causation. What's the point to your project, morality without content? Al the real content of moral philosophy has been rejected as not relevant.

Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. — Dan

If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way.

So the possibility of infinite universes is a 'tidier explanation' than a higher intelligence. — Wayfarer

The old principle of plenitude, to the rescue. Given enough universes, one's got to produce intelligence. Given enough monkeys with typewriters... Typewriters went out of style before a monkey could even produce a two syllable word. I imagine the same thing will happen to the multiverse.

OK, if I still have your attention Paine, I will continue.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. — Paine

Right, this is the point I was making, the different senses of potentiality. That is what had been pointed to in Ch 5. One sense is related to movement, the other sense is related to being.

Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present: — Paine

Now, in Ch 6, he proceeds to discuss the two principal senses of "actuality" which are related to those two senses of potentiality.

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so. — Paine

Of course it uses the the antithesis between actuality and potentiality, you and I always agreed on that. But the significant point, the importance, of the chapter is the two distinct senses of "actuality" which correspond with the two distinct senses of potentiality, in the relation of antithesis. What I said already is that he states that we must use this relation between potential and actual as the means for determining which sense of "actual" is being referred to by the word.

You seemed to be ignoring, or simply denying, the substance of Ch 6 which is the distinction between two separate senses of "actual". He is saying that since there are two distinct senses of potential, if we maintain the antithesis, there must be two distinct senses of actuality. This is the analogy, wherever the analysis of "potential" has led us (to two distinct senses), so we must follow with "actual", to maintain the antithesis.

So, according to my Ross translation, Ch 6 progresses in this way.
"...let us discuss actuality..." 1048a,26
"...we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move something else...but also use the word in another sense..." 1048a, 27-29
"Actuality ,then, is the existence of a thing not in the way that we express by 'potentially'". 1048a, 30
"Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis and potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually...for some are as movement to potency and others as substance to some sort of matter." 1048b, 4-8
"Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but are relative to an end...but that movement which the end is present is an action. ... At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. ... Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities." 1048b ,18-28
"The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement." 1048b, 34

The final statement above is how he closes out the chapter.

He has distinguished two principle senses of actual, corresponding by analogy to the two senses of potential distinguished earlier . One sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential which is known as potency, and this is movement, activity, and it exists relative to an end. The other sense of "actual" describes what exists relative to the type of potential known as matter. This is substance, "actuality", and it has the end within itself.

Notice, that in his conclusion, he has not only distinguished these two principal types of actuality, but he has even gone so far as to have given one of them a different name "movement". This allows him to proceed with clarity as to what kind of thing "actuality" is, having been separated from activity and movement. "Actual" describes what exists as substance in relation to the potential which is known as matter. We know have "actual" in the sense of being, as distinguished from motion (what we call "activity") in the sense of becoming.

After having distinguished "actual" from "movement" in this way, he proceed to question which is prior, "the actual" (substance), or "the potential" (matter). He concludes by the so-called cosmological argument that the actual must be prior to the potential, and since he has separated "actual" from "movement" in this way, it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement.

Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy. — Shawn

You misunderstand what Wittgenstein was saying. It is not the case that philosophy is in need of therapy, it is the case that philosophy is the therapy. Look at the quote from @Banno.

255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — Philosophical Investigations

See, the illness inheres within the general population, as a deficiency in the way that we think, and it is exemplified by the way that we use language, common usage. Philosophy is the therapy which is required to treat this ailment. That is why Wittgenstein engaged in philosophy, rather than simply accepting the mistaken ways of thinking which he noticed as abundant, and thereby becoming a part of the disease, he wanted to be a part of the cure, and act as a philosopher.

It is a fine line to distinguish the boundary between the cure and the disease, as Plato found out in trying to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. The therapy then, philosophy itself, is shown to be this activity of distinguishing the afflicted thinking. Apprehending the mode by which the illness is recognized, is the therapy, and this distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist. As Wittgenstein explains it involves understanding the role of "purpose", what Plato called "the good".

He says it’s Part 2, although part 1 doesn’t seem to be published yet. — Wayfarer

That's the trend, leave room for the prequel. Biologists should get themselves up to date with the modern trends, and instead of leading people toward believing in abiogenesis, they should leave an opening for the prequel, the prior agency.

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10: — Paine

Your interpretation of "sharply separates", when Aristotle is talking about the difference between a definition, and understanding by analogy, is a fabrication by you. Please, stay true to a respectable translation, rather than making up your own translation, to suit your purpose.

Your post makes no sense Paine. You seem to be completely confused as to what Aristotle is explaining in Bk 9 Ch 6. You start out by saying that Aristotle is talking about sharply separating different ways of understanding meaning, then you end the post by saying that he "yokes together the two senses".

What he is saying about the two senses of "actuality" discussed in Ch 6, is that they are different meanings for "actuality", and these meanings are explicitly separable. But the difference in meaning is not one understood by referring to two different definitions, rather it is understood through analogy. The "analogy" spoken about involves reference to the related senses of "potential".

Please, try reading the entire chapter, beginning to end, then decide whether you still disagree with me. The chapter is not long, and although it is somewhat difficult, so it needs to be read slowly, it's not extremely difficult

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is: — Paine

The point is, that in the chapter you quoted, Aristotle says we refer to analogy to understand the sense of "actual" which is implied in a particular instance of usage. We refer to analogy by determining what sense of "potential" is referred to in the usage. So sometimes "actual" is related to a potency, a power, and in this sense "actual" means active, or movement. But at other times "actual" is related to the potential of matter, and in this sense "actual" means what is substantial, what is real, or what exists.

Notice your quoted paragraph, from 1048b: "for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter" These are the two senses of "actual" which we distinguish by determining the related sense of potential (analogy).

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6. — Paine

No it is not the same pair of terms. He is not talking about "natural being" in the section we are discussing, he is talking about "actual", and its two distinct senses which we distinguish through the type of "potential" which is related in the particular instance of usage. The issue is whether "actual" means movement, or active, as when it is related to potency, or whether "actual" means real, existent, or substance, as when it is related to the potential of matter. These are the two distinct senses of "actual" which he is describing, and he says that we distinguish one from the other through the use of analogy

You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing. — Dan

I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,

What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will.

Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. — Dan

Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.

This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".

But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.

This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought".

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. — Dan

What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning.

I suggest you read more carefully. Ch. 5 discusses potency, then chapter 6, starts out with the following sentence:

"Since we have treated of the kind of potency which is related to movement, let us discuss actuality ---what, and what kind of thing, actuality is."

The issue in this chapter, is that there are different senses of "actual", and he wants to distinguish a special sense of "actual". So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". He wants to distinguish the special sense, which is what is meant when we say that something "actually exists", (or what is "actual"), from another sense which is "active", or "movement". This specific sense of "actual", as we say, "what is real", is what his analysis intends to bring out.

Your quoted paragraph refers to how we must relate "actual" to "potential", in order to determine what sense of "actual" is actually being used. At the end of that paragraph he makes the following statement:

Here is your quoted translation from Reeve:

"But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter."

Here is the translation of W. D. Ross:

"But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy---as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D, for some are as movement to potency, and others as substance to some sort of matter.

So we have two principal senses of "actual" being discussed, movement which is related to potency (understood as active), and substance which is related to matter (seemingly passive as 'being', but still "actual"). The chapter ends with an interesting distinction between "actuality" in the present tense, as being active, moving, and "actuality" in the past, as what has been is "actual" in the sense of real, but it is not currently active.

"But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call, an actuality, the former, a movement."

@Dan
My last post shows the two significant problems with your thesis, the faulty assumptions you work from.
1. You misrepresent "freedom".
2. You misrepresent "morality"

Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case. — Dan

You're working from a false assumption. It is not force which restricts freedom, it is impossibility which restricts freedom. We can find our way around force, and even use it to our advantage toward getting what we want. This is the case with our use of "energy". Force is power, which may be used to assist us with our freedom when we understand it properly. To portray "force" as that which restricts freedom is a mistaken conception which demonstrates the misunderstanding of "freedom" which you have, and I've been trying to help you to see, and to address.

I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". — Dan

You clearly have a "consequentialist bias". Your stated moral framework is consequentialism, and you refuse to think outside the box, closing your mind to the possibility that consequentialism is woefully inadequate as a moral philosophy. See below.

Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

We disagree because you present an ill-defined concept of making one's own choices. As I said you override the stated definition with principles which force the employment of subjective and arbitrary judgement. Naturally we disagree.

Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them. — Dan

This is more evidence of the consequentialist bias in your moral principles. It is not the act of providing false information which you judge as immoral, it only becomes immoral if it has observable consequences which are judged as immoral. This is the gap you create between final cause and efficient cause. Whenever a link between the teaching (misinformation), and the acts which follow, cannot be adequately established, so as to be able to decisively say that the person "convinces" someone else, then the teaching is judged as not morally relevant, due to an inability to establish the link between the teaching and the acting. This renders the majority of teaching (all that is not forcefully "convincing" another to make an act with bad consequences) as morally irrelevant. But in reality, teaching is the most morally relevant thing there is, and you simply turn a blind eye to this fact, refusing to accept the significance of ideology.

I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus. — Paine

I think we have to be very careful in what it means to say that Socrates held so and so in high esteem. Socrates was very respectful of all his interlocuters in Plato's dialogues. That was his mode of inquiry, show great respect for the individual philosopher, and great interest in his philosophy, so that the philosopher would explain and reveal as much as possible. Then after learning the information Socrates would address the weaknesses. So I think that if Socrates held Parmenides in high esteem in Theatetus, this doesn't really mean much relative to the question of whether Plato came to regard Parmenides as a sophist.

There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon. — Paine

That looks exactly as I said, we learn what "potential" means through its relations to "actual":

" what is building is in relation to what is capable of building"
"what is awake is in relation to what is asleep"
" what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight"
"what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter"
"what has been finished off is to the unfinished"
" some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential]"

Your translation says "analogy", I would prefer "comparison", to describe how Aristotle explains these relations which give meaning to words like "potential", and "actual", because "analogy" has slightly different connotations in modern usage.

Notice also, that your quoted paragraph, is from BK 9 Ch. 6, where he is discussing the word "actuality", after he has already discussed "potential" in the prior chapter. The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential".

It's easy to invert what Aristotle says, to suit one's purpose, because his writing is full of inversions. But in the big picture, to understand him clearly, it's better to adhere strictly to what he says, and not be swayed to create your own inversions. This will help to reveal inconsistencies like those in Book Lambda, which betray inauthenticity.

I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear. — Dan

I used that example, as an extreme, to bring to your attention the complexity of human interactions with "property" as the medium. If you dismiss the car stealing example, because the intent of the thief is to do something with the other's property, even though the thief is using one's own property (tools) to do this, then we also need to dismiss cases of purchasing, where on uses one's own property (money) with the intent of doing something with another's property (what is purchased).

"There are potentially some complicated cases" is a gross understatement. The reality is that the vast majority of human interactions are "complicated cases", making your simple principle "one's own choice", completely ineffective, and unsuitable for the task you assign to it, due to the subjectiven, and arbitrary principles which you are forced to apply in your judgements as to whether a choice fulfills the criteria of "one's own". In reality, you simply apply some preconceived ideas about morally good and bad, to make that judgement, even though you insist that it is not. Then, "protecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices" turns out to be nothing more than encouraging moral restraint, as I pointed out earlier.

Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case. — Dan

The point I am making is that we do not need to involve property or human bodies in these examples. We have three distinct items named, mind, body, and property. Without involving property, or body, we can discuss mind to mind relations, which occur through the medium of communication. These interactions consist primarily of one mind affecting another mind, and as such are morally relevant.

However, you dismiss these, and refuse to discuss them as morally relevant because (I assume), you cannot see and observe the consequences of these interactions (that is your consequentialist bias). The only observable part is the physical symbols (language) used in these intentional acts, and it is apprehended as innocuous. But these physical symbols are simply the tools by which the perpetrator carries out the intended act, just like the thief uses tools to steal the car. Therefore to be consistent you need to consider the intended consequences within the other's mind, in the case of communications, just like you consider the intended consequences to another's property, in the case of stealing the car. It is apparent, that since these consequences are unobservable, you dismiss them as not relevant.

It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice. — Dan

Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception.

f I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car? — Dan

This goes back to what I said at the beginning of the thread, which you seemed to have difficulty understanding. Every choice which an individual makes limits the person's future choices, by determining the person's current situation. So, if you offer to educate me, just like if you are a scammer and offer me something but it's really a scam, I can choose to proceed with you, or turn away. That choice is a reflection of my attitude toward future relations with you, and the choice hardens my position, one way or the other, thus limiting my future choices.

If I walk away, then you have not educated or scammed me. That is not the situation I am talking about though. I am talking about the situation when I do not walk away. After choosing to engage you, I have limited my own future choices accordingly. I can proceed with extreme caution, exercising principles of skepticism, or I can throw care to the wind and suck up everything you say. Again, this is an attitudinal choice which I must make, and most of us are inclined toward the principles described by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, following an intermediary path, not too skeptical, not to rash.

Now, my examples concern cases where you actually do educate me, or you actually do deceive me, so all those past choices, where you say that I could have walked away, and I limited my own freedom through my own choices, are irrelevant now, even though your approach had a great effect on this limiting. We are in the position where you have engaged me and I have chosen to listen.

It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept.

So, I don't see the distinction you are trying to make between my mind, and your car. In one case, the object of my intention is your property, your car. In the other case, the object of your intention is my mind, to educate it. In the former case, if you are worried about your property, you will go through extreme measures to protect it from my advances, and I will simply find another easy target. In the latter case, if I am extremely worried about false information, I will take extraordinary measures to resist all attempts by you to educate me, and you will end up leaving me alone. In principle the two are very similar.

Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help. — Dan

As I said, this principle you are trying to impose, "one's own choice" is not viable for the reason's I have described. In your attempt to make it viable you give preference to a person's property rights, "stuff", and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. When the effects of a person's acts are within another's mind (education, deception, etc.), these consequences cannot be observed, and so they are dismissed as not morally relevant (effectively, there are no consequences). Then, when the person who has been so affected (educated, deceived, brainwashed, etc.) acts in the world, the consequences of the person's acts are judged as the products of that person's choices, without respect for the "education" which that person underwent to get into that attitudinal head space.

You ought to be able to conclude that this is very problematic because it provides no bridge between "final cause", which is the product of one's wants, desires, ideologies, and other immaterial, "mental" principles, and "efficient cause", which is the results of one's actions in the world. The results of one's actions in the world (efficient cause) are judged as morally relevant. However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant.